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The Presidential Determination of...

**THE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF
"FULL FAITH COOPERATION"
BY VIETNAM ON POW/MIA MATTERS**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD

JUNE 19, 1996



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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1997

39-553

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THE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF "FULL FAITH COOPERATION" BY VIETNAM ON POW/MIA MATTERS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 19, 1996.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert K. Dornan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. DORNAN. The Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the National Security Committee will come to order.

We again welcome our panelists to try and shed more light on one of the most hurtful periods, not in just 208 years of American military history, not only just military history, but in all of our history, there has been no sadder problem.

The great western artist, Frederic Remington, has two important paintings. I think they hang in the Cowboy Museum at Tulsa, OK. One of them is simply called "Prisoner," and the other one is called "Missing in Action." Even in the 1800's, that term was used.

In the first picture a young cavalry officer, stripped to the waist, a rope around his neck, is being led behind the war ponies of one of the Plains native American tribes. I found out after I saw that painting in 1975 that there was a page in American history when even on this continent of North America American soldiers would disappear and never to be seen again, and to live a miserable existence, being periodically tortured, passed from tribe to tribe, tortured again, and then die alone somewhere in the cold outside of a tent, wondering why the strongest young Nation in this hemisphere couldn't effect a rescue.

The same fate befell a lot of Colonists, a lot of injustices on both sides, and I'm not making any judgment of that whole terrible period and what was done to the first people here, the native Americans.

But the other Frederic Remington painting, the one that says "Prisoner," shows a group of native American warriors around a campfire. It's severely cold. You can see some frost, and they're all huddled with blankets around them. And just outside the warmth of the fire is another American young cavalryman, prematurely bald, probably in his late twenties or early thirties, deliberately stripped to the waist, freezing in the cold, hands tied behind his back, has undergone torture and will be tortured again, and since

the rate of ever rescuing these captured Americans was almost nil, here was another young man, maybe born in Ireland or some other country, fought his way through the Civil War maybe, and here he is a sergeant in his thirties, knowing he's going to succumb to his torture some day, deliberately being kept in the cold outside the fire. And all it says under that is "Prisoner." That stuck in my mind as a young Air Force officer.

I'm going to make a statement here today, and I can't speak for my colleagues, Republican or Democrat, who will join me. But it is an incontrovertible, absolute fact of history, that we left American warriors behind in Korea. I specifically did not say Vietnam. In Korea, hundreds probably. I have been doing research to jog my memory, and my memory is as good as any man or woman who serves on this Hill, with possibly the only exception being Robert Byrd of West Virginia. As I read and do research, I remember reading all of this as a young enlisted man, an aviation cadet, and a young officer going through gunnery.

President Eisenhower said it, not once, not twice, but multiple times—most in classified sessions. He said it clearly. "Yes, we left men behind in Korea." He didn't say maybe, or probably. He said it. And before we start taking testimony, I'm going to suggest—and I hope it's not an arrogant suggestion—that if anybody works in the Defense missing persons office who can't accept that as an historical fact, that we left live Americans behind from that conflict—maybe in Russia, maybe in Manchuria, maybe in China, maybe some in North Korea itself—if they can't accept that, then they should, in all decency, as honorable persons, resign or transfer. Go get a job somewhere else, because otherwise, you're not going to be doing patriotic work. You're not going to be doing the Lord's work. You're going to fall in the trap of the mindset to debunk. You're going to have a hidden agenda. You're not going to be seeking truth. You're going to be looking for ways to say that a five-star general, who led the crusade across Europe and drove Hitler to suicide within only 3 years and 5 months, that General and President Eisenhower didn't know what he was talking about, that you know more than he did.

If you really believe that, if you can't come to the conclusion, using deductive reasoning and logic that yes, we left Americans behind in Korea, then get out of the job you're in. You don't belong there. You do a disservice to these families. That's the prelude to tracking what communists do everywhere in the world, and it should be the predicate to how we analyze Korea.

So, having said that—we've got a first vote, and I think there's going to be a few votes today—let me explain to the witnesses why I want them sworn in. It's because the families have asked me to do this, because family members who do not believe that anybody has ever been part of any type of a coverup but who question the Sherlock Holmes skills of what has gone on in this country on this missing issue within Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, they simply want people to be sworn in.

To tell you the truth, I love to be sworn in. I love to be sworn in. It doesn't offend me at all. It should be part of this Government. I have only had one witness here in my life that I ever saw resist this. His body language was terrible. It's not anybody who is here

now. I'm going to adopt the procedure from watching some of the Whitewater hearings that I had not done, and that is to stand myself and hold my hand up and take the oath right along with you.

So for our first panel—General Wold, you have done this before, and if Mr. Wiedemann would please stand and raise your right hand and with me take this oath for witnesses.

Do each of you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee in the matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. I do.

General WOLD. I do.

Mr. DORNAN. And I do.

Thank you. Please be seated.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I make an opening statement?

Mr. DORNAN. Absolutely. I'm honored to be joined by the chairman of the International Relations Committee. We have traveled to Hanoi twice together. He's been there on other trips without me, and vice versa. He has worn a POW bracelet, as I have worn two of them—the original round Montagnard bracelet and a flat one for a young hero from Hope, AK, who was missing in the first week of the Tet offensive, M. Sgt. Jimmy Holt.

Chairman Gilman, it is an honor to have you with us.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Chairman Dornan. I want to thank you for arranging this hearing. It is a very timely hearing and we look forward to reviewing the administration's assessment of Vietnam's cooperation on our POW/MIA issues.

Progress on this matter, as we all know, depends upon the full cooperation of the Vietnamese Government. Regrettably, historical and current experience reveal inadequate cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese Government. Of course, that is not acceptable.

The President has certified that, based on all the information available to our Government, the Government of Vietnam is cooperating in full faith with the United States. This means that, based on four simple criteria, the Vietnamese are not holding back on the accounting of our POW/MIA's. While I wish I could say otherwise, the facts just simply do not support the President's certification.

There is convincing evidence that the Government of Vietnam could—and I underscore could—unilaterally account for hundreds of Americans if it chose to do so. The comprehensive review report of all cases of Americans missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam war documents that Vietnam could be much more forthcoming on the specific criteria listed in the provisions in the Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriation Act.

Yet, the administration for some reason chooses not to use this data as a benchmark for determining full faith cooperation as defined in the statute. It appears that the administration's overwhelming interest is to open the doors for full trade and relegate the thorny issues of accounting for our missing to the bottom of the "in box." The path of least resistance may be a law of physics, but it is not a blueprint for successful foreign policy.

The administration is pursuing a full-blown relationship with Vietnam with unbridled enthusiasm. However, a more measured approach would be the more productive strategy to protect and pro-

mote our own national interest. As the executor of foreign policy, the President and the State Department have the responsibility to maximize our negotiating position with the Vietnamese, particularly on behalf of our POW/MIA families. This means securing concrete results to account for our missing before rewarding this Communist nation with full diplomatic and trade relations. And yet, contrary to logic, the Clinton administration has concluded that full diplomatic relations with Vietnam will facilitate better results.

I think that's wishful thinking based on razor-thin promises by the Vietnamese. Government-to-government negotiations must be based on more than mere hopes. The bottom line is that the Clinton administration has permitted Vietnam to set the terms and conditions under which it will provide all the remains and information they have with regard to our missing.

We have spent millions of dollars to bring to closure the fate of our missing in action. Far from being an incentive for Vietnam to be as forthcoming as possible, the administration policy actually encourages Vietnam to withhold as much information as long as possible in hopes of wringing even more trade and cash out of our Government.

Obviously and regrettably, the art of bilking our Nation is alive and well in Vietnam. Actually, what incentive do the Vietnamese have to resolve these cases of the missing? Our interest is to insist on unilateral efforts by the Vietnamese to return the remains and provide any records of the missing that are available. In addition, the administration needs to establish a productive working relationship that would lead to resolving POW/MIA cases which require joint cooperation and joint operations. That will take strength, creativity, and tenacity to see it through, not "soft sells," platitudes, or advance payoffs in the hope that the Vietnamese will respond.

Hopefully, we can impress upon this administration the need to be vigilant and honest about the progress and the good faith in which advances are made for the benefit of our POW/MIA families and all Americans.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, are you going to be able to join us at all during the hearing?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, I hope to return right after the vote.

Mr. DORNAN. I have had joint committee hearings with subcommittees, and joint committee hearings will full committees, but I didn't know how to make this a joint committee, so you were kind enough to say "I'll come," a full committee chairman with a subcommittee chairman.

What I'm going to do, because there's about 6 minutes left to vote, I'm going to hold my opening statement, and then have Mr. Pickett of Virginia's opening statement, and anybody else who joins the panel. I'm going to try to "dragoon" or "Shanghai" some Members off the floor.

Mr. Wiedemann and General Wold, if you will bear with us, we will take a short recess, go vote, and then come back to my formal opening statement, Mr. Pickett's, and then we'll proceed to take testimony.

[Recess.]

Mr. DORNAN. The subcommittee is back from recess.

This is my formal statement. I am convening today's hearing less than a month after Mr. Clinton's disgraceful action on Memorial Day weekend to issue a determination stating that the Vietnamese Communists are cooperating in "full faith" to account for the roughly 2,100 American heroes who are still missing from the conflict throughout Southeast Asia.

In my role as the chairman, I am responsible for the well-being of military personnel and those captured or missing. As a historical note here, if any prisoner is still alive, he's on active duty. Therefore, he is military personnel. That is why I repeat what we have discussed, Jim, why this committee should have kept this portfolio, this mandate, for the elected Congressmen of this country, all through the Vietnam war and right up to now.

It did its work during the Vietnam war, but somehow or other, the portfolio, the responsibility for this, went to the CIA, which did not want it—did not want it. In August 1977, I went to Stansfield Turner. He did not want it. He was too busy firing 800 agents because he thought the cold war was over 11 years before it did end.

Then it bounced around. It went to a geographical committee, on Foreign Affairs, now International Relations, and that's where Mr. Gilman was working hard on it, had already been working on it for 4 years when I was sworn in in 1977. That's why I want it to stay in this subcommittee, no matter what happens 139 days from today, the election.

I'm outraged that Mr. Clinton or his advisers ignored the 1995 Department of Defense comprehensive review that shows, case by case, that the Vietnamese can do what Chairman Gilman just said, unilaterally provide answers that would resolve the fates of at least 400 POW/MIA heroes. In fact, far from improved performance, under the Clinton administration—that's 3½ years—only 85 MIA's have been accounted for, compared to 99 under George Bush's full 4 years, and 187 accountings during the second Reagan 4 years.

Based on the Defense Department comprehensive review, in January of this year I, as chairman, presented 29 MIA cases to Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Khanh, at their newly opened embassy. In that information was where the missing heroes were either last known alive or known to have perished under Vietnamese Communist control. I should have had Colonel David Allison, who received his wings with me in February 1955.

During this same period, the Defense POW/MIA Office, whose Director, General James Wold, will testify today, presented the Vietnamese with a list of 51 super-compelling cases involving 69 individuals—some of those were multiple crew shootdowns—whom the Vietnamese Government should be able to account for. Thus far, to my knowledge—and if I'm wrong, you can correct me in a few minutes, General—none of those 51 cases involving 69 individuals has been resolved.

In the five hearings this committee has conducted on this subject during the past year, Defense Department expert analysts have repeatedly testified under oath that the Vietnamese have not made available important original documents and records regarding their operations in Laos that are the basis of the "Group 559" document.

There are also critical records from the Vietnamese Communist Politburo, and a separate entity with some overlap, the Vietnamese Central Committee. This is a government, which most Americans still have to remind themselves, is run by a political party. In America, it means that Ron Brown would have been running the Government before Clinton was sworn in, and that it would be Haley Barbour running our Government, all decisions flowing from Haley Barbour. It's hard for Americans to conceive of the power of a politburo and a central committee.

Those records have not been made available. There can be no doubt that many of the 500-plus American servicemen, ground CIA and Government operatives and pilots, were lost in what I call the "black hole" of Calcutta, Laos, that were under the control, most of them, of North Vietnamese forces.

As I have told you, General Wold, I have talked to pilots, the 10 that were released on the last day of the freedom flights out of Hanoi in March of 1973. They were held under a tree, the news media blared, they're holding back the Laotian prisoners. They weren't from Laos. They were from the Hanoi prison system, but they had been captured in Laos.

One of them told me he was held by the Pathet Lao for 3 days, taken to caves that were so massive in northern Laos that they had three floors of bamboo built in the caves, caves so big—and I see Mike Benge nodding in affirmation—that they had riverlets running through the caves, of fresh, clear water, in the mountains of northern Laos. They were all turned over, including John McCain's first roommate, Ernie Brace, CIA captured, held his first 3 weeks at Dien Bien Phu, and then moved into the Hanoi prison system, where McCain tapped him up on the wall in a special section of a camp where prisoners like McCain and Norris Overly and CIA Ernie Brace were isolated from the other men in the camp. Those were not Laotian prisoners.

The next day my heart sank when President Nixon created a false headline: "Nixon holds firm. All prisoners returned from Laos." Why? Nixon knew it, Kissinger knew it, Roger Shields knew it. Everybody who worked on it, the predecessors in your office, they all knew we didn't get a single person back from Laos, that those were prisoners captured in Laos and held in North Vietnam. But America went to sleep and a major Joseph Goebbels lie had been perpetrated on the families, under a Republican administration.

So the lack of candor on the Laotian matter shows that the Clinton full faith determination was made fully without any merit whatsoever.

On May 28, 1996, my esteemed and, at this point, to the families, the heroic Senator Bob Smith, and Chairman Ben Gilman, also a hero to the families on this issue, we requested that the Department of Defense IG, the inspector general, conduct a thorough investigation on reports that the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting cannot account for at least four million tax dollars given to the Vietnamese Government out of the \$11 million spent in Vietnam for the purpose of searching for POW/MIA's.

Here is the type of headline generated across the country: "Vietnam Collects Windfall from MIA Searches by U.S. Government."

You usually see that word "windfall" attached to big oil companies. It says there is currently a five-person inspector general team working on this investigation. And they're all on the Federal tax payroll, the hard working, I trust.

The bottom line is that both the Vietnamese and our United States Government must work together to divulge what truly happened to hundreds of our missing men. The truth, and only the truth, will end the suffering of countless loved ones of our missing heroes.

The Korean situation is a nightmare for families, going back to the 1950's with the Chinese incursion into the war, the invasion, with only every seventh soldier with even a rifle, bugles blowing. That was November 1950, so we're talking 46 years to 43 years for the families that lost loved ones and that knew through early reports that their men were alive in prisons in North Korea. So I hope to get to some of the truth on that.

Mr. Pickett, we will now have your opening statement, and Mr. Skelton told me he did not have an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN PICKETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I understand that our two witnesses here are under somewhat of a time constraint, and in an effort to pick up on our schedule, I'm going to file my statement for the record and ask that we proceed with the hearing. I welcome all of our witnesses here today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pickett follows:]

**OPENING REMARKS -- REP. OWEN PICKETT
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF VIETNAMESE
COOPERATION ON POW/MIA MATTERS**

June 19, 1996

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses today.

I also extend a special welcome to the POW/MIA family members who are observing the hearing and will participate in the activities that are part of the annual meetings of the POW-MIA family organizations taking place this week.

Mr. Chairman, just about a year ago -- June 25, 1995 -- this subcommittee held its first POW-MIA hearing. As we have come to learn since then, there are many hard questions and no easy answers to achieving what we all agree is the right national objective in this matter: The fullest possible accounting of our POW-MIAs.

The principal focus of today's hearing is the President's recent determination that the Government of Vietnam was cooperating in full faith with the United States in resolving the POW-MIA issue. To support that determination the President

presented a list of events that have occurred since January 1993.

While I will not enumerate the list at this point, I would note that the general thrust of them is that improved cooperation from the government of Vietnam has resulted in increased and measurable results in accounting for US POW-MIAs.

Despite the list of events, the question remains: "Could the ^{gov} Vietnam ~~be~~ be doing more?" Our second panel of witnesses today will reference a number of areas where they believe that the government of Vietnam could be doing more to provide data and help expedite the process for a full accounting.

A recent Congressional Research Service report offers support for the statements we will hear from the second panel. That report says:

"Since normalization began in 1991 [when the US opened a POW-MIA office in Hanoi] the US has gained substantial access to aircraft crash sites, Vietnamese records, and Vietnamese civilians, and has established a substantial permanent presence of military and civilian personnel. This increased access has not yet led to resolution of large numbers of MIA cases; almost all of the material has turned out to be redundant, already in US hands, or pertaining to resolved cases; and there

continues to be evidence that the Vietnamese retain large amounts of unreleased data which is of much more importance in learning the fate of unaccounted-for Americans than excavations of crash sites and other field research."

I know, Mr. Chairman, that there are existing lists enumerating cases that it would be reasonable to expect the government of Vietnam should be able to resolve unilaterally. I would hope that this subcommittee and the Administration can find a means to translate improved access and better cooperation into full and final resolution of these and other cases so that the objective of the fullest possible accounting can be realized at the earliest possible date.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Buyer, did you have an opening statement?

Mr. BUYER. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. All right. If the witnesses would also, to pick up some time—I know it's my fault, but I don't think a family member here objected to my putting some history perspective on this—if you would please give a 5-minute summary of your statement. Of course, your full statement will go in the record and we can proceed into the questions.

Mr. Wiedemann, if you would go first, sir.

STATEMENT OF KENT M. WIEDEMANN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS; AND JAMES W. WOLD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS; MELINDA COOKE, WARREN GRAY, GARY SYDOW AND TIM CASTLE, DPMO ANALYSTS

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will try to summarize my remarks as best I can.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. I think it's been very clear ever since the very outset of this administration, with respect to Vietnam and to Cambodia and Laos, that the very highest priority of this Government has been achieving the fullest possible accounting for POW's and MIA's. And that remains the case.

Even though on July 11, 1995, we normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam, and have since then expanded our relations with Vietnam into some other areas to include more refugee work, emphasis on counternarcotics work, human rights, and yes, some work on expanding economic relations, the POW/MIA work remains at the very core of our relationship.

I returned from a Presidential mission to Vietnam, joined by my colleague here, General Wold, in March of this year. Based on that, which was the second Presidential mission in which I personally had been involved out of a total of four in this administration, I came away and was able to report, I believe honorably and absolutely honestly, to my Government that the Vietnamese were co-operating fully, sincerely, and with great energy and vigor in our joint efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for POW/MIA's. They repeated to us again that, as a matter of policy, from their government's standpoint, this is an issue not of politics but a humanitarian issue, that they would continue to operate regardless of the overall state of United States-Vietnamese relations.

More importantly, besides the words that we hear every time we speak with senior members of the Vietnamese Government, are the actual results. After all, we're not in this to simply carry on conversations about the continuing problems we encounter in achieving the fullest possible accounting, but it is to actually make progress. It is my feeling about those measures that we have determined that, indeed, the Vietnamese authorities are cooperating in full faith.

In terms of the four criteria that were set forth by President Clinton in July 1993, and which are repeated in section 609 of the legislation to which you have referred in your opening remarks,

they are specifically as measured by concrete progress in resolving and obtaining more information about discrepancy cases and live sightings; second, in respect to the repatriation of remains; third, in the acceleration of access to our servicemen and women, documents related to cases of POW's and MIA's; and lastly, establishing progress in trilateral cooperation between the United States, Vietnam, and Laos in recovering remains and developing information to resolve cases related to Laos, including obviously the areas that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, which were under the control of the North Vietnamese during the period of the war.

We feel that, as measured under these four categories, which General Wold will describe to you in much more detail in quantitative terms, that empirically the case is clear. We are making progress and it is significant. We are, therefore, delivering on a sacred promise we made to the American people: to find out as much as we can about the fates of those heroes who sacrificed their lives for this country in the war in Indochina, and we will not cease our efforts until that task is complete.

I would be happy to answer any questions, sir, that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wiedemann follows:]

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TESTIMONY OF

KENT M. WIEDEMANN

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

JUNE 19, 1996

- 1- -

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you once again about our policy regarding Vietnam and the POW/MIA issue and the recent Presidential Determination on this issue.

Obtaining the fullest possible accounting for our POW and MIAs has been and remains this Administration's highest priority with respect to Vietnam. By any measure, this Administration has fulfilled its promise to advance in an aggressive and determined way efforts to make progress toward this goal. U.S.-Vietnam relations are expanding into new areas, but this has not reduced in the slightest the centrality of POW/MIA accounting in our bilateral relationship.

As Ambassador Lord and I have testified previously, our policy has been to take carefully phased, incremental steps forward in U.S.-Vietnamese relations as we achieve tangible progress toward our POW/MIA accounting goal. Before each of these steps, the President carefully reviewed the progress that had been achieved and determined further tangible progress could best be promoted through these measured steps toward closer bilateral ties. In each and every case the decision to move forward was carefully examined by each U.S. government element charged with responsibility for this issue, including the Departments of State and Defense, and followed close consultations with the families of POWs and MIAs, interested veterans and the Congress.

In July 1993, the President set forth four specific areas on which decisions concerning further improvement in our relations with Vietnam would be based:

- First, the recovery and repatriation of remains of our POWs and MIAs;
- Second, the continued resolution of discrepancy cases, and continued live sighting investigations and field activities;
- Third, further assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with Laos; and
- Fourth, accelerated efforts to provide all relevant POW/MIA related documents.

All of the actions we have taken in the almost three years since then have been based on tangible progress in these fundamental areas and on our best judgments as to what we could do to continue and accelerate this progress. As an integral part of this process, Vietnam's cooperation has been under constant review.

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Mr. Chairman, this does not mean we have passively taken at face value Vietnamese assurances that they have done everything they can in a given area. Far from it. In the past three and one-half years we have continually and successfully pushed Vietnam to step up its efforts, both unilaterally and in the context of our joint activities. In addition to the ongoing technical-level work being done by Joint Task Force--Full Accounting with its Vietnamese counterparts, we have made full use of high level contacts with Vietnamese officials as well as the four Presidential Delegations on POW/MIAs that have visited Vietnam. Indeed, when Secretary Christopher visited Hanoi last August, he underscored our commitment to further progress by presiding over a remains repatriation ceremony, visiting Joint Task Force--Full Accounting Detachment 2, and stressing to Vietnamese leaders that "this will remain the number one priority on our agenda with Vietnam."

Along with Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs Hershel Gober and General Wold, I was a co-leader of the most recent Presidential Delegation this past March. This was the first Delegation since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam and the first since the completion of the Defense Department's Comprehensive Review of POW/MIA cases. Representatives of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia and five U.S. Veterans service organizations participated.

As you will know, Mr. Chairman, from having received the Delegation's trip report, we had meetings at the highest levels of the Vietnamese leadership, including with General Secretary Do Muoi, Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Many Cam, as well as with representatives of each of the ministries involved in the POW/MIA issue. In these meetings, we emphasized the importance of the Comprehensive Review as a critical tool for identifying unilateral and joint actions needed to move cases toward resolution. The Vietnamese leaders reiterated their commitment to sustained cooperation on accounting efforts and their readiness to take the steps identified through the comprehensive review.

As a result of the March Delegation visit, we concluded that the establishment of diplomatic relations and the prospect of expanded economic relations has strengthened Vietnam's pursuit of joint and unilateral accounting efforts. We believe the POW/MIA issue is firmly established as the keystone of our relations with Vietnam, and that both sides have the commitment and the institutional mechanisms in place to achieve the fullest possible accounting. We are, of course, closely monitoring the progress that is made and continuing to build upon the strong base established over the past three and one-half years of effort.

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After three and one-half years of personal involvement in the Administration's work on this issue, I can tell you that this approach is working. I will cite just a few examples of what we have achieved. At our request, Vietnam set up special research teams within the Ministries of Defense and Interior, teams that are locating and turning over documents with information concerning unaccounted for Americans. We have also established with Vietnam and Laos a mechanism for bringing Vietnamese witnesses to that country to help us locate crash and grave sites. In January, this procedure resulted in the recovery and repatriation of remains associated with a case involving eight unaccounted for Americans. General Wold will provide you with a great deal of additional information on what has been accomplished in the four key areas.

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is absolutely essential that we stick with the carefully considered approach that has brought us this progress. The May 29 Presidential Determination (Presidential Determination 96-28) on Vietnam should be seen in the context of this policy of measured steps in U.S.-Vietnam relations coupled with aggressive pursuit of a fullest possible accounting I have outlined above. I must note that the certification requirement of section 609 of the Fiscal Year 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act has been determined by the Department of Justice to be unconstitutional, and the President therefore provided the determination as a matter of comity while reserving his position that the condition enacted in section 609 is unconstitutional.

Nevertheless, the President viewed the determination as an occasion for him to reinforce his unwavering commitment to the pursuit of the fullest possible accounting as the guiding principle of U.S. policy toward Vietnam. In keeping with that commitment, I can state without hesitation that we will persevere in this task.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Wiedemann.

General Wold, please proceed, and please follow Mr. Wiedemann's lead and try to summarize. Your entire statement will be in the permanent record.

General WOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to do that and try to be brief and hold this to 5 minutes.

We are also engaged in support of the various family organizations annual meetings this week. My staff is busily engaged in working on Government briefings that will be presented to them over the next 3 days.

The Presidential certification was based on factual data provided by the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Office to the Department of State and the National Security Council, and it addressed the following areas:

One was resolving discrepancy cases and live sightings, as well as conducting field activities; second, recovering and repatriating American remains; third, accelerating efforts to provide documents that will help lead to the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIA's; and fourth, providing further assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with Laos.

It is not possible to do any accounting at all for Americans who are missing without some cooperation in these four areas from the governments of the region, especially Vietnam. But we are getting results and we are accounting for missing Americans. I would like to touch just briefly on the facts with respect to cooperation in those four areas.

First, resolving discrepancy cases and live sightings: of the 196 last known alive, we have identified 27 individuals and have confirmed the fate of all but 50. Those 50 and the remaining 119 for whom we have already reconfirmed fate still remain missing persons for whom we seek an accounting.

Mr. DORNAN. General, so I don't have to come back, please let me interrupt you at this point, because I used it in my opening statement.

In those 51 compelling cases involving the 69 that you presented, and some of it overlaps with the 29 that I took up to the North Vietnam Communist embassy, could you again state how much overlap is there of your 51 cases?

General WOLD. Congressman, I can't tell you without probably having a list in front of me to compare. But I just want to reiterate that we have 50 remaining individuals last known alive who are unaccounted for. But also, the 119 whose fate has been confirmed and are, therefore, no longer last known alive, are also missing personnel and they're not accounted for and we still seek their accounting.

Mr. DORNAN. All right. Please proceed.

General WOLD. On the special remains cases, during our May 1995 delegation we received a 118-page report regarding unilateral and joint investigative efforts for the majority of the outstanding cases. We originally began with 98 special remains cases. Seven individuals have been resolved and we now have 91. We continue to pursue resolution with respect to these 91, through both the joint process and through the separate requests for unilateral action on the part of the Vietnamese which were recently passed to them.

Live sighting investigations continue to be a matter of highest priority. As I reported before, over 1,780 first-hand live sighting reports have come in, and 98.5 percent of those have been analyzed, investigated and resolved. A small number of the reports, 1.5 percent, remain open and require additional work. They continue to be the focus of our current efforts.

With respect to 141 live sighting field investigations in Southeast Asia, 115 were conducted in Vietnam. To date, our conclusions as to those investigations is the same as that of the Senate Select Committee, which was "there is, at this time, no compelling evidence that proves that any American remains alive in captivity in Southeast Asia," and further, that "neither live sighting reports, nor other sources of intelligence have provided grounds for encouragement. The live sighting reports that have been resolved have not checked out; alleged pictures of POW's have proven false; purported leads have come up empty, and photographic intelligence has been inconclusive at best." Nor has there been found any evidence to support the existence of alleged "secret lists" of additional missing Americans.

Let me turn for a moment to recovering and repatriating American remains. In the difficult history of this work on this issue, the greatest obstacle to success was the refusal of the foreign governments to allow the United States access to both documents or to carry out in-country, onsite investigations. However, since 1988, we have worked jointly with Vietnam in these operations which has been instrumental in the recovery and repatriation of remains, particularly since 1993.

During July and August, JTF-FA will conduct the 41st joint field activity. In 1993, we repatriated 82 remains, 44 as a result of joint efforts. In 1994, the figures were 61 remains repatriated, 40 as a result of joint field activities, 21 as a result of unilateral turnovers. Last year we repatriated 35 remains, 26 from joint field activities, and 9 from unilateral returns. So far this year, we repatriated five remains, three as a result of two joint field activities, and two as a result of unilateral turnovers. These numbers reflect not only the excellent cooperation we have had in joint field operations, but the fact that the Vietnamese are cooperating in unilateral activity as well.

Mr. DORNAN. General, so we don't confuse the audience—and forgive me again for interrupting, but these figures are important to family members. They hang on every small number. And I have to ask my staff here.

If in my opening statement I say, under the Clinton administration, only 85 MIA's have been accounted for, and then you testify that, in 1993 alone, there were 82, and then 61, and then 35, that's 178, and 5 this year, that makes 183.

Why am I saying 85 and you're saying 183? Does the staff have an idea? Are you including in your figures—

General WOLD. I was talking repatriations, speaking to the cooperation of the Vietnamese in the joint field activities where we have repatriated identifiable remains.

I think you're referring, Mr. Congressman, to identifications which results in the accounting and the resolution—

Mr. DORNAN. Whoa, whoa. Wait a minute, General.

They sent us animal bones. They sent us Asian bones.

General WOLD. Not any more.

Mr. DORNAN. You're talking about repatriated remains and I'm talking about identified remains?

General WOLD. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Wait a minute. Then 183, and I'm going with 85, do you buy my 85 identified remains? They sent us 98 sets of remains that weren't American. They didn't do that under Bush and Reagan. Maybe it was because they were taking them out of a warehouse, off the shelf, where we had chemical evidence that they had been dug up and stored and were in better shape than the remains found in the high water table areas of South Vietnam.

We know that they stored remains. You and I have discussed that. We agree on that. So please don't dazzle me and anger the families and talk about repatriation of remains, because if some of them are animal bones, even if it's only one or two sets, and the rest are all Asians—I've been in the CIL in Hawaii where they've told me they can pick up a skull and, within 3 seconds, tell me whether it's Negroid, Mongoloid, or Caucasoid. They can do that within seconds. So they're playing with us again over there.

Somebody is shaking their head "no." Stand up and identify yourself. Let's have a productive hearing here. The gentleman right behind Mr. Wiedemann, on your right, Colonel. Were you shaking your head in disagreement, that they can identify bones within 2 or 3 seconds?

Mr. RUNNING. No, that's not what I was disagreeing with.

Mr. DORNAN. Were you disagreeing that they sent us Oriental bones or animals bones or what?

Mr. RUNNING. Not in the period we're talking about, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Okay. Please identify yourself.

Mr. RUNNING. My name is Eric Running.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Eric. I'm not saying anything here definitively. I'm trying to get to the bottom of this.

If they didn't do this in the period of the last 3 years, then I may be misunderstanding you, General Wold. You're talking about repatriated remains. Are you agreeing with me that we have only identified 85 sets of American remains, to have a funeral at Arlington or at some little plot out there in middle America?

The Colonel behind you is saying yes, 85 remains identified. Then what are the other 98?

Colonel YOUNG. What we're talking about, sir, is the identification process is something that we do within the U.S. Government. It's done at the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, as you said.

The Vietnamese Government does not have a play in that. We repatriate remains. There is a forensic review that is now done in Southeast Asia. We make that determination of whether the remains are possibly American remains or whether they're animal remains or Mongoloid remains that we do not believe potentially could be an American serviceman before we ever repatriate them any longer.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Excellent. Now I understand what you were trying to say.

However, I have been at the CIL in Hawaii, where Vietnamese have just left, getting educated. They understand this. They know the difference themselves. If somebody is a doctor, not just a forensic doctor, just a plain old M.D., and they look at a skull, you can teach them—I was taught, although I forget, how to tell, by the thickness of the skull, a certain little lump at the base of the skull—and I can't remember which group was which—how to tell these three basic racial types.

So even though it's done over there—and I accept now that we don't do it at the CIL any more, because we have an expensive office there in Hanoi—they're still playing with us. I mean, if they know how to identify the difference between an Asian—and I know we have some Asian-American heroes that are missing—it still kind of skews the count, if you don't mind my saying so, General, to come up with the bigger figures.

What the families are interested in is the end result, the funerals. This overworked word, "closure", that they do get this psychological closure. I understand now that we've got a team over there to separate all this out without the expense of caskets, with American flags on them, small boxes of bones in a casket coming to Hawaii. But this repatriation still is not dazzling weight against Reagan's second term of 147 accountings, and I guess what Eric meant is that is when they were mixing in animal bones and other bones and we were having to sort this out in Asia. And since these are all God's children, returning the bones of their heroes or soldiers that were mixed in with ours, or villagers that died in a plane crash, that were hit by a plane, they then have to be treated with respect, boxed up—I was there when we did this—and sent back to Vietnam, and said stop sending us your people.

I've got it sorted out, and I hope the families have. They may have been ahead of me on this.

Proceed, General Wold.

General WOLD. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

The figures I show for President Reagan's last 4 years, his last term, was 79 identifications, 215 remains were repatriated. During the Bush administration, 210 remains total were repatriated, and of those, 100 were identified. The 183 figure is the number of repatriations during the Clinton administration, and 51 identifications in about 3½ years.

The only point I want to make—

Mr. DORNAN. Your figures may be right, General, because you have a big staff and I have one Vietnam veteran and an intern. You make a good point, though, that Reagan's last years, 250 down to 79, and even 250 to 147, which I have, would make your point. And under Bush's last years, you said 210 down to 100, and I had 99. So that's close. Your figures may be right.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, this will help me now.

You keep saying the difference between positively identified and repatriated. How many remains do we have that are unidentified right now?

General WOLD. I'm glad you asked that question, Mr. Congressman.

We have 133 in Vietnam right now awaiting identification. Of those—We have about 180 remains awaiting identification. Of

those, 133 are remains from Vietnam whose families still wait for identification.

What I think is very important here today is that the bottleneck is not with the Vietnamese. The bottleneck is ours at CILHI because of limited resources, not only at CILHI but at AFDIL. AFDIL can process only 10 DNA identifications a month. Each one of those takes about 8 to 10 months.

Mr. DORNAN. Spell out that second acronym.

General WOLD. I'm sorry. The Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory up here in Rockville.

Mr. DORNAN. I visited them. They're a great group.

Mr. BUYER. The 133, those are in Vietnam?

General WOLD. Those are Vietnam returned.

Mr. BUYER. How many are in our possession? In other words, of the repatriations over the years, of which we have not been able to identify, how many do we have, that we have identified they could be American servicemen?

General WOLD. These are what we have at CILHI.

I don't think I understand your question. We have 133 remains at CILHI awaiting identification. Part of those may require some additional investigation, either unilaterally on our part or unilaterally on the part of the Vietnamese, or they may require some further joint activity by both of us in-country. But they are sitting out at CILHI at the laboratory awaiting identification.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you.

Mr. DORNAN. And just for the record—I have never objected to this, particularly if the families do not—about 10 of those remains identified, with a subsequent funeral, were on a tooth, a half-a-tooth in some cases, and a few on bone fragments. Then there was the one case we discussed of a mass burial of a C-130 crew, with 10 intermingled remains and not a single piece large enough to identify 1 person out of the 10. I didn't object to that, either. That was a sad ceremony in the rain.

I understand you have done your best, right down to half-a-tooth, to try and bring this to closure for some of the families. Proceed, General.

General WOLD. Regardless of how we recover remains, whether it's by joint operations or whether it's through unilateral activity on the part of the Vietnamese, the ultimate task is to identify them.

The question of resourcing AFDIL and the Central Identification Laboratory is a question that is near and dear to my heart. It goes to the responsibilities of this office as the policy overseer for everything related to missing in actions, and I would certainly want to work with you in the future in that regard as to what is adequate to do the job that needs to be done in all these areas.

Mr. DORNAN. You bet.

General WOLD. Let me address just briefly the question of documents. In 1994, the Ministries of National Defense and the Interior did create unilateral teams. In 1995, a process clearly was in being, and 295 documents and a total of 563 untranslated pages were given to us during that year. This year they made two additional turnovers. The process is now in place and the analysts are finding that the documents that we have been getting are useful, in some

cases providing some direct correlations which hopefully will lead to accounting.

On trilateral investigations with Laos, the Government has long maintained that trilateral investigations of specific incidents could provide critical answers to the accounting process, by bringing Vietnamese witnesses across the border into Laos and to assist our experts.

The Senate Select Committee, in January 1993, characterized this as a process "that has barely begun." However, in December 1994, when I met in Hanoi with Lao and Vietnamese Government officials to establish the formal process and routine procedures for conducting trilateral operations in Laos involving these witnesses, my Vietnamese counterparts said to me and Vice Minister Soubanh, who was the head of the Lao delegation, "Whatever you two decide, Vietnam will support you." And they have done just that.

The Vietnamese support in this area has been excellent. We've had seven Vietnamese witnesses come across the border. JTF-FA has identified another 42 witnesses which the Vietnamese say they will make available to us. We are now following up with both governments to bring that about in future investigations.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the hopeful trends and substantial results in Vietnam noted by the Senate select committee in its findings have, for the most part, been borne out and continue to this day. I believe the evidence presented strongly supports our belief that the Vietnamese Government is cooperating in full faith with our efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting. If we had no cooperation at all, we would have no joint field operations, we would have no repatriations, and no hope of identifying repatriated remains to bring closure to the families, which you so eloquently described a few moments ago.

The POW/MIA issue is too important and too personal for us to allow it to be driven by theory. It must be driven by fact. If our goal is to be effective and fair to families, as we say it is, then our efforts must go forward within that context, not based on speculation or hearsay or mere hope, as Chairman Gilman said, but of reality based on fact and on the kind of professional, objective analysis that would withstand scrutiny in a court of law.

The Department of Defense and the Government is committed to providing the necessary resources, personnel, and equipment to resolve the remaining cases of unaccounted for Americans in Vietnam, as well as Laos and Cambodia.

We have been able to achieve closure for some families. I have a file of letters expressing the emotions that are involved when this happens. There is no way that we, who have not suffered those losses, can say we fully understand what they have gone through. But we continue to work the problem, we have a lot of work yet to be done, and our job is clearly far from over. We will continue the pursuit, however, with all that we can muster.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Wold follows:]

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Written Statement By

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA Affairs)

James W. Wold

Congressional Hearing on U.S. POW/MIA Issue

**The Presidential Determination of "Full Faith Cooperation"
by Vietnam**

Before the

House Committee on National Security

Military Personnel Subcommittee

June 19, 1996

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Introduction

Good morning Mr. Chairman. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs, I once again welcome the opportunity to address the Military Personnel Subcommittee regarding the POW/MIA issue; specifically, as it relates to the War in Southeast Asia. On May 29, 1996 the President determined, based on all information available to the United States Government, that the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is cooperating in full faith with the United States in four areas of accounting for American Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (POW/MIA's), consistent with section 609 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, as contained in the Fiscal Year 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Public Law 104-134.

This Presidential certification was based on factual data provided by the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Office to the Department of State and the National Security Council that the Vietnamese Government is cooperating in the following areas:

- (1) Resolving discrepancy cases and live sightings, as well as conducting field activities;
- (2) Recovering and repatriating American remains;
- (3) Accelerating efforts to provide documents that will help lead to the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIA's; and
- (4) Providing further assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with Laos.

It is not possible to account for the Americans who are missing from the War in Southeast Asia without cooperation in these four areas from the governments of the region, especially Vietnam. But we are getting results, and we are accounting for missing Americans. I would like to briefly discuss the facts with respect to cooperation in the four areas and then I am prepared to address any questions the subcommittee members may have.

Resolving discrepancy cases, and live sightings.

First, with the assistance of the Vietnamese Government, the U.S. Government has been able to reconfirm fate for all but 50 of the 196 individuals (195 Americans) associated with "last known alive" priority discrepancy cases in Vietnam. These are cases in which individuals survived their original loss incidents, but did not return alive and remain unaccounted for. Members of the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Persons (VNOSMP) continue to work closely with our investigators in their efforts to reconfirm fate for the Americans on the list. Each case has been jointly investigated at least once, some as many as five times. As a result, a Department of Defense panel is convened periodically to review case information and, where appropriate, reconfirm the fate for individuals on this list. This action was taken most recently in January 1996 when fate was reconfirmed for five individuals on the list. Within DoD, we will continue to place a high priority on reconfirming fate for the final 50 individuals remaining on the list.

It should be further noted that as a direct result of work by the Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and its predecessors, the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), and the Vietnamese Government, the Department of Defense has been able to identify remains for 27 individuals on the priority discrepancy list, thereby resolving those 27 cases. We still seek to account for not only the 50, but for the 119 whose fate has been confirmed.

Since 1993, we have also worked with the Vietnamese to resolve the special remains cases. These are 84 cases involving 98 individuals in which there is evidence that the Vietnamese Government had knowledge of an American's death and disposition of remains. That evidence is found in Vietnamese wartime photographs, Vietnamese grave registration documents, died in captivity lists provided by the Vietnamese Government in 1973, and testimony by various Vietnamese officials and citizens. In May 1995, the Vietnamese Government provided the Presidential Delegation, led by Deputy Secretary for Veteran Affairs Hershel Gober, with a 118 page report regarding unilateral and joint investigative efforts for the majority of the outstanding cases. These reports should be of assistance as we focus our investigative efforts on the remaining 91 individuals. In addition, the cases in this group identified for further pursuit in conjunction with the 1995 comprehensive review are currently being pursued in both the joint process and through separate requests for unilateral action which were recently passed to the Vietnamese Government.

Live sighting investigations are a matter of highest priority. The investigation of credible firsthand live sightings reports continue to receive our immediate attention and the first cut at available resources. Since 1975, DoD analysts have evaluated over 1,780 firsthand live sighting reports concerning American POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia. The vast majority of these reports (98.5%) have been analyzed, investigated, and resolved with the reports often being equated to Americans accounted for (i.e. POW returnees), missionaries, Westerners serving jail time for various violations of Vietnamese laws, or other Westerners conducting business. A small number of the reports (1.5%) remain open and require additional work. These continue to be the focus of our current efforts.

In conjunction with these analyses of firsthand live sightings, the U.S. Government has conducted 141 live sighting field investigations in Southeast Asia. Of these, 115 have been conducted in Vietnam. To date, our conclusions as to these investigations is the same as that of the Senate Select Committee – “there is, at this time, no compelling evidence that proves that any American remains alive in captivity in Southeast Asia,” and further, “neither live sighting reports, nor other sources of intelligence have provided grounds for encouragement....The live sighting reports that have been resolved have not checked out; alleged pictures of POWs have proven false; purported leads have come up empty; and photographic intelligence has been inconclusive, at best.” Nor has there been found any evidence to support the existence of rumored “secret lists” of additional missing Americans.

Recovering and repatriating American remains.

In the difficult history of POW/MIA accounting, the greatest obstacle to success was the refusal of the foreign government involved to allow the U.S. access to documents or to carry out in-country, on-site investigations. Since 1988, however, we have worked jointly with Vietnam in these operations which has been instrumental in the recovery and repatriation of remains, particularly since 1993.

The Department of Defense's Joint Task Force - Full Accounting will conduct the 41st Joint Field Activity in Vietnam during July 5 - August 2. In 1993 we repatriated 82 remains, 44 as a result of joint efforts during seven scheduled joint field activities and 38 from unilateral turnovers. In 1994, we recovered and returned to the United States 61 remains, 40 as a result of six joint field activities and 21 as a result of unilateral turnovers. In 1995, we repatriated 35 remains, 26 as a result of six joint field activities and 9 from unilateral returns. So far this year, we have repatriated 5 remains, 3 as a result of two joint field activities and 2 as a result of unilateral turnovers. These numbers reflect not only the excellent joint cooperation we enjoy with the Vietnamese, but the fact that the Vietnamese are cooperating in unilateral activity, as well.

Since 1992, the U.S. Government has acquired new information that affects our understanding of what happened to Americans missing or killed in Vietnam, as well as our expectations as to how many can ultimately be accounted for by the return of identifiable remains. As the 1995 Department of Defense comprehensive review has

shown, during the course of our in-country investigations we have learned much about what happened to specific individuals lost all over Vietnam. The Vietnamese have turned over significant wartime documents, and for the first time we have been able to interview several officials who were involved in the official Vietnamese program to recover the remains of U.S. personnel. Taken in aggregate, this new information has led us to reassess the assumptions that underlay our earlier estimates of the number of U.S. remains that the Vietnamese government might have recovered on their own. DPMO is currently working on this new assessment which should be completed by the end of the year. We will advise you as soon as the results are available.

Regardless of how we recover remains, whether it be as a result of joint operations or through unilateral turnovers, the ultimate task is to identify them. Since 1973, we have identified the remains of 430 Americans. Unlike the recovery process, the process through which we identify repatriated remains is wholly independent of Vietnamese cooperation. The Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii possesses another 184 remains repatriated from Southeast Asia which have potential for identification, 133 of which are from Vietnam.

Accelerating efforts to provide documents that will help lead to the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIA's.

Another critical part of our work involves obtaining documents and records containing information that can further efforts to account for those Americans who did not return from Southeast Asia. In this regard, since 1973, the joint archival research team has examined over 28,000 items to include: 1,055 documents; more than 2,400 photographs and 16,500 artifacts; 2,685 newspapers; 319 films and nearly 5,000 other secondary and administrative items such as books, museum envelopes, receipts, and accessions records. 1,945 of these items (6.5%) have been correlated to cases involving Americans currently or previously listed as unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. Of the correlations, 742 pertain to cases involving still unaccounted for Americans, 40 involve priority discrepancy cases and 97 are associated with special remains cases.

The Vietnamese' creation of unilateral teams in 1994 within the Ministries of National Defense and the Interior to search throughout the country for documents and records involving American POW/MIAs has resulted in the turnover of documents which offer new leads that can further the accounting process. Overall, in 1995, the Vietnamese made ten separate document turnovers totaling 295 documents and a total of 563 untranslated pages. In 1996, they have made two additional turnovers. Included in these turnovers are examples of contemporary wartime reporting, late 1972 documents, a 1977 report on graves and remains, results summaries of 1988 - 1989 Vietnamese investigations, and 1991 - 1996 reporting by the Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons, provincial

officials, the document search teams, and Vietnam veterans. A process is now in place that has, over time, provided answers and is continuing to do so.

Providing further assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with Laos.

The US government has long maintained that trilateral investigations of specific incidents could provide critical answers to the accounting process by making available Vietnamese witnesses and experts in our investigations and recovery operations in Laos. The Senate Select Committee, in January 1993, characterized this as a process "that has barely begun." However, in December 1994, when I met in Hanoi with Lao and Vietnamese government officials to establish the formal process and routine procedures for conducting trilateral operations in Laos involving Vietnamese witnesses, my Vietnamese counterparts said to me and Vice Minister Soubanh, the head of the Lao delegation, "Whatever you two decide, Vietnam will support you." And they have done just that.

To date, Vietnamese government support for trilateral operations has been excellent with seven Vietnamese witnesses being allowed to participate fully in the joint field investigations in Laos. Joint Task Force Full Accounting has identified 42 additional potential Vietnamese witnesses for use during future trilateral operations. We are now following up with Vietnamese and Lao officials to gain approval for their future participation. We believe that future trilateral operations may enable us to resolve some of the more difficult cases that remain in Laos.

Closing

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the "hopeful trends" and "substantial results" in Vietnam notes by the Senate Select Committee in its Findings have, for the most part, been borne out and continue to this day. I believe the evidence presented strongly supports our belief that the Vietnamese Government is cooperating in full faith with our efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for those Americans who never returned from Southeast Asia. There is a process in place, and through it we are getting results.

The POW/MIA issue is too important and too personal for us to allow it to be driven by theory; it must be driven by fact. If our goal is to be effective, and fair to families, as we say it is, then our efforts must go forward within that context, not of speculation or hearsay, but of reality based on fact and on the kind of professional, objective analysis that would withstand scrutiny in a court of law.

The Department of Defense, and the United States Government, are committed to providing the necessary resources, personnel, and equipment to our effort to resolve the remaining cases of unaccounted for individuals in Vietnam, as well as Laos and Cambodia. While we have been able to achieve closure for some families, we realize that there are many more families who remain hopeful that their prayers will also be answered. We have much work yet to be done, and our job is clearly far from over. Thank you.

Mr. DORNAN. I thank you, General. You absolutely couldn't summarize the way I asked you to. It was too detailed in what you were trying to tell us. But you did it in the fastest time possible.

Before I turn to questions from members of the subcommittee, I just want to say that I have a personal annoyance, not with you, but with referring to the Senate select committee, because there was a minority report and I go with the minority report—they would now be the majority, Senator Smith and his team. There were people on that staff that were compromised.

Francis Weinig went directly from that job to making money off Vietnamese trade. Disgraceful. Francis Weinig, disgraceful. There were memos uncovered that showed an unfair—I want to take a neutral word—an unfair cooperation between the Pentagon people assigned to this and the majority staff. Senator Kerrey, of course, had made his reputation on "Meet the Press," in fatigues, after throwing his Navy Cross at the Capitol, pulling for what he called the righteous forces in Indochina, the Communist government in Hanoi, sending 13-year-old children to die. I think that committee just about drove Senator Bob Smith to distraction, with the way they cooperated with the Vietnamese Government to get out a one-sided story. So I can understand you wanting to quote a Senate committee, but all I would ever quote, as this chairman, is the minority report from that committee and the fact that, unfortunately, it wasn't a joint committee and, unfortunately, there wasn't different leadership of the committee.

People making money off of trade, even before the committee shut down, is exactly the way I described it—disgraceful.

Let us go vote and then I will go to my committee members for questions, and then I will get to my own questions. The committee will be in short recess for a vote.

[Recess.]

Mr. DORNAN. The subcommittee is back in session.

Mr. Wiedemann and General Wold, I have questions for both of you that I would like to submit for the record and then turn to Mr. Pickett and see if he has any questions, because most of the questions I would ask again are of your team, your analysts. I can submit these to you and you can get them back to me, if you would please burn a little midnight oil, not much, to get it to me as fast as if I had asked you here now, because I know you want to get over to the family members across the river and you're supposed to speak over there at 4:00—is that right?

General WOLD. No, it's tomorrow. We've just got work to do.

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, OK. That's fine.

[Questions and answers referred to can be found on page 218–221.]

Let me turn to Mr. Pickett to see if he has any questions.

Mr. PICKETT. Just a couple, Mr. Chairman.

General Wold, I think you have seen this matrix of numbers here, dated as of March 29, 1996, listing down the different unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, and in Vietnam it gives the total as 1,609 as of March 1996.

I would just ask you, General, rather than you looking through the records and trying to answer, if you could update this schedule for our record with the most current data, it would be very much appreciated.

General WOLD. I'll do that, sir.

[The information referred to was submitted for the record:]

CURRENT AS OF: 9/3/96

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SUBJECT: VIETNAM-ERA UNACCOUNTED FOR STATISTICAL REPORT

BACKGROUND: The Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Service, and the Department of State report the current numbers of Americans who are unaccounted for in Southeast Asia:

Figure 1

AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

COMPONENT	COUNTRY OF LOSS *					TOTAL
	VN	VS	LA	CB	CH	
ARMY	10	506	110	36	0	662
NAVY	293	94	31	2	8	428
MARINE CORPS	31	208	22	14	0	275
AIR FORCE	253	184	283	19	0	739
COAST GUARD	0	1	0	0	0	1
CIVILIANS	0	23	13	5	0	41
Total	587	1016	459	76	8	2146

/N = VIETNAM, NORTH

/S = VIETNAM, SOUTH

/A = LAOS

/B = CAMBODIA

/H = CHINA

Mr. PICKETT. The other question I have is that there were some cases that had been identified by your office as ones that the Vietnamese should be able to provide data unilaterally that would be perhaps decisive in making the identification. It seems to me there were about 400 or so of those cases.

What progress is being made on those cases, and if no progress is being made, what is the problem in achieving the expected result there with the Vietnamese?

General WOLD. Sir, it may be early to determine that. We turned over those lists to them—I believe it was March, or it may have been February. I was over there in January also, but within the past 3 to 5 months, they have just received those lists. Recently they have received some additional information from JTF-FA concerning unilateral turnovers.

What I would certainly do is, as periodically through the next few months, as we receive an indication of the progress we're making, we can make a report to you on that. Today I'm not prepared to give you that kind of information. I think it's probably a little bit too early.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that covers the two areas that I was interested in pursuing with General Wold, and he's going to answer part of it for the record.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett.

General Wold, have you ever raised these Russian documents 1205 and 735 with the Vietnamese? Have you ever shown those documents to them? Did anybody specifically raise concern about these documents, and if you have one, what was their response?

General WOLD. I have, probably 18 months ago, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The response was a lot of excited rebuttal, I guess, in a nutshell. They denied that they had any knowledge as to the 1205—they didn't deny knowledge. They denied that the 1205 document, which turned up in the Russian archives, was a valid document.

We have raised it. It's still a matter of interest. I still consider it a document to pursue.

Mr. DORNAN. Your office has made a formal determination that it is a valid document?

General WOLD. The Russians have told us that they believe the document to be valid. However, they always qualify that with a statement that we can't vouch for the veracity of the report. That's been a standard line with the Russians.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. Wiedemann, can you explain to the committee what efforts you have made to seek those additional wartime records for Vietnam's Ministry of National Defense on Americans lost or captured in Laos, the ones captured in Laos by Vietnamese forces? They are all over northern Laos and all along the trail, like the people that built the pyramids. I mean, they were manpower heavy, and truck parks and rest stops and asphalt on some of it.

I remember one defector saying they had a field telephone every 100 yards. McNamara, in his own disgusting inimitable way, was dropping flower-shaped microphones along the trail, giving us docu-

ments of how some people at NSA claim they tracked prisoners being moved from some of the crashes.

What about that Ministry of National Defense? I think they used documents to compile the 559 documents that were turned over in 1993. Are we still asking for Ministry of National Defense records on Laos?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Oh, yes, sir, we are. On the first Presidential mission to which you refer, that occurred in 1993, we received the 559 document. It was really quite, we thought, quite a breakthrough getting that document, in the sense that it was probably the most palpable, fresh, obviously authentic document that they had conjured up out of their archives. It was water-stained. I remember it clearly had been stored for some time.

We looked at it preliminarily there in Hanoi, and later, of course, with much greater care back here in Washington and found out that, indeed, it was authentic. But still, it raised a lot of questions about the original reports that were generated at the time of the war that formed the summaries that were reflected in the 559 document which itself, also, was a product of the wartime era.

Since then, I would venture to say, in every contact we have had with Vietnamese authorities, and because POW/MIA, as I said at the outset, remains the highest priority we have with Vietnam, we have raised our desire to get more of these documents, including the background of the 559 documents related to Laos.

We met, for example, this last March on the last Presidential delegation with the Vice Minister of Defense and raised this issue along with the whole issue, generally, of the need for the Ministry of National Defense, along with the Ministry of Interior and that of Foreign Affairs, to continue to keep their nose to the grindstone and working with us, bilaterally, but very, very important, unilaterally, in coming up not only with documents but continuing to try to uncover remains from around Vietnam and other ways help us resolve these cases.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me make a request of both of you, for both sides of the aisle on this subcommittee. Unlike on the other side of the Capitol, with threats of subpoenas and wanting 3,000 documents released, and they get 1,000 and there's still 2,000 being held back, we're on track together now. When I ask for documents, you get them over as fast as you can. My chief of staff, John Chapla, has our classified room upstairs, on the third floor here. I went in there last night and went through all the documents on the Korean sightings by the Rumanians, which we'll discuss tomorrow. So if you could get me the original records—Remember, I'm one of only two people, out of 435, that chairs two committees. I chair the Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence. The NSA is under me. I was up there recently and I can go through everything up there. We've got top secret, the old Atomic Energy Commission rooms up inside the skirt of the dome of the Capitol. We've got this room upstairs. Send me the documents. They're secure. I would like to see the original records that constitute this 559.

I will submit, then, 11 questions for you, Mr. Wiedemann, and 13 questions for General Wold.

[The questions and answers referred to can be found on page 218-221.]

Mr. DORNAN. Before we bring our family members up, which always generates more thoughtful questions, I would like to call up in a few seconds Melinda Cooke, Warren Gray, who both have testified before this subcommittee before, Gary Snyder also, and I don't recall if Tim Castle has testified before us—Is Tim here? Yes, if Tim can come up.

You're welcome to stay, or if you have to get back to something else, you will get a blow-by-blow from them. But I would like to ask them some specific questions that I have worked out for the analysts.

Let me point out something that has to do with Korea and Vietnam that I have told you privately, General Wold, that I would like all the family members to hear.

In 1953, when I was a pre-cadet—and I think I'm going to go to the Library of Congress and research this name—a young Army psychiatrist came through Williams Air Force Base, and we were backlogged to go to pilot training, a wartime backlog that in peacetime they were looking for any excuse to wash us out before we even started. To keep us busy—we were all enlisted men, and they called us "pre-cadets"—they would give us occasional lectures.

The top leader of the Army psychiatrist team from Korea came by and gave us an hour's lecture that turned into several hours. He had done most of the interviewing of all of the people that had come back and had been brainwashed, signed germ warfare conventions, tortured, abused, and they were telling him there were live prisoners left behind without head injuries, with no amputations, with no amoebic or serious wasting dysentery. That's when I learned, just turning 20 years of age, that we left behind hundreds of men in Korea.

Now, obviously, that bothered me for many years, until February 7, 1970. Is Carol Bates still in the room? Carol was an eyewitness, so I have an eyewitness in the room along with my wife, Sally.

On the first "Robert K. Dornan Show," coming out of 1968 and 1969, two incredible fighting years in Vietnam, the POW bracelet was born. A friend of Carol's—she was a teenager and has worked on this issue ever since, 26 years—Kay Hunter, about to leave on a scholarship to Taiwan, walked up to this Montagnard bracelet that had never been off my wrist, and says, "Can I wear a POW bracelet?" I looked at her and said it's a Montagnard bracelet. Say that again. She says, "A POW bracelet, and couldn't we put an man's name on it?" I said, "Well, it would have to be flat."

I had bailed out twice in peacetime and I knew what a shoot down date or a missing date on the ground was. I said, "That's an excellent idea, a man's name with a shoot-down date", which is like a second birthday if you survive. "Let's do something with it."

We all went to work. I'm in gyms in West L.A. Gloria Compen, a wealthy lady, said "Can I have your idea?" I said, "Well, we all worked it out together. Run with it." She went to Ross Perot, and we gave him a sterling silver one that said for all the men, with the dates of the Vietnam war up to 1970. Ross Perot says do your own thing, as he always does. We raised piddling amounts of money, put out 30,000 the first year, 300,000 the next year, and 13 million before we were through.

Nineteen years ago this month, the now quite well-known negotiator for the Dayton Accords, Richard Holbrook, I meet him in the front yard of the American Embassy in Paris. I take off my POW bracelet. He was going in the embassy, in June of 1977, to talk with the Vietnamese about missing Americans; 19 years ago. I said, show them this bracelet. Tell them that hundreds of thousands, not millions any more maybe, but hundreds of thousands of Americans are still wearing this bracelet to remember these men. Do that for me, will you, please? I would love to go in there with you and talk to them.

Tucker Gulerman's body had not come back yet. That was later in the year when Sonny Montgomery and I picked it up in October at the airport, \$265 and change, all of his clothes back from the cleaners. He was tortured to death in a Saigon jail, because he was CIA. He was the mentor of Bill Buckley, tortured to death and died in the presence in the dead of night in front of David Jacobson, who has become a friend of mine. There is a thread that weaves through all these stories.

Richard Holbrook went in to meet with the Vietnamese. These people that you deal with, that you think are so forthcoming and honest with you, they were running some pretty rough reeducation camps. I call them concentration camps, summarily shooting people. The "killing fields" in Cambodia was just at its peak.

I got this bracelet back, or one like it—I think it was David Hrdlicka's bracelet—I get it back in a brown envelope 2 weeks later, and Richard Holbrook, of Bosnia and Dayton Accords fame, has a little hand note, "Sorry, Congressman. It never came up. We never brought up the POW's, so I never gave them your bracelet."

Gentlemen, 19 years is way too long to solve this, and obviously, 46 years since Korea. We're going to deal with one another as ladies and gentlemen, but I have a fundamental disagreement, so much so that I'm passionately, deeply desirous of Clinton's defeat on November 5. I think he's ripping our country apart. It's an administration shot through with not even pathological lying but deliberate lying and deception. So, 139 days from tomorrow, maybe we'll get something that will resolve this.

I accept your honor personally, that you're working hard on this, but I can't accept the conclusions, and we'll learn more about Korea tomorrow.

Thank you very much for your testimony, and thanks for your cooperation, General Wold, personally coming to see me whenever I asked you. If your four analysts could come forward, I would like to ask them questions.

If the four of you would please stand, for the aforementioned reasons, and raise your right hand.

Do each of you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee, in the matters now under consideration, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

[Collectively answer in affirmative.]

Mr. DORNAN. Warren, Mr. Gray, are you the senior analyst, not in analytical profession time, but in working on this problem?

Mr. GRAY. I'm the senior analyst with regard to Laos and Cambodia.

Mr. DORNAN. If I could, let me—forgive me for doing this, Mr. Gray, but I've got to do it. It's the reason for the hearings.

Are you personally satisfied that the Vietnamese Communists have provided all the records and documents concerning Americans lost in Laos?

Mr. GRAY. We can't say that we're satisfied with them because there have been no documents from the Vietnamese. There have been some documents, a small amount, with regard to American losses in Laos. We think the Lao and the Vietnamese have more and, of course, an effort is underway dramatically to get those documents.

Mr. DORNAN. I will not ask you the followup question, which is why I understand you took your time, and that is, do you personally—and that shouldn't come into this—believe in the full faith thing. But you've answered the first question straightforward, that there are more documents to come. So that's why an honorable combat officer like General Wold and this honorable Congressman can disagree on what full faith means. There are documents out there and this is what's driving the families to just a passionate distraction on what is full faith.

Remember what's coming out on Korea. And I was shocked that General Wold had not seen this BBC documentary. It is simply this:

In 1970, Israeli fighter pilots shot down four Russian pilots flying Egyptian MiGs. They actually had four pilots in their parachutes at the same time coming down over Egyptian territory. They had all the transcriptions, and I heard them in Tel Aviv at their pentagon, Russian voices, panicking in dog fights, getting shot down.

Now we find out from documents, and Russian fighter pilots being interviewed in living color on camera—and I've just seen it—that they ran the fighter pilot program in North Korea, that they were getting shot down at the rate of 7 or 8 to 1, and in early reports, 13 to 1. They would have been obsessively desirous of capturing an F-86. They did, too, one of the plane of a good friend of mine, Bud Mahearan, with 26 aerial victories, German, Japanese, and 5 in Korea, but only got credit for 4.

They got his plane. They would have obsessed on breaking F-86 Sabrejet pilots and getting their testimony. And now I've seen the documents. Pilots under stress, cooperating, drawing perfect maps of the entire ramp and runways and buildings at K-13, K-16, how our fighter tactics were worked out in the air, giving them everything they wanted, and a Russian looking into the camera saying, "Oh, yeah, we had an F-86 pilot and his plane come to the scientific technological academy in Moscow and give a lecture on the F-86" and we can't put that two and two together.

Now we find out that in the Vietnam war, after the *Pueblo* was taken, and a Czech major general, one of the highest ranking defectors ever, was in my office the night before last and told me a week before he defected, during the Tet offensive period, to put a time line on it, February 1968, he had been briefed that they were going to capture a U.S. ship, an intelligence ship, like the *Liberty* or the *Pueblo*, and they were going to do it as a Russian operation. So they get the *Pueblo* and North Korea says, "Oh, oh, we may be in this Vietnam war."

Isn't it sensible that they would say to the Vietnamese, "Hold out a couple of your pilots, your captured pilots, when they bail out. Don't put them in the prison camps. Treat them like ace Jim Lowe, or Knight, or Overly, or McCain, for a while. Separate them and send them to us up in Korea." Now we find out that people were exchanging our prisoners to Russia, to Korea, to Vietnam. This general told me, when he interviewed with the CIA in March 1968 and told them that the Czechs had built a hospital in North Korea where they were doing medical experiments on South Korean soldiers, on United States, Brits, other soldiers, does that have a ring of the camp in Harbin, Manchuria, Unit 731? Horrible war crimes, with experiments. He said I was laughed at and the CIA said they didn't want to know anything about that.

He says, well, how about the strategic plan in Eastern Europe, worked out over the next 10 years, from a major general. "We don't want to know about that. We want to know about simple street things." And then Kissinger fired him within 1 week after Nixon becoming President 10 months later. This is incredible stuff. I happen to believe this man, after 2 hours.

Now, guess what? Ten or fifteen years later, guess what turns up in North Korea? The Czech-built hospital. To this member, that's a smoking gun, and this man was telling the truth and nobody gave a damn then or now. That's why I'm going to have him in the room, I hope, tomorrow.

This man was discredited by both parties' intelligence operations over the past years. They gave him \$50,000 and said, "You'll love Lake George in upstate New York. Get out of town." This was after 10 months, and it took him 5 years to work his way back.

Let me ask you a couple more questions, Warren, given that I've got Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia all running together, looking for this tragic thread.

When you testified before this committee last November, you indicated that Vietnam had demonstrated some knowledge concerning over 250 unaccounted Americans from Laos, but they have not turned over any information unilaterally. Do you still hold that view, or are we still dead in the water?

Mr. GRAY. They have not turned over anything since then. Once the scrub was done, or the comprehensive review was done, we passed to them listings of cases that we thought they can provide records. So that's being asked for.

Mr. DORNAN. So in that subset, there doesn't seem to be full faith, what everybody is rolling the dice and hoping more will be forthcoming, right?

In other words, 2 years from now, if nothing comes forth on this, or a year from now, that couldn't be called full faith, could it?

Mr. GRAY. Not at all.

Mr. DORNAN. Not at all. Thanks, Mr. Warren Gray.

Do you believe the book has been closed on the Baron 52 case?

Mr. GRAY. I can't answer that question. My personal opinion is no, that we need to look further as to what happened.

Mr. DORNAN. I had the wife of one of the two senior technicians, super-NSA type technicians, feeding information from Lima Site 85. She's with us in the audience—two wives, actually. One wife, her husband was shot, and other people identified him as being

wounded, saying here I am, and a helicopter did go back, courageously, an hour or two later to pick up this one sole remaining survivor on the top of this incredible, super secret TACAN radar site, directing all of our F-105's from central Thailand.

Do you believe the Pathet Lao have given a full knowledge of what happened at Lima Site 85? I know some of your technicians have walked the ground there on that plateau. Have you?

Mr. GRAY. I have not actually been at Pu Pot Ti or Lima Site 85, not at all. Dr. Tim Castle has.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me just go to you for 1 second, Tim. You have walked the real estate, an incredible site, kind of like visiting the Alamo within years after the battle there.

Do you believe the Pathet Lao have come clean with full knowledge on that incident, as far as did they capture any prisoners and hold them for their technical knowledge?

Mr. CASTLE. Sir, we have only had very limited discussions with people that we believe would be knowledgeable in that area.

Mr. DORNAN. OK. I learned about that about a year or two later from an historian that had too much to drink, who at Siam Intercontinental told me the story. I couldn't believe what I was hearing. An incredible story. Scaling a sheer cliff, the Vietnamese, to get at it, bombing it with Russian biplanes, Antonov II Colts, an incredible story, with hand-to-hand fighting, people slinging themselves over the side of the cliff in hammocks, trying to hide from the Pathet Lao, with them dropping grenades to explode in mid-air next to them. An incredible story.

Let me ask you first, then, Tim. Are you satisfied that Gen. Trung Muc provided credible information? He himself talked to you, right?

Mr. CASTLE. No, sir. I did the interview with General Sinkapao, who was Lao. Trung Muc is someone who has been represented to us by the Vietnamese as having been the leader of the attack on Lima Site 85.

Mr. DORNAN. If you see the movie, "The Longest Day," or read far more accurate accounts like Stephen Ambrose's book, you realize that allies sometimes work very well together and coordinate everything, every shred of intelligence.

The thread I'm looking for here is Soviet, Czech, Korean, Vietnamese, Pathet Lao cooperation, where they are obsessing to get at our intelligence. There are reports that the Soviets airlifted material off Lima 85, preparing for a possible war in Europe. The big one, world war III.

Have you ever been satisfied that the Soviets did or did not do that?

Mr. CASTLE. Sir, I have been told by people that there is a possibility that the Soviets may have been involved in helicopter operations in northern Laos during the war.

Mr. DORNAN. And probably Soviet crews flew the Antonov II Colts, the biplanes, that tried to bomb?

Mr. CASTLE. No, sir. My information is that they were flown by Vietnamese pilots.

Mr. DORNAN. Vietnamese pilots, taking out a TACAN site in Laos because we're bombing them. That's totally understandable on their part.

A couple more questions, because we're going to submit a whole series of questions to you.

Have you personally met Gen. Trung Muc?

Mr. CASTLE. Once again, sir, General Sinkapao is the Laotian commander who I interviewed in 1990. Trung Muc——

Mr. DORNAN. Is a Vietnamese.

Mr. CASTLE. He is a Vietnamese, who was a lieutenant at the time of the attack in 1968.

Mr. DORNAN. A lieutenant who worked his way up to a general officer status——

Mr. CASTLE. No, sir. He retired as a lieutenant colonel. We are told by the Vietnamese that he's a retired lieutenant colonel.

Mr. DORNAN. And we had Americans personally interview him about the incident there? This will help me for——

Mr. CASTLE. Yes, sir. He was interviewed by an American debriefer.

Mr. DORNAN. I will ask you and Warren this.

Based on your years of involvement in this—how many years, Tim, have you worked on this?

Mr. CASTLE. I have been in DPMO for about a year and a half. I was with Stony Beach——

Mr. DORNAN. Field experience.

Mr. CASTLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. How many years all together in analyzing Indochina?

Mr. CASTLE. Probably about 15 years total. I have a doctorate in Southeast Asian history, so if you include the academic time, it would come up to——

Mr. DORNAN. Excellent. I certainly would.

Warren, how many years would you say for yourself?

Mr. GRAY. I was in JCRC in 1973 and 1974, in Thailand, and then with DIA and now DPMO since 1984.

Mr. DORNAN. All right. This is not a loaded question, just straightforward.

Based on your years of involvement in this issue, do you believe that the governments of Vietnam and Laos—this is personal for me—could provide additional information on the fate of Col. David Hrdlicka or Colonel Shelton, known to be POW's for years in Laos? Do you think there is still information they could give us on Shelton and Hrdlicka?

Mr. GRAY. I think it's a given that certainly the Pathet Lao can provide further information on David Hrdlicka and Charles Shelton, primarily because these two Americans were held at the Pathet Lao headquarters in the caves at Vihn Phu in northeastern Laos. They have to know what happened to these folks.

Mr. DORNAN. Held at the headquarters. So when they take Ann Griffiths, sweltering through that humid heat, on a trip to the other side of the world, and members of your team, out to some so-called gravesites under a cliff, and say that American bombs made direct hits and atomized their bones and remains, nobody believes that, that that was a wild goose chase out to this so-called gravesite?

Mr. GRAY. Well, they have pointed out, with witnesses that have come forward—I guess a minimum of four different gravesites,

grave areas. Of course, we have gone to every one of them and tried recovery operations and found nothing.

Mr. DORNAN. "When at first we practice to deceive, what a tangled web we weave." Liars always get caught up because they're lying.

That's the first time I learned this. I'm sure Carol Hrdlicka, who is here, will not be pleased to hear that four different sites have been passed off by people who had the information.

Tim, have you worked on the Charles Shelton or David Hrdlicka cases at all?

Mr. CASTLE. No, sir, not personally. I have been in the caves at Vinh Phu and up in that area, but I have not worked on those cases.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me turn to Miss Cooke for a second because you gave such good, straightforward testimony before, that you felt we were, to use current street language, having our chain jerked around on this.

Has anything happened, since you first wrote the report, that there was obviously, in Laos, an attempt to deceive us, because of what people said right on the site with some of our investigation teams, has there been anything more forthcoming or have we developed any new valuable intelligence since you wrote that report?

Ms. COOKE. Sir, I'm not sure what report you're referring to. I don't think I ever said that.

Mr. DORNAN. What is your field of study?

Ms. COOKE. I'm Vietnam.

Mr. DORNAN. I'm sorry.

Ms. COOKE. I think you might have me mixed up with another analyst.

Mr. DORNAN. I did.

Mr. Sydow, who was the analyst that—

Mr. SYDOW. Captain Caughlin.

Mr. DORNAN. That's right, Captain Caughlin.

Miss Cooke, do you feel something has happened significantly in the last year or two, after we took testimony before just this subcommittee, not to mention the Senate Select Committee, mainly at the request of Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire, do you feel there has been some breakthrough in the last 2 years that would make inoperative all these statements that the Vietnamese Communists were not negotiating in good faith?

Have you, as an analyst, come across something that looks more forthcoming?

Ms. COOKE. I think our relationship has steadily improved. I began this job right before the joint investigations were underway in Vietnam, and there's really a big difference between the first iterations in 1988 and now. We have a completely different atmosphere. We are getting cooperation; we are able to work together.

In the last year or so, we have gotten a large number of documents, many of which are wartime and post-war documents that are particularly valuable. I think they have utility for accounting for missing men. I think they are cooperating with us and we are working together better than we ever have.

Personally, I think the best way we're going to get more is to continue that relationship. I haven't seen any change that coopera-

tion has lessened. In fact, it is quite the opposite. I am rather optimistic that continuing the engagement and continuing down the process that we now have underway is going to pay off for us.

I can't say that it's—you know, this is a slow issue. We're not promising big results soon. But I think, incrementally, this is the way to make progress.

Mr. DORNAN. Obviously, applying logic, if we shut down, we get nothing. But then there's Chairman Gilman's statement here earlier, that there's a monetary incentive to drag this out. That's what I would like to ask Mr. Gary Sydow.

Gary, for people who are new to this subcommittee, there are some Korean-Arab people who have never had a chance to come to the District of Columbia, they're not COIN-assisted airfare by the Pentagon so they're here on their own. They wanted to come to this committee.

How many years experience do you have now?

Mr. SYDOW. Twenty-some, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Twenty-some.

Mr. Sydow, the Central Committee records on POW's, it's now a year later since you testified that none of them have been turned over. Have any such records been provided, or any part thereof?

Mr. SYDOW. No, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Politburo records?

Mr. SYDOW. Now, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. And you're still of the opinion that they're sitting there in some air-conditioned room, not being eaten by bugs or molded by the weather?

Mr. SYDOW. No, sir. In a letter—my views were phrased in a recent letter to a colleague of yours. I don't think that's the best place to ask for records. That's part of Vietnam's policy and political structure, which I don't find the most likely place to go ask for records concerning our missing.

Mr. DORNAN. When I took the first group of wives, in January 1970—I kind of felt like this Robert K. Dornan Show was a reward from Heaven for just quitting my whole career, with nothing on the line, a 4-hour daytime television show—to take Carol Hanson, the first president of the League, and four marine and three Air Force wives around the world, through Moscow. Clinton was going to a big banquet on January 2 while we were being arrested in a hotel, with no heating, 26 degrees below zero, with 10 inches of snow cover, and he's just a student touring Moscow University. That's why I never believed that story. It was the dinner, with Eugene McCarthy being touted, thanking him and students like Clinton for the fall offensive, title by Hanoi "The Fall Offensive," coordinated demonstrations, pro-Hanoi, in every major European capital, and in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, and New York.

I took those wives into Laos, into Cambodia. We would go to the Russian Embassies, the Chinese Embassy—the North Koreans wouldn't let us in. They wouldn't let Bob Hope in within a year, a year later. But I remember meeting a Russian, Valentin, who left the Embassy and walked us down a road. I have pictures of him talking alone on a dusty road in Vientiane, Laos, to the future

president of the League of Families, Carol Hanson, now Hickerson. She married a Navy POW. Never got back Steve Hanson.

The reason the Russian met with her was because I had touched them. I said, "Here's what we're here for, Colonel. You've had skirmishes along the Chinese border. You have Russian soldiers missing in action. If you came to an embassy in the United States, or one of our embassies overseas, and said you didn't want them released, you just wanted to know whether they're alive or dead, wouldn't that touch your heart? I would do that for a Soviet soldier captured along the Chinese border. I know I would."

He looked at me and he said, "May I talk to one of the ladies alone?" And they went for this walk down the road. For all I know, he was very forthcoming. He said he would check when he got back to Moscow. Maybe it cost him his career, if not his life. That was 1970, 19 years before the Berlin wall came down.

Do you have any doubt in your mind at all, as a senior analyst, that Hanoi was crawling with Russians during the whole war, since they paid for 95 percent of it?

Mr. SYDOW. There were significant numbers of Russian advisers, yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Wouldn't they be the same type of skilled people that would spend some time in Pyongyang and in other capitals?

Mr. SYDOW. I have no expert—

Mr. DORNAN. It's a fair speculation. But you see where you will specialize in an area—you see my problem as the chairman with some historical background here, because now the information is coming out of the Soviet Union, more slowly than it was a few years ago.

Tomorrow I'm going to bore in on something that makes me emotionally sick, that we had a window of opportunity from 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994, where people, out of guilt, were dying to talk about things, and the way we have approached it, bureaucratically, at the highest levels, we have caused windows to be slammed, archives to be locked up, people to "dummy up", and now people like General Volkogonov are dying on us and we've lost an opportunity.

When I see Russian fighter pilots, who are general officers, who were captains and majors at the time, all in Chinese clothes in Beijing on their way to run the air battle in North Korea, then I wonder how many Russians flew in air combat in Vietnam, to test themselves and train themselves for a possible war in Europe.

Do you have any questions, Mr. Pickett, because I'm going to submit all the rest of mine so we can get some family members up here.

Mr. PICKETT. A followup matter, Mr. Chairman.

Miss Cooke, when you were here before, if I recall correctly, you stated that some provincial records had at that time been recently turned over to your office, and that you were beginning to review those, and that it appeared they may have some data that had not heretofore been given to your office.

Could you elaborate and tell us where that's leading?

Ms. COOKE. Well, we have had, especially in 1995, there were provincial records, records out of a few districts. They are wartime and immediate post-war records. They are particularly valuable.

They're internal Vietnamese documents, made for their own consumption, and they're really very credible. They help us to understand what the Vietnamese knew and what we will ultimately be able to accomplish in the way of accounting for our missing men.

They have given us graves documents. Most of those turn out to relate to individuals whose remains have already been returned and identified. But it's very interesting for us to make sure that we assess to be sure we have gotten everything that the Vietnamese were able to get themselves. That's what those documents are helping us come to understand.

There are a few instances where there is locational data in those documents that helps our joint investigating teams. The more documents we can get, the better. We think we have come upon a way where we seem to be getting better production.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. PICKETT. Are you still in the process—Have you completed the work, or are you still in the process of reviewing the documents?

Ms. COOKE. We have reviewed the documents rather thoroughly and applied them—As soon as we get documents, we review them immediately for application to individual cases, because we want to feed that information back into the case investigation as quickly as possible. Then we like to step back and say what does that tell us globally about a certain jurisdiction, because these are prepared by, for instance, a district or a province. If we can then take all the documents from that district or province and look at them together, it gives us a bigger picture of what's going on within a certain geography. That is still underway.

Mr. PICKETT. So you only have these for one province?

Ms. COOKE. No, we have them for several provinces.

Mr. PICKETT. For what period of time?

Ms. COOKE. Well, I believe we got some isolated documents that are wartime. I hope I remember this correctly, but we got some in the immediate post-war period—

Mr. PICKETT. You can answer this for the record, if you wish.

Ms. COOKE. All right. I had better do that.

Mr. PICKETT. I am very interested as to where this is leading you. You did make the remark that you thought some of this data may ultimately tell us how much additional data we can expect in the way of confirmation from the Vietnamese.

Ms. COOKE. I think it helps us understand what the Vietnamese originally—the kind of records the Vietnamese originally created, and then what we can ever expect to find. I mean, if they never created it, we're never going to find it. So it gives us a more realistic expectation of what might be available when everything is found.

Mr. PICKETT. I appreciate it very much if you could summarize this in a way that would tell us how extensive the coverage is, province by province, whether you got 10 percent or 20 percent or 50 percent of the provinces.

Ms. COOKE. We can do that.

Mr. PICKETT. And then what time periods are covered, so we would know whether you're covering the war period during which most of these incidents would have occurred.

Ms. COOKE. All right, we can do that.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett.

Have any of the four of you seen the BBC documentary on American pilots going to Russia? This is from Korea. Have you seen it, Warren?

Mr. GRAY. I have not seen it.

Mr. DORNAN. I talked to Colonel Young in my office about this the other day. I brought the BBC documentary, and it's a little less than an hour. I would ask all of you, even though this is a different war and a different issue—not a different issue, the same generic issue, but a different war—if I give Colonel Young this copy, could you all sit down, as an intellectual exercise, and look at this documentary, for this reason:

It shows you, beyond the shadow of a doubt, with Russians in uniform, general officers being interviewed and showing visually the maps of what our captured Sabrejet pilots drew for their captors under interrogation. It will show you how the Soviets, as the main dog of the Communist world, thinking they were riding high and would soon have the entire planet Earth under their control, you see how extensively they were involved in Korea.

There is no reason, extending it logically, that they wouldn't have had the same intense interest, since they were spending 95 percent of the money on Vietnam, that they wouldn't have the same interest in the air war there. The Vietnamese started out with old MiG-19's, two-engine, slow MiG-19's, transonic, and pretty soon it was the biggest combat in the world, with MiG-21's, and the kill ratio was reversed, because they were doing to us what the British Spitfire pilots and Hurricane pilots did to German bombers: hit and run, Hit and run, hitting them out of the Sun, which McNamara allowed them to do, total MiG sanctuaries, even in Vietnam I'm talking about, and China is a major sanctuary. Then they would shoot down an F-105 loaded with bombs and get out of there the minute somebody tried to engage them. That was all creating Russian doctrine, Soviet doctrine.

Please look at this film. I think it will give you an insight of how hard it is to find the truth in a repressive regime, and contemplate what Chairman Gilman said, that they are stretching this out. Of course, the cooperation has to be incrementally better, quarter to quarter, but if we look at the results, given that we have a diminishing number of missing-in-action cases, there is a credible case to be made by honorable people that they're jerking us around. And since Lenin was the father of lies, who said a lie for the cause was not a lie, and that we're dealing with Communists, and this is what drives the families to anger, we must always keep in reserve that we're talking to a system based on lies, during the period when they were killing tens of thousands of people, executing 58,000 people who dared to work with us as their ally by death lists that we left in deserting the Embassy.

Our pullout of Vietnam remains one of the most disgraceful incidents in American history. We left the death list for them to pick up off the floor of the Embassy, and they summarily executed people. That is so unknown to European and American experience, the way they abuse prisoners, that we will fixate on Mylai from 1968 to now, where Gen. Colin Powell still wears his Americal combat patch from his service in the 23d Division.

Let me send this over. I will send it to your attention. If you want to go over with it, Mr. Santoli, so we can get it back, or we could always have another print made from the BBC. Look at this. I think you will see the frustration of the families. If I were Ted Turner, I would promo this for 1 month and run it in prime time on CNN, and let all of America see Soviet general officers willing to talk profusely about what they did, and then backing it up with scrapbook pictures of them in noninsignia uniform in Beijing, on their way.

As people have said to me, including Sam Johnson, one of our greatest war heroes serving in Congress, the key always comes back to Beijing. The Russians had to transit through China. The North Koreans owed their very existence to China. The whole peninsula would be liberated if they hadn't entered the war in November 1950. The Chinese ran the anti-aircraft program, shooting down our planes, while the Russians picked up the tab for the other 95 percent. McCain will tell you that Russian trawler intelligence ships patterned after the *Liberty* and the *Pueblo*, tracking our carriers, calling in how many planes have taken off the deck, which carrier, and when they'll be due across the beach. I mean, what a bizarre period of American history. So I will send that over.

Any other questions I have I will submit to you. Please get them back to me within reason, as far as you can, and I thank the panel for joining us again today.

The next panel will be Jo Anne Shirley, chairman of the board, National League of POW/MIA Families; Dolores Alfond, chairperson of the National Alliance of POW/MIA Families; Ann Holland, wife of U.S. Air Force missing-in-action Sgt. Mel Holland, a highly trained intelligence expert from that plateau in Northern Laos, that TACAN site that controlled all of our bombing into Route Pac 5 and 6 in North Vietnam.

Also back again before the subcommittee is Garnett "Bill" Bell, former Director of the United States POW/MIA office in Vietnam, and then George J. Veith, researcher.

If my five panelists would rise and raise your right hand. Do each of you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give before the subcommittee in the matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

[Witnesses answer collectively in the affirmative.]

Mr. DORNAN. Please be seated.

We will just go clockwise from my position, starting with Mrs. Shirley. Please, if you can, because of the time factor, summarize your statements. Of course, your full statement will be part of the permanent record.

Proceed, Miss Shirley.

**STATEMENT OF JO ANNE SHIRLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF POW/MIA FAMILIES**

Ms. SHIRLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I do welcome this opportunity to make my first appearance before this subcommittee. I follow a steady stream of former and current league officials who have provided testimony since the league was founded well before the Vietnam war was over, in May 1970.

Although we deeply appreciate your continued interest and willingness to focus attention on this issue, the timing is especially difficult. Tomorrow morning, we begin our 27th National League of Families annual meeting, and final details require my involvement. As you have attended many of these annual meetings, you know the complexity and the scope of these preparations. I have supplied my full testimony and I will try to be brief.

Regrettably, I must leave. I would ask that you please leave the record open in case I do have to leave after my testimony, so that any questions that might be asked of me, I might supply the answers if I have to leave before we are finished.

Mr. DORNAN. We will do that.

Ms. SHIRLEY. Thank you.

The topic of this hearing, the certification by President Clinton that Vietnam is "cooperating in full faith" with the United States to resolve this issue, is critical. Everyone with knowledge of the facts, with knowledge of successive intelligence assessments and knowledge of this administration's record, knows that the President's decision is unwarranted.

Before providing our views on President Clinton's inaccurate determination, I would like to share a few examples showing how we and the issue we represent have been treated by this administration.

Despite President Clinton's repeated assurances and commitments that, like Presidents Reagan and Bush, POW/MIA accounting is the highest priority objective in dealing with Vietnam, this administration has adopted the rhetoric but not the seriousness or the commitment.

First, the families are no longer viewed as partners, those for whom the U.S. Government is seeking answers, but as customers who mean little, are owed nothing, and are to be patronized.

Unlike official delegations from 1982 to 1992, the league has been excluded from all delegations except the public ones involving veterans groups and excluded from serious or timely input to such delegations.

Mr. DORNAN. Since what year?

Ms. SHIRLEY. From 1982 to 1992, we were included. Since that time, we are an afterthought with these delegations.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

Ms. SHIRLEY. Experienced linguist investigators, regional specialists, have been removed from in-country investigations. Those still involved at DIA's Stony Beach office in Bangkok are restricted from performing the crucial tasks that they can do best to help us get accountability.

The POW/MIA Interagency Group, formed in 1980, which had league representation since its inception, was immediately dis-

banded by this administration. Everyone has the responsibility, yet no one does. We call State and they defer to DOD as the lead agency. We call DOD and they defer to CINCPAC/JTF-FA's joint field operations process. If we inquire of JTF-FA, they routinely tell us it's a policy matter and we need to contact DOD.

We know that field operations alone cannot get the results in many cases. Yet, if we criticize, we are accused of maligning the hard-working, dedicated troops in the field. That is not so. All of this is due to disbanding of the IAG and the lack of serious policy, coordination, and cooperation.

Long-accepted definitions were changed for political expedience, to demonstrate progress that wasn't really valid. For example, the definition of unilateral repatriation of remains by Vietnam now means bone fragments turned over to field operators during joint activities, rather than identifiable remains turned over by the Government of Vietnam.

Unidentified remains are now counted as repatriations by Vietnam. The Vietnamese always used that counting method as a propaganda ploy, but never the United States Government, unless identified as American, until this administration.

Excavations have been conducted at crash sites where United States intelligence indicates remains were already recovered by Vietnamese authorities. What kind of signal does that send to Vietnam? What motivation does it give Vietnam to unilaterally turn over remains being held? Why would they risk possible criticism when they can keep the money coming and achieve their economic and political objectives with the willing assistance from this administration?

Procedures for identification of our missing relatives' remains, including the roles of CILHI, qualified consultants, and the Armed Forces Identification Review Board, have been altered, removing protection for the families. Though the changes were approved on August 31, 1995, we were not even notified and the families have yet to receive a copy of those changes in procedure.

The analytic community's judgments are now compromised and give a spin to serve political objectives. Even the President's recent determination that Vietnam is cooperating in full faith was not the judgment of the POW/MIA intelligence community, but the decision of policy-level officials going full speed ahead on the administration's real objective, which I believe to be normalization of economic and diplomatic relations.

When he lifted the trade embargo, the President promised our executive director, Ann Mills Griffiths, that before any further steps were taken to improve relations with Vietnam, the White House would consult with the league and with veterans groups. This promise has been ignored at every step since that time, including normalization of relations, opening a United States Embassy in Hanoi, and the naming of a United States Ambassador to Vietnam.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Clinton told her that personally at the White House?

Ms. SHIRLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Proceed.

Ms. SHIRLEY. Every year, the President has been invited to address the annual meeting. Not only have our invitations been declined, but he has never even met with our board of directors in the 3 years he has been President.

Every U.S. President since the end of the war, except Presidents Carter and Clinton, has spoken to the league or at least met with the league board. Late last week——

Mr. DORNAN. Excuse me, Jo Anne. In 4 years—I did not know this—President Carter never came to address the league?

Ms. SHIRLEY. President Carter or President Clinton.

Mr. DORNAN. All right. Proceed.

Ms. SHIRLEY. Late last week, for the first time since I have been involved in this for 23½ years, we were notified that there will not even be an administration keynote speaker at the opening session of our annual meeting this year.

This administration doesn't even include the league on its guest list for ceremonies such as the wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknowns, the first administration to exclude us since the Vietnam Unknown, one of our own relatives, was interred at the tomb.

The last example I would like to cite comes from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. This past Sunday, on David Brinkley's news program, when asked by George Will about Government efforts on POW/MIA's, Secretary Talbott referred to seeking answers for us as a "residue of the war in Southeast Asia."

Mr. DORNAN. Pause right there.

I was watching, and came to full attention. He was asked basically about North Korea—I guess I had generated that by releasing a document that I thought America should know about. It had "official business" on it, but it was subject to a Freedom of Information request anyway because it was over a year old, the basic research in it. The story was from 1979, about live Americans in Korea. So I came to full attention.

It was interesting that he brought up Southeast Asia. Keep in mind he is the man who admitted, in a two-page essay, on April 6, 1992, that he had chanted, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many babies did you kill today?"

In that same two-page essay, defending Clinton's actions at Oxford, and claiming, through convoluted logic, he had not dodged the draft. He admitted that he played vigorous rugby on the soccer fields of Oxford while a 4F himself. Clinton lived on the floor of his apartment, his second year at Oxford, at 43 Lettner Road, without ever having registered to go to school but drawing his Rhodes Scholarship money.

Strobe Talbott, I believe, far more than Warren Christopher—because he goes for those long, beachside walks at Hilton Head every New Year's weekend for the past 4 or 5 years with Mr. Clinton—I believe he is the gray eminence.

So I came to attention when he was asked this question about Korean stories. He brought up Southeast Asia—isn't that the way he referred to it? I've got his transcript here. And then he did refer to it as the "residue of the war in Southeast Asia."

It's interesting that he's probably the one who makes the call that no State Department people, or anybody in the administration, will show up at a league or Alliance of Families meeting.

By the way, Dolores, everything that Jo Anne has read applies, of course, to the alliance? You've never been invited to anything?

Ms. ALFOND. He has been invited but has not accepted.

Mr. DORNAN. No, I mean you've never been invited to anything, anybody from the Alliance of Families, and nobody has shown up at your meetings, either?

Ms. ALFOND. No.

Mr. DORNAN. Okay. Proceed, Mrs. Shirley.

Ms. SHIRLEY. So we have been referred to as "customers" and "residue." Is that an indication of serious priority? Does that match the President's rhetoric that progress on POW/MIA accounting is the governing criteria with Vietnam? Of course, not. But I believe Secretary Talbott stumbled unexpectedly into the truth as to how the administration views this issue.

This administration must think that we never listen to or understand official presentations, and that we are ignorant of the results of repeated intelligence assessments and analysis.

This administration seems proud to state that no remains returned since 1990 show evidence of long-term storage. This is a policy failure, not a success to brag about. Mr. Chairman, what happened to the others, to those that we can't account for in the figures we were debating before with General Wold? How can anyone, much less the President of the United States, determine that Vietnam is cooperating in full faith?

Despite all this data, the administration's rationale for each step to help to Vietnam is that Hanoi's cooperation is "superb, unprecedented, outstanding, excellent," and just about every other superlative you can think of, while asserting that he is doing it for us, the families, to generate even more such wonderful cooperation—a total of 85 accounted for by this administration, 44 from Laos, 37 from Vietnam, and 4 from Cambodia.

It is ironic that the Clinton administration has accounted for more people lost in Laos than in Vietnam, this despite the greater difficulty, the fact that nearly 85 percent of United States losses in Laos were in areas where Vietnamese forces operated during the war, and the fact that Vietnam had such an effective wartime and post-war system for collection and retention of all remains and information related to United States POW's and casualties.

Mr. DORNAN. Miss Shirley, would you pause for just 1 second?

I'm going to ask you—and believe me, I want to hear every word, and I will read your testimony fully, and this goes for all the witnesses—but because of time constraints, if you could summarize a little bit, and if you miss anything as the others are testifying, come back and add any highlights.

I wanted to add a point that I meant to interrupt the first panel on. On part of these identifications, there's an overlap. If we had bipartisan continuity here and there wasn't room for criticism for all Presidents, all the way back to a hero of mine, President and five-star general Eisenhower, the continuity wouldn't be a problem.

But some of the people being claimed as identified remains, under Clinton, were remains that were brought home under Reagan.

Ms. SHIRLEY. That's right.

Mr. DORNAN. I knew you wanted me to make that point. They sat in the CIL, with hard-working people under Colonel Jimmy Woods. They sat there for all that time, and then they would take a half-a-tooth and decide well, maybe it's time to declare this one.

So I'm going to have to go back, without splitting hairs, and really determine how many identifications there were under the 85 or so, that were purely retrieved, heroes remains, and identified all in the last 3½ years. But if you could help me with that.

I just want to refer to something else that I wanted to ask Mr. Wiedemann. He said—and I could see some of you family members flinch—that the Vietnamese are not only cooperating fully, but sincerely, with great energy. Then he said it's a sacred promise that Clinton made to you, so sacred that they don't even supply some low-level bureaucrat to come and speak to you.

Now, I'm not making the administration's case, but maybe they recall that in 1992, George Bush elicited some emotion from family members at a league meeting, and my good friend—and he knew it was wrong the minute it happened—looked out and said, "Shut up and sit down."

The liberal media loved this. It was on all three network programs, probably all the next day on CNN. But they loved showing a Navy carrier pilot with 58 missions saying, "Shut up and sit down." It hurt, and there was no way he could unravel that. But I'm sure they're making a political calculation that they're not going to run the risk of sending a speaker to you this year. I won't fault them for it because of what they just did a few weeks ago, saying they are fully cooperating, sincerely, with great energy. But to not have sent a representative or have gone himself in 1993, 1994 and 1995, that really is shocking. I feel the hand of Strobe Talbott advising don't do it.

OK. See if you can speed up the end of your statement, and then we'll go to Dolores.

Ms. SHIRLEY. I believe what this administration has done with this certification is a national disgrace. I think the families and our missing men certainly deserve better, and so does our national honor.

I believe that what our expectations are very reasonable. They are based on information that has been provided to us on our cases by our own U.S. Government intelligence database.

Vietnam has clearly not yet made the decision to be fully forthcoming. In 1994, the league delegation took an entire folder from the United States Government, full of data, including photographs, to Hanoi, and presented it to Vietnamese leaders, on cases that they could easily reach an accounting for. When the Government of Vietnam begins to account for these individuals, then we will be willing to discuss whether they are cooperating in full faith. These are the easy ones.

Two quick things. One, included in the information that I gave you was the analysis of the March delegation's trip by the league and the veterans organizations, versus the one that was presented

to Congress from the Clinton administration. When they made their presentation and filed their report, it was under the auspices that this was a consensus by everyone who went. They didn't even show it to the veterans groups or the league before they presented this, and we have some gross discrepancies on how we view the delegation and how they view the delegation. Both of them have been provided to you, and I hope that you will look at them and observe what their differences are.

I will close by saying that we feel an urgency about getting this issue resolved. We have family members that are dying. My father passed away 2 years ago with absolutely no knowledge of what happened to my brother. We are dying while the Government of Vietnam is being asked to just take next step actions. Each action that they take will be counted, like a little tally mark against their name. Using the new definition, as I referred to before, as more unilateral cooperation, Vietnam will again be given credit for full faith cooperation. That will leave the President to take another step that will be beneficial to Vietnam. It might be most-favored-nation status, or confirming the newly nominated Ambassador to Vietnam.

We understand that there is significant pressure to confirm him, and we hope that before that is done we give Vietnam a chance for their Politburo to meet and to discuss the commitments that were made to the delegation in March, that they would increase unilateral efforts, to give them an opportunity to respond to the cases that were given to them under the scrub turned over by DPMO before we do a confirmation and move forward on the normalization process.

We could wallpaper this room, sir, with commitments that have been made by the Vietnamese and this administration that have not been followed through on. We hope that this issue will not be moved by what is economically and politically expedient, but on the merits of our own database and where we actually stand on accountability and cooperation, real cooperation, by Vietnam.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Shirley follows:]

TESTIMONY OF
JO ANNE SHIRLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF POW/MIA FAMILIES
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
JUNE 19, 1996

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gilman, Members of the Committee..... I welcome the opportunity to make my first appearance before this Subcommittee. I follow a steady stream of former and current League officials who have provided testimony since the League was formed well before the end of the Vietnam War, in May, 1970. I know that you understand how frustrating it is for us that such hearings are still necessary after so many years. We deeply appreciate your continued interest and willingness to focus attention on the issue.

The topic of this hearing, certification by President Clinton that Vietnam is "cooperating in full faith" with the United States to resolve this issue, is critical. Everyone with knowledge of the facts, successive intelligence assessments and this Administration's record knows that the President's decision was unwarranted.

Before providing our views on President Clinton's inaccurate determination, I would like to provide a few examples of how we and the issue we represent have been treated by this Administration. Despite President Clinton's repeated assurances and commitments that, like Presidents Reagan and Bush, POW/MIA accounting is the highest priority objective in dealing with Vietnam, this Administration adopted the rhetoric, but not the seriousness or commitment. Just a few examples will make my point.

- First, the families are no longer viewed as partners, those for whom the U.S. Government is seeking answers, but as "customers" who mean little, are owed nothing and are to be patronized.
- Unlike official delegations from 1982 - 1992, the League has been excluded from all delegations except public ones with veterans groups and excluded from serious or timely input to such delegations.
- Experienced linguist investigators, regional specialists, have been removed from in-country investigations. Those still involved at DIA's Stony Beach office in Bangkok, are restricted from performing the crucial tasks that they can do best to help us get accountability.
- The POW/MIA Interagency Group, formed in 1980, which had League representation since its inception, was disbanded by this Administration. Everyone has the responsibility, yet no one does. We call State, they defer to DoD as the lead agency. We call DoD, they defer to CINCPAC/JTF-FA's joint field operations process. If we inquire of JTF-FA, they routinely tell us it's a policy matter, contact DoD. We know that field operations alone can't get the results in many cases; yet, if we criticize, we are accused of maligning the hard-working, dedicated troops in the field. All of this is due to disbanding of the IAG and lack of serious policy, coordination and cooperation.

- Long-accepted definitions were changed for political expedience, to demonstrate progress that wasn't really valid. As an example, the definition of unilateral repatriation of remains by Vietnam now means bone fragments turned in to field operators during joint activities, rather than identifiable remains turned over by the Vietnamese government.
- Unidentified remains are now counted as repatriations by Vietnam. The Vietnamese always used that counting method as a propaganda ploy, but never the U.S. Government -- unless identified as American -- until this Administration.
- Excavations have been conducted at crash sites where U.S. intelligence indicates remains were already recovered by Vietnamese authorities. What kind of signal does that send to Hanoi? What motivation does it give Vietnam to unilaterally turn over remains being held? Why would they risk possible criticism when they can keep the money coming and achieve their economic and political objectives with the willing assistance of this Administration?
- Procedures for identification of remains, including the roles of CILHI, qualified consultants and the Armed Forces Identification Review Board were altered, removing protection for the families. Though the changes were approved on August 31, 1995, we were not even notified. We were not even provided a copy of the new procedures until our executive director insisted, and it was received at the League office two days ago. The new procedures still have not been provided to the families. The version adopted in 1987, after three years of intense effort, was distributed to all primary-next-of-kin; we believed these procedures were still in effect.
- The analytical community's judgments are now compromised and given a spin to serve political objectives. Even the President's recent determination that Vietnam is "cooperating in full faith" was not the judgment of the POW/MIA intelligence community, but the decision of political appointees going full speed toward this Administration's real objective -- normalization of economic and diplomatic relations.
- No longer are previously helpful countries, like Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, briefed on the issue for the purpose of asking for help to urge more serious cooperation from Hanoi.
- When he lifted the embargo, the President promised our executive director Ann Mills Griffiths that, before any further steps were taken to improve relations with Vietnam, the White House would consult with the League and the veterans groups. This promise has been ignored at every step since that time, including normalization of relations, opening a U.S. Embassy in Hanoi and naming of a U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam.
- Every year, the President has been invited to address the annual meeting. Not only have our invitations been declined, but he has never even met with our board of directors.

Every U.S. President since the end of the war, except President Carter, has spoken to the League or met with the board. Late last week, for the first time since I can remember, we were notified there will not even be an Administration keynote speaker at the opening session of our annual meeting.

- This Administration doesn't even include the League on its guest list for White House and Arlington ceremonies associated with Veterans Day and Memorial Day, such as the wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknowns, the first Administration to exclude us since a Vietnam unknown -- the unidentifiable remains of one of our relatives -- was interred.
- The last example comes from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott this past Sunday on the David Brinkley news program. When asked by George Will about government efforts on POW/MIA, Secretary Talbott referred to seeking answers for us as a "residue of the war in Southeast Asia."

A residue, Mr. Chairman. I ask you. Is that an indication of serious priority? Does that match the President's rhetoric that progress on POW/MIA accounting is the governing criteria with Vietnam? Of course not, but Secretary Talbott stumbled unexpectedly into the truth.

This Administration must think we never listened to or understood official presentations, that we are ignorant of the results of repeated intelligence assessments. According to a Joint Casualty Resolution Center estimate, approximately 1,450+ remains of Americans could be returned without any field operations. The intelligence community officially estimated a minimum of 600-800, and the lowest figures on expected remains recovery that we ever heard were in May, 1993. At that time, the official assessment was, "In an atmosphere of complete SRV cooperation and information sharing," the remains of 435 - 560 Americans were either stored or "easily retrievable" by Vietnam. An additional 225-360 were estimated to be accountable with full and open Vietnamese cooperation. The famous "mortician" reported having processed nearly 300 American remains, and saw over 400. But, according to CILHI, the U.S. Government has received and identified only 162-3 with evidence of detectable storage.

We have seen these briefings; perhaps, charitably, Secretary Talbott has not. If not, it shows the real priority as well. Nevertheless, this Administration seems proud to state that no remains returned since 1990 show evidence of long-term storage. This is a policy failure, not a success! Mr. Chairman, what happened to the others? How can anyone, much less the President of the United States, determine that Vietnam is "cooperating in full faith"?

Despite this existing data, the Administration's rationale for each beneficial step the President has authorized is that Vietnam's cooperation is "unprecedented, outstanding, excellent, superb" and just about every other superlative you can think of, while asserting that he is doing it for us, the families, to generate even more such wonderful cooperation.

Despite executive orders and Congressional requirements for full disclosure, the evidence and assessments above have not been widely distributed, nor really addressed in substance publicly.

The President's certification that Vietnam is "cooperating in full faith" is an appalling decision. While certifying "full faith cooperation," the Administration also concluded that unilateral steps by Vietnam are necessary to resolve many specific cases. This Administration appears not to recognize any of these contradictions.

Ironically, but obviously, to those of us who have followed the issue closely, the Clinton Administration has accounted for more of our men lost in Laos than in Vietnam. This, despite the greater difficulty, the fact that nearly 85% of U.S. losses in Laos were in areas where Vietnamese forces operated during the war, and the fact that Vietnam had such an effective wartime and post-war system for collection and retention of all remains and information related to U.S. POWs and casualties. One has to question why, and the answer is clear. This Administration never had any intention of seriously pursuing POW/MIA accountability; their course was set firmly on full normalization of relations as rapidly as political circumstances would allow.

What this Administration has done on this issue is a national disgrace. I can only surmise that either the President and his senior advisors are being sadly misinformed, or they are purposely misleading the American people and thwarting the intentions of Congress. It would be difficult for them to explain the President's determination that Vietnam is "cooperating in full faith" with such documentation widely available. It also should be impossible for the U.S. Government to claim that Vietnam is "cooperating in full faith" knowing that Vietnam has yet to provide the case-specific documents used, by one individual, to compile the highly publicized Group 559 summary.

We and our missing loved ones deserve better. Our nation's honor deserves better. We expect the fullest possible accounting. Our expectations are reasonable; they are based on information we have been provided by our own government.

Vietnam clearly has not yet made the decision to be fully forthcoming. The League's delegation in 1994 took an entire folder of U.S. Government data, including photos, to Hanoi and presented it to Vietnamese leaders. When the Government of Vietnam begins to account for these individuals, we will know that the decision has been made to cooperate in full faith.

There are two other matters I must mention -- first, the March, 1996 Presidential Delegation in which our executive director participated, along with representatives of The American Legion, DAV, VFW, VVA and AMVETS. Despite problems, a basic consensus was reached to press for unilateral Vietnamese efforts. Three members of the Vietnamese Politburo reacted positively and made specific commitments to increase unilateral, as well as joint, accounting efforts. These welcome commitments were immediately undercut by the Administration's report that was distributed to Congress.

Their report clearly implied that we and all of the veterans groups supported the report's content, though it was not even shown to Ann and the veterans representatives. In reaction, we, The American Legion and the DAV wrote dissenting views to the President, and we subsequently published our own report. I would like to include both in the Record.

The second matter concerns recent media reports that U.S. Government payments to the Vietnamese for POW/MIA-related efforts have been misused and that even vehicles supplied for joint operations have been rented to private parties by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs agent. Perhaps the most egregious was the claim that the United States is paying some ill-defined "processing" fee for remains. We commend you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues for delving into these reports. If true, such actions hardly reflect "full faith" cooperation by the Government of Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to close by saying that we feel an urgency about getting this issue resolved. Family members are dying while the Government of Vietnam is being asked to take "next step" actions. Each action will be counted under this Administration's new definitions as more unilateral cooperation, and Vietnam will again be given credit for full faith cooperation. Then, the President will likely announce another step beneficial to Vietnam -- perhaps Most Favored Nation trade status, or possibly the basis to press for confirmation of the recently nominated U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam.

We could paper our walls with commitments by the Vietnamese government and this Administration, most of which have not been fulfilled. We urge the Congress to ensure that commitments made by the President are implemented, not dismissed by this Administration for business interests, convenience, or some unexplained, or unadmitted, broader agenda. We've fought too long and hard to be forced to endure such basic disrespect. Our missing loved ones deserve better and so do we.

Finally, the League has traditionally worked hard, on a non-partisan basis, to cooperate with every administration and the Congress. We are disappointed, to say the least, that the Clinton Administration has priorities starkly different from this approach. It is sad that we must once again move our focus to our own government's failures, instead of Hanoi's.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1001 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NORTHWEST, SUITE 919

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20038-5504

UPDATE LINE: 202-658-0133

202-723-6846

STATUS OF THE POW/MIA ISSUE: June 14, 1996

2,153 Americans are still missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War: Vietnam - 1,608 (North, 590; South, 1,018); Laos - 461; Cambodia - 76; Peoples Republic of China territorial waters - 8. The League seeks the return of all U.S. prisoners, the fullest possible accounting for those still missing and repatriation of all recoverable remains.

The League's highest priority is resolving the live prisoner question. Official intelligence indicates that Americans known to have been alive in captivity in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were not returned at the end of the war. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that these Americans are still alive. As a matter of policy, the U.S. Government does not rule out the possibility that American POWs could still be held.

Unilateral return of remains by the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has been proven the most effective means of obtaining accountability. Extensive field activities have brought some progress through joint recovery or turnover in the field of remains fragments. From that process, 85 Americans were thus far accounted for during 1993-96 (VN-37; LA-44; CB-4). Archival research in Vietnam has produced roughly 30,000 items, documents and photos, but only 1% are relevant to accounting for missing Americans. A comprehensive wartime and post-war process existed in Vietnam for collection and retention of information and remains. For this reason, unilateral SRV efforts to locate and return remains and provide records offer the most productive short term potential. The Defense Department's case-by-case review and other evidence reveal that unilateral SRV efforts could many bring answers.

Joint field activities in Laos are productive and, increasingly, the Lao Government has permitted greater flexibility while US teams are in-country. Agreements between the US and the Indochina governments now permit Vietnamese witnesses to participate in joint operations in Laos and Cambodia when necessary. Field activities in Cambodia, though few in number, have received excellent support. Over 80% of US losses in Laos and 90% of those in Cambodia occurred in areas where Vietnamese forces operated during the war; however, Vietnam has not yet responded to numerous US requests for case-specific records on US loss incidents in these countries. Field operations and records research are the most likely means of accounting for Americans missing in Laos and Cambodia.

Despite US intelligence assessments and other evidence that hundreds of Americans can best be accounted for by unilateral Vietnamese efforts to locate and return remains and provide relevant documents and records, President Clinton lifted the trade embargo, established a U.S. Embassy in Hanoi, normalized relations, nominated a US Ambassador to Vietnam and has now determined, without supporting evidence, that Vietnam is "cooperating in full faith" to resolve this issue. The burden is squarely on the Clinton Administration to obtain increased accountability. The League supports steps by the U.S. to respond to concrete results, not advance political and economic concessions in the hope that Hanoi will respond.



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
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UPDATE LINE: 202/458-0133

VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR MISSING AMERICANS

June 17, 1996

Family members, veterans and other League supporters throughout the country have consistently opposed steps to improve economic and political relations until Hanoi makes the decision to cooperate fully to resolve the POW/MIA issue. The League supports a policy of reciprocity -- steps by the U.S. to respond to efforts by Vietnam to locate and return remains and provide case-specific POW/MIA-related documents, not steps in advance in the hope that Vietnam will respond.

One way of viewing what the U.S. knows and what Vietnam can do is by looking at what Vietnam has not, but could have done. At the end of the war, U.S. intelligence and other data confirms that over 200 unaccounted for Americans were last known alive or reported alive and in close proximity to capture. Vietnam knows that these are highest priority cases, directly related to the live prisoner issue. In over 100 of these cases, joint field investigations in recent years have reportedly been sufficient to confirm death. If true, remains of these Americans are logically the most readily available for return since they were in captivity or on the ground in direct proximity to Vietnamese forces. Yet, Vietnam has accounted for very few of these Americans.

U.S. wartime and post-war reporting on specific cases, captured Vietnamese documents concerning the handling of U.S. prisoners and casualties, and debriefs of communist Vietnamese captives, reinforced by U.S. monitored directives and other reporting, form a clear picture of a comprehensive Vietnamese system for collection of information and remains, dating back to the French-Indochina War. Specific sources, such as the mortician in 1979, substantiated by others in the 1980's, highlighted remains collection and storage as a key aspect of Vietnam's policy for eventual dealings with the U.S.

Assessments by community-wide intelligence serve as the basis for long-standing U.S. expectations that hundreds of Americans could be readily accounted for by unilateral Vietnamese action to locate and return remains. In 1986-87, the entire intelligence community maintained higher estimates, but the numbers were subsequently further screened to establish the most realistic targets for the SRV government to meet.

During the war and since, the Vietnamese communists placed great value on the recovery and/or recording of burial locations of U.S. remains. In wartime, if jeopardized by imminent discovery or recovery by U.S. forces, burial was immediate to hide remains, which were disinterred and photographed when possible, then reburied or transferred to Hanoi, if feasible. Evidence of this process is confirmed by U.S. intelligence.

Forensic evidence serves as another basis for establishing expectations. Roughly 51% of the 319 identified remains returned from Vietnam since the end of the war have shown evidence of both above and below ground storage. This is hard evidence, confirmed by forensic scientists, but the number is far below U.S. expectations on remains repatriations.

-over-

**NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

1001 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 919

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4/2/96

LEAGUE REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION

From March 8-15th, 1996 the Presidential Delegation visited Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The League was again represented by Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths; The American Legion, VFW, DAV, VVA and AMVETS also participated. The delegation used the results of the *Department of Defense's Comprehensive Review* to urge unilateral actions by the Indochinese governments, particularly Vietnam, to account for missing Americans.

In Vietnam very specific commitments were made by Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Do Muoi, Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Manh Cam and Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai to renew and increase Vietnam's unilateral and joint efforts to account for missing Americans. These SRV pledges (three from Politburo members) were in response to U.S. Government, League and Veterans presentations on the need for unilateral SRV efforts, as revealed in the individual analyses of the cases of all Americans still missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War.

The delegation arrived in Laos and immediately went to the field. Although joint field operations are extremely difficult in Laos, as was evident during the Delegation's visit to two remote incident sites, accounting results from such efforts have been greater in Laos than in Vietnam. A working dinner, hosted by the Lao Government, was held with Vice Foreign Minister Soubanh Srithirath. The delegation expressed appreciation for Laos' increased flexibility in conducting field operations, its willingness to allow Vietnamese witnesses to participate in field activities, and for agreeing to permit an American archival research specialist to augment the existing JTF-FA effort. The delegation also expressed hope that historical Lao films could soon be made available to U.S. officials for review, as Vice Minister Soubanh had agreed last fall.

Minister Soubanh first expressed his government's policy of continued cooperation and indicated that additional work was needed on the Lao film storage facility to ensure the safekeeping of the important film record of Lao history and culture. He also expressed

the hope that arrangements could soon be made to facilitate the long-standing U.S. Government offer to provide training for Lao pilots and a helicopter for use in joint field operations.

The delegation flew to Cambodia for a four-hour stop, during which meetings were held with the Co-Ministers of Interior Sar Kheng (also Deputy Prime Minister) and Vu Hockry. The Royal Cambodian Government official with primary POW/MIA responsibility, Lt. General Nuon Suret, Ministry of Defense, was present at this meeting and a luncheon hosted by U.S. Charge d'Affaires Bob Porter. The delegation expressed appreciation for the broad based, cooperation that Cambodia has provided, particularly in the context of problems associated with devastating events that occurred in Cambodia after the Vietnam War.

Due to the limited time available, the points which the League and Veterans groups would have made were omitted; however, the League's points were provided in written form. The League urged the Royal Cambodian Government to again request from Vietnam their records on American losses in Cambodia that, according to U.S. intelligence and assurances by Cambodian Co-Prime Minister Hun Sen, the Vietnamese could readily provide. The League also urged that Cambodian officials move forward with their previous offer to unilaterally investigate individual cases for joint follow-up if required.

Background: During the July, 1994 Presidential Delegation, SRV Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai specifically requested that the U.S. provide a list of cases on which Vietnam, on its own, should pursue accountability, as well as those which should be pursued jointly. Though long overdue, the DoD Comprehensive Review provided the opportunity to present the requested data and allow the SRV to respond in that context.

To achieve accountability, unilateral actions by Vietnam are critical. Recent DoD analysis of available evidence and other information clearly indicates that a significant number (hundreds) of missing Americans can most likely be accounted for *only* by Vietnam, not

Asian Affairs Sandra Kristoff. In addition to League Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths, non-government "principals" were John Sommer, Jr., Executive Director, The American Legion; DAV Legislative Counsel Joe Violante; Junior Vice Commander John Moon, VFW; National Commander Ken Wolford, AMVETS; and National Vice President George Duggins, VVA.

Comment: U.S. officials and non-government representatives had disagreements on policy and approach during the trip, but were able to work them through and present the all important unity necessary when meeting with senior SRV leaders. Unfortunately, when we returned, coordination stopped and a *TRIP REPORT* was sent to the President and Members of Congress that signaled agreement with the content by all delegation members. (Copy attached.)

A letter to the President was sent by non-government members of the delegation, copied to Members of Congress, clarifying that our "primary focus was to gain from the Vietnamese Government firm commitments to take unilateral actions to account for missing Americans in keeping with the results of the recently completed DoD Comprehensive Review and prior intelligence data and assessments." The letter noted that "the tone of this report appears to be slanted to affect the current debate in the Congress. We believe it should have been a vehicle to open discussion and signal both Congress and Hanoi about what is needed for the U.S. to certify that your (Clinton's) criteria have actually been met."

The letter also noted that if input had been sought, the following concerns, at a minimum, would have been expressed regarding content:

1) The assessment of "progress" on the four criteria established by President Clinton in July, 1993 reflects a numerical summary of past joint activities and unidentified remains. The focus should have been on actual accountability achieved and the lack of needed unilateral actions.

2) Absolute disagreement with the report's statement that "the POW/MIA issue has been embedded sufficiently in the daily conduct of our overall relations with Vietnam to allow us to rely with confidence on the regular and routine working of JTF-FA mechanisms to achieve the fullest possible accounting."

3) Agreement in principle with the statement that "as a result of the DoD Comprehensive Review, Vietnam now has a better understanding of the actions required of it and is prepared to step up its unilateral efforts in individual cases."

4) Firmly held view that the fullest possible accounting requires unilateral actions by the Vietnamese Government, including on those cases in Laos and Cambodia where Vietnamese forces operated during the war.

5) Continued policy-level follow-up and serious negotiations are required to ensure that Vietnam acts on a unilateral basis to account for hundreds of Americans. As a complement to Vietnam's unilateral actions, joint field operations are useful and, particularly in Laos, appear to be functioning well.

6) Disagreement with the assertion that "the less difficult cases are behind us" unless the reference is to possible SRV political sensitivity to locating and providing identifiable remains which should be readily available to them.

7) Disagreement with the statement that "We have secured impressive gains in accounting results," based on the individual cases assessments that comprise the DoD Comprehensive Review, prior intelligence assessments and patterns of accountability since the end of the war which reveal the extent to which Vietnam can and should unilaterally account for hundreds of U.S. personnel.

8) The importance of the delegation's trip was to ensure that the Vietnamese understood the President's stated priority and that unilateral action by their government is needed to account for hundreds of Americans, plus the fact that three members of Vietnam's Politburo agreed and pledged to move in this area.

9) Vietnam's unilateral actions are awaited.

The American Legion

★ WASHINGTON OFFICE ★ 1608 'K' STREET, N. W. ★ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008 ★
 (202) 861-2711 ★



March 26, 1996

OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

President William J. Clinton
 The White House
 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We appreciate your inclusion of the undersigned in the March 8-15, 1996 Presidential Delegation to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. However, we feel compelled to write this letter, though in great disappointment.

We had our disagreements with the U.S. Government delegates during the trip, but felt we were able to work them through and present the important united voice necessary when meeting with the Vietnamese. Unfortunately, when we returned, coordination stopped and a TRIP REPORT was sent to you and Members of Congress that infers that we agree with the content, though we were not asked for input.

Our primary focus was to gain from the Vietnamese Government firm commitments to take unilateral actions to account for missing Americans in keeping with the results of the recently completed DoD Comprehensive Review and prior intelligence data and assessments. Vietnam's leaders responded with pledges to renew and increase their unilateral and joint efforts, both of which are necessary, but time is required to gauge the extent of their cooperation in this regard.

So that there is no misunderstanding, we believe it is important for you to know that at a minimum, we would have voiced the following concerns:

- 1) The TRIP REPORT's assessment of "progress" on the four criteria you established in July, 1993 reflects a numerical summary of past joint activities and unidentified remains. The focus should have been on actual accountability achieved and the lack of needed unilateral actions which would provide clarity to the reader.
- 2) We absolutely do not agree that "the POW/MIA issue has become embedded sufficiently in the daily conduct of our overall relations with Vietnam to allow us to rely with confidence on the regular and routine working of JIF-FA mechanisms to achieve the fullest possible accounting." We agree in principle that "as a result of the DoD Comprehensive Review, Vietnam now has a better understanding of the actions required of it and is prepared to step up its unilateral efforts in individual cases."

We hold the view that the fullest possible accounting requires unilateral actions by the Vietnamese Government, including on those cases in Laos and Cambodia where Vietnamese forces operated during the war. Continued policy-level follow-up and serious negotiations are required to ensure that Vietnam acts on a unilateral basis to account for hundreds of Americans. As a compliment to Vietnam's unilateral actions, joint field operations are useful and, particularly in Laos, appear to be functioning well.


- 3) We do not agree that "the less difficult cases are behind us" unless the reference is to possible Vietnamese political sensitivity to locating and providing identifiable remains which should be readily available to them. Individual assessments which comprise the DoD Comprehensive Review refute this contention.
- 4) We do not agree with the statement that "We have secured impressive gains in accounting results." We base our position on the individual case assessments that comprise the DoD Comprehensive Review, prior intelligence assessments and patterns of accountability since the end of the war which reveal the extent to which the Government of Vietnam can and should unilaterally account for hundreds of U.S. personnel.


Mr. President, the importance of this trip was to ensure that the Vietnamese understand your priority and that unilateral action by their government is needed to account for hundreds of Americans. Three members of Vietnam's Politburo agreed and pledged to move in this area; however, their unilateral actions are awaited.


We have other concerns, but the tone of this report appears to be slanted to affect the current debate in the Congress. We believe it should have been a vehicle to open discussion and signal both Congress and Hanoi about what is needed for the U.S. to certify that your criteria have actually been met. For these reasons, we're confident that you understand the necessity for us to also make our views known to the Congress.

We assure you that if and when accounting results begin to increase due to Vietnam's unilateral actions, it will be obvious to you, the Congress and all of us, and we will then have a basis on which to reassess our positions.

Respectfully,


JOHN F. SOMMER, JR.
Executive Director
The American Legion


ANN MILLS GRIFFITHS
Executive Director
National League of POW/MIA Families


JOSEPH VIOLANTE
Legislative Counsel
Disabled American Veterans

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

MAR 21 1996

105/3/25/96



Ms. Ann Mills Griffiths
Executive Director
National League of Families
1001 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 919
Washington, DC 20036-5504

Dear Ann:

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your participation on the recently completed Presidential Delegation on POW/MIA Affairs. This important trip to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia reinforced the President's commitment to the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans.

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the delegation trip report to the President. A copy has been forwarded to members of congress. Please feel free to utilize this document in preparing your report to your membership.

Again, thank you for your participation in the activities of the delegation. Your input proved to be invaluable in our discussions with the host governments. I enjoyed having you, has a member of the government negotiation team.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "H. Gober".

Hershel W. Gober

Enclosure

Presidential POW/MIA Delegation
 Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
 March 8-15, 1996

TRIP REPORT

This was the fourth Presidential POW/MIA Delegation to visit Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (first visit) since the beginning of the Administration and the first since normalization of relations and the completion of the Defense Department's zero-based comprehensive review of the 2,202 individual cases of unaccounted for Americans (as of July 1995). As with the earlier visits, this delegation reaffirmed that achieving the fullest possible accounting for Americans lost as a result of the war in Southeast Asia remains the highest priority in the President's policy towards Vietnam. The notable result of this trip was the confirmation by each Southeast Asian government of its commitment to assist fully in our POW/MIA accounting efforts, convincingly evidenced by results in the four areas identified by the President for accounting progress.

The delegation was headed by Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs Hershel Gober and included representatives of the Departments of Defense and State, the NSC, the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA), five major veterans organizations and the National League of Families.

RESULTS IN THE FOUR AREAS

In the ten months since the third Presidential delegation to the region, we have achieved significant results in the four areas identified by the President. While we will continue our activities until all leads are exhausted, it is clear the less difficult cases are behind us and we now face increasing challenges in our accounting efforts.

Recovery and Repatriation of Remains

- Five Joint Field Activities (JFAs) have been conducted in Vietnam (JFAs 35 - 39).
- CILHI identified 15 sets of remains previously repatriated from Vietnam.
- Twenty-two remains (19 from joint U.S.-Vietnam efforts/three from unilateral Vietnamese action) were repatriated; five as a result of the most recent JFA.

VIETNAM

The delegation met with Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, Party General Secretary Do Muoi, Foreign Minister Cam and Deputy Defense Minister Bung. A plenary session chaired by Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai included representatives from each of the ministries involved in the POW/MIA issue.

We told the Vietnamese that:

- There have been significant, measurable results in the four areas identified by the President for progress in achieving the fullest possible accounting.
- The comprehensive review should be viewed by policymakers and experts on both sides as a critical tool for identifying actions needed to bring individual cases to closure.
 - ⇒ The review provides a mechanism for moving all cases toward resolution, enables analytic conclusions not available when historic lists were developed, details the next appropriate steps for action, clearly identifies specific cases for unilateral and joint government pursuit and permits broader flexibility for demonstrating comprehensive accounting progress.

The Vietnamese told us that:

- The SRV is committed to sustaining support and cooperation for our fullest possible accounting efforts and is prepared to take the necessary next steps to move individual cases to resolution either unilaterally or jointly with the U.S., as appropriate.
- The SRV views POW/MIA accounting as a humanitarian issue to which no conditions should be attached.
- The investigation and recovery process has been institutionalized and a close working relationship exists between JTF-FA and its Vietnamese counterpart VNOSMP.

We conclude that:

- The establishment of diplomatic relations and the prospect of MFN-based economic relations has motivated the SRV to broaden and deepen its commitment to cooperate on the fullest possible accounting goal.

plans for advancing discussions on civil aviation, copyright protection, and debt rescheduling as well as the core elements needed for a trade agreement. We believe these efforts should move forward without delay.

We also raised other issues of importance in our bilateral relations, including refugee resettlement, human rights, political pluralism, domestic economic reform, counternarcotics and Vietnam's integration into ASEAN. We thanked Vietnam for its release of prominent dissidents and urged a continued human rights dialogue. On these broader issues, Vietnam appears ready to be responsive to U.S. concerns, although the SRV leadership made clear that the solidity of the internal political base for responsiveness to U.S. concerns could erode if normalization slowed. In this regard, our humanitarian assistance to Vietnam can help maintain our goodwill image; we should resist cutbacks in current programs. Finally, Vietnam's participation in ASEAN offers an opportunity to influence its views on regional security issues and its trade and economic reform programs. We should consider ways to better leverage our interests with Vietnam through our extensive, positive relations with the six members of ASEAN.

The veterans and family representatives will submit their own report of this visit, but we believe they share generally our assessment of the meetings in Hanoi. Each expressed satisfaction with the Vietnamese government's pledge of continued cooperation, reinforced our request that Vietnam intensify its unilateral efforts, offered assistance to Vietnam in its efforts to locate its own MIA's, stressed the humanitarian nature of the accounting effort and commended the professionalism of the JTF-FA personnel.

LAOS AND CAMBODIA

Since the May 1995 mission, we have accounted for 35 Americans previously listed as missing in Laos and have recovered and repatriated additional remains for identification. We encouraged Vice Foreign Minister Soubanh to maintain the level of support evidenced by these results. Important to increasing results is Lao willingness to retrieve and provide access to Lao film currently stored in Hanoi. Soubanh resisted a request to view the film in Hanoi, using the film issue as a bargaining chip and raising again the Lao interest in U.S. assistance to upgrade storage facilities in Laos for the film. In addition, Soubanh asked that we revisit the 1985 commitment to provide helicopters and training for Lao pilots. We will explore further both requests, as well as urge Laos to cooperate on access to films as

But we must move to complete the normalization process in order to consolidate, preserve and advance the gains of the past three years. Continued movement by Vietnam on U.S. issues will be most likely in the context of careful management and expansion of our overall bilateral relations.

*KEY SPEAKERS AT LEAGUE ANNUAL MEETINGS FROM JULY, 1981 - JULY, 1995

- 1981: LTG Richard Lawson, USAF, Chief of Staff
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
LTG Eugene Tighe, USAF, Director, DIA
- 1982: Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Charles Hagel, Deputy Administrator, VA
- 1983: President Ronald Reagan
William Clark, National Security Advisor
- 1984: President Reagan, hosted White House National POW/MIA
Recognition Day Ceremony
Vice President Bush, White House Ceremony
General John Vessey, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, White House Ceremony
Harry Walters, Administrator, VA, White House Ceremony
Congressman Ben Gilman, Chairman, House POW/MIA Task
Force
Senator Robert Byrd (POW/MIA medal presentation)
Mr. George Will, Columnist
- 1985: Vice President George Bush
Robert McFarlane, National Security Advisor
Everett Alvarez, Deputy Administrator, VA
Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman, Foreign Relations
Committee
Senator Frank Murkowski, Chairman, Asian & Pacific
Affairs Subcommittee, Foreign Relations Committee
Congressman Stephen Solarz, Chairman, Asian & Pacific
Subcommittee, Foreign Affairs Committee
Congressman Gerald Solomon, Chairman, House POW/MIA Task
Force
Assistant Secretary of State for Asian & Pacific Affairs
Paul Wolfowitz
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs Richard Armitage
LTG James Williams, USA, Director, DIA
- 1986: Acting Secretary of State Michael Armacost
ADM William Crowe, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Thomas Turnage, Administrator, VA
Senator Frank Murkowski (same as above)
Congressman Stephen Solarz (same as above)
Congressman Gerald Solomon (same as above)
Richard Armitage (same as above)
LTG Leonard Perroots, USAF, Director, DIA
LTG Art Brown, Jr., USA, Director of the Army Staff
- 1987: Secretary of State George Schultz
Thomas Harvey, Deputy Administrator, VA
Congressman Stephen Solarz (same as above)
Congressman Bob Lagomarsino, Chairman, House POW/MIA Task
Force
LTG Colin Powell, USA, Deputy National Security Advisor

1988: President Reagan
Vice President Bush
Thomas Harvey (same as above)
General John Vessey, Jr., USA-Ret., Presidential Emissary
Congressman Stephen Solarz (same as above)
Congressman Robert Lagomarsino (same as above)

1989: President Bush
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
Secretary of Veterans Affairs Edward Derwinski
General John Vessey, Jr., USA-Ret. (same as above)
Congressman Stephen Solarz (same as above)
Congressman Bob Lagomarsino (same as above)
LTG Ed Soyster, USA, Director, DIA

1990: Vice President Dan Quayle
Congressman Stephen Solarz (same as above)
Congressman Bob Lagomarsino (same as above)
Under Secretary of State for Policy Bob Kimmitt
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz
General John Vessey, Jr., USA-Ret. (same as above)
LTG Ed Soyster, USA (same as above)

1991: Secretary of Defense Cheney
Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs Tony Principi
Senator Frank Murkowski (Member, Asian & Pacific
Subcommittee, Foreign Relations Committee)
Congressman Stephen Solarz (same as above)
Congressman Bob Lagomarsino (same as above)
Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control and
Communications Duane P. Andrews
LTG Ed Soyster, USA (same as above)

1992: President Bush
Senator John Kerry, Chairman, Select Committee on POW/MIA
Senator Bob Smith, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on
POW/MIA
Under Secretary of State for Policy Frank Wisner
Ambassador Malcolm Toon, Chairman, US-Russia Commission
General John Vessey, Jr., USA-Ret. (same as above)
LTG James Clapper, Jr., USAF, Director, DIA
Assistant Secretary VA for Legislative Affairs Sylvia
Chavez Long

1993: Samuel Berger, Deputy National Security Advisor
Ambassador Malcolm Toon, Chairman, US-Russia Commission
Assistant Secretary of VA for Congressional Affairs Ed
Scott

1994: Deputy Secretary of VA Hershel Gober, Presidential
Emissary
Senator Robert Smith, Member, Armed Services Committee
Under Secretary of Defense Walt Slocombe
Assistant Secretary of State for Asian & Pacific Affairs
Ambassador Winston Lord

1995: Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor
 Senator Bob Dole, Majority Leader
 Senator Craig Thomas, Chairman, Asian & Pacific Affairs
 Subcommittee, Foreign Relations Committee
 Senator Bob Smith (same as above)
 Congressman Ben Gilman, Chairman, International Relations
 Committee
 . Congressman Bob Dornan, Chairman, Military Personnel
 Subcommittee, National Security Committee
 Ambassador Winston Lord (same as above)
 Assistant Secretary of VA for Congressional Affairs Ed
 Scott

Note: Numerous deputy assistant secretary-level U.S. officials and military officers at the MG rank and below are not listed. Repeated invitations to Members of Congress are due to their positions of oversight responsibility on the POW/MIA issue. Until 1993, the POW/MIA Interagency Group consistently participated with Directors of Asian Affairs at the NSC, along with State and Defense officials at the deputy assistant secretary level, in League annual meetings. Prior to 1976, Presidents Nixon and Ford and their Secretaries of State and Defense addressed the League.

Mr. DORNAN. Miss Shirley, one comment. You said your dad died—

Ms. SHIRLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. Without this being resolved. Of course, it was resolved instantly for him at the moment of death.

Ms. SHIRLEY. That's the only way, yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. In doing my research on Korea, jogging my memory—and you were in the room when I mentioned this earlier—I came across the story of a four-star general, a great West Point graduate, General Van Fleet. His son, while he was a general officer, was a young company commander captured in Korea, his unit overrun, no remains retrieved—we had covered that battlefield area—and it was assumed that maybe he was a prisoner, but certainly missing in action.

Shortly after the Korean war, about 1955, General Van Fleet said, as an active duty four-star general, "I don't know what the problem is here, but in days gone by, we would have sent an American battleship group into Wonsan Harbor and said one word—Produce."

General Van Fleet, when I looked up his biography, was born the same month as my father, March 1892, 14 days later, March 19, 1892. He died after his 100th birthday, a few years ago in 1992, and he never had the case of his son resolved. So as frustrated as some of you family members are, a four-star general, with a long and honorable career, a highly decorated combat and wounded officer, cannot even get information on his son, the bureaucracy is so tough on this issue.

In case I forget it, I wanted to ask you to carry back a message to my dear friend of almost a quarter of a century, Ann Mills Griffiths. I would tell you, Dolores, and to Mrs. Holland, who weighs in as a Laotian Lima Site 85 wife, and to the Korean families that are in the room, don't blend your organizations together.

We all learned from the Attorney General's list of Communist organizations in the thirties and forties that the more the merrier. Use titles like "Abraham Lincoln, Motherhood, Republican, Democratic", and the minute you're found out as a tool of the Communists, disband and form a new group, change your name back to "Motherhood" and "Abraham Lincoln."

Keep all the identity of your groups. But I'm begging you to come up with a coalition, a task force, from the league, the alliance, and the Korean families, because we have another window opening up here because of the Korean testimony.

The news media, you will notice, left at 3:00 o'clock. That's why I want to try and move up the opening of tomorrow's hearing before 2:00 o'clock, because AP and the others say we pack up and we're gone by 2:00 o'clock. This is an information battle, getting this story out to Americans who still care, which I think is the majority. But then I'm always an optimist.

So please take the word back to your various groups. I'm going to say it when I speak at some of the groups tomorrow, if it's possible for me to get over there. And if I don't, please explain to the groups that I think it was right—Ann and I disagreed on this—that these meetings for the Korean families, who don't have COIN-assisted travel, they wanted me to have these hearings. I never

even thought there would be a disagreement over doing them concurrently with the League meetings across the river, so see if we can't get a coalition of the groups together that will work with me.

Dolores, please proceed, and try and shorten your statement up. It will appear fully in the record.

STATEMENT OF DOLORES APODACA ALFOND, NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON, NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF POW/MIA FAMILIES

Ms. ALFOND. I will be brief.

Chairman Dornan and members, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to bring these highlights to you regarding the POW issue, the Department of State, and actually this administration.

Several weeks ago, President Clinton certified Vietnam's full faith cooperation on the issue of our prisoners of war and missing in action. Vietnam's cooperation is carefully calculated. We have all realized that. The myth of cooperation can be demonstrated simply by looking at the fact—which probably should have been asked of General Wold today—where the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, the media, and DPMO, whoever, has never been able to go into the underground military prison in Vinh Phu Province. There have been people go over there, media people and JTF-FA, who have gone around the whole area, but they have never been allowed inside. And then there were congressional representatives that flew over the site in a helicopter, but they still have not been allowed to go inside. So I'm raising the question regarding the full faith cooperation. This is a moral issue. We have men in the Vietnam area, in the Laos, Vietnam and China area.

The other thing that has to be brought up about the myth is that you worked so hard, Congressman Dornan, to bring about the Missing Service Personnel Act of 1996. It is so beneficial to the families, not only for director activity but for the future.

Now we have Senator McCain with his amendment, who is trying to take away all the important aspects, that each one of our family members will be able to share and be able to receive information on. So again, this is showing how we are not getting cooperation on the POW issue. It seems that some of those people in Congress are really not interested.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, I understand, have written letters to McCain, agreeing with McCain's amendment. I think this is outrageous. These were soldiers that served in the military. They are people who led our men, and now they're saying we should have this amendment, the missing service amendment, changed? I feel that it's abominable.

Mr. DORNAN. Dolores, if you could pause 1 second, a four-star chief of staff of any of the services is so busy, has so much responsibility, that a letter even from a Senator, although they would be made aware of it, the body of the letter would be worked over by staffers. And if Senator McCain tells them that it is the original missing persons bill that I adapted to conform with several of the combat CINC's, the one who just had to resign in Hawaii over the triple rape atrocity in Okinawa, over one single caustic remark he made—it cost him his career as Commander-in-Chief in the Pa-

cific—but that CINC and a couple of others wrote me, and it was based on misinformation.

Senator McCain had not told them that I had changed the act, according to some of their warfighting time constraints, as to when they would move on a missing person. I'm thinking Scott O'Grady and they're thinking major battles with a thousand people captured a day. We resolved that.

Now that it's law, signed into law by Clinton on February 10, to go back and gut it with some of the same misinformation, to the same players—and I really should pick up the phone and call General Shalikashvili on this—when it's not even being represented as the same piece of legislation, your letters are powerful.

Now, your letter won't go all the way to Shalikashvili the way a U.S. Senator's letter will, but the same staffers who said, "General, there's a letter here from John McCain; what do you want us to do? Well, write a letter and kick Dornan in the face and let's gut this thing." If your letters at least go to him, it will get to those staffers and they'll go, "Oh, oh, we're giving the boss, the chief, the old man, bad information here, and maybe we shouldn't touch this."

Some of you are sending copies of your letters to me, and I'm trying to pass them on to Mr. Pickett, who has been a champion and trying to be open minded on this. You keep those letters going and keep sending me the carbons, and then I'll send the carbons to Shalikashvili and say, "Is your staff showing you these letters that I'm getting from family members? You're poking at a hornet's nest here. These people want this Missing Persons Act." That will really help us.

Because do you know what I'm told? That I'm going to get rolled in conference. This is not a Democratic problem, although Sam Nunn is weighing it. This is Republicans bragging to the press, and to homosexual newspapers, "We will clean Dornan's clock on HIV people on active duty, on homosexuals, on Hustler magazine on PX's. We're going to rip all this stuff out and we're changing that Missing Persons Act."

My strength, as a representative, is through you. You keep the letters going to the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, and to the Chiefs of Staff, and send me the carbons so I can let them know that I know what you're doing. That will help me a lot.

Ms. ALFOND. That's our project for next week then.

Mr. DORNAN. You got it.

Ms. ALFOND. The other thing that I would like to bring up specifically is the CILHI. What has happened, as you know, in 1996, they accounted for 3 flight crews and buried 25 men. They made their identifications based on a total of 3½ teeth that were said to belong to 2 men that were involved in these crews.

CILHI did not prove death, but they have assigned names to these burials. This is particularly difficult for our family right now because we had a box that was returned in July 1988 with my brother's name on it, Victor Apodaca. It was determined that those remains were nonhuman.

In 1989, there was another box that was repatriated, and the documentation that CILHI had on that said, according to the September 8, 1989, message regarding ID status remains from SRV,

CILHI determined the second box contained no teeth and consists of two portions of left hip bone and one portion of talus, which is a foot bone. The age of the individual represented can only be assessed as an adult individual and that nothing else could be determined.

Mr. DORNAN. Dolores, your brother's shootdown date and aircraft again?

Ms. ALFOND. June 8, 1967, an F-4C. He was on an armed reconnaissance mission.

Mr. DORNAN. And your backseater?

Ms. ALFOND. Was Busch, B-u-s-c-h.

Mr. DORNAN. Also an MIA?

Ms. ALFOND. Also MIA, but the family did accept his remains in 1989. There was another box that came back, or was returned at that time.

But what is interesting about my case specifically, it took 20 years for DOD to state that my brother was a back-seater on that date. So for 20 years they were trying to bury my brother in the crash where the plane went down, and there was supposed to be only one ejection and gotten to the ground. But it seems that he was a backseater, and I'm told that the backseater goes out first when anything goes wrong.

Mr. DORNAN. It just occurred to me that you must have watched television on June 8 of 1991, the 24th anniversary of your brother's shootdown, with some hurt, to see this massive parade down Constitution Avenue led by General Schwarzkopf. I was right across from the reviewing stand where it stopped, and the President came out with Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell and greeted General Schwarzkopf. All of that was June 8, totally different from the way we treated the warriors that were part of the cold war that we were supposed to have won.

Go ahead.

Ms. ALFOND. Well, what's interesting is that in 1994, Col. Paul Mather spoke with CILHI and they still stated that Apodaca's remains are two small bone fragments. Earlier this year, my brother's name was on a list that was presented to the Vietnamese. The title of the list was "Cases requiring critical Vietnamese assistance."

Four weeks ago, the Air Force mortuary contacted me. They requested that I provide a blood sample for MT-DNA testing. Since 1994, what has changed with the remains? That's my question. They have not given me any answers in 4 weeks.

Did the Vietnamese provide new information? Has CILHI received additional remains? I don't know. They're trying to use the MT-DNA, and I understand that in 1994, CILHI was forbidden to use MT-DNA testing as the primary means of identification.

Mr. DORNAN. We heard testimony earlier that they're backlogged because of the work that we gave up at Walter Reed. It's amazing. You get the slide show of these codes on DNA. I went up there when they were trying to identify the burned remains of our heroes in Somalia, particularly Durant's crew, where they so severely desecrated the remains. Eventually, in the end, even from blood that had, under intense fire, changed its molecular structure, they

finally didn't have to use the DNA. But they were showing me how they were going to go about it.

If there's a backlog, then Owen Pickett and Bob Dornan will hire new people. We'll give them any money they want somehow. Speaker Gingrich or nobody would hold up money to expand the DNA operation at Walter Reed's labs. But this seems to be a decision where they don't even want to go the DNA route.

I see some family heads nodding.

Ms. ALFOND. Well, it isn't only our case. I was using this as an example. I have had several family members calling me in just the last short time. There was a particular family member who said the remains sat in CILHI and were there in 1986. They have just determined that they are his father.

Mr. DORNAN. From 1986?

Ms. ALFOND. From 1986.

Mr. DORNAN. Ten years.

Ms. ALFOND. So they must be attempting to use this MT-DNA, which is not used as 100 percent conclusive in proving a match.

Mr. DORNAN. Dolores, would you hold up just 1 second?

The freshman class, which is large, on my side of the aisle, 73, with probably 71 of them attempting to get re-elected in 139 days, they want me to come over and address them. I've been trying to do this for over a year now, about this missing persons act, of which they know virtually nothing.

If I could ask my ranking Democrat to take the chair for about 15 minutes, I think I can go over there and talk to them and get back. As you go through the other statements, I will have Mr. Santoli and Mr. Mero of my staff bring me up to speed. If you could keep it going until I get back, please, Owen.

I want to ask Mr. Bell and Mr. Veith, who is now a private citizen, but an excellent analyst, to give us his take on a book that they have just written, entitled "POWs and Politics: How much does Hanoi Really Know." You presented this in April at Texas Tech, at a prestigious conference, on the whole Vietnam conflict. I want to go into this in some depth, even if you can't stay.

Just continue with your testimony and I will catch up late reading tonight, and let me see if I can accomplish two things and be at two places almost at the same time.

Mr. PICKETT [presiding]. Please continue, Miss Alfond.

Ms. ALFOND. Thank you.

The goal of the U.S. Government is not to resolve POW/MIA cases but to make them disappear. Instead of burying remains, they are burying cases. This current process is a mockery to missing servicemen and their families, and it must stop. We can no longer allow DPMO, JTF-FA, and CILHI to ignore intelligence and witness statements because they contradict a declaration of death.

My question is, how many of our abandoned servicemen has CILHI buried alive? Congressman Pickett, why is this allowed to happen? Why is CILHI allowed to name remains instead of identifying them? Why haven't the Vietnamese commandos been interviewed to see if they were with American prisoners of war? Why are National Security Agency documents relating to our POW's still classified, and what is in those documents?

Why are 30,000 pages of records from the National Interrogation Center still classified? Why are photographs of American POW's still classified? How many of those photos show men who did not come home, and who are those men? Why are 45 and 50-year-old documents relating to our prisoners of war and missing in action, from World War II and Korea, still classified? Why hasn't the Pentagon interviewed the four Army enlisted men who supposedly deserted to North Korea in the 1960's?

Now we have the breaking news, the Associated Press reported on June 15, that 10 to 15 American POW's in North Korea want to come home. You have the documentation, I believe both of your offices, Congressman Dornan and Pickett, regarding the document on those live sightings, or the analysis of it. You know that they're there, and Jim Wold knows that they're there, and Secretary Perry knows that they're there, and so does President Clinton. So the families are asking to get them home.

North Korea needs American foreign aid. Give it to them on the condition they return the live POW's immediately. We hold no animosity towards the North Koreans. The world has changed. The cold war is over and it's time to set matters straight and go forward and learn from the bitter lessons of the past.

Based on United States history, we will eventually provide North Korea with the much needed foreign aid they seek. We question under what conditions will we provide that aid. Will the United States make the live POW's part of the deal, or will the deal be foreign aid for North Korea's silence on our live POW's?

In 1953, the families of our missing in Korea knew all the POW's did not come home. They spoke out and the United States Government ignored them.

In 1973, the POW/MIA families knew that we left men behind, alive, in Southeast Asia. The United States Government dismissed us, as they dismissed our Korean War POW/MIA families. We were all distraught family members who could not accept our loved ones' deaths. That's what the Government said. They labeled the concerned citizens who supported us as opportunists, preying on delusional family members.

Twenty years later, in 1993, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, concluded that the United States left a small number of American men alive at the end of the war. The Senate select committee, with two dissensions, dismissed that small number, saying there was no evidence that any of the men were alive today. To that we say, where is the evidence that they're dead? Will it take us another 20 years to prove the men are alive today?

Gentlemen, the POW's alive today in Southeast Asia and North Korea do not have another 20 years. Live POW's do not factor into any of our negotiations with Vietnam or North Korea. Instead of asking for live men, we ask for remains. We dig at crash sites long since scavenged by locals. Even official Government reports no longer refer to POW/MIA's. Now it's MIA/POW's. How long will it be before the POW designation disappears altogether?

For 50 years, generations of POW/MIA families have battled for the truth. Over 40 years passed before the United States Government admitted what the Korean war POW/MIA families knew in 1953: North Korea shipped hundreds, if not thousands, of men to

China and the Soviet Union during and immediately after the Korean war.

It took 20 years to get the Government to admit we left men behind in Southeast Asia. How much longer must we wait for the truth?

The POW/MIA families are tired. The concerned citizens who support us are tired. But we're not going away. We have battled too long and fought too hard to stop now.

President Clinton can certify Vietnamese full faith cooperation on the POW/MIA issue, but saying it does not make it so. It's a lie. We know it, and the President knows it.

John McCain can produce a hundred amendments designed to stop us, but he will not stop us. We will fight the McCain amendment to the Missing Service Personnel Act of 1996 with all the strength we have.


CILHI can bury our POW/MIA's with no remains, make identifications based on a single tooth, and turn animal bones into human. We will not accept those identifications. They can stop looking for our loved ones, but we will not.

In closing, let me share with you the unofficial creed of the POW/MIA families and the concerned citizens who support us:

"Though we've come a long way, there is much, much more to be done. The deck is stacked against us, our adversaries are well-entrenched and well-financed and scared of any change in the status quo. In the long run, we will prevail. We hold the trump card, folks, and when the dust clears, and the dense morning fog burns off, when we clear our wire of sappers, and when the gunships go home, by God, we'll still be there, because what we seek to do is right."

Thank you. [Applause.]

[The prepared statement of Ms. Alfond follows:]



NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF FAMILIES
FOR THE RETURN OF AMERICA'S MISSING SERVICEMEN
WORLD WAR II • KOREAN WAR • COLD WAR • VIETNAM WAR

POWs - MIAs

**FOR PRESENTATION BEFORE THE
HOUSE MILITARY PERSONNEL
SUBCOMMITTEE**

**TESTIMONY OF
DOLORES APODACA ALFOND**

**NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON
NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF FAMILIES**

JUNE 19, 1996

CONGRESSMAN DORNAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK WITH YOU, TODAY. I SPEAK ON BEHALF OF OUR AMERICAN SERVICEMEN LEFT BEHIND AT THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR, COLD WAR AND THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, PRESIDENT CLINTON CERTIFIED VIETNAM'S "FULL FAITH" COOPERATION ON THE ISSUE OF OUR PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION."

VIETNAM'S COOPERATION IS CAREFULLY CALCULATED. THEY PROVIDE INFORMATION ONLY WHEN IT IS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. THE VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO WITHHOLD VITAL DOCUMENTATION ON CAPTURED AMERICAN SERVICEMEN. THEY CONTINUE TO WITHHOLD STORED REMAINS. THE VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO DENY ACCESS TO SITES BELIEVED TO HOLD AMERICAN POW'S.

THE MYTH OF COOPERATION MAY BE DEMONSTRATED IN MANY AREAS. FOR EXAMPLE, JOINT TASK FORCE FULL ACCOUNTING AND THE MEDIA REPORTED THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE UNDERGROUND MILITARY PRISON IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. PERPETUATORS OF THE COOPERATION MYTH, POINTED OUT WITH PRIDE THAT THE PRISON HAD BEEN INVESTIGATED AND NO AMERICANS FOUND.

REPRESENTATIVES OF CONGRESS TRAVELED TO VIETNAM AND EXAMINED THE SITE. THEY REPORTED NO AMERICANS WERE AT THE UNDERGROUND PRISON IN VINH PHU. TO THE CASUAL OBSERVER, THIS LOOKS LIKE A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION.

WHAT EVERYONE FAILS TO MENTION IS THAT THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT ALLOW JTF-FA INVESTIGATORS INSIDE THE MILITARY ZONE, MUCH LESS THE PRISON. THEY INVESTIGATED FROM OUTSIDE THE PERMITTER IN WHAT AMOUNTED TO A WALKING TOUR. THE CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES FLEW OVER THE SITE IN A HELICOPTER, TOTALLY ELIMINATING ANY POSSIBILITY OF VIEWING AN UNDERGROUND SITE.

NO AMERICAN INVESTIGATOR, REPORTER OR CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS EVER SET FOOT INSIDE THE UNDERGROUND MILITARY PRISON AT VINH PHU. YET, THE MYTH EXISTS OF A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION.

CONGRESSMAN DORNAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, VIETNAM'S "FULL FAITH" COOPERATION IS A MYTH USED TO JUSTIFY DECISIONS BASED ON PROFIT MARGINS RATHER THEN MORALITY.

ANOTHER OF THE MYTHS FOISTED ON AN UNSUSPECTING PUBLIC IS THAT THE "MC CAIN AMENDMENT" TO THE MISSING SERVICE PERSONNEL ACT OF 1996 IS BENEFICIAL TO THE FAMILIES OF THE MISSING. OR THAT IT OFFERS PROTECTION TO FUTURE GENERATIONS OF AMERICA'S FIGHTING FORCES. IT ISN'T BENEFICIAL AND OFFERS NO PROTECTION.

SENATOR MC CAIN CONSTRUCTED THIS AMENDMENT TO LIMIT OR ELIMINATE ANY AVENUE OF RECOURSE AVAILABLE TO POW/MIA FAMILY MEMBERS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO LEARN THE TRUTH ABOUT THEIR LOVED ONES. FOR THE FUTURE, THE MC CAIN AMENDMENT ALLOWS THE MILITARY TO REDUCE THE RANKS OF THE MISSING BY DECLARING A SERVICE MEMBER DEAD WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF DEATH.

SENATOR MC CAIN HAS MADE HIS POSITION CLEAR. HE HAS DONE EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO STOP US. HE WOULD RATHER HUG HIS COMMUNIST CAPTOR THAN ACCOUNT FOR MISSING SERVICEMEN.

SENATOR MC CAIN LOBBIED HARD AGAINST THE MISSING SERVICE PERSONNEL ACT OF 1996. IN SPITE OF HIS EFFORTS, AND THANKS TO YOURS, CONGRESSMAN DORNAN, THE MSPA OF 1996 SURVIVED.

FOR THE FIRST TIME THE FAMILIES OF OUR POW/MIA'S HAVE LEGAL RECOURSE. OUR LOVED ONES HAVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND

THOSE WHO WILLFULLY WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM US ARE NOW SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION. FUTURE POW'S - AND THERE WILL BE POW'S IN THE FUTURE - CAN NO LONGER BE DECLARED DEAD UNDER THE MISSING SERVICE PERSONNEL ACT OF 1996.

THESE ARE BASIC PROTECTIONS TO THE RIGHTS OF EVERY SERVICE PERSON. YET, JOHN MC CAIN IS ADAMANTLY AGAINST THE LAW AS IT STANDS NOW.

SENATOR MC CAIN CLAIMS CONCERN FOR THE FAMILIES. HIS CONCERN IS TO KEEP AS MUCH POW/MIA INFORMATION AWAY FROM THE FAMILIES, AND THE PUBLIC, AS POSSIBLE. HE WILL DO ANYTHING TO ACCOMPLISH THAT GOAL.

JOHN MC CAIN DOES NOT SPEAK FOR ME OR MY FAMILY, HE DOES NOT SPEAK FOR THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF FAMILIES, VETERANS AND THE CONCERNED CITIZENS WHO SUPPORT US.

THE MISSING SERVICE PERSONNEL ACT OF 1996 MUST SURVIVE INTACT. A VOTE TO AMEND OR REPEAL THIS LEGISLATION IS A VOTE TO FURTHER ABANDON OUR LOVED ONES AND THEIR FAMILIES.

LASTLY, I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF CIL-HI REMAINS IDENTIFICATIONS. BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1995 AND MARCH OF 1996 CIL-HI ACCOUNTED FOR THREE FLIGHT CREWS AND BURIED 25 MEN. THEY MADE THEIR IDENTIFICATIONS BASED ON A TOTAL OF 3 1/2 TEETH SAID TO BELONG TO TWO OF THE MEN INVOLVED.

CIL-HI DID NOT PROVE DEATH. ASSUMING YOU BELIEVE IN SINGLE TOOTH IDENTIFICATIONS, AND WE DO NOT, THEY DECLARED A DEATH BY ASSOCIATION FOR 23 MEN. THEY IGNORED INTELLIGENCE WHICH SUGGESTED THAT SEVERAL OF THESE MEN WERE ACTUALLY CAPTURED. THE PRACTICE OF NAMING REMAINS RATHER THAN IDENTIFYING THEM, MUST STOP.

ANN HART, WIFE OF POW THOMAS HART SAID IT BEST: "THESE MASS BURIALS ARE NOT TRIBUTES TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE SERVED THIS COUNTRY, THEY ARE PUBLIC SCORE CARDS OF HOW MANY NAMES HAVE BEEN CHECKED OFF THE LIST.... I SEE THESE MASS BURIALS AS THE USG'S SICK SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF HAVING ID'S CHALLENGED. CLEARLY, THEY HAVE LEARNED FROM WHAT HAPPENED WHEN I REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE IDENTIFICATION BY CIL-HI AND THESE BURIALS ALLOW THEM TO AVOID THE CHALLENGES AND LOOK SUCCESSFUL AT THE SAME TIME."

THIS SUBJECT HAS GREAT PERSONAL MEANING FOR ME AND MY FAMILY. IN JULY 1988, THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERALLY RETURNED REMAINS SAID TO BE THOSE OF MY BROTHER, CAPT. VICTOR APODACA. CIL-HI DETERMINED THE REMAINS WERE NON-HUMAN.

IN 1989, VIETNAM UNILATERALLY REPATRIATED ANOTHER BOX OF REMAINS SAID TO BE VICTOR'S. THESE REMAINS WERE ACQUIRED FROM A SMUGGLER IN HO CHI MINH CITY. ACCORDING TO DOCUMENTATION "THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHY THE SRV CONTENTED THESE REMAINS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH APODACA."

ACCORDING TO A SEPTEMBER 8TH, 1989 MESSAGE REGARDING "ID STATUS - REMAINS FROM SRV" CIL-HI DETERMINED THE SECOND BOX CONTAINED "NO TEETH AND CONSIST OF TWO PORTIONS OF LEFT HIP BONE AND ONE PORTION OF A TALUS (FOOT) BONE. THE AGE OF THE INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTED CAN ONLY BE ASSESSED AS ADULT NOTHING ELSE CAN BE DETERMINED. THE BOX ALSO CONTAINED NINE NON-HUMAN MAMMALIAN BONE FRAGMENTS AND EIGHT UNIDENTIFIABLE BONE FRAGMENTS WHICH MAY BE OF HUMAN ORIGIN."

THE MESSAGE CONTINUED "CIL-HI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS APODACA UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE."

AN OCTOBER 19, 1994 "MEMO FOR RECORD" ISSUED BY COL. PAUL MATHER CONCERNING A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH A MR. HELGESEN OF CIL-HI. IN HIS MEMO MATHER STATED "THE SECOND "APODACA REMAINS" REPATRIATION CONSISTED OF TWO SMALL BONE FRAGMENTS. THESE WERE DETERMINED TO BE OF HUMAN ORIGIN, BUT RACE WAS UNDETERMINED. NOTHING ELSE COULD BE CONCLUDED. HELGESEN FOUND NOTHING IN HIS IMMEDIATE RECORDS WHICH INDICATED THESE WERE CANDIDATES FOR DNA TESTING." IT IS INTERESTING THAT COL. MATHER DOES NOT MENTION THE NON-HUMAN REMAINS ALSO CONTAINED IN THAT BOX.

EARLIER THIS YEAR, MY BROTHER'S NAME WAS ON A LIST PRESENTED TO THE VIETNAMESE. THE TITLE OF THAT LIST WAS "CASES REQUIRING CRITICAL VIETNAMESE ASSISTANCE."

FOUR WEEKS AGO, THE AIR FORCE MORTUARY CONTACTED ME. THEY REQUESTED THAT I PROVIDE A BLOOD SAMPLE FOR MT-DNA TESTING. WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE 1994 WHEN THE REMAINS WERE "NOT CANDIDATES FOR DNA TESTING?"

DID THE VIETNAMESE PROVIDE NEW INFORMATION? HAS CIL-HI RECEIVED ADDITIONAL REMAINS? I DON'T KNOW. NO ONE AT THE AIR FORCE OR CIL-HI HAS ANSWERED MY QUESTIONS.

LET'S PAUSE FOR A MOMENT AND DISPEL ANOTHER MYTH. MT-DNA IS NOT, I REPEAT NOT, 100% CONCLUSIVE IN PROVING A MATCH. IT IS ONLY 100% ACCURATE IN ELIMINATING AN IDENTIFICATION.

UNTIL THE SUMMER OF 1994, CIL-HI WAS FORBIDDEN TO USE MT-DNA TESTING AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION. IN A STAFF ACTION MEMORANDUM DATED JULY 7TH, 1994 A REQUEST WAS MADE FOR A "ONE TIME EXCEPTION TO MORATORIUM ON THE USE OF MT-DNA AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION."

CIL-HI REQUESTED THIS WAIVER BECAUSE A SET OF REMAINS, THEY DESPERATELY WANTED TO IDENTIFY, COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED BY DENTAL RECORDS OR TRADITIONAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL METHODS. A DOCUMENT DATED JULY 13, 1994, STATES "TRADITIONAL DENTAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROCEDURES ARE INADEQUATE TO POSITIVELY RESOLVE THIS IDENTITY."

AN INFORMATION PAPER, PREPARED JUNE 22, 1994, STATES "DENTAL COMPARISON.... IS INSUFFICIENT FOR RECOMMENDING POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION." YET, CIL-HI AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT NOW INSIST THAT THE REMAINS IN QUESTION ARE "POSITIVELY" THOSE OF MARINE PVT. MARK WARREN JUDGE.

WHY WAS CIL-HI FORBIDDEN TO USE MT-DNA TESTING AS THE PRIMARY METHOD OF IDENTIFICATIONS? THE ANSWER IS SIMPLE. MT-DNA TESTING IS NOT 100% CONCLUSIVE IN PROVING A MATCH. IT INDICATES A POSSIBILITY OF A MATCH. USED WITH POSITIVE DENTAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL EVIDENCE, IT IS A VALUABLE TOOL TO SUBSTANTIATE AN IDENTIFICATION. USED AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION, IT IS USELESS.

TODAY NO SUCH MORATORIUM EXISTS. CIL-HI IS FREE TO USE MT-DNA TESTING AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION.

AFTER WHAT I JUST SAID ABOUT MT-DNA TESTING, WOULD ANY MEMBER OF THIS COMMITTEE ACCEPT AN MT-DNA IDENTIFICATION OF THEIR LOVED ONE ON BONES ONCE CONSIDERED NON-HUMAN? WOULD YOU BURY YOUR BROTHER ON A 50%, 60%, OR EVEN 95% POSSIBILITY THAT A SMALL PIECE OF HIP BONE EXHIBITED SIMILARITIES TO YOUR OWN DNA?

YET, IF MT-DNA TESTING SHOWS THE SLIGHT POSSIBILITY OF A MATCH, CIL-HI AND THE ARMED FORCES IDENTIFICATION REVIEW BOARD WILL DECLARE MY BROTHER ACCOUNTED FOR.

THE GOAL OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS NOT TO RESOLVE POW/MIA CASES BUT MAKE THEM DISAPPEAR. INSTEAD OF BURYING REMAINS, THEY ARE BURYING CASES. THIS CURRENT PROCESS IS A MOCKERY TO MISSING SERVICEMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES AND IT MUST STOP. WE CAN NO LONGER ALLOW DPMO, JTF-FA AND CIL-HI TO IGNORE INTELLIGENCE AND WITNESS STATEMENTS, BECAUSE THEY CONTRADICT A "DECLARATION OF DEATH."

HOW MANY OF OUR ABANDONED SERVICEMEN HAS CIL-HI BURIED ALIVE?

CONGRESSMAN DORNAN, WHY IS THIS ALLOWED TO HAPPEN?

WHY IS CIL-HI ALLOWED TO NAME REMAINS?

WHY HAVEN'T THE VIETNAMESE COMMANDOS BEEN INTERVIEWED TO SEE IF THEY WERE WITH AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR?

WHY ARE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DOCUMENTS RELATING TO OUR POW/MIA'S STILL CLASSIFIED? WHAT'S IN THE DOCUMENTS?

WHY ARE 30,000 PAGES OF RECORDS FROM THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER, STILL CLASSIFIED?

WHY ARE PHOTOGRAPHS OF AMERICAN POW'S STILL CLASSIFIED? HOW MANY OF THOSE PHOTOS SHOW MEN WHO DID NOT COME HOME? WHO ARE THOSE MEN?

WHY ARE 45 AND 50 YEAR OLD DOCUMENTS RELATING TO OUR PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION, FROM WORLD WAR II AND KOREA, STILL CLASSIFIED?

WHY HASN'T THE PENTAGON INTERVIEWED THE 4 ARMY ENLISTED MEN WHO SUPPOSEDLY DESERTED TO NORTH KOREA IN THE 1960'S?

AND THAT CONGRESSMAN DORNAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, BRINGS US TO THE BREAKING NEWS. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORTED, ON JUNE 15TH, THAT 10 - 15 AMERICAN POW'S IN NORTH KOREA WHO WANT TO COME HOME. CONGRESSMAN DORNAN, YOU HAVE SEEN THE DOCUMENTATION. YOU KNOW THEY ARE THERE. JIM WOLD KNOWS THEY ARE THERE. SECRETARY PERRY KNOWS THEY ARE THERE AND SO DOES THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

GET THEM HOME!

NORTH KOREA NEEDS AMERICAN FOREIGN AID. GIVE IT TO THEM ON THE CONDITION THEY RETURN THE LIVE POW'S, IMMEDIATELY. WE HOLD NO ANIMOSITY TOWARD THE NORTH KOREANS. THE WORLD HAS CHANGED. THE COLD WAR IS OVER. IT'S TIME TO SET MATTERS STRAIGHT AND GO FORWARD AND LEARN FROM THE BITTER LESSONS OF THE PAST.

BASED ON U.S. HISTORY, WE WILL EVENTUALLY PROVIDE NORTH KOREA WITH THE MUCH NEEDED FOREIGN AID THEY SEEK. WE QUESTION UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WILL WE PROVIDE THAT AID?, WILL THE U.S. MAKE THE LIVE POW'S PART OF THE DEAL OR WILL THE DEAL BE FOREIGN AID FOR NORTH KOREA'S SILENCE ON OUR LIVE POW'S.

IN 1953, THE FAMILIES OF OUR MISSING IN KOREA KNEW ALL THE POW'S DID NOT COME HOME. THEY SPOKE OUT AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IGNORED THEM. .

IN 1973, THE POW/MIA FAMILIES KNEW THAT WE LEFT MEN BEHIND, ALIVE, IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE GOVERNMENT DISMISSED US, AS THEY DISMISSED OUR KOREAN WAR POW/MIA FAMILIES. WE WERE DISTRAUGHT FAMILY MEMBERS WHO COULD NOT ACCEPT OUR LOVED ONES DEATHS. THEY LABELED THE CONCERNED CITIZENS

WHO SUPPORTED US OPPORTUNISTS, PREYING ON DELUSIONAL FAMILY MEMBERS.

TWENTY YEARS LATER, IN 1993, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED STATES LEFT A SMALL NUMBER OF AMERICAN SERVICEMEN BEHIND, ALIVE, AT THE END OF THE WAR. THE SENATE COMMITTEE, WITH TWO DISTENTIONS, DISMISSED THAT SMALL NUMBER SAYING THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY OF THE MEN WERE ALIVE, TODAY.

TO THAT WE SAY, WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE THEY ARE DEAD? WILL IT TAKE US ANOTHER 20 YEARS TO PROVE THAT MEN ARE ALIVE, TODAY?

CONGRESSMAN DORNAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE THE POW'S ALIVE TODAY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND NORTH KOREA, DO NOT HAVE ANOTHER 20 YEARS.

LIVE POW'S DO NOT FACTOR INTO ANY OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH VIETNAM OR NORTH KOREA. INSTEAD OF ASKING FOR LIVE MEN, WE ASK FOR REMAINS, WE DIG AT CRASH SITES LONG SINCE SCAVENGED BY LOCALS. EVEN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT REPORTS NO LONGER REFER TO POW/MIA'S. NOW, IT IS MIA/POW'S. HOW LONG BEFORE THE POW DESIGNATION DISAPPEARS ALTOGETHER?

FOR 50 YEARS, GENERATIONS OF POW/MIA FAMILIES HAVE BATTLED FOR THE TRUTH. OVER 40 YEARS PASSED BEFORE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ADMITTED, WHAT THE KOREAN WAR POW/MIA FAMILIES KNEW IN 1953. NORTH KOREA SHIPPED HUNDREDS, IF NOT THOUSANDS OF MEN TO CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE KOREAN WAR.

IT TOOK 20 YEARS, TO GET THE GOVERNMENT TO ADMIT WE LEFT MEN BEHIND, ALIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. HOW MUCH LONGER MUST WE WAIT FOR THE TRUTH?

THE POW/MIA FAMILIES ARE TIRED. THE CONCERNED CITIZENS, WHO SUPPORT US, ARE TIRED BUT WE ARE NOT GOING AWAY. WE HAVE BATTLED TOO LONG AND FOUGHT TOO HARD TO STOP NOW.

PRESIDENT CLINTON CAN CERTIFY VIETNAMESE "FULL FAITH" COOPERATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE, BUT SAYING IT DOES NOT MAKE IT SO. IT IS A LIE. WE KNOW IT AND THE PRESIDENT KNOWS IT.

JOHN MC CAIN CAN INTRODUCE 100 AMENDMENTS, DESIGNED TO STOP US, BUT HE WILL NOT STOP US. WE WILL FIGHT THE "MC CAIN AMENDMENT" TO THE MISSING SERVICE PERSONNEL ACT OF 1996, WITH ALL THE STRENGTH. WE HAVE.

CIL-HI CAN BURY OUR POW/MIA'S WITH NO REMAINS, MAKE IDENTIFICATIONS BASED ON SINGLE TEETH, AND TURN ANIMAL BONES TO HUMAN. WE WILL NOT ACCEPT THOSE IDENTIFICATIONS. THEY CAN STOP LOOKING FOR OUR LOVED ONES, WE WILL NOT.

IN CLOSING LET ME SHARE WITH YOU THE UNOFFICIAL CREED OF THE POW/MIA FAMILIES AND THE CONCERNED CITIZEN WHO SUPPORT US.

"THOUGH WE'VE COME A LONG WAY, THERE IS MUCH, MUCH MORE TO BE DONE. THE DECK IS STACKED AGAINST, US. OUR ADVERSARIES ARE WELL-ENTRENCHED AND WELL FINANCED AND SCARED OF ANY CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO. IN THE LONG RUN, WE WILL PREVAIL. WE HOLD THE TRUMP CARD, FOLKS, AND WHEN THE DUST CLEARS, AND THE DENSE MORNING FOG BURNS OFF, WHEN WE CLEAR OUR WIRE OF SAPPERS, AND THE GUNSHIPS GO HOME, BY GOD, WE'LL STILL BE THERE, BECAUSE WHAT WE SEEK TO DO IS RIGHT."

DRAFT

14 September 1992

DENTAL SUMMARY : CILMI 0048-86

FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY SECTION
U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, HAWAII

RECOVERY OF REMAINS: The remains designated CILMI 0048-86 were received in Box 15 of 21 sets of remains released at Noi Bai Airport, SRV on 10 April 1986. No name was associated with these remains by the SRV.

POSTMORTEM EVIDENCE: The dental remains of CILMI 0048-86 consist of the skull with attached maxillae which contain five teeth and a mandible which contains nine teeth (see Dental Photograph 1 and 2). The dental remains were radiographed in duplicate with Size 2 dental film at 10MA, 80KVP, and 18/60 seconds. The results are two frames each containing fourteen periapical films dated April 1986. Salient points of interest include the presence of two impacted mandibular molars (teeth #17 and #32), both which have incomplete root formation, and one restored tooth (an occlusal amalgam in tooth #19). Refer to DD FORM 891 dated 10 July 1992 for graphic depiction of the dental remains.

NAME ASSOCIATION: No name was associated with these remains by the SRV. A possible association, PLUMADORE, REFNO 0839-0-01, was provided for analysis by DIA in May 1989. The dental record of LCpl PLUMADORE was compared to the remains and could be excluded. The mortuary files and available antemortem dental records of the remaining fourteen other Marines involved in this incident (listed as killed, body recovered) were examined and compared to the remains of CILMI 0048-86. No records of any of the Marines in this incident matched the dental remains of CILMI 0048-86. The following chart summarizes these findings:

IDENTIFICATION #	NAME	RECORD USED	
REFNO 0839-0-01	PLUMADORE	EF 603	E - 2
PDAD 1666-67	AMORCZEL	DD 891	F - 13
PDAD 1669-67	SPINK	EF 603	G - 13
DAD 1669-67	SPINK	DD 891	H - 3
DAD 1669-67	CURRY	DD 891	31
DAD 1672-67	RECUZZA	DD 891	3
DAD 1675-67	HAPPELIN	DD 891	34
DAD 1667-67	ROUSE	DD 891	E - 10NA
DAD 1668-67	JENSEN	DD 891	F - 89
PDAD 1674-67	JACK	EF 603	G - 2
DAD 1673-67	KAVOLAK	DD 891	H - 0
DAD 1677-67	KENOSKI	DD 891	H+5 - 1
DAD 1671-67	MENFORD	DD 891	13
DAD 1678-67	RECH	DD 891	3 → 15
DAD 1670-67	TRIMMAM	DD 891	

Additionally the dental characteristics of all CILMI 0048-86 were compared to all known recorded dental characteristics of three U.S. service members listed as unaccounted for in Southeast Asia through the use of the Computer Assisted Postmortem Identification system (CAPMI). The following records could not be

AUG 23 '94 10 47 USA CILMI FAX (838) 448-7813

P. 5-18

REPLY TO
ATTENTION

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND
ALEXANDRIA VA

22331-0482

July 13, 1994



MEMORANDUM THRU COMMANDER, U.S. TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL
COMMAND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
DIRECTOR ARMY STAFF

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER & RESERVE
AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Request for One-Time Exception to Moratorium
on the Use of mtDNA as the Primary Means of
Identification

Reference Information Paper, TAPC-PED-M, 22 June 1994.
subject: Unknown Remains at CILMI and Possible Misiden-
tification of Two Remains which may be Associated with
that Case (encl 1).

Request a one-time exception to the moratorium on
the use of mtDNA as a primary means of identification in
the interest of resolving a high-priority discrepancy
case discussed in the enclosure.

Presently, traditional dental and anthropological
procedures are inadequate to positively resolve the
identity of the skeletal remains designated CILMI
0048-86. Analysis to date, however, suggests that CILMI
0048-86 may represent a previously accounted for
individual.

The Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory
already has obtained a unique mtDNA sequence from bone
samples taken from CILMI 0048-86 and awaits a reference
blood sample for comparison.

Due to unique circumstances, it is requested that
CILMI be granted a one-time exception to the use of
mtDNA analysis as the primary means of identification in
the case of CILMI 0048-86. MtDNA analysis is the

only scientific means presently available to confirm or negate the suspicions of the CILMI scientific staff and thus determine the logical next steps required to resolve the identity of the individual represented by CILMI 0048-86.

Patricia P. Hickerson
PATRICIA P. HICKERSON
Brigadier General, U.S. ARMY
The Adjutant General

Inclosure

STAFF ACTION MEMORANDUM								
MEMORANDUM THRU: TAG				ACTION OFFICER <u>CPT Jones</u>				
FOR: CG, PERSCOM				OFFICE SYMBOL <u>TAPC-PED-M</u> PHONE <u>448-8201</u>				
				DATE <u>7 July 1994</u>				
SUBJECT: Request for One-Time Exception to Moratorium on the Use of mtDNA as the Primary Means of Identification								
☐ INFORMATION		☐ DECISION		☒ SIGNATURE		☒ INITIALS		
SPECIFY THE FOLLOWING "PURPOSE," "DISCUSSION," "RECOMMENDATION(S)," "FOLLOWUP" ACTION(S)." IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED, USE CONTINUATION PAGE.								
1. PURPOSE: To obtain TAG's signature on the memorandum at Red Tab A for forwarding to CG, PERSCOM.								
2. DISCUSSION:								
a. The moratorium has precluded CILMI from making a decision on a possible misidentification.								
b. Request a one-time exception to policy be granted to confirm or negate suspicions of misidentification.								
3. RECOMMENDATION: That the TAG sign and forward the memorandum at Red Tab A and forward to CG, PERSCOM for line-thru and forwarding.								
OPTIMIS RESEARCHED? YES ___ NO ___ OPTIMIS FILE RECOMMENDATION? YES ___ NO ___								
COORDINATION:			INTRADIR CONTROL:		STAFFING:		ACTION TAKEN:	
ACTION	NAME	OFFICE	INIT	DATE	INIT	DATE		
CONCUR NON-CONCUR		EE CH			SCS		APPROVED _____	
CONCUR NON-CONCUR		DIV CH	<i>[Signature]</i>	8/7	XO		DISAPPROVED _____	
CONCUR NON-CONCUR		DIR XO	<i>[Signature]</i>	7/11	CBM		NOTED	
CONCUR NON-CONCUR		DEP DIR	<i>[Signature]</i>	"John"	C/S		SEE ME	
CONCUR NON-CONCUR		DIRECTOR	<i>[Signature]</i>	13	CG		BRIEF	

John
Henry
Hess,
Feb.

2000

ACTION OFFICER COL Jordan
OFFICE SYMBOL TAPC-PED-H PHONE 448-9203
DATE 22 June 1994

SUBJECT: Recommended Course of Action on Remains held at USACILHI that are involved in a Potential Misidentification during the Vietnam War

X	INITIALS
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SPECIFY THE FOLLOWING "PURPOSE," "DISCUSSION," "RECOMMENDATION(S)," "FOLLOWUP ACTION(S)." IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED, USE CONTINUATION PAGE.

1. PURPOSE: To obtain TAG's line-thru on the memorandum at Red Tab A for forwarding to CG, PERSCOM.
2. DISCUSSION:
- a. The enclosed Information Paper provides the background and subsequent actions on resolution of remarks received by USACILHI in 1986 initially associated with 2nd Lt Plunadora, TSMC.
- b. This is a sensitive case involving a multi-loss ground incident.
- c. Recent events described in the information paper and cover memorandum necessitate informing the Army leadership as soon as possible.
3. RECOMMENDATION: That the TAG line-thru and initial/sign the memorandum at Red Tab A and forward to CG, PERSCOM for release approval.
- Red Tab A should be handled by the Air Force Plunadora family in United States Army.*

OPTIMIS RESEARCHED? YES___ NO___ OPTIMIS FILE RECOMMENDATION? YES___ NO___

COORDINATION:			INTRADIR CONTROL:			STAFFING:		ACTION TAKEN:
ACTION	NAME	OFFICE		INIT	DATE	INIT	DATE	
CONCUR NON-CONCUR			BR CH			SGS HK	27 June	APPROVED _____
CONCUR NON-CONCUR			DIV CH	WJF		XO JF	27/6	DISAPPROVED _____
CONCUR NON-CONCUR			DIR XO	H	6/27	CSM		
CONCUR NON-CONCUR			DEP DIR	LD	27 June	C/B KH	29/6	SEE ME
CONCUR NON-CONCUR			DIRECTOR	24 JF	27 June	CG		BRIEF

AUG 23 '94 10:45 USA CILMI FAX (808) 446-78:3

F. B. I.

INFORMATION PAPER

TAPC-PED-M
23 June 1994

SUBJECT: Unknown Remains at CILMI; Possible Misidentification of two Remains which may be Associated with that Case

1. Purpose: To advise of a complex problem involving an unidentified remains (CILMI 0048-86) and the planned attempts to establish the identity thereof, which may lead to the revelation that the remains of two individuals possibly killed during the same incident may have been misidentified in 1967. One of the remains possibly misidentified may in fact be those of REFNO 0839, a priority discrepancy case, discussed at the 9 June 1994 intra-DOB review.

2. Discussion:

a. On 21 September 1967, Marine Lance Corporal Kenneth L. Plumadore (REFNO 0839) was participating in Operation Kingfisher near the Con Thien Firebase, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam. A large Vietnamese force attacked LCpl Plumadore's unit in the vicinity of grid coordinates YD 133699. Several witnesses saw LCpl Plumadore sustain several chest wounds in the ensuing battle. He was examined on the battlefield and pronounced dead. LCpl Plumadore's body, along with those of 14 other Marine casualties were left behind when the U.S. battalion withdrew.

b. On 10 October 1967, Marine units returned to the battlefield and recovered the bodies of 14 of the 15 dead Marines, numerous body parts, and LCpl Plumadore's helmet. The semi-skeletal remains were taken to the U.S. Army Mortuary, Da Nang for identification and processing.

c. As of 17 October 1967, 12 of the 14 remains had been definitely identified dentally. The other two remains were subsequently identified by dental records and analysis of skeletal remains as PFC Mark W. Judge, 2235869, and Cpl William A. Berry, 2273159 respectively. What antemortem records for LCpl Plumadore that were available for identification purposes during the processing of these remains is unknown; his service records were reportedly lost in an airplane crash on 8 October 1967 (CILMI has SF 603 and SP 68).

AUG 23 '94 10:45 USA CILHI FAX (8X) 448-7813

P.5-10

TAPC-PED-H

SUBJECT: Unknown Remains at CILHI; Possible Misidentification of two Remains which may be Associated with that Case

There is no documentation addressing the disposition of the "numerous body parts", but it is reasonable to assume they were consolidated with one or more of the 14 remains, and may represent the 14th Marine killed in the incident. The USMC carries LCpl Plumadore as dead, body not recovered.

d. Investigations conducted during the 18th Joint Field Activity suggested that a wounded Marine survived the initial battle and was captured by the enemy force. Testimony from eyewitnesses inferred that the Marine was killed along an evacuation route by allied air strikes. The physical description of the prisoner as given by the eyewitnesses does not match LCpl Plumadore.

e. On 10 April 1986, the Vietnamese government repatriated the remains of an individual they reported as captured at Con Thien and died on 27 September 1967 in Vinh Linh. Using this information, the Defense Intelligence Agency correlated these remains to LCpl Plumadore. However, the dental remains are contradictory to the antemortem records of LCpl Plumadore and the tentative association nullified. The SRV has been asked for additional information on this case at numerous technical level meetings; most recently in December 1993. Thus far, no additional information has been obtained.

f. The CILHI Scientific Director reviewed all available antemortem and postmortem evidence of the 15 Marines involved in the Con Thien incident. This review indicated that 12 of 14 Da Nang Mortuary identifications are, within reasonable scientific certainty, dentally valid. The other two identifications are questioned because of the lack of either adequate antemortem or postmortem documentation.

g. The two identifications which are questionable are those of Cpl Berry and PFC Judge. A review of the Da Nang Mortuary records indicates that the remains interred as Cpl Berry do not include dental remains (teeth). This review also finds that the remains interred as PFC Judge include teeth which could be those of Cpl Berry.

AUG 23 '94 18:46 USA CILMI FAX (808) 448-7813

P.O. 10

TAPC-PED-H

SUBJECT: Unknown Remains at CILMI; Possible Misidentification of two Remains which may be Associated with that Case

h. Further complicating the matter is the possibility that the unidentified remains now in CILMI custody (CILMI 0048-86) may be those of PFC Judge.

3. Problems:

a. Remains CILMI 0048-86 have been compared to the records of all unaccounted for Americans in SEA with negative results.

b. Remains CILMI 0048-86 have been dentally excluded as being those of LCpl Plumadore.

c. Remains CILMI 0048-86 may, in fact, be those of PFC Judge; a dental comparison indicates this may be the case, but is insufficient for recommending positive identification.

d. If so, the remains buried as Cpl Berry or PFC Judge may be misidentified.

e. The remains buried as Cpl Berry and PFC Judge may be commingled; they may also include portions of LCpl Plumadore.

4. Subsequent Actions: In early 1994 CILMI provided four bone samples cut from CILMI 0048-86 to AFDIL for mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) analysis. On 1 June 1994 AFDIL reported obtaining a unique mtDNA sequence from two of the four samples.

5 Conclusion:

a. A blood sample provided by the Judge family should either confirm or refute the remains on hand at CILMI as PFC Judge. If it confirms the identity, then remains believed interred as Judge should be disinterred and submitted to AFDIL for DNA testing. If DNA is sequenced, reference blood samples should be requested from the Berry and Plumadore families for comparison.

b. The matching mtDNA appears to be the only likely means to resolve this three fold problem. The paucity of antemortem records for all three Marines makes other means of identification unlikely, therefore an exception to the current moratorium on the use of mtDNA as a primary means of identification will have to be requested. This is currently being prepared.

AUG 23 194 10:47 USA CILHI FAX (000) 448-7812

P. 7/10

TAPC-PED-H

SUBJECT: Unknown Remains at CILHI; Possible Misidentification of
two Remains which may be Associated with that Case

0. We will continue to treat this as a sensitive, close hold
matter to protect the families until they can be notified.

COL William Jordan/4-6-9203
APPROVED BY: COL Neal Grotegut

MEMO FOR RECORD

19 OCT 1994

SUBJECT: CASE 0727, APODACA

REF: TELECON BETWEEN MATHER AND HELGESEN, CILHI, THIS DATE

REMAINS ALLEGED TO BE THOSE OF APODACA HAVE BEEN UNILATERALLY REPATRIATED BY THE SRV ON TWO OCCASIONS, JULY 1988 AND APRIL 1989. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE REMAINS PROVED TO BE NON-HUMAN. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO INDICATION IN THE FILE AS TO THE CIL FINDINGS REGARDING THE SECOND REPATRIATION. THOUGH THE SRV SAID THESE REMAINS HAD BEEN ACQUIRED FROM A SMUGGLER IN HCM CITY, THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHY THE SRV CONTENTED THESE REMAINS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH APODACA.

ACCORDING TO MR. HELGESEN, THE SECOND "APODACA REMAINS" REPATRIATION CONSISTED OF TWO SMALL BONE FRAGMENTS. THESE WERE DETERMINED TO BE OF HUMAN ORIGIN, BUT RACE UNDETERMINED. NOTHING ELSE COULD BE CONCLUDED. HELGESEN FOUND NOTHING IN HIS IMMEDIATE RECORDS WHICH INDICATED THESE WERE CANDIDATES FOR DNA TESTING. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT, SINCE THESE REMAINS COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED AS BEING PART OF APODACA, THE CIL HAD NOT PUBLISHED ANY FINDINGS. IN OTHER WORDS, THESE REMAINS WILL CONTINUE TO RESIDE AT CIL IN AN INDETERMINATE STATUS PENDING THE RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR OTHER EVIDENCE ALLEGED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH APODACA.

MR HELGESEN COULD NOT SHED LIGHT ON THE SRV RATIONALE FOR ALLEGING THESE TO BE APODACA'S REMAINS. HE SHARED MY OPINION THAT APPARENTLY SOMEONE, PERHAPS THE "SMUGGLER," HAD COME UP WITH THE APODACA NAME. I FIND THIS PLAUSIBLE SINCE ONE OF APODACA'S DOGTAGS WAS ALSO RECOVERED DURING THE FIRST (NON-HUMAN) REMAINS REPATRIATION.

PAUL MATHER

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX525 MCN = 89251/38625 TOR = 892512220
 PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS3089 2512217- --RUEALGX.

HEADER

P 082217Z SEP 89
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUCCGCHS/NATS CJS WASHINGTON DC
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 P 072100Z SEP 89
 FM CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 TO RHWRMPC/HQ AFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//MPCC//
 RUCIPGA/HQ AFESC TYNDALL AFB FL//DEHM//
 RUEACNP/COMNAVPERSCOM WASHDC//CODE 64//
 RULSBUA/COMNAVMECOM WASHDC//CODE 332//
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHDC//MHP 10//
 RUEAHOF/CDRPERSCOM ALEX VA//TAPC-PED-F//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP/VLC//
 RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC//NSC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//PW-MIA//
 RUEADWD/CSA WASHDC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHDC
 RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC
 RUHQBPA/CDRJCRC NAS BARBERS PT HI
 RUEHBT/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
 RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36//
 BT

CONTROLS

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: ID STATUS - REMAINS FROM SRV
 THIS MSG IN THREE PARTS
 PART ONE FOR ALL

1. THIS MSG PROVIDES THE PARENT SERVICE AND ALCON WITH THE IDENTIFICATION STATUS OF SPECIFIC REMAINS RECEIVED DURING THE PAST SEVEN REPATRIATIONS IN HANOI (13 JUL 88 THRU 31 JUL 89). THE CASES DISCUSSED ARE THOSE RETURNED BY THE SRV WITH NAME ASSOCIATIONS OF US SERVICEMEN STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN WHICH EITHER THE NAME ASSOCIATIONS HAVE PROVEN ERRONEOUS OR THE NAME ASSOCIATIONS STILL CANNOT BE VALIDATED. THESE PROBLEM CASES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AT TECHNICAL LEVEL MEETINGS BETWEEN JCRC/CILHI AND THE VNOSMP, WHERE-AT THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR ID RESOLUTION WERE SPELLED OUT. THESE REQUIREMENTS RANGED FROM ADDITIONAL REMAINS PORTIONS TO INCIDENT AND ACQUISITION INFORMATION (PROVENIENCE, DATE, TYPE OF ACFT, ETC). THESE REPEATED ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN LARGELY UNSUCCESSFUL AT LEAST IN TERMS OF REAL VALUE TO THE ID PROCESSES. IN SOME INSTANCES, THE JOINT US/SRV INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS HAVE SURVEYED

NOT BE CORRELATED TO A SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT. A CILHI OBSERVER, WHO WAS TAKEN TO THE SITE IN JUN 89, REPORTED THAT THE FLOODING FROM HEAVY RAINS COUPLED WITH THE HIGH WATER TABLE APPARENTLY MADE A SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY EFFORT IMPOSSIBLE. AT THE AUG 89 TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI, CDCILHI POINTED OUT THAT THE PAUCITY OF THE REMAINS PRECLUDED IDENTIFICATION AND REQUESTED THAT ANOTHER EXCAVATION OF THE SITE BE CONDUCTED IN THE COMING DRY SEASON. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS CONLEY UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

14. REMAINS CILHI 0175-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 9 DURING THE 31 JUL 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF *NAME*

NAME IS REFNO *DATA*. THE SRV ALLEGED THAT DEATH OCCURRED ON 24 APR 66 IN HA BAC PROVINCE, WHICH AGREES WITH US RECORDS OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH *NAME* WAS LOST. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND THE POSTCRANIAL SKELETON IS VERY INCOMPLETE, FRAGMENTARY, AND ERODED. THEY ARE ADULT, POSSIBLY MALE, AND APPROXIMATELY 67 INCHES IN STATURE. NOTHING ELSE CAN BE DETERMINED. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

PART THREE FOR COMNAVPERSCOM, COMNAVMEDCOM, AND CMC

15. REMAINS CILHI 0202-88 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 7 DURING THE 3 NOV 88 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF *NAME*

NAME IS REFNO *DATA*. THE REMAINS IN BOX 7 HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL. NO REMAINS WERE RECEIVED DURING THIS REPATRIATION THAT CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS EDWARDS.

16. REMAINS CILHI 0252-88 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 30 DURING THE 15 DEC 88 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF "FOULKS, RALPH E." (FOULKS, RALPH E., JR. IS REFNO 0968-0-01). THE SRV ALLEGED THAT DEATH OCCURRED ON 5 JAN 68 IN HA NAM NINH PROVINCE, WHICH AGREES WITH US RECORDS OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH FOULKS WAS LOST. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH BUT ARE FAIRLY WELL REPRESENTED POSTCRANALLY. NO DEFINITIVE RACE MARKERS ARE PRESENT, BUT NOTHING SUGGESTS NON-CAUCASOID. OTHER FINDINGS ARE: NEARLY 25 YOA, MALE, ABOUT 69 INCHES IN STATURE, AND A MEDIUM BUILD. ANTEMORTEM CHEST X-RAYS OF FOULKS HAVE JUST BEEN OBTAINED; COMPARISON WITH POSTMORTEM X-RAYS AND EVALUATION ARE PENDING. THE RESULTS OF THIS ANALYSIS WILL DETERMINE IF A RECOMMENDATION FOR IDENTIFICATION IS SUPPORTABLE.

17. REMAINS CILHI 0174-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 8 DURING THE 31 JUL 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF "FLANIGAN, JOHN N." (FLANIGAN IS REFNO 1484-0-01). A DD FORM 2MC, A DD FORM 528, AND A MACV FORM 5 FOR FLANIGAN WERE ALSO TURNED OVER. THE SRV ALLEGED THAT DEATH OCCURRED ON 19 AUG 69 IN BINH TRI THIEN PROVINCE, WHICH AGREES WITH US RECORDS OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH FLANIGAN WAS LOST. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST OF AN INCOMPLETE CRANIUM AND AN INCOMPLETE HUMERUS. THEY REPRESENT AN ADULT, POSSIBLY CAUCASOID, PROBABLY MALE, AND ABOUT 66.5 INCHES TALL. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS FLANIGAN OR THE OTHER BNR OF THE INCIDENT UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION IS RECEIVED.

18. REMAINS CILHI 0180-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 14 DURING THE 31 JUL 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF *NAME*

IS REFNO DATA THE REMAINS IN THIS BOX HAVE BEEN
IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL. NO REMAINS WERE RECEIVED
DURING THIS REPATRIATION THAT CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS *1/4/4/4/4*
PROTECTIVE MARKINGS MAY BE REMOVED IAW AR 340-17, SEC 4-500.

ADMIN
BT

#3090

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THE SITES AND INTERVIEWED WITNESSES TO THE INCIDENT. BUT FOR THE FOLLOWING CASES, THOSE ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN ESSENTIALLY UNPRODUCTIVE. PART TWO FOR HQAFMPC AND HQAFESC

2. REMAINS CILHI 0132-88 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 4 DURING THE 13 JUL 88 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME "APODACA VICTOR J., JR." (APODACA IS REFNO 0727-0-01). THE SRV ALSO TURNED OVER A MUTILATED ID TAG FOR APODACA. THE BOX CONTAINED ONLY NONHUMAN BONES AND MAP REMNANTS. NO REMAINS WERE RECEIVED DURING THIS REPATRIATION THAT CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS APODACA.

3. REMAINS CILHI 0233-88 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 11 DURING THE 15 DEC 88 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF *NAME*. *NAME* IS REFNO *DATA*). ONE DD FORM 2AF FOR *NAME* WAS ALSO TURNED OVER. THE SRV ALLEGED THAT DEATH OCCURRED ON 12 JUL 72 IN BINH TRI THIEN PROVINCE, WHICH AGREES WITH US RECORDS OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH *NAME* WAS LOST. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST ONLY OF 11 BONE FRAGMENTS. THE ONLY BIOLOGICAL DETERMINATIONS THAT CAN BE MADE ARE THAT THESE ARE THE REMAINS OF AN ADULT MALE (25-35 YOA) OF AVERAGE MUSCULARITY, POSSIBLY CAUCASOID. THESE DATA ARE MINIMALLY CONSISTENT WITH KNOWN ANTEMORTEM CHARACTERISTICS OF *NAME*, BUT CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS *NAME* UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS PORTIONS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

4. REMAINS CILHI 0234-88 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 12 DURING THE 15 DEC 88 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF "HUARD, JAMES LINTON" (HUARD IS REFNO 1898-0-01). ONE DD FORM 2AF FOR HUARD WAS ALSO TURNED OVER. THE SRV ALLEGED THAT DEATH OCCURRED ON 12 JUL 72 IN BINH TRI THIEN PROVINCE, WHICH AGREES WITH US RECORDS OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH HUARD WAS LOST. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST OF PORTIONS OF A CLAVICLE, SOME RIBS AND VERTEBRAE, AN INCOMPLETE HIP BONE AND SACRUM, AND SOME LOWER LEG BONE FRAGMENTS AND FOOT BONES. THE ONLY BIOLOGICAL DETERMINATIONS THAT CAN BE MADE ARE THAT THESE ARE THE REMAINS OF AN ADULT MALE (25-35 YOA) OF AVERAGE MUSCULARITY, POSSIBLY CAUCASOID. THE DATA ARE MINIMALLY CONSISTENT WITH KNOWN ANTEMORTEM CHARACTERISTICS OF HUARD, BUT CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS HUARD UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS PORTIONS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

5. REMAINS CILHI 0240-88 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 18 DURING THE 15 DEC 88 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF *NAME*. *NAME* IS REFNO *DATA*). ONE DD FORM 528 FOR *NAME* WAS ALSO TURNED OVER. THESE REMAINS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF BELL, HOLLY GENE (REFNO 1552-0-01). THE REMAINS IN BOX 17 OF THIS REPATRIATION WERE RECEIVED AS "BELL, HOLLY GENE". THE SRV ALLEGED THAT THE PLACE OF DEATH FOR THE INDIVIDUALS REPRESENTED IN BOTH BOXES WAS IN NGHE TINH PROVINCE, WHICH AGREES WITH US RECORDS OF THE REFNO 1552 INCIDENT. THERE ARE CURRENTLY FIVE PERSONNEL IN A BNR STATUS FROM THIS INCIDENT. THE REMAINS IN BOX 17 HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST OF SOME ADULT HUMAN CRANIAL FRAGMENTS, PROBABLY MALE. THE RACE CANNOT BE DETERMINED. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS *NAME* OR ANY OTHER BNR INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

6. REMAINS CILHI 0023-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 21 DURING THE

23 JAN 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF ~~NAME~~ ^{NAME} IS REFNO DATA . ONE ID TAG FOR ~~NAME~~ ^{NAME} WAS INCLUDED IN THE BOX WITH THE REMAINS. THE SRV ALLEGED THAT DEATH OCCURRED IN BINH TRI THIEN PROVINCE, WHICH AGREES WITH US RECORDS OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH WOODS WAS LOST. THE JOINT US/SRV INVESTIGATIVE TEAM HAD HOPED TO SURVEY THE CRASH SITE IN DEC 88, BUT WERE UNABLE TO DO SO. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST OF ABOUT TWO DOZEN SMALL CREMATED BONE FRAGMENTS AND BONE DUST, THE LARGEST FRAGMENT MEASURING 2X4 CM. THE BONE LOOKS TO BE FROM AN ADULT, BUT NO OTHER DETERMINATIONS CAN BE MADE. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS WOODS UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS PORTIONS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

7. REMAINS CILHI 0025-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 23 DURING THE 23 JAN 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF "DAVIES JOSEPH E" (DAVIES IS REFNO 1182-0-01). TWO ID TAGS FOR DAVIES WERE INCLUDED IN THE BOX WITH THE REMAINS. THE SRV ALLEGED THAT DEATH OCCURRED IN THE AREA OF BO TRACH, BINH TRI THIEN PROVINCE, WHICH IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH US RECORDS OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH DAVIES WAS LOST. A JOINT US/SRV INVESTIGATIVE TEAM VISITED THE AREA IN DEC 88, BUT NO REMAINS OR MATERIAL EVIDENCE WAS DISCOVERED. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST ONLY OF ONE SMALL PORTION OF A HUMAN FEMORAL SHAFT. IT IS PROBABLY ADULT, BUT RACE, SEX, STATURE AND MUSCULARITY CANNOT BE DETERMINED. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS DAVIES UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS PORTIONS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

8 REMAINS CILHI 0026-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 24 DURING THE 23 JAN 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF ~~NAME~~ ^{NAME} IS REFNO DATA). ONE SF46 (GOVERNMENT MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR'S IDENTIFICATION CARD) MADE OUT FOR ~~NAME~~ ^{NAME} AND A PORTION OF WHAT SEEM TO BE INSTRUCTIONS FOR A MEDICAL KIT WERE INCLUDED IN THE BOX WITH THE REMAINS. THE SRV ALLEGED THAT DEATH OCCURRED IN TUYEN HOA, BINH TRI THIEN PROVINCE, WHICH AGREES WITH US RECORDS OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH ~~NAME~~ ^{NAME} WAS LOST. THERE ARE CURRENTLY FOUR PERSONNEL IN A BNR STATUS FROM THIS INCIDENT. THE REMAINS AND OTHER ITEMS SEEM TO BE THOSE VIEWED BY THE JOINT US/SRV INVESTIGATIVE TEAM WHEN THEY TRAVELLED TO TUYEN HOA DISTRICT, BINH TRI THIEN PROVINCE IN DEC 88 IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION ON REFNO 0591. VNOSMP OFFICIALS PRODUCED THE REMAINS AND ITEMS WHICH THEY SAID A LOCAL FAMILY HAD "RELEASED" TO THEM AFTER RECOVERING THE MATERIAL FROM A CRASH SITE IN TUYEN HOA DISTRICT NEAR THE LAOTIAN BORDER. THE TEAM ATTEMPTED TO INSPECT THE CRASH SITE BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS AND THE LACK OF A LZ. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST OF EIGHT CRANIAL FRAGMENTS, TWO RIB FRAGMENTS, ONE HUMERAL PORTION, FOUR FEMORAL FRAGMENTS, TWO FIBULAR FRAGMENTS, AND THREE UNIDENTIFIABLE LONG BONE FRAGMENTS. THE REMAINS APPEAR TO BE THOSE OF AN ADULT, BUT RACE, SEX, STATURE AND MUSCULARITY CANNOT BE DETERMINED. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFI-

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

CATION OF THESE REMAINS AS ~~NAME~~ ^{NAME} OR ANY OTHER BNR FROM THIS INCIDENT UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

9. REMAINS CILHI 0105-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 19 DURING THE

27 APR 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF "APODACA VICTOR" (APODACA IS REFNO 0727-0-01). THE SRV ALLEGED THAT THE REMAINS WERE "COLLECTED" IN HO CHI MINH CITY. APODACA WAS LOST IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST OF TWO PORTIONS OF LEFT HIP BONE AND ONE PORTION OF A TALUS (FOOT) BONE. THE AGE OF THE INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTED CAN ONLY BE ASSESSED AS ADULT; NOTHING ELSE CAN BE DETERMINED. THE BOX ALSO CONTAINED NINE NONHUMAN MAMMALIAN BONE FRAGMENTS AND EIGHT UNIDENTIFIABLE BONE FRAGMENTS WHICH MAY BE OF HUMAN ORIGIN. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS APODACA UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

10. REMAINS CILHI 0143-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 17 DURING THE 21 JUN 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF NAME IS REFNO DATA). THE SRV DID NOT PROVIDE PROVENIENCE OR DATE OF INCIDENT. TWO INDIVIDUALS ARE REPRESENTED BY THESE REMAINS. ONE IS SMALLER AND MORE GRACILE, IS AN ADULT MALE, AND POSSIBLY MONGOLOID. THERE WERE TWO LOOSE UNRESTORED UPPER BICUSPIDS IN THE BOX AND THEY PROBABLY BELONG WITH THE FIRST REMAINS (THE ROOTS ARE SHORT, STUBBY, AND FUSED). THE SECOND INDIVIDUAL IS LARGER AND MORE MUSCULAR, IS AN ADULT, AND PROBABLY MALE. THE RACE CANNOT BE DETERMINED. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF EITHER SET OF REMAINS AS NAME OR ANY OF THE OTHER FOUR US AND ONE VNAF BNR OF THE INCIDENT UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

11. REMAINS CILHI 0144-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 18 DURING THE 21 JUN 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF "HYNDS, WALLACE G." (HYNDS, WALLACE G., JR. IS REFNO 0782-1-01). THE SRV ALLEGED THAT THE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED FROM SON GIANG (V), HUONG SON (D), NGHE TINH (P), WHICH AGREES WITH US RECORDS OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH HYNDS WAS LOST. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST OF SIX BONES OR FRAGMENTS THEREOF. THEY ARE FROM AN ADULT, BUT NO OTHER DETERMINATIONS CAN BE MADE. CILHI CAN NEITHER RECOMMEND NOR RULE OUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE REMAINS AS HYNDS OR THE OTHER BNR OF THE INCIDENT UNLESS ADDITIONAL REMAINS OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

12. REMAINS CILHI 0150-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 24 DURING THE 21 JUN 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF "ROCKETT, ALTON C. (ROCKETT, ALTON C., JR. IS REFNO 0717-0-02). THE PRINCIPAL REMAINS IN BOX 24 HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL. AN UPPER FIRST BICUSPID TOOTH (NO. 5) WAS SEGREGATED FROM THE PRINCIPAL REMAINS, BUT THAT TOO DOES NOT REPRESENT THE REMAINS OF ROCKETT. NO REMAINS WERE RECEIVED DURING THIS REPATRIATION THAT CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS ROCKETT.

13. REMAINS CILHI 0154-89 WERE RECEIVED IN BOX 28 DURING THE 21 JUN 89 REPATRIATION WITH THE NAME ASSOCIATION OF NAME IS REFNO NAME THE SRV ALLEGED THAT THESE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED DURING THEIR UNILATERAL EXCAVATION OF A CRASH SITE IN OUTER HANOI PROVINCE IN LATE MAY 89. THE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND CONSIST OF A SHAFT FRAGMENT OF A FEMUR, THREE HAND BONES, AND A LONG BONE FRAGMENT. THE AGE IS ADULT, BUT NOTHING ELSE CAN BE DETERMINED. TWO PIECES OF NON-HUMAN MAMMALIAN BONE WERE ALSO IN THE BOX ALONG WITH FOUR MUTILATED PORTIONS OF A DD FORM 528 FOR NAME AND A DATA PLATE FROM A F-105D AIRCRAFT. THE DATA PLATE COULD

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Miss Alfond. We appreciate your statement.

I know that the chairman mentioned earlier that each of the witnesses' entire written statements will be included as part of the record of this hearing. If you can summarize the points in your remarks, that will be helpful.

Miss Holland, we're going to hear from you next. You take your time and present your material in the way you see fit.

**STATEMENT OF ANN HOLLAND, WIFE OF T/SGT. MELVIN A.
HOLLAND, MIA**

Ms. HOLLAND. Thank you very much for inviting me to testify before this panel today and giving me this opportunity to speak for men who cannot speak for themselves.

Congressman Dornan and Congressman Pickett, we applaud you for having held these hearings this past year, and not allowing our men to die a slow, silent death.

I will try to summarize what it's been like for me during the past 28 years into a 5- or 8-minute statement. I will submit the total statement for the record.

Mr. PICKETT. Your complete statement in its entirety will be made a part of the record, yes, ma'am.

Ms. HOLLAND. Thank you very much.

When my husband, T. Sgt. Melvin Holland, was selected to volunteer for a sensitive assignment in September 1967, he was told it would help to bring the war to an early end. It did—for him. For me, it was the beginning of an odyssey that has yet to have an ending.

In order for my husband to accept the assignment, both he and I were required to attend a briefing at the Pentagon and sign a secrecy agreement. We were told the men selected for this assignment were the cream of the crop, the very best the Air Force had to offer. My husband was very proud to have been selected. He and 49 other men were discharged from the Air Force and put on the Lockheed Air Service payroll. They were to be sent to Laos as civilian technicians to man a radar base on a mile-high mountain in the Sam Neua Province, 15 miles from the North Vietnamese border, in the middle of 5,000 enemy troops.

When he had been gone for 5 months, I received a telephone call one afternoon, and I was told that the mountain had been overrun and my husband was missing. Five men had been rescued off of the mountain, and one of the five men had died, but his body was recovered because it was in the helicopter. The other missing men they had no information about at all.

I could not tell anyone. I could not tell my children, and I could not tell my husband's brothers and sisters what had happened. I was told to keep my mouth shut because, if the news got out and the news media got a hold of it, I could be causing my husband's death.

I had to turn around and face my own five little children as well as eight little cub scouts that afternoon and continue on as if nothing had happened. That went on for 3 months. When my kids would ask if we had gotten a letter from daddy, I would have to

drag out an old letter and pretend to be reading them something new.

At the end of 3 months, I had a visit from my adviser at the Pentagon. He came out and told me they were declaring the men dead. I asked him if he had any proof that my husband had died, and he said no, nothing has changed. We have to get them off of the Lockheed payroll. I said I thought you carried men in a missing status for at least a year when you didn't have any information about them, and he said well, they're civilians and they're under the control of the State Department, and the State Department has no "missing" status, so we have to declare them dead.

"But it doesn't mean anything, Mrs. Holland. He could walk out of the jungle tomorrow, and you have to keep your mouth shut. You could be causing his death if this gets out."

This was during a time when I would get a call every couple of—first it was every couple of days. This was before they declared him dead. They would tell me they had no information, never had any information. The survivors could not tell them what happened to my husband. So when they're declaring them dead, it's only a paper shuffle, not to worry. We're still going to do everything we can to bring them home.

I tried to believe that. I had doubts, so I tried to contact one of the other wives whose husband was on the same mission. I wrote to two of them, in fact. One of them contacted our adviser and told him that I had tried to make contact with her, which was a strict "no no". He called me up to remind me of the secrecy agreement that I had signed. He said the consequences could be very serious for me, that I could end up in prison and have my children taken away from me.

I told him, if my husband was dead, I had nothing to lose. And if he wasn't dead, I was going to do everything I could to bring him home, so he could take that piece of paper and put it where it would be most uncomfortable. He reminded me again that I had to keep quiet.

The other wife that I tried to contact, she did answer my letter, and I talked to her on the phone. But she, too, had been warned. She had been told of the serious consequences and she was scared to death to be talking to me. So I never tried to stay in contact with any of those wives. I was putting myself on the line, but I wasn't willing to put anyone else on the line.

I tried to keep the faith, to believe that the Air Force was trying to bring my husband home—until March 11, 1970, 2 years to the day since the mountain had fallen into enemy hands. President Nixon came on TV and said that we never lost any men in ground combat in Laos. I knew then that he either didn't know about the men at site 85, in which case he could do nothing to bring them home, or he knew about the men and he wasn't going to do anything to bring them home.

I called the editor of the local paper. He wanted to do a story, but I was so afraid of what the consequences could be. But I knew that I had to do something. I put my trust in God to take care of Mel, to take care of me, to take care of my kids, and I would deal with the consequences later.

Two weeks after the article appeared in the paper, I had a visit from three men from the Pentagon in Washington, DC. They came out to tell me the truth about what happened to the men at site 85. They were dead. They were all dead. I asked them if they had proof; did anyone see my husband die? They told me one of the survivors had heard my husband crying out for help, and his voice got weaker and weaker, until he heard it no more.

I asked for the name of the survivor. I was told I couldn't talk to him, that he had been injured too badly and was still recuperating in the hospital. But I had to accept the fact that my husband was dead.

When I asked them why it took 2 years for them to come and tell me that, when they had been telling me for 2 years that they had no information about him, they said they had to verify all the facts. I asked why did my adviser—because I was only speaking to one man for 2 years—I said, why did my adviser tell me they had no information about Mel? I asked him repeatedly if anybody had any information about my husband, and I was told repeatedly, for 2 years, no. None of the survivors had any information about my husband. And now they're telling me that they had this information for 2 years, but they had to verify all the facts.

I was devastated, to say the least. To think they would have put me through that for 3 months, lying to my children before they ever declared him dead, and then told me they were declaring him dead but it was strictly a paper shuffle and that was all, that he could still come home, and then for the next 2 years to tell me to keep my mouth shut, don't talk about it, but now here's the truth, he's dead, he's been dead all along, sorry about that.

Over the next 5 years I called my new adviser many times. I had a new adviser all of a sudden, too. He was usually courteous, but he never really gave me any answers. After a while, he told me that I would have to learn to accept the truth, that if I didn't, pretty soon people were going to think I was mentally unbalanced and that I could end up in a mental institution and have my children taken away from me. At other times I was told I could lose my income.

In 1975, I received some information from a source who said he was swapping war stories with a guy one night in Bangkok. He had heard about site 85 because he knows me personally. So he asked the man as many questions as he could. The man talked freely about what happened. He was clearly upset and he said the CIA never wanted that base up on the hill. They were really upset when the Air Force went ahead and put it up there. He felt like the men had been dumped on, that the truth had not been told about that mountain yet.

When my source told him that he knew one of the wives of one of the men that had been left behind on that hill, would he mind if he passed the information on to me. He was told, "Please do. Maybe she can do something with it, because I can't."

When he gave me the information, which I have included in my statement, he had said it was rumored that there were six men captured off of the mountain, but he wasn't sure how many were Americans. I knew when I saw that, when I got that information,

that I was going to have to do something else, that sitting quietly and trying to be the good military wife just wasn't going to do it.

So I went to my lawyer, a lawyer friend of mine, and asked him how I could get the truth out of the Government. He asked me if I had ever considered suing the bastards. I said for what, the truth? He said, no, but \$10 million should get their attention. But it had never been done before, and there was no guarantee that it would get me any answers. But we should be able to submit some interrogatories.

So I called my adviser out in Washington, DC and told him I wanted to speak to the colonel that had been in charge of the operation, Colonel Clayton. He told me I couldn't talk to him, that he had been discharged from the Air Force and he had no idea where he was, when, in fact, Colonel Clayton was working right down the hall from him as a civilian.

He insisted on wanting to know what he could do to help me. I asked him if LS-85 or channel 79 meant anything to him. There was total silence for a moment, and then he said, "You've been talking to someone who came back from over there, haven't you?" I said, "No, I haven't", but I knew that the source of the information was not just blowing smoke, that he had some good, solid information.

My adviser went on to say to me—I reminded him that when he had come to my house in 1970 to tell me the truth about what happened on the hill, I said you and Colonel Clayton both told me that you waited 3 days to bomb that hill. I said you didn't wait 3 days; the Air Force did not wait 3 days to bomb that hill, because that was some information I had just been given, also by the source.

He said on the phone, he said, "Colonel Clayton may have told you we waited 3 days to bomb that hill, but I never told you we waited 3 days to bomb that hill." I replied to him that "I told you that if I ever found out that that hill was bombed the next day, there was going to be hell to pay." I said, "Buddy, there's going to be hell to pay now."

He told me I was nothing but a troublemaker, that I would never find out any more than I had already been told. I told him I would go to hell trying then. So I called the lawyer and told him let's get going.

I decided to start a lawsuit against the Government to find out what happened to the men at site 85. But I had to explain to my children what I was doing. I lined them up, all five of them, and told them that I had to know the truth about what happened to their daddy.

Mr. DORNAN [presiding]. How old were your children, Mrs. Holland, at the time?

Ms. HOLLAND. Ten, nine, eight, seven, and four-and-a-half.

Mr. DORNAN. That very year.

Ms. HOLLAND. In 1975, when I got information that maybe someone had survived and been captured, I decided to start a lawsuit against the U.S. Government. I lined my kids up to explain to them why I was starting the lawsuit.

Mr. DORNAN. And the date of Lima Site 85 again?

Ms. HOLLAND. It fell on March 11, 1968, and in April 1975, I received information that someone may have survived and been cap-

tured. So I was starting a lawsuit against the U.S. Government to try and find out the truth about what happened to the men.

So I lined my kids up and I said I have to know the truth about what happened to daddy. What is the worst thing we can find out, and can we live with that? Because if we can't live with it, then I had better not ask the first question. They stood there and looked at me, and didn't say anything, and I said——

Mr. DORNAN. And now they're 17, 16 and——

Ms. HOLLAND. No—well, yeah, they were that much older. No, they weren't even that old. They were 11, 13, 14, and 15——

Mr. DORNAN. I mean, when the incident happened, they were toddlers?

Ms. HOLLAND. They were 4½, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

Mr. DORNAN. My children were the exact same age in that year, and I was over there as a reporter, stealing combat missions. My wife is in the room, and she is not just sympathizing. She is empathizing. She used to tell me, in some tense moments, "You're not my husband. You're owned by the missing-in-action families. You belong to the wives and the mothers." And then she would say, "and that's the way it should be."

Ms. HOLLAND. Thank God. [Applause.]

And thank you, Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. So back to 1975, you asked your kids these questions. Now they're still teenagers——

Ms. HOLLAND. I asked them what is the worst thing we could find out, and can we live with it, because if we can't live with it, I had better not ask the first question. They looked at me—and I told them the worst thing, for me, would be to find out that their daddy is alive over there and I can never bring him home; can we live with that? And they said, "Mom, you have to try."

I made my decision then that I would try, no matter how long it takes, how much money it costs, or what people say about me. God knows I have tried. I only hope and pray that if Mel is alive, he knows it, too.

The lawsuit bounced back and forth for 7½ years before it was finally dismissed in 1982, on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run out. There is a 2-year statute of limitations on Federal tort claims. During that 7½ years, there were many interrogatories entered on both sides. I answered all of their questions truthfully, to the best of my ability, and I now know that the U.S. Air Force lied about almost everything they answered, and it can be proven. Why?

In 1985, President Reagan decided that the families of the KIA/BNR's—which is what Mel was classified as—were to be included at the annual gathering in Washington, DC. I met for the first time other women——

Mr. DORNAN. BNR is body not recovered?

Ms. HOLLAND. Right.

For the first time, I met other women who were going through many of the same things I was going through. For the first time I met a casualty officer. For the first time I met someone who had heard about the men at Site 85 and they did not think I was crazy. I was not alone any more.

Mr. DORNAN. Miss Holland, you explained before I got back the specialty of your husband's job, or the other mother that's here? Your husband was seen alive by one of the men who did come out. He was so wounded that he couldn't move. That's what you told me in the office the other day.

Ms. HOLLAND. I didn't go into that. I was trying to keep it down to 5 or 8 minutes.

Mr. DORNAN. I just want everybody to know, because there's no press here—there never is when the real tough stories are told—but your husband was alive, wounded, hiding behind a rock, and somebody else—Who was the man who passed him by and was rescued?

Ms. HOLLAND. No, one of the survivors who came off of the mountain said that my husband had come around this rock—the survivor was wounded very badly, was hiding behind this rock. My husband and another man came around this rock, saw this survivor, asked him if there was anybody else up there still alive, and the survivor said: "Yeah, I think there's some guys over across". My husband and the other man took off running in that direction. That was the last time he saw him.

Mr. DORNAN. But then the rescuers came back and found and rescued the wounded man—

Ms. HOLLAND. Right.

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. Who had seen your husband not wounded?

Ms. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. I've got it straight. I'm sorry.

But the other mother who is here, or the other wife, her husband had a highly technical job, and she and you told me that in General Secord's book, he said our top secret NSA type codes are on their way to Moscow—

Ms. HOLLAND. It was the TSQ. He said the TSQ and encryption technology was on its way to Moscow.

Mr. DORNAN. That's written in his book.

Ms. HOLLAND. That's written in his book.

Mr. DORNAN. And then you or Mrs. Hall, whose husband had this top secret job, told me that you called General Secord?

Ms. HOLLAND. I called General Secord.

Mr. DORNAN. And you said, "Does that mean code books were taken off the plateau mountain top", and he said: "No, they didn't get the books", but we assume—meaning maybe somebody was captured, and if they were captured—and this is where I feel like I'm beating on a steel bank door.

How can anybody who's in intelligence assume they wouldn't have lusted for a prisoner like that? And then in my own cursory knowledge of POW affairs, at a cocktail party in Geneva in 1955, a Chinese diplomat slips and says to Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, "We've got a whole B-29 crew we don't know what to do with." Thirteen men; Anderson's crew. I had Al Santoli get the Life Magazine article. My memory is pretty good. There it was. The whole crew is returned, not through Panmunjom, as were the four F-86 pilots shot down in Manchuria—Cameron, Parks, Fisher, and the chairman of my first bailout board, who said it was not pilot error, a big, tall handsome

guy with slate blue eyes named Heller. Those four were returned through Korea.

But the Anderson B-29 crew was returned through Hong Kong, and what made that tragic is that, of the 13 men on the crew, only 11 returned. Who were they? Two enlisted radar operators who could pinpoint that they were over Korea, not over China or Manchuria, so they paid for that with their lives. They were not returned and the other 11 were.

They do keep some prisoners and return others. That's why, when wives came to me and said "My husband had an advanced degree in nuclear physics. Why should other people shot down that day turn up and not him?" I said it is fair to assume that a guy broken under torture, who has a degree in nuclear physics, is off to Russia. And now we're starting, as I said earlier with some passion, because I feel it, the windows are being slammed on the Russian side of this.

Sam Johnson, a 7-year prisoner, tells me. He's over there with Malcolm Toon's team—and Malcolm Toon will testify tomorrow. He said, why are we letting all these opportunities go by going over and saying to the top ex-communist diplomats, "By the way, here's what we're going to ask you. What do you think?" Oh, thank you very much. Don't let them see general so-and-so, lock up so-and-so, send that guy out of town, order them to go to the dacha and close off those archives before anything leaks out of here. Our national Russian pride is at stake.

That's what's driving this thing into a period of again renewed anger by the families.

Please continue.

Ms. HOLLAND. In 1985, I received Mel's records for the first time. Even my lawsuit had not been able to pry them loose. In those records was a report of a Pathet Lao rallier saying that he had encountered—this report was in 1972—that he had encountered a Pathet Lao group taking an American prisoner to the prison camps at Ban Nakay. He was told the man had come from the radar base at Phou Pha Thi, which is the name of the mountain where Site 85 was.

The man was 20-years-old, wearing light-colored frame glasses, and did not seem to be wounded. My husband is the only man on that mountain that wore glasses. This is the only picture that was published of him during 1970. It looks like the standard, dark military glasses.

I want everybody to see those, because these are the glasses, the very same glasses. This is that light-colored plastic. It's not the dark brown—

Mr. DORNAN. This 20-year-old rallier, or a man who came over to our side because he thought we were winning, and we were more reliable allies in 1972, so he comes over to our side. He's only 20 years old and—

Ms. HOLLAND. No, no. He said the prisoner seemed to be 20 years old.

Mr. DORNAN. Oh. And how old would your husband have been?

Ms. HOLLAND. My husband was 32, but, my gosh, when he was 21, he only looked 16. Besides that, I can't tell how old Asians are when I see them, so I just figure they can't tell how old we are.

Mr. DORNAN. And the document finally released to you under legal pressure, how old did they say the rallier was? Was he an officer, a sergeant?

Ms. HOLLAND. They didn't say. They just said a Pathet Lao rallier.

But what's amazing is, JCRC, JPRC, none of the agencies that collected information about prisoners of war knew about the men missing at Site 85. What's amazing is that this report ever ended up in my husband's records, because it says right on there they have no information about anybody missing in that area. But it did end up in my husband's records. I always call those things little gifts from God because I end up with them.

Mr. DORNAN. Or some filing clerk or analyst did the right thing.

Ms. HOLLAND. Except how could it end up in my husband's records? They didn't know about those guys. In fact, those men's records right now, if you were to go over to the casualty office right now and tell George Atkinson that you wanted the master file on Melvin Holland, you wouldn't be able to get it.

Mr. DORNAN. Is Carol Hrdlicka still in the room? This is what Carol testified. To show you how strange these things are for me, this is the first time that Carol Hrdlicka and my brother, Don Dornan, have ever been in a room together, even on the planet Earth. Don called my wife once at George Air Force Base, "Is Bob flying tonight?"

"Why would you ask, Don? Yes, he is."

"Never mind. I'll talk to you later."

That's a different story, but I was flying with David Hrdlicka. Carol has found in her records things filed in David's records that shouldn't be there, to eliminate another case, probably David Hrdlicka. No, it wasn't probably David Hrdlicka. It was another bailout, another year, another time, but we got rid of another case.

There is a—I want to say innocent—cross screw-up of filing of records, and then the families have to extract these over the years. The problem that you had, Mrs. Holland, is this was top, top, top secret, and kind of an embarrassment that was overrun, and you and Mrs. Hall told me that for the first time, down the front slope of the mesa where they always expected attack, never dreaming that these people would scale the sheer front of this mesa-type mountain, were two CIA—meaning secret war in Laos—field commanders of a top Thai special operations commando unit, there to guard the trail, and that you found the documents where people called them and said "What's going on? We're trying to land and we see only smoke on the top of Site 85."

They said, "Oh, yeah. We've been hearing gunshots for hours. We don't know what's going on up there." Well, move your tail and get up there. You're supposed to protect these people. I didn't learn that until yesterday in my office.

Ms. HOLLAND. Well, it's not documented, but I had to find the "bird dog" pilot, and he told me that—

Mr. DORNAN. He was flying around the site.

Ms. HOLLAND. Yes. He's the one who told me personally—I talked to him on the phone personally. It took me many, many years to find him.

Mr. DORNAN. We're going to get to Bill Bell in a minute. Bill, when you were running the office in Hanoi, you had some sympathy, if not empathy, for the families getting these pieces of information, and then when you tried to help a family on that one site in the central highlands, then they used your words against you, when all you're trying to say to a family is yes, this could be possible. You know, you may be going up a blind alley here, but maybe not. Then they'll take your words and try and discredit you.

It is this mindset to debunk, this attempt to discredit, and an attempt to treat the family members like children and say leave this to us, and they're not doing any investigating. Now we have a situation where there are some real investigators, which I don't know if you know, real investigators at the DPMO, the way he was a real investigator. And we're going to hear from Mr. Veith.

I'm afraid that, by trying to extract information, and letting the office know that I know what I know, that they're going to purge their own office. They had better not, especially if the election in 139 days relieves this country of a problem at the top.

Do you have anything else to say, Mrs. Holland? I want to get to Mr. Bell.

Ms. HOLLAND. No, just my final statement on it.

My husband's name was on the list that Boris Yeltsin gave to George Bush—

Mr. DORNAN. Excuse me. Wait a minute.

Your husband's name was on a list that Yeltsin gave to George Bush?

Ms. HOLLAND. Correct, the list with 42 names on it.

Mr. DORNAN. What list?

Ms. HOLLAND. That came out in 1992.

In 1992, do you remember Boris Yeltsin coming over here and telling George Bush "I've got good news for you—"

Mr. DORNAN. Wait a second. He spoke to a joint session of Congress.

If I may, with some lack of humility, but absolute truthfulness, tell you two things. I stopped Gorbachev from addressing a joint session of Congress, because no dictator of any philosophy or any 'ism had ever done that. I said, if he wants to talk to Senators and Congressmen, let's use the Mellon auditorium across from the Star Spangled Banner in the American History Museum, let's use that. It's 8,160 square feet, bigger than the House floor, but he will not be formally in front of a joint session. So I stopped Gorbachev.

Yeltsin I wanted to hear from. He had won the first election in Russia in its entire history. He did it on George Bush's birthday. So Yeltsin comes and Yeltsin, before a joint session, says "And I will find any Americans that were brought to Russia during World War II, Korea, or Vietnam," and I led the standing ovation. I was at the leadership desk and I popped up like a jack-in-the-box and applauded until my hands hurt.

Now I'm told there is a list with 42 names given to Bush—

Ms. HOLLAND. There is a list with 42 names on it. There is another lady in here that her husband's name is on the list, also, Patrick Fellon.

Mr. DORNAN. I just rode over on the train with him to talk to the freshmen.

Ms. HOLLAND. Right. And the name Arnold Mikhailovich Holland, which the Russians associated to Melvin Arnold Holland, with his DIA case file number of H189.

Mr. DORNAN. You see, until proven otherwise, I believe that my triggered standing ovation for Yeltsin was deserved. I think his heart was in the right place.

Ms. HOLLAND. I believe so, too.

Mr. DORNAN. I think he wanted to do that.

Ms. HOLLAND. But do you realize who was the head of the CIA the year that I started my lawsuit?

Mr. DORNAN. No.

Ms. HOLLAND. George Bush.

Mr. DORNAN. He was there for 11 months and he never liked this issue as much as—

Ms. HOLLAND. I started my lawsuit then, and he realized that maybe, a possibility, that maybe he knew that some of those men from site 85 had been captured and maybe turned over to the Russians.

Mr. DORNAN. Does your husband's middle name translate to Mikhailovich, Melvin?

Ms. HOLLAND. No. His name was Melvin Arnold Holland. The Russian name that they put next to his name was Arnold Mikhailovich Holland.

Mr. DORNAN. And then they did this with Fellon, who they listed as Filinov?

Well, again, let's move on. But I want any guests in the room, if there's a press person with the wherewithal, that still will be hanging on, this is why the families suffer. We had an opportunity with the head of the Soviet Union, who just won an election on June 12, 1991, he gets a standing ovation in front of the Congress, and he'll be before me tomorrow, and then the ex-ambassador from Moscow starts the bureaucracy thing which comes under the heading of a statement made in Hanoi in August 1978:

"You will not embarrass yourselves, or the United States, by coming up with live prisoners at this late date, will you?" And then the last general, three-star, a Loyola U. graduate, Eugene Tye, who coined the expression "mindset to debunk", tells me "Congressman Dornan, there is some indication by sightings that there were some executions in the fall of 1978." That statement popped back in my mind, from a decent Congressman who's a friend of mine, not understanding what he was saying in Hanoi in '78.

Is that the end of your statement, Miss Holland? I'll put the full statement in the record.

Ms. HOLLAND. All right.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Holland follows:]

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Subcommittee Hearings on

The Presidential Determination of "Full Faith Cooperation" by Vietnam

2118 Rayburn Building

June 19, 1996

TESTIMONY OF

ANN HOLLAND

Wife of T/Sgt. Melvin A. Holland

M.I.A. March 11, 1968

Lima Site 85, Laos

Thank you very much for inviting me to testify before this distinguished panel today and for giving me this opportunity to speak for the men who cannot speak for themselves. Congressman Dorman, we applaud you for having held these hearings this past year and not allowing our men to die a slow, silent death.

When my husband, T/Sgt. Melvin A. Holland, was selected to volunteer for a sensitive assignment in September of 1967, he was told it would help bring the war to an early end. It did....for him. For me it was the beginning of an odyssey that has yet to have an ending.

In order for my husband to accept the assignment, both he and I were required to attend a briefing at the Pentagon and sign a Secrecy Agreement.¹ We were told the men selected for this assignment were the "cream of the crop", the very best the Air Force had to offer. My husband was very proud to have been selected. He and the other forty-nine men were discharged from the Air Force and put on the Lockheed Air Service payroll.² They were to be sent into Laos as civilian technicians to man a radar base on a mile high mountain in Sam Neua Province 15 miles from the North Vietnamese border.

When my husband had been gone five months I received a telephone call one afternoon in the middle of a cub scout meeting and was told that the mountain had been overrun and my husband was missing in action. A few men had been rescued

but a number of others had not been recovered. I was told I could tell no one, not my husband's sisters, my children, no one. If I said anything and it got out to the press I could be causing my husband's death! I had to hang up the telephone and turn around and face my own five little children as well as eight little cub scouts and pretend that nothing was wrong. I had to go through the next three months pretending nothing was wrong. When my children would come running in from school and want to know if we had gotten a letter from Daddy, I would take out an old letter and pretend to read it. When Mel's sisters would ask how he was doing I would have to tell them fine. I would get a telephone call every other day for a while, then a couple of times a week, then it was every couple of weeks. It was always the same. No one knew what happened to any of the men left behind on that mountain. None of the survivors had seen my husband or knew what happened to him. About three weeks after the first telephone call, I saw an article in the local paper about a secret radar base in Laos being overrun and 8 of 12 Americans were killed there.³ I called my advisor at the Pentagon and asked him if my husband was one of the 8 that died. I was told to disregard the article, that it had nothing to do with the operation my husband was on. They still had no information about any of the missing men.

After three months my advisor came to visit me and told me my husband and the other men were being declared dead. They still had no information about any of the missing men, I still had to keep quiet about it because he could still walk out of

the jungle tomorrow. When I asked why they weren't being held in missing status for at least a year like other missing men when there was no information about them, I was told that since the men were civilians they were under the control of the State Department and the State Department did not have a "missing" status. The men were either returned, captured or dead. They certainly had not been returned, there was no proof they had been captured so they had to declare them dead. Again, I was told it didn't really mean anything other than that my income would be coming from a different source. I knew they would have to get the men off the Lockheed payroll and I believed that it was just a "paper shuffle" and really didn't change anything. I didn't know that once a man is KOP (Killed on Paper) he is never resurrected on paper. I didn't think that the Air Force that my husband loved with all his heart would force me to accept his death just because I accepted their explanation for the paper shuffle. I believed them when they told me they would continue to try and find out what happened to him and bring him home to me.

Shortly after Mel was declared dead I tried to contact two of the other wives to see if they had been told the same thing I had been told. One of the wives turned me in to our advisor because we had been told we could not contact each other or any of the men on the assignment. My advisor called me to "remind" me of the secrecy agreement I had signed and told me the consequences could be very serious for me, that I could end up in prison and lose my children. I told him if my husband was

dead then I had nothing to lose and if he wasn't dead I was going to do everything I could to bring him home and he could take that piece of paper and put it where it would be most uncomfortable! He reminded me again that I had to keep quiet, that I would only be hurting my husband if anyone found out about where he was and what he was doing. The other wife talked to me and she too had been told her husband could still be alive and to keep quiet. She was so afraid of even talking to me because of the "consequences".

I tried to keep the faith, to believe the Air Force was really trying to get Mel back....until March 11, 1970, two years to the day since I was told Mel was missing, when President Nixon said on national television that we had never lost any men in ground combat in Laos. I knew then that he either did not know about my husband in which case he could not do anything to bring him home, or he did know about him and was not going to do anything to bring him home. He was being abandoned. My greatest fear had come true. So I called the editor of the local newspaper. He wanted to do a story but I was so afraid. Afraid of what could happen to Mel and afraid of what the Air Force would do to me for breaking my oath of secrecy. I knew if Mel were alive and came home, I would have ruined his Air Force career. He would be so ashamed of me. I could end up in prison. I could lose my children. I was 28 years old and they were all I had and having been orphaned myself at 14 years of age, I did not want my children to grow up without either parent. But I knew that I had to do what I could to bring Mel home, I would

trust in God to take care of Mel, me and our children and deal with the consequences later. Two weeks after the story came out I had an unannounced visit from three men from the Pentagon. The commander of the operation, my new advisor, and a man from the Prisoner of War office came "to tell me the truth" about what happened to Mel. He was dead. They were all dead. When I asked for proof, did anyone see Mel die, I was told one of the survivors had heard him crying out for help until his voice got weaker and weaker until he didn't hear it anymore. I said if they had known that for two years why in God's name did they wait so long to tell me. He said they had to verify all the facts. I said I wanted to talk to the survivor and was told I couldn't because the survivor was wounded too badly and still in the hospital and unable to talk to anyone. When I asked about the husband of the woman I had talked to I was told they had no information about him. They just didn't know what happened to him. There were three or four men they had no information about at all but the men were all dead. The man from the P.O.W. office then went on to explain how there had not been any reports of anyone being captured in the area, no other information of any kind to indicate anyone had survived and was captured. I was totally devastated. When I asked why my advisor had let me believe Mel could have survived and been captured I was told they couldn't answer that because he had been transferred.

Over the next five years there were many times when I called my new advisor in Washington, D.C., because I had seen something in the news about prisoners in

Laos that was contrary to what my first advisor had told me. He was usually courteous, never really gave me any answers and after a while told me that I would have to quit talking about it or "people would begin to think that you are mentally unbalanced and you could end up in a mental institution and have your children taken away from you." Did I really want them to think I was like the little old lady who went down to the train station to wait for her son to come home from WWII ? At other times I was told I could lose my income.

In 1975 I received some information from a source who said he was swapping war stories with a guy one night and this man started telling him about a "war story" in Laos. He asked him as many questions as he could think of then told him he knew the wife of one of the men on that mountain top. Would he mind if he passed the information on to her. The man said "go ahead, maybe she can do something with it because I can't."⁴ He was clearly upset. Felt those men had been dumped on and the truth wasn't being told. When I got the information I called my advisor and told him I wanted to talk to Colonel Clayton, the former commander of the operation who had visited me in 1970. He told me I couldn't talk to Col. Clayton. he had retired and they had no idea where he was. (He was working right down the hall from him in the Pentagon). What could he help me with. I said "does L-85 or Channel 79 mean anything to you?" He was silent for a moment then in a very cold voice said "you have been talking to one of the men who came back from over there, haven't you ?" I knew then that the source of the information was not

just blowing smoke. One of the questions that I had repeatedly asked over the years was, "did they bomb the mountain the next day" and I was always told "no" by everyone I asked, including the present advisor. I reminded him that he told me they did not bomb the mountain the next day, and he said Col. Clayton may have told me they did not bomb the mountain the next day but he did not tell me they did not bomb the mountain the next day ! He went on to tell me, in a very loud, angry voice that I was nothing but a trouble maker and I would never find out any more than what I had already been told! I replied "then I would go to Hell trying!" I talked to a lawyer the next day and asked him how I could get the truth out of them. He suggested that I sue them. It had never been done before and there was no guarantee that I would succeed but I might be able to force them to answer some questions. I lined up my five children and explained to them that I was doing it to find out the truth about what happened to their Daddy. What was the worst thing we could find out and could we live with it because if we couldn't live with it then I'd better not ask the first question. They just looked at me. I told them I believed the worst thing we could find out would be that Daddy is still alive over there and we can never bring him home.....can we live with that. They said, "but Mom, you have to try." I made my decision then that I would try.....no matter how long it takes or how much money it costs or what people say about me. God knows, I've tried. I only hope and pray that if Mel is alive that he knows it too.

The lawsuit bounced back and forth for seven and a half years before it was finally

dismissed in 1982 on the grounds that the Statute of Limitations had run out. There is a two year Statute of Limitations on Federal Tort Claims. During that seven and a half years there were many interrogatories entered on both sides. I answered all of their questions truthfully to the best of my ability. I now know they lied about almost everything they answered. Why?

In 1985, thanks to President Reagan deciding the families of the KIA/BNR's were to be included in the P.O.W./M.I.A. annual gathering in Wash., D.C., I met for the first time other women who were going through much of the same things I was going through. It had been a long, lonely 18 years not having another soul to talk to about this. For the first time I met a "Casualty Officer". For the first time, I met someone who had heard about the men at Site 85 and they did not think I was crazy. I was not alone anymore.

Through an FOIA, in December of 1985, I received Mel's records that even the lawsuit had not been able to pry loose from the Air Force. In those records was a report from 1972 telling of a male Caucasian wearing glasses being taken to the prison camp at Ban Nakay.⁵ He was told the man was from the radar base at Phou Pha Thi (Site 85). The Joint Casualty Resolution Center had no record of those men missing anywhere. The very office that was to correlate information they receive from various sources about prisoners of war. How many reports had slipped through their hands because they didn't know about the eleven men left

behind at Site 85 and believed their source to be lying?

In 1987 I received from the Casualty Office a formerly Top Secret report (CHECO) on the Fall of Site 85, and a video tape of the mountain that was taken before the Site started operating but after the equipment was installed. Information in the CHECO report is contrary to the answers the Air Force gave to the interrogatories in the lawsuit. Who is telling the truth ?

In 1990 a Captain in the U.S. Air Force interviewed a former high level Laotian commander, General Singkapo.⁶ According to William Sullivan, former Ambassador in Laos during the fall of Site 85, Singkapo was the man most knowledgeable about American prisoners of war. General Singkapo, when asked about the battle at Phou Pha Thi stated that "two or three wounded Americans had been captured and sent North". The Laotian government later stated that he was old and senile and didn't know what he was saying. They have since refused to let him be re-interviewed by any American. Was he senile and didn't know what he was saying ?

In June of 1992, Boris Yeltsin came to the United States with a list with forty-one names on it⁷ and "good news about your missing men from World War II, Korea and even Vietnam who could be alive in our country today"! President George Bush promptly rebuffed him and said he had been drinking too much vodka when

President Yeltsin tried to hand him the list. He didn't know that George Bush was the director of the CIA the year I started my lawsuit and tried to get any records they had about Site 85. I believe George Bush did not want to see any list with the name Arnold Mikhailevich Holland, correlated to Melvin Arnold Holland, on it. My husband. Sentenced for "counter-revolutionary activities". The list was "misplaced" for 15 months when I learned of it in September, 1993, and demanded to know why it wasn't in my husbands' classified records that I had reviewed six months earlier in Washington, D.C. I was told it wasn't classified. No one had bothered to even ask the Russians about any of the names on the list. After I demanded some answers I finally got to attend a meeting in March, 1994, with the Russians and was told Arnold Mikhailevich Holland was an Estonian who was born in 1914 and sentenced in 1945 and couldn't possibly be my husband. Were they telling the truth or were they merely saying what they think our President wanted to hear ?

Richard Secord wrote a book in 1992 and in the chapter about Site 85 he stated the loss of the site "had been a major disaster made worse by the loss of nearly the entire team and the compromise of our TSQ technology and a variety of top-secret encryption systems that we could only assume were now safely on the way to Moscow." When I contacted him and asked him if he meant the equipment was on it's way to Moscow he said "no, they didn't get any equipment off the mountain." So, he was referring to the captured men when referring to the

"technology"? He replied that they didn't have any proof of that but they couldn't account for everyone and they had to assume the worst. They had to change secret codes all over the world within 24 hours after the site fell. Did Mel Holland go to Russia ? He was the electronics expert on Site 85. The man who could build and repair the TSQ radios and crypto equipment from the first screw to the finished product. There were only two men on Site 85 when it fell that had TSQ and/or encryption knowledge, Mel Holland and Willis Hall, the crypto expert.

In 1994 the Laotian government allowed the U.S. to return to Site 85 to search for remains. NBC-TV got permission to go up on the mountain and do some filming because they wanted to do a story about "the mystery on the mountain". They interviewed a survivor who said he saw Mel Holland dead with his arm blown off. The same survivor who I was told said he heard him crying out for help. The same survivor who I contacted during the lawsuit to ask him if he saw Mel dead and he told me "no". He said the last time he saw Mel he was alive and running for cover. He said he heard him crying out for help from the direction he had seen him run to but he did not see him dead. He never said anything about Mel's arm being gone. (Another wife had been told in 1970 that a survivor had seen her husband with his arm blown off.) He could not remember the name of the man who was with Mel and went off in the same direction as Mel. He could not remember the name of the man laying next to him on the ground that the enemy shot in the head when they heard him groaning. I talked to him in 1977, nine years after the incident. He was

still very much traumatized by it and started crying and said he hadn't slept the whole night through in nine years. He was left behind on the mountain after the first four survivors were rescued. One of the survivors ran by him when he was running to the first rescue helicopter that came in. He told him to tell them he was there. Two hours later a second helicopter came in to look for him. During that two hours the enemy went around killing any one they found alive. The man played dead and they shot the man laying next to him. What if he had been unconscious when the other survivor had run by? What if the other survivor had been killed on the helicopter as it lifted off? What if he had been unconscious when the rescuer had come in looking for him and assumed he was dead when he crawled by him? Would he have been declared dead after three months? Would his wife have been told she was mentally unbalanced because she wouldn't accept the "truth"?

In 1995 the Vietnamese "found" one of the men who participated in the attack on the mountain and knew where the bodies of the dead Americans were buried. He accompanied the JTF-FA recovery team back to the site. After much searching there were no human remains to be found, not a tooth, nor a button, or a scrap of cloth, or a ring. Nothing.

Early this year some documents were discovered that stated that the Laotians recovered a certain number of remains from Phou Pha Thi in 1977.⁵ The

Vietnamese were in control of the mountain until 1975. I do not believe the Vietnamese would have just buried the bodies on that mountain and not taken every scrap of information from those bodies that they could get. Since the Laotians did not recover enough remains to account for the eleven men missing up there, what happened to the rest of them? How could the "witness" the Vietnamese provided say he saw "more then 10 bodies" buried there when the Laotians found only half that number?

As you can see, after 28 years I still have more questions than I have answers. I have spent over half of my life trying to bring my husband home. There are only three things that I know for an absolute certainty: 1. Some day I will die. 2. Until then I will pay taxes. 3. The Vietnamese have the remains of the men who died on that mountain top on March 11, 1968 and they know what happened to the ones who didn't die.

My country could not prove eleven men died on that mountain top in 1968 and they cannot prove it in 1996. If even only one man survived and was captured, he could be alive today, still waiting for his country to come for him. If not Mel Holland, then maybe Willis Hall or Jim Davis or Herbert Kirk. The Vietnamese owe me and my family the truth about those men. We have served our time in Hell.

ATTACHMENTS

1. Secrecy Agreement
2. Lockheed contract/Air Force contract
3. Newspaper article
4. Source information
5. Live sighting report
6. Singkapo report
7. Russian list
8. Remains recovery report

SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, Myrtle Ann Holland, understand that I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to security standards set by the U. S. Government. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage laws, Act of June 25, 1940, as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the national defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for the violation thereof.

I acknowledge that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or methods of collecting or handling it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the U. S. Government, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either word, conduct, or any other means any classified intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States and the orders lawfully authorized in writing, in each case, by the U. S. Government.

I understand that no change in my relationship with the U. S. Government will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the U. S. Government.

I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

WITNESS Whereof, I have set my hand and seal this 10 day of Oct, 1967.

Myrtle Ann Holland (SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 10 day of Oct, 1967.

Pentagon, Wash. D.C.
Myrtle Ann Holland
Signature

A G R E E M E N T O F E M P L O Y M E N T

THIS AGREEMENT made this 16th day of October, 1967, by and between LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT SERVICE COMPANY (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Employer"), a California corporation, with its principal office located at P.O. Box 33, Ontario, California and Melvin A. Holland (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Employee"), an individual, presently residing at P.O. Box 145 Woodland Wash. 98674 (hereinafter referred to as his normal place of residence):

W I T N E S S E T H:

WHEREAS, Employer desires to employ Employee to perform certain services, and Employee desires to accept such employment in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the mutual covenants and agreements hereinafter set forth, Employer and Employee hereby agree as follows:

1. SEVERABILITY OF CONTRACT TERMS

In the event that any one or more of the provisions of this Agreement shall, for any reason, be held by competent authority to be invalid or unenforceable, such particular provision or provisions shall be deemed to be separate and severable from all other provisions of this Agreement, which shall continue in full force and effect, and be binding upon the parties hereto, in the same manner as if the severed provision or provisions had not been included herein.

2. EMPLOYMENT AND DUTIES

Employer hereby employs Employee to render such services and perform such duties related to a _____ as Employer may from time to time direct or designate. Employee hereby accepts such employment with knowledge of the terms and conditions herein set forth and agrees to give throughout the term of this Agreement, his exclusive time and attention to the diligent and faithful performance of such services and duties and to abide by and be subject to all rules, regulations, and requirements of Employer, as well as all civil laws and regulations in effect from time to time at the place or places of duty where Employee may be assigned during his employment hereunder.

3. TERM OF EMPLOYMENT

The term of Employee's employment under this Agreement shall commence on _____ and shall continue for an indefinite period.

4. AMOUNT, TIME AND MODE OF PAYMENT OF SALARY

- (a) Beginning with the date Employee's term of employment commences, Employee shall be paid a base salary at the rate of \$228.60 per week. In addition, Employee will receive fifty percent (50 %) of such base rate commencing on the date of departure from the continental United States and ceasing upon the permanent departure of Employee from the designated place or places of employment upon the termination of this Agreement. Employee's base salary rate shall be subject to review at the end of each full year of employment hereunder and at the time of any extension of the terms of this Agreement, at which time such

4. (a) Continued

rate may be adjusted at the discretion of Employer. Any such adjustment in such rate shall be evidenced by a written notice to Employee, signed by both Employee and authorized representative of Employer, and a copy shall be attached to this Agreement as evidence of such adjustment, without further formal amendment hereto.

- (b) Salary payments shall be made weekly by check payable in United States dollars to _____

 Failure on the part of Employer to conform to the precise time and mode of payment of salary prescribed herein shall not be considered as a breach or default on the part of Employer in those cases in which such failure is the result of causes beyond Employer's control.

- (c) Employee shall not be entitled to, and shall not seek reimbursement from Employer for, any foreign exchange loss that he may incur as a result of converting into foreign or U.S. funds any sums paid or payable to him under the terms of this Agreement, and it is understood that Employer shall be under no obligation to exchange foreign exchange or currency of any country into U.S. funds or exchange.
- (d) The normal work week will be forty (40) hours and five (5) days per week. Overtime work, where required by matters of special urgency, shall be compensated for by granting corresponding time off. Time worked in excess of the normal work week must be approved in advance by the Employer or his designated representative.

5. VACATIONS, SICK LEAVE AND OTHER BENEFITS(a) Vacation

Employee shall be entitled to two weeks (10 days) vacation pay after one year of service with the Employer. Such vacation pay shall be computed at the same base salary plus 50% bonus specified in Section 4(a) above. In the event that the Employer has granted leave with pay, during the year of service, the Employer shall deduct from this vacation pay an amount proportionate to such days of paid leave up to a maximum of ten (10).

(b) Holidays

Employee shall be entitled to nine paid holidays per year.

(c) Sick Leave

Employee shall be entitled to sick leave benefits in accordance with the plan for sick leave benefits which is in effect for salaried employees of Employer. During any period of sick leave, Employee shall be entitled to the salary rate including the 50% overseas bonus set forth in Section 4. Such salary shall be less any salary benefits under Section 6(a).

5. (Continued)

(d) Retirement Plan

The provisions of the "Lockheed Retirement Income Plan for Certain Salaried Employees" as may from time to time be amended for salaried employees shall be made available to Employee on the same basis and subject to the same conditions and requirements as such Plan and benefits are made available to salaried employees of Employer.

(e) Group Insurance

The provisions of the "Lockheed Employees Group Insurance Plan" shall be made available to Employee on the same basis as such Plan is presently available to salaried employees of Employer, except that such coverage shall commence on October 16, 1967.

6. COMPENSATION FOR DEATH OR DISABILITY

- (a) Employee shall be insured by Employer under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Insurance policies, with benefits comparable to those required by the State of California.
- (b) Special accident, foreign field service insurance, in addition to the group insurance stated in Section 5(e), will be provided by Employer at the time Employee departs from the United States. Such insurance provides for payment to designated beneficiaries of Employee, for death of the Employee, in the principal amount of \$25,000, or dismemberment in lesser amounts as the result of any accident, excluding death or dismemberment directly or indirectly caused or contributed to by certain acts or omissions, as specifically set forth in such insurance policy. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as amending or enlarging upon the special accident foreign field service insurance policy provided by the Employer.
- (c) The terms and conditions of any insurance policies shall govern in any event relative to any claims arising under such policies. Employer shall not, in any event, be liable for the payment of such claims.
- (d) In the event of the death of Employee while outside the United States, during the term of his employment, Employee agrees that Employer may make such appropriate disposition of the body as Employer deems best under the prevailing circumstances, in compliance with any directions issued by the appropriate United States Governmental Official or Agency. Personal effects will be forwarded to the person named as principal beneficiary of the insurance covered by Section 5(e).

7. COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYEES MISSING OR UNDER DETENTION

- (a) An employee on foreign field service in a combat area found to be missing from his place of employment or known to have been taken prisoner, hostage, or otherwise detained by a hostile force or the force of any power not allied

7. (a) Continued

with the United States in a common military effort, shall continue to receive his regular base salary plus the 50% overseas bonus specified in Section 4(a) above, while missing or under such detention.

- (b) Compensation benefits paid or payable in accordance with Federal and State compensation laws shall reduce by such amount of compensation the amount of salary to be paid.
- (c) The terms "missing" or "under detention" shall be construed to include the period until the employee is returned to his place of employment, or the United States, or is able to be returned to the jurisdiction of the United States, or death in fact is established by a finding by the Federal Security Administrator or other Federal Body having jurisdiction or by other evidence satisfactory to the Company or death can legally be presumed to have occurred.
- (d) If an Employee should be termed "missing" or "under detention" as described in (a) and (c) above, then his total regular weekly salary shall be mailed to _____ at the address of _____ in the city and state of _____; when he no longer is categorized as "missing" or "under detention" then his regular weekly salary shall be mailed to the location authorized by the Employee.

8. TAX LIABILITY

Employee will be subject to and liable for all appropriate taxes and duties imposed by any government or political subdivision thereof, foreign or domestic, upon Employee's income or property. Employee is reminded that a citizen of the United States, regardless of his geographic location or his employer's nationality, is lawfully bound to file yearly income tax returns. Refer to the "Guide for U. S. Citizens Working Abroad" issued by the Internal Revenue Service for qualifications relative to tax exemptions.

9. TRANSPORTATION

All travel and transportation as required in performance of normal duties shall be arranged by the Employer by means provided by the United States military services.

10. PASSPORTS AND PREPARATION FOR TRAVEL

- (a) This Agreement is predicated upon Employee furnishing satisfactory proof that he is a citizen of the United States of America; upon his ability to secure necessary passport, visas, and other permits as may be necessary to authorize his departure and absence from the United States, and his entrance into and stay in such foreign countries as may be necessary; and upon his passing physical examination, submitting to such disease immunization and fingerprinting, and complying with such other rules and regulations as may be required by proper authority or by Employer.
- (b) Employer shall assist Employee in obtaining those passports, travel permits, and visas required for Employee without cost to Employee.

11. MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS

- (a) Prior to each departure from the United States, immediately prior to termination of this Agreement, and at such other time or times as Employer shall direct, Employee shall, without expense to Employee, submit to such physical examination, vaccination, inoculation, and other medical, dental, surgical, nursing, and hospital treatment, whether preventative or curative, as Employer's medical staff or medical examiners shall direct.
- (b) Medical limitations applicable to Employee as determined during the most recent physical examination shall be set forth on a document attached hereto and made a part hereof.

12. TERMINATION

- (a) Employer may by notice in writing or by telegram or cablegram terminate Employee's employment under this Agreement and his right to receive further salary and other benefits hereunder for any of the following causes:
 - (1) Employee, in the opinion of Employer or Employer's customer is not trustworthy, or is otherwise disqualified to render the services required hereunder, or does not abide by all rules, regulations, and requirements of Employer's management.
 - (2) Employee violates any of the provisions of this Agreement or fails, in the opinion of Employer or Employer's customer to perform faithfully and diligently the services and duties required of him hereunder.
 - (3) The performance or the personal conduct of the Employee is unsatisfactory to Employer.
- (b) In addition, Employer may by notice in writing or by telegram or cablegram terminate Employee's employment under this Agreement under the following circumstances:
 - (1) Upon or after completion of performance of Employer's contracts.
 - (2) Upon or after completion of Employee's performance under this Agreement.
 - (3) Upon Employee's being inducted into, or being recalled to, active duty (as distinguished from voluntary entrance) in the Armed Forces of the United States.
 - (4) When, in the opinion of Employer, the health or physical condition, as determined by medical examination of Employee is such as to render undesirable the further performance by Employee of service hereunder.

12. (b) Continued

Upon termination of Employee's employment under this Section (b), Employer shall make available to Employee return transportation, normally by military transportation, to Ontario, California in the United States. If Employee is terminated under the conditions specified in Subparagraphs (1), (2), or (3) hereof, Employee shall be entitled to severance benefits or leave of absence according to Employer's current policy. The application of such benefits shall commence on the date specified by Employer.

- (c) In the event Employee voluntarily terminates his employment or is terminated pursuant to Section 12(a), he shall not from and after such termination be entitled to any salary or any other benefits. However, Employer may at his discretion provide return transportation to Employee to Ontario, California.

13. CLAIMS AGAINST EMPLOYEE

Whenever Employer, by regulations of the host country, is required to guarantee the personal obligations of Employee, Employee agrees that Employer or any of its affiliates may deduct from sums owing to Employee the amounts of any claims which the Employer is actually required to pay under such guarantees. Any disputes relating to such claims will be settled by and between Employee and the claimants and Employer shall have no further responsibility respecting the claims nor shall Employer suffer any liability to Employee for said deductions and payments.

14. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

In addition to information treated as classified by the U. S. Department of Defense, the Employee agrees to treat as confidential all information and knowledge received or acquired by him relating to his employment and to his services hereunder, and to the services, products, or processes of manufacture and operation of Employer not disclosed by Employer to the general public. In furtherance thereof, Employee agrees that he will not, without the prior written consent of Employer, where applicable, publish or cause to be published such information, or disclose to any person, firm, or corporation, in any manner, or by any means, either by statements, photographs, books, pictures, articles, reports, charts, graphs, maps, or in any other manner or by any other means, written, pictorial, oral, or otherwise, any information directly or indirectly relating to such employment, services, products and/or processes of manufacture. Employee further agrees that the provisions of this Section may be enforced by injunctive relief or by any other legal action.

15. ASSIGNMENT

It is expressly agreed that Employer may assign its rights and delegate its obligations under this Agreement, as the same may be amended and extended (and under any and all subsequent agreements between the parties hereto relating to the subject matter hereof) to any subsidiaries or affiliates of Lockheed Aircraft

15. Continued

Corporation. It is further agreed that no assignment of rights or delegation of obligation under this Agreement (or under any and all such subsequent agreements) shall be made by Employee without the prior written consent of Employer.

16. INTERPRETATION

This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties hereto relating to the subject matter hereof and the provisions hereof shall be construed and interpreted solely in accordance with the laws of the State of California in the United States of America.

17. FINAL SETTLEMENT

Upon termination of this Agreement and upon payment to Employee of all amounts due Employee hereunder, Employee shall execute and deliver to Employer, upon a form or forms prepared by Employer and submitted to Employee:

- (a) a receipt for said amounts; and
- (b) a release of all claims except claims for compensation insurance or such claims as may have been submitted pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 hereof which may remain unresolved at the time of execution of such release.

18. CERTIFICATION OF EMPLOYEE

- (a) Employee certifies to Employer that he has read this Agreement in its entirety and that he fully understands its terms and conditions; that the foregoing terms and conditions constitute his entire agreement with the Employer relating to the subject matter hereof; and that no promises or understandings have been made other than those stated herein. It is specifically agreed by the parties hereto that this Agreement shall be subject to modification only by written instrument signed by both Employer and Employee.
- (b) No promises or representations of any kind have been made to Employee regarding exemption from payment of United States or any other income tax or duties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Employer has caused this Agreement to be executed in triplicate by its officer or other person thereunto duly authorized, and Employee has executed the same, in triplicate, as of the day and year first above written:

LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT SERVICE COMPANY

By _____

WITNESS TO SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

(Employee)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AND

MELVIN D. HOLLAND

1. (TS) (Gp-1) This Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Air Force and the Air Force member whose name appears above (hereinafter referred to as the Member) will govern the terms and conditions of his assignment to Project HEAVY GREEN. The terms and conditions are set below:

a. (TS) (Gp-1) The Member will submit a request for release from the US Air Force. The request will be approved by Hq USAF and the Member separated at Hq Command, Bolling AFB, Washington, D. C. During the period of separation from the US Air Force:

(1) All military pay, allowances, privileges, and benefits normally due a military member or his dependents while the Member is actively serving will be terminated.

(2) The Member will accept employment with Lockheed Aircraft Services Company (LAS), a subsidiary of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

(3) Pay and allowances during the term of employment with LAS will be equivalent to the Member's active duty gross pay in SEA plus a gross monetary gain of \$6,000.00 per year for a Member with dependents, \$4,500.00 per year for a Member without dependents, or 50% of the Member's gross pay, whichever is greater. The amounts referred to in this paragraph are before taxes.

(4) Member and dependents will be entitled to all privileges and benefits due an employee of LAS, to include death and disability insurance for the member; hospital, surgical, supplemental accident, polio, and major medical expense benefits for dependents.

b. (TS) (Gp-1) In the event a Member dies in any circumstance other than while serving under the documentation of a LAS employee, e.g., operating Site #85 and transiting between the Site and Udorn, Thailand, employment to LAS will be terminated and the Member reinstated in the USAF. In this event, military benefits to the Member's dependents or other beneficiaries shall apply as in the case of the death of any officer or airman in ordinary circumstances.

c. (TS) (Gp-1) In the event of death while under LAS documentation (as specified in b above) where the Member's body is recovered by friendly forces, b above applies.

d. (TS) (Gp-1) In the event of death while under LAS documentation (as specified in b above) where the Member's body is not recovered, benefits shall apply to the Member's dependents or other beneficiaries as in the case of the death of any LAS employee. In addition, the Member shall be reinstated to the rolls of the USAF, and normal military benefits to the Member's dependents or other beneficiaries shall also apply.

e. (TS) (Gp-1) In the event of capture by enemy forces while under LAS documentation (as specified in b above) LAS will continue to pay the contractual salary to the Member's account and provide benefits to the Member's dependents under paragraph a(4) until the Member is restored to US control and reinstated to the rolls of the USAF or subsequent death of the Member while under the control of enemy forces is established. In the event of the latter, d above applies.

f. (TS) (Gp-1) In the event a Member becomes "missing in action" while under LAS documentation (as specified in b above) he will be considered as captured, and e above will apply. This status will be reviewed under the applicable public law 12 months following the missing in action report. At that time, determination will be made to continue the Member's status under e above or declare the Member dead and invoke the provisions of d above.

g. (TS) (Gp-1) Upon completion of the Member's assignment to Site #85, he will, upon authoritative direction, be discharged from LAS and reinstated to the rolls of the USAF. In this regard:

(1) The Member's military records will be corrected to void any indication that the Member had been released from military service. Military service in terms of longevity, accrual of time for promotion purposes and the like will be credited.

(2) A review of the Member's records will be conducted. The purpose of the review will be to ascertain if the Member would normally have been promoted while serving in the cover status. If the review is affirmative, a special board will effect the necessary promotion and establish an appropriate date of rank.

2. (C) (Gp-3) I have read and understand the foregoing, and I freely and voluntarily enter into this Memorandum of Understanding with the United States Air Force in accordance with the terms and conditions thereof.

12 Sept 1967
Date

Mr. R. H. Ellis SSGT AF 19485705
Name/Rank/Serial Number

3. (C) (Gp-3) The Member whose name appears above has read the foregoing and has indicated his full understanding of its contents. I undertake on behalf of the United States Air Force to ensure that the actions which are the responsibility of the United States Air Force in this connection are promptly and adequately taken.

7 Sept 1967
Date

R. H. Ellis
R. H. ELLIS, Major General, USAF
Director of Plans
Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans & Operations

Reds cool off Laos drive apparently under orders

VIENTIANE, Laos (AP) — Western diplomats in Vientiane say the Communists have put the brakes on their drive against the U.S.-backed Royal Laotian forces.

Casualties from Communist probes and mortar attacks now number in the twos and threes daily, instead of in the hundreds as they did during a big enemy push from Jan. 1 into April.

A Royal Army spokesman conjectured that the Communists might be regrouping for a new offensive. But several Western diplomats believe that the restraint is due to pressure from the Soviet Union, which possibly is anxious to block any Communist military action that could erect new barriers to peace in Vietnam.

Western diplomats say the Communists do not seem likely to overrun the fertile Mekong River plain facing Thailand.

"They could come down to the Mekong any day they wanted to," one Western military source said. "The really significant thing is that they are not exploiting their obvious military advantage."

The 75,000 Royal Laotian troops, beset by squabbles and a lack of fighting spirit, have been a poor match for about 40,000 Pathet Lao and an equal number of North Vietnamese.

From mid-January to the end of March the government lost substantial ground in the north and northeast sectors. A division-strength government force fled in disarray on Jan. 15 from the Nam Bac Valley 60 miles north of Luang Prabang, the royal capital. The army reportedly lost 5,000 men in the battle and retreat.

The United States observes the 1962 Geneva agreement pro-

vision that no foreign troops be quartered in Laos, but U.S. bombers support Laotian troops by regular bombing missions against Communist forces. And the government army is supported by more than \$10 million in U.S. aid each year.

The United States also operates radar stations in Laos, manning them with American

civilians, to guide American bombers and reconnaissance planes to North Vietnam and to targets in Laos. Eight of the 12 American technicians at one station were killed March 11 when the North Vietnamese overran the post, which was in Sam Neua province 15 miles from the North Vietnamese border.

Early April, 1968

Before the Air Force moved in, all that was on the site was a couple of radio beacons there to guide aircraft. The Air Force moved in two more vans that were used to guide B-52's on target. There were CIA people on the hill but not for this project. The CIA advised the AF not to put the vans on the hill because they knew the NVA wouldn't stand for it. The NVA gave the AF ample notice to clear the Americans off the hill and remove the vans or be overrun. They even gave the date they were going to take it. Rumored that there were six prisoners taken off the hill. Not know whether they were American or Laotian. There were only 14 Laotian troops on the hill to protect it. They manned the 105mm guns and the bunkers. The troops that were supposedly at the bottom of the hill for protection were local troops and the highest bidder could buy them off. The Americans were sold out and the NVA or Pathet Lao took the hill without any resistance. Twenty Pathet Lao could have taken it. If the Americans had guns, they were probably locked up. All the destruction devices were thermo-blocks or explosive blocks that had a pin to pull. The cave did have radio equipment in it but the men didn't live in it.

The whole place was approximately 2 miles wide on top. Sheer cliffs were on three sides, the fourth side where the 105's were was a gradual incline. The two radio beacons were on top little hills and used for aircraft guidance. The sleeping quarters were behind the cave. Inside the cave they had a few radios. There was a rope ladder on the back side of the mountain that was kept rolled up on top and used if they had to go down that side in an emergency. It was only a couple hundred feet sheer cliff there and it led to a village at the bottom that was friendly. The two vans in front are the ones the AF put in. The whole area was cleared except the brush on the right side of the mountain. There were two villages in front below the mountain. If the Pathet Lao took the runway and mountain they had to do it by the way that the arrows go. The Number on the paper is the site number, L-85. L-111 was the runway. L-58, L-36, L-20A and L-20 were off quite a distance. The site was also called Channel 79 by some people. The U.S. did in fact bomb the site the next day, with F-4 fighters.

There were no problems with the NVA or Pathet Lao until the AF put the two vans in. The Lt. Col. in charge of the site was killed. The "friendly" Laotians Did not like him.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

THIS IR WAS TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIA MESSAGE DTG 102100Z OCT 72, WHICH INSTRUCTED SELECTED COLLECTORS TO SUBMIT IRs VIA MESSAGE FOR A 90 DAY TEST PERIOD. DURING THIS TEST, YOU MAY RECEIVE DUPLICATE DISTRIBUTION OF SOME INFORMATION. COMMENTS ON THE TEST PROGRAM SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO DIA ATTN-DS-4C.

FM JANAF ATTACHE VIENTIANE LAOS
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC
INFO RUEADMD/DA WASH DC
RUEFHQA/HQ USAF WASH DC
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC BAHAM M-SHIZH MI
RUHHC/SEC STATE WASH DC
RUHHHQA/CINCSARPAC FT SHAFTER MI
RUHSHVA/CDRUSACV SAIGON RVN
RUHHTA/CRUSACTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUHOGRA/DEPCJUSACTHAI UDORN THAI
RUHHAGA/808TH MI GROUP FORD ISL MI
RUHOGRA/HQ 7713AF UDORN THAI
RUHHTA/CHIEF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES BANGKOK THAI
BT

1980 DEC 22.
DIA FOR DI-SC AND DC-4) HQ DA FOR DANI-DOC) HQ USAF FOR AFMNH;
CINCPAC FOR J-2) CINCSARPAC FOR SPIN) CDRUSACV FOR
J-212-3/JPRC, J221 AND CAS) STATE FOR W/PN.
FROM JANAF ATTACHE VIENTIANE LAOS
THIS IS IR NO. 2-237-0223-72
PROJECT 6318-03-1
1. (U) LAOS
2. (U) PRISONER OF WAR REPORT- CAPTURE OF A REPORTED MALE
CAUCASIAN AT PHOU PHA THI, LAOS
3. (U) N/A
4. (U) MARCH 1988
5. (U) VIENTIANE, LAOS, 155 NOVEMBER 1978
6. (U) F-8
7. (U) 22226362 FROM PLTRALLER
8. (U) 2-237-0223-72
9. (U) 17 NOVEMBER 1978

PAGE 1

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

04108

10. (U) 1
11. (U) DIRMI 663, 1918, SICRI D-7CX-49918, AMS SERIES L7918,
ED:2
12. (U) OUSARMA, VIENTIANE, LAOS
13. (U) J. B. WILSON, MAJ, 68, ARMA
14. (U) B. BAILEY, JR., COL, 68, ARMA
15. IN APPROXIMATELY MARCH/APRIL 1968, SOURCE WAS ASSIGNED
AS A PLATOON LEADER IN THE PATHET LAO 705TH INFANTRY BATTALION.
HIS UNIT WAS ASSIGNED TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE AREA OF BAN INA
KAY TOGETHER WITH A DISSIDENT HEO BATTALION KNOWN AS THE HEO
PACHAY BATTALION. DURING THIS PERIOD, LARGE INVA UNITS WERE
ENGAGED IN SEIZING THE TACAN SITE AT PHOU PHA THI (UH 6563).
FOLLOWING THE NVA SEIZURE OF PHOU PHA THI, SOURCE ENCOUNTERED
A SMALL ARMED PATHET LAO ELEMENT TAKING A MALE CAUCASIAN TO THE
HEADQUARTERS AREA AT BAN INA KAY (VH 1967). THE INDIVIDUAL WAS
WOUND, DID NOT SEEM TO BE INJURED, WAS IN HIS EARLY 20'S AND
WAS WEARING LIGHT COLORED FRAME GLASSES. SOURCE WAS UNABLE TO
RECALL ADDITIONAL DETAILS CONCERNING THIS CAUCASIAN. THE PATHET LAO
ESCORTING THE INDIVIDUAL STATED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS AN AMERICAN
WHOM THEY HAD CAPTURED NEAR PHOU PHA THI AFTER HE HAD COME FROM
THE SITE AT PHOU PHA THI. THE PATHET LAO CLAIMED TO BE MEMBERS
OF THE 618TH INFANTRY BATTALION AND STATED THAT THEIR UNIT HAD
BEEN DEPLOYED NEAR THE BASE OF PHOU PHA THI.
ARMA COMMENTS: A. SOURCE IS CURRENTLY SUFFERING FROM MALARIA.
WHEN SOURCE RECOVERS FROM HIS CURRENT POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION,
HE WILL BE REINTERROGATED CONCERNING THIS SIGHTING AND POSSIBLE
AIRCRAFT DOWNINGS, WHICH HE MAY HAVE WITNESSED. NVA RALLIER
(LA-72-17) WAS A COMPANY COMMANDER IN THE NVA 883RD
BATTALION DURING THE ATTACK AT PHOU PHA THI IN MARCH 1968. HIS
COMPANY WAS CHARGED WITH SECURING THE RADAR SITE AT PHOU PHA THI
AND RELIEVING THE INVA SAPPER COMPANY WHICH HAD SECURED THE TACAN
SITE.
B. SOURCE HEARD THAT ALL AMERICANS HAD BEEN THROWN OVER THE CLIFF BY THE
NVA SAPPERS AFTER THE AMERICANS WERE CAUGHT BY SURPRISE AT THE
RADAR SITE AT APPROXIMATELY 0400 HOURS ON THE DAY OF THE ATTACK.
C. SOURCE ALSO HEARD THAT ONE AMERICAN REPORTEDLY HAD NOT FALLEN
TO THE BASE OF PHOU PHA THI AND HAD LATER BEEN RECOVERED BY US
HELICOPTERS. THIS IS THE FIRST REPORT THIS OFFICE HAS SEEN THAT ONE
OF THE US PERSONNEL (ALL PRESUMED KILLED) AT PHOU PHA THI MAY HAVE
BEEN CAPTURED.
D. JPRC RECORDS DO NOT INDICATE ANY PRIOR REPORT CONCERNING
US PERSONNEL CAPTURED, MISSING, OR KILLED AT PHOU PHA THI.
E. EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT IS REQUESTED.

PAGE 2

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ADH 17

DEFENSE INFORMATION REPORT EVALUATION

INSTRUCTIONS: To be completed by
Typewriter or Ball Point Pen

CUSTOMER NUMBER B 390	IR NUMBER 2 237 0203 72	COLLECTION PROJECT NUMBER	IR DATE		
			YEAR	MONTH	DAY
			7	2	1
TO:	ICR NUMBER/OTHER REFERENCE D-7CX-49018 DIRM 663	SOURCE NUMBER	DATE RECEIVED BY INFORMATION ACTIVITY		
			YEAR	MONTH	DAY
THRU:	IR CODE(S)	TARGET COUNTRY DESI LA	DATE RECEIVED BY EVALUATOR		
			YEAR	MONTH	DAY
REASON FOR EVALUATION		B. ☐ SELECTED BY COL MGR		IR ORIGINATOR	
1. ☐ ICR		4. ☐ SPECIAL REQUEST			
2. ☐ COLLECTOR'S REQUEST		5. ☐ ANALYST INITIATIVE			

A. IR RESPONDED TO		B. RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION		C. VALUE OF INFORMATION	
1. ☐ DIRM Part Three		1. ☐ Confirmed by other sources		1. ☐ High (Unique, Timely, and of Major Significance)	
2. ☐ CIR		2. ☐ Substantially true		2. ☒ Moderate (Contributory and Useful)	
3. ☒ ICR - If checked, ICR was satisfied		3. ☒ Cannot be judged		3. ☐ Low (Marginal)	
a. ☐ Completely		4. ☐ Doubtful		4. ☐ None (Of no use)	
b. ☒ Partially (If a or c checked, see Guidance in Remarks Section)		5. ☐ False		5. ☐ Cannot be judged (Analyst has no basis for value judgement)	
c. ☐ Not at all					
4. ☐ Other					
D. USABILITY OF INFORMATION					
1. ☒ Used or planned for use in product		2. ☒ Incorporated in Data Base		4. ☐ Not used (All responses require explanation in Remarks section)	
a. ☒ Basic Intelligence		a. ☐ Potentially Useful		a. ☐ Unreliable	
b. ☐ Current Intelligence		b. ☐ Background/Confirmatory		b. ☐ Too Fragmentary	
c. ☐ Estimative Intelligence		3. ☐ Stimulus for Intelligence Guidance or Requirement		c. ☐ Duplication	
d. ☐ Other				d. ☐ Not Pertinent to Needs	
NAME OF PRODUCT:					

REMARKS (Number and Classify each Paragraph)

** REEVALUATION **

This report was previously evaluated on 10 January 1973. It is currently being re-evaluated in light of further analysis.

The source stated that in approximately March/April 1968, he saw a male caucasian prisoner, who the source said was in his early 20's and was wearing light colored frame glasses. The prisoner was being escorted by a Pathet Lao element, who told source that the prisoner was an American whom they had captured near Phou Pha Thi.

It is known that Donald E. Westbrook, USAF (MIA), was piloting an A-1E that was lost on 13 March 1968. He was involved in a flight of four A-1E's for a stand-by SAR orbit. The flight was to perform visual reconnaissance for U.S. survivors of an attack at Phou Pha Thi. However, it is unlikely that the American source allegedly saw would equate to Westbrook, even though he was lost in the area at that time. Witnesses to Westbrook's incident stated that they did not see a chute, heard no beepers, and established no voice contact. It was further stated that the wreckage of his aircraft was scattered over a wide area and was smoking. There was no sign of life. The source's information that the American was in his early 20's would not equate to Westbrook, who was in his early 40's at the time of his incident. Furthermore, source gave no indication that the American was a pilot or that an aircraft crash had been involved. There is no information available to indicate that Westbrook may have survived his incident. Moreover, it is believed that there were no survivors of the Phou Pha Thi attack.

EVALUATOR'S RELEASE and DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE

1. ☐ Paragraph(s) _____ above are releasable to the government of _____
2. ☐ Evaluation is Not Releasable
3. ☒ Releasable Evaluation Not Requested

EVALUATOR'S ORGANIZATION

DB-4H

NAME OF EVALUATOR

PENNY GARDNER

DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

DATE EVALUATED

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING AUTHORITY

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
78	02	22

Salvatore M. Fene
CDR BRUCE L. HELLER

DD FORM 1 JUN 73 1480

EDITION OF APR 66, IS OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

R 110918Z SEP 90 PSN 144203P14 01 SEP 91 11 11 11

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

INFO JCS WASHDC//JCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
NSC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

SECDEF WASHDC//DASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA//
SECSTATE WASHDC//RAP-VLC//

BT

BANGKOK TH 48912

0627 SEP 90

SUBJ: LAO OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON LIMA SITE 85

1. CAPT , AN AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY PHD STUDENT AND CAREER INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A THREE WEEK RESEARCH VISIT TO LAOS DURING WHICH TIME HE MET AND TALKED WITH SEVERAL LAO OFFICIALS. ON 21 AUG 90, HE INTERVIEWED GENERAL , PRESENTLY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LAO PEACE COMMITTEE AND CHIEF COORDINATOR OF THE LAO OLYMPIC COMMITTEE. DURING HIS DISCUSSION WITH GEN , CAPT ASKED HIM ABOUT THE ATTACK ON LIMA SITE 85 (PHOU PHATHI RADAR SITE). GEN TALKED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SITE IN DIRECTING U.S. BOMBING. HE ALSO PROVIDED OTHER DETAILS WHICH CORRELATE WITH KNOWN INFORMATION ABOUT THE PHOU PHATHI INCIDENT; FOR EXAMPLE, HE RELATED HOW THE VIETNAMESE/LAO FORCES USED SOVIET MINE DETECTORS TO AVOID MINES AS THEY BEGAN THEIR ASSAULT ON THE MOUNTAIN TOP INSTALLATION. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT 100 PATHET LAO SOLDIERS AND DOUBLE THAT NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATED IN THE ASSAULT. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE U.S. PERSONNEL WHO WERE AT THE SITE WHEN IT WAS OVERTAKEN, THE GENERAL RESPONDED THAT TWO OR THREE AMERICANS HAD BEEN WOUNDED AND TAKEN AWAY BY THE VIETNAMESE FORCES. HE ADDED THAT THE PATHET LAO HAD STANDING ORDERS TO SEND ALL CAPTURED AMERICANS TO VIETNAM SINCE THE PL HAD NO FACILITIES TO CARE

DLVR:CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI(2)...ACT

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144203/3491/254 1 OF 2 MI 0458
CSN:RAGP0343

254/11:04Z 110918Z SEP 90
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

FOR THEM.

2. CAPT CHARACTERIZED THE GENERAL AS BEING VERY FORTHCOMING BOTH IN THE 21 AUG INTERVIEW AND IN A SECOND INTERVIEW WHICH WAS HELD A FEW WEEKS LATER. WAS A SENIOR PATHET LAO MILITARY LEADER, AND SAID HE WAS THE PATHET LAO COMMANDER OF FORCES INVOLVED IN THE MARCH 68 ATTACK ON LIMA SITE

95. WHEN ASKED IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THIS INFORMATION WITH OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD.

3. CAPT WILL DEPART BANGKOK ON 18 SEP AND RETURN TO , UNTIL COMPLETION OF HIS DOCTORAL PROGRAM AT THE UNIVERSITY OF IN JUL 91. CONTACT NUMBER IS .

BT

144203/3991/254 2 OF 2 01 0453 254/11:04Z 110918Z SEP 90
 CSV:RXHP0343 JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

CERTIFICATE

Pow 6661

A check of a list of 3,752 U.S. servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia, and other foreigners, against the records of the Main Information Center of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Internal Affairs, has established a similarity in the information recorded for 41 individuals who have undergone accounting by last name and who were sentenced for various offenses during the period of 1922 through 1968. These included the following sentences:

1. Espionage - 10 persons

- * Filinov, Peter Mikhailovich, listed as Fellon, Patrick M. (FO57)
- Gaider, Rolf, listed as Geiter, Ralph Ellis (GO45)
- Grauert, Hans Georg Ludwig, listed as Groert, Hans Herbert (G383)
- Hill, Daniel Davidovich, listed as Hall, Donald J. (HO04)
- Mayer [Maier?], Theresa, listed as Kerber, Maria Theresa (K733)
- Stefan, Leopold, listed as Leopold, Steven Rider (LO49)
- MacDonald, William Lionel, listed as MacDonald, Joseph William (M172)
- Thomas, Robert, listed as Thomas, Robert J. (TO67)
- Wano [Ueno?], Tomaso, listed as Thomas, William Z. (TO64)
- Washington, Leroy, listed as Washinton, Bobby (W149)

2. Heinous crimes in the occupied territory and collaborating with the fascists -- 14 persons

- Clifford; this is Braun, Charles, listed as Braun, Charles A. (B198)
- Daniel, Herbert, listed as Herber, Daniel A. (G600)
- Dewitt, Martin, listed as Martin David Earl (M365)
- Meyer, Benno Edward, listed as Meyer, Elton Benno (M065)
- Miller, Carl Davidovich, listed as Miller, Carl D. (M062)
- Niko, Felix, listed as Neko-Kuinones, Felix B., (N021)
- Ernst, Arthur, listed as Olds, Ernst Arthur (O004)
- Ernst, Arthur, listed as Olds, Ernst Arthur (O004)
- Parra, Richard, listed as Perry, Richard Clark (P378)
- Herold, Robert, listed as Roberts, Harold J. (R106)
- Thomas, Robert, listed as Thomas, Robert J. (TO67)
- Leisten, Fritz, listed as Lestien F. (L751)
- Thomas, Paul, listed as Pail, Thomas Show [Shaw?] (R073)
- Thomas, Carl, listed as Weidequist, Thomas Carl (W138)

3. Counter-revolutionary activities -- 6 persons

- Holland, Arnold Mikhailovich, listed as Hollend, Melvin Arnold (H189)
- Holinger-Mullinger, Edwin Henrikovich, listed as Hollinger, Greg Neimen (H402)
- Jans [?], Georges, listed as Jones, George Emerson (J372)
- Gere, Robert, listed as Lenrn [?], Gary Robert (L092)

OSIA/DXL

TFR 2-152

 INFO

 SUBJECT

 RESPONSE TO RFI ON POW-MIA REQUIREMENT

4

R 170156Z NOV 90

M.
O.

SECRET

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO RFI ON POW-MIA REQUIREMENT

REF: POW-MIA RFI, 152000Z OCT 90

A SEARCH OF OUR RECORDS PROVIDED 27 REPORTS CONCERNING LIHA
 SITE 85 AT PHOU PHA THI, LAOS.

3.

INITIAL ENEMY FORCES MOVEMENTS TOWARDS PHA THI AND THE SURROUNDING
 AREA, THE ATTACK ON PHA THI AND OTHER LIHA SITES (107, 111, 185,
 195), THE CAPTURE OF THE PHA THI RADAR STATION AND THE OVERRUN OF
 BASE OPERATIONS. 14 AND 16 MARCH

PHA THI WAS TAKEN BY THE ENEMY AT 1000 GULF
 (1700Z) WITH FRIENDLY LOSSES AS 30 KIA AND 50 WIA. NO
 INFORMATION THAT THREE AMERICANS WERE CAPTURED. LAOTIAN DISSIDENT
 20 MAR 1968 INFORMATION THAT 30 AMERICANS
 (NFI) WERE KILLED AT PHA THI. THIS WAS NOT CORROBORATED BY ANY OTHER
 SOURCE.

3. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE/REQUEST IS REQUIRED.---

DECL: OADR

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CONCUR:

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file - done*

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Herber, Bernard Samuelovich, listed as Blagemeyer, Bernard
Herber (R097)
Thomas, Paul, listed as Pail, Thomas Shaw (Shov?) (R073)

4. Criminal offenses -- 8 persons

Un-Bon-A, listed as Cho Un Ban (C746)
Herbert, Lange, listed as Lanford, Herbert L. (L036)
Haider, Kurt Max, listed as Meider, Kurt (M742)
Pereons, Michael James, listed as (P102)
+ Peterson, William-Jay, Listed as Petterson, James Kelly
(P057)

Francis, Robert Fridrikhovich, listed as Praiss, Robert
Francis (P407)
Kurt, Frederick, listed as Waisman [?], Kurt Frederick
(W374)
Warren, Dale, listed as Warren, Gray D. (W081)

5. No indication of articles of indictment -- 3 persons

Un-Bon-O, listed as Cho Un Ban (C746)
Pepper, John Wilhelm, listed as Pepper, Anthony John (R375)
Roper, John Thomasovich, listed as Roberts, Harold J. (R106)

Chief, State Information Center
Colonel, Internal Services
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs

[Signature] G.L. Lezhikov

14 May 1992

TFR-2-153

~~11-01-03~~

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FM

TO

SECRET

FOLLOW UP TWO TO

071949Z JUN 77

LAOS

REMAINS OF AMERICAN WAR DEAD

LAOTIAN OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SEARCHING FOR AMERICAN WAR DEAD SOMEWHAT EARLIER THAN ORIGINALLY THOUGHT, AS RECENTLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION REVEALS THE SEARCH WAS ONGOING IN APRIL AND MAY RATHER THAN EARLY JUNE.

IN XIENG KHOANG PROVINCE

ONE

INDIVIDUAL TO SEARCH THE PROVINCE FOR GRAVES OF AMERICANS

PURSUANT TO AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR)

THE

REMAINS OF SOME AMERICAN WAR DEAD HAD BEEN TAKEN TO OFFICE 208

SOMEWHERE IN HOUA

PHAN PROVINCE

AUTHORITIES

IN VIENG SAI (2024N 10413E VH1955) TO INVESTIGATE THE LOCATION OF THE REMAINS

FINDING THE REMAINS OF ONE AMERICAN AND

HAVING MOVED THE BODY

NEITHER THE NAME NOR

LOCATION

SEARCH HAD NOT UNCOVERED ANY ADDITIONAL REMAINS.

AMERICANS KILLED IN THE AREA OF PHOU PHA THI, HOUA PHAN PROVINCE. (B)

LAOS AGREED TO ACCOUNT FOR AMERICAN SERVICEMEN

MISSING IN THE INDOCHINA WAR AND HAD ESTABLISHED A "COMMITTEE" TO SEARCH FOR INFORMATION. (B)

071949Z JUN 77

072128Z JUN

77

Mr. DORNAN. Just pick up where you said your husband's name was on this list. When did you find out your husband's name was on Yeltsin's list?

Ms. HOLLAND. It took me 15 months to find out about the document. It was slid into some Korean war documents and sent to a family member, and it just happened that a friend of mine was helping her go through the Korean war documents. That's how I found out about it.

I called casualty to ask them about it. George Atkinson knew nothing about it. He called DPMO and they knew nothing about it. The Joint Task Force Russia knew nothing about it.

So George asked me if I could fax him a copy of it, and I did. To put it bluntly, all hell broke loose.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me ask a couple of questions. Earl Hopper, who has worked this issue for a quarter of a century, have you ever heard of this list, from Yeltsin to Bush?

Mr. BELL. I have.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you ever heard of it, Mr. Veith?

Mr. VEITH. Yes, sir. I can add some illumination to this.

What happened is, in 1992, when Senator Smith and Senator Kerrey went over to Moscow to form the Joint Task Force Russia, they handed the Russians a list with all the Americans missing in Southeast Asia. They said take this list and run it against your automated prisoner data base. The Russians have a data base of prisoners in their prison system from 1932 to 1967. The Russians ran the list against the data base——

Mr. DORNAN. From 1932 to when?

Mr. VEITH. To 1967, at this point in time.

Mr. DORNAN. That would have millions and millions of names on it.

Mr. VEITH. That's what I've been told by DPMO.

When they took the list, the came back and said "Here are 42 names that match up very closely to this." On the second page of that you'll see James Kelly Peterson also.

Mr. DORNAN. This is incredible.

Did the League know about this list?

Ms. ALFOND. We had the list, but I was wondering if Congressman Gilman, or Congressman Ackerman, knew about the list.

Mr. DORNAN. I will find out.

Ms. SHIRLEY. Ann might know, but I have no knowledge of it.

Mr. VEITH. The Russians have now said that most of the names on there—I think they said Mel Holland was an Estonian——

Ms. HOLLAND. Right, an Estonian born in 1914, sentenced in 1945.

Mr. VEITH. German or Dutch people from World War II.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you feel the window closing again?

Ms. HOLLAND. Well, I met with General Volkagonav in about——

Mr. DORNAN. When did he die?

Ms. HOLLAND. I don't know, but I met with him in March of—— 6 months after I found out about the list, I met with him out here in Washington, DC, at one of the plenary meetings.

Mr. DORNAN. The Russian plenary meeting, supposedly with Sam Johnson, Pete Peterson——

Ms. HOLLAND. Right. Volkagonav was there. I made the statement to him, "Since you were working with the Vietnamese during the Vietnam war, during the time that site 85 fell, could you help us with getting information? Could you use your influence to get information to convince the Vietnamese to give us information about our loved ones?"

He looked right at me and he said, "We cannot help you any more with the Vietnam problem. We got into too much trouble over the 1205 document." He said that to me during that meeting, in front of everybody in that room.

Mr. DORNAN. The 1205 document, for newcomers to the issue, was the letter from the Hanoi Politburo—correct me here, Bill, if I'm wrong—sent to the Soviet Union, where a high-ranking Vietnam Communist politburo member said, "Boy, we don't know what to do when this war ends. We've got 1,205 prisoners." That was a high, high, a huge figure.

Ms. HOLLAND. They got into too much trouble over it. They could not help us any more with the Vietnamese.

Mr. DORNAN. Just try and think, Miss Holland, when you met with Volkagonav.

Ms. HOLLAND. It was in March 1994.

Mr. DORNAN. And would someone look up for me when he died?

Mr. VEITH. I believe it was October, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. All right. I've learned something again. To think of somebody running a computer check, even with older computers in the Soviet Union, and coming up with 42 names, and even with transposing Melvin to Mikhailovich, but to get the last name correct, I'm sorry, but that's indicative of again prisoners that they would have lusted to bring to Lubianka for debriefings, as an F-86 pilot was supposed to have debriefed technicians and scientists and aircraft designers, in person, in Moscow, and some people think it's Bud Mahearan—and Bud denies it. He's a friend of mine and I've got to believe him, unless he wants to go under sodium pentothal. But to see a general officer in the BBC documentary, in color, on screen, without any reason to lie, saying "Of course, he came and debriefed us on the capabilities of the F-86 Sabrejet."

Bill, if you could please kind of abbreviate your statement, we will put the whole thing in the record. Thank you for coming back again.

STATEMENT OF GARNETT E. BELL, FORMER DIRECTOR, U.S. POW/MIA OFFICE IN VIETNAM

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify here at this hearing, which I understand is oriented toward determining whether or not United States Government claims to the effect that Vietnam is cooperating in full faith to account for our missing men are justified.

As you are no doubt aware, the original legislation dealing with this particular topic carried the term "fully cooperating," rather than "full faith." The motivation for this change in wording, from a meaningful, realistic term to meaningless, unmeasurable political rhetoric, strikes at the very heart of the issue of an honest accounting.

I believe that, regardless of their political views, those educated on this issue will acknowledge the fact that the POW/MIA issue is controlled entirely by the Communist Party of Vietnam. Now our Government has resorted to the use of the term "full faith" in dealing with the Communist Party of Vietnam. This implies that our Government has a confident belief in the truth, value, or trustworthiness of this Communist Party, but that this belief does not rest on logical proof or material evidence.

The very crucial question that this committee needs to ask those who came up with this new term is: Does this confident belief in the Communist Party of Vietnam stem from the fact that, during the war, they claimed they had no troops in the south killing our men, and this was actually the case? Does it stem from the fact that the Communists said they had no troops in Laos or Cambodia, when this was actually the case? Does it stem from the fact that the Communists mutually agreed to a cease-fire during Tet and that they did not take advantage of the cease-fire to attack and kill our men? Does it stem from the fact that the Communists signed the Paris Peace Agreements and then respected those agreements by not invading and occupying South Vietnam?

Does it stem from the fact that when our Government dropped opposition to membership by Vietnam in the United Nations the Communists did not take advantage of that membership to escape international isolation while invading and occupying Cambodia for more than 10 years?

Does it stem from the fact that in 1976, the Vietnamese leadership assured Representative Sonny Montgomery that no Americans were remaining in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming, and Robert Garwood and Arlo Gay were not subsequently released by Vietnam?

Does it stem from the fact that the Communist Party assured our Government that they were not warehousing the remains of our heroes, and we have not yet received any remains with scientific evidence of warehousing and storage?

In essence, what does form the basis of this unprecedented degree of trust and confidence by our Government in the Communist Party of Vietnam?

As for quality of effort, if any member of the committee or a Member of Congress here in Washington called the authorities in Washington, DC, to report a son missing, only to have the authorities tell them not to worry, that they had a \$50-million-a-year budget and infantry officers were being sent in from Fort Benning, GA, to work the case, I don't think they would agree with this type of effort.

If after a year of reporting their son missing, if a Member of Congress here in Washington didn't receive any word back after 1 year, and then they contacted the authorities again and were told not to worry, we're going to double the budget to \$100 million a year, and now we have artillery officers coming in from Fort Sill, OK, to do the investigation, they would be in the same predicament that the families are in today with the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, because the qualifications just aren't there.

I am also concerned this year, and a point that I think we need to raise is the fact that the DPMO has recently begun quarterly

meetings all across the country. Just within the past 2 weeks, they have made an announcement that now these meetings held throughout the United States will be on a monthly basis.

Another thing that has changed this year is that the COIN assist by the U.S. Air Force for the families coming to their annual meetings has now gone on a commercial airline basis.

If you consider the certification of full faith and the fact that our DPMO is holding meetings out in California and around the country on a quarterly and now a monthly basis, what this all indicates to me is that someone is preparing to pull the plug on support for the annual meetings here in Washington, DC. I just hope the Congress, and especially this committee, will follow this issue very closely and see that the families are not deceived.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me see if I can restate what you just said.

By going to commercial from military airlift, they can suddenly point to a cost factor and shut it down?

Mr. BELL. I'm thinking they're going to say, now that we're giving briefings out in California and around the country, there is no need for the families to come here and have a meeting any more, so we're just not going to support the League meetings and there will be no more COIN assist.

This year they went commercial to allow the units providing the service in the past to stand down and get out of the habit of going through the COIN-assist procedure. I think what they're really doing is waiting until November to see what happens, and depending on the election, they will go one way or the other.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. BELL. I just think that's a shame that this has to happen.

Mr. DORNAN. Depending on the election, the Senate will have to face confirmation of an ambassador, maybe our colleague Pete Peterson, who has been nominated——

Mr. BELL. That's another subject that's been talked about among veterans' organizations and family members. I think what the consensus was before the champagne corks began popping and the caviar starts spreading, we need to look at other Communist countries.

For example, we've had an embassy in Moscow for 50 years, and an ambassador in Moscow for 50 years, and only recently did we get the 1205 document, which is better than nothing at all. But I think the reason we got any cooperation is because the Communist Party collapsed. It wasn't because we had an embassy there and an ambassador there.

If you look at China, in 1979 we heard that this is going to be good for POW/MIA's and we're going to send an ambassador over there and open an embassy, that it will be good for human rights, also. That just hasn't been the case. We haven't gotten any answers from China, and we've had an embassy and an ambassador there for 18 years.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you seen the BBC documentary with Russian fighter pilots in Chinese civilian clothes, with no markings, on their way to all the air bases to——

Mr. BELL. No, sir. I would like to see that. I heard you mention it earlier. I would like to see that.

Ms. ALFOND. I believe, if you come to the Alliance meeting tomorrow, you will be able to see it.

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, you've got the BBC documentary?

Ms. ALFOND. I will have it.

Mr. DORNAN. And you're going to show it to the Alliance?

Ms. ALFOND. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. You see, I was thinking of extending the COIN assist to the Korean war families, given this—

[Applause.]

Mr. DORNAN. Given the new information coming out on Korea, and here you're telling me—and I think your analysis is correct—that they're getting ready to wind down the whole thing, going to an advanced trade thing, and get around to those oil leases in the Spratly Islands.

Mr. BELL. They have already delinked human rights from the trade issue, and now, if you watch CNN or whatever, you see our policymakers on there arguing about copyrights of compact discs or something, but you never hear them mention the 389 men captured alive in Korea and who never came home. I haven't heard any of them mention that. All you hear is compact discs or—

Ms. ALFOND. Clinton just signed something 2 weeks ago that said that Vietnam is no longer—that we're no longer at war with Vietnam.

Mr. DORNAN. No longer a combat theater.

Let me ask Bill right now, because you always had to have in the back of your portfolio, what if we had a real live sighting, verifiable, fairly recent, and we had to execute a rescue mission, even if it was in Laos or along the trail somewhere, now my understanding is—and it's just a cursory understanding—that by signing this document, which Mr. McCurry, the White House press secretary said in a meeting “we don't understand what this even means,” that President Clinton doesn't even know what he signed here—that now we would not be able to execute a rescue mission.

Isn't that the way you interpret it?

Mr. BELL. That's the way I would interpret it, yes, sir. But I think the decision was made in 1992—and I have never seen it in writing, but I've heard it—that from that point on, if we determine there's a live American in Vietnam, they will be returned through diplomatic means rather than military means.

Mr. DORNAN. You see, it has never occurred to anybody that we would ever execute a rescue mission in the Soviet Union territory, and now Vietnam has this protection, since this has been signed by Clinton, has this protection of there's nothing we can do now except present our demands to them and they would treat it the way the Russians have treated it for 75 years—“Get Lost.”

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Go ahead, Bill.

Mr. BELL. As the situation exists today, in one corner of the proverbial ring you have the missing and their beleaguered families, and in the other corner you have the corporate giants of America—Motorola, GE, IBM, Collier-Forbes, Heinz, Ford, Mobil, and others. The current policy of our Government clearly indicates that the missing men and their families do not have a Commander in Chief

who will stand beside them at this critical juncture in our Nation's history.

I can come to no other conclusion, that unless the men and their families have the complete support of Congress, they will soon be sacrificed for the bottom line.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bell follows:]

National Security Committee
Military Personnel Subcommittee
Testimony of Garnett E. Bell
June 19, 1996

Mr Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee thank you for your continued interest in accounting for American personnel who still remain on communist soil. It is very unfortunate that some of your distinguished colleagues in both the House and Senate apparently view the accounting for America's missing as a problem that needs to be removed from the national conscience. By holding this important hearing today, you are setting a very clear example which corresponds to the perception of all patriotic Americans that the situation of our missing men is not a problem, rather it is a legitimate national issue with a very compelling basis for honest and fair resolution. I can assure you that the beleaguered families of the missing, as well as American veterans of the Vietnam War and the Vietnamese and Lao people who have sought refuge on our shores greatly appreciate the overall efforts of your Committee to closely scrutinize the actions of U.S. Government officials responsible for relations with Communist Vietnam and Laos.

I understand this hearing is oriented toward determining whether U.S. government claims to the effect that Vietnam is cooperating in "full faith" to account for our missing men are justified. As you are no doubt aware, the original legislation dealing with this particular aspect carried the term "fully cooperating," rather than "full faith." The motivation for this change in wording from a meaningful realistic term to meaningless, unmeasurable political rhetoric strikes at the very heart of the issue of an honest accounting.

Such political pandering and use of meaningless jargon has become increasingly commonplace within our government. In the not too distant past, the term retreat was changed to "evacuation." Nowadays American personnel no longer retreat, they simply evacuate. Those in charge were never responsible for a retreat, they were simply in charge of the evacuation. When interest rates were so high that the people could not afford to buy homes, our government came up with the term "creative financing." Now that our government is unable to show real progress in the search for our missing heroes in Vietnam, our government has resorted to "creative accounting." This includes political rhetoric such as the term "cooperating in full faith," group burials of entire aircrews based on a single tooth or small bone fragments, and the removal of last-known-alive cases from the discrepancy case list based on the verbal testimony of witnesses introduced by the communist party of Vietnam. Such witnesses are interviewed by young infantry officers of the Desert Storm type "Joint Task Force-Full Accounting."

I believe that regardless of their political views, those educated on the issue of POW/MIA will acknowledge the fact that the POW/MIA issue is controlled entirely by the Communist Party of Vietnam. Now our own government has resorted to the use of a term "full faith." This implies that our government has a confident belief in the truth, value, or trustworthiness of the Communist Party of Vietnam, but that this belief does not rest on logical proof or material evidence. The very crucial question that this Committee needs to ask those who came up with this new term is: Does this confident belief in the Communist Party of Vietnam stem from the fact that it claimed there were no North Vietnamese troops in the South killing our young men and this was in fact the case; Does it stem from the fact that the communists said they had no troops in Laos or Cambodia and this was in fact the case; Does it stem from the fact that the Communists mutually agreed to a ceasefire during Tet 1968 and they did not take advantage of the ceasefire to attack and kill our men; Does it stem from the fact that the communists signed the Paris Peace Agreements and then respected those agreements by not invading and occupying South Vietnam; Does it stem from the fact that when our government dropped opposition to membership by Vietnam in the United Nations the communists did not take advantage of that membership to escape international isolation while invading and occupying Cambodia for more than 10 years; Does it stem from the fact that in 1976 the Vietnamese leadership assured Rep Montgomery that no Americans were remaining in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming and Robert Garwood and Arlo Gay were not subsequently released by Vietnam; Does it stem from the fact that the Communist Party assured our government that they were not warehousing the remains of our heroes and we have not received any remains with scientific evidence of warehousing and storage; In essence, what does form the basis for this unprecedented degree of trust and confidence by our government in the Communist Party of Vietnam?

I believe every member of this Committee, regardless of political affiliation, knows why the trade embargo was lifted. I also believe that every member of this Committee knows why our President granted diplomatic recognition to Vietnam and then certified that Vietnam is cooperating in "full faith" to account for our men. The answer is money, plain and simple. Regardless of all the rhetoric, we all know the truth concerning Vietnam's actual level of cooperation..the Vietnamese are as far along in this issue as they choose to be at this time.

As for the quality of effort, suppose that one of you, a member of this distinguished Committee, called the authorities to inform them that you had a son missing right here in our nation's capital. Suppose you were told not to worry, because the authorities have a 50 million dollar per year budget and that a large contingent of infantry officers was en route from Fort Benning, Ga to begin the investigation. I am not convinced that you would have faith in such an effort. Some things that might come to your mind right way would include the fact that these young

infantrymen know nothing about Washington, D.C., the criminal elements here, the streets, the airports, the parks and so on. If after a year you did not receive any word regarding your loved one, and after once again contacting the authorities you were told that the budget was being increased to 100 million and that artillery officers from Fort Sill, OK were being added to the case, you might begin to lose faith in the system. If you consider the accounting effort from this perspective, perhaps you can gain more insight to the plight of MIA family members across the country. If your Committee were to call every MIA family member into this room and ask them individually just how securely they feel with the way this situation is being handled and just how much faith they have in our government's ability to achieve an honest and fair accounting for their loved ones, I believe you would find their response very revealing.

With this kind of treatment of the MIA family members by our government, I can see why so many of them feel they have been deceived. As for what is on the horizon, the future does not look very bright. I have noticed that along with the move to political rhetoric such as "cooperating in full faith," the Defense Department has recently begun a program where the DPMO sends representatives across the country on a quarterly basis in order to brief the family members on the POW/MIA situation. I understand that more recently a decision was made to increase these briefings to a monthly basis, and to include discussions on individual cases. As a Vietnam veteran who lost a son in Vietnam, and who still has fellow members of my infantry unit on the last-known-alive discrepancy case list, I am gravely concerned that this may be a coldly calculated move by our government to foster disunity among MIA family member organizations and will soon lead to a gradual lessening of support by our government to their annual meetings traditionally held here in our nation's capital each summer. I note that for the first time, this year the families are receiving COIN assist air transportation from commercial carriers, rather than by the U.S. Air Force. Sadly, what our government claims will be a better plan for assisting the families may ultimately prove to be nothing more than another sinister ploy by those spurred by greed in developing commercial ties with the Communist Party of Vietnam. I sincerely hope that this Committee will closely scrutinize the actions of each official involved in this plan in order to insure that if the family members of our missing men do once again fall victim to treachery and deceit, those responsible will be identified and held accountable for their actions.

Committees of Congress will soon face another calculated move by the administration to push forward in the march toward commercial dealings with the Communist Party of Vietnam. Recently the decision was made to upgrade to a full embassy in Vietnam and one of your own colleagues has been designated to serve as the President's representative in Hanoi. But before the corks in the champagne bottles begin popping and the caviar begins to spread, let us look back on the histories of other communist nations which

have been responsible for detaining American fighting men who have yet to return home. For example, we have maintained an embassy and

an Ambassador in Moscow for 50 years but we still have not received answers on our missing men from Korea or the Cold War. Only recently have we begun to realize any progress in Russia, and I submit to you that this small amount of progress has come about as a result of the collapse of the Communist Party, not because we have an Ambassador there.

In the case of China, in 1979 we were told that by sending an Ambassador to Beijing we would enjoy better cooperation on POW/MIA and it would also bring progress on the issue of human rights for the Chinese people. We have now maintained an embassy and an Ambassador in China for almost 18 years now, but we still have not received answers on 389 of our men who were captured in Korea. Moreover, the massacre of innocent civilians involved in peaceful assembly at Tienanmin Square clearly proves that the presence of an American Ambassador in Beijing have not led to increased progress on human rights. As further insult to American fighting men and women of all previous wars, our government recently took steps to de-link the important human rights issue from our trade policy with China.

Those of us who are dedicated to a fair and honest resolution of the POW/MIA issue are concerned that the arrival of an American Ambassador in Hanoi will send the wrong signal to the Politburo of Vietnam and serve to stimulate a few greedy entrepreneurs in this country to begin clamoring for Most Favored Nation Trading Status, Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance, and financing from the Export-Import Bank. This too will come under the guise of "obtaining more answers" and "improved progress on human rights." As was the case with China, once this diabolical scheme has been implemented, the next step will be to "de-link" trade from POW/MIA and human rights concerns. Our government has already made numerous significant concessions in advance to the Communist Party of Vietnam. Having been active in veterans affairs for several years and in constant contact with MIA family member organizations across the nation, I can assure you that the majority of this nation's 22 million veterans and MIA family members believe it is time for a moratorium on expanded contacts with communist Vietnam, to include the appointment of an Ambassador to Hanoi.

As the situation exists today, in one corner of the proverbial ring you have the missing men and their beleaguered families. In the other corner you have the corporate giants of America... Motorola, GE, IBM, Collier-Forbes, Heinz, Ford, Mobil, and others. The current policy of our government clearly indicates that the missing men and their families do not have a Commander-in-Chief who will stand beside them at this critical juncture in our nation's history. I can come to no other conclusion that unless the men and their families have the complete support of Congress they will soon be sacrificed for the bottom line.

Case 1625

On 1 June 1970, Charles R. Duke, Jr. and Kit T. Mark, employees of Dynalectron Corporation, were reported missing when Mr. Duke failed to report to Pleiku, after the 30-31 May 1970 weekend holiday, for his return to the United States. Mr. Duke and Mr. Mark were last seen by Dynalectron employee Landel Scott on Saturday, 30 May 1970. The two men indicated that they intended to ride motorbikes to an area known as Bald Mountain, about seven miles south of Pleiku.

On 1 June 1970, Warren L. McKean, Pleiku site supervisor, notified the Dynalectron Corporation, Southeast Asia office, in Saigon, of the missing personnel. All U.S. and South Vietnamese military authorities and hospitals in the Pleiku area were checked, but neither men were found, and an unsuccessful search of the Bald Mountain area, the Lake Bien Ho area, the Pleiku area, and the roads from Pleiku was conducted by helicopter on 1 June 1970.

On 17 June 1970, an American Embassy consular officer visited Pleiku to inquire about the disappearance of the two men and was informed that the following measures had been taken to locate them: a U.S. Army unit conducted a ground sweep and a helicopter search on 1 June, Montagnard tribesmen were hired to go into the nearby villages to make discreet inquiries, leaflets advertising a reward for information about the two men were dropped in the area, and the government of Vietnam sent agents into villages in the area. All of these efforts were unsuccessful.

The Two-party Joint Military Commission was given details of this case and it was discussed with the Province Representative on several occasions. In March 1975, he reiterated his intent to recover remains from an alleged grave site in this area after his staff completed extant projects. After evacuation from the Central Highlands, the Province Representative told the ADO, Military Region II, that his staff had recovered some remains, but had not given them to him prior to his evacuation. These individuals' names and identifying data were turned over to the Four-party Joint Military Team with a request for any information available. No response was forthcoming.

On 17 and 18 January 1994, an investigation "element" of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTFFA) and a team of Vietnamese officials conducted a joint investigation of this case in Pleiku City, Chu Pah district, and Mang Yang district of Gia Lai (formerly Pleiku) province. The element received testimony from a witness who claimed that he and two other members of the B-6 guerrilla unit were shooting fish in the river with AK-47 rifles when the two Americans first appeared. The same witness claimed to have participated in the killing of two male caucasians riding on motorcycles in March or April of 1970. According to the witness, the bodies of both men were left lying on the ground where they were killed and the two motorcycles were set on fire. The element conducted a search at the site where the two men were reportedly killed, as well as the site where they indicated they had planned

to visit shortly before they disappeared. No material evidence, remains, or personal effects were found by the joint element and the case has now been placed in "pending" (i.e. inactive) status.

Bill Bell's Assessment of Case 1625:

The site which the two men planned to visit has been described as "Bald Mountain." Apparently this is a reference to "Dragon's Jaw Mountain" (i.e. Nui Ham Rong, aka Chu Hodrong) overlooking Camp Hensel, a former base camp of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division. The site where the witness claimed the two men were killed is located on Route 509, which served as the primary resupply route for the Plei Djereng (Project Omega/Truong Son Group) Special Forces Camp at the time of the incident.

Although the element's investigation report indicates that the witness did not give the appearance of having been coached and the element assessed the reliability of the witness as "good," there are several points which do not appear to be plausible. For example, the witness claimed that at the time of the incident, the bridge was constructed of concrete. The witness further stated that the bridge is currently constructed of iron or steel. Actually, at the time of the incident, this was a frequently travelled route. All major bridges in the Pleiku area, especially those constructed of concrete or steel located on main supply routes were constantly guarded by either U.S. or South Vietnamese forces. The bridge pointed out by the witness in this case was most likely guarded by a local forces unit of the GVN. (Note: contrary to the testimony of the witness, the portion of the Detailed Report of the Investigation compiled by the CILHI Search and Recovery Specialist indicates that the bridge in question is now constructed of concrete).

In any case, considering the location of the bridge on Route 509, its close proximity to Pleiku where the U.S. II Corps Hq was located, ARVN Ranger units, elements of the 22nd and 23rd ARVN Divisions, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division, U.S. Special Forces units, and a number of local and popular forces units of the GVN, it is highly unlikely that communist guerrilla forces would emerge on the roadway during the daylight hours to shoot fish with AK-47 rifles. Had their intention been to shoot fish, it would have been far more plausible for them to have done so in an area away from the main road. This route was also routinely patrolled by helicopters from aviation units located at nearby Camps Holloway and Hensel. Simply put, it just does not make sense for three communist guerrillas to risk being shot or captured by shooting fish from a bridge on a main road when there were numerous rivers and streams with good concealment throughout the area. The three guerrillas participating in the attack might well have been living as "legals" (i.e. legal residents with GVN identification cards working secretly for communist forces), and would, therefore, be expected to draw little attention. However, in this case, according to the witness, the three men were armed with communist

issue AK-47 rifles, which would have alerted anyone passing by as to their guerrilla status. During the war, ARVN or any other non-communist Vietnamese did not carry AK-47s because they were fearful of being mistaken for a Viet Cong and killed on the spot. On the other hand, if the trio was on an armed mission to kill American personnel, a detailed report of the action would have been submitted. This is not plausible, because the Vietnamese have indicated that no records were initiated as a result of the incident.

According to the witness, he would have been 17 years old at the time of the incident. The witness claimed that although he is an ethnic minority hill tribesman, who served as a member of the B-6 village guerrilla unit at the time of the incident, he moved to reside in the City of Pleiku only approximately seven months after he allegedly killed the two men. The JTF-FA element made no attempt to have the witness explain this unusual move, nor is there any information contained in the report which can shed any light on the witnesses' activities prior to or after the alleged killings occurred. Specifically, there was no attempt to ascertain whether or not the witnesses were ever in contact with the two Americans prior to their alleged deaths, or whether or not the alleged killings were prearranged.

Considering the age of the witness at the time, and the fact that he moved into the city shortly after the incident, it would seem logical that this was the only case in which this witness was involved in where American personnel were killed. Since killing someone can be expected to be an unusual event, the witness can reasonably be expected to recall far greater detail than that revealed to the JTF-FA element during the field investigation. For example, the witness should have been able to clearly recall the time frame, the weather conditions (i.e. beginning of the rainy season), what documents were removed from the bodies, what type of report was submitted to higher authorities informing them of the action, the disposition of any personal effects, and the identities of the other two guerrillas involved. Moreover, considering the fact that the incident occurred on a major transportation route in close proximity to numerous allied military units, it is highly unlikely that the trio would have ignited both motorcycles due to the smoke and fire, nor would they leave the two bodies lying in plain view to be observed by passing traffic. Again, this is an important point, because if the witness was being truthful about leaving the burning motorcycles on the ground, the allied ground and air searches of the area after the two Americans were reported missing would have observed "two large burning motorcycles and two bodies on the ground".

Since the witness was described by the JTF-FA element as being "attentive to the questions and definite about the extent of his knowledge," the element should have insisted that he provide clarifying details as to the precise nature of the wounds inflicted on the two men, a more precise physical description, and explain

the manner in which the two motorcycles were ignited (e.g. covered with brush or leaves, fuel from tanks drained to sustain fire). Additionally, the witness should have provided at least some information concerning his activities leading up to the incident, his route taken to the incident site, and his route of withdrawal. The witness should have been requested to provide information concerning the disposition and composition of the B-6 guerrilla unit for comparison of his information with other wartime sources. The JTF-FA element did not mention which regional dialect of Vietnamese was spoken by the witness, any assessment of his background based on vocabulary and terminology used during the interview session, demeanor, knowledge of general wartime incidents and actions in the same area, his ability to converse in a Montagnard language, his particular tribal affiliation (e.g. Jiarai, Rhade, Bahnar) or other pertinent details reasonably expected to be covered during the investigation of a "last known alive" type case. In the absence of significant details such as those outlined above and the fact that the witness was interviewed on only one occasion by the experts of the JTF-FA, it is difficult to conceive how the JTF-FA element was able to even properly evaluate the reliability of the witness at all, much less to classify it as "good."

Other reports which should have been investigated in conjunction with this case include, but are not limited to, the following:

--The report from the 525th Military Intelligence Group indicating that on 9 October 1970, two Sources visited Plei Vieng Duong (YA 590965). The two Sources heard from the village chief that two American POWs were taken through the village by four North Vietnamese Army personnel during late June 1970. The two Americans were described as caucasians wearing black pajamas and their heads had been shaved. The two Americans were held in the village for approximately six hours before departing on an infiltration route. (The Sources of this report were described by the 525th MI Gp as having reported reliably for more than two years).

--The CIA report indicating that in December 1970, two Americans captured in South Vietnam were detained in a camp located at Ban Tam Prin, about 43 km north of Dak Chung in Laos. One of the Americans was said to be short with black hair and the second man taller with white hair. The Ban Tam Prin area was said to contain a "Supreme Command Training Center." (Note: it would have been plausible for U.S. POWs to have been moved from Cambodia into Laos during this time frame. The two men involved in this case were captured only two weeks after a joint U.S./Truong Son Group (Doan Truong Son) cross-border raid was conducted by helicopter from Pleiku into Cambodia in the area of the communist wartime V-211 Hospital of Sr Col (Doctor) Le Cao Dai and POW Camp 102).

--The report of the 525th MI Group indicating that in May 1971, two caucasians were observed while accompanying the B-1 and B-2 VC/NVA Companies approximately 25 km northwest of Pleiku (AR 967701). The

two caucasians were believed to be acting as "advisors" to communist units. The Sources of this report were said to have been reporting reliably in the past. (Note: since the witness interviewed by the experts of the JTF-FA were informed that the two Americans on motorcycles were killed by members of the B-6 guerrilla unit, sound investigative procedures require that additional information concerning the possible relationship of units B-1 and B-2 to B-6 contained in the above report be developed)

--The report by a defecting Vietnamese mortician indicating that he personally observed three male caucasians in Hanoi from 1974 to 1979. After the mortician arrived in the United States, one of the three men was positively identified by him as being Robert Garwood. One of three composite sketches made with the assistance of the mortician matches the pre-capture photograph of Charles R. Duke, and a second sketch closely resembles Kit Mark. The three caucasians were observed at Office 22 of Group 875, which was located at 3 Duong Thanh Street in Hanoi. The mortician heard from cadre of Office 22 that the three caucasians were Americans and that two of them were working as aircraft technicians at the Da Phuc Airfield north of Hanoi.

In investigating the report concerning three caucasians observed by the mortician, the JTF-FA experts should include information pertaining to possible "stay behinds" contained in U.S. files which could possibly correlate to this case. For example, the report by a rallier (SGN FVS 32,810, 24 Jul 73) indicating that he had personally observed two Americans on three separate occasions. According to the rallier, the two men were collaborating with the Political Staff Section of the PAVN 2nd Division in Military Region 5 in proselytizing efforts toward luring other American personnel to cooperate with communist forces; the report by a refugee in Hong Kong (JCRC H84-048) indicating that he had been assigned to a film crew to film two American caucasians north of Hanoi in 1977; the report by a refugee in Los Angeles indicating that he observed Americans remaining in the Hanoi area as late as 1984, and that these men worked repairing aircraft left behind by U.S. forces after the war ended. According to this Source, the Americans often surfaced at a hotel in Hanoi which had been converted into a military office, and that the same hotel was connected to the Ministry of National Defence compound by a secret tunnel built by the French; the report by a refugee in Hong Kong (JCRC Report Z30416) indicating that he observed Americans remaining in Hanoi during 1982. According to the refugee, the Americans were observed in an area adjacent to the Central Military Court and Office 22, which was located next to the Phung Hung Hotel where communist intelligence operatives returning from South Vietnam were debriefed during the war. The Phung Hung Hotel is located at the eastern entrance to an underground tunnel to the Ministry of National Defence compound; the report by a refugee and former Major of the Military Security Service which was provided during the annual meeting of the National Alliance of Families during 1995. The

refugee provided one sighting pertaining to Robert Garwood and another sighting pertaining to three Americans he observed in Camp 1, Duong Quy village, Van Ban district, Hoang Lien Son province during August 1977; the numerous reports indicating that a "blind American" remained behind in the Central Highlands area after the war ended (Note: these reports are centered on the former B-3 Front area where the two men in this case were last observed, however, these reports possibly correlate to Case 0811-0-03, Allard, Richard M.); the report by an American deserter who returned to the U.S. in late 1975 indicating that 20 U.S. POWs were still being held in the Central Highlands as of 1975. According to the deserter, the 20 U.S. POWs included one black enlisted man captured during 1970; the report by a refugee (JCRC T84-110) who was a LTC and former VNAF pilot indicating that he personally observed 20 "foreign" POWs, including 14 Americans held in the western Central Highlands during 1972, after all known U.S. POWs had already been moved north to Hanoi. According to the refugee, the group included a black Master Sergeant called "Bob." (Note: this same Source provided two other separate reports which were correlated to Cases 0155 and 2001); the Thai Humint report (290845Z Aug 84) indicating that 23 U.S. POWs were being held at Ban Kadon in Saravan province Laos as of August 1984; the report provided by the former Soviet Consul General in Danang indicating that three Americans remained in the western Central Highlands area as late as 1982 (Note: this report might possibly correlate to Case 1171 involving 12 U.S. Army personnel lost in a ground incident on 12 May 1968); the reports indicating that Fifth Column Penetration Section of the Military Proselytizing Office of Central Highlands/Military Region 5 used American POWs to teach English to communist female agents for the purpose of luring American servicemen to capture. The JTF-FA experts should interview former Regional Current Affairs Committee member Ho Nghinh, aka Ho Huu Phuoc (Note: Ho Huu Phuoc vice Ngo Hau Phuoc as mentioned in the report associated with the so-called "three amigos"/Robertson, Lundy, Stevens photo) concerning the methods employed to lure American personnel in the Central Highlands area, with emphasis on Cases 0108, 0155, 0286, 0439, 0604, 0740, 0951, 1038, 1217, 1219, 1231, 1249, 1476, 1625, 1767, 2055, 2056, and 9951; the JTF-FA experts should also interview Mr. Bui Van Thanh, a native of Tam Ky who was assigned to the MR-5 Military Proselytizing Office and is now retired and residing in Chu Prong district of Dac Lac province; the JTF-FA experts should also research the historical archives of the B-3 Front and "Southernmost Extremity" (i.e. Cuc Nam) located in Nha Trang City (Note: the experts should also contact former Interrogator of U.S. POWs and English Language translator for POW camps of the B-3 Front, Mr. Khuong Xuan Que, who is now residing in Nha Trang), the archives of the Central Party Military Affairs Committee in Hanoi, the archives of the Military Affairs Committee of Region 5, and the permanent archives of the Party Central Committee in Hanoi.

General background: this case is located within the boundary of the B-3 front, aka the Western Highlands Front (Mat tran Tay nguyen). The B-3 Front was initially an integral part of Inter-region 5

(i.e. Inter-region meaning the region linking North Vietnam with the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in the South), which was established in June 1961. This Hq, which was later redesignated Military Region 5, was located in the Hiep Duc area southwest of Danang. The Hq initially controlled the Military Affairs Committees (Quan uy) of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Dac Lac, Pleiku, and Kon Tum. In May 1964, the provinces of Khanh Hoa and Phu Yen were redesignated as the "Southern Extremity" (Cuc nam) of MR-5. The provinces of Dac Lac, Pleiku, and Kon Tum were redesignated as the Western Region of MR-5. In September 1965, the Western Region was redesignated as the Western Highlands Front, aka B-3. In 1965, the province of Dac Lac was divided with that portion of the province north of Highway 26 subordinate to the B-3 front, and that portion of the province south of Highway 26 subordinate to Military Region 6. The provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien were redesignated as Military Region Tri-Thien and placed under the direct control of the PAVN High Command in Hanoi. MR-5 was commanded by MG Nguyen Don (ddoon), who was later replaced by Gen Chu Huy Man when he was transferred from his "two hat" position of Commander and Political Commissar of the B-3 front, which he held since July 1965. Two well known Political Commissars were Gen Doan Khue, who was later reassigned to command the Binh Dinh Front (note: currently SRV Defense Minister), and LTG Nguyen Nam Khanh, who was previously the Political Commissar of the 3rd PAVN Div, aka Yellow Star Division (Su doan Sao vang) (note: LTG Khanh is currently the Deputy Director of the General Political Directorate, PAVN). The B-3 front bordered on Pathet Lao wartime Military Regions 3 and 4 in the LPDR. MR-3 and MR-4 in Laos were under the military control of the 968th Pavn Div.

--Major units operating in the B-3 Front area during the war include the 1st PAVN Div, aka Work Site 1, (established in December 1965 by the B-3 Party Chapter (Dang bo) and later incorporated the 6th PAVN Div which was disbanded shortly after formation in December 1965, initially comprised of the 33rd, 66th, and 320th Inf Regt's). The 1st Div was disbanded in late 1969 and subordinate Regt's were moved to the Mekhong Delta, the Enemy Proselyting Section, aka Group 21, of the 1st Div captured several U.S. POWs prior to moving south to the Delta. Some of these men are currently carried on the last known alive list for Gia Lai-Kon Tum). The 5th PAVN Div (Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, and Dac Lac), the 10th PAVN Div (formerly 325B Div) (Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 320th Independent Regt, aka Work Site 320 (Cong truong 320) (Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 9th Regt, 304th Div deployed to southern Laos in 1965 and was redeployed to Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue in late 1966 and participated in the battle for Hue during "Tet" 1968 (most members were from Thai Binh province North Vietnam and probably returned there after the war ended), the 24th Regt, Left Bank (Ta ngan) Military Region (northern Dac Lac, Gia Lai-Kon Tum, most members were from Nam Ha in North Vietnam and probably returned there after the war), the 28th Regt (moved from North Vietnam to the B-3 Front in early 1969 and incorporated the 8th, 8B, and 3rd Independent

Bn's of MR Tri-Thien-Hue, moved to Highway 9 in Quang Tri in 1968, in early 1970 moved to southern Laos with the 24A regt, and finally returned to Kon Tum to participate in the Vo Dinh battle of 1972), the 33rd Regt (formerly the 101B Regt, operated in Dac Lac area as of 1967), the 66th Regt, 304th PAVN Div (note: LTG Tran Van Quang, the purported author of the "1205" document found in the archives of the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union, was the first Political Commissar of the 304th Div during the war against the French) (Gia Lai and Kon Tum until decimated by the U.S. 1st Cav and 3rd Brigade, 25th Inf Div during 1965-66. The 66th withdrew to Thanh Hoa and later redeployed to the Quang Tri area and southern Laos, and finally moved back to Kon Tum to participate in the battle for Dak To during the 1972 spring offensive; most members were from Hung Yen province in North Vietnam and probably returned there when the war ended), the 304B PAVN Div, established in September 1965 (Gia Lai and Kon Tum), the 88th Regt, 308th PAVN Div (Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 95th Regt (Sa Thay district mid-1966, Gia Lai 1967-68, Mang Yang Pass/Highway 19 area 1968-69), the 101A Regt, 325A PAVN Div (Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 33rd Regt, aka 101B Regt, 325B PAVN Div (northern Dac Lac and Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 209th Regt (moved from North Vietnam to the B-3 Front in late 1968), the 250th Transport Regt, B-3 Front (Dac Lac, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa), the 559th Military Logistics Group (from the Western Highlands area to Vinh in MR-4), and numerous local force units of the various provinces. Also, the 1st and 40th Regt's of the 2nd PAVN Div were moved from the Quang Nam-Danang area to participate in the 1972 battle for Dak To.

--When pavn troops began arriving in the B-3 Front during mid-1965, B-3 forces consisted of three infantry regiments, one sapper battalion and a number of artillery battalions. Each province military command consisted of one infantry battalion, one sapper company and a number of artillery detachments. Each district military command (designated as "H" plus a number) consisted of one infantry unit from platoon to company size. The primary units in contact with U.S. Forces in the B-3 front beginning in 1965 were the 66th PAVN Regt (7th, 8th, and 9th bns), the 24th PAVN Regt (note: formerly the 42nd Regt) (3rd, 4th, and 5th bns), the 33rd Regiment (established in august 1965 when it absorbed the former 101st Regt of the 325B PAVN Div), the 9th Regt, and the 68th Artillery Regiment.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

How many years were you in Hanoi?

Mr. BELL. I was up there—the first time I went up there was in 1973, for Operation Homecoming. I was last up there 4 days before Saigon fell.

Mr. DORNAN. Did you stay through all the homecoming takeoffs of the C-141's?

Mr. BELL. I was there in Hanoi during homecoming.

Mr. DORNAN. Were you there on March 27, when the last plane left—

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. And the so-called Laotian prisoners were sitting under a tree?

Mr. BELL. There were two of us. I was there with the other—one guy came up from the south, but I was the homecoming rep for the Lao release. I actually signed the document for those guys.

Mr. DORNAN. So you tracked that thing that President Nixon claimed was a victory, that all the prisoners from Laos were coming home—that was the headlines in this country. It put the whole Nation to sleep, and the 10 people, Lieutenant Long, Bernie Brace, and others, were sitting there—I always remember these stupid words, under a tree, waiting for their fate to be decided, and they finally said, “okay, come on, you can go home,” and they got on the last C-141, which arrived back here on March 28.

You were there during that.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Then how many years were you in Hanoi running our Hanoi office?

Mr. BELL. I went back to Hanoi in 1982. I didn't actually move up there until 1991, 1992. The last time I was there was September 1993 in an official capacity. I have been back since then.

Mr. DORNAN. For the Korean families who don't always speak fluent Vietnamese, and a special operations officer with a long career, thank you.

Now to the book that you have cowritten with George J. Veith, “POWs and Politics: How much does Hanoi really know?”

I have your whole statement in front of me, Mr. Veith. Of course, it will go in the record. It's a superb statement, because you mention Jerry Mooney and others later on.

Could you start your statement in the first paragraph and then summarize it as best you can, so I can ask you some questions.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE J. VEITH, RESEARCHER

Mr. VEITH. I can summarize it pretty quickly for you, Mr. Chairman. I will leave any questions you might have on our paper for later.

There are two areas I wanted to bring up. One was the oral history program initiated by Mr. Bell in 1993, with selected Vietnamese cadre. If you read those interviews—and I have read most of them—there are two things that the Vietnamese consistently bring out in terms of their cooperations:

One is that, during the war, their units created very few records, and of the records they did create, they either lost them, they buried them, or burned them. Well, if that was true, then why are

there 954 rolls of Vietnamese captured documents on microfilm down at the National Archives? We captured over 3 million Communist documents during the war, and bear in mind we only translated 10 percent of those, those that were deemed to be of intelligence value.

The Vietnamese had a major bureaucracy called the General Directorate of Rear Services during the war that created an enormous amount of documents. I think the record is fairly clear that that statement of the Vietnamese cadre is simply false.

The second thing they keep bringing out in these oral history interviews is that it's going to be very difficult to recover remains because they were lost due to the severity of American aerial bombardments, especially by the B-52s.

I would like to read to you from an analysis by DIA/DPMO, on the Lt. James Kelly Patterson case, which I know you're familiar with.

Mr. DORNAN. George, just hold it 1 second. The clock is chasing us and I want to get this on the record today, or I'll put it in tomorrow.

Imagine you're in my office yesterday, and I have a two-star Czech general who defected in February 1968, and he tells me that the hospital that the Czechs built in North Korea had a crematorium with it—they would learn this from the Germans at Auschwitz. So American, and later Australian and South Korean, and later maybe South Vietnamese prisoners were treated with the abhorrent war crime activity of Unit 731 under the Japanese war lords in Harbin, Manchuria, that when the prisoners would die, they would be incinerated to ashes.

Are we going to go on a body or a cemetery hunt in North Korea now, at the expense of millions of dollars, when there are no remains of the Americans that were experimented on in this Czech hospital?

At one point—and he speaks good English now—he indicates that even some limbs were cut off. So the debriefing went on with several staffers, and a tremendous author, James Douglas. I said, "Wait a minute. In Harbin, they would take prisoners, Chinese, Russian, British, American, New Zealand, and Australian, and they would amputate a leg off a perfectly healthy man, and then they would amputate the other leg, and then an arm, and then the other arm. There would remain a torso, forsaken by all but God, wondering what in holy hell is happening to them. And then they would kill them, with injections, with Anthrax, or using them for another experiment."

I said, "They were cutting off the limbs of healthy people?" He said "Oh, yes. Our doctors, Czech, Russian, North Korean, were training to be combat doctors." I said, "Wait a minute, General. You mean your fellow Czechs and Russians did what the Japanese did in this horror site in Harbin, Manchuria?" He got this pained look on his face and he said, "Yes."

Now, keep in mind from earlier, nobody at the CIA would interrogate this man on this. They told him they didn't want to hear about that. Let's move to simple stuff that's happening in Czechoslovakia now.

Then he says, "I was Chief of Staff of the Joint Chiefs. I was a 41-year-old major general." He said, "I was a colonel in my twenties. I was on a fast track." He said, "How about talking about this strategic plan for Eastern Europe in the coming war." No, we don't want to hear about that, either. And within months he's on his way with \$50,000 to Lake George in upstate New York. He said he failed in business there, and he called and said he was broke, I'm going to be on the street, and they bring him back, and then they give him a job in the CIA doing menial work, translating books, and then Kissinger fires him within a month of Nixon's inauguration, and then 5 years later he's brought back in and he's got a deal where he does some consulting in the Defense Intelligence Agency.

This is not a story of glory of our intelligence agencies dealing with this, any more than I appreciated, on August 9, 1977, being told by the Director of the CIA, Stansfield Turner, "I'm not interested in this POW issue. Let the State Department handle it."

It belongs to the military. These are military people, aren't they? And Bill, about that time, you knew it was a football being bounced around.

I recommend to everybody to see "Braveheart." They will understand that people aspiring to be nobles cannot bop themselves with the blood of the battlefield, or whether William Wallace is disemboweled, because they're nobles. They don't have to go on the battlefield. They want to pick up all the political chips and just move on. That's why this crematorium thing, or what you just said, triggered in my mind. If a site is pulverized with U.S. bombing, of course we're not going to find some remains.

Proceed.

Mr. VEITH. Well, to answer your question, I believe that the press reports that I saw from Tuesday, indicated that the Deputy Director of DPMO, that they have signed an agreement to give the North Koreans several million dollars to repatriate remains. But the point I was going to make was on the remains that the Vietnamese said they can't find. The DIA/DPMO came back and said this was quite impossible. It bordered on the incredible, the exact statement that they used.

Mr. DORNAN. Who made that statement?

Mr. VEITH. DIA/DPMO. This is in response to an analysis of a detailed investigation of James Kelly Patterson's case, because the Vietnamese said they couldn't find his body. They buried it next to a stream, where the wild pigs dug it up and dragged it away.

Also, in recent numerous reports, the VNOSMP, which is a Vietnamese counterpart to DPMO, stated that graves containing remains of United States personnel have been destroyed by wild beasts, natural calamities, reforming of the terrain, and United States bombing. "The mounting incidence of such alleged loss of graves borders on the incredible."

This report, referring to Mr. Patterson, contains still another such claim. That's not me. That's from DPMO saying that.

To move on further——

Mr. DORNAN. So now we're going to go back 46 years and do this in Korea, with units overrun of the 24th Infantry Division in 1950—first overrun in June and July and August by North Kore-

ans, and then we come into Inchon and clean their clock, and then the Chinese come in. But we're going to go up there and spend millions looking for graves.

Let me ask Bill a question. Do you think the North Koreans, in Pyongyang, would walk across the street to the Vietnamese embassy and ask their advice on how to get millions of dollars out of us in a bone chase?

Mr. BELL. We know that the Koreans had personnel west of Da Nang in the 1960's teaching Korean to Vietnamese, proselytizing teams, to exploit the Korean forces that were in Vietnam. We know that the Koreans and Vietnamese collaborated during the time that Tucker Guggleman was in the Chi Hau prison because all the Korean embassy personnel were arrested about the same time as Guggleman, and they were held there and interrogated by the North Koreans. So the Vietnamese and the Koreans have cooperated over a long period of time on POW/MIA's.

Mr. DORNAN. I visited with the Tiger Division and the White Horse Division, protecting our biggest air base, Cameron Bay. No Vietnamese units ever again mortared or attacked anywhere near Cameron Bay once the ROC forces, the Tiger and White Horse Division, were in place. But it never occurred to me that the North Vietnamese would act like an ally of communist Hanoi and send North Koreans down to Vietnam to participate in that conflict and advise Vietnamese how to handle their southern Korean cousins. That's the first time I ever heard that.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. So it's perfectly understandable for us to assume that, in Pyongyang, the Vietnamese, out of their embassy—and that must be an interesting assignment for a brother Communist country—will be talking back and forth about how to whiplash the DPMO office here in the United States and get lots of money out of them in a grave chase, where there are 8,000 missing in Korea.

We are in for a tough ride here on the Korean side of things.

Mr. Veith, continue. I'll tell you what. We will have to end it in about 7 minutes. Go ahead.

Ms. ALFOND. Congressman Dornan, excuse me, but I just wanted to make mention, because you were talking about the money, that in my statement I made the suggestion that we use the money that we're going to give to North Korean now to excavate an airplane site, that we utilize that money, and more, and buy out the 10, 12 or 15 men that are alive in North Korea today.

[Applause.]

Mr. DORNAN. It won't be on the mike, but would a Korean family member stand up, some volunteer, and tell me, if the odds are a 1,000 to 1, that your husband or son or brother—

Ms. JOHNSON. My brother.

Mr. DORNAN. If the odds are a 1,000 to 1 that your brother would not be in the 12, would you rather spend money on the long shot that your brother might be in the 12, rather than looking for your brother's bones from 45 years ago?

Ms. JOHNSON. In the 25 years that I have been doing a lot of this research, here and back in New York State—my brother came from New York—and talking with many, many veterans, ex-POW's, Ko-

rean war, and discussing it with my sister—there's only my sister and I and a younger brother——

Mr. DORNAN. Identify yourself, please, ma'am.

Ms. JOHNSON. I am Gloria Johnson from——

Mr. DORNAN. The recorder is straining to hear you. Gloria Johnson, J-o-h-n-s-o-n?

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes, from New York, although I have been in this area since 1953 most of the time.

I and my sister, we would hate to think that our brother was going through all this that I've gone through. But I would like to take the long shot, that if he were, I would like to see them come home. I feel, because I have been involved also in going to DNA meetings and all of that stuff, and listening to some of the Korean war veterans, at Chosen, where my brother was, and how they were buried and all of that stuff.

Mr. DORNAN. Then you would see——

Ms. JOHNSON. I would rather see that, if there is anyone alive, my brother or anyone else, I would rather see them——

[Applause.]

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Gilman and I already knew what your answer would be, but we wanted to hear it.

Yes, ma'am.

[Voice inaudible.]

Mr. DORNAN. Please speak up, very loudly.

[Inaudible.]

Mr. DORNAN. Let me repeat that for the recorder.

Out of 7 days at that plenary session—wasn't it out near Dulles?

Voice. No, it was in Washington, DC. We stayed at a Washington hotel and brought them down to the Hill. The State Department entertained them. We took them all over Washington, and in 2 hours——

Mr. DORNAN. So they got a tour, and during 7 days, the Korean families got 2 hours.

VOICE. Two hours. And we were told by—for taking care of our American prisoners, and we were allowed to ask one question. So all these families came.

I will tell you that, in some cases, 100 percent of the next-of-kin of B-29 crews, who came from all over the country——

Mr. DORNAN. At their own expense.

VOICE. To plead their case.

Mr. DORNAN. Nancy, thank you.

Look, George, can you come by tomorrow?

Mr. VEITH. Sure.

Mr. DORNAN. Not to testify, but I would like to talk to you for an hour, before or after. And, Bill, you will be around tomorrow?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Veith follows:]

Testimony by George J. Veith before the House Military Personnel Subcommittee on June 19th, 1996.

Chairman Dornan, Committee members and other distinguished guests, I wish to express my deep appreciation for your invitation to testify before this Committee on the POW/MIA issue, an issue that continues to create controversy in our country. As a private citizen and a researcher who has spent a considerable amount of time studying captured enemy documents, wartime interrogation reports, Oral History interviews, and Signal Intercepts of PAVN Air Defense communications, I welcome the opportunity to convey some of the information I have learned to this Committee for its review and discussion. I will limit my opening remarks to two areas that I believe the Committee should investigate when considering whether the Vietnamese are cooperating on solving this contentious issue. At the end, I would also like to make some recommendations that I hope you will undertake to improve the ability of interested citizens like myself to conduct POW research.

First, Mr. Bill Bell and I recently completed a one-year study of POW handling organizations and Vietnamese POW cooperation entitled "*POWs and Politics: How much does Hanoi Really Know.*" This paper was presented at the most prestigious academic conference on Vietnam, which was recently held in April at Texas Tech University. Our findings were that the Vietnamese Communist Party, despite much rhetoric in their media to the contrary, undoubtedly continues to view this issue as not only an Intelligence and Security issue, but an Economic/Political one. Mr. Bell and I provide a large body of evidence to show that Vietnamese POW policies were formulated to exploit POWs for communist intelligence requirements and propaganda designs. These policies are revealed through reviewing the wartime interrogations of communist soldiers and cadre, along with examining dozens of captured POW policy documents. This policy, part of a broader program termed "Proselytizing," used the POW issue as one facet of a vast propaganda effort to influence the civilian masses and the military forces of the South Vietnamese and the U.S., along with the remainder of world-wide public opinion, to turn against the war, or at minimum, take a neutralist position. Like the French before us, the North Vietnamese believed our "rear" was vulnerable to political manipulation, while theirs was secure. We believe their approach of attempting to influence U.S. political policies towards Vietnam, such as lifting the embargo and gaining diplomatic recognition through control of the POW/MIA issue, continues today.

We can debate whether the proselytizing programs fostered or even had a measurable impact on the anti-war movement. The Vietnamese often tried hard themselves to quantify the success of their proselytizing programs. But regardless of the relative success or failure of their propaganda programs, there can be no doubt that the Communist Party completely controlled all types of proselytizing, and that two types in particular, Military and Enemy Proselytizing, were deeply intertwined with their Security forces.

By way of a brief explanation, Enemy Proselytizing cadre were Political officers assigned to PAVN forces and who reported through PAVN channels to the General Political Directorate, the Communist Party organization that controlled the PAVN. These Enemy Proselytizing cadre handled routine POW matters while also engaging in interrogations for information of an immediate tactical or propaganda value. However, the other type, Military Proselytizing cadre, were under the

direct control of the Communist Party and reported directly through Party Channels. These cadre had the responsibility for both penetration operations, i.e., agents, and convincing POWs or enemy soldiers to desert and collaborate. Since many experts believe the best opportunity for finding any U.S. MIAs still alive, short of discovering a secret prison, comes from the ranks of the deserters, and if the deserters were handled by cadre directly reporting through Party channels, it seems apparent to us that the U.S. focus in this area should be as important as crash site recovery.

Therefore, Mr. Bell and I believe that, in addition to deserters, many of the answers to the ultimate fate of our soldiers can be found in the records of the Communist Party, as opposed to the JTF-FA's Archival Research Teams sole concentration on PAVN records. Further, since unilateral Vietnamese archival research efforts studied by us do not meet Western academic standards, it becomes difficult to determine whether Vietnamese research results of PAVN records are accurate and thorough, let alone honest. However, given the combination of the well-known Vietnamese penchant for record keeping and the communist mentality towards bureaucracy, we suspect that the Party records are more complete and well-indexed. Anyone who has studied communist systems knows that what the communists most fear within their system is the rise of a charismatic military leader, a fear known as Bonapartism, and so consequently maintain a close control over the military. This control, along with the traditional rivalry between the Security services and the military, indicates to us that a search combining Party, Security, and PAVN records would hold a greater potential for answers than a search strictly of PAVN records and the current limited examination of MOI materials. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, the Vietnamese have not been asked by the U.S. government to search Party records, nor have any of the documents unilaterally turned over come from Party Archives.

Further, our examination of the Oral History interview program initially begun by Mr. Bell and later continued by less experienced, lower ranking JTF-FA personnel, has shown that the Vietnamese consistently claim that few records were kept by their military units due to the difficulties of the war. I would like to point out that if this claim were true, then why are there 954 rolls of microfilm of captured enemy documents sitting in the National Archives, which bear in mind was only 10% of the total captured and represents only those documents deemed worthy of translation. Anyone who has studied these microfilm rolls can see that they contain both mundane records such as weapons receipts, financial statements, medical records, and individual Personal History Statements, while also cataloguing high level Party and military strategic documents. Obviously, the opposing forces maintained a large bureaucracy, called the General Directorate of Rear Services, which provided all forms of logistics to their military. Along with the traditional communist insistence on ideological purity and thought control which resulted in numerous documents on Party policy, this Rear Services bureaucracy generated enormous amounts of documents, even in a jungle environment in the midst of a long and difficult war. For the Vietnamese to indicate otherwise, just as when they attempted years earlier to inform Gen. Vessey that their records had been "eaten by termites," suggests an attitude geared more towards continuing to control the process rather than genuine cooperation.

I would like to add one last point in judging Vietnamese cooperation. Many of the individuals interviewed under the Oral History Program state that remains will be difficult to find due to the severity of the American aerial bombardment, especially the B-52 strikes. Other rationale include

that the remains were lost due to the scavenging of wild animals, or buried in extremely close proximity to stream beds and thus washed away by torrential rains. This occurred despite long-standing Vietnamese directives, which date back to the war against the French, which require the burial of Americans in well-marked graves. One example of lost remains involves the case of Lt. James Kelly Patterson, a case you are familiar with Mr. Chairman. To quote from an earlier DIA/DPMO analysis of this case, "These requirements included precise marking of graves, usually in well-defined cemeteries, not on-the-spot burial locations. The locations were recorded and sent to higher, central command along with any personal effects and a full report on the circumstances surrounding the incident. That Lt. Patterson's ID card was returned to U.S. authorities indicates that this policy was apparently followed in this case. Also, in numerous recent reports the VNOSMP have stated that graves containing remains of U.S. personnel have been destroyed by wild beasts, natural calamities, reforming of the terrain, and U.S. bombings. The mounting incidence of such alleged loss of graves borders on the incredible. This report contains still another such claim."

In the second area I want to bring to the Committee's attention, I wish to remind the Committee of the many statements from former NSA analyst Jerry Mooney, and to draw the Committee's focus to one claim in particular by Mr. Mooney. Mr. Mooney has stated in the past that in July 1972, NSA intercepted a PAVN communication which indicated that a PAVN Air Defense Battalion had orders to execute 10 Americans. Over the years, in various affidavits and in Congressional testimony, statements like this by Mr. Mooney have either been ignored or ridiculed by DIA/DPMO. However, in November of last year, I found confirmation of Mr. Mooney's claim when I located the pertinent message, exactly as Mr. Mooney described it, in the POW/MIA records of the Library of Congress. With your permission Mr. Chairman, I would like it to be entered into the record along with my opening statement.

I shared this information with DPMO, hoping that DPMO would take the opportunity to research this incident thoroughly, and then publish a study on the intercept. In this way, I thought, a good faith effort by the government might begin a process of bridging some of the obvious differences between both sides. However, DPMO has as usual simply denied that this incident took place. If they conducted any analysis at all, it has remained hidden. In fact, they have again refused to meet with Mr. Mooney, even though he has offered on many occasions.

In my many conversations with Mr. Mooney, I have come to have a great respect for the capabilities of the National Security Agency. To sum up Mr. Mooney's position for you, PAVN Air Defense's used old style Soviet codes to communicate, used Soviet weapons and tactics to fight, and organized and trained under Soviet guidance. Because of this, PAVN Air Defense's were completely exploitable by NSA crypt systems and analysts, so exploitable that we achieved what Mr. Mooney calls the "Crown Jewel" of intelligence, Prior Knowledge. NSA collected and analyzed an enormous amount of information about the PAVN into a tremendously effective technical and product database, which included not only SIGINT, but HUMINT, ELINT, RADINT, and PHOTINT, along with additional information collected by other non-U.S. intelligence agencies under Third Party Agreements. This database was so effective that we could predict their responses, and just as importantly, we could follow their reporting on events down to the gun crew level, which provided us the ability to discern what was the truth, and what was not. This database enabled NSA to easily discriminate between the different message categories of Emulation, "Hot B," and

Control/Dummy Traffic, versus information NSA initially judged to be reliable, and which was then later confirmed. According to Mr. Mooney, NSA judged this execution message to be accurate. For DPMO to now dismiss this wartime NSA analysis without releasing the unredacted contents of the message, conducting a search for Collateral and other SIGINT related material on the Vietnamese officer who signed the message, or engaging in a range of other research efforts to discern the validity or non-validity of this message, simply adds fuel to the conspiracy fire.

Therefore, if NSA was able to effectively exploit PAVN Air Defense communications, and possesses a vast database that enabled NSA to make outstanding intelligence estimates of the target's communications, it logically follows that if the man judged to be the leading expert on the PAVN Air Defenses says that the Vietnamese possess more knowledge on U.S. air losses and the fate of our pilots than what they have given us, those claims should be seriously investigated, not brushed off by DIA/DPMO as "intellectual musings" or allowed to be dismissed because NSA is afraid of revealing the extent of its capabilities. I would like to remind the Committee of the recommendation of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs that further research in the NSA Archives should be conducted. If such research has been done, it has not been released. In addition, every time DIA/DPMO has gone to NSA to search for POW related material, NSA has discovered additional information. Indeed, it was Mr. Mooney who provided NSA with the computer codes that enabled them to recover the records presently on file in the L.O.C.

Lastly, I would like to offer some recommendations to the Committee that would hopefully further your understanding of the issue, and that would also assist the research efforts of private citizens like myself who are struggling to understand this difficult issue. First, investigate the Legal Agreement signed by Mr. Mooney and the Senate Committee on POW/MIA Affairs with NSA that called for NSA to locate and release certain documentation. According to Mr. Mooney, the records in the L.O.C. represent only one portion of that agreement, which indicates that NSA has not fulfilled the terms of the Legal Agreement it signed with Mr. Mooney and the Senate Committee, or the data still remains classified. Second, create a Joint Documentation Center in which all the Vietnamese documents that have been turned over, their English translations, and their DPMO/JTF-FA analysis are present. The Vietnamese currently have such an archive center located in the Central Military Museum in Hanoi. Regardless of DPMO "concerns" over privacy laws, it seems odd to me that ordinary Vietnamese citizens can view these documents rather easily, yet no such program exists in the U.S. Third, release the files of the House Select Committee on POW Affairs from 1976. These files are currently housed at the National Archives. While the Senate Select files are open, due to normal restrictions the House files remain closed. If the Senate files are open, there is no need for the House files to be closed. Fourth, join with your Senate colleagues in amending the McCain Amendment to allow for the release of all the POW files maintained by DPMO. The McCain Bill was written so that only those files of individuals still missing at the time of the legislation, minus any families that didn't want their case released, were sent to the L.O.C. Thus, while DPMO maintains close to 3750 case files, only 44% of those were sent to the L.O.C. Additionally, those case files sent to the L.O.C. were the same case files that were "streamlined," i.e., stripped of much of the relevant all-source intelligence data, when the "Brightlight" database was given to the Vietnamese in 1989.

Again, thank you for your invitation. I will be happy to answer any questions you might have.

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DIVISION PLANS TO EXECUTE 10 AMERICANS NVN 37TH AIR DEFENSE

ON 6 JULY, THE NVN 37TH AIR DEFENSE DIVISION (UNLOCATED, LOWER QUANG BINH PROVINCE) THE 284TH AAA REGIMENT AND DIRECTED THE EXECUTION OF 10 AMERICANS. AN 8 111V.

SHALL BE LEFT BEHIND TO KILL THE 10 AMERICANS. COMPLETE THE TASK AND RETURN.

THE 284TH AAA REGIMENT DEPARTED QUANG TRI CITY ON 5 JULY AND IS PRESENTLY LOCATING IN THE AREAS OF CAM LO (16-49N 107-00E), DONG LO (16-47N 107-05E) AND TAN VINH (16-46N 107-06E)

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] SECTION ONE

[REDACTED]
SOUTHEAST ASIA [REDACTED] SUMMARY
[REDACTED]

THIS REPORT SUMMARIZES DEVELOPMENTS NOTED THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA AVAILABLE
[REDACTED] AS OF 1500Z, 7 JULY. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

284TH REGIMENT HAD WITHDRAWN FROM QUANG TRI CITY. ON 6 JULY, THE DIVISION
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SAM REGIMENT IN THE VINH LINH/DMZ AREA HAVE [REDACTED] TO PREPARE TO
RETREAT. [REDACTED]
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POW's and Politics: How Much Does Hanoi Really Know?

Written by: Garnett "Bill" Bell and George J. Veith

POW's and Politics: How Much Does Hanoi Really Know?

The recent debate concerning a possible move by President Clinton toward diplomatic recognition of Vietnam offers an opportunity to re-examine the most pernicious legacy of the Vietnam War. From a policy standpoint, the two most enduring problems were the "Vietnam Syndrome" and the POW/MIA dilemma. The "Vietnam Syndrome" alluded to a perceived public disillusionment to intervene with U.S. military forces in regional or ethnic conflicts, and to sustaining a strong commitment to an anti-communist approach to foreign affairs. A resounding victory on Kuwaiti sand allowed then President Bush in a speech given at the conclusion of "Operation Desert Storm", to declare that "we had put the Vietnam syndrome behind us". Having skewered the "Vietnam syndrome", American policy-makers undoubtedly hoped these lingering issues from the Vietnam war had finally loosened their grip on both the public and the American political elite. The slow Vietnamese march towards a free market economy had raised U.S. policy makers expectations that the U.S. and Vietnam could reexamine their strained relationship. While the Bush administration's "Road Map" spelled out U.S. requirements to re-open economic and political ties with Vietnam, the primary internal U.S. political issue was undoubtedly a satisfactory resolution of the remaining unresolved POW/MIA questions.

However, in the Spring and Summer of 1991, the surfacing of photos allegedly depicting Americans still held in captivity lead to the creation of a Senate Select Committee to investigate the war-time fate of many American servicemen. For years, family members of the missing servicemen have struggled with these questions. During the Vietnam War, family members of the POW/MIA's had organized into groups such as the National League of Families to pressure the U.S. Government into placing more emphasis on the issue. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV) actions regarding American POW's had become well-documented, ranging from refusal to allow ICRC inspections of POW camps to brutal torture to stonewalling on who it held as prisoner. Notwithstanding Vietnamese claims to have released all the American prisoners they held at the completion of "Operation Homecoming", serious questions remained regarding Americans known to have been captured but not released or accounted for. Despite repeated U.S. efforts through various forums to achieve answers to these questions, post-war mechanisms designed to account for the remaining missing quickly collapsed.

Outraged over what many viewed as Vietnamese political manipulation of a basic humanitarian issue, an activist community arose, combining veterans of the Vietnam War with more vocal family members. The activists have also continually savaged the U.S.

Government over its post-war POW/MIA policies and actions, culminating in bitter charges of a politically motivated coverup of evidence indicating the presence of live American prisoners remaining in Vietnamese or Lao custody. Several books, most notably Sauter's and Saunders', *Soldiers of Misfortune* and *The Men We Left Behind*, Nigel Cawthorne's *The Bamboo Cage*, and Monika Jensen-Stephenson's *Kiss The Boys Goodbye*, have further developed this conspiracy theory.

The Government has vehemently denied these allegations, and has steadfastly maintained that it possesses no credible evidence that any American servicemen remained as prisoners after "Operation Homecoming". The widely reported conclusion of the Senate Select Committee, that although some evidence existed that as many as 100 men may have remained alive after "Operation Homecoming", no "proof" could be found in U.S. Government intelligence files to support the stance that men remained alive today, let alone support any wide-ranging conspiracy theory. Obviously believing itself vindicated in the January 1993 findings of the Senate Select Committee, the DOD has pressed on with its remains recovery activities in Southeast Asia under its Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA), an expanded organization from its prior unit, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). The report went further and counterattacked some of the POW/MIA activists, exposing several fraudulent operators. The recent publication of Susan Katz Keating's *Prisoners of Hope* and Malcolm McConnell's *Inside Hanoi's Secret Archives*, has swung the pendulum even further, leaving many of the activists reputations in public ruin.

How did we get to this situation? How has the public discourse grown so rancorous over what would seem to be an obvious consequence of war, that men disappear as a result of combat. That answer may be as complex as the issue, but notably absent from this acrimonious debate has been any balanced examination by U.S. scholars of the Vietnamese system for handling American POW's and remains. With some exceptions, the mainstream media has also generally avoided investigating the complex questions of the POW/MIA issue. Apparently, most Vietnam-era pundits find no intellectual discomfort in their opposite positions of having eviscerated the military's war-time statements while now completely accepting Governmental testimony on the POW/MIA issue. Although they dutifully reported the information released or discussed during the Senate Select Committee hearing, after having raised several false alarms in the past, the media has now begun subtly lumping the radical activists and more strident family members in the same community as UFO watchers and those convinced they have recently spotted Elvis pumping gas at their local convenience store.

Believing themselves abandoned on all fronts, many family members and veterans groups have grown despondent, giving in to

conspiracy theories ranging from "Secret Returnee" programs to beliefs in hundreds of men still being held in Southeast Asia. Deepening the families dismay, shortly after the Senate Select Committee adjourned, some key personnel assigned to the committee tasked to investigate this controversial issue quickly seized high salaried positions within the U.S./Vietnam Trade Council, a business group designed to facilitate normalization and trade between the U.S. and Vietnam. According to a biographical sketch on the President of this business-lobby group, the U.S. Vietnam Trade Council has also developed close ties with the leadership of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). The POW/MIA families suspicions have additionally been fueled by U.S. Government claims of "outstanding" or "superb" Vietnamese cooperation, even though after receiving numerous significant concessions from the current administration, the Vietnamese have continued to slowly release to U.S. Government officials and complacent veterans groups small, piecemeal increments of remains and records.

Confronted with this situation, MIA family members, veterans, and activists have pointed increasingly to their belief that the Vietnamese kept detailed records of wartime incidents involving American personnel still unaccounted-for, and if it had the political will to do so, the communist apparatus controlling the POW/MIA issue in Indochina could rapidly account for many more POW/MIA's. Given the political ramifications surrounding this issue, the various charges and denials have undoubtedly confused the average citizen. Additionally, for an American raised in the relatively simple aspects of democratic politics, understanding Vietnamese communist bureaucracy and policies can be daunting. Unfortunately, little has been published concerning the actual mechanisms, systems, and policies the Vietnamese communists used to process American POW's.

The sheer intransigence of the Vietnamese, manifested in their coldly calculating long-term manipulation of the issue, has obviously created a climate of great suspicion. Yet, in the U.S., reasoned discussion has vacillated between two polar extremes of unsubstantiated theorizing by misinformed individuals and increasingly defensive outright denials from the Government. The U.S. intelligence community has further compounded the difficulty for any outside reviewer to piece together the outlines of the Vietnamese POW system in this highly emotionally atmosphere through a haphazard declassification process, which is often mistaken for governmental stonewalling. Even after allowing for these complexities, the adversity qualified historians face when dealing in the grey area between national security considerations and public discussions of controversial events does not explain the dearth of scholarly studies. This article seeks to take the first step in addressing that problem, and outlines our views on the Vietnamese communist prison and administrative system, and our differences with the beliefs of the Defense Prisoner of War and

Missing-in-Action Office (DPMO).¹

Sensitized from the bitter results of the peace talks and eventual prisoner exchanges during the Korean War, American intelligence labored to penetrate the inner-working of the Vietnamese bureaucracy. As a result, the U.S. military placed great emphasis on targeting Vietnamese POW installations and policies, creating a collection and recovery program code named "Brightlight". Much information on Vietnamese procedures was gleaned from interrogations of captured or surrendered PAVN or NLF soldiers and from monitoring NVN news broadcasts and publications during the war. Additionally, Allied forces captured millions of communist documents that provided elaborate detail of their plans and personnel.² On the post-war live prisoner issue, DPMO's position is that, after extensive wartime intelligence efforts, and combined with information provided by early American releasees, they were able to identify with some precision both the numbers and locations where American POW's were being held in North Vietnam during the war. Upon debriefing the returned POW's after "Operation Homecoming", these locations were basically confirmed, and the returnees, desperate to prevent a repetition of the Korean POW experience, had labored mightily to ensure that every POW and camp was identified and reported to the U.S. government when they were released. Thus, the returnee debriefs, other still classified war-time intelligence, and the "lack of proof" resulting from post-war refugee interviews and all-source analysis forms the basis for DPMO's stated beliefs that no prisoners remain alive in Southeast Asia.

By examining these declassified interrogation reports and reviewing selected captured documents, along with interviews of Vietnamese cadre involved in the processing of American POW's and remains conducted by members of the JCRC after the war, a picture emerges of a complex system heavily influenced by Vietnam Communist Party (formerly the Lao Dong Party) policies and goals and strictly controlled by trusted party political cadre. The obvious implication is that those critical of U.S. Government claims to the effect that Vietnam is cooperating in healing the wounds of war, are to a degree at least, justified in maintaining their views. Although the DPMO continued to study the Vietnamese prison system to identify the procedures which they used to process American POW/MIA's, it has focused primarily on the Enemy Proselytizing Department (*Cuc Dich Van*) of the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN).

However, the authors believe that the systems for handling of American POWs organized by the Vietnamese Communist Party were far more complex and multi-channeled, reflecting not only DRV security and intelligence issues, but short and long-term propaganda concerns. This is not to be confused with the so-called "second prison system" which the Vietnamese allegedly used for hiding a group of POW's separate from the main body of POWs, but rather a

delineation of duties between the military forces, the public security forces, and the Party Central Committee Propaganda Organ. This delineation not only prevented duplication of effort, but it served to compartment the intelligence gathering and overall exploitation effort from a security standpoint as well, and served both the short-range and long-term interests of the Party. It is this least understood aspect of war-time communist methodology that has had the greatest impact on American post-war POW/MIA efforts since the ending of that tragic war.

Vietnamese POW policies and views:

The Vietnamese philosophy of liberation known as *dau tranh*, (literally struggle), evolved into what the Viet Cong termed the "three pronged struggle" comprised of "armed struggle" (*Dau tranh vu trang*), "political struggle" (*Dau tranh chinh tri*), and "proselytizing" (*van*).³ In the English language the term "proselytize" means to convert from one belief or faith to another. Since during the war years religious activity was not encouraged, and the Vietnam Communist Party was the sole political party allowed to exist, the term proselytize came to mean in the Vietnamese language to accept the leadership and doctrine of the Vietnam Communist Party. In transforming the idea of proselytizing into a usable process, which former PAVN Commander General Vo Nguyen Giap called "disintegrating the enemy," party planners divided the members of the opposing force into three basic categories: soldiers of the enemy, cadre of the enemy, and the civilian masses.

It is necessary, then, to understand the communist view of the difference between "soldiers" and "cadre" of the enemy. The Western mind normally first considers the rank, or position, of the individual to determine which category will be applied. In the eyes of the Asian communist, however, although rank is often considered important, it is the attitude and political awareness of the individual that will ultimately enable one to make this crucial distinction. Thus, each category was handled by a separate proselytizing cadre section. "Soldiers" of the enemy were handled by Military Proselytizing cadre (*Binh van*), "Cadre" of the enemy by Enemy Proselytizing (*Dich van*), and the "masses" by Civilian Proselytizing (*Dan van*).

The cadre system, borrowed by the Vietnamese Communist Party from the Soviet and Chinese models, was designed to insure control of the military and political "struggle" to liberate South Vietnam. In order to institute this process, General Giap linked armed military struggle with political struggle, and as a result every PAVN military organ, down to and including company sized units, had both a commander and a political officer. While battalion and smaller sized units were managed by "party subchapters" (*Chi bo*) under the leadership of the political officers (*Chinh tri vien*),

regimental and larger sized units were managed by "party chapters" (*Dang bo*) under the direction of political commissars (*Chinh uy*).

Although the military commanders were primarily responsible for tactical operations on the battlefield, all major decisions were ultimately approved by the political commissar. These military politicians were also responsible for writing detailed performance evaluations, and for assessing the reliability and suitability of all members occupying key positions, including the unit commanders. In addition to monitoring the commanders, other important responsibilities of the political officers included the evacuation, detention, medical treatment, and exploitation of prisoners of war. In outlining the role of the party in dealing with American prisoners, some of the following points were emphasized: "The battalion Party Committee and the Chapter Committee should consider the mission and capability of the unit before prescribing criteria ((for the capture of prisoners)). In meetings, Party Chapters must use their time ((to study)) to thoroughly understand the importance of PW's. Party Chapters are also responsible for detecting the ideological weaknesses of soldiers and Party members in capturing and handling prisoners in order to provide appropriate leadership".⁴

Party cadre attached to PAVN or VC units were responsible for implementing the POW policy when they captured U.S. personnel by properly training their soldiers in Party policies. Both the Enemy and Military Proselytizing cadre were assigned to sections attached to the various commands ranging from COSVN to Military Region or Front and below. These cadre would inspect the different units or POW camps in their areas for compliance, and would write monthly, semi-annual, and annual reports, which were forwarded to higher echelons. In the more southern parts of South Vietnam and in Cambodia, these reports were sent via courier along the commo-liaison routes. Further north, the cadre could transmit using the telephone wire nets which extended down the Ho Chi Minh Trail into MR-5 and the B-3 Front.

Prisoners, especially American prisoners, were considered a strategic asset to the North Vietnamese. NVA/VC policy on foreign POW's, which dated back to the war against the French, was still applicable towards U.S. POW's. Instructions by the NLF in December of 1963 after the release of some early captured Americans stressed both the propaganda and document collection themes. "Take advantage of prisoners for international propaganda purposes. The prisoners must express good impressions about the Liberation Front...records of the deceased Americans were kept, and their remains were carefully maintained...You must understand the experiences and procedures for the release of prisoners in order to provide the necessary documents in the propaganda program".⁵

Reinforcing the argument against claims of outstanding

Vietnamese cooperation by the current administration, captured wartime documents and Sources provided overwhelming evidence that as a part of their training, PAVN forces were given detailed instructions concerning the handling of American personnel captured or killed on the battlefield. According to those instructions "a detailed file was to be prepared on each POW as soon as he was brought to a detention camp. With regard to the deceased ones, records should be maintained, listing such information as deceased date and burial location. Personal belongings of the deceased should be carefully kept. Similar records were to be prepared for the U.S. POWs who escaped, were missing, became lost, or were killed by enemy bombing."⁶

The communists had many reasons for actively managing this POW exploitation program. "There is a threefold purpose in taking U.S. prisoners: They can be exploited for intelligence purposes; they can be exploited for propaganda and counter-propaganda purposes through radio broadcasts and interviews published in the neutralist and pro-communist press; they can be used politically to further the cause of communism beyond the limited context of Vietnam by propagandizing them, brain washing them, and converting them into communist or pro-communist cadres who will work actively for the Party in their own country after they have been released".⁷

The authors are not suggesting that NVA/VC policies were always perfectly adhered to, or that documents pertaining to captured U.S. may not have survived the journey to Hanoi or were simply lost due to the ravages of war. Indeed, at times VC troops or North Vietnamese militia were either unaware of Central Committee policies or failed to carry them out, especially in the early years of the war. However, Party cadre labored hard to educate their soldiers and civilians to capture Americans alive, and to collect all their documentation. Proselytizing sections were urged to emphasize care of the POW, "for to do otherwise harms the revolution, decreases the chance for prisoner exchanges, and limits the international propaganda impact".⁸ In reviewing dozens of captured documents and interrogation reports, a consistent theme emerges of careful handling of not only American prisoners or their remains, but any documents or material possessions captured with them. Nothing was overlooked that could be used for implementing Party policy, a policy which was driven by communist ideology to both extract as much useful intelligence information from U.S. prisoners as possible, and even more importantly, create the seeds of communist revolution in the prisoners home country by "educating" the POW's in communist beliefs. To accomplish this task, the North Vietnamese leadership invested POW responsibility with several ministries.

The Ministry of Public Security :

The primary responsibility for handling American POW's rested

with the Ministry of Public Security. The relationship of the public security apparatus to the overall process of exploiting American personnel was described by the CIA in a 1975 study, which clearly outlined the responsibilities of the MPS: "The MPS is similar in organization and mission to the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). The MPS is the executive arm of the communist party (*Dang Lao Dong*-Workers Party) of the DRV. It is responsible for the overall security of the party, internal security within the DRV, and for foreign intelligence operations. It has the overall responsibility for the administration and detention of POWs. Within the MPS, the two organizations responsible for evaluating information obtained from American POWs by the MPS or MND were the General Research Organization (*Co quan Nghien cuu Tong Hop*), and the National Intelligence Organization (*Co quan Tinh bao Quoc gia*), with the former concentrating on follow-up interrogations for exploitation of western technology, often shared with the USSR and the PRC, and the latter concentrating on operational leads and recruitment in foreign countries. These two organizations coordinated their efforts to identify, evaluate, develop, and gain the cooperation of prisoners for foreign operational leads used in long term planning. In general, the MPS conducted the basic intelligence screening of all U.S. POWs for the DRV intelligence community. It disseminated knowledgeability briefs (KB's) to various interested DRV agencies and ministries. It solicited requirements, except from the MND which interrogated prisoners on its own requirements. As noted previously, the MPS collected information on economic, political, scientific, and strategic military topics, as well as foreign operational leads. Information was shared with both the Soviets and People's Republic of China (PRC). Within the DRV, the MPS forwarded its KB's and interrogation reports through Party channels to the MND and the Office of the Prime Minister for coordination throughout the remainder of the DRV government."⁹

Although the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of National Defense shared some responsibilities relating to captured Americans, the MPS was vested with the overall responsibility for all American and other foreign prisoners captured in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and therefore maintained the most detailed lists of American and foreign prisoners held throughout Southeast Asia. In southern Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, captured Americans were moved to the nearest PAVN military station (*Binh Tram*) and transferred to the control of Logistics Group (*Doan*) 559. The system in South Vietnam and Cambodia was controlled by forward commands of the MPS and the MND attached to COSVN. With the breakup of MR 5 into 3 distinct regions in early 1967, Hanoi assumed direct responsibilities of the northern provinces of South Vietnam, leaving COSVN in charge of the southern half.

The MPS had two main offices in Vietnam, with Office "A" in

Hanoi and Office "B" collocated with the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in the south. The southern office of the MPS also maintained detention facilities in the outskirts of Hanoi at Thanh Tri. This prison, where U.S. POW's captured in south Vietnam and later moved to the north were detained, was designated "Hanoi B". Detention facilities of the MPS Office "A" in northern Vietnam were staffed by personnel of Prisons Department C-51 in Hanoi, while those in southern Vietnam fell under the authority of Prisons Department C-53, located in the Lo Go area of northwestern Tay Ninh province. Some remains of U.S. POW's held in C-53 were repatriated after the war ended, but other prisoners executed there on orders of the party have never been returned. Live-sighting reports on American prisoners held in the C-53 prison continued to be received by the U.S. Government until late 1974, but were never acted upon due to procrastination and the sudden collapse of the Saigon Government. In the north, intelligence interrogations of American POWs were conducted by Interrogation Department C-44 in Hanoi. In the south, interrogations were conducted by public security cadre attached to the various Party Regions and provinces throughout southern Vietnam, or by cadre assigned to the Security Section of COSVN. In selecting cadre for duty with the security services the party was at the forefront: "The party should be regarded as the sole body that provides absolute and direct leadership. Whenever possible, security sections at various echelons were to be staffed by Chapter Party Committee members exclusively, and individual Party Chapters were to as "steering" nuclei in the various security and intelligence communities.¹⁰ Information gained from interrogations of American POWs was processed and forwarded to the MND and the Office of the Prime Minister for coordination throughout the remainder of the government.¹¹

Coordination with the Office of the Prime Minister is considered noteworthy, since the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Personnel (VNOSMP), established after the war to work with American POW/MIA specialists, also reports to the Office of the Prime Minister. The Office of the Prime Minister also managed part of the war-time propaganda effort through the Vietnam News Agency (VNA) and the Radio Diffusion Board. It is important to note that Radio Hanoi, like the Vietnam News Agency (VNA), while under the control of the Central Party Propaganda and Training Department (Cuc Tuyen Truyen Dao Tao), was attached to the Office of the Prime Minister. When considering the relationship between the Office of the Prime Minister against the long term implications of Vietnam's propaganda efforts, it is not surprising that such radio broadcasts and the recent "discovery" of VNA photographs of deceased American personnel have formed the basis for the U.S. Government's categorization of literally hundreds of cases, where neither the missing man or his remains have been returned, as so-called "discrepancy cases." As the U.S. began to conduct the first joint field investigations in Vietnam during 1988, the Radio Diffusion Board continued to send signals to the U.S. concerning the POW/MIA

issue when the following broadcast by Radio Hanoi was monitored: "At a press conference on 4 July held in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center, Comrade Sukaret (Translator's note: spelled phonetically) the head of the public prosecutor's office raised the issue of Soviet soldiers who were captured as POWs in Afghanistan. He rejected the fabricated themes of a number of reactionary circles that apparently some repressive cases are being prepared in regards to the Soviet POWs captured in Afghanistan in case they return home. He emphasized that the military personnel who belong to the element of Soviet voluntary forces engaged in the fighting in Afghanistan who were captured as POWs and returned to the Fatherland from abroad will entirely enjoy the rights of political society and other rights of every Soviet citizen as specified in the Soviet constitution. Stemming from the lofty humanitarian viewpoint of socialism, the Soviet State is prepared to be lenient to all those Soviet POWs whose actions, because they were unable to withstand enemy torture, have caused damage to the interests of the Soviet State. Comrade Sukaret stated that approximately 312 Soviet military personnel have been captured in the Afghanistan conflict. A number of them were sacrificed while searching for a way to escape from the prison camps of the Afghan counter-revolutionaries. Currently there are approximately 200 people being held in Afghanistan, a few tens of people in America, and a small number in Canada and western Europe. He hoped that the administrations of the countries involved in this issue, especially America and Pakistan, would create conditions for the Soviet POWs to soon return and reunite with their families." ¹²

In addition to military prisoners, Public Security camps also processed "civilian" prisoners. In a document of the Binh Dinh Province Security Committee pertaining to captured Vietnamese personnel, "Camps for POWs and defecting soldiers should only be used to confine personnel from military or semi-military units. GVN cadres such as Inter-family Chiefs, Hamlet Chiefs, administrative personnel, "plainclothesmen," reconnaissance unit personnel and civilians should be placed under the control of Security Sections." ¹³ Other documents of the Binh Dinh Province Party Committee captured during the war indicate that personnel transferred from regular detention camps to security agencies were scheduled for "further investigation."

Also included in the security system were American civilians who performed other than normal military duties. These personnel were considered as "spies," and subjected to very thorough interrogations. Even American female volunteer workers, such as school teachers and medical specialists captured in Hue during the 1968 "Tet" offensive, were suspected of being "spies." In some cases, those prisoners who were not successful in explaining their backgrounds either disappeared, died in captivity due to brutal

interrogations, or were executed after capture. Those who were able to convince their captors that they were genuine volunteers, such as the female prisoners captured in Hue, were required to sign statements to be broadcast over Radio Hanoi, and then released to American control. In the case of the American females captured in Hue, the unedited radio broadcasts were made from Hanoi only days after the statements were recorded near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). On the other hand, Chief Warrant Officer Solomon Godwin, from Hot Springs, Arkansas, who was also captured in Hue, died while undergoing a lengthy period of interrogation by the Public Security Police. Due to his assignment as an Intelligence Advisor to the RVN National Police Special Branch in Hue, both CWO Godwin and captured CIA agent Eugene Weaver were held in a highly secret camp far removed from other American prisoners. Mr. Weaver survived the ordeal, and more recently the Soviet KGB has admitted to U.S. officials that not only did they have direct access to Mr. Weaver for interrogation in Vietnam, they also attempted to recruit him for intelligence operations here in the United States. Although an American eyewitness account provides proof that CWO Godwin was in the custody of communist forces at a fixed location, his remains have never been returned. Another clear example of Vietnamese intransigence is the case of SSGT Harold Bennett from Perryville, Arkansas. Another American captured with SSGT Bennett was told by guards that he was executed, because he had been wounded and unable to keep pace with the movement to a new camp. Although the American survivor provided a location for SSGT Bennett's burial, his remains have not been returned by Vietnam.

During interrogations, the MPS was supported by its subordinate "Medical Office." Some known functions of this office included: "providing medical guidance and support to MPS interrogators on the most effective medical and psychological techniques in exploiting and gaining the cooperation of American POWs in the DRV".¹⁴ This included the use of various drugs and serums and other techniques which might induce the POWs to provide information while in a semi-conscious state, and providing the necessary medical care after the use of torture. These forms include: propagandizing the POW and of influencing him through the appropriate exposure of different equipment, weapons and torture techniques or by exposing the prisoners to others who were tortured, and preparing studies and performing research on the most effective Soviet, French, Communist Chinese and other oriental and western medical techniques which could be used in public security activities. The preparation of such research studies included working with Soviet and Communist Chinese intelligence advisers who were qualified in the use of medical techniques for intelligence purposes and coordinating medical matters with the MPS Technical Department, and with its Scientific Criminal Affairs Laboratory in regard to the analysis and preparation of devices/equipment for use by the MPS Medical Office in its support of the MPS interrogation elements.¹⁵

Some insight as to how information obtained from American personnel was shared with the USSR and PRC was reported by the CIA in Saigon just prior to the withdrawal of American forces: "Starting with the 1960 visit to NVN of a deputy chief of the KGB and the initiation of professional training for MPS cadres in the Soviet Union sponsored by the KGB, the MPS maintained a close but controlled liaison with Soviet KGB officials in Hanoi. Conversely, although the Chinese Communist advisors to the MPS were withdrawn in 1958, the MPS continued to maintain liaison with the Communist Chinese Ministry of Public Security officials attached to their Hanoi embassy to exchange information. (Field Comment: Although the Source does not claim the MPS also maintained a field relationship with KGB or Chinese MPS officials in other countries, he has identified MPS officials under North Vietnamese Embassy cover in Laos and Cambodia with known and frequent contact with Soviet and Chinese Embassy officials in those countries.) The Soviet KGB, with its wide range of activity against the United States, has provided political and military information to the MPS. In exchange the MPS and the North Vietnamese Army have furnished the KGB information on US pilots imprisoned in North Vietnam and on other US military and civilian prisoners in North Vietnamese hands. In addition, the KGB worked with the MPS in establishing the original interrogation requirements for all US prisoners and, although neither the KGB nor the Chinese Ministry of Public Security was allowed direct access to any US prisoner, the MPS accepted specific intelligence requirements from the Soviets and Chinese which it used in prisoner interrogations. (Source Comment: The primary Chinese concern was with the capabilities of US aircraft. MPS officials speculated that the Chinese intended to use technical interrogation and examination of US aircraft to supplement Chinese Communist aircraft design.)¹⁶

There is additional information available indicating that the intelligence shared by the MPS with the USSR and the PRC was considered valuable to the extent that it created competition between the two countries: "In spite of the obvious great importance for both sides of this collaboration, our military-scientific specialists in the DRV continue to operate under difficult circumstances, which are often artificially complicated by our Vietnamese comrades. It is known that trips to the sites of downed aircraft is the Soviet specialists' main method of collecting pieces of equipment. This system is set up by the Vietnamese side. The Vietnamese, however, hide the aircraft crash sites from us using various pretexts. They delay our trips, even after giving us permission to go to the crash site. It is for this reason that the main source of information regarding aircraft crash sites comes from the observation of Soviet specialists. There have been many times when downed aircraft were examined by qualified specialists before the arrival of our specialists. That has now been cleared up; it turned out to be Chinese."¹⁷

The Ministry of National Defense:

As mentioned, the MPS and MND shared responsibilities for the exploitation of American prisoners. While some of the prisoners who entered both the security and propaganda systems were later transferred to the custody of PAVN military forces, others were released, swapped, executed, or simply disappeared. Civilian prisoners screened by the MPS and found not to be "spies," but still not released to American control, were transferred to the custody of the *Dich van* (Enemy Proselytizing) Element. It is this element that the DPMO has concentrated most of its research efforts.

The military system for handling American POW's began at the capturing unit on the battlefield, and extended to Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi. Although this system was managed by PAVN military forces, such operations were nevertheless controlled by the party, through the various political officers or political commissars, up to the General Political Directorate (*Tong cuc Chinh tri*) of the military high command in Hanoi. Almost all of the captured Americans who lived to return home went through this system. All prisoners were carefully screened and evaluated by experts of the Ministry of Public Security, which made recommendations concerning the further evacuation and future potential of captured personnel.

The three service components of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) function as the Ministry's intelligence, security, and proselytizing arms. All the services have a role in the prisoner system and the exploitation of captured or detained Americans. The elements included the Central Research Department, which collected military intelligence and was organized similar to the Soviet "GRU", the Enemy Proselytizing Department, and the Military Security Department. The Enemy Proselytizing Department (*Cuc Dich Van*) was the senior PAVN authority for POW matters and, "had the primary responsible for the administration and indoctrination of American POW's. The CDV closely coordinated with the MPS regarding the placement of U.S. POW's in MPS-run facilities. The CDV drew up indoctrination plans and recommendations for the interrogations of U.S. POW's by the Research Department".¹⁸

The Research Department maintained several separate offices tasked with the exploitation of American POWs, the Research Office (*Phong 70*), the Reconnaissance Office (*Phong 71*), the Technical Reconnaissance Office (*Phong 72*), and the Foreign Countries Intelligence Office (*Phong 76*). The Military Proselytizing and the Enemy Proselytizing Departments maintained offices designated C-12 and C-14 respectively, located near the "Citadel" POW Camp in Hanoi. Both the Research and Enemy Proselytizing Departments maintained master lists of all captured American POWs. The Military Security Department Office (*Phong 50*), which coordinated

closely with the General Department for Security (*Tong cuc An ninh*), of the MPS designated PH-46, was later changed to KP-36, and finally KH-50.

Enemy "cadre" targeted by the *Dich van* element were perceived as being more loyal to the opposing force, and, therefore, not worthy of trust for the long term propaganda aspect. Since Americans, like the French before them, were obviously foreigners, and far removed from loyalty to Vietnam, they were normally considered as "cadre" and placed under the control of the *Dich van* element. Due to the amount of tactical and technical knowledge possessed by enemy cadre, a principal mission of the *Dich van* element was the extraction of military information to be shared with the various PAVN Commands. In some areas where there were large concentrations of American forces, such as the Hue-Quang Tri area, a specialized sub-element designated *My van* (American proselytizing) was added to the existent structure. There is no indication that the third main proselytizing element, *Dan van*, designed to sway the civilian masses of the countryside, had any relationship to POW's.

The Unknown Military Proselytizing System:

The general purpose of *Binh van* was to destroy Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and U.S. military strength, or at least reduce its efficiency, through a spectrum of politically motivated acts. This was the main thrust of General Giap's "disintegrating the enemy" process. The *Binh van* element was oriented toward "soldiers" of the enemy, rather than "cadre," because this particular element sought not only to persuade soldiers to cross over to the communist side themselves, but to elicit their assistance in luring other soldiers to cross over as well. Due to the degree of importance placed by the communists on the motivation of personnel taken into custody and their potential value toward propaganda efforts, any individual who voluntarily crossed over to the communist side would be considered a "soldier," and would, therefore, be under the control of the *Binh van*, rather than the *Dich van* element. This policy was apparently consistent without regard to the rank or position of the individual. This, however, is an assumption, since no known senior U.S. personnel defected to the communist side during the war.

Such distinctions may also have been considered as a point of law, since anyone who crossed over would normally be considered as a *Hang binh*, or deserter, and not subject to the law of land warfare. According to Vietnam's law on Vietnamese nationality "Foreign citizens and apatrid (sic) persons residing in Vietnam, abiding of their own free will by the Vietnamese Constitution and law, are eligible to Vietnamese naturalization if they fulfill the following conditions: to be eighteen years old or more; knowing the Vietnamese language; having resided in Vietnam at least five years.

In special cases, foreign citizens are eligible to Vietnamese nationality without being asked to fulfil (sic) the above mentioned conditions: have made contributions to the cause of protecting and defending the Vietnamese homeland."

During oral history interviews conducted in 1988, when questioned concerning the differences between the Military and Enemy Proselytizing elements, knowledgeable communist cadre summed up the situation by stating that the difference between the *Binh van* and *Dich van* elements was very similar to the difference between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency of the United States.¹⁹ Such interviews also revealed that while the *Dich van* element was under the military control of either the headquarters of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces (SVNLAF), code named "*Mien*" (i.e. "Region") in southern Vietnam, or the General Political Directorate of PAVN in Hanoi, the *Binh van* element was under the direct control of either the southern arm of the Politburo in the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in South Vietnam, code named "R," or the actual Politburo in Hanoi.²⁰

This is a critical point, and represents the most important divergence between DPMO's position and ours, because the *Binh van* element had the responsibility of coordinating with the Politburo in arranging prisoner exchanges or in obtaining approval for scheduled executions. In the case of American POWs held in southern Vietnam, a directive issued by COSVN head and Politburo member Pham Hung in 1969, and forwarded to units of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces (SVNLAF) stressed the importance of cooperation between the Military and Enemy Proselytizing Elements: "Close liaison with the Military Proselytizing Section was to be conducted to obtain an understanding of the psychological development within the enemy ranks so that an effective propaganda campaign could be carried out to intensify further the anti-war movement and decrease the enemy's combat effectiveness." The directive further stated that "American POWs constituted valuable capital assets and were an effective weapon in the field of the VC political and diplomatic struggle."²¹

The *Binh van* element maintained both foreign and domestic interest, since it was responsible for influencing the families of the captured men, in the hope that dissention would spread throughout the masses inside Vietnam, as well as the homelands of the invading force (i.e., France or America). Personnel from the Propaganda and Training Department assigned to Military Proselytizing duties held no government positions, but were simply referred to as Party Cadre (*Can bo Dang*). In most cases, such cadre were graduates of the Communist Party Ideological School designed to train party cadre for critical positions. This elite course was called the "*Nguyen Ai Quoc*" school (*Truong Nguyen Ai Quoc*), i.e., Nguyen the Patriot, a pseudonym used at one point by

Ho Chi Minh. Although the principal location for this school was in Hanoi, some cadre reassigned to *Binh van* duties during the war were trained at a southern branch of the school located inside Laos and adjacent to Kontum province, Vietnam.²² Due to the agitation-propaganda aspect, and the sensitive nature of operations designed to lure both Vietnamese and American personnel to desert and collaborate, the *Binh van* function was considered a propaganda matter, and, therefore fell within the purview of the Propaganda and Training Department of the Communist Party Central Committee, but coordinated closely with the Ministries of Public Security and National Defense.

By building on the World War II era "Armed Propaganda Teams" (*Doi Tuyen truyen Vo trang*), of which General Giap served as a Team Leader, the Vietnamese leadership was able to utilize trusted party cadre in re-orienting those teams toward both foreign and domestic opposing forces for long term guerrilla war. By operating solely on instructions issued by the Politburo, the Party cadre were able to instill the will of the party through assassination, extortion, coercion, intimidation, and political/diplomatic maneuvering. Foreign (e.g. Chinese, Japanese, French, American, Cambodian) prisoners and remains were considered as a key part of their near and long term negotiating strategies. At the same time, they stressed the lenient policy of the "Revolution" for those who willfully cooperated with their efforts to place the Communist Party in complete control of the nation.

Directives issued in 1970 by the Standing Committee of the southern arm of the Politburo, COSVN, as well as the headquarters for Military Region 5, in central Vietnam southwest of Danang, called for all units to increase efforts aimed at capturing American personnel. Such units were instructed to hide the bodies of Americans killed-in-action (KIA), and to collect all personal documents for forwarding to Hanoi. Such documents were needed by the *Binh van* element, in order to develop propaganda broadcasts oriented toward POW/MIA family members in the United States. One such release came in November 1967 when Hanoi announced the death of USMC Lance Corporal James O. Pyle. Actually Pyle was alive and well, but his field pack with letters containing the address of his parents in America was captured by PAVN forces during an attack. Thus Pyle's personal documents, lost in the area of Danang, found their way to Hanoi, far north of the battlefield.²³

According to one Source, arrangements were made by the *Binh van* element whereby any American families notified concerning the capture or death of a relative in Vietnam would be able to establish contact. All such arrangements were to be made through the Permanent Office of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam in Cuba. "The POW's family would be notified of his detention through this office which would receive at least the man's name, rank, and serial number from COSVN. COSVN was often

able to furnish family data from memorabilia carried by the prisoner. COSVN would forward all this information together with a current photograph of the prisoner to the Liberation Front's office in Cuba."²⁴

Upon being captured, each American POW was required to complete a standard questionnaire. The purpose of the questionnaire was to collect information which would be used to promote the overall goals of the *Binh van* element (i.e., persuading American military personnel in Vietnam to ask the U.S. Government to send them home; persuading the American military not to fight the Viet Cong and that the latter were fighting a just cause; persuading the U.S. Government not to support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam nor to condone the killing of innocent civilians in "liberated" areas.²⁵ The *Binh van* element were also interested in personal information from POW's concerning relatives, including their mailing address in the United States. Such information was obtained in an attempt to gain the "support of the individual POW, his family and friends, and the American public. "American POWs were categorized according to their perceived intelligence and propaganda value. POWs were categorized as "A" (i.e. special due to the important information they possessed), "B" (i.e. those who had the same intelligence value as "A," but who were uncooperative, "C" (i.e. those whose continued presence in the DRV, after thorough debriefing, offered little or no advantages to the DRV. These POWs were released whenever it best served the DRV's purpose). No attempt was made to contact relatives in the U.S. of certain categories for the following reasons: "Prisoners in categories "A" and "B" were not exploited for the purposes of collecting information through their contacts in the U.S. or by attempting these contacts to engage in anti-war activities. This was not done because it might have led to the surfacing of their identities. The identity of category "A" prisoners was carefully guarded because identifying them as POWs rather than as missing or killed-in-action would permit the U.S. to employ countermeasures to negate the value of the information they provided. Similarly, the identity of the category "B" prisoners was kept secret because they may not have survived the interrogations or other techniques used to make them cooperate."²⁶

Regarding the manipulation of public opinion in America, the *Binh van* element was responsible for both penetration of, and recruitment from the POW population. This element was charged with the mission of "promoting the antiwar movement and urging US and satellite troops to refuse to take part in operations and to demand prompt return home". The *Binh van* element also played a key role in advancing the strategy of the party far into the future. Charismatic *Binh van* cadre were also tasked with developing lasting friendships with some selected U.S. POW's believed to have the potential for influencing public opinion after being released to go home. Documents captured during the war included one Military

Proselyting cadre's guidebook, which in addition to essays by American antiwar critics, contained the following instructions: "Special treatment was to be granted to U.S. PW's having special social standing, such as those who were the sons or relatives of American celebrities or high ranking officials in the U.S. Government. Intense propaganda and motivation should be imposed on these PW's".²⁷ An interrogation report compiled in 1969 indicated that "Before 1968, North Vietnamese military and civilian personnel were hostile to U.S. military personnel and often killed those who were captured. In 1969, however, the North Vietnamese Government issued an order stipulating that captured U.S. military and civilian personnel be kept alive for anticipated exchange and compensation. Moreover, it was specified that special attention should be paid to captured Americans who had made specific achievements, or came from wealthy families."²⁸ It had been hoped that the Americans could possibly be exchanged for gold". Concerning postwar efforts to influence U.S. public opinion, after the collapse of the south in 1975, cadre assigned to the Binh van were transferred to duties placing them in positions insuring continued contact with American targets with potential for exploitation regarding political and economic concessions, such as removing the trade embargo and improved U.S./Vietnam relations. For example, MR-5 female Binh van cadre, Ms Nguyen Thi Ngoc Suong was reassigned as the Vice-chairman of the Vietnam Petroleum Organization dealing with representatives of American oil companies. MR-5 Binh van cadre Nguyen Chinh was transferred to become the Deputy Director of the Religious Affairs Department in Hanoi dealing with U.S. officials concerned with human rights. Cadre Ho Nghinh was assigned to the Committee for Economic Development. Former Binh van cadre and Deputy Minister of Defense, LTG Tran Quang, was assigned as head of the National Veterans Organization of Vietnam and targeted against U.S. veterans organizations.

As American strategists began to withdraw United States forces from the battlefields of Vietnam, the two elements of *Binh van* and *Dich van* became almost synonymous, thus the term which began to appear in captured communist documents in the late 1960's and early 1970's indicated a combining of the two; *Binh/dich van*.²⁹ Subsequent to the ending of the war in Vietnam, the *Binh van* element was reorganized as the propaganda element of the restructured "Enemy Proselytizing and Special Propaganda Department" (*Cuc Dich van va Tuyen Truyen Dac Biet*). During the war years, other specialized *Van* elements were created when the situation dictated, including intellectual proselytizing (*tri thuc van*).³⁰

An interrogation report from a former member of the *Dich van* element in southern Vietnam provided the following: "The Enemy Proselytizing Office of the South Vietnamese Liberation Army (SVNLAF) Political Staff has the primary responsibility for the

administration, indoctrination and interrogation of foreign military and civilian prisoners as well as for Army of Vietnam (ARVN) captured personnel. It had no jurisdiction over captured VC deserters, captured Vietnamese civilians, or U.S./Allied/ARVN deserters who voluntarily rally directly to VC organizations." This category included both McKinley Nolan and Robert Garwood. Concerning the relationship between the Binh van and Dich Van elements, the same document states that "the only other COSVN-level organization which was in contact with the PDV (Phong Dich van) detention facilities was the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section (Ban Binh van). The PDV (Phong dich van) sent information copies of all its indoctrination and interrogation reports to the Military Proselytizing Section via the SVNLAFF Political Staff.³¹ Another document underlining the coordination between the Binh van and Dich van elements issued by the Dich van Section, Political Department of the SVNLAFF is titled "Public Presentation of U.S. Prisoners of War": "To make a rational use of POW's during their detention [period], the Political Department of Mien [Zone] (i.e. southern Vietnam, aka B-2) had, for the first time and in coordination with the Military Proselytizing Section of the Region (i.e. Party Committee Region, Khu uy), organized meetings during which U.S. POW's were publicly presented to the masses with a view to propagandizing our military victories and motivating the masses' hatred of the Americans and readiness to fight any American move in the Western Zone [of South Vietnam's Delta]." ³²

Concerning Vietnamese knowledge of the 505 MIA cases remaining in Laos, several advisory units were deployed by Vietnam to that country during the war. One recently declassified study of the CIA describes Vietnamese involvement: "In support of increasing requirements for PAVN involvement in Laos, the Lao Dong Party established in 1959 a central control authority over all PAVN activities in Laos. Designated after the date of its establishment, Group (Doan)/Office 959 was under dual command of the Central Committee's Central Western Affairs Department (Ban Cong Tac Mien Tay Trung Uong) Military Staff and the Ministry of National Defense. Until 1968, Office 959 was responsible for control of all PAVN units in Laos. In 1968, control over PAVN combat units and advisory personnel to the LPLA was reorganized. Office 959 relinquished its control over PAVN units in north to the PAVN Northwest Military Region, and its control over PAVN units in central and south Laos to PAVN Military Region 4 group 68, which later became known as Group/Division 968. Office 959 and its subordinate advisory groups became solely responsible for advisory assistance to the LPLA, although it continued to coordinate its activities with the PAVN Northwest Region and with PAVN military Region Group 68. This organizational system for PAVN operations in Laos remained intact through at least 1975".³³ At differing times, PAVN advisory groups operating in Laos included Groups 6, 95, 100, 363, and 763. The Lao High Command Political Staff's Military Security Section (Suan Sua Ka Suc) (i.e. Binh van element) had

approximately 200 personnel, and engaged in recruitment and penetration operations against enemy forces. Coordination for inter-party liaison between Vietnam and Laos was the responsibility of International Liaison Group 101.

Approximately 85 per cent of the remaining MIA cases in Laos, involving U.S. personnel, have incident locations in areas that were under the wartime control of Vietnamese forces. The PAVN-advised Lao Binh van efforts were similar to those conducted unilaterally by the Vietnamese in Vietnam. An example of Lao record-keeping is evidenced by the acquisition of a document pertaining to CPT Walter H. Moon from Rudy, Arkansas. This document was obtained from refugee sources in Thailand, and was titled "Biography of a Prisoner". It was obtained from a collection of similar documents from the Lao Military High Command Headquarters in Vientiane during the early 1980's. Although CPT Moon was executed while being held prisoner in a fixed camp, his remains have not been returned. Lao Military Security personnel observed in the same office where the document was obtained have been identified as having been involved with U.S. POW's during the war, and having participated in meetings with U.S. officials and MIA family members arriving in Laos to discuss the POW/MIA issue. Moreover, the government of Vietnam has already returned the remains of two U.S. pilots with incident locations inside Laos, with one of the locations in the Plain of Jars.

Other Vietnamese offices:

The Intelligence and Security Services also played a key role in security matters involving American prisoners. In addition to monitoring foreign diplomatic communications in Hanoi, the Technical Reconnaissance Office, KG-3, of the Ministry of Public Security was responsible for the censorship of all letter mail and parcels sent to or from U.S. POWs. KG-3 also planted audio and video surveillance devices in both detention cells and interrogation rooms occupied by U.S. personnel, and monitored POW "tap" codes in use during the war. Some foreign journalists working on postwar film projects in Hanoi have been provided motion picture footage of U.S. POW's, which was obviously filmed without the knowledge of the subjects.

Concerning the processing of the remains of Americans who died in captivity, Office KG-5 of the MPS performed forensic science duties in examining the remains to determine the cause of death. KG-5 personnel were included in Vietnamese delegations that visited the JCRC and the Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI) in Hawaii. KG-5 personnel normally examined U.S. remains at the Forensics Laboratory located in the Da Phuc area northwest of Hanoi, or the Criminal Science Institute located at 66A Yet Kieu Street in Hanoi. To accommodate the processing of remains of Americans who died in the south, KG-5 established an additional

section in Office "B" of the MPS located in southern Vietnam designated KG-5B. In processing skeletal remains for repatriation to the United States, Office KG-5 coordinated with the Policy Office of Enemy Proselytizing Department (also referred to as the Graves Management Agency (Co quan Quan ly Mo Ma)) of the PAVN General Political Directorate, and military hospitals, such as Military Hospital 108 (Quan y Vien 108) in Hanoi. Concerning the recovery and examination of U.S. remains, artifacts, weapons, and aircraft parts throughout the provinces, Offices KG-5 and KG-5B coordinated closely with the Political Security Department, PH-16, in Hanoi, or Office X-16 in the south. The Political Security Department was comprised of several offices including a Political Security Section, Legal Section, Technical Reconnaissance Section, Foreign Personnel Contacts Section, Records Section, and Intelligence Collection Section.

Another document described the relationship between the Military Justice Department (MJD, now reorganized in the General Political Directorate as the "Military Police and Criminal Investigation Department") and the MPS: "Between 1964 and March 1973, the MJD worked jointly with the Ministry of Public Security (now known as the Ministry of Interior) in guarding U.S. prisoners of war (POW's) in the northern SRV. During this period, the MJD was tasked with providing physical protection for U.S. POW detention facilities, such as the Son Tay facility. It had no jurisdiction over the central Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi, which was guarded by, and under the administration of, the Ministry of Public Security. Although the MJD provided external guard forces for other U.S. POW detention facilities, the internal administration of these facilities was under the Ministry of Public Security, which maintained U.S. POW records and directed the interrogation of U.S. POW's." ³⁴

The Political Security Department also maintained offices in each province, with increased manning in areas with high rates of incidents involving U.S. personnel, such as Ha Dong, Hai Phong, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, and Quang Binh. According to the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, the combined efforts of the MPS and MND resulted in a very efficient system for recovering and storing U.S. remains and personal effects. A 1991 memo of the lab indicated that "CILHI had prepared a bar chart displaying the number of identified remains received during official repatriations from the SRV since March 1973, with contrasting bars showing the number of remains exhibiting some evidence of storage. The chart and supporting statistics were as of 31 January 1991. The total number of identified remains was 260; the total number showing evidence of storage was 158." ³⁵

After reviewing all available information concerning Vietnam's handling of the remains issue, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) produced a detailed report outlining the U.S. Government's

expectations for cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese in unilaterally turning over both remains and records. This study incorporated information obtained from defectors involved with processing or storage of remains, scientific analysis of remains, wartime interrogation reports, wartime captured document translation and analysis reports, and a detailed survey undertaken by the highly respected Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), indicating that 1485 remains could be recovered and repatriated by the Vietnamese, without the deployment of U.S. field teams in Indochina.³⁶ There was no emotion or motivation displayed in the straightforward presentation prepared by professional Pentagon analysts. According to a key point of the DIA briefing: "Finally, our forensics experts tell us that approximately 70 per cent of U.S. remains returned by your government show evidence of long-term storage. By this we mean they exhibited minimal bone mass loss, commingling with other remains of individuals lost in widely disparate areas, and coating with preservatives and/or disinfectants. Thus, while your government has returned many sets of remains that exhibit evidence of storage, the information available to us leads us to the conclusion that there are still American remains that are readily available or easily retrievable and that could be repatriated to the U.S. in a very short period of time." Concerning the ability of Vietnam to provide records, the briefing indicated that: "Based on information acquired through original documents, wartime and refugee interviews, and other sources, we have learned that PAVN developed a specialized cadre and a dedicated organization to handle foreign prisoners and casualties during the first Indochina War. That cadre and organization, which appear to have continued to operate into the early 1960's, was adapted to deal with U.S. Forces when they were introduced into Indochina."³⁷

Already embarrassed by reports of "warehousing and storage" provided by a Vietnamese mortician who escaped by boat from Vietnam in 1979, and who later testified before a concerned U.S. Congress, Vietnam's Propaganda Department moved to counter the DIA briefing by raising the issue of "grave robbers," and "remains traders." This was not altogether unexpected by skilled U.S. negotiators with long-time experience in dealing with Asian Communists, but at least some officials responsible for the issue sought to give the Vietnamese the benefit of the doubt, and attempted to gain sympathy for Vietnam's position from key White House officials. The President's Special Emissary for POW/MIA Affairs in Vietnam forwarded a memo stating "It appears to me that the difficulties of terrain, the effects of high-G impacts on the human body, the effects of climate on the remains, the errors in location of remote area graves and associated difficulties of finding them several years later, and the questionable efficiency of a reporting system under wartime attack might push the probabilities in the various steps well below that which the DIA has implicitly assumed. Further, I don't believe we have any real handle on the extent

civilian scavenging of crash sites and battlefields has disrupted the government's attempts to collect remains. Simply put, there are a lot of unknowns in Vietnam. Getting remains into "the warehouse" was not so easy as the hearer of the DIA briefing may infer.³⁸

Incoming President Clinton's so-called "point-man" on the POW/MIA issue, Veterans Administration Deputy Secretary Hershel Gober, himself a Vietnam veteran and native Arkansan, travelled to Vietnam to observe digging operations west of Danang during 1994. After returning to the U.S., Deputy Secretary Gober began calling for more movement in the normalization process. In September 1994, a delegation from the Arkansas Governor's Task Force on POW/MIA coordinated a "fact finding" trip to Vietnam with Deputy Secretary Gober. After a four day visit to Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Personnel (VNOSMP) in Vietnam, the delegation included the following in their trip report: "The United States needs to expedite the normalization process with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam at the earliest possible moment. The strategic benefits to be gained by an alliance with this country to offset the influence of Communist China should be paramount in the long range goals of the United States. The Defense Department is apparently hamstrung in its efforts to completely resolve the MIA issue because of the standards imposed upon them for resolution of the identity of remains. We therefore strongly recommend that the President ask the United States Congress to enact legislation to establish a final, definitive, category, with the approval of the next of kin of the missing Americans, to reach conclusions based on reasonable standards without having to depend upon identification techniques not yet technically feasible". In the report, the delegation acknowledged several organizations for making the trip possible including: the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, the Maybelline Company, Remington Arms, and Delta Airlines.³⁹

Mention by the Arkansas delegation of the situation wherein the members came away with the conclusion that the Defense Department was "hamstrung in its efforts to completely resolve the MIA issue," and the President should recommend that Congress enact legislation to establish a final conclusion without having to depend upon "identification techniques not yet technically feasible," indicates far more profound political insight than could normally be expected of a delegation of state-level officials from Arkansas. A review of events leading up to the departure of the delegation, however, may shed some light on this particular aspect. One month prior to departure of the delegation from Arkansas, the Military Command in Hawaii held a round-table discussion dedicated to approaching this same delicate issue. According to the results of the meeting: "The purpose of this message is to encourage submission of cases through established AFIRB procedures where insufficient biological remains exist to establish identity of the remains. USACILHI is

currently preparing cases for submission that will rely on acceptance of non-biological evidence to establish the identity of the remains." ⁴⁰

Thus it becomes increasingly obvious that regardless of the amount of hard intelligence and scientific evidence concerning Vietnam's duplicity made available to Washington and Hawaii, the White House has been repeatedly counseled to move forward in the normalization process, under the guise that Vietnam is not only cooperating for the present, but for unexplained reasons is expected to be even more forthcoming in the near term. In order to lay the ground work for explaining this phenomenon the Defense Department has released subtle indications to the effect that "we have previously been operating under false assumptions." This new, progressive attitude has been well received by major American corporations seeking to do business in Vietnam, as well as some aging American veterans of the Vietnam War, who still suffer from psychological problems due to their wartime service, and who now return on "Veterans Initiative Trips," to heal. However, for professional historians and researchers, who must be content to work with facts, rather than the emotional aspect, a 1987 DoD memo resulting from an extensive Rand Corporation analysis of the French experience in coping with the POW/MIA issue provides a dramatic illustration of Vietnam's coldly calculated intent: "Despite the substantial political and economic concession the French have made to Hanoi since 1954, France has never received a full accounting for its missing and dead. The Vietnamese communist government has consistently circumvented and violated the terms of the 1954 agreement concerning the accounting for France's missing servicemen. Hanoi's actions clearly demonstrate that its only interest in the French military graves in Vietnam and the requests for remains by the families of the deceased is in the economic and political benefits that the Vietnamese Government can derive from control of these remains. We should keep this in mind in dealing with Hanoi. We can anticipate that Hanoi's objective is to obtain increasingly large economic and political concessions in exchange for piecemeal releases of remains and information about our missing servicemen." ⁴¹

Conclusions:

Although the U.S. Government claims that Vietnam is doing everything it can to account for the 2,200 American personnel still unaccounted-for in Indochina, this contention is not supported by facts. On the contrary, all available evidence suggests that the Vietnam Communist Party could rapidly account for a significant number of MIA cases, especially the 95 men associated with the "Special Remains" cases, who either died due to disease or were executed in wartime prison camps, or whose remains have been depicted in photographs released by Vietnam. Evidence of a complex wartime record keeping system indicates that Vietnam could also

provide important information on many of the 305 last-known-alive discrepancy cases, as well as crash sites and grave sites.

The postwar reassignment of experienced proselytizing cadre into political, economic, human rights, and veterans affairs organizations involved with the United States indicates that the Vietnam Communist Party intends to continue its long established process of exploiting U.S. officials, business groups, and veterans organizations. The extent to which this has already occurred, to the detriment to MIA accounting, can only be determined by careful scrutiny of the official and unofficial contacts by representatives of organizations from both sides over the years. The amount of influence that Vietnam's proselytizing efforts have had on postwar policy-level decisions made in Washington can only be assessed by comparing concessions made to Vietnam by the White House with those made to the United States by the Politburo in Vietnam.

References:

1. The Defense Department's agency for handling the POW/MIA issue is called the Defense POW/MIA Office, known by the initials DPMO. Specialists of the DIA working on the issue since the war years have now been incorporated into this organization.
2. Known as the Combined Document Exploitation Center, or CDEC by its military acronym, an enormous cache of enemy documents were screened, translated and reproduced on microfilm. The collection currently resides at the National Archives in Washington, DC in Record Group 472,
3. Pike, Douglas. PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, Presidio Press, 1986, p. 153.
4. "Experience gained in capturing U.S. prisoners". Captured North Vietnamese documents of the Combined Documents Exploitation Center (CDEC) Document Log #02-2090-70, Roll 941, Records of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Record Group 472, National Archives, Washington.
5. "NLF Instructions on Treatment of American Prisoners". Indochina Archive, Unit POW/MIA file 12/63, Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, CA. The Archive currently resides at the Center for Vietnamese Studies at Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX.
6. "Guide for Interrogation of US Prisoners of War, Military Proselytizing Section, VC MR-5", CDEC Bulletin 48,829, Log # 4-1654-72, Roll 903, RG 472, NA, hereafter referred to as "Guide".
7. "Viet Cong Policy Toward and Exploitation of U.S. Prisoners of War". CIA Intelligence Information Report, dated 14 March 1967, LBJ Library, NSF Country File, Vietnam, Folder 81, Document 70, Austin, TX. This document is also located in the CIA's ORIS database, available by FOIA. Due to heavy and often uneven redaction policies, CIA cables are often missing cable numbers and other identifying media. Again, the authors have attempted to provide as much information to the reader. All CIA documents listed are in the Authors' possession. All CIA cables hereinafter referred to as CIA cable.
8. "VC Treatment of US Prisoners of War", Strategic Research & Analysis Division, Directorate of Intelligence Production, dated 15 October 1969, p. 2, quoting a captured document.
9. "The Responsibilities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Intelligence and Security Services in the Exploitation of American Prisoners of War", Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), dated 17 Nov 75, page 3-7, Roll 513, Folder 31, Vietnam-era POW/MIA

documentation collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Hereafter referred to as Responsibilities.

10. Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Directive # 165.
11. Responsibilities, page 6.
12. Radio Hanoi Broadcast July 6, 1988.
13. "Special Reports on RVNAF POWs Detained in Various Camps in Binh Dinh Province". This document can be found in the Indochina Archive, POW File for September 1972.
14. Responsibilities, page 17.
15. Responsibilities, page 18.
16. "Exchange of Intelligence Information by North Vietnam with the Soviet Bloc Countries and Communist China between 1958 and 1968", CIA cable dated 30 April 1973, L.O.C. Vietnam-are, Reel 513, Folder 27.
17. Task Force Russia Document TFR-136-11.
18. "Delineation of Responsibilities of the North Vietnamese Army Enemy Proselytizing Department, The "Cuc Nghien cuu", and the Ministry of Public Security in the Handling and Interrogation of US POWs in NVN", CIA cable dated 15 July 1970, L.O.C., Reel 320.
19. Discussions with SRV Military Police and Criminal Investigation LTC Pham Van Khoi. The information presented is the result of many conversations Bill Bell had with LTC Khoi concerning Vietnamese wartime organizational structure. LTC was a member of Office 22, Group 875, and was involved field grade U.S. POWs during the war.
20. JTF-FA Oral History Interview by Bill Bell with Senior Colonel Pham Van Ban, aka Ba (3) ban, Hanoi 7 Jan 93.
21. "South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLAF) Directive 1/H Exhorting Subregion 1 Troops to capture Many Prisoners of War, Particularly Americans, to Serve the Political and Diplomatic Struggles" CIA cable, dated 24 Jun 71.
22. JTF-FA Oral History Interview by Bill Bell with former Military Proselytizing Chief, Major General Vo van Thoi, Saigon, SRV, 18 Jan 93.
23. Stars and Stripes, 18 Dec 67, page 6.
24. CIA Information cable, Saigon, Vietnam, 12 Feb 68.

25. CIA Information cable IN 636181, TDCS-314/04542-72, 15 Jun 72.
26. Responsibilities, page 20.
27. Guide.
28. CIA, FIR, 1969 North Vietnamese Policy on Prisoners of War.
29. Thuan Thuy District, Binh Thuan Province Part Committee Directive 62/CT/TT, dated 19 May 1973, MR-5 Party Committee Directive 25/KHBV, dated 26 May.
30. CAS Report, Saigon, RVN
31. "South Vietnam Liberation Army Enemy Proselytizing Office Handling of Prisoners of War", CIA cable, 25 Mar 71.
32. Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, Document # 65, Aug 1969.
33. "Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense Enemy Proselyting Department", CIA Study, Dec 1979.
34. "The Military Justice Department of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Ministry of National Defense; Past and Present Responsibilities for the Detention of Prisoners; Past Guarding of U.S. Prisoners of War (DOI: 1964-june 1981), Cable, CIA dated 8 Sep 82, L.O.C., Reel 320.
35. Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii Memo, 8 April 1991
36. Survey Conducted by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, undated, Raymond Spock & Joe Bob Harvey, (Document in the author's possession).
37. Defense Intelligence Agency, Records and Remains Brief, undated, (Document in the author's possession).
38. Gen John Vessey memo for Secretary Baker, Secretary Cheney, and General Scowcroft, 12 Jan 92, (Document in the author's possession).
39. Report of the Arkansas POW/MIA Verification Task Force Delegation Visit to Hanoi, Vietnam September 9-16, 1994.
40. HQ, U.S. Pacific Command, Deputy for POW/MIA Affairs J/30M, dated 3 Aug 94.
41. Office of the Asst Secretary of Defense (ISA) Fact Sheet, dated October 1987.

References:

1. The Defense Department's agency for handling the POW/MIA issue is called the Defense POW/MIA Office, known by the initials DPMO. Specialists of the DIA working on the issue since the war years have now been incorporated into this organization.
2. Known as the Combined Document Exploitation Center, or CDEC by its military acronym, an enormous cache of enemy documents were screened, translated and reproduced on microfilm. The documents were summarized and published in daily "Bulletins", with each separate document having its own log number. The collection currently resides at the National Archives in Washington, DC in Record Group 472. Some CDEC documents found in archives outside NARA often are missing Bulletin numbers or were issued as Intelligence Information Reports, or IIR's. The authors have attempted to be as detailed as possible in providing the proper citations of the CDEC material.
3. Pike, Douglas. PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, Presidio Press, 1986, p. 153.
4. "Experience gained in capturing US prisoners". Captured North Vietnamese Documents of the Combined Exploitation Center (CDEC) Document Log # 02-2090-70, Roll 941, Records of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Record Group 472, National Archives, Washington, DC.
5. "NLF Instructions on Treatment of American Prisoners". Indochina Archive, Unit 8, POW/MIA file 12/63, Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, CA. The Archive currently resides at the Center for Vietnamese Studies at Texas A & M, Lubbock, Texas.
6. "Guide for Interrogation of US Prisoners of War, Military Proselytizing Section, VC MR 5", CDEC Bulletin 48,829, Log #4-1654-72, Roll 903, RG 472, NA
7. "Viet Cong Policy Toward and Exploitation of U.S. Prisoners of War". CIA Intelligence Information Report, dated 14 March 1967, LBJ Library, NSF Country File, Vietnam, Folder 81, Document 70, Austin, Texas. This document is also located in the CIA's ORIS database, available by FOIA. Due to heavy and often uneven redaction policies, CIA cables are often missing cable numbers and other identifying media. Again, the authors have attempted to provide as much information to the reader. All CIA documents listed are in the author's possession. All CIA cables hereinafter referred to as CIA cable.

8. "VC Treatment of US Prisoners of War", Strategic Research & Analysis Division, Directorate of Intelligence Production, dated 15 October 1969, p. 2, quoting a captured document.

9. "The Responsibilities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Intelligence and Security Services in the Exploitation of American Prisoners of War", Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), dated 17 Nov 75, page 3-7, Roll 513, Folder 31, Vietnam-era POW/MIA Documentation Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Hereafter referred to as Responsibilities.

11

11. Responsibilities, page 6.

13.

14. Responsibilities, page 17.

15. Responsibilities, page 18.

16. "Exchange of Intelligence Information by North Vietnam with Soviet Bloc Countries and Communist China between 1958 and 1968," CIA cable, dated 30 April 1973, L.O.C. Vietnam-era, Reel 513, Folder 27.

17. Task Force Russia Document TFR-136-11

18. "Delineation of Responsibilities of the North Vietnamese Army Enemy Proselytizing Department, the Cuc Nghien Cuc, and the Ministry of Public Security in the Handling and Interrogation of US POW's in NVN", CIA cable dated 15 July 1970, L.O.C., Reel 320.

19. Discussions with LTC Pham Van Khoi, Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Personnel (VNOSMP). The information presented is the result of many conversations Bill Bell had with LTC Khoi concerning Vietnamese war-time organizational structure. LTC Khoi probably belonged to Office 22, Group 875, a Military Justice Task Force. He was involved in handling and exploitation of U.S. POW's during the war.

20. JTF-FA Oral History Interview by Bill Bell with Senior Colonel Pham Van Ban, aka Ba (3) Ban, Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), 7 January 1993.

21. "South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLAF) Directive 1/H Exhorting Subregion 1 Troops to Capture Many Prisoners of War, Particularly Americans, to Serve the Political and Diplomatic Struggles", CIA cable, dated 24 Jun 1971.

22. JTF-FA Oral History Interview by Bill Bell with Major General Vo Van Thoi, Saigon, SRV, 18 Jan 93.
23. Stars and Stripes, 18 Dec 1967. p.6
24. CIA Intelligence Information Cable, Saigon, Vietnam, 12 Feb 68.
25. Intelligence Information cable IN 636181, TDCS-314/04542-72, 15 Jun 72. Bill, I think I lost this one somewhere.
26. Interrogation report of Source Pham Huu Them, aka Phan Chi Cuong, captured in Quang Tri on 19 June 1968.
- 27.
- 28.
29. Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, Document 18, February 1968
30. CAS Saigon report, FVS 33,092. Document in author's possession.
- 31.
32. Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 65, August 1969
- 33.
34. "The Military Justice Department of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Ministry of National Defense; Past and Present Responsibilities for the Detention of Prisoners; Past Guarding of U.S. Prisoners of War (DOI:1964-June 1981), CIA cable, dated 8 Sep 82, L.O.C., Reel 320.
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
- 38.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me bring down the gavel tonight, because Mr. Pickett and I have to go vote.

I close where I opened. In American history, not just military history, but in American history, this is the most tragic thing I have ever come across.

Yes, Mr. Bell.

Mr. BELL. Sir, I would like to have entered into the record, if I could—I did a case review for Mrs. Jane Gather, who was here in the wheelchair a few minutes ago. She asked me to review the case of her son. DOD had already reviewed her case and she wanted to get a comparison from an independent reviewer, which I have done.

She has discussed it with DPMO, and they say my review, or my treatment of her, is criminal. I would just like for the committee to look at my review and compare it against the DOD review.

Mr. DORNAN. I will read that review, also, if you will give one to Mr. Santoli.

[The review is not available.]

Mr. DORNAN. Family members, the questioning hasn't been as extensive as I would have liked. We will get written answers. Everybody was under oath. We will get the written answers back to you. If I have told you too much personal history, I apologize, but I think it accomplished something. I know I had your trust anyway.

But I want Mr. Pickett and others—and Mr. Gilman already knows this because we've been to Hanoi together—I do take this personally. I don't see anything wrong with that. [Applause.]

As it has become personal for Mr. Gilman, who wears a POW bracelet for over a quarter of a century. Thank you.

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

[The following information was submitted for the record:]

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO KENT WIEDEMANN

Question 1. Is it correct to say that you worked on POW/MIA issues at DOD, NSC and DOS during the past three years in the Clinton Administration?

Answer. I worked extensively on the POW/MIA issue during my time at the NSC (March 1993 to March 1994) and since coming to State in 1995. During the intervening period, when I worked in the Department of Defense, my involvement in the POW/MIA issue was only peripheral, since primary responsibility for POW/MIAs within DOD rests with the Defense POW/MIA office.

Question 2. Approximately how many trips have you taken to Vietnam during the Clinton Administration?

Answer. I have visited Vietnam five times while serving in the Clinton administration, including as a participant in the July 1993 and March 1996 Presidential Delegations on POW/MIAs.

Question 3. Were you part of the Clinton Administration trip to Vietnam in March 1996?

Answer. With Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs Hershel Gober and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Wold, I was a co-leader of the Presidential Delegation on POW/MIAs that visited Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in March 1996.

Question 4. Is it fair to say that you have done your best during these trips to press the government of Vietnam on behalf of the families for more cooperation on POW/MIAs?

Answer. Whether traveling as an individual or as a member of a Presidential Delegation, pushing for the fullest possible accounting for our POW/MIAs has always been my top priority in discussions with Vietnamese officials.

Question 5. Can you explain to the Committee what efforts you have made to seek additional wartime records for Vietnam's Ministry of National Defense on Ameri-

cans lost or captured in Laos by Vietnamese forces, which constitute the original documents that were used to compile the "559" Document turned over in 1993?

Question 6. Have you asked Vietnamese officials for access to these documents?

Answer. As I stated during the hearing, I was present on the July 1993 Presidential Delegation when the "559 Document" was handed to us by Vietnamese officials. Since receiving the document, which appears to be a compilation of information gathered from various sources, we have repeatedly asked the Vietnamese to locate and provide to us any source documents from which the information in the 559 document may have been drawn.

The Vietnamese have said the sources for many, if not all, of the entries in the 559 compendium were radio reports from units in the field. In response to our requests, they have told us in January 1995 and again in May 1996 that they cannot find any source documents for the 559 document. We have no evidence that source documents still exist today.

Apart from our request for source documents for the "559" document, we also continue to ask the Vietnamese to locate and provide to us any documents potentially relevant to U.S. personnel unaccounted for in Laos. The Vietnamese have said that military units operating in Laos kept few written records. The document search teams established by the Vietnamese Defense and Interior ministries in response to our request have located and turned over to us a number of documents with information regarding unaccounted-for Americans lost inside Vietnam. As the search process continues, we would expect, as the Vietnamese know well, that any documents located by the teams concerning American losses in Laos will also be provided to us.

Question 7. What about wartime Central Committee or Politburo records where the issue of American POWs was discussed? What information has the U.S. government received from the Russians on these documents?

Question 8. Have you personally asked the Vietnamese government for Central Committee or Politburo records from the war? If you have, what has been their response?

Answer. We have asked the Vietnamese for all records and documents with information potentially relevant to unaccounted-for Americans. I have made this request personally and as a member of Presidential Delegations. We have also mentioned our special interest in Central Committee or Politburo documents. While Vietnam has provided no Central Committee or Politburo documents to date, we have no evidence, from Russia or any other quarter, that the kind of case-specific information that would help us resolve POW/MIA cases was discussed at the Central Committee or Politburo level. It is the nature of bureaucratic hierarchies that specificity decreases as one ascends the chain of command. (Even the so-called 1205 document, which the Vietnamese deny is a genuine record of a Politburo meeting, lacks any case specific information and only contains alleged aggregate numbers.)

The kind of detail we need is much more likely to be found in unit records and in documents prepared at lower echelons. These are among the types of records that we have begun to receive from the Vietnamese document search teams. The Vietnamese have also located and made available a number of witnesses, some of them quite senior, enabling us to interview them directly regarding any relevant knowledge they might have.

As to how the Vietnamese respond to requests for Central Committee or Politburo documents, they reply by saying no information relevant to unaccounted for Americans is contained in these records.

Question 9. During the most recent trip to Vietnam by the Clinton Administration, there was a press release put out by your delegation which stated, "We have no reason to believe that any information is being withheld." Did you participate in the drafting of that delegation's press release? Do you think that is an accurate statement?

Answer. As co-leader of the March 1996 Presidential Delegation I, of course, participated in the drafting of the delegation's press release and I stand behind its contents without reservation. The quote you have cited in fact reads as follows: "While we have no evidence that the Vietnamese government is withholding any information, we urged its leaders to continue efforts to uncover any new information that would aid in the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIAs."

The statement is an accurate one. In its Zero-Based Comprehensive Review of Cases Involving Unaccounted for Americans in Southeast Asia of November 13, 1995, the Department of Defense said the following with respect to cases identified for further pursuit by the Vietnamese, Lao or Cambodian governments:

It must be emphasized that we cannot be certain that the Southeast Asian government involved can provide additional information due to the loss of records,

death of relevant persons, and other factors. We have no evidence that information is being deliberately withheld.

Question 10. How is it that your Department recommended to the White House on Memorial Day this year that the Vietnamese communists have provided full faith cooperation?

Question 11. Did the State Department specifically ask either the Defense Department or the CIA for their input or their judgment on whether there has been full faith cooperation on all four key areas cited in the President's certification message?

Answer. Based on the results being achieved in the four key areas in cooperation with Vietnam, the Department of State recommended the President certify Vietnam is cooperating in full faith in the four stated areas. Prior to making this recommendation the Department consulted, among others, both the CIA and the Department of Defense and determined that all U.S. government agencies involved agreed a Presidential certification was warranted. As he has in connection with every decision he has taken with respect to Vietnam, the President did not act in this matter without assuring himself that certification enjoyed the unanimous support of the involved U.S. government agencies.

The Department of State had no direct role in determining the timing of the certification announcement. I would add, however, that proximity to the Memorial Day holiday was highly appropriate in view of the President's strong affirmation of his personal commitment to families and friends of our POW/MIAs and to the goal of achieving the fullest possible accounting.



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400



In reply refer to:
1-96/19373

Honorable Robert K. Dornan
Chairman, Military Personnel Subcommittee
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Chairman Dornan:

This letter responds to your July 3, and 5, 1996, letters requesting additional information as a result of your June 19, 1996, hearing.

Answers to questions asked in your July 3 letter are as follows:

1. "Please identify each individual in the list of cases based on the Comprehensive Review that DPMO presented to the Vietnamese Government in February 1996 that has been resolved?"

One case has been resolved through the identification of remains determined to be those of Air Force Colonel Burriss N. Begley. In this instance, Vietnamese authorities returned the remains prior to February. Final identification was made in April 1996.

2. "Please list, case by case, what the Vietnamese government has done thus far to resolve each case?"

Enclosure 1 is a list detailing Vietnamese actions on the aforementioned cases for which leads sheets were passed in February 1996. In a few instances, case reference numbers have been deleted from this listing in accordance with Public Law 102-190.

3. "Please provide all records, cables, and documentation of discussions by DPMO and/or JTF-FA from February 1996 to present to resolve the above mentioned list of cases."

Enclosures 2 through 4 are documents responding to this request. The documents at enclosure 2 are United States Government originated "lead sheets" furnished to the Vietnamese in February 1996. Enclosures at tab 3 are translations of the Vietnamese reports of investigation of the referenced cases. The documents at tab 4 are copies of cable traffic.

4. "Please identify each individual on the original special remains list."

Enclosure 5 is a copy of the original "special remains" list naming 98 individuals associated with 84 cases.

5. "Please identify each individual on the original special remains list whose remains have been identified, along with the date and manner of recovery (i.e. joint or unilateral) and the date of identification."

Enclosure 6 is a listing of eight individuals who were among the original special remains cases and for whom there has since been an accounting.

6. "Please identify each individual on the original discrepancy case list whose remains have been identified."

Enclosure 7 is a listing identifying these men.

7. "Please identify each individual on the original discrepancy case list whose death has been determined by circumstantial evidence and no identifiable remains have been recovered."

Enclosure 8 is a list titled "Vietnam Priority Discrepancy Cases, Fate Confirmed." These individuals were on the original discrepancy case list and their deaths have been determined by circumstantial evidence and no identifiable remains have been recovered.

8. "What was the criteria for the special remains list?"

The "special remains cases" involve Americans whose remains were in the custody of Vietnamese authorities, but who have not been located, identified, or repatriated. These cases are subdivided into four categories: photo cases involving Americans depicted in Vietnamese combat photos; died-in-captivity list cases received from the Vietnamese in 1973; cases listed on Vietnamese grave registers for which there is no accounting; and cases where field investigations have found Vietnamese witnesses who indicated that Vietnamese officials had previously recovered remains from wartime burial sites for which it appears that remains have not yet been repatriated.

9. "Why haven't individuals with "fate determined" as death been added to the special remains list?"

In some instances, the cases where fate has been determined do not meet the criteria to be on the special remains list. In other cases, the determination of fate was made only after United States investigators found convincing evidence that not only had the individual died, but his remains had been subsequently destroyed or buried at a location where there was no hope of recovery.

10. "Do you have any reports, the analysis of which shows evidence indicating that the Vietnamese continue to withhold any records, artifacts or human remains which if provided, could assist our government in resolving additional cases?"

Other than the gentleman known as the "mortician," whose reporting has been substantiated by the Vietnamese with their admission that they had previously stored remains, we do not have any reports that provide evidence or proof that the Vietnamese continue to withhold such items.

The following answers are provided for the second set of questions contained in your July 3 letter.

1. "In addition to the mortician who testified before the U. S. Congress in 1979, do you have any other reports indicating that the Vietnamese Government collected and stored U. S. remains and artifacts?"

We have received approximately a dozen raw reports of this nature. All are publicly available in the Library of Congress.

3. "In incidents where recovered remains show scientific evidence indicating that the individual was held in confinement prior to death, was this information passed to investigators responsible for determining the fate of other individuals who have loss incidents in, evacuation routes through, or live sighting reports in the same general area?"

We are unaware of any cases where forensic examination of remains recovered has produced scientific evidence that indicates the individual was held captive prior to death.

4. "Have investigators in the field conducting investigations in geographic areas been routinely provided the forensic analysis of recovered remains from the same areas prior to beginning their work?"

Beyond the simple identification or listing of the remains recovered from the area under investigation, no.

5. "Do you have any reports, the analysis of which provides evidence indicating the Lao Government stored records, artifacts or remains in the Phon Kheng Ministry of National Defense compound in Vientiane?"

There is no evidence that such items are stored at the Ministry of National Defense compound, however, directly outside the compound is a military museum. The museum contains some artifacts relating to Americans. In 1980, a CBS film crew photographed inside the facility. JTF-FA archival teams have surveyed the museum twice in the past two years.

My office is currently coordinating with outside agencies to answer questions 11 through 14 contained in the first set of questions and question 2 contained in the second set of questions. My office will forward the answers to these questions when we receive them.

Enclosures 9 through 12 include the requested responses to questions posed to Mr. Warren Gray, Mrs. Melinda Cooke, Mr. Gary Sydow, and Dr. Tim Castle in your July 5, 1996, letter. Enclosure 13 provides information in response to questions #5 and #10 which were posed to me.


Per the request of Representative Pickett, a chart to update the data provided by the Congressional Research Service is provided at enclosure 14.

Enclosure 15 is the information Representative Pickett requested concerning Vietnamese provincial records furnished to the United States.

At Enclosure 16 are answers to questions posed to Mr. Gray, Mrs. Cooke, and Mr. Sydow in your December 11, 1995, letter.

My staff continues to work on the remaining questions. When we have answered them we will forward them to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'James W. Wold', written over a horizontal line.

James W. Wold
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(POW/MIA Affairs)

Enclosures:

As stated

TAB 1

Vietnamese Responses to 27 Unilateral Case Requests

0077: Searched for documents at District Security Office, District Military Headquarters, and District People's Committee Office with negative results.

0105: Interviewed three witnesses, two identified and requiring follow-up from a previous JFA. The Vietnamese conclude that none are firsthand witnesses, and the investigation should end because both sides have exerted their best efforts and there is no new information.

0266: Response turned up significant new information, which reveals existence of a graves roster for Thanh Hoa Province, and possibly other documents, that have never been shared with us and apparently were relatively easy for the Vietnamese investigators to get their hands on. Reveals collection and forwarding to VNOSMP of identification card and Geneva Convention card that we've never seen. Also states that remains were forwarded to the Vietnamese MIA office. The report states remains may have become mixed up in storage and suggests CILHI check two still unidentified boxes that the Vietnamese apparently believed were good candidates. However, neither box appears to be a possibility. One has been recommended for identification as Case 0500 based at least in part on DNA. The contents of the other box were consolidated with remains turned over during the same repatriation, so that there is nothing of the box's original contents.

: Vietnamese determined that remains were in the hands of the Dong Nai Provincial Police and requested that they be transported to the VNOSMP or to Ho Chi Minh City where a forensic review is planned.

: Vietnamese interviewed two witnesses who participated in the burial, one of whom provided similar information in Iteration 26. Both affirmed that the total amount of remains exhumed was turned over to upper echelons.

0326: Vietnamese learned from village authorities and confirmed with district and province officials that no one had turned in any remains of Americans to village authorities since 1983. Village authorities were, however, paying close attention to the possibility that someone had discovered the burial site, but thus far, no one has been able to provide any additional information.

0350: Response turned up significant new information, which reveals existence of a graves roster for Thanh Hoa Province, and possibly other documents, that have never been shared with us and apparently were relatively easy for the Vietnamese investigators to get their hands on. The report cites testimony by witnesses interviewed in Iteration 34, but the information provided contradicts their earlier statements as to the number and condition of remains that were initially buried. This report says that five sets of remains were repatriated in April 1986, and the other three were destroyed in the crash, only bits

and pieces having been buried. When they attempted to exhume these remains, they found there was nothing left. According to the report, the witnesses and exhumation team affirmed that they only collected five sets of remains, not eight, and the five were turned over to the U.S. in 1986. The Vietnamese reported that there were no province or military region documents that said that eight sets of remains were exhumed. The report asserted that witnesses cannot identify a burial site for joint excavation since the area is now in an immense rice field.

0435: Vietnamese located one witness, couldn't find another, and interviewed Bo Trach District officials and citizens, but the report provided no information concerning remains from this case or a report that a cadre from province came to inspect and remark the grave in 1975. They asserted that reports alleging Bo Trach District cadre recovered remains in Tuyen Hoa District are untrue because cadre from one district would not have worked in a different district.

: Vietnamese interviewed four witnesses who provided information on the location of a crashsite to the south of the area previously investigated, which related to an aviator who ejected and died. According to the witnesses, the second pilot died in the aircraft explosion. Many pieces of flesh were found at the crash site, but no one buried them.

0586: Vietnamese interviewed people directly involved in the burial or removal of remains. Two graves were exhumed, but the second set of remains had very few bones because animals had dug them up. They reburied what they found 700 meters from the original grave, and a province and district team collected them in 1976 or 1977. No one remembers the identity of the province and district team members. The original site is still known, but no one can confirm if there are still any remains there.

: Vietnamese interviewed witnesses having firsthand knowledge of the burial and exhumation. Those who exhumed the graves placed the remains in one bag and did not attempt to separate them. Vietnamese recommended CILHI action to re-examine remains associated with Hartney, turned over on 30 September, 1977 because they were collected in Bac Thai Province.

0641: Vietnamese searched archives but located no records. They interviewed former soldiers in Bo Trach District and learned that no Bo Trach cadre would have carried out excavations in Minh Hoa District. The Vietnamese team was unsuccessful in tracking down a named source who turned over remains on another case during a prior investigation. The team also said it could not locate former medical personnel of Military Post 12-14 hospitals because after the war they disbanded, and personnel scattered to unknown locations.

: After an unsuccessful search for documents and new witnesses at the local level, the Vietnamese concluded that the pilot was carelessly buried and, because of the changes in terrain and flooding of the area, the site cannot be located.

0727: The Vietnamese investigation report sheds a little light on the remains alleged to have been obtained from "Ho Chi Minh City remains traders," but the report leaves unanswered the question of why we cannot excavate this crashsite.

0732: This report provides clarification regarding the sequence of events surrounding the loss incident. It provides answers to the questions we had about a "second set" of remains recovered in the same area; we now know which remains these were.

0826: Vietnamese searched archives but located no records. They interviewed former soldiers in Bo Trach District and learned that no Bo Trach cadre would have carried out excavations in Minh Hoa District. The Vietnamese team was unsuccessful in tracking down a named source who turned over remains on another case during a prior investigation. The team also said it could not locate former medical personnel of Military Post 12-14 hospitals because after the war they disbanded, and personnel scattered to unknown locations.

1065: The Vietnamese did not find what we were looking for but came up with a legitimate explanation of why it may not exist. Still have nothing more than a rumor that Hunt died from a bombing run while being transported.

: The Vietnamese recommended that Mr. Ngoi, the photographer who photographed the bodies, be taken to the site to identify the burial location. The report notes, however, that Mr. Ngoi has infirmities that may prevent him from going to this very remote site.

1504: The Vietnamese identified the individual who may have documentation concerning the remains of "Martin Scanlow" but could not locate him.

1538: The Vietnamese responded that the remains turned over in 1987 and alleged to be Long, were determined by a joint forensic review to be Mongoloid. According to the report, the Vietnamese then cremated the remains and all of the artifacts that accompanied them.

1843: The Vietnamese located and interviewed a new witness. While their report of this interview is not completely clear, it leaves open the possibility that this individual may have knowledge of a gravesite other than the one previously excavated.

1870: The Vietnamese interviewed a new witness and one who had already been interviewed. It is difficult to determine where the site they located is in relation to the site we excavated in 1994. In response to our request that they find veterans of Missile Regiment 261, they responded that they learned that no members of this unit went to the site.

1924: The Vietnamese team interviewed three witnesses who described finding various pieces of fragmented flesh. Although all described the content of what they found differently, they seemed to be saying that everything was collected into one gunny sack

and buried. The team interviewed Nguyen Ba Sung, who seized the remains from Nguyen Tien Si after he had exhumed them. Sung said he turned over everything to province and could no longer remember exactly what he had seized.

: Vietnamese reinterviewed three witnesses who provided same information as before. They learned that Dinh Van Thoi and Le Khac Son also participated in the exhumation in approximately 1974 or 1975. At that time the body was found immediately because it was in a coffin and still in a flight suit. It was necessary to remove the flesh from the bones because the body had been buried for only two years. Remains were relatively complete. There was only one grave exhumed at Tan Ninh and that was at the Nua Mountain chrome mine area. Two men took the remains to province and they were then given to MR4. Vietnam recommended U.S. check to see if remains became mixed, and the still unidentified remains returned during the same turnover as coming from Nhu Xuan (Box 12) could actually be those of Case *D4TJ*.

1952: This report strongly suggests that the aircraft went down offshore but does not provide any substantive evidence. The report makes reference to an entry in "records that the (Hai Phong) museum solely manages" and a mention of the 18 December 72 shootdown of an F-111 aircraft.

1965: The Vietnamese came up with new witnesses who gave us a new location that we now need to follow-up and excavate.

1978: This report describes an investigation in the local area. It suggests that the VNOSMP saw the anomalies in information collected to date, but the report does nothing to resolve these problems.

TAB 2

REFNO 0023 (CODY)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

ON 24 NOVEMBER 1963, CAPTAIN CODY AND TWO CREWMEMBERS WERE ABOARD A B-26B AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE AND CRASHED. THE CREW OF ANOTHER AIRCRAFT OBSERVED THE CRASH AND AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH WAS ABLE TO RECOVER THE REMAINS OF THE OTHER TWO CREWMEN. ON 11 DECEMBER 1963, A HANOI RADIO BROADCAST STATED THAT THE PEOPLE IN A LIBERATED AREA HAD GIVEN CAPTAIN CODY A HUMANE BURIAL. HIS CORRECT MILITARY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WAS READ AT THAT TIME.

DURING FOUR JOINT TASK FORCE INVESTIGATIONS, MANY WITNESSES HAVE STATED THAT THE REMAINS WERE DUG UP BY A LOCAL GUERRILLA UNIT AND REBURIED AT ANOTHER LOCATION.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM SEARCH VILLAGE AND PROVINCIAL RECORDS IN THE VICINITY OF THE LOSS LOCATION FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DISINTERMENT AND REBURIAL OF THE REMAINS IN 1974 BY A LOCAL GUERRILA FORCE. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHERE THE REMAINS WERE REBURIED AND BY WHOM.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS

BACKGROUND:

NAME WAS SERVING AS AN ADVISOR WHEN HE WAS CAPTURED AT A SOUTH VIETNAMESE TRAINING CAMP. HE WAS HELD IN SEVERAL POW CAMPS WITH OTHER AMERICANS IN THE SOUTH. IN 1967, NORTH VIETNAMESE RADIO ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD BEEN EXECUTED. TWO AMERICANS, WHO WERE RELEASED EARLY BY THE VIETNAMESE GUERRILLA FORCES, SAID THEY HAD BEEN HELD WITH NAME, BUT THE LAST TIME THEY SAW HIM WAS IN SEPTEMBER 1965. THEY BELIEVED HE HAD BEEN EXECUTED. NAME'S NAME APPEARED ON THE 1973 PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST, WHICH INDICATED HE DIED IN 1965.

THIS CASE HAS BEEN INVESTIGATED SEVERAL TIMES, AND JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE TEAMS HAVE LOCATED AND INTERVIEWED FORMER STAFF MEMBERS AND GUARDS AT THE POW CAMP. THE WITNESSES ALL RECALLED THAT AN AMERICAN DATA WAS EXECUTED IN 1965, BUT THEY COULD NOT REMEMBER WHERE THE CAMP WAS LOCATED OR WHERE HE WAS BURIED.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST REVIEW OF OFFICIAL RECORDS FOR INFORMATION ON THIS CASE. DURING TALKS AT THE END OF THE WAR, OFFICIALS FROM THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN THE SOUTH UNOFFICIALLY INDICATED THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE GRAVES OF PRISONERS WHO DIED IN CAPTIVITY WERE KNOWN AND POSSIBLY AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION BY U.S. TEAM MEMBERS.

REFNO 0047 (TADIOS)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW; SEARCH FOR WITNESSES; SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS; AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

SGT TADIOS WAS CAPTURED IN DECEMBER 1964. ACCORDING TO AMERICAN RETURNEES HELD WITH HIM, BY MARCH 1966 HE HAD BECOME SERIOUSLY ILL, SUFFERING FROM MALNUTRITION AND MALARIA. POW CAMP GUARDS REMOVED HIM FROM THE CAMP AND INDICATED THAT HE WAS BEING TAKEN TO A HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT. THE AMERICAN POWS WERE LATER TOLD THAT HE DIED ON 20 MARCH 1966. SGT TADIOS' NAME APPEARED ON THE 1973 PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY (DIC) LIST AS WELL AS A SECOND DIC LIST TURNED OVER TO U.S. OFFICIALS IN 1994. TWO JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATIONS OF THIS CASE HAVE FAILED TO FIND ANY EVIDENCE OF SGT TADIOS' BURIAL SITE OR REMAINS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

SGT TADIOS WAS LISTED ON THE DIC LIST. DURING THE FOUR PARTY JOINT MILITARY TEAM (FPJMT) DISCUSSIONS FROM APRIL 1973 TO AUGUST 1974, THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT UNOFFICIALLY INDICATED THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE GRAVES OF AMERICANS WHO HAD DIED IN CAPTIVITY WERE KNOWN AND POSSIBLY AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION. REQUEST VIETNAM SEARCH DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING THE PRG NEGOTIATING STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION THAT WOULD AID IN LOCATING THE GRAVE SITE OF SGT TADIOS.

REQUEST VIETNAM LOCATE FOR INTERVIEW THE FOLLOWING FPJMT DELEGATION MEMBERS SO WE CAN INTERVIEW THEM REGARDING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIC CASES REFERRED TO DURING THE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS: GEN TRAN VAN TRA; MG HOANG ANH TUAN, CHIEF PRG DELEGATE; COL VO DONG GIANG, SENIOR SPOKESMAN; MAJ PHUONG NAM; AND LTC SON. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT ABOUT GRAVE LOCATIONS AND PLANS OR EFFORTS, OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL, TO RECOVER REMAINS.

ADDITIONALLY, REQUEST VIETNAM IDENTIFY FOR INTERVIEW NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) REPRESENTATIVES IN PHNOM PENH. IN AT LEAST TWO INSTANCES, FAMILY MEMBERS OF DECEASED PRISONERS WERE TOLD TO CONTACT THE NLF REPRESENTATIVES IN PHNOM PENH TO MAKE FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF THEIR LOVED ONES' REMAINS AND/OR THEIR PERSONAL EFFECTS.

REFNO 0048 (PARKS)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW; SEARCH FOR WITNESSES; SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS; AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

SSGT PARKS WAS CAPTURED BY ENEMY TROOPS ON 22 DECEMBER 1964. U.S. RETURNEES HELD WITH HIM STATED THAT BY THE END OF 1966, SSGT PARKS HAD GROWN VERY DESPONDENT AND WEAK. HE WAS FOUND DEAD ON 1 JANUARY 1967. POW CAMP CADRE REMOVED HIS BODY BY BOAT, AND IT WAS ASSUMED THAT HIS REMAINS WERE BURIED NEARBY. SSGT PARKS' NAME APPEARED ON THE 1973 PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY (DIC) LIST AS WELL AS A SECOND DIC LIST TURNED OVER TO U.S. OFFICIALS IN 1994. THREE JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATIONS OF THIS CASE HAVE FAILED TO FIND ANY EVIDENCE OF SSGT PARKS' BURIAL SITE OR REMAINS. ONE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE WAS EXCAVATED, BUT NO REMAINS WERE FOUND.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

SSGT PARKS WAS LISTED ON THE DIC LIST. DURING THE FOUR PARTY JOINT MILITARY TEAM (FPJMT) DISCUSSIONS IN APRIL 1973 TO AUGUST 1974, THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT UNOFFICIALLY INDICATED THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE DIC GRAVES WERE KNOWN AND POSSIBLY AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION. REQUEST VIETNAM SEARCH DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING THE PRG NEGOTIATING STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION THAT WOULD AID IN LOCATING THE GRAVE SITE OF SSGT PARKS.

REQUEST VIETNAM LOCATE FOR INTERVIEW THE FOLLOWING FPJMT DELEGATION MEMBERS SO WE CAN INTERVIEW THEM REGARDING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIC CASES REFERRED TO DURING THE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS: GEN TRAN VAN TRA; MG HOANG ANH TUAN, CHIEF PRG DELEGATE; COL VO DONG GIANG, SENIOR SPOKESMAN; MAJ PHUONG NAM; AND LTC SON. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT ABOUT GRAVE LOCATIONS AND PLANS OR EFFORTS, OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL, TO RECOVER REMAINS.

ADDITIONALLY, REQUEST VIETNAM IDENTIFY FOR FUTURE JOINT INTERVIEW NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) REPRESENTATIVES IN PHNOM PENH. IN AT LEAST TWO INSTANCES, FAMILY MEMBERS OF DECEASED PRISONERS WERE TOLD TO CONTACT THE NLF REPRESENTATIVES IN PHNOM PENH TO MAKE FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF THEIR LOVED ONES' REMAINS AND/OR THEIR PERSONAL EFFECTS.

REFNO 0049 (BENNETT)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW AND INTERVIEW
OF A REQUESTED SOURCE

BACKGROUND:

SERGEANT BENNETT AND ANOTHER AMERICAN WERE SERVING AS ADVISORS TO A SOUTH VIETNAMESE UNIT WHEN THEY WERE CAPTURED IN DECEMBER 1964. THEY WERE MOVED MANY TIMES TO VARIOUS CAMPS IN THE SOUTH, AND SERGEANT BENNETT TRIED TO ESCAPE AT LEAST ONCE. THE AMERICAN WHO WAS CAPTURED WITH BENNETT WAS RELEASED IN 1967. DURING HIS DEBRIEFING, HE SAID THE LAST TIME HE SAW SERGEANT BENNETT WAS IN MAY 1965 WHEN THE CAMP WAS BEING MOVED, AND SERGEANT BENNETT FELL BEHIND THE REST OF THE GROUP BECAUSE HE WAS EXTREMELY WEAK. THE GUARDS LATER TOLD THE OTHER AMERICANS THEY HAD TO KILL BENNETT BECAUSE HE COULD NOT KEEP UP. ACCORDING TO MEDIA REPORTS AT THE TIME, BOTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, SERGEANT BENNETT WAS EXECUTED IN RETALIATION FOR THE DEATH OF A VIETNAMESE GUERRILLA IN SAIGON.

IN JANUARY 1973, SERGEANT BENNETT'S NAME WAS INCLUDED ON THE DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST PROVIDED BY THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. THE LIST INDICATES HE DIED IN JUNE 1965.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE LOCATE AND INTERVIEW SEVERAL WITNESSES IDENTIFIED DURING JOINT INVESTIGATIONS WHO HAVE INFORMATION ON SERGEANT BENNETT'S BURIAL. THE GROUP INCLUDES: MR. NGUYEN VAN MUOI WHO LIVES IN BIEN HOA TOWN, DONG NAI PROVINCE; MR. MUOI DUONG; AND MR. HO HUE. AN INDIVIDUAL NAMED "TU MAO" WAS ALSO IDENTIFIED AS A POSSIBLE WITNESS: "TU MAO" HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A NOM DE GUERRE FOR TWO MEN - PHAM KIM TRUONG, WHO HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED, AND TRUONG VAN MAO, WHO HAS NOT BEEN INTERVIEWED. TRUNG VAN MAO, WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE LIVING IN HCMC, WAS IDENTIFIED BY HOANG NGOC CHINH IN A SEPTEMBER 1993 INTERVIEW.

REFNO 0050 (COOK)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

CAPTAIN COOK WAS SERVING AS AN ADVISOR TO A VIETNAMESE MARINE BATTALION WHEN HE WAS WOUNDED AND CAPTURED ON 31 DECEMBER 1964. CAPTAIN COOK WAS HELD IN VARIOUS POW CAMPS ALONG THE VIETNAM/CAMBODIA BORDER FROM 1964 UNTIL 1967. RETURNEES SAID HE BECAME VERY ILL WHILE MOVING BETWEEN CAMPS AND HAD TO STAY BEHIND AT A COMMO-LIAISON STATION WITH A GUARD AND A DOCTOR. THE REST OF THE GROUP MOVED TO ANOTHER CAMP, AND THEY WERE TOLD LATER THAT CAPTAIN COOK HAD DIED OF MALARIA.

IN 1973 CAPTAIN COOK'S NAME APPEARED ON A DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY (DIC) LIST PRESENTED BY THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DAY U.S. POWS WERE RELEASED IN 1973, A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL, FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO POW CAMPS IN THE SOUTH, TOLD ONE OF CAPTAIN COOK'S FELLOW POWS THAT HE HAD DIED IN 1967.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE REVIEW OFFICIAL RECORDS FOR THE REPORT PREPARED AFTER CAPTAIN COOK'S DEATH AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION ON THIS CASE. DURING TALKS AT THE END OF THE WAR, OFFICIALS FROM THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN THE SOUTH UNOFFICIALLY INDICATED THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE GRAVES OF AMERICANS WHO HAD DIED IN CAPTIVITY WERE KNOWN AND POSSIBLY AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION BY U.S. TEAM MEMBERS.

REFNO 0052 (HERTZ)

TYPE OF ACTION: INTERVIEW OF A REQUESTED SOURCE AND SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

MR. HERTZ WAS A CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WHEN HE WAS CAPTURED BY VIETNAMESE GUERRILLA FORCES. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HE WAS PICKED UP WHILE RIDING HIS BICYCLE NEAR SAIGON ON 2 FEBRUARY 1965. ON 7 APRIL 1965, A COMMUNIST RADIO BROADCAST ANNOUNCED THAT MR. HERTZ WOULD BE EXECUTED IF A COMMUNIST AGENT WAS EXECUTED IN SAIGON. THE BROADCAST WAS CONSIDERED THE FIRST CONFIRMATION THAT MR. HERTZ HAD BEEN CAPTURED. FROM THE TIME HE WAS CAPTURED UNTIL LATE 1967, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND MR. HERTZ' FAMILY RECEIVED CONFLICTING INFORMATION ON HIS STATUS FROM THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS ACTING AS AN INTERMEDIARY.

IN NOVEMBER 1967, THE NLF GAVE PRINCE SIHANOUK COPIES OF MR. HERTZ' MEDICAL RECORDS MAINTAINED AT THE POW CAMP. ACCORDING TO THESE RECORDS, MR. HERTZ DIED ON 24 SEPTEMBER 1967 OF MALARIA. MR. HERTZ' DEATH WAS REPORTED IN U.S. NEWSPAPERS ON 8 NOVEMBER 1967. IN FEBRUARY 1968, THE NLF GAVE MR. HERTZ' WATCH AND A LETTER TO THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT WITH INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE ITEMS SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO MRS. HERTZ. THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE POSSIBLE RETURN OF MR. HERTZ' REMAINS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AS INTERMEDIARY. MR. HERTZ'S NAME WAS INCLUDED ON THE DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST PROVIDED IN 1973.

WITNESSES WHO WORKED IN THE POW CAMP SYSTEM IN THE SOUTH HAVE PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT MR. HERTZ' CAPTIVITY DURING JOINT INVESTIGATIONS. TWO WITNESSES SAID THEY WERE TOLD IN 1973 TO RECOVER THE REMAINS OF MR. HERTZ AND OTHER FOREIGNERS SO THEY COULD BE REPATRIATED AFTER THE PEACE TREATY WAS SIGNED. THEY SAID THEY COULD NOT FIND THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE GRAVE, BUT THEY TOOK THE JOINT TEAM TO THE GENERAL AREA; THIS AREA WAS LATER EXCAVATED, BUT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANYONE HAD BEEN BURIED THERE.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE INTERVIEW THE FORMER COMMANDER OF THE CAMP WHERE MR. HERTZ WAS HELD.

REQUEST ALSO A REVIEW OF OFFICIAL RECORDS TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION AND STATUS OF MR. HERTZ' GRAVE AND REMAINS. IF COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE SOUTH WERE PREPARED TO RETURN MR. HERTZ' REMAINS SEVERAL YEARS AFTER HIS DEATH, IT IS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT RECORDS HAD BEEN MAINTAINED ON HIS CASE OR THAT IT MIGHT STILL BE POSSIBLE TO FIND HIS REMAINS. MOREOVER, DURING TALKS AT THE END OF THE WAR, OFFICIALS FROM THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN THE SOUTH UNOFFICIALLY INDICATED THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE DIC GRAVES WERE KNOWN AND POSSIBLY AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION BY U.S. TEAM MEMBERS.

REFNO 0077 (SHEA)

TYPE OF LEAD: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

DURING THE 13TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY, FOUR WARTIME RESIDENTS OF SON THUY VILLAGE, LE THUY DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE, PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION REGARDING THE CRASH OF AN AD-6 (A-1) ATTACK AIRCRAFT AT 0300 HOURS ONE MORNING NEAR LEN BAC MOUNTAIN IN SON THUY VILLAGE. THIS INFORMATION CORRELATES WELL WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH REFNO 0077. THEY REPORTED THAT MILITIA FORCES BURIED THE PILOT'S BADLY BURNED BODY. IN MAY 1994 AND AGAIN IN MAY 1995, JOINT INVESTIGATIONS OF THIS CASE PRODUCED SIMILAR EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS. A SUBSEQUENT EXCAVATION OF THE REPORTED GRAVE SITE REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF A BURIAL. MR. PHAM VAN THIET (PHAN VAWN THIEETS), THE DEPUTY PUBLIC SECURITY CHIEF OF SONG THUY VILLAGE, CLAIMS HE WITNESSED LIEUTENANT SHEA'S BURIAL AND THEN SUBMITTED A WRITTEN REPORT OF THE INCIDENT TO THE DISTRICT PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE.

THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL MUSEUM CONTAINED AN EXHIBIT THAT INCLUDED LIEUTENANT SHEA'S LEATHER NAME TAG WHICH HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM HIS FLIGHT SUIT. THE REPORT ON THE ACQUISITION RECEIPT CORRECTLY LISTED LIEUTENANT SHEA'S INCIDENT DATA, INCLUDING LOSS LOCATION. FURTHER, NHAN DAN NEWSPAPER, ISSUE 4036, DATED 21 APRIL 1965, DESCRIBES THIS INCIDENT AND CONTAINS THE COMMENT, "THE PILOT WAS SHOT IN THE HEAD."

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE SEARCH WARTIME RECORDS IN ARCHIVES AT LE THUY DISTRICT AND QUANG BINH PROVINCE FOR MR. THIET'S WRITTEN REPORT REGARDING LIEUTENANT SHEA'S DEATH AND BURIAL. WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE EVENTUAL DISPOSITION OF HIS REMAINS.

REFNO 0079 (SHELTON)

TYPE OF ACTION: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS AND SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

ON 29 APRIL 1965, CAPTAIN CHARLES E. SHELTON WAS FLYING A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER HOUAPHAN PROVINCE, LAOS, WHEN HIS AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY ENEMY GROUND FIRE. HE SUCCESSFULLY EJECTED, MADE VOICE CONTACT WITH OTHER AIRCRAFT ON THE SCENE AND WAS OBSERVED WHILE ON THE GROUND. U.S. FORCES WERE UNABLE TO PICK HIM UP DUE TO ADVERSE WEATHER. SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION INDICATED THAT CAPTAIN SHELTON WAS CAPTURED AND HELD WITH ANOTHER AMERICAN IN CAVES IN THE VICINITY OF VIENGSAI, HOUAPHAN PROVINCE, LAOS.

DURING JFA 95-6L, TWO WITNESSES TO THE BURIAL OF AN AMERICAN POW, POSSIBLY CAPT SHELTON, POINTED OUT A GRAVESITE WHICH WAS EXCAVATED BY A JOINT TEAM. NO REMAINS OR ARTIFACTS WERE FOUND. RELIABLE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT A 1977 UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION BY THE LAO GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE LOCATED THE GRAVESITES OF TWO AMERICANS BURIED IN VIENGSAI. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE GRAVESITE EXCAVATED DURING JFA 95-6L WAS PREVIOUSLY EXHUMED BY LAO OFFICIALS DURING EARLIER UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN ADDITION, ALTHOUGH THE U.S. PRISONER WHOM THE WITNESSES BURIED IS BELIEVED TO BE CHARLES SHELTON, HIS IDENTITY HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED. ONE OF THE WITNESSES SAID HE IDENTIFIED THE PRISONER FROM A BOOK OF PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWN TO HIM BY MR. SIKHAI.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT REVIEW ITS RECORDS OF PREVIOUS UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS TO IDENTIFY AND LOCATE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN SUCH INVESTIGATIONS FOR JOINT INTERVIEW.

REQUEST LAOS ALSO PROVIDE ANY AVAILABLE DOCUMENTARY OR OTHER INFORMATION ON THE RESULTS OF THOSE INVESTIGATIONS.

IN ADDITION, REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT PROVIDE THE BOOK OF PHOTOGRAPHS MENTIONED BY THE WITNESS AND INDICATE WHICH PHOTOGRAPH THE WITNESS IDENTIFIED.

REFNO 0084 (HRDLICKA)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES, SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS, AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

CAPTAIN DAVID L. HRDLICKA WAS FLYING A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER HOUAPHAN PROVINCE LAOS ON 18 MAY 1965 WHEN HIS AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN ABOUT 14 KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF SAM NEUA. HE EJECTED AND WAS CAPTURED. ON 25 SEPTEMBER 1982, A LAO GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TOLD A VISITING DELEGATION FROM THE U.S. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES THAT CAPTAIN HRDLICKA HAD BEEN HELD IN A CAVE COMPLEX IN THE VIENGSAI AREA UNTIL 1968 WHEN HE DIED OF DISEASE AND WAS BURIED NEARBY IN A GRAVE THAT WAS LATER DESTROYED BY AMERICAN BOMBS. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO A BOOK WRITTEN BY MR. IVAN SHCHEDROV, A FORMER SOVIET JOURNALIST, MR. SHCHEDROV SPOKE WITH CAPTAIN HRDLICKA AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE SPRING OF 1969.

THIS CASE HAS BEEN INVESTIGATED SEVEN TIMES, AND SEVERAL GRAVESITES IDENTIFIED BY WITNESSES HAVE BEEN EXCAVATED, BUT NO REMAINS OR ARTIFACTS HAVE EVER BEEN FOUND. FURTHER INFORMATION IS REQUIRED TO CONFIRM THE FATE OF CAPTAIN HRDLICKA. SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT LOCATE MR. KHAMSENG (POSSIBLY KHAMSENG PATHAMAVONG), WHO SERVED IN THE FRENCH SECTION OF THE BAN BAC RADIO STATION AND REPORTEDLY INTERROGATED CAPTAIN HRDLICKA.

IN MAY 1967, MR. VONGVICHIT, AN OFFICIAL OF THE LAO GOVERNMENT, ACKNOWLEDGED THE CAPTIVITY OF CAPTAIN HRDLICKA, AND ON 10 MAY 1973 MR. VONGVICHIT AGREED TO GATHER INFORMATION ABOUT MR. HRDLICKA'S FATE. REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT LOCATE MR. VONGVICHIT FOR JOINT INTERVIEW.

REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT REVIEW ITS RECORDS AND PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE REGARDING THE DATE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTAIN HRDLICKA'S DEATH.

REFNO 0086 (WALKER)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW; SEARCH FOR WITNESSES; SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS; AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

CAPT WALKER WAS CAPTURED ON 23 MAY 1965. A FORMER U.S. POW HELD WITH HIM STATED THAT CAPT WALKER JOINED HIS GROUP ON 8 JANUARY 1966. BY THAT TIME HE WAS IN POOR HEALTH, SUFFERING FROM MALARIA AND MALNUTRITION. ON 4 FEBRUARY 1966, THE VIETNAMESE TOOK CAPT WALKER AWAY, ALLEGEDLY TO A HOSPITAL. HE WAS COMPLETELY INCOHERENT AND HAD A SEVERE CASE OF BERI-BERI. IT WAS BELIEVED BY THOSE WHO SAW HIM THAT HE WOULD DIE WITHIN TWO TO THREE HOURS. CAPT WALKER'S NAME APPEARED ON THE 1973 PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY (DIC) LIST AS WELL AS ANOTHER DIC LIST TURNED OVER TO U.S. OFFICIALS IN 1994. A U.S. RETURNEE HELD WITH CAPT WALKER REPORTED THAT, UPON HIS RELEASE, HE WAS TO CONTACT MRS. WALKER AND INFORM HER THAT IF SHE WANTED HER HUSBAND'S REMAINS AND WEDDING RING, SHE WAS TO CONTACT THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) REPRESENTATIVE IN PHNOM PENH.

A JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE LED TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF A DOCTOR CURRENTLY LIVING IN SIHANOUKVILLE PORT, CAMBODIA, WHO MAY BE ABLE TO PINPOINT CAPT WALKER'S GRAVE SITE. A SURVEY OF A POTENTIAL BURIAL SITE LOCATED NEAR CANAL 26 FAILED TO REVEAL ANY EVIDENCE OF BURIAL. AN ATTEMPT TO LOCATE THE DOCTOR, NGUYEN QUOC CHINH, IN CAMBODIA IS UNDERWAY.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

CAPT WALKER WAS LISTED ON THE OFFICIAL DIC LIST PASSED TO THE U.S. IN 1973. DURING THE FOUR PARTY JOINT MILITARY TEAM (FPJMT) DISCUSSIONS FROM APRIL 1973 TO AUGUST 1974, THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT UNOFFICIALLY INDICATED THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE GRAVES OF AMERICANS WHO HAD DIED IN CAPTIVITY WERE KNOWN AND POSSIBLY AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION. REQUEST VIETNAM SEARCH DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING VIETNAM'S NEGOTIATING STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION THAT WOULD AID IN LOCATING THE GRAVE SITE OF CAPT WALKER.

REQUEST VIETNAM LOCATE FOR INTERVIEW THE FOLLOWING FPJMT DELEGATION MEMBERS SO WE CAN INTERVIEW THEM REGARDING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIC CASES REFERRED TO DURING THE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS: GEN TRAN VAN TRA; MG HOANG ANH TUAN, CHIEF PRG

DELEGATE; COL VO DONG GIANG, SENIOR SPOKESMAN; MAJ PHUONG NAM; AND LTC SON. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT ABOUT GRAVE LOCATIONS AND PLANS OR EFFORTS, OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL, TO RECOVER REMAINS.

ADDITIONALLY, REQUEST VIETNAM IDENTIFY FOR FUTURE JOINT INTERVIEW NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) REPRESENTATIVES IN PHNOM PENH. IN AT LEAST TWO INSTANCES, FAMILY MEMBERS OF DECEASED PRISONERS WERE TOLD TO CONTACT THE NLF REPRESENTATIVES IN PHNOM PENH TO MAKE FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF THEIR LOVED ONES' REMAINS AND/OR THEIR PERSONAL EFFECTS.

REFNO 0096 (NAME, CURLEE, NAME, HALL, NAME, OWENS, SAEGAERT)
 REFNO 0097 (HOLLAND)

TYPE OF LEAD: UNILATERAL SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

DURING THE RECENT ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT OF REFNOs 0096 AND 0097, JTF-FA DETERMINED THAT THE ONLY REALISTIC CHANCE OF RECOVERING THE REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE CASES IS TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW THE VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS WHO BURIED THEM. BOTH INCIDENTS OCCURRED NEAR THUAN LOI AIRFIELD IN JUNE 1965. VIETNAMESE FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE 9TH DIVISION WERE INVOLVED IN BOTH LOSS INCIDENTS.

JOINT TEAMS HAVE ALREADY INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING FORMER 9TH DIVISION OFFICERS DURING THE INVESTIGATIONS OF REFNOs 0096 AND 0097: A. RETIRED SENIOR COLONEL PHAM VAN TRAN, ASSIGNED TO COMPANY 2, 1ST BATTALION (AKA BINH DA UNIT); B. RETIRED MAJOR THAN VAN RIA, ASSIGNED TO THE 3RD PLATOON, COMPANY 3, 1ST BATTALION; C. RETIRED SENIOR COLONEL NGUYEN VAN NAM, 18TH AAA COMPANY.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE IDENTIFY AND MAKE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW ADDITIONAL CADRE PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO THE 9TH DIVISION DURING THE BATTLES AROUND DONG XOAI IN JUNE 1965. SEEK INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF THE REMAINS OF THE INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH REFNOs 0096 AND 0097 OR THE SPECIFIC LOCATION OF THEIR BURIAL SITES. WARTIME REPORTING INDICATES ALL THREE OF THE 9TH DIVISION'S REGIMENTS, I.E. THE 271ST, 272ND AND 273RD REGIMENTS, WERE INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE FOR DONG XOAI.

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING THEIR EFFORTS TO RECOVER REMAINS FROM GRAVES LOCATED NEAR DONG XOAI, TO INCLUDE THE LOCATIONS OF THE GRAVES AND WHETHER OR NOT ANY NON-VIETNAMESE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED. A FORMER RESIDENT OF THE NEW ECONOMIC ZONE AT CAY LAY, DINH TUONG, REPORTED THAT IN ABOUT 1980, HE OBSERVED WORKERS, SUPERVISED BY A "CADRE," DISINTER EIGHT COMPLETE SKELETONS FROM GRAVES A FEW KILOMETERS NORTH OF DONG XOAI TOWN, POSSIBLY IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES YT 1083. THE WITNESS AND OTHERS HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THIS AREA TO DELIVER WOODEN BOXES FOR THE REMAINS. THE WITNESS BELIEVED THE REMAINS WERE AMERICAN. WE NOTE THAT THE UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS LOST IN THE BATTLE AT DONG XOAI NUMBER PRECISELY EIGHT, AND WERE KNOWN TO BE IN THE HANDS OF LOCAL COMMUNIST FORCES NORTH OF DONG XOAI AT THE TIME OF LOSS.

REFNO 0099 (SCHUMANN)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

CAPTAIN SCHUMANN WAS CAPTURED WHEN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE UNIT HE WAS ADVISING WAS ATTACKED BY GUERRILLAS. ABOUT ONE MONTH LATER, FRIENDLY UNITS CAPTURED VIETNAMESE GUERRILLA DOCUMENTS LEFT BEHIND AFTER A FIREFIGHT; THESE DOCUMENTS INCLUDED A PICTURE OF CAPTAIN SCHUMANN THAT APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN RECENTLY.

CAPTAIN SCHUMANN'S STATUS WAS OFFICIALLY CHANGED FROM MISSING TO POW BASED ON THE DEBRIEF OF AN AMERICAN ESCAPED FROM THE CAMP. ANOTHER AMERICAN WHO WAS RELEASED IN 1967 SAID CAPTAIN SCHUMANN DIED OF PNEUMONIA IN JULY 1966; HE SAID THE OTHER PRISONERS ASKED TO BURY HIM, BUT THE GUARDS WOULD NOT LET THEM GO OUTSIDE THE CAMP. THE CAMP STAFF HAD THE AMERICAN WHO WAS RELEASED EARLY SIGN A RECORD OF THE MEDICAL TREATMENT GIVEN TO CAPTAIN SCHUMANN; THE RECORDS WERE PREPARED IN ENGLISH AND VIETNAMESE AND COSIGNED BY THE CAMP DOCTOR AND CAMP COMMANDER. THE FORMER PRISONER BROUGHT CAPTAIN SCHUMANN'S WEDDING RING WITH HIM TO RETURN TO MRS. SCHUMANN.

THE 1973 PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST CITED THE SAME DATE OF DEATH MENTIONED BY RETURNEES. IN MAY 1973, U.S. OFFICIALS ATTEMPTED TO INVESTIGATE CRASH AND GRAVE SITES IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE, INCLUDING A POSSIBLE GRAVESITE FOR CAPTAIN SCHUMANN, BUT THEY WERE DENIED ACCESS TO MOST AREAS FOR SECURITY REASONS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE REVIEW OFFICIAL RECORDS FOR INFORMATION ON THIS CASE. ONE OF THE AMERICANS HELD WITH CAPTAIN SCHUMANN HAD TO COSIGN DETAILED RECORDS OF CAPTAIN SCHUMANN'S MEDICAL TREATMENT, WHICH HE WAS TOLD WERE PREPARED SO THEY COULD EVENTUALLY BE GIVEN TO MRS. SCHUMANN.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

· ACCORDING TO A 1972 SON LA PROVINCE DOCUMENT, AS WELL AS WITNESSES INTERVIEWED DURING OUR JOINT INVESTIGATIONS, SOLDIERS BURIED *N. A. 1415* BODY IN THE AREA OF THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION MEDICAL SCHOOL (AKA HOSPITAL 6), WHICH WAS ABANDONED IN 1965. SHORTLY AFTERWARD, PERSONNEL FROM THE NORTHWEST SOLDIER NEWSPAPER WENT TO THE GRAVE SITE AND DUG UP THE BODY IN ORDER TO PHOTOGRAPH IT. IN 1972, WHEN OFFICIALS FROM THE MUONG LA DISTRICT MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION AND FROM HUA LA VILLAGE WENT TO VERIFY THE LOCATION OF NAME 'S GRAVE, THEY WERE ONLY ABLE TO FIND THE ORIGINAL HOLE WHERE IT HAD BEEN BURIED BEFORE IT WAS DISINTERRED AND PHOTOGRAPHED. IN 1972, OFFICIALS IN SON LA PROVINCE SUGGESTED THAT IN ORDER TO FIND THE BODY, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO RESEARCH INFORMATION FROM THE NORTHWEST SOLDIER NEWSPAPER AND THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION MEDICAL SCHOOL.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE SEARCH FOR RECORDS OF AND PERSONNEL BELONGING TO THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION MEDICAL SCHOOL (AKA HOSPITAL 6) DURING 1965 AND TO THE NORTHWEST SOLDIER NEWSPAPER DURING THE SAME PERIOD. WE WOULD LIKE TO LOCATE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR WITNESSES THAT CAN HELP IDENTIFY WHAT HAPPENED TO NAME 'S BODY AFTER IT WAS DISINTERRED AND PHOTOGRAPHED, AND IF IT WAS REBURIED, THE LOCATION OF THE SECOND BURIAL SITE.

REFNO 0121 (GRAY)

TYPE OF LEAD: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

ON 7 AUGUST 1965, LIEUTENANT COMMANDER GRAY'S A1H ATTACK BOMBER WAS SHOT DOWN AND CRASHED IN DONG HOI CITY, NORTH VIETNAM. A WARTIME SOURCE CLAIMED THAT IN 1965, HIS UNCLE FOUND THE REMAINS OF AN AMERICAN PILOT IN DONG HOI CITY AND BURIED THE PARTIAL REMAINS IN A GARDEN ON VO NGUYEN GIAP STREET. THIS INFORMATION CORRELATES TO CASE 0121.

IN 1988, THE VIETNAMESE PROVIDED A REPORT DESCRIBING THEIR INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE. THE REPORT STATES THAT AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN AND CRASHED IN DONG HOI CITY. LOCAL RESIDENTS FOUND PORTIONS OF THE PILOT'S BODY AND BURIED THEM IN A GARDEN ON VO NGUYEN GIAP STREET. THE REPORT SAID THAT AFTER 1973, A RECOVERY ATTEMPT WAS INITIATED BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.

A WITNESS INTERVIEWED IN APRIL 1992 BY A JOINT FIELD TEAM DESCRIBED THE CRASH OF AN A6D (A1H) AIRCRAFT NEXT TO THE DONG HOI CITY PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE BUILDING IN THE SUMMER OF 1965. HOWEVER, HIS STATEMENT THAT PIECES OF FLESH FOUND AT THE CRASHSITE WERE THROWN AWAY BY AN ANGRY CROWD IS INCONSISTENT WITH OUR WARTIME INFORMATION. ALSO, ENTRY IN THE MILITARY REGION FOUR SHOOTDOWN RECORD CORRELATES TO THIS INCIDENT BY DATE, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND GENERAL LOCATION. THE ENTRY STATES THE PILOT IS DEAD.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE SEARCH WARTIME ARCHIVES IN DONG HOI CITY AND QUANG BINH PROVINCE FOR INFORMATION ON THE BURIAL OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER GRAY'S BODY AND THE ON 1973 ATTEMPT TO RECOVER HIS REMAINS.

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE LOCATE FORMER RESIDENTS OF VO NGUYEN GIAP STREET SO THEY CAN BE INTERVIEWED REGARDING THE REPORTED BURIAL OF AN AMERICAN BODY IN 1965 AND THE 1973 ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THESE REMAINS.

REFNO 0266 (SMITH)

TYPE OF ACTION: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS AND SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

ON 20 MARCH 1985, VIETNAM RETURNED A SET OF REMAINS ALLEGED TO BE THOSE OF HAROLD V. SMITH. CILHI DETERMINED THAT THIS BOX CONTAINED THE REMAINS OF TWO MEMBERS OF CASE 0156, LOST IN NINH BINH PROVINCE ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1965. THIS HAS LED US TO QUESTION VIETNAM'S BASIS FOR BELIEVING THAT CAPT SMITH'S REMAINS HAD INDEED BEEN RECOVERED.

DURING OUR JOINT INVESTIGATIONS, WITNESSES IN THO LAM VILLAGE, THO XUAN DISTRICT, HAVE DESCRIBED AN INCIDENT IN WHICH A U.S. AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO THE CHU RIVER AND SANK. VILLAGERS SAID THAT THE PILOT DID NOT EJECT, AND NO REMAINS WERE EVER FOUND. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND WRECKAGE OR DOCUMENTS THAT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THAT THIS INCIDENT RELATES TO CAPT SMITH'S LOSS. INFORMATION FOUND ON AN ITEM RECEIPT IN THE AIR DEFENSE MUSEUM IN HANOI AND IN AN ISSUE OF THE NEWSPAPER "THANH HOA IN RENEWAL" SUGGESTS THAT THE AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE BEEN DOWNED IN THO XUAN DISTRICT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE RECORD OF U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE THANH HOA ARMED FORCES BETWEEN AUGUST 1964 AND 27 JANUARY 1973 SUGGESTS ANOTHER POSSIBLE DOWN SITE IN SAM SON.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH CAPT SMITH'S NAME CAME TO BE MISTAKENLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE REMAINS OF THE TWO MEMBERS OF CASE 0156. WHAT WAS THE BASIS FOR THE BELIEF THAT CAPT SMITH'S REMAINS HAD BEEN RECOVERED?

REQUEST VIETNAM ATTEMPT TO LOCATE ADDITIONAL RECORDS THAT CAN CONFIRM THE LOCATION OF THE LOSS SITE OF THE CASE 0266 AIRCRAFT.

REQUEST VIETNAM RESEARCH INFORMATION IN THE AIR DEFENSE MUSEUM THAT INDICATES A PISTOL FROM AN F105 PILOT SHOT DOWN ON 7 MARCH 1966 CAME FROM THO XUAN. WHEN WAS THE PISTOL ACQUIRED, AND WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR LOCATING IT?

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

ON APRIL 1966, NAME WAS FLYING THE LEAD DT IN A FLIGHT OF THREE ON AN ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM. WHILE ENROUTE TO THE TARGET NAME AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY A SAM AND DESTROYED.

IN MAY 1991, LOCAL OFFICIALS IN THANH GIANG VILLAGE GAVE THE JOINT TEAM A SMALL QUANTITY OF BONES THAT THEY SAID HAD BEEN RECOVERED FROM THE CRASH SITE WHEN IT WAS UNILATERALLY EXCAVATED IN 1990. THE VNOSMP MEMBERS OF THE TEAM SIGNED A RECEIPT FOR THE ITEMS AND TOOK CUSTODY OF THE REMAINS. THESE REMAINS HAVE NEVER BEEN REPATRIATED.

IN AUGUST 1994, LOCAL OFFICIALS TOLD THE SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM THAT PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICIALS IN DONG NAI PROVINCE HAD ARRESTED MEMBERS OF A FREE LANCE SALVAGE TEAM AND CONFISCATED REMAINS AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE THAT HAD COME FROM THE CRASHSITE IN THANH GIANG VILLAGE. WE WOULD LIKE TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE ITEMS CONFISCATED AND EXAMINE ANY REMAINS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM TURN OVER THE REMAINS PROVIDED TO THE VNOSMP IN 1991 AND ANY ARTIFACTS ALSO DISCOVERED.

REQUEST VIETNAM PROVIDE THE DETAILS OF THEIR INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE RECOVERY OF REMAINS AND ARTIFACTS SEIZED FROM MEMBERS OF A SALVAGE TEAM IN DONG NAI PROVINCE.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

IN AUGUST 1989, VIETNAM REPATRIATED REMAINS IN BOX 9 THAT ACCOMPANYING DATA IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF NAME, WHO WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN LOST ON APRIL 1966 AT HIEP HOA, HA BAC. BECAUSE THESE REMAINS HAVE NO TEETH AND ARE VERY INCOMPLETE, FRAGMENTARY, AND ERODED, OUR FORENSIC EXPERTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RECOMMEND OR RULE OUT IDENTIFICATION.

IN OCTOBER 1993, A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED ONE WITNESS WHO DESCRIBED THE MIDDAY DOWNING OF AN DT AT HOANG THANH VILLAGE, HIEP HOA DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO THIS WITNESS, PARTIAL CHARRED REMAINS OF THE PILOT WERE BURIED NEAR THE CRASHSITE. AFTER THE WAR, THE WITNESS HELPED DISTRICT MILITARY OFFICIALS EXHUME THE REMAINS. WHEN SHOWED A PHOTO OF THE REMAINS HELD AT CILHI, THE WITNESS SAID THEY LOOKED VERY SIMILAR. ALTHOUGH THIS WAS PROMISING, OUR FORENSIC EXPERTS STILL NEED ADDITIONAL DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THE REMAINS COLLECTED IN HOANG THANH VILLAGE.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAMESE PROVIDE COPIES OF AN INVENTORY SHOWING THE COMPOSITION OF REMAINS COLLECTED IN HOANG THANH VILLAGE, AS WELL AS RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY FOR THE REMAINS RETURNED IN BOX 9 DURING AUGUST 1989.

REQUEST VIETNAMESE SEARCH FOR RECORDS OR PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE REMAINS RECOVERY EFFORT THAT TOOK PLACE AT HOANG THANH VILLAGE, HIEP HOA, HA BAC.

REFNO 0326 (MALONE)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

JOINT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT PRIVATE MALONE WAS KILLED AFTER HE LEFT HIS UNIT ON A MAIL DETAIL. HIS BODY WAS REPORTEDLY BURIED IN KHANH BINH VILLAGE, TAN UYEN DISTRICT, SONG BE PROVINCE. SUBSEQUENT JOINT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO LOCATE PRIVATE MALONE'S REMAINS.

A POST-WAR SOURCE REPORTED THAT IN LATE 1983, FARMERS IN THE TAN UYEN AREA HAD FOUND THE REMAINS AND THE MILITARY IDENTIFICATION TAG OF A U.S. SERVICEMAN IN A CASHEW ORCHARD. THESE REMAINS WERE REPORTEDLY TURNED OVER TO LOCAL VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES.

INDEPENDENT OF THE POST-WAR SOURCE, WITNESSES INDICATED DURING JOINT INVESTIGATIONS OF THIS CASE THAT REMAINS BELIEVED TO BE AMERICAN HAD BEEN FOUND ACCIDENTALLY BY METAL SCAVENGERS IN KHANH BINH AND TURNED OVER TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES. THE AREA WAS LATER PLANTED AS A CASHEW ORCHARD.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE PROVIDE RECORDS REGARDING THE DISPOSITION OF THE U.S. REMAINS REPORTEDLY FOUND IN TAN UYEN.

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE LOCATE AND MAKE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE RECOVERY OF THESE REMAINS.

REFNO 0350 (NAME /ALBERTON/EDMONDSON/STICKNEY/SHINGLEDECKER)

TYPE OF ACTION: INVESTIGATE OFFICIAL RECOVERY OPERATION AND SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

EYEWITNESSES TO THE MAY 1966 CRASH OF THIS AIRCRAFT IN THO BINH VILLAGE, TRIEU SON DISTRICT, THANH HOA PROVINCE, REPORTED THE REMAINS OF THE EIGHT CREWMEMBERS ABOARD THE C-130 WERE BURIED IN TWO GRAVES: SEVEN REMAINS IN ONE GRAVE AND ONE IN A SECOND NEARBY GRAVE. THE WITNESSES ALSO REPORTED THAT TRIEU SON DISTRICT OFFICIALS SUPERVISED THE EXHUMATION OF ALL EIGHT U.S. REMAINS FROM THE GRAVES IN THO BINH VILLAGE SOMETIME DURING THE MID-1970S. WITNESSES INSISTED THAT ALL EIGHT SETS OF REMAINS WERE RELATIVELY COMPLETE WHEN THEY WERE EXHUMED.

IN APRIL 1986, VIETNAM TURNED OVER FIVE SETS OF REMAINS ALLEGEDLY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS LOSS. U.S. FORENSIC SPECIALISTS SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED THREE OF THESE REMAINS AS CREWMEMBERS WHO WERE ABOARD THIS AIRCRAFT. THE OTHER TWO REMAINS ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR IDENTIFICATION. WE HAVE LEARNED NOTHING ABOUT THE FINAL THREE REMAINS COLLECTED FROM THIS SITE.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

1. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE LOCATE THE THREE ADDITIONAL SETS OF REMAINS COLLECTED FROM THO BINH VILLAGE THAT HAVE NOT YET BEEN REPATRIATED. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, REQUEST VIETNAMESE PROVIDE A REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO WHAT HAPPENED TO THESE REMAINS AFTER DISTRICT OFFICIALS TOOK THEM AWAY.

2. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE PROVIDE DISTRICT, PROVINCE AND MILITARY REGION DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE RECOVERY OF THE REMAINS OF ALL EIGHT CREWMEMBERS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. THESE RECORDS SHOULD CONFIRM THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY FOR THESE REMAINS AND PROVIDE INFORMATION REGARDING THE DISPOSITION OF ALL EIGHT REMAINS. INFORMATION IN THESE DOCUMENTS MAY HELP IDENTIFY THE TWO SETS OF REMAINS STILL AT CILHI.

3. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE IDENTIFY AND MAKE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW MEMBERS OF THE DISTRICT TEAM THAT SUPERVISED THE RECOVERY OF THE REMAINS OF THE CREWMEMBERS OF THE REFNO 0350 AIRCRAFT FROM THO BINH VILLAGE.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF LEADS: SEARCH FOR CEMETERY RECORDS AND INVESTIGATE BURIAL REPORT.

BACKGROUND:

ON AUGUST 1966, NAME WAS THE PILOT OF AN DATA ON A STRIKE MISSION. AS THE FLIGHT PULLED OFF THE TARGET, NAME

STATED THAT HIS AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN HIT, AND HE WAS GOING TO EJECT. WHEN ANOTHER AIRCRAFT ASKED FOR A POSITION, NO REPLY WAS MADE. AFTER THE PILOT HAD SAID HE WOULD EJECT, AN DT WAS SEEN DESCENDING IN A GRADUAL RIGHTHAND TURN. NO PARACHUTE WAS SEEN AND NO MEMBERS OF THE FLIGHT ACTUALLY SAW THE AIRCRAFT IMPACT THE GROUND.

NAME IS SAID BY THE VIETNAMESE TO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED AND EVACUATED TO VINH YEN CITY WHERE HE WAS HOSPITALIZED FOR TREATMENT OF WOUNDS. HE ALLEGEDLY DIED AT THE HOSPITAL AND WAS BURIED IN THE LOCAL CEMETERY. IN MARCH 1977, VIETNAM TURNED OVER REMAINS PURPORTED TO BE THOSE OF NAME. HOWEVER, FORENSIC ANALYSIS CONCLUDED THEY WERE THOSE OF A MONGOLOID.

DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES, TEAMS INVESTIGATED IN THE AREA OF VINH YEN TOWN FOR INFORMATION ON THIS CASE BUT DID NOT LOCATE THE CORRECT BURIAL SITE. RECORDS FROM THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, VINH PHU PROVINCE, INDICATE THAT NAME WAS BURIED IN A COFFIN AT THE CEMETERY AT THE XA TEMPLE, VINH YEN TOWN.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM INVESTIGATE THE CEMETERY AT THE XA TEMPLE, VINH YEN TOWN, TO DETERMINE IF AN AMERICAN GRAVE SITE IS IN THE AREA.

REQUEST VIETNAM ALSO PROVIDE ANY BURIAL OR CEMETERY DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THIS CASE THAT WOULD ASSIST IN PINPOINTING THE BURIAL LOCATION OR RECOUNT EARLIER RECOVERY ATTEMPTS.

FINALLY, REQUEST VIETNAM PROVIDE A REPORT ON THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY FOR THE REMAINS RETURNED IN 1977 WHICH VIETNAM ORIGINALLY ASSOCIATED WITH NAME BUT WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE MONGOLOID.

REFNO 0435 (MILIKIN)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW AND SEARCH FOR ADDITIONAL WITNESSES.

BACKGROUND:

THIS CASE WAS INVESTIGATED BY A JOINT TEAM IN MAY 1993 AND AGAIN BY THE SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM IN OCTOBER 1994. DURING BOTH INVESTIGATIONS, WITNESSES DESCRIBED LIEUTENANT MILIKIN'S BURIAL IN MAI HOA VILLAGE. DURING THE FIRST INVESTIGATION, MR. HOA VAN THE SAID THAT SOMETIME AROUND 1975, MR. DUYEN (ZUYEEN), A POLICY CADRE FROM THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, CAME TO MAI HOA VILLAGE TO LOCATE AND RE-MARK THE GRAVE. SOMETIME AFTER THAT, MR. THE SAID HE HEARD THAT A TEAM FROM BO TRACH DISTRICT CAME AND EXHUMED THE REMAINS. HE SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS' NAMES OR WHETHER THEY HAD FOUND THE REMAINS BECAUSE THEY WORKED AT NIGHT AND LEFT BEFORE MORNING. DURING THE SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM INVESTIGATION, MR. THE CHANGED HIS STORY TO SAY THAT THE PEOPLE FROM BO TRACH WHO TRIED TO RECOVER THE REMAINS WERE PRIVATE CITIZENS.

ON 13 MAY 1995, VIETNAM PROVIDED A REPORT ON EACH OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM CASES. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT ON THIS CASE, MR. THE STATED THAT IN 1973-74 QUANG BINH PROVINCE CADRE RETURNED TO THE VILLAGE AND REMOUNDED THE GRAVE. IN 1975, RESIDENTS LEVELED THE AREA AND USED THE DIRT TO BUILD A DIKE. DUE TO TERRAIN CHANGES, THE GRAVE CAN NO LONGER BE LOCATED.

MEMBERS OF THE JOINT TEAMS THAT INVESTIGATED THIS CASE IN MAI HOA VILLAGE CONCLUDED THAT THE AREA WHERE LIEUTENANT MILIKIN WAS BURIED HAS LONG BEEN UNDER CULTIVATION AND RECOMMENDED AGAINST EXCAVATION.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

1. REQUEST VIETNAMESE LOCATE TWO WITNESSES IDENTIFIED AS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THIS GRAVE AND OF EFFORTS TO VERIFY ITS LOCATION: MR. THANG, FORMER DEPUTY MILITIA COMMANDER OF TUYEN HOA DISTRICT, AND MR. DUYEN (ZUYEEN), A POLICY CADRE FROM QUANG BINH MILITARY HEADQUARTERS.

2. REQUEST VIETNAMESE SEARCH FOR BO TRACH DISTRICT OFFICIALS WHO MAY HAVE ATTEMPTED TO RECOVER THESE REMAINS.

3. REQUEST VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATE THE REPORT THAT PRIVATE CITIZENS FROM BO TRACH ATTEMPTED TO RECOVER THESE REMAINS.

REFNO 0476 (TAYLOR)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW

BACKGROUND:

ON 28 SEPTEMBER 1966, SSG DANNY TAYLOR WAS A MEMBER OF A RECONNAISSANCE PATROL WHEN HIS UNIT CAME UNDER FIRE IN THE VICINITY OF XD760460 (IN WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE). SSG TAYLOR WAS HIT IN THE BACK BY A ROUND THAT CUT HIS SPINE AND OPENED UP HIS STOMACH. PRIOR TO LEAVING THE AREA, MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT CHECKED HIS BODY, WHICH WAS PROPPED BETWEEN TWO ROCKS, AND FELT NO PULSE OR HEARTBEAT.

ON 20 DECEMBER 1990, VIETNAM REPATRIATED A SET OF REMAINS IN BOX 4, WHICH VIETNAM ASSOCIATED WITH THE NAME DANNY G. TAYLOR. THESE REMAINS WERE DETERMINED TO BE THOSE OF A SOUTHEAST ASIAN MONGOLOID, HOWEVER, AND WERE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0476.

IN 1989, A SOURCE PROVIDED A PACKET CONTAINING MANY NAMES OF U.S. SERVICEMEN ALLEGEDLY MISSING IN VIETNAM. TWO NAMES RELATED TO UNACCOUNTED FOR PERSONNEL, ONE OF WHOM WAS SSG TAYLOR. THE SOURCE SAID A MR. VO VAN THUONG HAD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. MR. THUONG WAS INTERVIEWED IN JULY 1994. HE SAID HE WAS AN INTERMEDIARY FOR A FRIEND WHO HAD MANY SETS OF REMAINS IN DONG NAI. MR. THUONG NAMED MR. DAC MINH TRIEU AS HAVING ID TAGS THAT CORRELATED TO THESE REMAINS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

LOCATE WITNESSES: REQUEST SRV ATTEMPT TO LOCATE THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS AND MAKE THEM AVAILABLE FOR JOINT INTERVIEW: 1. PERSON WHO TURNED OVER REMAINS RETURNED BY THE SRV IN BOX 4, DECEMBER 1990; 2. MR. DAC MINH TRIEU, IDENTIFIED BY VO VAN THUONG AS HAVING HAD ID TAGS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN THOSE OF SSG TAYLOR.

DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS AND LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW.

BACKGROUND:

ON 31 JULY 1989, VIETNAM RETURNED THE REMAINS AND MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD OF NAME 'S FELLOW CREW MEMBER, LT COL BRINCKMAN.

DURING FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1995, OUR JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATED THIS LOSS IN TRI YEN VILLAGE, YEN DUNG DISTRICT, WHICH THE HA BAC COMMAND CHRONOLOGY IDENTIFIED AS THE DOWN SITE OF THIS AIRCRAFT. WITNESSES AT THIS LOCATION SAID THEY HAD BURIED THE BODY OF A PILOT WHO HAD EJECTED FROM HIS AIRCRAFT AND LANDED MORTALLY WOUNDED NEARBY. THEY ALSO SAID THAT EITHER IN 1972-73, OR IN 1975, UNIDENTIFIED OFFICIALS RECOVERED THESE REMAINS. WE NEED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE GRAVE AND THE REMAINS THESE WITNESSES DESCRIBED ARE THOSE REPATRIATED IN 1989. WE ALSO WISH TO DETERMINE WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OTHER AMERICAN INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS RETURNED IN JULY 1989 AND IDENTIFIED AS NAME 'S CREW MATE, LT COL BRINCKMAN.

LOCATE WITNESSES, INCLUDING DISTRICT OR PROVINCE OFFICIALS, WHO WERE PRESENT AT THE RECOVERY OF LT COL BRINCKMAN'S REMAINS AND MAKE THEM AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS; SEARCH FOR WITNESSES; SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS.

BACKGROUND:

NAME 'S NAME APPEARED ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST PROVIDED TO THE U.S. IN 1973. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, HE DIED ON 12 APRIL 1967.

THREE OTHER POWS INTERNED WITH HIM IN A PRISON CAMP IN SOUTH VIETNAM REPORTED THAT WHEN THEY WERE RELEASED IN LATE 1966, HE WAS STILL ALIVE AND IN CAPTIVITY. THESE POWS ALSO SAID THAT TWO OTHER POWS HELD IN THE SAME CAMP, AN AUSTRALIAN AND A FILIPINO, HAD DIED AND BEEN BURIED AT THIS SAME CAMP.

IN 1973, THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT ADVISED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO HAND OVER THE REMAINS OF THE AUSTRALIAN WHO HAD DIED IN THE SAME CAMP WHERE NAME WAS LAST KNOWN TO BE ALIVE AND HELD CAPTIVE. THE AUSTRALIAN'S WIDOW REFUSED REPATRIATION OF HIS REMAINS, HOWEVER.

JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATING THIS CAN HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO FIND THE LOCATION OF THE POW CAMP WHERE NAME WAS LAST KNOWN TO BE ALIVE IN VIETNAMESE CAPTIVITY NOR LEARNED ANYTHING THAT WOULD CORROBORATE THE CLAIM THAT HE DIED IN 1967.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE PROVIDE DETAILS OF NAME 'S CASE INCLUDING HIS CAPTURE, A CHRONOLOGY OF HIS MOVEMENT AND, IF HE DIED, THE PLACE OF DEATH AND BURIAL.

REQUEST VIETNAM CONDUCT ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TO DETERMINE LOCATION OF THE PRISON CAMP WHERE NAME REPORTEDLY DIED.

REQUEST LOCATION OF VIETNAMESE WITNESSES ASSIGNED TO THE CAMP.

REQUEST ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF THE GRAVES OF MR. GAZA AND MR. STEPHENSON. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE U.S. IN 1973, THE PROVISIONAL - REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT KNEW WHERE MR. STEPHENSON HAD BEEN BURIED.

REFNO 0542 (BEGLEY)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

IN 1986, VIETNAM REPATRIATED REMAINS SAID TO BE THOSE OF CAPTAIN BEGLEY. THE REMAINS SHOWED EVIDENCE OF A HIGH SPEED IMPACT BUT WERE NOT SUFFICIENT FOR BIOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION. THE VIETNAMESE REPORTED THE REMAINS WERE FROM A 5 DECEMBER 1966 SHOOTDOWN OVER THAI LONG VILLAGE, HA TUYEN PROVINCE. THIS INFORMATION CORRELATED WITH CAPTAIN BEGLEY'S INCIDENT.

DURING A JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE, A WITNESS CLAIMED TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF AN F105D AIRCRAFT, (THE SAME AS THAT OF MAJOR BEGLEY), THAT CRASHED IN LATE 1966 AND THE SUBSEQUENT BURIAL OF THE PILOT'S REMAINS IN THAI LONG VILLAGE, YEN SON DISTRICT. THE WITNESS REPORTED THE REMAINS HAD BEEN EXHUMED BY DISTRICT OFFICIALS, AND PARTIAL REMAINS WERE REPATRIATED IN 1986. THE TEAM VISITED THE PURPORTED BURIAL SITE BUT FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF A GRAVE SITE DUE TO EXTENSIVE, CONTINUOUS CULTIVATION OF THE AREA.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE PROVIDE ANY ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTATION USED TO ASSOCIATE THE REMAINS REPATRIATED IN 1986 WITH CAPTAIN BEGLEY, TO INCLUDE WHERE THE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED, BY WHOM, HOW THEY WERE FOUND, AND AN INVENTORY OF THE CONTENTS OF REMAINS RECOVERED. SUCH INFORMATION COULD ASSIST IN AN EVENTUAL IDENTIFICATION OF THE REMAINS ALREADY IN U.S. POSSESSION.

REFNO 0586 (SILVA)

TYPE OF ACTION: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

ON 29 JANUARY 1967, AN F105 AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN TUYEN QUANG PROVINCE. TWO CREWMEMBERS, FIRST LIEUTENANT SILVA AND MAJOR BIEDIGER EJECTED AND PARACHUTED TO THE GROUND. MAJOR BIEDIGER'S REMAINS WERE REPATRIATED BY THE VIETNAMESE AND IDENTIFIED IN 1983. PARTIAL REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH LIEUTENANT SILVA WERE ALSO TURNED OVER BUT WERE INSUFFICIENT FOR IDENTIFICATION.

DURING A JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE, THREE WITNESSES PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT A MID-1967 CRASH THAT CORRELATES TO THIS INCIDENT. ALL THREE REPORTED FINDING A DEAD PILOT IN THE TREES BY THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. HE WAS BURIED, AND HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS WERE TURNED OVER TO DISTRICT OFFICIALS. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES, ONE WEEK LATER, THE BODY OF A SECOND PILOT WAS FOUND IN THE JUNGLE. HE WAS ALSO BURIED. THE WITNESSES STATED THAT SOME TIME AFTER 1972, CENTRAL AUTHORITIES RECOVERED THE BODY OF AT LEAST ONE OF THE BURIED PILOTS; THE WITNESSES WERE NOT PART OF THE EXHUMATION TEAM. THE JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED THE TWO ALLEGED GRAVE SITES BUT FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF BURIAL.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE REVIEW THEIR RECORDS TO DETERMINE THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY FOR THE REMAINS REPATRIATED IN 1986 AND CLARIFY THE ASSOCIATION OF EACH SET OF REMAINS TO EACH INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN THE LOSS INCIDENT. AS A FOLLOW-ON, INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE INITIAL RECOVERY OF REMAINS, AND ANY RELATED PERSONAL ARTIFACTS, WOULD BE USEFUL IN AIDING IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE BONE FRAGMENT ALLEGED TO BELONG TO LIEUTENANT SILVA.

REFNO DATA(NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

ON 4 FEBRUARY 1967, NAME'S DATA WAS SHOT DOWN NEAR NA MOU VILLAGE, BAC THAI PROVINCE. OF THE SIX AMERICANS ON BOARD, THREE WERE CAPTURED AND RELEASED IN 1973 DURING OPERATION HOMECOMING. TWO SETS OF REMAINS WERE REPATRIATED IN 1977 AND 1989. ONLY NAME IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR. DURING JOINT INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE, ONE WITNESS REPORTED THAT A MILITARY TEAM RECOVERED THREE SETS OF REMAINS PROBABLY COMING FROM THIS INCIDENT. A VIETNAMESE BOOK, AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE (VOL II), CONTAINS A PASSAGES THAT CORRELATES TO THIS CASE BY TIME, DATE, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND NAME OF THE CREWMEMBERS. THE PASSAGE STATES THAT THREE WERE CAPTURED AND THREE WERE KILLED IN THE INCIDENT. THE CRASHSITE OF THE DATA HAS NOT BEEN LOCATED DURING THE JOINT INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE REVIEW THEIR RECORDS FOR INFORMATION TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF THE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE. THIS REVIEW MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THE AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE BOOK, THE CAPTURE RECORDS OF THE THREE RETURNEES, AND THE REPORTS OF THE REMAINS RECOVERY OPERATION THAT RESULTED IN THE EXHUMATION AND REPATRIATION OF TWO CREWMEMBERS FROM THIS INCIDENT. IF NAME'S REMAINS WERE NOT RECOVERED IN THE 1970S ALONG WITH THOSE OF THE OTHER TWO MEN, AN EXAMINATION OF THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE (WHEN FOUND) MAY CONTAIN CLUES HELPFUL IN LOCATING HIS REMAINS.

REFNO 0641 (O'GRADY)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS; INVESTIGATE REPORT OF PRIOR RECOVERY OF REMAINS; AND LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

JOINT INVESTIGATIONS OF THIS CASE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT MAJOR O'GRADY EJECTED FROM HIS AIRCRAFT BUT INJURED HIS LEG UPON LANDING. HE WAS IMMEDIATELY CAPTURED BY THE DAN HOA VILLAGE MILITIA. WITNESSES REPORT MAJOR O'GRADY LATER DIED, AND HIS BODY MAY HAVE BEEN BURIED NEAR Y LENG HAMLET IN DAN HOA VILLAGE. A JOINT EXCAVATION OF THE REPORTED GRAVE SITE PRODUCED NO REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS. IN MAY 1991, VNOSMP MEMBER PHAM VAN RUYEN SAID THAT LOCAL VILLAGERS REPORTED THAT MAJOR O'GRADY WAS BURIED NEAR THE HEADQUARTERS OF DAN HOA VILLAGE, BUT THESE REMAINS WERE LATER REMOVED BY PERSONS UNKNOWN.

U.S. TEAMS OBSERVED MAJOR O'GRADY'S MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION MEDIA AT THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT TRADITION HOUSE AND WERE GIVEN ACCESS TO A CLASSIFIED OPERATIONS REPORT DETAILING MAJOR O'GRADY'S SHOOT DOWN, CAPTURE AND DEATH. ENTRY 728 IN THE "MILITARY REGION FOUR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS JOURNAL" ALSO ACCURATELY DESCRIBES MAJOR O'GRADY'S SHOOT DOWN AND CAPTURE.

ON 4 AUGUST 1995, VIETNAM TURNED OVER A TYPEWRITTEN REPORT, DATED 16 MAY 1973, FROM THE CHIEF OF THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCY TO THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY. THIS DOCUMENT REPORTS ON THE LOCATIONS OF GRAVES OF U.S. PILOTS IN THE PROVINCE AND NOTES THE PRESENCE OF 24 GRAVES IN VARIOUS SCATTERED RURAL LOCATIONS. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, ONE GRAVE IN DAN HOA VILLAGE, MINH HOA DISTRICT, HAD NOT BEEN CHECKED AS OF THE TIME THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED. THIS IS THE SAME VILLAGE WHERE MR. RUYEN SAID MAJOR O'GRADY HAD BEEN BURIED BEFORE HIS REMAINS WERE RECOVERED BY PERSONS UNKNOWN TO LOCAL VILLAGERS. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, THE QUANG BINH PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCY INTENDED TO CHECK AND TO SURVEY THE REMAINING GRAVES TO EXHUME THE REMAINS AND MOVE THEM TO STIPULATED LOCATIONS.

THESE DOCUMENTS AND EXHIBITS CONFIRM SIGNIFICANT VIETNAMESE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS INCIDENT AND MAJOR O'GRADY'S DEATH AND BURIAL. ADDITIONAL VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL RESEARCH SHOULD DEVELOP INFORMATION REGARDING THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF MAJOR O'GRADY'S REMAINS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

1. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATE THE OUTCOME OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCY TO CHECK AND SURVEY THE GRAVE AT DAN HOA VILLAGE AND TO EXHUME THE REMAINS AND MOVE THEM TO A STIPULATED LOCATION. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE ALSO SEARCH FOR RECORDS AND WITNESSES WHO CAN PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THESE ACTIONS.

2. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATE THE BASIS FOR MR. PHAM VAN RUYEN'S ASSERTION THAT LOCAL PEOPLE SAID THAT PERSONS UNKNOWN TO THEM HAD RECOVERED REMAINS BURIED NEAR THE DAN HOA VILLAGE HEADQUARTERS.

3. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE SEARCH FOR RECORDS AND WITNESSES FROM THE WARTIME ARCHIVES OF MINH HOA DISTRICT AND QUANG BINH PROVINCE FOR INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MAJOR O'GRADY'S DEATH, BURIAL AND THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF HIS REMAINS.

4. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE IDENTIFY AND MAKE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW WARTIME MEMBERS OF THE BO TRACH DISTRICT MILITARY COMMAND WHO WERE REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN THE RECOVERY OF U.S. REMAINS IN TUYEN HOA DISTRICT (AND POSSIBLY MINH HOA DISTRICT). DETERMINE IF THE BO TRACH DISTRICT COMMAND, ACTING FOR THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES, RECOVERED ANY U.S. REMAINS FROM DAN HOA VILLAGE OR FROM THE BINH TRAM 12/14 HOSPITAL IN HOA TIEN VILLAGE, MINH HOA DISTRICT. THESE INDIVIDUALS MAY ALSO HAVE INFORMATION REGARDING OFFICIAL RECOVERY EFFORTS FOR MAJOR O'GRADY'S REMAINS.

5. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE LOCATE AND MAKE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS:

- TRUNG VAN TRUONG, MINH HOA DISTRICT MILITARY COMMAND, WHO IN 1975 PARTICIPATED IN AN OFFICIAL REMAINS RECOVERY EFFORT ALONG WITH CAO XUAN DUC ((ZUCJ)) IN TRUONG HOA VILLAGE, MINH HOA DISTRICT. WHAT CAN HE TELL US ABOUT OTHER REMAINS RECOVERY EFFORTS IN MINH HOA DISTRICT?

- FORMER DOCTORS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL WHO SERVED IN THE BT12/14 HOSPITAL, DRS. LUU, DINH, CHI.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS.

BACKGROUND:

ON 12 MAY 1967, COLONEL NORMAN GADDIS AND NAME WERE THE CREW ABOARD AN F-4C SHOT DOWN OVER HOA BINH PROVINCE. COL GADDIS WAS CAPTURED. UPON HIS RELEASE FROM CAPTIVITY, HE STATED THAT AFTER THEIR AIRCRAFT WAS DAMAGED, HE FELT AN EXPLOSION AS IF NAME HAD EXITED THE AIRCRAFT. IMMEDIATELY UPON LANDING, COL GADDIS WAS CAPTURED. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, TWO OF HIS GUARDS LEFT FOR ABOUT 25 MINUTES AND RETURNED WITH NAME 'S HELMET, CLIPBOARD, AND NAMETAG. THE NAMETAG APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CUT FROM HIS FLIGHTSUIT. NONE OF THE ITEMS WERE BURNED OR OTHERWISE DAMAGED, NOR WAS THERE ANY BLOOD OR MUD ON THEM.

LOCAL WITNESSES HAVE DESCRIBED HOW THEY BURIED THE BODY OF ONE PILOT IN THIS INCIDENT. EXTENSIVE EXCAVATION OF THE AREA THEY IDENTIFIED, HOWEVER, FAILED TO TURN UP ANY SIGN OF REMAINS OR A BURIAL SITE. ALTHOUGH WE INTEND TO CONDUCT A SECOND EXCAVATION OF THIS AREA, WE ALSO NEED TO FOLLOW UP OTHER LEADS IN ATTEMPTING TO ACCOUNT FOR NAME .

THIS WAS A WELL PUBLICIZED LOSS THAT OCCURRED ON MILITARY PROPERTY RELATIVELY CLOSE TO HANOI. RECORDS RELATING TO NAME 'S DEATH, BURIAL, AND THE DISPOSITION OF HIS REMAINS MAY HAVE BEEN PREPARED ONE OF SEVERAL MILITARY JURISDICTIONS. THESE INCLUDE: HOA BINH PROVINCE, THE LOSS SITE; HA TAY PROVINCE, WHERE HOA LAC AIRFIELD IS LOCATED; OR HANOI MUNICIPALITY, WHICH ONE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RECORD LISTS AS COLONEL GADDIS' CAPTURE SITE.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM ATTEMPT TO LOCATE HOA LAC AIRFIELD TROOPS WHO, ACCORDING TO A HA TAY PROVINCE RECORD PROVIDED IN NOVEMBER 1992, PARTICIPATED IN THE CAPTURE OF COLONEL GADDIS AND MAY BE ABLE TO HELP LOCATE NAME 'S GRAVE. DOCUMENTS CONCERNING COLONEL GADDIS'S CAPTURE MAY IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED.

REQUEST VIETNAM SEARCH FOR RECORDS IN HANOI MUNICIPALITY, HOA BINH PROVINCE, AND HA TAY PROVINCE, RELATING TO NAME 'S DEATH AND BURIAL, AND A POSSIBLE OFFICIAL ATTEMPT TO RECOVER HIS REMAINS.

REFNO 0727 (APODACA)

TYPE OF ACTION: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

CAPT APODACA'S F4C WAS STRUCK BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE, EXPERIENCED CONTROL DIFFICULTIES, AND CRASHED. MORE RECENT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE LOCATED WHAT IS BELIEVED TO BE THE CRASH SITE IN TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

REMAINS IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF 1ST LT BUSCH (CREWMATE) WERE REPATRIATED IN JULY 1988, ALONG WITH A BOX ALLEGED TO CONTAIN APODACA'S REMAINS. ALSO TURNED OVER WAS CAPT APODACA'S MUTILATED MILITARY IDENTIFICATION TAG AND A MAP. SRV OFFICIALS FOREWARNED THAT THE "APODACA" REMAINS WERE BELIEVED TO BE NON-HUMAN, AND THIS WAS LATER CONFIRMED BY CILHI.

IN DECEMBER 1988, A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. TRAN MANH HUNG, A RESIDENT OF TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE. HE CLAIMED THAT IN EARLY 1987, WHILE DIGGING AT THE CRASH SITE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE, HE RECOVERED HUMAN REMAINS AND CAPT APODACA'S MILITARY IDENTIFICATION TAG. MR. HUNG REPORTEDLY TURNED THESE REMAINS AND IDENTIFICATION TAG OVER TO TRUNG TRACH OFFICIALS. ANOTHER RESIDENT, MR. NGUYEN VAN RUONG, REPORTED THAT IN 1987 LOCAL VILLAGERS DISCOVERED HUMAN REMAINS AT THE CRASH SITE. THESE REMAINS WERE TURNED OVER TO THE VILLAGE CHAIRMAN, MR. THANH.

IN APRIL 89 VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS AGAIN REPATRIATED REMAINS ALLEGEDLY ASSOCIATED WITH CAPT APODACA. THESE REMAINS WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED BY PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICERS IN HO CHI MINH CITY FROM "REMAINS SMUGGLERS." THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHY VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS ASSOCIATED THESE REMAINS WITH CAPT APODACA. CILHI HAS DETERMINED THE REMAINS ARE HUMAN BUT ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR IDENTIFICATION.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS REINTERVIEW LOCAL WITNESSES IN TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE, AND SEARCH RECORDS IN TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE, AT BO TRACH DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, OR AT QUANG BINH PROVINCE FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CURRENT DISPOSITION OF THE REMAINS RECOVERED FROM THE TRUNG TRACH CRASH SITE. IN ADDITION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO TRACE THE RECORD OF CUSTODY OF THE REMAINS WHICH WERE REPATRIATED IN APRIL 1989 AND ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN CONFISCATED FROM "REMAINS SMUGGLERS."

REFNO 0732 (KLEMM)

TYPE OF ACTION: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF
REMAINS AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS

BACKGROUND:

ON 11 JUN 67 MAJOR KLEMM AND 1LT PEARSON WERE FLYING AN F4C WHEN THEY COLLIDED IN MID-AIR WITH ANOTHER F4C OVER HUU LUNG DISTRICT, LANG SON PROVINCE. THE CREW OF THE SECOND F4C WERE CAPTURED, INCARCERATED, AND EVENTUALLY RELEASED FROM HANOI IN 1973. IN JULY 1988 VIETNAM REPATRIATED REMAINS LATER IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF 1LT PEARSON.

VIETNAMESE AND U.S. PERSONNEL HAVE CONDUCTED SEVERAL EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF THIS CASE AND HAVE EXCAVATED A CRASH SITE BELIEVED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR KLEMM'S AIRCRAFT. NOTHING WAS FOUND. RETIRED SENIOR CAPTAIN HOANG VIET THANG HAS STATED THAT IN 1977 HE SUPERVISED THE OFFICIAL RECOVERY OF TWO SETS OF REMAINS IN TAN THANH VILLAGE, ONE NEAR A CRASHSITE IN LANG NHON HAMLET AND THE OTHER NEAR A CRASHSITE IN COT COI HAMLET. HE THEN TURNED THE REMAINS OVER TO A MR. LY FROM THE POLICY DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY REGION 1. WHILE THE REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS OF 1LT PEARSON IN JULY 1988 MAY ACCOUNT FOR ONE EXHUMATION, UNCERTAINTY STILL EXISTS WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBLE SECOND EXHUMATION.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS REVIEW THEIR ARCHIVAL INFORMATION RELATING TO THE EXHUMATION OF TWO REMAINS FROM TAN THANH VILLAGE TO DETERMINE THE PARTICULARS OF THIS AND ANY OTHER EXHUMATION ACTIVITY IN THIS IMMEDIATE AREA, AND TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION IN THIS MATTER.

WE WOULD LIKE CONFIRMATION THAT ONE OF THESE TWO REMAINS WAS AMONG THOSE REPATRIATED (BOX 8) TO U.S. CUSTODY IN JULY 88, AND LATER IDENTIFIED AS 1LT PEARSON. CLARIFY WHICH REMAINS WERE HIS, AND EXACTLY WHERE WERE THEY RECOVERED. WERE THEY RECOVERED FROM THE COT COI SITE AND, IF SO, WHICH PART OF THE SITE (THE ALLEGED TAIL SECTION, OR THE ALLEGED FUSELAGE SECTION)? REGARDING THE SECOND REMAINS, EXACTLY WHERE WERE THEY EXHUMED AND WHAT IS THEIR PRESENT DISPOSITION? IF THESE REMAINS HAVE ALREADY BEEN REPATRIATED, PLEASE PROVIDE ELABORATION AND THE REPORT OF THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION THAT LED TO THE RECOVERY OF THESE REMAINS.

REFNO 0802 (KERR, MORGAN)

TYPE OF ACTION: INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE RECOVERY OF REMAINS

BACKGROUND:

ON 22 AUGUST 1967, MAJOR KERR AND CAPTAIN MORGAN WERE LOST WHILE FLYING AN A26A AIRCRAFT ON AN ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE VICINITY OF BAN BAN, XIANGKHOANG PROVINCE, LAOS. THE CRASHSITE WAS NOT LOCATED DURING THE WAR, BUT SEVERAL REPORTS PROVIDED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO DETERMINE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED NEAR BAN KHONG VILLAGE (UG 484729). WARTIME RADIO BROADCASTS CORRELATED TO THIS CASE REPORTED THAT LAO PEOPLES FORCES, PERHAPS ALONG WITH ALLIED DEUANIST ARMED FORCES DOWNED A U.S. AIRCRAFT ON 22 AUGUST 1967 NEAR ROUTE 7; THE REPORTS INDICATED A CAPTAIN AND A MAJOR DIED IN THE INCIDENT.

THIS CASE WAS INVESTIGATED IN JULY 1993 DURING JFA 93-6L; A JOINT U.S.-LAO TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION CONSISTENT WITH THE INCIDENT. ONE WITNESS SAID HE BURIED THE BODY OF ONE AMERICAN, AND LED THE TEAM TO A GRAVESITE WHICH VILLAGERS SAID HAD BEEN EXCAVATED SOMETIME IN 1986. THE CONDITION OF THE SITE INDICATED AN EXTENSIVE AND PROFESSIONAL EXCAVATION HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO LOCATE THE REMAINS. OTHER REPORTING SUGGESTS THE EXCAVATION MAY HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN 1986 OR 1988 BY PROVINCE OFFICIALS DURING UNILATERAL LAO INVESTIGATIONS OF AMERICAN LOSS INCIDENTS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT REVIEW ITS RECORDS OF PREVIOUS UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS, IDENTIFY AND LOCATE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN SUCH INVESTIGATIONS FOR JOINT INTERVIEW, AND PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THOSE INVESTIGATIONS.

REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT QUERY XIANGKHOANG PROVINCE OFFICIALS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EXHUMATION OF THIS GRAVESITE.

REFNO 0826 (MOORE)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS; INVESTIGATE REPORT OF PRIOR RECOVERY OF REMAINS; AND LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW.

BACKGROUND:

ACCORDING TO VIETNAMESE WITNESSES IN THANH HOA VILLAGE, TUYEN HOA DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE, CAPT MOORE EJECTED FROM HIS AIRCRAFT AND LANDED IN AN AREA NEAR DA BAN CREEK. DUE TO ACTIVITY OF OTHER U.S. AIRCRAFT SEARCHING FOR CAPT MOORE, THE MILITIA DID NOT FIND HIS BODY UNTIL TWO DAYS LATER. AT THAT TIME, MILITIA TOOK HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS, DOGTAGS, AND ID MEDIA, INTENDING TO GIVE THEM TO BINH HUU LY (SINCE DECEASED) OF THE DISTRICT MILITARY COMMAND. INSTEAD, "COMRADE BA" OF THE PAVN AIR DEFENSE UNIT WHICH HAD SHOT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT INSISTED HE BE GIVEN THESE ITEMS. JOINT TEAMS TWICE EXCAVATED THE AREA WHERE WITNESSES INSISTED CAPT MOORE WAS BURIED, BUT THE TEAMS FOUND NO REMAINS OR ANY EVIDENCE OF A BURIAL SITE.

ACCORDING TO THE "MILITARY REGION FOUR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS JOURNAL," CAPTAIN MOORE'S AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED BY THE 11TH BN OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE RGT, STATIONED AT CA TANG.

ON 4 AUGUST 1995, VIETNAM TURNED OVER A TYPEWRITTEN REPORT, DATED 16 MAY 1973, FROM THE CHIEF OF THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCY TO THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY. THIS DOCUMENT REPORTS ON THE LOCATIONS OF GRAVES OF U.S. PILOTS IN THE PROVINCE AND NOTES THE PRESENCE OF 24 GRAVES IN VARIOUS SCATTERED RURAL LOCATIONS. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, ONE GRAVE IN THANH HOA VILLAGE, TUYEN HOA DISTRICT, HAD NOT BEEN CHECKED AS OF THE TIME THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED. THIS IS THE SAME VILLAGE WHERE CAPT MOORE WAS REPORTEDLY BURIED. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, THE QUANG BINH PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCY INTENDED TO CHECK AND TO SURVEY THE REMAINING GRAVES TO EXHUME AND MOVE THE REMAINS TO STIPULATED LOCATIONS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

1. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATE THE OUTCOME OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCY TO CHECK AND SURVEY THE GRAVE AT THANH HOA VILLAGE AND TO EXHUME AND MOVE THE REMAINS TO A STIPULATED LOCATION. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE ALSO SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND RECORDS THAT CAN PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THESE ACTIONS.

2. REQUEST THE VNOSMP LOCATE FOR FUTURE JOINT REVIEW THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS:

- MR. THANG (THANGR), FORMER DEPUTY DISTRICT MILITARY COMMANDER.

- MR. DUYEN (ZUYEEN), A POLICY CADRE FROM THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS WHO AROUND 1975 TRAVELED TO ANOTHER VILLAGE IN TUYEN HOA DISTRICT TO LOCATE AND RE MARK THE GRAVE OF ANOTHER MISSING AMERICAN (CASE 0435 MILIKIN). WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCOVER WHETHER MR. DUYEN ALSO VISITED THANH HOA VILLAGE AND PERFORMED THE SAME TASK.

- "COMRADE BA", MEMBER OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT (POSSIBLY THE 11TH BN COMMANDER OR POLITICAL OFFICER) WHO TOOK CUSTODY OF CAPT MOORE'S PERSONAL ITEMS AND IDENTIFICATION MEDIA.

REFNO 1065 (HUNT)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

THIS CASE INVOLVES THE LOSS OF M41 TANK GUNNER CORPORAL ROBERT HUNT DURING A RECONNAISSANCE-IN-FORCE MISSION IN HOC MON DISTRICT, HO CHI MINH MUNICIPALITY (FORMERLY GIA DINH PROVINCE), ON 28 FEBRUARY 1968. CORPORAL HUNT WAS LAST SEEN STANDING ON THE BACK OF HIS TANK WHEN IT WAS STRUCK BY TWO RPG ROUNDS. THE REMAINS OF PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JAMES SCUITIER, ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE TANK CREW, WERE RECOVERED FROM THE BATTLEFIELD AFTER THE INCIDENT, BUT NO TRACE OF CORPORAL HUNT WAS EVER FOUND. PRIVATE SCUITIER'S NAME APPEARS ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST PROVIDED TO THE U.S. IN 1973. THE INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED AS PRIVATE SCUITIER IS REPORTED TO HAVE DIED ON 10 MARCH 1968. THE APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE SCUITIER'S ON THE DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST HAS LED U.S. ANALYSTS TO BELIEVE THAT VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES MAY HAVE MISTAKENLY IDENTIFIED CORPORAL HUNT AS PRIVATE SCUITIER.

IN THE COURSE OF OUR INVESTIGATIONS, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT A WOUNDED AMERICAN, SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE TO CORPORAL HUNT, WAS CAPTURED AFTER THE AMBUSH AND EVACUATED FROM THE AREA. WITNESSES HEARD THAT HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY KILLED IN AN AIR ATTACK.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE PROVIDE INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED ON THE DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST AS PRIVATE SCUITIER, SPECIFICALLY HOW HIS NAME CAME TO BE INCLUDED ON THE LIST. WE ARE LOOKING FOR ANY ORIGINAL SOURCE MATERIALS OR SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS USED TO COMPILE THE DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST, SUCH AS A DEATH CERTIFICATE OR A GRAVES REGISTRATION RECORD.

REFNO 1093 (RAY)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

PFC RAY AND 1LT DUNN WERE ACCOMPANYING THE ARVN 407TH SCOUT COMPANY ON A ROAD CLEARING MISSION WHEN THE GROUP WAS AMBUSHED AT MIDDAY ON 18 MARCH 1968. PFC RAY AND 1LT DUNN WERE CAPTURED AFTER THE FIREFIGHT, WHICH TOOK PLACE ALONG HIGHWAY 20, ABOUT 2 KM SOUTH OF DI LINH. THE TWO AMERICANS WERE TAKEN TO A FIELD DISPENSARY WHERE THEY STAYED UNTIL 2 APRIL 1968. THEY WERE THEN MOVED WEST INTO TAY NINH PROVINCE, AND THEY ARRIVED AT THE B2 FRONT POW CAMP IN MID-MAY. PFC RAY WAS HELD WITH OTHER AMERICANS IN A SERIES OF POW CAMPS ALONG THE VIETNAMESE/ CAMBODIAN BORDER. THE RETURNEES FROM THIS CAMP SAID PFC RAY BECAME VERY ILL WHILE IN CAPTIVITY, AND THEY LAST SAW HIM ALIVE IN NOVEMBER 1969.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM REVIEW OFFICIAL RECORDS TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF THE POW CAMP WHERE PFC RAY DIED.

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE LOCATE AND MAKE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW FORMER CADRE AND GUARDS FROM THE TB-21 PRISON CAMP WHO WERE PRESENT WHEN PFC RAY DIED IN NOVEMBER 1969. SOME OF THE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE CAMP STAFF AND THE B2 FRONT PROSELYTING CADRE HAVE DEMONSTRATED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THIS CASE DURING EARLIER INVESTIGATIONS. ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO FIND THE LOCATION OF THE CAMP, INVESTIGATORS HAVE HAD SUCCESS LOCATING THE V211 HOSPITAL, ANOTHER VAGUELY DEFINED AREA ALONG THE VIETNAMESE/CAMBODIAN BORDER.

REFNO 1112 (CICHON)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES

BACKGROUND:

SP4 CICHON, WOUNDED IN THE HEAD AND BELIEVED TO BE DEAD, WAS LEFT BEHIND WHEN HIS UNIT WAS FORCED TO WITHDRAW UNDER INTENSE ENEMY PRESSURE IN SA THAY DISTRICT OF WESTERN KONTUM PROVINCE ON 30 MARCH 68. ON 20 APRIL 68 TWO PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) SOLDIERS REPORTED THAT AFTER THE BATTLE THEY HAD SEEN A CAPTURED U.S. SOLDIER, FITTING CICHON'S DESCRIPTION AND WITH A HEAD WOUND, BEING GUARDED BY PRG PERSONNEL. THEY ALSO REPORTED THAT THE CAPTIVE WAS TAKEN TO A HOSPITAL IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA AND WAS TREATED AND INTERROGATED. SEVERAL CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND OTHER REPORTS DISCUSS THE CAPTURE OF AN AMERICAN WITH A HEAD WOUND, INDICATING HE WAS TAKEN FROM THE BATTLEFIELD FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATIONS HAVE ALSO LOCATED SEVERAL WITNESSES WHO REPORT THE CAPTURE OF AN AMERICAN WITH A HEAD WOUND. NO WITNESSES, HOWEVER, HAVE SHED LIGHT ON THE EVENTUAL FATE OR DISPOSITION OF SP4 CICHON.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS ATTEMPT TO LOCATE ANYONE WHO IS AWARE OF THE MOVEMENT, MEDICAL TREATMENT, INCARCERATION, AND EVENTUAL DISPOSITION OF SP4 CICHON. LOCATE WITNESSES TO THE 30 MAR 68 BATTLE NEAR CHU TANG MOUNTAIN, SA THAY DISTRICT, KONTUM PROVINCE, DURING WHICH SP4 CICHON WAS LOST. THESE INDIVIDUALS MAY INCLUDE FORMER MEMBERS OF:

320TH NVA REGIMENT: WARTIME REPORTS INDICATE THIS UNIT CAPTURED A WOUNDED U.S. SOLDIER IN MARCH 68 AND ESCORTED HIM TO THE T-3 MEDICAL FACILITY.

K7 BATTALION, 66TH NVA REGIMENT: WARTIME REPORTING INDICATES MEMBERS CAPTURED A WOUNDED U.S. SOLDIER FOLLOWING A BATTLE AT CHU TANG MOUNTAIN IN MARCH 68.

C187 COMPANY, 307TH LOCAL FORCE BATTALION, 62ND REGIMENT (PROBABLY H62 DISTRICT FORCES): MR. A MA LIN, FORMERLY OF THIS UNIT, SAID THE 62ND REGIMENT OPERATED WITH THE 66TH REGIMENT DURING THIS BATTLE, SAID THAT HE TOOK CUSTODY OF A WOUNDED U.S. SOLDIER, ESCORTED HIM AWAY FROM THE BATTLEFIELD, AND TURNED HIM OVER TO UNKNOWN CADRE FROM THE B-3 FRONT NEAR THE

VIETNAM/LAOS BORDER. OTHERS FROM THE C187 COMPANY MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

C107 LOCAL FORCES COMPANY, 67TH (H67) DISTRICT FORCES: MEMBERS WERE KNOWN TO HAVE SUPPORTED THE 66TH NVA REGIMENT.

T-3 MEDICAL UNIT, POSSIBLY ALSO KNOWN AS THE DT-3 FORWARD MEDICAL UNIT, SUBORDINATE TO THE B-3 FRONT: THE WOUNDED U.S. SOLDIER WAS REPORTEDLY TAKEN TO THE T-3 MEDICAL FACILITY.

COMMO-LIAISON STATIONS T3 AND T9, SUBORDINATE TO TROOP STATION NORTH DURING 1968: THE U.S. SOLDIER MAY HAVE BEEN MOVED THROUGH THESE STATIONS.

28TH NVA REGIMENT; 40TH NVA ARTILLERY REGIMENT; K26 SIGNAL BATTALION (B-3 FRONT); K27 GUARD BATTALION (B-3 FRONT); K28 RECONNAISSANCE SAPPER BATTALION (B-3 FRONT): THESE UNITS WERE KNOWN TO HAVE OPERATED IN BASE AREA 609, AN AREA NEAR THE LOSS LOCATION OF SP4 CICHON.

ALL THESE UNITS WERE KNOWN TO HAVE OPERATED IN THE KONTUM AREA DURING 1968: K5 BATTALION, 320TH NVA REGIMENT; K1 BATTALION, POSSIBLY SUBORDINATE TO THE 28TH NVA REGIMENT; 95TH (POSSIBLY 95B) NVA REGIMENT; 470TH NVA REGIMENT, ALSO KNOWN AS THE HE-70 REGIMENT; H5 DISTRICT FORCES, SUBORDINATE TO KONTUM PROVINCIAL FORCES.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

NAME 'S UNIT WAS ENGAGED WITH PAVN AND MILITIA FORCES IN A BATTLE NEAR THE BEN CUI RUBBER PLANTATION, 25 KM EAST OF TAY NINH CITY. AFTER HIS UNIT WITHDREW UNDER FIRE, NAME WAS REPORTED MISSING ALONG WITH ANOTHER SOLDIER. WHEN THE UNIT RETURNED TO THE AREA, THEY FOUND THE REMAINS OF THE OTHER MISSING AMERICAN, AND SOME NEWLY DUG GRAVES. THEY INVESTIGATED THE GRAVES AND DETERMINED THEY DID NOT CONTAIN AMERICAN REMAINS. THERE WAS NO SIGN OF NAME

TWO CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, WRITTEN ON 23 AUGUST 1968, REPORTED THE CAPTURE OF TWO AMERICANS BY ELEMENTS OF THE 7TH DIVISION. ONE OF THE AMERICANS WAS PFC WALTER FERGUSON, WHO WAS HELD IN VARIOUS CAMPS IN TAY NINH UNTIL HIS DEATH IN 1970. THE ONLY OTHER INDIVIDUAL MISSING IN THAT AREA AT THAT TIME WAS NAME. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS FROM 27 AUGUST 1968 REPORT ONLY ONE POW BEING TRANSFERRED TO A CAMP. OTHER REPORTING FROM AUGUST 1968 ALSO MENTIONS THE CAPTURE OF AN AMERICAN ON 22 AUGUST IN TAY NINH.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM RESEARCH RECORDS FROM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, SPECIFICALLY THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE 7TH DIVISION. SUBORDINATE UNITS OF THE DIVISION OPERATING IN THE BEN CUI AREA AT THE TIME PROBABLY INCLUDED ELEMENTS OF THE 9TH AND 27TH COMPANIES FROM 7TH BATTALION, 32ND REGIMENT; THE 141ST REGIMENT; 165TH REGIMENT; AND THE 52ND REGIMENT. ACCORDING TO THE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT EVENT BECAUSE THE ELEMENTS WHO CAPTURED THE AMERICANS WERE COMMENDED AND USED AS AN EXAMPLE TO ENCOURAGE THE REST OF THE DIVISION. OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE AREA INCLUDED: Q16 REGIMENT, COSVN; 100TH SAPPER COMPANY; 48TH (OR 49TH) TRANSPORT COMPANY; 82ND (OR 83RD) REAR SERVICES GROUP; 570TH SECURITY GROUP; TAY NINH 14TH LOCAL FORCES BATTALION; AND SEVERAL FIELD HOSPITALS (K-16, K-71B, K-79D).

REFNO 1260 (FERGUSON)

TYPE OF ACTION: INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCES AND SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

PFC FERGUSON BECAME MISSING NEAR LOC NINH, SONG BE (FORMERLY BINH LONG) PROVINCE WHEN HIS UNIT WAS OVERRUN. DOCUMENTS CAPTURED DURING THE WAR REPORTED PFC FERGUSON'S CAPTURE THE DAY AFTER THE INCIDENT. PFC FERGUSON WAS HELD WITH OTHER U.S. POWS IN VARIOUS CAMPS ON THE VIETNAM/ CAMBODIA BORDER FROM 1968-70.

IN 1973 AMERICAN RETURNEES PROVIDED CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PFC FERGUSON WAS SHOT WHILE TRYING TO ESCAPE IN MAY 1970. AFTER HE LEFT THE GROUP OF POWS, THEY HEARD THE GUARD CALL AFTER HIM, THEN HEARD GUNSHOTS, A SCREAM, AND THE SOUND OF SOMEONE FALLING TO THE GROUND. NO ONE SAW PFC FERGUSON AGAIN. AT THAT TIME, BECAUSE OF CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS, THE POW CAMPS WERE MOVED FREQUENTLY BACK AND FORTH ACROSS THE BORDER, MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE THE EXACT LOCATION WHERE PFC FERGUSON DIED. HIS NAME APPEARED ON THE DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST PRESENTED TO THE U.S. BY PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IN 1973.

THIS CASE WAS DISCUSSED SPECIFICALLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING THE FOUR PARTY JOINT MILITARY TALKS (FPMJT) IN 1973 AND 1974. DURING THE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT UNOFFICIALLY INDICATED THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE GRAVES OF U.S. POWS WERE KNOWN AND POSSIBLY AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION BY U.S. TEAM MEMBERS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH MORE RECENT WITNESSES WHO HAVE NOTED THAT THEY NOTE THAT THEY WERE TOLD BY HEADQUARTERS, CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, TO RECOVER THE REMAINS OF AMERICANS WHO DIED IN CAPTIVITY SO THE REMAINS COULD BE RETURNED AS THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PLANNED TO DO WITH NORTHERN DIED IN CAPTIVITY CASES.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM RESEARCH OFFICIAL ARCHIVES FOR INFORMATION ON THE RECOVERABILITY OF PFC FERGUSON'S REMAINS.

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE LOCATE AND MAKE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW MR. NONG VAN HUONG AND OTHER FORMER CADRE AND GUARDS FROM THE TB-21 OR TB-22 PRISON CAMP WHO WERE PRESENT WHEN PFC FERGUSON WAS KILLED.

REQUEST VNOSMP LOCATE THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS SO THEY CAN BE INTERVIEWED REGARDING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY CASES: GENERAL TRAN VAN TRA; MG HOANG ANH TUAN, CHIEF PRG DELEGATE; COL VO DONG GIANG, SENIOR COMMUNIST SPOKESMAN; VC MAJ PHUONG NAM; LTC SON. WE ARE INTERESTED SPECIFICALLY INFORMATION ON GRAVES LOCATIONS, EFFORTS AT FORMAL REMAINS RECOVERY, AND/OR PLANS TO CONDUCT SUCH OPERATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE DICS.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

ON SEPTEMBER 1968, NAME WAS BADLY WOUNDED WHILE HIS UNIT WAS ON A RECONNAISSANCE-IN-FORCE MISSION. WAS POINT MAN WHEN A FRAGMENTATION GRENADE EXPLODED NEAR HIM AND IGNITED THE SMOKE GRENADES ON HIS WEB GEAR. MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT WERE UNABLE TO RESCUE HIM BEFORE THEY LEFT THE AREA. WHEN THEY RETURNED TO THE AREA TWO DAYS LATER, THEY ONLY FOUND HIS HELMET AND PART OF HIS CANTEEN.

IN JANUARY 1969, U.S. FORCES CAPTURED A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1968 BY A LONG KHANH PROVINCIAL UNIT THAT REPORTED THE CAPTURE OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN FIGHTING BETWEEN 10-14 SEP 1968. ONE OF THE AMERICANS WAS CAPTURED WHEN A VIETNAMESE UNIT ATTACKED AN AMERICAN BATTALION NEAR ROUTE 13 IN LOC NINH DISTRICT. IN JANUARY 1972, A RALLIER PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT A WOUNDED AMERICAN CAPTURED IN AUGUST 1968 WHO DIED AT A FIELD DISPENSARY IN CAMBODIA SEVERAL DAYS AFTER HE WAS WOUNDED. IN JANUARY 1973, A FORMER GUARD AT A FIELD HOSPITAL IN CAMBODIA ALSO REPORTED THE BURIAL OF A U.S. SOLDIER AND, BASED ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE DESCRIBED, A TENTATIVE CORRELATION WAS MADE TO NAME. THE FIELD HOSPITAL WAS REPORTEDLY LOCATED NEAR THE BORDER IN THE VICINITY OF XU840250. NAME'S NAME WAS INCLUDED ON THE 1973 PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S DIED-IN-CAPTIVITY LIST.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM RESEARCH RECORDS FROM THE 7TH DIVISION AND HOSPITAL K-42 (OR DISPENSARY K-101). NAME WAS INITIALLY TREATED BY PERSONNEL AT THE 7TH DIVISION MEDICAL FACILITY AND, WHEN THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE TREATMENT, HE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE K-42 HOSPITAL.

REQUEST VIETNAM LOCATE PERSONNEL AFFILIATED WITH THE 7TH DIVISION AND HOSPITAL K-42 OR DISPENSARY K-101 IN ORDER TO CONFIRM THE LOCATION OF THE HOSPITAL, THE HOSPITAL CEMETERY, AND NAME'S GRAVESITE.

REFNO 1329 (FRANCISCO, NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES

BACKGROUND:

NAME AND 1ST LT FRANCISCO WERE FLYING AN F-4D AIRCRAFT THAT WAS DOWNED NEAR THE ENTRANCE TO THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL IN WESTERN QUANG BINH PROVINCE. BOTH EJECTED FROM THEIR AIRCRAFT AND, AFTER LANDING, MADE CONTACT WITH OTHER U.S. FORCES IN THE AIR. BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE LAST KNOWN TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO VIETNAMESE FORCES.

IN 1989, A JOINT TEAM LOCATED THE CRASH SITE OF THIS AIRCRAFT, BUT SINCE THE LOCAL POPULACE HAD BEEN EVACUATED FROM THE AREA DURING WARTIME, NO WITNESSES COULD BE FOUND WHO COULD TELL US WHAT HAPPENED TO NAME AND 1ST LT FRANCISCO. WARTIME MEDIA RELEASES, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, AND ITEMS ON DISPLAY IN VIETNAMESE MUSEUMS DEMONSTRATED THAT VIETNAM HAD EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS CASE. SO TOO DID WARTIME PHOTOS SHOWING NAME 'S BODY, AS WELL AS PERSONAL ITEMS BELONGING TO BOTH AVIATORS.

EARLIER THIS YEAR WE WERE FINALLY SUCCESSFUL IN INTERVIEWING A FORMER PEOPLES ARMY OF VIETNAM COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHER WHO PROVIDED A CREDIBLE AND DETAILED ACCOUNT OF AN INCIDENT IN WHICH HE TOOK PHOTOS OF TWO AMERICAN AIRMEN WHO HAD BEEN KILLED FOLLOWING THEIR SHOOTDOWN. WHILE WE PLAN TO SEE IF THIS PHOTOGRAPHER CAN LEAD US TO THE BURIAL SITES, WE ALSO WISH TO FIND ADDITIONAL WITNESSES WHO MAY BE ABLE TO ASSIST IN RESOLVING THIS CASE.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM SEARCH FOR ADDITIONAL WITNESSES WHO WERE PRESENT DURING THIS INCIDENT AND CAN IDENTIFY WHERE EACH MAN DIED. THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATES WILL BE FORMER SOLDIERS ASSIGNED TO THIS AREA, IN PARTICULAR MEMBERS OF THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT WHO WERE ON THE SCENE DURING THE SHOOTDOWN. ACCORDING TO THE PHOTOGRAPHER WHO TOOK PICTURES AFTER THE INCIDENT, MEMBERS OF A YOUTH ASSAULT GROUP WERE ALSO PRESENT.

REFNO 1456 (SPARKS)

TYPE ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

PFC DONALD SPARKS WAS CAPTURED IN JUNE 1969, WEST OF TAM KY TOWN, BY ELEMENTS OF 8TH BATTALION, 31ST REGIMENT, 2D PAVN DIVISION. AFTER INITIAL EVACUATION, HE WAS HELD IN A DETENTION SYSTEM ADMINISTERED BY THE MILITARY PROSELYTIZING OFFICE OF MILITARY REGION FIVE (MR5). HE WAS NOT HELD IN THE MR5 POW CAMP IN QUANG NAM. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE RUMORS THAT HE WOULD BE TRANSFERRED THERE, HE NEVER WAS. HIS RECOVERY FROM WOUNDS IS DOCUMENTED IN LETTERS HE WROTE IN APRIL 1970 WHILE IN CAPTIVITY.

JOINT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE REVEALED THAT PFC SPARKS WAS HELD IN AN MR5 HOSPITAL IN TIEN LANH VILLAGE, JUST EAST OF THE TRANH (AKA TRANG) RIVER, UNTIL EARLY 1970. WITNESSES ACKNOWLEDGE HE WAS VISITED BY MR5 CADRE AND THAT IT WAS MR5 CADRE WHO TOOK HIM AWAY AFTER HIS WOUNDS HAD HEALED; HOWEVER, NO DEFINITE INFORMATION HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING ABOUT HIS FATE OR DISPOSITION AFTER HE WAS TAKEN WESTWARD ACROSS THE TRANG RIVER.

THE T-154 POW CAMP WAS LOCATED ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE TRANG RIVER, OPPOSITE TIEN LANH VILLAGE ON THE EAST, DURING THIS TIME. THIS CAMP OR ITS SUB-CAMPS MAY HAVE ALSO BEEN KNOWN AS CAMP 1 OR CAMP 110. THIS CAMP HELD REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (RVN) PRISONERS, BUT ONE FORMER RVN PRISONER CLAIMED "DON," AN AMERICAN POW, WAS HELD ALSO THERE DURING EARLY 1970. BECAUSE PFC SPARKS NEVER ARRIVED AT THE MR5 MAIN POW CAMP, AND BECAUSE JOINT INVESTIGATION WITNESSES SAY HE WAS TAKEN ACROSS THE RIVER IN THIS IMMEDIATE AREA IN EARLY 1970, WE SUSPECT HE MAY HAVE BEEN HELD IN THIS CAMP FOR A TIME.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM LOCATE AND MAKE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW FORMER STAFF, AS WELL AS FORMER RVN PRISONERS, OF THE WARTIME T-154 POW CAMP DURING LATE 1969 AND 1970. T-154 CAMP WAS MOVED EAST INTO TIEN LANH VILLAGE AFTER THE WAR, WHERE IT SERVED AS A REEDUCATION CAMP FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE POSTWAR CAMP IS NOT OF ANY INTEREST, BUT ANY LONGTIME PRISONERS OR CAMP PERSONNEL WHO MOVED WITH THE CAMP MAY HAVE RELEVANT INFORMATION.

REQUEST VIETNAM LOCATE AND MAKE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW FORMER STAFF, AS WELL AS FORMER PRISONERS, OF THE RVN SECTION OF THE MR5 MAIN CAMP (U.S. AND RVN SUB-CAMPS WERE GEOGRAPHICALLY SEGREGATED BY A FEW KILOMETERS), WHO MAY HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF A SINGLE AMERICAN DETAINED THERE OR ELSEWHERE.

REQUEST VIETNAM CONTACT QUANG NAM - DA NANG AUTHORITIES REGARDING FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM SUPPORTING THE PCIT INVESTIGATION IN AUGUST 1994. THEY PROMISED TO CONSULT WITH THE CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION AND SPECIAL INFORMATION OFFICE (PHONGF ZAAAN VAANJ VAF TUYEEN TRUYEENF DAWCJ BIEETJ). THE TASK TEAM POINTED OUT THAT THAT OFFICE, DUE TO ITS MISSION, HAS THE MOST INFORMATION ABOUT THE LOCATION AND WARTIME EXPERIENCE OF THE RESIDENTS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES, ENABLING THEM TO LOCATE FORMER RVN POWS AND FORMER CAMP STAFF MEMBERS WHO STILL RESIDE IN THE REGION.

REFNO 1504 (COOK)

TYPE OF ACTION: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS AND SEARCH FOR WITNESSES ASSOCIATED WITH FINDING REMAINS

BACKGROUND:

ON 21 OCT 1969 MAJ JOHN L. ESPENSHIELD, OBSERVER, AND 1LT GLENN R. COOK, PILOT, WERE CREW MEMBERS ABOARD ON O-2A AIRCRAFT ON AN AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER THE HO VALLEY, WEST OF CAM RANH BAY. THE AIRCRAFT WAS REPORTED MISSING AFTER IT FAILED TO RETURN TO BASE. THE LAST RADIO CONTACT WAS MADE WHEN THE AIRCRAFT WAS REPORTED TO BE IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES BP 587459. AT THAT TIME, LIEUTENANT COOK REPORTED THAT HE WAS DIVERTING TO A SECONDARY TARGET BECAUSE OF WEATHER IN THE INITIAL TARGET AREA. AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORT FAILED TO LOCATE THE CRASHSITE.

ON 23 JANUARY 1989, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT RETURNED REMAINS ALLEGED TO BE MARTIN H. SCANLOW. THESE REMAINS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS MAJOR ESPENSHIED. VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS REPORTED THAT THEY CONFISCATED THE REMAINS IN HO CHI MINH CITY AND WERE UNABLE TO FIND ANY RECORDS OR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CONFISCATED REMAINS. NO INDIVIDUAL NAMED "MARTIN H. SCANLOW" IS MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM LOCATE RECORDS THAT TRACK THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE REMAINS TURNED OVER IN 1989. IT IS POSSIBLE THESE MAY BE FOUND UNDER THE NAME "MARTIN H. SCANLOW," THE NAME UNDER WHICH THE REMAINS WERE TURNED OVER.

REQUEST VIETNAM IDENTIFY AND LOCATE THE INDIVIDUAL FROM WHOM THE REMAINS WERE CONFISCATED. WE WOULD LIKE TO INTERVIEW THIS PERSON, WHO WE HOPE MIGHT BE ABLE TO LEAD US TO THE CRASHSITE WHERE THE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED.

REFNO 1536 (PIRRUCCELLO)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES, SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS AND INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE RECOVERY OF REMAINS

BACKGROUND:

ON 8 DECEMBER 1968, CAPTAIN JOSEPH S. PIRRUCCELLO WAS FLYING AN A-1E AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF A SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION NEAR PHOU PHA THI IN HOUAPHAN PROVINCE, LAOS, WHEN HE WAS SHOT DOWN NEAR UH 593727. CAPTAIN PIRRUCCELLO'S IDENTIFICATION CARD WAS DISPLAYED IN THE LAO MILITARY MUSEUM, AND THE LAO GOVERNMENT PROVIDED A PHOTOCOPY OF THE ID CARD TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN 1988. IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1993, THE LAO NEWSPAPER PASASON CARRIED AN ARTICLE ABOUT THE BATTLE FOR PHOU PHA THI; THE ARTICLE CREDITED THE "KHO 18 PATCHAI" UNIT FOR DOWNING A U.S. AIRCRAFT DURING THE 24-27 DECEMBER BATTLE. THIS REPORT HAS BEEN CORRELATED TO REFNO 1536.

THIS CASE WAS INVESTIGATED IN MARCH 1994. ALTHOUGH SOME WRECKAGE WAS FOUND, THE CRASHSITE COULD NOT BE CORRELATED TO THIS CASE, AND NO REMAINS OR ARTIFACTS WERE FOUND. HOWEVER, RELIABLE INFORMATION INDICATES THE LAO GOVERNMENT UNDERTOOK UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE PHOU PHA THI AREA IN 1977 AND MAY HAVE RECOVERED AMERICAN REMAINS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE RECOVERY OF CAPTAIN PIRRUCCELLO'S IDENTIFICATION CARD.

REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT LOCATE FOR INTERVIEW: COMRADE YEU VA; CHEU SONG; AND MAJOR SIVON. CHEU SONG IS LISTED IN THE PASASON ARTICLE AS A FORMER COMMANDER OF "KHO 18" AND, AS OF 1993, WAS THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE POLITICAL OFFICE IN HOUAPHAN PROVINCE. MAJOR SIVON WAS IDENTIFIED IN THE PASASON ARTICLE AS COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, HOUA MEUANG DISTRICT.

REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT REVIEW ITS RECORDS OF PREVIOUS UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS, IDENTIFY AND LOCATE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN SUCH INVESTIGATIONS FOR JOINT INTERVIEW, AND PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THOSE INVESTIGATIONS.

REFNO 1538 (LONG)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

ON 20 DECEMBER 1969, CAPTAIN CARL LONG WAS FLYING AS AN OBSERVER ON AN OV-10 WHEN IT WAS SHOT DOWN BY ENEMY FORCES. SALVAGE OPERATIONS BEGAN IMMEDIATELY AND RESULTED IN THE RECOVERY OF PARTIAL REMAINS OF THE PILOT. FURTHER RECOVERY EFFORTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN LOCATING CAPTAIN LONG'S REMAINS, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF THE CRASHSITE BEING IN A MUDBANK NEXT TO A RIVER.

IN 1987, A VILLAGER CLAIMED TO HAVE RECOVERED THE REMAINS AND WALLET OF CAPTAIN LONG. THE REMAINS INCLUDED: 6 LARGE SHAFTS OF BONE; 28 RIB BONES; 21 VERTABRAE; 4 SKULL FRAGMENTS; 2 HIP BONES; 2 ARM BONES; AND A WALLET WITH CAPTAIN LONG'S MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD AND OTHER PAPERS. THESE REMAINS AND THE WALLET CONTENTS WERE TURNED OVER TO LOCAL OFFICIALS AND EVENTUALLY TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AT WHICH POINT THEY WERE SIGNED FOR BY MR. HO XUAN DICH.

DURING THE 19TH JFA, THE MAN WHO ALLEGEDLY DISCOVERED THE WALLET AND REMAINS, TURNED OVER A PAIR OF ROTTED BOOTS WITH FOOT BONES INSIDE, WHICH HE STATED CAME FROM THE SAME CRASHSITE. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED THE PROVINCE SECURITY OFFICER WHO SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT THE REMAINS HE GAVE TO MR. DICH IN 1987 WERE FROM THIS CASE. THESE REMAINS WERE REPORTEDLY EXAMINED DURING A FORENSIC REVIEW IN DECEMBER 1988 AND WERE REJECTED AS MONGOLOID. THE FOOT BONES ARE AT CILHI AWAITING IDENTIFICATION.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM REVIEW THEIR RECORDS TO ASCERTAIN IF REMAINS REPORTEDLY EXAMINED IN DECEMBER 1988 DURING THE FORENSIC REVIEW WERE IN FACT THOSE TURNED IN DURING 1987. MR. DICH SIGNED FOR CAPTAIN LONG'S WALLET AND CONTENTS, BUT THESE EFFECTS WERE NOT TURNED OVER TO U.S. CUSTODY SO THEY COULD BE RETURNED TO THE FAMILY. REQUEST A RECORDS SEARCH TO DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION OF THESE PERSONAL EFFECTS.

REFNO 1719 (ARD, BURNETT)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW.

BACKGROUND:

ON 7 MAR 71, LTC BURNETT AND WO1 ARD WERE ABOARD AN OH58A THAT WAS SHOT DOWN IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. TWO SURVIVORS FLEEING AN ENEMY PATROL REPORTED THAT BOTH MEN WERE ALIVE BUT SEVERELY WOUNDED. WHEN A RESCUE PARTY ARRIVED, NO TRACE OF THE MISSING PERSONNEL COULD BE FOUND.

A WARTIME REPORT STATED THAT AN AMERICAN POW WOUNDED IN A HELICOPTER CRASH DURING MARCH 1971 WAS CARRIED TO THE VIETNAMESE ARMY HOSPITAL 42 OF THE B-70TH MILITARY COMMAND HEADQUARTERS AT XD594559. THIS AMERICAN SUBSEQUENTLY DIED AND WAS BURIED NEAR THIS FACILITY.

THE CRASH SITE AREA HAS BEEN SURVEYED, BUT NO EVIDENCE ON THIS CASE WAS FOUND. THE AREA OF THE ABANDONED HOSPITAL WAS ALSO SEARCHED, BUT ALL GRAVES WERE FOUND TO BE EMPTY. RESIDENTS REPORTED THAT VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS HAD REMOVED THESE BODIES IN 1988 AND 1989.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM SEARCH FOR FORMER MEMBERS OF THE 1ST CO, 18TH BN, 210TH RGT, 75TH ARTILLERY DIVISION, WHO MAY HAVE WITNESSED THIS INCIDENT.

REQUEST VIETNAM ALSO SEARCH FOR PERSONS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE OPERATIONS OF HOSPITAL 42 DURING WARTIME OR ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE CEMETERY NEAR THIS HOSPITAL. ACCORDING TO NGUYEN NGOC THANH, AN ASSISTANT PLATOON LEADER OF THE 25TH ENGINEERING BATTALION, ONE AMERICAN FROM THIS CASE WAS BURIED ON THE "TALOY SLOPE" IN A CEMETERY NEAR HOSPITAL 42.

REQUEST VIETNAM IDENTIFY AND LOCATE FOR JOINT INTERVIEW MEMBERS OF A GROUP OF VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS WHO REPORTEDLY RETURNED TO THIS CEMETERY IN 1988 AND 1989 TO REMOVE REMAINS.

REFNO 1843 (WILES)

TYPE OF ACTION: INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS

BACKGROUND:

LT. WILES' A7E WAS STRUCK BY A SAM WHILE HE AND HIS WINGMAN WERE ATTACKING SAM SITES. HE EJECTED, AND HIS CHUTE WAS SEEN TO DESCEND INTO A POPULATED AREA. CONTEMPORARY MEDIA AND DOCUMENTS, ON-SITE INVESTIGATIONS, AND WARTIME REPORTS, ALL POINT TOWARD LT. WILES BEING KILLED WHILE TRYING TO RESIST CAPTURE.

JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE TEAMS INVESTIGATED THE INCIDENT IN APRIL-MAY 1990, AND AGAIN IN OCTOBER 1994, IN VAN TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THESE INVESTIGATIONS INCLUDED INTERVIEWS OF WITNESSES, EXAMINATION OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE, AND EXCAVATION OF THE ALLEGED GRAVE SITE AT GRID COORDINATE XE 54584949. THOUGH THE INFORMATION GATHERED WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT LIEUTENANT WILES HAD DIED, REGRETTABLY IT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ASCERTAIN THE PRESENT LOCATION OF HIS REMAINS.

AS EVIDENCED BY CONTEMPORARY VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTS SHARED WITH U.S. INVESTIGATORS, THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WAS VERY MUCH AWARE OF THIS INCIDENT AND HAD APPARENTLY MADE EARLIER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO LOCATE THE REMAINS. THE JOINT EXCAVATION CONFIRMED THAT THE REMAINS ARE NO LONGER BURIED AT THEIR ORIGINAL LOCATION. WITNESSES SAID THE SITE HAD BEEN DUG UP ON THREE EARLIER OCCASIONS, BUT THEY WERE NOTICEABLY RETICENT IN IDENTIFYING WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY DUG UP THE GRAVESITE.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

AT THIS POINT, WE CAN CONCLUDE WITH CERTAINTY THAT LT. WILES' REMAINS WERE EXHUMED AND MOVED, POSSIBLY BY LOCAL OFFICIALS OR PERHAPS BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS WITH QUESTIONABLE MOTIVES. THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MUST PLAY THE DOMINANT ROLE IN RESOLVING THE CASE. THEREFORE, VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS ARE REQUESTED TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION IN VAN TRACH VILLAGE, TO SOLICIT THE ASSISTANCE OF THE LOCAL POPULACE IN IDENTIFYING WHO REMOVED LT. WILES' REMAINS, AND TO MAKE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO RECOVER AND REPATRIATE THESE REMAINS.

REFNO 1870 (FOWLER, SEUELL)

TYPE OF ACTION: LOCATE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW

BACKGROUND:

ON 6 JUNE 1972 MAJ JAMES FOWLER AND CAPT JOHN SEUELL, WERE FLYING THE LEAD F-4D AIRCRAFT ON A MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM. AS THEIR FLIGHT APPROACHED THE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM) RING PROTECTING THE YEN BAI AIRFIELD, BOTH MIG FIGHTERS AND SAM MISSILES WERE ENCOUNTERED. MAJ FOWLER FAILED TO REACT TO A SAM WARNING, AND A MISSILE DETONATED NEAR HIS AIRCRAFT, CAUSING IT TO BURST INTO FLAMES, BUT NOT TO DISINTEGRATE. NO EJECTION OR PARACHUTES WERE SEEN, AND NO BEEPER SIGNALS WERE HEARD. BECAUSE THE CRASH SITE WAS LOCATED IN SUCH A STRONGLY DEFENDED LOCATION, NO GROUND OR AERIAL SEARCH EFFORTS WERE CONDUCTED. WARTIME REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE 261ST SAM REGIMENT WAS INVOLVED IN THE DOWNING, AND BOTH OF THE PILOTS WERE DEAD.

ON 4 DECEMBER 1985, VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS TURNED OVER MAJ FOWLER'S MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD AND CAPT SEUELL'S MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD AND GENEVA CONVENTION CARD. THEY SAID THAT THESE ITEMS AND THE PERSONAL EFFECTS OF HIS CREWMATE WERE OBTAINED FROM LOCAL PEOPLE OF THE YEN BINH AREA OF YEN BAI PROVINCE. PHOTOGRAPHS OF CAUCASIAN REMAINS POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE DEPICT A VIETNAMESE SOLDIER EXAMINING AN INTACT CAUCASIAN BODY. THE CORRELATION OF THE PHOTOS TO THIS CASE IS BASED ON VIETNAMESE ANNOTATIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE PHOTOS NAMING CAPT SEUELL, THE CORRECT AIRCRAFT, DATE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS.

TWO INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING A JOINT SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM AND JOINT RECOVERY TEAM RESULTED IN NEGATIVE FINDINGS. THE JOINT RECOVERY ELEMENT CONDUCTED AN EXCAVATION OF A BURIAL SITE NEAR DONG DAO HAMLET, DAI DONG VILLAGE, YEN BINH DISTRICT, YEN BAI PROVINCE. NO HUMAN REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR MATERIAL EVIDENCE WERE EXCAVATED FROM EITHER SITE. OF SIGNIFICANCE, MATERIAL EVIDENCE CORRELATING TO AN F-4 AIRCRAFT WAS FOUND DURING THE SURFACE SEARCH OF THE CRASH SITE.

ON 18 MAY 1995, THE SRV TURNED OVER DOCUMENTATION FOR CASE 1870 STATING THAT MEMBERS OF THE MILITIA HAD BURIED THE REMAINS OF BOTH CREW MEMBERS 800 METERS FROM WHERE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED. PREVIOUS INFORMATION IN U.S. RECORDS DOES NOT GIVE A SPECIFIC DISTANCE FROM THE CRASH SITE AT WHICH THE BODIES WERE INTERRED.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

IDENTIFY AND LOCATE FOR INTERVIEW FORMER CADRE ASSIGNED TO ELEMENTS OF THE 261ST SAM REGIMENT OPERATING IN THE LOSS AREA AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT. WE HOPE TO FIND SOMEONE WHO CAN IDENTIFY AN EXACT BURIAL LOCATION.

REFNO 1924 (BUELL, DONNELLY)

TYPE OF ACTION: INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS AND LOCATE WITNESS FOR INTERVIEW.

BACKGROUND:

IN SEPTEMBER 1990, VIETNAM REPATRIATED THE REMAINS OF CDR DONNELLY. HIS FELLOW CREW MEMBER, LCDR BUELL, IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR.

IN AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1994, A JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED THIS CASE IN CAM LY VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE. LOCAL WITNESSES SAID A U.S. AIRCRAFT HAD CRASHED AT NIGHT INTO A LOCAL MOUNTAIN. THEY DESCRIBED FINDING SCATTERED REMAINS AT THE SITE, WHICH WERE BURIED NEARBY. WITNESSES SAID THEY BELIEVED THEY HAD RECOVERED FRAGMENTED REMAINS OF TWO PILOTS. ACCORDING TO MR. NGUYEN TIEN SI, SOMETIME IN 1986, HE EXCAVATED THE GRAVE SITE AND FOUND THESE FRAGMENTED REMAINS. DISTRICT AND PROVINCE AUTHORITIES FOUND OUT, HOWEVER, AND ARRESTED EVERYONE INVOLVED, CONFISCATING THE REMAINS.

DURING REINVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE IN JANUARY 1995, THE VNOSMP PROVIDED A RECORD DOCUMENTING THE CONFISCATION OF THESE REMAINS BY DISTRICT AUTHORITIES IN APRIL 1986. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, THE REMAINS WERE TURNED OVER TO NGUYEN BA SUNG, PA15 PROVINCE SECURITY POLICE, 17 APRIL 1986. THIS RECORD CONTAINED AN INVENTORY OF THE REMAINS SEIZED. COMPARISON OF THE ITEMIZED BONE FRAGMENTS WITH THE REMAINS REPATRIATED IN SEPTEMBER 1990 REVEALS SOME DISCREPANCIES.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VNOSMP INVESTIGATE THE DISCREPANCY IN THE REMAINS LISTED IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY DOCUMENT AND THE REMAINS RETURNED TO U.S. CONTROL AND LATER IDENTIFIED AS CDR DONNELLY.

REQUEST VIETNAM REPATRIATE ANY ADDITIONAL FRAGMENTARY REMAINS SEIZED BY DISTRICT AUTHORITIES IN 1986 AND TURNED OVER TO NGUYEN BA SUNG OF THE HA BAC PROVINCE SECURITY POLICE ON 17 APRIL 1986.

REQUEST VIETNAM LOCATE NGUYEN BA SUNG AND MAKE HIM AVAILABLE FOR JOINT INTERVIEW.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS AND INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

ON OCTOBER 1972, NAME 'S F4D WAS SHOT DOWN OVER VINH PHU PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. HIS CREWMATE WAS CAPTURED AND SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED IN 1973 DURING OPERATION HOMECOMING.

IN SEPTEMBER 1990, THE VIETNAMESE REPATRIATED REMAINS THEY ASSOCIATED WITH NAME. THESE REMAINS, HOWEVER, WERE IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF REFNO 0914, LOST AT ANOTHER TIME, IN ANOTHER LOCATION, AND IN A DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT THAN WAS NAME. INTERESTINGLY, THE VIETNAMESE HAD EARLIER REPATRIATED REMAINS THEY CLAIMED WERE THOSE OF CASE 0914, BUT THESE HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF CASE 0781. ALL THREE LOSSES OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE.

WITNESSES INTERVIEWED IN VAN LUONG VILLAGE, TAM THANH DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE, DURING FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OF THIS INCIDENT CLAIMED THAT REMAINS FOUND IN THE WRECKAGE ASSOCIATED WITH NAME 'S LOSS WERE EXHUMED BY DISTRICT AUTHORITIES WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE INCIDENT. IN 1993, MORE REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH NAME

WERE TURNED OVER BY VILLAGERS WHO CLAIMED THEY WERE RECOVERED FROM THE CRASHSITE INVESTIGATED BY THE MOST RECENT JOINT TEAM.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE REVIEW THEIR RECORDS TO DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION OF NAME 'S REMAINS. IN ATTEMPTING TO RETURN REMAINS FROM AVIATORS LOST IN VINH PHU PROVINCE, VIETNAM HAS CONFUSED INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THREE INDIVIDUALS' REMAINS. WE BELIEVE THAT A REVIEW OF ARCHIVAL RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE RECOVERY OF EACH OF THESE SETS OF REMAINS SHOULD BE ABLE TO SORT OUT THE ACCOUNTING MIX-UP, TO SHED LIGHT ON THE REMAINS TURNED OVER IN 1993, AND TO ADDRESS THE WITNESS STATEMENTS THAT

NAME 'S REMAINS WERE SUBJECT TO AN OFFICIAL RECOVERY EFFORT.

REFNO DATA (NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

IN 1989, VIETNAM REPATRIATED REMAINS ALLEGED TO BE THOSE OF NAME . THE REMAINS WERE LATER IDENTIFIED AS REFNO 0083 (KARDEL).

DURING THE 26TH JFA, WITNESSES FROM TAN NINH VILLAGE, TRIEU SON DISTRICT, IDENTIFIED A CRASH SITE WHICH CORRELATED TO REFNO 0083. THESE WITNESSES REPORTED THAT THE PILOT'S REMAINS WERE BURIED SHORTLY AFTER THE INCIDENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXHUMED BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AROUND 1975. ONE WITNESS STATED THAT TRIEU SON DISTRICT AUTHORITIES HAD DOCUMENTATION OF THE EXHUMATION.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VNOSMP INVESTIGATE TO DETERMINE WHAT HAPPENED TO THE REMAINS RECOVERED BY TRIEU SON DISTRICT AUTHORITIES FROM TAN NINH VILLAGE IN 1975. WITNESSES CONSISTENTLY REPORT THAT THESE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED BY DISTRICT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING TWO UNNAMED PERSONS WHO ARE NOW RESIDENTS OF DAC LAC PROVINCE.

REQUEST VIETNAMESE RESEARCH TRIEU SON DISTRICT, THANH HOA PROVINCE, AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS FOR INFORMATION ON THE RECOVERY OF NAME 'S REMAINS.

REQUEST VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATE TO DETERMINE THE BASIS ON WHICH REMAINS RETURNED IN 1989 CAME TO BE MISTAKENLY IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF NAME .

REFNO 1952 (NAME , WARD)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

LT COL WARD AND NAME WERE LOST DURING A NIGHTTIME COMBAT MISSION NEAR HANOI ON 18 DECEMBER 1972. SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS WERE INITIATED WHEN THE AIR CONTROLLERS LOST CONTACT WITH THEIR AIRCRAFT. THE SEARCH WAS CALLED OFF AFTER FOUR DAYS DURING WHICH THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGNS OF EITHER THE MISSING F111 OR THE CREW. A SAM BATTALION IN HAIPHONG REPORTED SHOOTING DOWN AN UNIDENTIFIED U.S. AIRCRAFT AT NIGHT ON 18 DECEMBER; THIS REPORT MAY CORRELATE TO THIS LOSS. ONE OTHER AIRCRAFT WAS LOST ON THE SAME DATE BUT THAT INCIDENT HAPPENED SEVERAL HOURS BEFORE THIS LOSS AND THE REPORTED SHOOTDOWN.

DURING PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OF AIR LOSSES IN THE AREA, REFERENCES TO THIS INCIDENT WERE FOUND IN ARCHIVAL RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE HAIPHONG CITY MUSEUM. A PHOTO ASSOCIATED WITH NAME WAS ALSO FOUND IN VIETNAMESE RECORDS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE REVIEW THEIR RECORDS FOR INFORMATION ON THIS CASE, SPECIFICALLY, HOW THE PHOTO OF NAME WAS ACQUIRED, WHO TOOK IT, AND WHERE IT WAS TAKEN. WE ARE ALSO SEEKING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE FATE OF THE CREW AND/OR THE WHEREABOUTS OF THEIR REMAINS.

REFNO 1965: (BENNETT)

TYPE OF ACTION: SEARCH FOR WITNESSES AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BACKGROUND:

CAPTAIN BENNETT'S B52D WAS LOST ON A NIGHT BOMBING MISSION OVER THE HANOI AREA ON 22 DECEMBER 1972. THREE CREWMEMBERS EJECTED SAFELY, WERE CAPTURED, AND RETURNED TO THE U.S. DURING OPERATION HOMECOMING IN 1973. THE REMAINS OF TWO OTHER CREWMEMBERS WERE REPATRIATED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IN 1988. CAPTAIN BENNETT IS THE ONLY INDIVIDUAL STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR FROM THE CREW.

IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1994, A CRASHSITE NEAR TRUNG SON VILLAGE, LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE WAS EXCAVATED. THE EXCAVATION YIELDED B52 AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE, BUT NOT ENOUGH TO IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC B52. NO HUMAN REMAINS WERE RECOVERED, AND THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE RECOVERED NEITHER CONFIRMED OR DENIED THAT AN INDIVIDUAL WAS IN THE AIRCRAFT AT THE TIME OF IMPACT.

ACCORDING TO A WARTIME DOCUMENT FROM HOA BINH PROVINCE, PASSED TO US IN 1992, THE VIETNAMESE WERE AWARE AT THE TIME OF CAPTAIN BENNETT'S SHOOTDOWN THAT THREE INDIVIDUALS FROM THE AIRCRAFT WERE KILLED. THE REMAINS OF TWO WERE REPATRIATED IN 1988, LEAVING CAPTAIN BENNETT AS THE ONLY POSSIBLE CHOICE TO BE THE THIRD INDIVIDUAL. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS KNEW A THIRD CREWMAN WAS KILLED OR IF THEY WERE IN POSSESSION OF HIS REMAINS.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE RESEARCH RECORDS AND LOCATE INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE COLLECTION AND REPATRIATION OF THE OTHER TWO CREWMEN'S REMAINS.

REFNO 1977 (JOHNSTON)

TYPE OF ACTION:

LOCATE WITNESS; UNILATERAL SEARCH FOR ADDITIONAL WITNESSES; AND ARCHIVAL RESEARCH INTO CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS AND DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.

BACKGROUND:

ON 4 JAN 1973, CAPTAIN STEVEN JOHNSTON WAS LOST DURING A BOMBING MISSION OVER SOUTHERN LAOS. ON 6 DECEMBER 1994, A TEAM INTERVIEWED RESIDENTS OF BAN KANG (WD986359) WHO DESCRIBED THE BURIAL OF ONE INDIVIDUAL AND A SUBSEQUENT EXCAVATION OF THE GRAVE EIGHT MONTHS LATER BY DISTRICT/PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS. THE PHIN DISTRICT MAYOR, MR. KHAMPHONE TONEMANY, STATED THAT IN 1974, AN ORDER CAME FROM VIENTIANE FOR THE RECOVERY OF REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS; HOWEVER, FOLLOWING EXCAVATION OF THE GRAVE, THE ORDER WAS CHANGED AND REQUIRED THAT ONLY LIVE POWS BE TURNED OVER. LAO OFFICIALS HAVE VERIFIED REMAINS WERE RECOVERED, BUT FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. IN OCTOBER 1995, VICE FOREIGN MINISTER SOUBANH AGREED THAT THE LAO WOULD INITIATE A UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST THE LAO GOVERNMENT RE-INTERVIEW BAN KANG WITNESS MR. GNONG AND LOCATE AND INTERVIEW ALLEGED WITNESS MR. VONG TO DETERMINE THE MANNER IN WHICH THE REMAINS WERE EXHUMED AND STORED FOR SHIPMENT TO VIENTIANE.

MR. GNONG HAS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED MR. KHAMLOY AND MR. BOUNPON AS THE PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE RECOVERY OF THE BODY. REQUEST LAO AUTHORITIES LOCATE THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS FOR INTERVIEW.

FURTHER REQUEST RE-INTERVIEW OF MR. KHAMPHONE, THE PHIN MAYOR, REGARDING HIS RECOLLECTION OF AN ORDER TO TURN OVER "LIVE POWS." WE ARE INTERESTED IN LEARNING WHO GAVE THE ORDER, WHAT BECAME OF THE ORDER, WHETHER ANY LIVE POWS WERE TURNED OVER, AND WHAT MIGHT HAVE BECOME OF THE REMAINS THAT WERE EXHUMED.

REFNO 1978 (NAME, NAME , NAME , STINSON, NAME)

TYPE OF ACTION: INVESTIGATE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS AND SEARCH FOR ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS.

BACKGROUND:

ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, A JOINT TEAM OF U.S. AND VIETNAMESE MEMBERS HAS INVESTIGATED THE 1973 SHOOTDOWN OF THIS HELICOPTER IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. DURING THESE INVESTIGATIONS WE INTERVIEWED NUMEROUS RESIDENTS AND OFFICIALS FROM THE AREA. BASED UPON THEIR TESTIMONY WE LOCATED AND EXHUMED THE REMAINS OF ONE SOLDIER, WHO HAS SINCE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A MEMBER OF THE HELICOPTER CREW.

WITNESSES HAVE ALSO PROVIDED CORROBORATING AND CONSISTENT INFORMATION THAT IN THE LATE 1970S OR EARLY 1980S, OFFICIALS OF MILITARY REGION FOUR DISINTERRED AND REMOVED THE REMAINS OF THREE OR FOUR OTHER AMERICANS WHO HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE CRASH AND BURIED NEARBY. WE CAN FIND NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE REMAINS HAVE EVER BEEN REPATRIATED.

SPECIFIC ACTION REQUIRED:

REQUEST VIETNAM INVESTIGATE CURRENT DISPOSITION OF THE REMAINS EXHUMED FROM THIS SITE AND REPATRIATE THEM. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, REQUEST A WRITTEN REPORT EXPLAINING WHAT HAPPENED TO THESE REMAINS.

REQUEST VIETNAM SEARCH FOR RECORDS THAT DOCUMENT THE RECOVERY OF THESE REMAINS BY MILITARY REGION 4 OFFICIALS, CONTAIN AN INVENTORY OF ITEMS RECOVERED, AND ESTABLISH A CHAIN OF CUSTODY FOR THEIR HANDLING,

TAB 3

REPORT
UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION RESULTS

ON 15 APRIL 1996, THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM, NGUYEN NGOC BICH (NGOCJ BICH) AND TRAN NGOC BICH (TRAANF NGOCJ BICH) OF THE VNOSMP, CONDUCTED THE ADVANCE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS OF CASES: 0326, 1065, 1504, 1538 AND 0301.

RESULTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

CASE 0326: DO NOT HAVE ANY NEW INFORMATION, NO ONE HAS DISCOVERED OR TURNED IN AMERICAN REMAINS TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

CASE 1065: NO NEW INFORMATION FOR THIS CASE.

CASE 1504: NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSONS TURNING OVER AMERICAN REMAINS.

CASE 1538: THE REMAINS GATHERED IN DONG NAI IN 1988 WERE TURNED OVER TO BE EXAMINED FOR THE SECOND TIME, (14 JANUARY TO 21 JANUARY 1989), IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE REMAINS WERE OF MONGOLOID DESCENT AND WERE CREMATED BY THE VNOSMP.

CASE 0301: A PORTION OF THE REMAINS IN THIS CASE WERE TRANSPORTED TO THE SOUTH AND WERE SEIZED BY DINH QUAN, DONG NAI POLICE AND ARE CURRENTLY BEING KEPT AT THE PROVINCIAL SECURITY OFFICE.

10 JUN 96
ON BEHALF OF THE
INVESTIGATION TEAM
(SIGNED)
NGUYEN NGOC BICH

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

REPORT OF COLLECTION AND CUSTODY OF EVIDENCE

AT 1400 12 APR 86, AT THE HOME OF MR. NGUYEN VAN TUA, A 29
YOA RESIDENT OF DONG THINH HAMLET, TAM DI, HA BAC.

OUR TEAM INCLUDES:

1. NGUYEN NGOC SON (NGOCJ SOWN), SECURITY CADRE OF LAI NAM DISTRICT.
2. NGUYEN THAI BICH (THAIS BICHS), SECURITY CADRE OF LAI NAM DISTRICT.
3. NGUYEN VAN TRI (TRIS), SECURITY CADRE.

PROCEEDED TO COLLECT AMERICAN REMAINS FOUND BY MR. NGUYEN VAN TUA. THESE REMAINS ARE BEING KEPT AT HIS HOME.

ALL THE EVIDENCE INCLUDES:

1. ONE PIECE OF TORN PARACHUTE, PARTIALLY BURN.
 2. TWO LONG PIECES OF BONE FRAGMENTS (FOREARM) 22-CENTIMETERS LONG, DECAYING AT BOTH ENDS.
 3. ONE PIECE OF BONE FRAGMENT, 25-CM LONG, DECAYING AT BOTH ENDS.
 4. ONE PIECE OF PELVIS BONE FRAGMENT, ONE PIECE OF JAW BONE FRAGMENT WITH THREE TEETH REMAINED (1 TOOTH IS CHIPPED).
- A RIB SECTION APPROXIMATELY 10-CM LONG
- A SMALL PIECE OF SKULL
- SEVERAL SMALL PIECES OF BONE FRAGMENTS INCLUDING: FINGER, AND VERTEBRATE, APPROXIMATELY .02 KILOGRAMS.
- WE COLLECTED AND KEPT THE ABOVE MENTIONED EVIDENCE. NO OTHER EVIDENCE WAS KEPT.
THE REPORT ENDED AT 1400 AND IT WAS READ AND SIGNED BY ALL THE WITNESSES.

SIGNATURE
(SIGNED)
NGUYEN VAN TUA

LUC NAM, 12 APRIL 1986
CADRE REPORTING
(SIGNED)
NGUYEN THAI BICH

ON 12 APRIL 1986, ALL OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED EVIDENCE WAS
HANDLED OVER TO COMRADE NGUYEN BA SUNG (BAS SUNGF), CADRE &
SECURITY OFFICE 16-PROVINCIAL SECURITY. COMRADE SUNG
RECEIVED ALL OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED EVIDENCE.

HA BAC, 12 APRIL 1986
RECEIVED BY
(SIGNED)
NGUYEN SUNG

REPORT

RESULTS OF THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0077-QUANG BINH

I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS: ON 20 APRIL 1965 THE PILOT, CAPT. JAMES P. SHEA FLYING AN A-14 WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATE XE 801 028 DURING A NIGHT BOMBING MISSION, APPROXIMATELY 3 KM SOUTH OF MY DUC TRAIN STATION, QUANG BINH. NO PARACHUTE WAS SEEN AND NO EMERGENCY SIGNAL WAS HEARD.

II. INVESTIGATION PROCESS: THIS CASE WAS INVESTIGATED DURING THE 2ND, 10TH, AND 13TH JFAS. WITNESSES AT SON THUY (SOWN THUYR) VILLAGE, LE THUY DISTRICT REPORTED THAT IN THE VICINITY OF LEN BAC (LENF BACJ), PART OF THE SON THUY VILLAGE TERRITORY, ONE PROPELLER AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN ON THE NIGHT OF 20 APR 65, THE PILOT WAS BURNED IN THE CRASH AND WAS BURIED IN THE VICINITY OF A RUN OFF NEAR A HYDROPOWER PLANT IN LEN BAC. DURING THE 29TH JFA A WITNESS POINTED OUT A BURIAL SITE WHICH A JOINT TEAM EXCAVATED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS WERE CARRIED OUT SINCE THEN BUT NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS FOUND.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FROM THE U.S.:
REQUEST VIETNAMESE SEARCH WAR RECORDS IN LE THUY DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE TO FIND A REPORT FROM MR. THIET (THIEETS) THAT DESCRIBES THE DEATH AND BURIAL OF 1LT. SHEA.

IV. RESULTS OF THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE U.S. REQUEST, OUR TEAM MET WITH THE LE THUY (LEEJ THUYR) SECURITY TO INVESTIGATE THE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS. WE WERE PROVIDED WITH A GREAT DEAL OF HELP FROM THE AUTHORITIES AND RECORD SPECIALIST BUT DUE TO THE FIERCENESS OF THE WAR, THE OFFICE HAD TO BE MOVED FREQUENTLY TO EVADE BOMBING. THEREFORE NO RECORD KEEPING WAS DONE. WE DID NOT FIND MR. THIET'S REPORT AT THE DISTRICT SECURITY OFFICE.

LATER, THE TEAM ALSO SEARCHED FOR DOCUMENTS AT THE DISTRICT MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, AND DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OFFICE WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

REPORTCASE DATA IN SON LA PROVINCE1. ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN RECORDS:

ON ~~DATE~~ JUNE 1965, ~~DATA~~, FLYING AN F-105 AIRCRAFT, WAS SHOT DOWN IN SON LA PROVINCE. THE PILOT PARACHUTED OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT BUT DESCENDED [AND] DIED AND HIS BODY WAS BURIED BY RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS OF THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION. A FEW DAYS LATER, THE NORTHWEST SOLDIER NEWSPAPER DUG UP HIS BODY AND PHOTOGRAPHED [IT] FOR THE ARCHIVES AND PROPAGANDA. THE INFORMATION RESEARCH TEAM DISCOVERED THESE PHOTOGRAPHS IN THE MILITARY MUSEUM. AS OF TODAY HIS BODY HAS NOT BEEN FOUND.

2. THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS:

IN 1982, VIETNAM UNILATERALLY INVESTIGATED THIS CASE AND DID NOT LOCATE THE BURIAL SITE. IN THAT AREA THEY DISCOVERED A LARGE HOLE WITH THE POSSIBILITY [THE REMAINS] HAD BEEN REMOVED BY SOMEONE ELSE.

FROM 1989 TO THE PRESENT, THE UNILATERAL TEAM INVESTIGATED THIS CASE MORE THAN TEN TIMES, WHICH INCLUDED TWO SMALL EXCAVATIONS [AND] TWO LARGE EXCAVATIONS, AND INTERVIEWED WITNESSES FROM: THE RECONNAISSANCE UNIT OF THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION, THE MEDICAL SCHOOL, NORTHWEST NEWSPAPER REPORTERS, MILITARY PROVINCE CADRE AND MILITIAMEN FROM CHIENG COI VILLAGE [XAX CHIEENG F COWI] AND HUA LA VILLAGE [XAX HUA LA]. ALSO, [THE TEAM] TOOK THE WITNESSES TO THE AREA THAT LINDSEY WAS BURIED BUT THEY COULDN'T REMEMBER THE EXACT LOCATION.

[DURING THE] 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY, [THE TEAM] EXHUMED TWO AREAS BASED ON STATEMENTS FROM RIT WITNESSES [AND] RECOVERED FOUR BONE FRAGMENTS IN ONE OF THE AREAS. ON THE LAST DAY OF THE EXCAVATION, TWO WITNESSES INFORMED VIETNAMESE SPECIALISTS THEY KNEW THE PILOT'S BURIAL SITE: MR. CA VAN THAI [CAF VAWN THAIS], FORMER VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER AND MRS. HOANG THI UAN [HOANG F THI J UAA N] IN BAN ME [BAN R MES], CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA TOWNSHIP. BECAUSE OF TIME RESTRICTIONS, THE TEAM COULD ONLY TAKE DOWN THE INFORMATION IN WRITING AND PROMISED [A TEAM] WOULD COME BACK AND INVESTIGATE THE CASE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

ON JUNE 1996, THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTING OF: MR. PHAM CONG KHOI [PHAM J COONG KHOOI], MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SPECIALIST, AND MR. NGO QUANG HUNG [NGOO QUANG -HWNG], MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SPECIALIST, CAME TO SON LA AND INVESTIGATED THIS CASE. WITH THE COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

OF SPECIALISTS FROM THE PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND TOWNSHIP, THE TEAM LOCATED AND INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES:

1. MR. CA VAN THAI, 56 YOA, FORMER VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER, PRESENTLY RESIDING IN BAN PONG [BANR PONG], HUA LA VILLAGE.

2. MRS. HOANG THI UAN, 52 YOA, IN BAN ME, CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA TOWNSHIP.

3. MR. LO VAN UA [LOF VAWN UAJ], FORMER PROVINCE MILITIA CADRE, SON LA TOWNSHIP, RETIRED IN MUONG LA VILLAGE [XAX MWONGF LAF], SONG MA DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE.

MR. THAI INFORMED [THE TEAM]: HE ONLY WITNESSED THE TROOPS BURY THE PILOT FOR THE FIRST TIME, BUT HE DIDN'T WITNESS THE EXHUMATION OF THE PILOT FOR THE PHOTOGRAPH. THE FIRST TIME, THE PILOT WAS BURIED WHERE HE DIED, THE GRAVE WAS ABOUT .6 METERS DEEP, [THERE WAS] NO CASKET, [THE GRAVE WAS] NEAR THE BOTTOM OF THE MOUNTAIN NEXT TO SEVERAL LARGE ROCKS, [AND] ON TOP OF THE MOUNTAIN WAS A LARGE BANYAN TREE. LATER HE HIMSELF CUT DOWN THAT TREE FOR FIRE WOOD. THE AREA WAS FLAT AND APPROXIMATELY SIX SQUARE METERS AND ABOUT 60-70 METERS FROM THE 40TH JFA EXCAVATION LOCATION. HE INTRODUCED HIS FRIEND, MR. UA, A SONG MA NATIVE, TO THE TEAM. AT THAT TIME [MR. UA] WAS A CITY UNIT SOLDIER WHO WITNESSED THE EXHUMATION OF THE PILOT'S REMAINS FOR THE PHOTOGRAPH. PASSING THROUGH ONCE, [MR. THAI] MET [MR. UA] AT MR. UA'S HOUSE. MR. UA AGREED WITH HIM [MR. THAI] THAT THE LOCATION OF THE BURIAL SITE WAS AS HE [MR. THAI] PRESENTED. THE UNILATERAL TEAM SEARCHED AND LOCATED MR. UA AND HE AFFIRMED HE DID NOT DIRECTLY SEE OR WITNESS THE BURIAL OF THE PILOT TWICE IN HUA LA VILLAGE [AND] HE ONLY HEARD A NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN SON LA PROVINCE RELATE [THE STORY]. HE WITNESSED ANOTHER CASE BUT IT HAPPENED IN MUONG LAN VILLAGE [XAX MWONGF LANJ], SONG MA DISTRICT, BUT THE REMAINS HAVE BEEN RECOVERED.

EVALUATING MR. THAI'S AND MR. UA'S INFORMATION, WE BELIEVE THEY ARE NOT FIRST HAND WITNESSES, ALTHOUGH MR. THAI WITNESSED THE FIRST BURIAL BUT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE SECOND ONE. MR. UA LEARNED ABOUT THE CASE WHEN SOMEONE ELSE RELATED [THE STORY] TO HIM. BECAUSE OF THIS, THEIR INFORMATION WAS UNRELIABLE.

REGARDING THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION MRS. UAN PROVIDED, SHE ONLY HEARD MRS. CAY [CAYS] IN HUA LA VILLAGE RELATE [THE STORY] TO HER WHILE PICKING WILD VEGETABLES IN THAT AREA. THE AREA SHE DESCRIBED FELL IN BACK BELOW A STREAM ACROSS A CURRENT PATH. BUT ACCORDING TO SOME WITNESSES FROM THE MILITARY UNIT THAT OPERATES IN THAT AREA, THE AREA IS VERY

CLOSE TO THE UNIT'S KITCHEN. BECAUSE OF THAT [THEY] DO NOT BELIEVE THE PILOT COULD BE BURIED THERE. ALSO, THE AREA IS APPROXIMATELY 80 METERS FROM THE MOUNTAIN, [WHICH] IS CONTRADICTORY TO THE OTHER WITNESSES' ACCOUNTS.

INVESTIGATORS' PROPOSAL: RECOMMEND ENDING THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE, BECAUSE BOTH SIDES HAVE EXERTED THEIR BEST EFFORTS BUT THERE IS NO NEW INFORMATION.

REPORT
INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0266 IN THANH HOA

1) AMERICAN INFORMATION

SMITH PILOTED AN F-105D WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN IN THANH HOA PROVINCE ON 7 MAR 66. VIETNAM UNILATERALLY RECOVERED THE REMAINS AND TURNED THEM OVER TO THE UNITED STATES ON 20 MAR 85. THE UNITED STATES DETERMINED THE REMAINS WERE FROM CASE 0156 LOST IN NAM HA (FORMERLY HA NAM NINH).

2) INVESTIGATION PROCESS

DURING THE 26TH AND 29TH JFA'S JOINT INVESTIGATIONS, AT THUONG NINH (THWONGJ NINH) VILLAGE, NHU XUAN DISTRICT, [THE TEAM] INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES,

- BUI MANH KET (BUIF MANHJ KEETS) FORMER GROUP CADRE OF THUONG NINH VILLAGE, NHU XUAN DISTRICT.
- NGUYEN QUOC DOAN (NGUYEENX QUOOC DOANF) THUONG NINH VILLAGE, NHU XUAN DISTRICT.
- VI DUC THAO (VIF DWCS THAOS) THUONG NINH VILLAGE, NHU XUAN DISTRICT.
- HA VAN HUNG (HAF VAWN HUNG) THUONG NINH VILLAGE, NHU XUAN DISTRICT.
- DAO DINH DUNG (DAOF DINHF DUNGJ), FORMER VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER FOR THUONG NINH VILLAGE.

THESE GENTLEMEN REPORTED THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE VILLAGE (AROUND MAY OF 1965) WITH DISPERSED WRECKAGE [AND] THE PILOT DIED WHILE PARACHUTING DOWN TO GROUND. THE MILITIA BURIED THE BODY. IN 1972 THE PROVINCE TEAM EXHUMED THE BODY. VIETNAM TURNED OVER THE REMAINS ON 31 JUL 84 (NUMBER 12 ON THE LIST).

DURING THE 38TH JFA'S JOINT INVESTIGATION, THE TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES IN THO LAM (THOJ LAAM) VILLAGE, THO XUAN.

- HOANG MANH THOI (HOANGF MANHJ THOIJ), THO LAM VILLAGE, THO XUAN DISTRICT.
- PHAM VAN MAU (PHAMJ VAWN MAU) THO LAM VILLAGE, THO XUAN DISTRICT.
- NGUYEN CHI HY (NGUYEENX CHIS HYR) THO LAM VILLAGE, THO XUAN DISTRICT.

WHILE INVESTIGATING CASE 0254, THE WITNESSES TALKED ABOUT ONE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN ABOUT 0800 OR 0900 NEAR THE CHU RIVER [SOONG CHU], [BUT] NOBODY REMEMBERED THE SPECIFIC DAY OR MONTH BUT JUST REMEMBERED THE YEAR AS 1966. FISHERMEN, WHILE [THEY] FISHED IN THE AREA, HAD PULLED UP AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. THE ABOVE INFORMATION DOES NOT YET HAVE ENOUGH DATA TO CONCLUDE WHICH CASE IT IS.

ACCORDING TO THE LIST OF REMAINS EXHUMED BY THANH HOA PROVINCE, SMITH'S REMAINS WERE EXHUMED IN THO BINH AND—, TURNED OVER TO THE VNOSMP WITH ATTACHED IDENTIFICATION CARD AND GENEVA CONVENTION CARD. THAT IS THE REASON THE LIST

TURNED OVER CLEARLY RECORDED THE LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, DATE MISSING, SERVICE NUMBER, ETC.

IN MAY 1966, A UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTING OF MR. PHAM CONG KHOI (PHAMJ COONG KHOOI), MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SPECIALIST [AND] MR. NGO QUANG HUNG (NGOO QUANG HWNG), MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SPECIALIST, WENT TO THANH HOA AND RE-INVESTIGATED THIS CASE. WITH THE ASSISTANCE AND LABOR OF THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT SPECIALISTS, THE TEAM WENT TO BINH SON (BINHF SOWN) VILLAGE, TRIEU SON DISTRICT AND INTERVIEWED THESE WITNESSES:

- MR. HA VAN LOT (HAF VAWN LOOTS), THIS PERSON DISCOVERED THE BODY, HERE IN BINH SON VILLAGE, TRIEU SON DISTRICT (THO BINH VILLAGE WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO VILLAGES, THO BINH AND BINH SON)

- MR. HA VAN CHON (HAF VAWN CHON) FORMER CO-OPERATIVE CHAIRMAN [AND] MILITIA COMMANDER. MR. LOT RELATED THAT, IN 1966, DURING HUNTING SEASON (MARCH OR APRIL), IN THE MORNING HE WENT HUNTING IN THE FOREST. HE SAW A GREEN AND RED PARACHUTE SUSPENDED IN A TREE IN NHA LAM HAMLET (THOON NHAR LAWMS), BINH SON VILLAGE. HE THEN RAN BACK AND REPORTED TO THE AUTHORITIES [AND] THE VILLAGE MOBILIZED THE MILITIA TO BURY THE PILOT. THE LOCATION OF THE PILOT'S DEATH WAS ON THE SIDE OF A HILL NEAR A STREAM. THE PILOT WAS DEAD WITH HIS HEAD POINTED TO THE GROUND AND HIS LEG WAS SUSPENDED IN THE TREE. THE MILITIA ORGANIZED A BURIAL ON THE SPOT. THE BURIAL HAD NO COFFIN, [AND THE GRAVE] HAD A TOMBSTONE BUT NO MARKINGS. THEY EVEN BURIED THE BODY WITH HIS CLOTHES ON BECAUSE THE BODY WAS ROTTING. THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS WERE COLLECTED BY THE DISTRICT. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES THE PILOT HAD BEEN DEAD FOR TEN DAYS.

MR. CHON ADDITIONALLY INFORMED [US] THIS PILOT CRASHED IN THE SAME YEAR AS A C-130 IN THO BINH VILLAGE BUT CRASHED SOME TIME BEFORE. THE PILOT WAS CAUCASIAN, FAT, [AND] NOT VERY TALL. THE BODY WAS INTACT [AND] THE LEFT ARM WAS BROKEN. IT IS UNCLEAR WHERE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED. IN 1974, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT [AUTHORITIES] RETURNED TO EXHUME REMAINS.

INTERVIEW OF THE GROUP EXHUMING THE REMAINS:

- MR. LE DINH KIEN (LEE DINHF KIEEN), FORMER DISTRICT MILITIA CADRE, RETIRED IN MINH DAN (MINH ZAAAN) VILLAGE, TRIEU SON.

- MR. LE VAN HANH (LEE VAWN HANHJ) FORMER PROVINCE MILITIA CADRE, RETIRED IN DAN LY (ZAAAN LYS) VILLAGE, TRIEU SON.

THE EXHUMATION TEAM FIRST WENT TO THO BINH VILLAGE TO EXHUME (CASE 0350) AND AFTERWARDS EXHUMED THE DEAD PILOT IN THE FOREST (NOVEMBER 1974). MR. XUM [XUM] AT THAT TIME WAS THE DEPUTY VILLAGE CHAIRMAN AND TOOK A NUMBER OF FORMER MILITIA MEMBERS TO PARTICIPATE. WHILE EXCAVATING THEY

IMMEDIATELY FOUND FOUR SECTIONS OF TUBULAR LEG BONES AND THIGH BONES. THE OTHER BONES WERE EATEN BY TERMITES. BESIDES THAT [THEY] COLLECTED ONE IDENTIFICATION CARD [AND] ONE GENEVA CONVENTION CARD. AFTERWARDS [ALL ITEMS] WERE BROUGHT TO THE DISTRICT AND TURNED OVER TO THE PROVINCE.

SUGGESTION: THE REMAINS WITH THE NAME OF SMITH WERE DETERMINED TO BE CASE 0156 IN Y YEN-NAM HA (YS YEEN-NAM HAF) (NOT IN NINH BINH AS IN AMERICAN RECORDS). WE HAVE COMPARED WITH THE CILHI-SUPPLIED LIST [AND] NAM HA ONLY HAS TWO REMAINS THAT ARE NOT CONCLUDED: NUMBER 8 ON THE LIST HANDED OVER ON 3 NOV 88 WITH THE NAME OF BENNETT. BUT BENNETT WAS CONCLUDED TO BE REMAINS NUMBER 7 ON THE LIST AND NOT EDWARD.

- NUMBER 3 ON THE LIST HANDED OVER ON 14 OCT 82 WAS COLLECTED FROM HA NAM NINH. REQUEST THE UNITED STATES RE-CHECK THIS.

INVESTIGATION RESULTS FOR CASE DATA

ON MAY 25 1996, THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTING OF MR. NGUYEN NGOC BICH (NGUYEENX NGOOCJ BICHJ) AND MR. TRAN NGOC BICH (TRANF NGOOCJ BICHJ) OF THE VNOSMP ARRIVED IN DONG NAI PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE TWO ITEMS CONCERNING REMAINS POSSIBLY RELATING TO CASE 0301 THAT WERE RECEIVED IN DONG NAI.

THE TEAM WORKED WITH THE DONG NAI MIA TASK FORCE WITH MR. NGUYEN VAN KHANH (NGUYEENX VAWN KHANHS) WAS THE TEAM LEADER. THE TEAM REPORTED TO MR. KHANH INFORMATION CONCERNING A NUMBER OF REMAINS TRADERS FROM NGHE AN, THAT WERE ARRESTED BY THE DINH QUAN DISTRICT POLICE IN 1993, WHEN THEY BROUGHT REMAINS INTO DONG NAI.

COORDINATION WAS DONE BY THE PROVINCE MIA TASK TEAM. THE TEAM WENT TO WORK WITH THE DINH QUAN DISTRICT POLICE REGARDING THE ABOVE MENTIONED CASES. CADRES IN CHARGE OF THE DINH QUAN DISTRICT POLICE GAVE THE TEAM THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: IN 1993 THE DISTRICT POLICE RECEIVED A PACKAGE OF REMAINS FROM AN ETHNIC MINORITY PERSON FROM NGHE AN PROVINCE WHO SAID IT CONTAINED THE REMAINS OF AN AMERICAN PILOT. AFTER THE DISTRICT WAS THROUGH EXAMINING THE REMAINS MENTIONED ABOVE THEY TURNED IT OVER TO THE DONG NAI PROVINCE POLICE.

THE TEAM RETURNED TO WORK WITH THE DONG NAI PROVINCE POLICE AND RECEIVED INFORMATION ABOUT THE REMAINS CONFISCATED FROM THE REMAINS TRADERS. THE REMAINS ARE STILL MAINTAINED BY THE PROVINCE POLICE. THE TEAM ADVISED THE PROVINCE MIA TASK TEAM TO ARRANGE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF THE REMAINS TO THE VNOSMP OR TRANSPORT THE REMAINS TO HO CHI MINH CITY, BECAUSE A FORENSIC REVIEW WILL TAKE PLACE THERE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEEKING MISSING PERSONS
(VNOSMP)

UNILATERAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA
(HA BAC PROVINCE)

I. HISTORICAL SUMMARY (DOCUMENTS SUPPLIED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE):

- IN AUGUST 1989, VIETNAM REPATRIATED REMAINS ACCOMPANIED BY INFORMATION THOUGHT TO BE BELONGING TO ~~PHAM TEO~~, MISSING ON ~~APRIL~~ APRIL 1966 IN HIEP HOA, HA BAC. BECAUSE THESE REMAINS HAD NO TEETH, WERE NOT COMPLETE, CONSISTED OF FRAGMENTS AND WERE ERODED, AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY EXPERTS COULD NOT IDENTIFY THEM. REQUEST TO RE-EXAMINE THE REPORTS AND WITNESSES AND THE EXCAVATION OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED REMAINS.

II. INVESTIGATION PROCESS:

- INVESTIGATED JOINTLY DURING THE 26TH JFA.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

1/ THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTED OF MESSRS.:

- PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF)	:	VNOSMP
- NGUYEN THANH HA (THANH HAF)	:	-
- DOAN VAN QUAN (DOANF QUAAN)	:	HA BAC PROVINCE SPECIALIST
- NGUYEN DUY THAI (ZUY THAIS)	:	-
- NGUYEN VAN THO (THOW)	:	HIEP HOA DISTRICT
SPECIALIST		
- NGUYEN VAN VUONG (VWONGJ)	:	-

1/ 4 JUNE 1996:

- THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE HIEP HOA DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

- THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:

A. MR. LE XUAN BIEN (LEE XUAAN BIEENF): 68 YOA, TRI CU HAMLET (THOON TRIJ CUJ), HOANG THANH VILLAGE (XAX HOANGF THANHf), FORMERLY WAS CONCURRENTLY THE MILITIA COMMANDER AND VILLAGE PUBLIC SECURITY COMMANDER. MR. BIEN INFORMED US ON APRIL 1966, IN A FORMATION OF F-105 AIRCRAFT THAT FLEW FROM THE DIRECTION OF BAC THAI, ONE AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY A MISSILE, BURNT AND CRASHED IN THE LOCAL AREA AT APPROXIMATELY 1100. THE AIRCRAFT BURNT AND CRASHED INTO THE GROUND, THE AMMUNITION INSIDE CONTINUED TO EXPLODE, [AND] THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SANK INTO THE RICE PADDY. NOT UNTIL APPROXIMATELY EVENING DID WE DISCOVER THE

BODY OF THE PILOT INSIDE THE AIRCRAFT CONSISTING OF ONE SIDE OF THE BODY, ONE SIDE OF THE THIGH ... AND BURIED [THE REMAINS] IN A HILLY AREA, BURIED [THEM] SHALLOW, THERE WAS NO WOOD OR COFFIN.

IN APPROXIMATELY 1973-1974, MR. BIEN POINTED OUT THE BURIAL LOCATION AND PARTICIPATED IN EXHUMING THE PILOT'S REMAINS TOGETHER WITH MR. THANH AT THE DISTRICT MILITIA WHO CAME TO COMMAND. THE REMAINS ESSENTIALLY CONSISTED OF A FEW RIB BONES, LEG BONES ... [THE REMAINS] WERE PUT IN A NYLON BAG TO TRANSFER TO THE DISTRICT.

B. MR. DINH VAN THANH (DINH THANH): 57 YOA, DONG TAM HAMLET (THOON DOONGF TAAM), THUONG THANG VILLAGE (XAX THWONGF THAWNGS), FORMERLY WAS A DISTRICT MILITIA TRAINING AIDE. MR. THANH WAS THE PERSON WHO DIRECTLY COMMANDED AND PARTICIPATED IN EXHUMING THE REMAINS. THEY HAD BURIED THEM SHALLOW APPROXIMATELY 30 CM DEEP, THERE WAS NO WOOD OR COFFIN, THE REMAINS EXCAVATED CONSISTED OF ONE HIP BONE, 1/2 OF A THIGH BONE, VERTEBRAE, ARM BONE, A FEW TOE BONES, THERE WERE NO SKULL BONES. THE EXCAVATION WAS CARRIED OUT METICULOUSLY, A REPORT WAS WRITTEN AND THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF REMAINS WAS HANDED OVER TO UPPER ECHELONS.

C. MR. TA VAN DAU (TAJ DAAUR): 79 YOA, THANG TOWN (THIJ TRAANS THAWNGS), HIEP HOA DISTRICT, FORMERLY THE DISTRICT PUBLIC SECURITY COMMANDER. MR. DAU INFORMED US, AFTER THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, HE RODE HIS BICYCLE DOWN TO THE SITE, HE HIMSELF PULLED PART OF THE DEAD PILOT'S BODY FROM THE AIRCRAFT BUT A LONG TIME HAS PASSED THEREFORE HE DID NOT REMEMBER WHAT THE CORPSE CONSISTED OF BECAUSE PRIMARILY HE PERFORMED THE DUTY OF COMMANDING [AND] SUPERVISING.

IV. CONCLUSION:

- TWO WITNESSES PARTICIPATED IN THE EXCAVATION OF THE REMAINS. THE INVESTIGATION AND INTERVIEW TEAM ALL AFFIRMED THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF REMAINS EXHUMED WAS COMPLETELY HANDED OVER TO UPPER ECHELONS.

- THE REPORT OF THE REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS DID NOT SAY CLEARLY ABOUT THE CONDITION OF THE REMAINS.

HANOI, 24 APRIL 1996
ON BEHALF OF/ THE INVESTIGATION TEAM
(SIGNED)
NGUYEN THANH HA

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA

1/ THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM SEARCHING FOR MISSING AMERICANS CONSISTED OF MESSRS.:

- PHAM TEO : COLONEL, TEAM LEADER
- NGUYEN THANH HA : VNOSMP SPECIALIST
- DOAN VAN QUAN : HA BAC PROVINCE SPECIALIST
- NGUYEN DUY THAI : PROVINCE SPECIALIST
- NGUYEN VAN THO : HIEP HOA DISTRICT SPECIALIST

2/ THE INVESTIGATION TEAM CARRIED OUT THE INTERVIEW OF THE FOLLOWING THREE WITNESSES:

- MR. LE XUAN BIEN : 68 YOA, TRI CU HAMLET, HOANG THANH VILLAGE
- MR. DINH VAN THANH : 57 YOA, TEAM 2 (DOOIJ 2), DONG TAM HAMLET, THUONG THANG VILLAGE
- MR. TA VAN DAU : 79 YOA, THANG TOWN, HIEP HOA DISTRICT

3/ THE WITNESSES PROVIDED INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA, THE CONTENT WAS AS FOLLOWS: AT APPROXIMATELY NEAR NOON ON DATA APRIL 1966, THERE WAS ONE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED IN THE LOCAL AREA OF TRI CU HAMLET. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO THE RICE PADDY ACCOMPANIED BY MANY SOUNDS OF BOMB [AND] AMMUNITION EXPLOSIONS AND BURNT. PART OF THE BODY OF THE PILOT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE BURNT AIRCRAFT. THERE WAS ONLY A PART, THERE WAS NO SKULL, LATER [THEY] IMPLEMENTED A BURIAL IN TRI CU HAMLET.

- IN APPROXIMATELY THE YEARS 73-74 [THEY] CARRIED OUT AN EXHUMATION OF THE SET OF REMAINS AND HANDED THEM OVER TO UPPER ECHELONS.

4/ THE INVESTIGATION DETAILS WILL BE MADE INTO A REPORT AND ATTACHED BY THE VNOSMP'S INVESTIGATION GROUP.

5/ THE HIEP HOA DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE ALONG WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES CREATED EVERY FAVORABLE CONDITION TO HELP THE INVESTIGATION TEAM COMPLETE ITS MISSION.

HIEP HOA DISTRICT, 4 JUNE 1996

VNOSMP TEAM LEADER

HA BAC PROVINCE
MIA REPRESENTATIVE

CONFIRMATION OF THE
HIEP HOA DISTRICT
PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE
[STAMPED AND SIGNED]
ON BEHALF OF THE
HIEP HOA DISTRICT
PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN

[SIGNED]
PHAM TEO

[SIGNED]
DOAN VAN QUAN

DUONG NGO CAU (ZWONG NGOO CAAUF)

INVESTIGATION RESULTSCASE 0326

ON 24 MAY 1996, THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM OF THE VNOSMP CONSISTING OF NGUYEN NGOC BICH (NGOCJ BICHS) AND TRAN NGOC BICH (TRANF NGOCJ BICHS). THE TEAM LEFT FOR SONG BE PROVINCE TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE CASE 0326. THIS CASE OCCURRED IN THE VILLAGE OF KHANH BINH (KHANHS BINHF), TAN UYEN DISTRICT.

THE TEAM WORKED WITH NGUYEN VAN HOA (HOAF), THE SONG BE PROVINCE MIA TEAM LEADER. AFTER HEARING THE REPORT OF MR. NGUYEN NGOC BICH (WHICH HAD WITHIN IT THE REQUIREMENTS FROM THE U.S.) BOTH TEAMS WENT TO TAN UYEN DISTRICT AND KHANH BINH VILLAGE.

WITH THE COORDINATION OF MR. VO VAN SINH (VOX SINH), A TAN UYEN CADRE MEMBER, THE TEAM ARRIVED IN KHANH BINH VILLAGE. THERE THE TEAM MET WITH THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN MR. NGUYEN VAN DUOC (DWOVCJ) AND THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN MR. NGUYEN VAN LUC (LUCJ). MR. DUOC AND MR. LUC STATED THAT DURING OTHER INVESTIGATIONS THE VILLAGE AND THE RESIDENTS OF THE VILLAGE ALREADY PROVIDED ALL THE INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THIS INCIDENT. THEY STATED THAT THERE WAS ONE AMERICAN KILLED IN THE AREA AND HE WAS BURIED. AFTERWARDS THE AREA WAS TURNED INTO A LARGE GARDEN AND IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE BURIAL SITE. MR. DUOC HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED THE TIME OF THE BURIAL TO THE TEAM. THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES ARE CURRENTLY PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEONE DISCOVERED THE BURIAL SITE, BUT PRESENTLY NO ONE HAS BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

THE TEAM PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION (FROM THE AMERICANS) TO THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES OF KHANH BINH: AT THE END OF 1983 WHILE SCAVENGING WRECKAGE PEOPLE OF KHANH BINH DISCOVERED THE REMAINS AND I.D. TAGS OF AN AMERICAN SERVICEMAN IN A CASHEW GARDEN. THOSE REMAINS WERE TURNED OVER TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

MR. NGUYEN VAN DUOC STATED ON BEHALF OF THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES THAT SINCE 1983 NO ONE HAS DISCOVERED OR TURNED IN ANY REMAINS OF AMERICANS TO THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES. WITH THE STATEMENTS OF THE SONG BE PROVINCE AND TAN UYEN DISTRICT AUTHORITIES, THE TEAM HAS DRAWN UP AND CONFIRMED THE ABOVE INFORMATION (ALONG WITH THIS REPORT).

THE TEAM RETURNED TO THU DAU MOT VILLAGE, AND ALONG WITH THE SONG BE PROVINCIAL AND TAN UYEN DISTRICT MIA TEAMS RE INVESTIGATED THE TURN OVER OF REMAINS IN THE PROVINCE, BUT THERE WERE NO CIRCUMSTANCES OF REMAINS BEING TURNED OVER AT ALL.

24 MAY 1996
INVESTIGATION TEAM
NGUYEN NGOC BICH

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

CONFIRMATION PAPER

ON OR ABOUT 10:30 HOURS, 24 MAY 1996.

THE VIETNAMESE CENTRAL MIA INVESTIGATION TEAM OF MR. NGUYEN NGOC BICH AND MR. TRAN NGOC BICH VISITED SONG BE PROVINCE TO CONFIRM AND INVESTIGATE INFORMATION RELATING TO CASE 0326.

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SONG BE PROVINCIAL MIA TEAM AND THE TAN UYEN DISTRICT, THE TEAM TRAVELED TO KHANG BINH VILLAGE, TAN UYEN DISTRICT.

THE TEAM MET AND WORKED DIRECTLY WITH MR. NGUYEN VAN DUOC, THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN AND MR. NGUYEN VAN LUC, THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN.

THEY REPRESENT THE AUTHORITY OF KHANG BINH VILLAGE AND AFFIRMED THAT FROM 1983 UNTIL NOW, THERE WERE NO LOCAL RESIDENTS WHO HAD FOUND OR TURNED IN ANY AMERICAN REMAINS.

THIS CONFIRMATION PAPER IS WRITTEN IN KHANG BINH AND READ FOR EVERYONE TO HEAR.

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY
KHANG BINH VILLAGE
(SIGNED)
NGUYEN VAN DUOC

24 MAY 1996
PREPARER
(SIGNED)
NGUYEN VAN BICH

REPORT
INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0350 IN THANH HOA PROVINCE

1) AMERICAN INFORMATION: A C-130 AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN ON 31 MAY 66 AT GRID COORDINATE WG 510 910 (THO BINH VILLAGE [XAX THOJ BINHF], TRIEU SON DISTRICT, THANH HOA) [AND] EIGHT PEOPLE ON THE AIRCRAFT WERE KILLED. ON 10 APRIL 1986, THE VIETNAMESE SIDE REPATRIATED TO THE U.S. FIVE SETS OF REMAINS AND THREE [SETS OF] INFORMATION [THAT THEY WERE] UNABLE TO RECOVER REMAINS. THE AMERICAN SIDE IDENTIFIED THREE PEOPLE. AS FOR TWO SETS OF REMAINS, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH ELEMENTS TO CONFIRM.

2) PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION:

[DURING] THE 34TH JFA (MARCH 95) THE TEAM RETURNED TO THO BINH VILLAGE, TRIEU SON, [AND] INTERVIEWED THE TWO MESSRS. BUI BA THAO [BUIF BAS THAOR] AND QUACH XUAN THU [QUACHS XUAAN THWS] WHO INFORMED [US]: THE C-130 CRASHED ON THE EVENING OF 31 MAY 66, EIGHT AMERICANS DID NOT EJECT IN TIME [AND] DIED. FOUR BODIES WERE STILL INTACT, THREE PEOPLE WERE CRUSHED AND WERE MISSING BODY PARTS. THE MILITIA DUG TWO HOLES IN THE RICE PADDY TO BURY [THE REMAINS]. LATER THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT MILITIA CAME TO EXHUME THE REMAINS [AND] TOOK [THEM] AWAY.

- IN MAY 96, THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTING OF MR. PHAM CONG KHOI [PHAMJ COONG KHOOI], MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SPECIALIST, AND MR. NGO QUANG HUNG [NGOO QUANG HWNG], MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SPECIALIST, WENT TO THANH HOA PROVINCE TO RE-INVESTIGATE. THE GROUP [RECEIVED] COOPERATION TO INVESTIGATE FROM MESSRS. TRINH QUOC TRINH [TRINHJ QUOOCS TRINH], PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY, [AND] LE KHAC DAN [LEE KHAWCS DANF], PROVINCE MILITIA MAJOR, AND WERE GUIDED BY MR. LE MANH HUNG [LEE MANHJ HUNGF], MAJOR, TRIEU SON DISTRICT MILITIA. THE TEAM WENT TO THO BINH VILLAGE AND INTERVIEWED WITNESSES:

- QUACH XUAN THU, DIRECTLY BURIED [THE REMAINS],
- BUI BA THAO, WITNESSED WHEN [THEY] EXHUMED [THE REMAINS],
- LE TRONG PHU [LEE TRONGJ PHUS], FORMER TEAM LEADER, COMMANDED THE BURIAL,
- LUU MINH HIEU [LWUX MINH HIEEUJ], FORMER THO BINH VILLAGE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN.

THE WITNESSES AGREED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT: AFTER THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, THEY WENT TO THE SITE [AND] SAW THE AIRCRAFT HAD EXPLODED AND SCATTERED. THE BODIES WERE THROWN OUTSIDE. FOUR BODIES, WHICH WERE STILL INTACT, WERE LYING 20 METERS FROM THE AIRCRAFT [AND] ONE BODY WAS THROWN OUT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NOSE OF THE AIRCRAFT. THIS BODY WAS MISSING A BIG PIECE OF THE TOP OF THE HEAD. MR. THU WAS THE PERSON WHO DIRECTLY BURIED THIS BODY ALONG WITH A QUANTITY OF BONES AND FLESH THAT WAS THROWN OUT NEAR THERE. THREE BODIES WERE CRUSHED [AND] WERE NOT INTACT. THERE WAS ONE BODY THAT ONLY STILL HAD TWO ARMS [AND] TWO LEGS. THERE WAS ALSO ONE BODY WEDGED IN THE AIRCRAFT. ONLY

AFTER [THEY] HAD CUT THE AIRCRAFT WERE [THEY] ABLE TO DRAG [THE BODY] OUT. THIS BODY ALSO WAS NOT INTACT. AT THE SITE [THEY] COLLECTED EIGHT UNOPENED PARACHUTES, SEVEN PISTOLS, SEVEN RINGS, A NUMBER OF PAPERS ... EVERYTHING WAS TURNED OVER TO THE DISTRICT MILITIA. THE REMAINING BODIES AND THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE THROWN FAR AWAY WERE BURIED IN AN AREA IN THE DIRECTION OF THE TAIL OF THE AIRCRAFT. ACCORDING TO MR. THAO AND MR. PHU, [THEY] DUG A HOLE ABOUT 60 CM DEEP THEN TIED A ROPE AND DRUG EACH BODY DOWN [THE HOLE]. [THEY] BURIED ALL OF THE CLOTHING [AND THERE WERE] NO COFFINS. THE BURIAL AREA WAS BAT LANG DAM [BATJ LANGF DAAMF] WHICH WAS AN AREA OF FALLOW, HIGH GROUND. NOT UNTIL LATER DID PEOPLE LEVEL [THE GROUND] DOWN LOWER IN ORDER TO PLANT RICE. MR. THAO ALSO INFORMED [US], AFTER BEING BURIED FOR ONE WEEK, [THERE WAS] HEAVY RAIN, THE BODIES SWELLED, ROSE [AND] OVERFLOWED THE WATER OUTSIDE CAUSING POLLUTION. HE AGAIN HAD TO MOBILIZE THE MILITIA TO COVER THE GRAVE AGAIN.

THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT, WHEN [THEY] RETURNED TO EXHUME [THE REMAINS], THERE WAS MR. HANH [HANHJ] FROM THE THANH HOA PROVINCE MILITIA AND MR. KIEN [KLEEN] FROM THE TRIEU SON DISTRICT MILITIA. THE TEAM LOOKED FOR AND INTERVIEWED THE TWO MESSRS.:

- LE VAN HANH [LEE VAWN HANHJ], 2LT, PROVINCE MILITIA CADRE, COMMANDED THE EXHUMATION [AND] RETIRED IN DAN LY VILLAGE [XAX ZAA N LYS], TRIEU SON.

- LE DINH KIEN [LE DINHF KIEEN], 2LT, DISTRICT MILITIA CADRE, CARRIED OUT THE EXHUMATION [AND] RETIRED IN MINH DAN VILLAGE [XAX MINH ZAA N], TRIEU SON.

THE TWO MEN INFORMED [US] THE REMAINS EXHUMATION TEAM RETURNED TO THO BINH VILLAGE IN APPROXIMATELY 1974 OR 1975 ASSISTED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES [AND] MOBILIZED THE OLD MILITIA TO POINT OUT THE SITE. THE BURIAL SITE AT THAT TIME HAD BECOME RICE PADDY [AND] THE RICE WAS STILL GREEN. THE MILITIA LED THE TWO MEN OUT TO THE FIELDS [AND] THEY POINTED TO TWO AREAS OF GREENER, BETTER RICE. HERE THE TWO MEN DUG FIVE HOLES (FOUR HOLES NEAR EACH OTHER AND ONE HOLE 100 METERS AWAY). [THEY] DUG 30 CM DEEP, IMMEDIATELY SAW CLOTHING AND, IF [THEY] COLLECTED BONES IN ANY HOLE, THEN THEY PUT [THE BONES] SEPARATELY INTO A NYLON BAG. LATER [THEY] WIPED [AND] WASHED [THE BONES] CLEAN [AND] TOOK THEM TO THE DISTRICT MILITIA. ONE WEEK LATER MR. HANH CAME DOWN TO COLLECT [THE BONES AND] TOOK THEM TO THE PROVINCE MILITIA, WHICH LATER HANDED [THE BONES] OVER TO MILITARY REGION 4. IN SUMMARY, IN THIS AREA, THE MEN DUG ALL THE AREAS OF GREENER, BETTER RICE (BECAUSE [THEY] BURIED THE BODIES UNDER THE GROUND).

THE VIETNAM MIA AGENCY RECEIVED THE ABOVE FIVE SETS OF REMAINS FROM MILITARY REGION 4 [AND] TRANSFERRED AND REPATRIATED TO THE AMERICAN SIDE ON 10 APRIL 1986 ALL OF THESE FIVE SETS OF REMAINS. THE OTHERS, ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL POPULACE, WERE DEAD [AND] DESTROYED. THEY WERE BURIED BUT THERE WAS ONLY A LITTLE BONE AND FLESH, THEREFORE WHEN [THEY] EXHUMED [THESE REMAINS]

THERE WAS NOTHING LEFT. THEREFORE, [WE] OFFER INFORMATION THAT THERE WERE NO REMAINS FOR THREE INDIVIDUALS.

THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT THINKS THE VIETNAM SIDE COLLECTED EIGHT REMAINS BUT ONLY REPATRIATED FIVE IS COMPLETELY INCORRECT BECAUSE THE EXHUMATION TEAM AND THE WITNESSES AFFIRMED [THEY] ONLY COLLECTED FIVE SETS OF REMAINS AND THE DATA HANDED OVER BY MILITARY REGION 4 TO THE MIA AGENCY WAS ALSO FIVE SETS ACCORDING TO THE LIST [OF REMAINS] REPATRIATED. THERE WERE NO PROVINCE AND MILITARY REGION DOCUMENTS THAT SAID [THEY] EXHUMED EIGHT REMAINS IN THO BINH VILLAGE.

SUGGESTION: CAREFULLY RE-EVALUATE THE REMAINS FROM THIS CASE THAT [THE AMERICAN SIDE] HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONCLUDE YET IN ORDER TO AFFIRM [THESE ARE] THE REMAINS BELONG TO HOW MANY PEOPLE. IF [THE AMERICAN SIDE] CONCLUDES [THE REMAINS] BELONG TO TWO PEOPLE THEN THERE ARE STILL THREE PEOPLE LACKING. THE VIETNAMESE SIDE AFFIRMED AND OFFERED INFORMATION [THEY] WERE UNABLE TO FIND THE REMAINS. IF [WE] RE-EXCAVATE THIS CASE THEN THE WITNESSES CAN NOT DETERMINE THE BURIAL AREA BECAUSE IT IS AN IMMENSE RICE FIELD.

REPORT

UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION RESULTS OF CASE 0435 - QUANG BINH

I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS: ON 20 AUGUST 1966, PILOT RICHARD M. MILIKIN, FLYING AN RF-4C, WAS SHOT DOWN IN QUANG BINH. BOTH PILOTS EJECTED. ONE PILOT WAS RESCUED BY A HELICOPTER, BUT RICHARD M. MILIKIN WAS SHOT DEAD BY THE LOCAL MILITIA AS HE WAS DESCENDING.

II. PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION: UNILATERALLY INVESTIGATED IN 1987, 1988, 1993 AND 1994. INVESTIGATED JOINTLY DURING THE 3RD, 23RD AND 32ND JFAS. [THE TEAMS] INTERVIEWED MANY WITNESSES, AMONG THEM WAS MR. HA VAN THE [HAF VAWN THEER], THE FORMER DEPUTY MILITIA COMMANDER OF MAI HOA VILLAGE [XAX MAI HOAS], TUYEN HOA DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. MR. THE SAID THE AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY AAA. RICHARD MILIKIN EJECTED FROM THE AIRCRAFT AND WAS SHOT DEAD BY THE MILITIA WHEN HE WAS DESCENDING IN HIS PARACHUTE APPROXIMATELY 500 METERS FROM THE SURFACE OF THE GROUND IN THE TERRITORY OF MAI HOA VILLAGE, TUYEN HOA DISTRICT, QUANG BINH. MAI HOA VILLAGE OFFICIALS REPORTED UP TO THE DISTRICT MILITIA. AFTER THAT THE VILLAGE MILITIA BURIED THE PILOT'S BODY IN MAI HOA VILLAGE. IN 1975 THE LOCAL POPULACE BULLDOZED THE AREA TO MAKE IRRIGATION DITCHES, THEREFORE WITNESSES CAN NOT CONFIRM THE BURIAL SITE.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS:

1. FIND WITNESSES

MR. THANG [THAWNGS], FORMER DEPUTY DISTRICT MILITIA COMMANDER FOR TUYEN HOA DISTRICT

MR. DUyen [ZUYEEN], POLICY CADRE FOR THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

2. FIND BO TRACH DISTRICT OFFICIALS WHO POSSIBLY RECOVERED REMAINS.

3. INVESTIGATE BO TRACH DISTRICT CITIZENS' REPORTS OF PEOPLE WHO POSSIBLY RECOVERED REMAINS.

IV. INVESTIGATION RESULTS:

1) ACCORDING TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL, THE TEAM FOUND MR. PHAM XUAN THANG [PHAMJ XUAAN THAWNGS], 58 YOA, FORMER MAJOR AND TUYEN HOA DISTRICT DEPUTY MILITIA COMMANDER, CURRENTLY RETIRED IN PHU SON HAMLET [THOON PHUS SOWN], DUC HOA VILLAGE [XAX DWCS HOAS], TUYEN HOA, QUANG BINH. MR. THANG SAID IN 1966-1967 HE WAS APPOINTED TO GO STUDY. IN 1968 HE RETURNED TO THE TUYEN HOA DISTRICT MILITIA TO WORK AS A STAFF ASSISTANT UNTIL 1971 WHEN HE WAS APPOINTED TO BE THE DEPUTY DISTRICT MILITIA COMMANDER UNTIL 1983 WHEN HE RETIRED. WHEN THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND THE PILOT DIED MR. THANG WAS STUDYING FAR AWAY SO HE DIDN'T KNOW [ANYTHING]. DURING THE TIME HE WAS THE DEPUTY DISTRICT MILITIA COMMANDER HE KNEW OF THE POLICY TO RECOVER REMAINS OF PILOTS, BUT, BECAUSE HE DID NOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATE, FURTHERMORE THE

DISTRICT ONLY SUPPORTED THE PROVINCE, THEREFORE HE PERSONALLY DID NOT REMEMBER ANYTHING SPECIFIC ABOUT THIS ISSUE.

ACCORDING TO MR. THANG'S INFORMATION, THE TEAM MET MR. HOANG CAO [HOANGF CAOS], 74 YOA, THE FORMER TUYEN HOA DISTRICT MILITIA COMMANDER FROM 1960-1967, PRESENTLY RETIRED IN DIEM DIEN HAMLET [THOON ZIEEM DIEENF], DAC NINH VILLAGE [XAX DAWCS NINH], DONG HOI TOWNSHIP, QUANG BINH. MR. CAO SAID, IN APPROXIMATELY AUGUST 1966, THE TUYEN HOA MILITIA SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT. TWO PILOTS EJECTED, ONE WAS RESCUED [AND] ONE WAS SHOT DEAD AND BURIED IN MAI HOA VILLAGE. IN 1967, MR. CAO WAS APPOINTED TO GO STUDY, AFTER THAT HE WENT TO THE SOUTHERN BATTLEFIELD UNTIL 1972, THEN RETIRED. AS FOR THE FATE OF THE BURIED PILOT'S REMAINS IN MAI HOA VILLAGE, HE WAS NOT CERTAIN.

THE TEAM MET THE CADRE SECTION AND POLICY SECTION OF THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS. THEY SAID, FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT, THERE WAS NO ONE NAMED DUyen. THE TEAM ALSO FOUND AND ASKED MANY VETERANS OF BINH TRI THIEN PROVINCE BUT THERE WAS ALSO NO ONE WHO KNEW MR. DUyen AT THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS.

2) THE TEAM MET AND INTERVIEWED MANY BO TRACH DISTRICT OFFICIALS (MR. KE [KEE], FORMER POLICY CADRE, MR. TAN [TAANF], MR. LAM [LAAMX], FORMER DEPUTY DISTRICT MILITIA COMMANDERS), MET AND ASKED MANY PEOPLE, AMONG THEM WERE MANY PEOPLE WHO PARTICIPATED IN SEARCHING FOR AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AND REMAINS LIKE MR. HUNG [HUNGF] OF TRUNG TRACH [TRUNG TRACHJ] AND MR. RIENG [RIEENGf] OF HOAN TRACH VILLAGE [XAX HOANF TRACHJ], BUT NO ONE KNEW ABOUT REMAINS IN TUYEN HOA DISTRICT.

BO TRACH DISTRICT VETERANS ALSO SAID, ACCORDING TO THE DIVISION OF LABOR, CADRE OF THIS DISTRICT NEVER CARRIED OUT WORK IN A DIFFERENT DISTRICT. THEREFORE, REPORTS ALLEGING BO TRACH DISTRICT CADRE RECOVERED REMAINS IN TUYEN HOA DISTRICT ARE UNREALISTIC.

3) THE TEAM MET MANY BO TRACH DISTRICT CITIZENS IN ORDER TO ASK ABOUT INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE REMAINS OF CASE 0435 BUT NO ONE KNEW [ANYTHING].

VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEEKING MISSING PERSONS
UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORT OF CASE DATA
(HA BAC PROVINCE)

I. BACKGROUND (INFORMATION PROVIDED BY U.S.):

- ON JULY 31ST, 1989, THE VIETNAMESE RETURNED LTC BRINCKMAN'S REMAINS AND DOG TAG; NAME AND THE FLIGHT CREW ARE STILL MISSING.

II. INVESTIGATION PROGRESS:

- THIS CASE WAS INVESTIGATED DURING JFA'S 26, 31, 34 AND 39.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

1. THE UNILATERAL TEAM CONSISTED OF:

- PHAM TEO	: VNOSMP
- NGUYEN THANH HA	: -
- DOAN VAN QUAN	: HA BAC PROVINCE'S SPECIALIST.
- NGUYEN DUY THAI	: -
- NGUYEN VAN DU	: YEN DUNG DISTRICT'S SPECIALIST
- TRAN VAN THANH	: -

2. ON JUNE 5, 1996:

- THE UNILATERAL TEAM TOGETHER WITH THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF YEN DUNG DISTRICT AND TRI YEN (TRIS YEEN) VILLAGE DISCUSSED THE WORK PLAN AND REVIEWED ASSOCIATED WITNESSES.

- THE TEAM INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:

A. MR. VU HAI KHANH (VUX HAI KHANHS): 70 YOA, TAN THINH HAMLET, TRI VAN VILLAGE. MR. KHANH SAID HE WAS A VILLAGE MILITIA MEMBER AT THE TIME, AND SAW A FLAMING AIRCRAFT WHICH EXPLODED. THERE WAS A DEPLOYED PARACHUTE APPROXIMATELY 700 TO 800 METERS FROM HIS HOUSE, AND THE WIND BLEW IT TO COVER THE ROOF OF HIS HOUSE. THE PILOT LANDED BEHIND THE BACK WINDOW OF HIS HOUSE, HEAD DOWN, LEG HUNG ON THE ROOF. AFTER THAT, VILLAGERS CAME TO TAKE HIM DOWN AND TWO DAYS LATER BURIED HIM IN A RICE FIELD. IN THIS LOCALE, THERE WAS ONLY ONE PILOT WHO DIED AND WAS BURIED. AFTER THE AIRCRAFT EXPLODED, MR. KHANH SAW SMOKE COMING UP FROM THE VICINITY OF CHAM DIEN (CHAMJ DIEENS) MOUNTAIN, NEXT TO HUNG DAO (HWING DAOJ) HILL, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE. LATER ON, MR. KHANH HEARD THERE WAS AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE IN THE AFOREMENTIONED VICINITY, HE BELIEVED THE SECOND PILOT DIED IN THE AIRCRAFT.

B. MR. VU CHI CU (VUX CHIS CWR): 60 YOA, RETIRED, VINH LONG HAMLET, TRI YEN VILLAGE. FROM 1964 TO 1966, HE WAS THE POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE VILLAGE MILITIA, AND WAS THEN ASSIGNED TO TRI YEN DISTRICT. FROM 1983 TO 1990, HE WAS THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF YEN DUNG DISTRICT...MR. CU SAID AFTER HEARING THE AIRCRAFT EXPLOSION, HE CAME TO THE SITE WHERE THE PILOT LANDED BEHIND MR. KHANH'S HOUSE AND PARTICIPATED IN THE PILOT'S BURIAL. HE HEARD THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN HAI HUNG

PROVINCE. MR. CU CONFIRMED THAT DURING THE ENTIRE TIME HE SERVED AT THE HAMLET, VILLAGE, AND DISTRICT, THERE WAS ONLY ONE PILOT WHO DIED AND WAS BURIED IN TRI YEN VILLAGE THROUGHOUT THE WAR.

ON JUNE 10, 1996:

- THE TEAM WORKED WITH PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF HAI HUNG PROVINCE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HUNG DAO VILLAGE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

- THE TEAM INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:

A. MR. TRAN VAN BA (TRANF VAWN BAR): 64 YOA, PHUONG SON HAMLET, HUNG DAO VILLAGE, HE WAS WARTIME FORMER VILLAGE COMMANDER WHO DIRECTED MILITIA AND GUERILLA VILLAGERS TO CLEAN UP THE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE. HE SAID: AT APPROXIMATELY NOON IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER OF 1966 (LUNAR), DURING A MEETING WITH MILITIA MEMBERS, THERE WAS A BURNING AIRCRAFT COMING FROM THE DIRECTION OF HA BAC WHICH CRASHED INTO THE TOP OF A HILL IN THE PHUONG SON HAMLET. IT THEN ROLLED DOWN TO THE FOOT OF THE HILL. THE AIRCRAFT ENGINE LANDED IN A RICE FIELD. IN 1990-1992, THERE WERE SEVERAL PEOPLE FROM THE SOUTH WHO CAME TO SCAVENGE THE SITE, BUT THEY DID NOT FIND ANY REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS. THE AIRCRAFT CRASH DESTROYED FOUR HOUSES. SURROUNDING THE SITE, MILITIA PEOPLE FOUND AND BURIED MANY PIECES OF FLESH, INTESTINE, HAIRY PIECES OF STOMACH AND CHEST, BUT THEY DID NOT FIND ANY ASSOCIATED PERSONAL EFFECTS. LATER ON, MR. BA HEARD OF A MR. LAP (LAAPJ) (DECEASED 1982), WHO RECOVERED A SKULL AND BURIED IT IN THE CORNER OF A RICE PADDY TOWARD THE FOOT OF A HILL (GRID COORDINATES XJ 37270 - 423061); THIS PLACE WAS LATER FLATTENED AND MADE INTO A JUNK YARD BY THE VILLAGE COOPERATIVE. CURRENTLY, THE YARD IS A CULTIVATED FARM.

- MRS. VU THI HAO (HAOR): 54 YOA, PHUONG SON HAMLET, HUNG DAO VILLAGE, FORMER WARTIME LEADER OF A WOMEN'S GROUP. MRS. HAO SAID THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER OF 1966 (LUNAR). AT THE TIME, SHE SAW AN AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS ALREADY ON FIRED FLYING FROM HA BAC DIRECTION. THIS AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO A HILL IN THE VILLAGE, CREATING A LOUD EXPLOSION. THE ENGINE SLID DOWN THE HILL SIDE AND LANDED IN A FARM. AFTER THE EXPLOSION, THERE WERE FOUR HOUSES ON FIRE. THE MILITIA AND GUERILLA FORCES AND MANY PEOPLE ARRIVED AT THE SITE. SHE SAW CLEARLY WITH HER OWN EYES INTESTINES AND PIECES OF FLESH SCATTERED AT THE SITE. THERE WERE SEVERAL PIECES OF HAIRY FLESH. MANY VILLAGERS KNEW OF THE INCIDENT, BUT NO ONE HAS FOUND ANY PERSONAL EFFECTS OF THE PILOT. SHE DID NOT THINK THE STORY OF MR. LAP BURYING A SKULL ALLEGED TO BE OF A PILOT WAS TRUE BECAUSE IF IT WAS TRUE, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE KNOWN ABOUT IT. SHE ALSO SAID THAT THE PILOT'S PARACHUTE DID NOT DEPLOY AND WAS BURNT, TORN, AND SOME VILLAGERS TOOK THE HARNESS HOME TO TIE BUFFALO. SHE BELIEVED THE PILOT DID NOT EJECT IN TIME AND DIED IN THE CRASH AND EXPLOSION. WHEN THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, THERE WERE MANY OTHER AIRCRAFT CIRCLING OVER THE SITE. -4

- THE TEAM CAME TO THE SITE AND VERIFIED THE GRID AS: XJ 37327-42516.

IV. RESULTS:

1/ CASE DATA , IN TRI YEN VILLAGE, YEN DUNG DISTRICT: THERE WAS ONLY ONE PILOT WHO PARACHUTED, LANDED DEAD, AND WAS BURIED. THE VIETNAMESE RETURNED THIS SET OF REMAINS TO U.S. ON JULY 31ST, 1989.

2/ THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE WAS DISCOVERED IN THE VICINITY OF A HILL OF PHUONG SON HAMLET, HUNG DAO VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE.

3/ THE SECOND PILOT, ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES, DIED IN THE AIRCRAFT EXPLOSION. AT THE CRASH SITE, MANY PIECES OF FLESH WERE FOUND, BUT NO ONE BURIED THEM.

V. ENCLOSED WITH THIS REPORT IS THE REPORT VERIFYING THE TEAM'S INVESTIGATION FROM THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF YEN DUNG DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE.

HA NOI, 24 JUNE 1996

INVESTIGATION TEAM'S REPRESENTATIVE

[SIGNED]

NGUYEN THANH HA

SOCIAL REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

INVESTIGATION REPORT CASE DATA

1. VNOSMP MEMBERS INCLUDED:

- PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF): COLONEL, TEAM LEADER
- NGUYEN THANH HA (THANH HAF): VNOSMP SPECIALIST
- DOAN VAN QUAN (DOANF QUAAN): HA BAC PROVINCE SPECIALIST
- NGUYEN DUY THAI (ZUY THAIS): PROVINCE SPECIALIST
- NGUYEN VAN DA (ZAJ): YEN DUNG DISTRICT SPECIALIST

2. AFTER WORKING WITH THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES OF YEN DUNG DISTRICT AND TRI YEN VILLAGE, THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED TWO WITNESSES:

- MR. VU HAI KHANH (VUX HAIR KHANHS): 70 YOA, TAN THINH HAMLET, TRI YEN VILLAGE.
- MR. VU CHI CU (VUX CHIS CWR): 60 YOA, VINH LONG HAMLET, TRI YEN VILLAGE.

3. BOTH WITNESSES AFFIRMED THE FOLLOWING:

- THROUGHOUT THE WAR IN TRI YEN VILLAGE TERRITORY ONLY ONE PILOT PARACHUTED OUT OF THE BURNING AIRCRAFT AND DIED. HIS BODY WAS BURIED, EXHUMED LATER AND DELIVERED TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES.

- IN THE AREA OF TRI YEN VILLAGE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OR FRAGMENTS OF AIRCRAFT.

4. THE VNOSMP WILL COMPIL A REPORT INCLUDING THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION AND INTERVIEW.

5. THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF YEN DUNG DISTRICT, TRI YEN VILLAGE HAS CREATED ADVANTAGEOUS CONDITIONS [FOR THE INVESTIGATION]. ALL CADRE HAVE PARTICIPATED IN HELPING THE INVESTIGATION TEAM COMPLETE THE MISSION.

YEN DUNG DISTRICT, 5 JUNE 1996

CONFIRMATION OF PEOPLE COMMITTEE DISTRICT

VNOSMP TEAM LEADER
[SIGNED]
PHAM TEO

MIA PROVINCE REPRESENTATIVE
[SIGNED]
DOAN VAN QUAN

VNOSMP HAS VISITED AND WORKED WITH THE PEOPLE COMMITTEE OF YEN DUNG DISTRICT AND TRI YEN VILLAGE. TEAM ALSO WORKED WITH LOCAL PEOPLE AND WITNESSES ACCORDING TO THE REPORT.

[STAMP]

CHAIRMAN PEOPLE COMMITTEE OF YEN DUNG

CHIEF OF STAFF
[SIGNED]
TRAN DUNG

REPORT
INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0586 IN TUYEN QUANG

1) ACCORDING TO U.S. FILES:

SILVA AND BIEDGER WERE THE PILOTS OF AN F-105F AIRCRAFT THAT WAS SHOT DOWN IN LINH PHU VILLAGE, CHIEN HOA DISTRICT, TUYEN QUANG. THE TWO PILOTS PARACHUTED TO THE GROUND BUT WERE ALREADY DEAD. VIETNAM RETURNED THE REMAINS ON 3 JUN 83 BUT THE U.S. HAS JUST EXAMINED BIEDGER. BECAUSE THE REMAINS OF SILVA ARE SO LITTLE, NO CONCLUSIVE HAS BEEN REACH.

2) PROGRESS OF INVESTIGATION:

VIETNAM HAS UNILATERALLY INVESTIGATED, AND HAD THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES WATCH OVER THE GRAVE AND HAD THE PROVINCE MILITIA COMBINE WITH THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES TO EXHUME THE REMAINS AND TURN THEM OVER TO THE VIETNAMESE MIA OFFICE. ON 3 JUN 86, VIETNAM TURNED THESE REMAINS OVER TO THE U.S. THE REMAINS WERE RETURNED IN ONE COFFIN BECAUSE THEY WERE COMMINGLED (BECAUSE SUBORDINATES TURNED THE REMAINS OVER ALREADY COMBINED).

INVESTIGATED DURING THE 28TH JFA, 2 WITNESSES INTERVIEWED:

- MR. BAN TUAN NGOC (BANF TUAANS NGOCJ), CURRENTLY LINH PHU (LINH PHUS)-CHIEM HOA (CHIEEM HOAS) VILLAGE SECURITY.
- BAN VAN NGON (BANG VAWN NGOON), VILLAGE MILITIA MEMBER THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE BURIAL OF THE SECOND PILOT.

THE MEN SAID: A JET AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE AFTERNOON ON AN UNKNOWN DAY IN AN UNRECALLED MONTH IN 1965 IN LINH PHU VILLAGE. THE PILOTS EJECTED BUT WERE KILLED BECAUSE OF MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. ONE HAD A BROKEN LEG AND BONES WERE STICKING OUT OF THE LEG. MILITIA BURIED THE BODIES ON THE SPOT. BECAUSE THIS WAS A MOUNTAINOUS REGION, THE MILITIA JUST PILED ROCKS ON TOP FOR A GRAVE. THEY DIDN'T USE A COFFIN AND BURIED THE PILOTS IN THEIR UNDERGARMENTS. THEY TURNED THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE OVER TO THE DISTRICT.

SECOND PILOT; EIGHT DAYS AFTERWARD, PEOPLE WENT INTO THE JUNGLE TO GET MUSHROOMS AND DISCOVERED THE SECOND PILOT. THE PEOPLE BURIED HIM ON THE SPOT, USING A COFFIN. THEY BURIED HIM IN HIS UNDERCLOTHES AND ALL VAL OVER TO THE AUTHORITIES.

DISTRICT AND PROVINCE TEAMS LATER EXH AND TOOK THEM AWAY. ON 6 MAY 96, THE INVE WENT TO THE SITE. THE TEAM CONSISTED OF: KHOI (PHAMJ COONG KHOOI), A MINISTRY OF NA' SPECIALIST, AND MR. NGO QUANG HUNG (NGOO QI MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS SPECIALIST. 1 PROVINCIAL SPECIALISTS AND DISTRICT SPECIAL

LINH PHU VILLAGE, CHIEU HOA TO REINVESTIGATE. THE RESULTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

THE TEAM MET WITH VILLAGE AUTHORITIES AND SUGGESTED INTERVIEWING PEOPLE THAT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN THE BURIAL OR REMOVAL OF REMAINS:

- MR. DANG VAN AN (DAWNGJ VAWN AN), 70 YEARS OLD, FORMER PHU THO (PHUS THOJ) VILLAGE CHAIRMAN, DIRECTLY SUPERVISED THE BURIAL OF BOTH PILOTS.

- MR. BAN VAN NGAN (BANF VAWN NGAAN), 52 YEARS OLD, FORMER MILITIA MEMBER, DIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN THE BURIAL OF THE SECOND PILOT.

- MR. DINH HONG CANH (DINH HOONGF CANHR), 69 YEARS OLD, FORMER VILLAGE CHAIRMAN, SUPERVISED BURIALS.

BESIDES THESE INDIVIDUALS, THERE WAS ALSO MR. DANG VAN SON (DAWNGJ VAWN SOWN) (FORMER VICE COMMANDER OF VILLAGE MILITIA) AND MR. BAN VAN SON (BANF VAWN SOWN) (FORMER VILLAGE NURSE), BUT THEY ARE DEAD.

THE WITNESSES SAID THE TWO PILOTS PARACHUTED DOWN ONTO THE MOUNTAINS BUT HIT THE ROCKS AND DIED. WHEN THE WITNESSES ARRIVED, THE FIRST PILOT WAS DEAD AND HAD A BROKEN LEG WITH BONES STICKING OUT OF THE FLESH. THIS PILOT WAS BIG, FAT, ROUND HEADED, HAIRY CHESTED, HE HAD A SHOULDER STRAP WITH TWO STARS ON IT. THE BODY WAS BURIED UNDER ROCKS. THE SECOND PILOT WAS DISCOVERED WHEN SOME PEOPLE WENT INTO THE JUNGLE TO GET MUSHROOMS AND FOUND A RED PARACHUTE. THEY FOUND THE DEAD PILOT STILL SEATED IN THE AIRCRAFT CHAIR, HIS HAND STILL HOLDING HIS PISTOL. THE BACK OF HIS HEAD HAD NO FLESH, HIS LEG WAS MANGLED. THIS PERSON WAS THE OPPOSITE OF THE OTHER PILOT: HE WAS SMALL, BLACK HAired, HE DID NOT HAVE A HAIRY CHEST, AND HAD A SHOULDER STRAP WITH ONE STAR. HE WAS BURIED ABOUT TEN METERS FROM THE SITE IN A COFFIN. HE WAS BURIED IN HIS UNDERCLOTHES. HIS PROPERTY WAS TURNED OVER TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES.

MR. DINH HOANG CANH, FORMER VILLAGE CHAIRMAN ALSO SAID THAT IN 1982, TWO PROVINCE CADRE AND A DISTRICT TEAM WENT TO EXHUME THE REMAINS. HE SAID MR. BAN VAN SON (BANF VAWN SOWN), A FORMER VILLAGE MEDIC WENT WITH THE TEAM (MR. SON IS DEAD). AFTER MR. SON RETURNED, HE TOLD HIS BROTHER, MR. BAN VAN NGOC (CURRENTLY THE VILLAGE SECRETARY), THAT THEY HAD EXHUMED TWO GRAVES, BUT THE SECOND GRAVE HAD VERY FEW BONES BECAUSE ANIMALS HAD DUG THEM UP AND EATEN THEM. AFTER THEY HAD EXHUMED THE REMAINS THEY PUT THEM INTO TWO PORCELAIN BOXES AND CARRIED THEM DOWN THE HILL AND BURIED THEM AT THE EDGE OF A RICE FIELD. THIS SITE IS 700 METERS FROM THE ORIGINAL SITES. IN 1976 OR 1977 A PROVINCE TEAM AND A DISTRICT TEAM RETURNED TO GET THE REMAINS (NO ONE REMEMBERS THE NAMES OF THE PROVINCE OR DISTRICT CADRE). THE ORIGINAL BURIAL SITE IS STILL KNOWN BUT NO ONE CAN CONFIRM IF THE REMAINS ARE STILL THERE.

IN SUMMARY: THE GROUP THAT EXHUMED THE REMAINS
CONFIRMED THE GRAVE LOCATION, EXHUMED THEM, AND TURNED THE
PILOT REMAINS OVER TO THE U.S. AUTHORITIES. SUGGEST THE
U.S. REINSPECT THE SECOND SET OF REMAINS.

REPORTINVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA IN CAO BANG (CAO BAWNGF)1) AMERICAN INFORMATION:

NAME AND FIVE OTHER PILOTS IN AN EB66-C AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN ON APRIL 1968 AT GRID COORDINATES WK 860 550, BAC THAI PROVINCE. THE THREE SURVIVING PILOTS WERE CAPTURED AND WERE RELEASED IN 1973. VIETNAM RETURNED TWO SETS OF REMAINS IN 1977 AND 1989. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS NO TRACE OF NAME'S REMAINS.

2) PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION:

[WE] UNILATERALLY INVESTIGATED AND RECEIVED REMAINS. LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND PEOPLE WHO GATHERED THE REMAINS AFFIRMED THAT THREE DEAD PILOTS WERE BEEN BURIED IN TWO GRAVES. THE FIRST GRAVE CONTAINED ONE PILOT WHO DIED OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT AND LOST HIS RIGHT LEG. THE SECOND GRAVE CONTAINED THE TWO PILOTS WHO DIED INSIDE THE AIRCRAFT. THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS BODIES WERE NOT INTACT (ONE PERSON ONLY HAD ONE THIGH, THE OTHER PERSON ONLY HAD A BODY, NO HEAD).

THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES WERE INTERVIEWED DURING THE 20TH AND 28TH JFA'S:

- MR. HOANG VAN CAO (HOANGF VAWN CAO), FORMER PARTY SECRETARY OF MY PHUONG (MYX PHWONG) VILLAGE, RA (RAR) MARKET.
- MR. DUONG VAN AN (ZWONG VAWN AAN), FORMER MY PHUONG VILLAGE MILITIA, RA MARKET.

THEY PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING: THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE AFTERNOON ON JANUARY 25 1966 (LUNAR CALENDAR). FOUR PILOTS PARACHUTED, THREE WERE CAPTURED, AND ONE WAS SHOT AND DIED IN THE AIR, LOSING HIS RIGHT LEG WHEN HE LANDED. THE OTHER TWO PILOTS DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO PARACHUTE, AND DIED IN THE BURNING AIRCRAFT. THE NEXT MORNING, THE MILITIA BURIED THE PILOT WHO PARACHUTED AND DIED IN ONE GRAVE. THEY PULL THE BODIES OF THE TWO WHO DIED IN THE BURNED AIRCRAFT AND BURIED THEM TOGETHER IN ANOTHER GRAVE. LATER, A PROVINCE TEAM AND DISTRICT TEAM CAME AND EXHUMED THE GRAVES AND TURNED [THE REMAINS] OVER TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES.

MAY 6 1996, THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL:

MR. PHAM CONG KHOI (PHAMJ COONG KHOOI), MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND MR. NGO QUANG QUANG HUNG (NGOO QUANG HWNG), MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. [THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TEAM] HAD THE COOPERATION

FROM MEMBERS OF CAO BANG PROVINCE AND BA BE DISTRICT (THE OLD DISTRICT MARKET "RA" HAS BEEN SEPARATED FROM BAC THAI (BAWCS THAIS) PROVINCE AND NOW BELONG TO CAO BANG PROVINCE SINCE 1979 UNDER THE NEW NAME BA BE DISTRICT). [THE TEAM] RETURNED TO RE-INVESTIGATE THIS CASE. THE TEAM MET AND INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES THAT HAD FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE BURIAL:

- MR. DUONG VAN SUONG (ZWOWNG VAWN SWONG), 62 YOA, FORMER MY PHUONG VILLAGE MILITIA.
- MR. HOANG VAN CAO (HOANGF VAWN CAO) 70 YOA, FORMER PARTY SECRETARY.
- MR. HUA QUANG HOI (HWAS QUANG HOOIJ), 73 YOA, FORMER PARTY SECRETARY.

THE THREE INDIVIDUALS MAINTAINED THAT: THE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE AT APPROXIMATELY 1500 HOURS ON 25 JAN 1966 (LUNAR CALENDAR). IT CRASHED IN MY PHUONG VILLAGE. FOUR PILOTS PARACHUTED OUT. THREE PILOTS CAME DOWN IN VI HUONG (VIJ HWONG) VILLAGE AND BACH THONG (BACHJ THOONG) VILLAGE (BACH THONG VILLAGE BORDERS MY PHUONG VILLAGE). THEY WERE CAPTURED ALIVE. ONE PILOT WAS SHOT AND KILLED IN THE AIR AND LOST HIS RIGHT LEG ON THE GROUND AND WAS BURIED THE NEXT DAY APPROXIMATELY 500 METERS FROM THE AIRCRAFT CRASH. HE WAS BURIED FULLY CLOTHED AND NOT PLACED IN A COFFIN. THE HOLE THEY BURIED THE BODY IN WAS APPROXIMATELY .60 METERS DEEP. AFTER THEY BURIED THE BODY THEY COVERED IT WITH DIRT APPROXIMATELY .50 METERS HIGH AND PLACED A STONE IN FRONT OF THE GRAVE TO MARK IT. THEY DISCOVERED TWO DEAD INDIVIDUALS IN THE BURNED AIRCRAFT TWO DAYS LATER. THE TWO INDIVIDUALS' BODIES WERE NOT INTACT; ONE INDIVIDUAL WAS MISSING A HEAD. THE MILITIA PULLED THE BODIES OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT AND BURIED THEM APPROXIMATELY 20 METERS FROM THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. THEY BURIED THE BODIES FULLY CLOTHED AND DID NOT PLACE THEM IN A COFFIN. THEY PILED APPROXIMATELY .50 METERS OF DIRT OVER THE GRAVE, BUT DID NOT MARK IT.

THE TEAM ALSO INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES THAT EXHUMED THE REMAINS:

- MR. NONG TINH (NOONG TINHJ), FORMER DISTRICT TEAM, RETIRED IN HA HIEU (HAF HIEEUJ) VILLAGE, BA BE DISTRICT, CAO BANG PROVINCE.
- MR. HOANG VAN NGO (HOANGF VAWN NGOJ), FORMER VILLAGE MILITIA CHIEF OF MY PHUONG VILLAGE, BA BE?

THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS STATED THAT WHEN THEY STARTED DIGGING THEY DISCOVERED THE REMAINS RIGHT AWAY. THEY EXHUMED TWO GRAVES IN THE SAME DAY. THEY DUG APPROXIMATELY .60 METERS DEEP AND HAD TO SCOOP WATER OUT OF THE HOLE TO RETRIEVE THE BONES. AT THE FIRST GRAVE THEY GATHERED MANY BONES BUT THEY WERE DECAYED. THEY

WIPE THEM CLEAN, THEN PLACED THE BONES IN A PLASTIC BAG. AT THE SECOND GRAVE THEY ALSO GATHERED MANY BONES, BUT THE BONES WERE CRUSHED AND BROKEN. THEY DID NOT REMEMBER DETAILS ABOUT WHAT TYPE OF BONES THEY RECOVERED. AFTER THEY CLEANED THE BONES, THEY PLACED THEM IN THE SAME PLASTIC BAG AS THE FIRST. THEY DID NOT SEPARATE EACH SET OF REMAINS.

THEY REMEMBERED THERE WERE TWO OTHER PERSONNEL WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE EXHUMATION:

- MR. HY (HYR), FORMER DOCTOR IN RA MARKET DISTRICT HOSPITAL, RETIRED IN THE TOWN OF RA MARKET - BA BE.

- MR. AU DINH CHAN (AAU DINH CHAANR), FORMER 2ND LIEUTENANT AND DISTRICT TEAM CADRE IN RA MARKET. HE LATER TRANSFERRED TO A DISTRICT TEAM IN RA MARKET. THE TEAM COULD NOT LOCATE THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS.

THE VNOSMP RECEIVED THE REMAINS AND TURNED THEM OVER TO THE U.S. ON 21 JUN 89 (NUMBERS 4, 5, AND 6 IN THE RECORDS). THE U.S. DETERMINED THE NUMBER 4 REMAINS BELONGED TO BILBURN, NUMBER 6 BELONGED TO HARTNEY OF CASE 0996, AND RECOMMENDED [THE U.S.] RE-EXAMINE REMAINS NUMBER 5.

THE REPATRIATION ON 30 SEP 77, VIETNAM TURNED OVER REMAINS BELIEVED TO BE HARTNEY (NUMBER 7 IN THE RECORD). SUGGEST THE U.S. SIDE RE-EXAMINE THE REMAINS BECAUSE THESE REMAINS WERE COLLECTED FROM BAC THAI PROVINCE.

DATA OF REMAINS IN BACH THAI PROVINCE
TURNED OVER FOR COMPARISON

DATE TURNED OVER	NUMBER ON LIST	NAME OF REMAINS	DATE MISSING	IDENTIFICATION	NOTES
30-9-77	6	FANTLE	5-1-68 BAC THAI	CANTLE	
30-9-77	7	HARTNEY	5-1-68 BAC THAI	NOT YET	RE- EXAMINE
21-6-89	4	NO NAME	4-2-67 BAC THAI	WILBURN	
21-6-89	5	NO NAME	4-2-67 BAC THAI	NOT YET	RE- EXAMINE
21-6-89	6	NO NAME	4-2-67 BAC THAI	HARTNEY	

REPORT
RESULTS OF UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0641 QUANG BINH

I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS: ON 10 APRIL 1967, MAJOR JOHN F. O'GRADY, FLYING AN F-105D AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATE WE 795 662. THE PILOT PARACHUTED IN THE VICINITY OF COORDINATES WE 818 719, QUANG BINH.

II. PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS: INVESTIGATIONS WERE CARRIED OUT DURING THE 10TH, 13TH, 17TH, AND 25TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES. A NUMBER OF WITNESSES WERE INTERVIEWED, AMONG THEM WERE MR. PHAM PHONG SAC (PHAMJ PHONG SAWCS), FORMER CADRE OF BORDER DEFENSE POST CHA LO PRESENTLY RETIRED IN THANH HOA (THANH HOAS) VILLAGE, MINH HOA (MINH HOAS) DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE, AND MR. HO HUAN (HOOF HUAAN) IN YLENG VILLAGE, DAN HOA (DAAN HOAS) VILLAGE, MINH HOA DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THE WITNESSES ALL CONFIRMED THAT AFTER THE AIRPLANE WAS SHOT DOWN, THE PILOT PARACHUTED INTO DAN HOA (ZAAN HOAF) VILLAGE AND WAS CAPTURED BY THE MILITIA BUT LATER DIED. THE PILOT'S BODY WAS BURIED IN THE AREA OF DAN HOA VILLAGE.

JOINTLY EXCAVATED DURING THE 25TH JFA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

IN THE 280TH AIR DEFENSE BATTALION MUSEUM THERE IS AN I.D. CARD BELONGING TO O'GRADY AND AN ATTACHED DOCUMENT SUMMARIZING THE BATTLE.

III. REQUIREMENTS OF UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

1) LOCATE FILES IN THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL SECURITY OFFICE RELATING TO CASE 0641.

2) INVESTIGATE INFORMATION GIVEN BY MR. PHAM VAN RUYEN CONCERNING LOCALS RESIDENTS, PARTICULARLY IF THERE IS ANYONE WHO DUG UP REMAINS IN DAN HOA VILLAGE.

3) LOCATE THE WITNESS FILE IN MINH HOA DISTRICT.

4) LOCATE AND INTERVIEW FORMER SOLDIERS IN MINH HOA, BO TRACH DISTRICT CONCERNING REMAINS IN MINH HOA.

5) REQUEST VIETNAM LOCATE AND INTERVIEW THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:

- MR. TRUNG VAN TRUONG (TRUNG VAWN TRWOWNG) OF MILITARY HEADQUARTERS FOR MINH HOA DISTRICT WHO, IN 1975, PARTICIPATED IN THE SEARCH FOR REMAINS ALONG WITH MR. CAO XUAN DUC (CAO XUAAN DWCS) IN TRUNG HOA VILLAGE, MINH HOA DISTRICT.

- LOCATE FORMER DOCTORS AND MEDICS WHO WORKED IN THE MILITARY POSTS 12-14 HOSPITALS. DOCTORS LAM (LAAM), DINH (DINH), AND CHI.

IV. RESULTS OF UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

1. THE TEAM WORKED WITH THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES FOR QUANG BINH PROVINCE, EXAMINING THE ARCHIVAL FILES BUT PRESENTLY DID NOT FIND ANY FILES CORRELATING TO THE PILOT'S GRAVE AND REMAINS FOR CASE 0641.

2. THE TEAM WORKED WITH THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, THE DISTRICT TEAM, AND THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES FOR MINH HOA DISTRICT, EXAMINING THE ARCHIVAL FILES. THERE WERE NO ARCHIVAL FILES CONCERNING MIA'S BECAUSE THE CONDITIONS OF THE WAR WERE FIERCE, CONDITIONS DID NOT ALLOW ARCHIVING. THE PRIMARY CONCERN WAS SERVING IN THE WAR. THEREFORE, ARCHIVING WAR FILES WAS NOT ACHIEVED IN A REGULATED, ORDERLY MANNER.

3. THE TEAM CARRIED OUT INTERVIEWS WITH SEVERAL FORMER SOLDIERS IN BO TRACH DISTRICT BUT THEY ALL CONFIRMED THAT UP TO NOW BO TRACH WAS AN ISOLATED DISTRICT AND WAS NEVER PART OF MINH HOA, TUYEN HOA THEREFORE BO TRACH CADRES COULD NOT HAVE CARRIED OUT EXCAVATIONS OF REMAINS IN MINH HOA DISTRICT.

4. THE TEAM WORKED WITH THE MINH HOA DISTRICT TEAM BUT AS THEY STATED BEFORE THE MINH HOA TEAM DOES NOT HAVE ANYONE NAMED TRUNG VAN TRUONG OR TRUONG VAN TRUNG. THE TEAM WENT TO TRUNG HOA VILLAGE (IN MINH HOA DISTRICT THERE IS ONLY TRUNG HOA VILLAGE, THERE IS NO TRUONG HOA VILLAGE AS STATED IN AMERICAN DOCUMENTS). AFTER WORKING WITH THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE VILLAGE POLICE STATED THAT IN TRUNG HOA VILLAGE PRESENTLY THERE IS A PERSON, NAMED CAO QUANG DUC (CAO QUANG DWCS) STILL LIVING IN THE LOCAL AREA AND ANOTHER PERSON NAMED CAO XUAN DUC BORN IN TRUNG HOA VILLAGE, A PROVISIONS CADRE WHO IS RETIRED AND LIVING IN THE QUY DAT DISTRICT SEAT, MINH HOA DISTRICT. THE TEAM MET WITH MR. CAO XUAN DUC, 55 YOA, BORN IN TRUNG HOA VILLAGE PRESENTLY LIVING IN QUY HOA (QUY HOAS) VILLAGE, QUY DAT DISTRICT SEAT, MINH HOA AND MR. CAO XUAN DUC, 73 YOA, LIVING IN TRUNG HOA. BOTH GENTLEMEN STATED THAT UP TO NOW THEY HAVE NEVER FOUND PILOTS REMAINS.

5. THE TEAM WORKED WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES (COMMITTEE, SECURITY FORCES, DISTRICT TEAM) IN MINH HOA, TUYEN HOA AND VARIOUS VILLAGES IN TRUNG HOA; THEY STATED, THE MILITARY POST 12-14 HOSPITALS WERE STATIONED IN SCATTERED GROUPS ON THE TRUNG SON ROAD IN A DESERTED AREA WITH NO RESIDENTS. AFTER PEACE WAS ESTABLISHED, THE VARIOUS UNITS SPLIT UP AND DISBANDED. TRANSFER LOCATIONS ARE UNKNOWN.

VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEEKING MISSING PERSONS
(VNOSMP)

UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR CASE 0680
(HOA BINH PROVINCE)

I. BACKGROUND (INFORMATION PROVIDED BY U.S. RECORDS):

- ON 12 MAY 1967, AN F-4C AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN IN HOA BINH PROVINCE. THE CREW CONSISTED OF COLONEL NORMAN GADDIS AND NAME . COLONEL GADDIS WAS CAPTURED, AND NAME DIED AND WAS BURIED.

II. INVESTIGATION PROCESS:

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

1/ THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONS:

- PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEO)	:	VNOSMP
- NGUYEN THANH HA (THANH HAF)	:	VNOSMP
- QUACH NGOC KHIEEN (QUACHS NGOCJ KHIEEN)	:	HOA BINH PROVINCE MIA TEAM LEADER.
- DINH VAN DUNG (DINH ZUNGX)	:	SPECIALIST
HOA BINH PROVINCE.		
- NGUYEN VAN BAY (BAYR)	:	SPECIALIST
LUONG SON DISTRICT.		
- BUI VAN HOI (BUIF HOOIF)	:	SPECIALIST
LUONG SON DISTRICT.		

2/ 15 MAY 1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF HOA BINH PROVINCE AND REPORTED THE WORK AND INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS OF CASE 0680. THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE CADRE AND ALL THE HOA BINH PROVINCE MIA SPECIALISTS AFFIRMED THEY PRESENTLY HAVE NOT WITHHELD ANY DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE CAPTURE OF COLONEL GADDIS AND THE BURIAL OF 1LT JEFFERSON OF CASE 0680.

3/ 16 MAY 1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF LUONG SON DISTRICT AND TIEN XUAN (TIEENS XUAAN) VILLAGE.

4/ 17 MAY 1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH COLLECTIVE FARM 1A (HEADQUARTERED AT HOA LAC (HOAF LACJ) VILLAGE, THACH THAT DISTRICT HA TAY PROVINCE) AND THE AGENCY IN CHARGE OF THE GROUND WHICH CONTAINS THE BURIAL LOCATION OF 1LT JEFFERSON. THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN VAN CAM (CAAMR): 62 YOA, CURRENTLY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE COLLECTIVE FARM 1A. THE WITNESS SAID DURING THE 60'S ON COLLECTIVE FARM 1A THERE WAS ONLY ONE SMALL ORGANIZATION THAT PRODUCED [GREW] FOR THE MILITARY. THE AREA WAS CULTIVATED ON THE SMALL HILLS AND THE OPEN AREAS. IN 1981 COLLECTIVE FARM 1A WAS ESTABLISHED. IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING AND PRODUCING DURING THE YEARS 1975 AND 1976, THE COLLECTIVE FARM CONDUCTED A LARGE EFFORT TO FLATTEN THE TERRAIN IN ORDER TO PLANT CROPS AND THE FOLLOWING YEARS THE COLLECTIVE FARM CONDUCTED A NUMBER OF SMALLER EFFORTS TO FLATTEN THE TERRAIN IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE TYPE OF CROPS THEY GREW. THIS EFFORT OF LEVELING THE TERRAIN WAS CARRIED OUT BY A 3-4 PERSON TEAM. IN THE PROCESS OF FLATTENING THE TERRAIN THEY DISCOVERED AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AND THEY BROUGHT BACK A NUMBER OF PIECES TO THE FARM. DURING THE ... JOINT INVESTIGATION THE U.S. SPECIALISTS PHOTOGRAPHED THIS WRECKAGE. THE DRIVER OF THE MACHINERY USED TO FLATTEN THE TERRAIN [BULLDOZER] ON THE COLLECTIVE FARM HAS RETIRED. ON TWO OCCASIONS MR. CAM HAS LED INVESTIGATION TEAMS TO THE SITE. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESS THE AREA WHICH CONTAINS THE BURIAL SITE OF THE PILOT OFTEN FLOODS, AND SOME YEARS THE ENTIRE COLLECTIVE FARM FLOODS.

- ALSO ON 17 MAY 1996, ACCORDING TO THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS, MR. CAM LED THE INVESTIGATION TEAM BACK TO THE SITE. THE INVESTIGATION TEAM OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING GRID COORDINATES:..... MR. CAM SAID FROM THE DAY HE TRANSFERRED TO THE COLLECTIVE FARM IN 1981 UNTIL PRESENT, HE HAS NOT DISCOVERED, SEEN OR HEARD ANYONE SAY THEY DISCOVERED THE REMAINS OF THE U.S. PILOT AT THE BURIAL LOCATION OR WITHIN THE AREA THE COLLECTIVE FARM MANAGES.

- AT THE TIEN XUAN VILLAGE PEOPLES COMMITTEE, THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. QUOC HUNG (QUOOC HWNG): 62 YOA, CHUA (CHWA) HAMLET, TIEN XUAN VILLAGE, LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE. MR. HUNG SAID THE DAY AFTER THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, HE WAS GOING TO WORK NEAR THE CRASH SITE. HE DOES NOT REMEMBER THE YEAR OR MONTH, BUT REMEMBERED IT WAS A HOT AND SUNNY DAY AND WAS SOMETIME DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON (NEARLY DARK). HE SAW A NUMBER OF PEOPLE FROM MIEN (MIEN) HAMLET (TIEN XUAN VILLAGE), BURYING THE BODY OF A U.S. PILOT IN THE FIELD. THEY DUG A VERY SHALLOW HOLE AND COVERED UP THE BODY WITH DIRT. THREE DAYS LATER, WHEN HE WAS PASSING BY THE BURIAL SITE MR. CAM [HUNG] SMELLED A BAD ODOR AND SAW A NUMBER OF PEOPLE COVERING THE GRAVE WITH ADDITIONAL DIRT TO ALLEVIATE THE SMELL OF THE BODY. AFTER

THAT MR. CAM [HUNG] DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING FURTHER ABOUT THE REMAINS OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED PILOT.

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM QUESTIONED MR. NGUYEN VAN NANG (NANG), THE TIEN XUAN VILLAGE CHAIRMAN, MR. LE VAN LINH (LINH), THE TIEN XUAN VILLAGE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, AND MR. MINH, THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, ABOUT INFORMATION RELATED TO THE FATE OF THE U.S. PILOT'S REMAINS. THESE INDIVIDUALS KNEW ABOUT OR HEARD OF A CASE WHERE A AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND THE BURIAL SITE OF THE PILOT'S BODY. BUT PRESENTLY THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY RELATED DOCUMENTS AND SAID THE PEOPLE IN THE LOCAL AREA DO NOT HAVE ANY NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE OF THE PILOT'S REMAINS.

5/ 18 MAY 1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM MET MR. HUNG (HWNG), DIRECTOR OF COLLECTIVE FARM 1A, PRESENTLY BEING TREATED AT MEDICAL CLINIC 108. MR. HUNG WORKED AT THE COLLECTIVE FARM FROM MARCH OF 1973. HE WAS THE TEAM LEADER IN CHARGE OF CULTIVATION. MR. HUNG SAID PREVIOUSLY THE COLLECTIVE FARM WAS A TERRACED FIELD. AROUND THE END OF 1973 OR BEGINNING OF 1974, THE COLLECTIVE FARM USED MACHINERY TO FLATTEN THE TERRAIN AND SET UP IRRIGATION TO GROW CORN. IN 1975 THE COLLECTIVE FARM AGAIN LEVELED THE AREA IN ORDER TO GROW RICE. THE TASK OF FLATTENING THE TERRAIN WAS CARRIED OUT BY ONE TEAM CONSISTING OF 2-3 DRIVERS. DURING THE PROCESS OF LEVELING THE TERRAIN MANY TIMES MR. CAM [HUNG] NEVER HEARD OF ANYONE FINDING THE REMAINS OF A U.S. PILOT. MR. HUNG ONLY HIRED ONE OF THE MANY PEOPLE WHO DROVE THE MACHINERY USED TO LEVEL THE TERRAIN, MR. QUYEN (QYUEENS) OF PHU KIM (PHUS KIM) VILLAGE, THACH THAT DISTRICT, HA TAY PROVINCE.

6/ 19 MAY 1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:

A. MR. CAN CONG QUYEN (CAANS COONG QYUEENS), 46 YOA, FORMERLY A BULLDOZER DRIVER FOR GROUP 809 (NOW AT COLLECTIVE FARM 1A), RESIDING AT PHU NGHIA (PHUS NGHIA) HAMLET, THACH THAT DISTRICT, HA TAY PROVINCE. MR. QUYEN SAID HE ENTERED THE COLLECTIVE FARM IN SEPTEMBER OF 1965, IN 1970 HE WENT TO LEARN HOW TO DRIVE A BULLDOZER. THE DAY THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND THE PILOT DIED MR. QUYEN WENT TO THE SITE TO LOOK AROUND BUT HE DID NOT WITNESS THE BURIAL. IN 1976 HE DROVE THE MACHINERY USED TO LEVEL THE AREA BELONGING TO PRODUCTION TEAM FOUR OF THE COLLECTIVE FARM. THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS OF LEVELING THE AREA AND WORKING ON THE COLLECTIVE FARM HE AND NO ONE ON HIS TEAM EVER FOUND ANYTHING RELATED TO A PILOT. HE SAID IN 1971 A LARGE TORRENTIAL DOWNPOUR WHICH CARRIED ON FOR DAYS, FLOODED THE ENTIRE

AREA OF THE COLLECTIVE FARM. ACCORDING TO MR. QUYEN THE FLOODING WAS A FACTOR THAT AFFECTED THE [TERRAIN AT THE] SITE.

B. MR. LE QUY TANH (LEE QUY TANH): BORN IN 1937, RESIDING AT DONG TAM (DOONF TAAM) HAMLET, HOA LAC DISTRICT, HA TAY PROVINCE. MR. TANH IS ONE OF SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO WERE THE FIRST TO WORK AT THE COLLECTIVE FARM 1A. HE DESCRIBED A CASE WHERE AN AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND THE PILOT DIED, BUT HE DID NOT WITNESS IT, THEREFORE HE DID NOT KNOW THE LOCATION.

C. MR. PHAM NHU AI (PHAMJ NHW AIS): BORN IN 1946, ENLISTED IN 1966 AND WAS TRANSFERRED TO COLLECTIVE FARM 1A. HE DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING [ABOUT THE CRASH] AND ALSO DID NOT HEAR ANY TALK ABOUT DISCOVERING REMAINS, OR PERSONAL EFFECTS OF THE PILOT.

IV. RESULTS:

- AFTER ANALYZING THE DOCUMENTS RELATED TO CASE 0680 THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM RETURNED TO WORK WITH THE HOA BINH PROVINCE, LUONG SON DISTRICT AND TIEN XUAN VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE. THE INVESTIGATION TEAM SEARCHED FOR DOCUMENTS FROM THE LOCAL AREA RELATED TO CASE 0680 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, BECAUSE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE WAR, UNTIL NOW THE LOCAL PEOPLE DID NOT HAVE A MEANS OF DOCUMENTING [INCIDENTS] IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THEM.

- THE INVESTIGATION ATTEMPTED TO LOCATE ADDITIONAL WITNESS OR NEW INFORMATION CORRELATING TO CASE 0680 IN ORDER TO INTERVIEW AND INVESTIGATE.

- AFTER THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION, THE TEAM COMBINED ALL THE DOCUMENTS, AND RESULTS OF ALL PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS AND EXCAVATIONS, THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES KNOW THAT THE PILOT FOR CASE 0680 DIED AND WAS CARELESSLY BURIED. BECAUSE OF THAT REASON, AND THE PASSAGE OF MANY YEARS, ESPECIALLY THE NUMEROUS OCCASIONS WHERE THE TERRAIN WAS LEVELED AND FLOODING IN THE AREA [CHANGED THE TERRAIN] THE SITE CAN NOT BE LOCATED. PROPOSE ENDING INVESTIGATIONS OR EXCAVATIONS OF CASE 0680.

V. ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT IS A LOCAL REPORT OUTLINING THEIR INVESTIGATION.

HANOI, XX JUNE 1996
TM/ INVESTIGATION TEAM
SIGNED
NGUYEN THANH HA

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

CERTIFIED PAPER

TIEN XUAN PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE, CERTIFIES THAT FROM THE 16 TO 19 MAY 1996, THE MIA INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTING OF MR. PHAM TEO AND MR. NGUYEN THANH HA OF THE VNOSMP VISITED OUR LOCALITY AND INVESTIGATED AND SEARCHED FOR INFORMATION, AND INTERVIEWED WITNESSES POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0680.

THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES COMPLIED WITH AND CREATED FAVORABLE CONDITIONS TO SATISFY THE REQUESTS OF THE INVESTIGATION TEAM.

AFTER FINISHING THE TASK, THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE ANALYZED AND EVALUATED THE INFORMATION AND CAME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION AS THE INVESTIGATION TEAM.

ENCLOSED IS THIS CERTIFICATION PAPER THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE PROVIDED TO THE INVESTIGATION TEAM FOR REPORTING AND FORWARDING TO RELATED AGENCIES.

TEAM LEADER
COL
SIGNED
PHAM TEO

TIEN XUAN VILLAGE XX MAY 1996
SIGNED SEAL
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
QUACH DINH DAO (QUACHS DINHF DAOJ)

REPORT
RESULTS OF THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0727
QUANG BINH

I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS: ON 8 JUNE 1967, CAPTAIN VICTOR J. APODACAR [SIC] AND 1LT JOHN T. BUSH WERE PILOTS OF AN F-4 AIRCRAFT THAT WAS HIT [BY GROUND FIRE]. COMMUNICATION WAS LOST AT GRID COORDINATE XE 343517 IN DONG NGHEN (DOONG NGHEN) VILLAGE, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. FORCES SEARCHING FOR THEM HEARD A RESCUE BEEPER FOR ABOUT 20 SECONDS BUT COULD NOT FIND THE AIRPLANE AND PILOTS.

II. INVESTIGATION PROCESS: INVESTIGATED DURING THE 3RD, 14TH AND 29 JFA'S. ACCORDING TO THE INFORMATION WITNESSES PROVIDED; THERE IS A DEFINITE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN AT THE HOAN LAO FORK, TRUNG TRACH (TRUNG TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. BOTH PILOTS DIED. WITNESSES SAID THAT ONE OF THE PILOTS OF THE ABOVE AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED IN TAY TRACH (TAAY TRACHJ) VILLAGE, DIED AND WAS BURIED IN TAY TRACH VILLAGE, BUT LATER WAS DUG UP AND LOST. THE CRASH SITE LIES NEXT TO NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1A IN THE GARDEN OF MR. TRAN MANH HUNG (TRAANF MANHJ HUNGF). IN 1987, MR. HUNG DUG UP AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE TO SELL AS JUNK AND RECOVERED REMAINS WHICH HE TURNED OVER TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES. ON 13 JULY 1988, VIETNAM REPATRIATED THOSE REMAINS (BELIEVED TO BE OF TWO PEOPLE) TO THE U.S. THE RESULTS OF THE IDENTIFICATION REVEALED THAT ONE OF THE TWO SETS OF REMAINS BELONGED TO 1LT BUSH AND THE OTHER SET WERE PIG BONES.

ON 27 AUGUST 1989, VIETNAM RECOVERED REMAINS IN THE POSSESSION OF A GROUP OF REMAINS TRADERS IN HO CHI MINH CITY. IN A PACKAGE WERE THE IDENTIFICATION TAGS OF APODACAR. THEREFORE, THERE IS A POSSIBLE CORRELATION TO CASE 0727, BUT BECAUSE A NUMBER OF THE BONES WERE TOO SMALL THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH DATA TO AUTHENTICATE THEM.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS:

INTERVIEW WITNESSES IN TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE, RESEARCH ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS IN TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE AND BO TRACH DISTRICT MILITARY HEADQUARTERS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING INFORMATION RELATING TO THE REMAINS RECOVERED AT THE SITE IN TRUNG TRACH.

INVESTIGATE FURTHER ABOUT THE REMAINS WHICH VIETNAM RECOVERED FROM THE GROUP OF TRADERS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0727.

IV. RESULTS OF THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

THE TEAM WENT TO TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE AND INTERVIEWED MR. TRAN MANH HUNG, THE PERSON WHO ORGANIZED THE WRECKAGE RECOVERY. MR. HUNG SAID THAT AROUND THE BEGINNING OF 1977, WHEN THE MOVEMENT TO DIG UP WRECKAGE TO SELL FOR JUNK INCREASED IN POPULARITY, HE ORGANIZED A DIG IN HIS GARDEN TO GATHER SCRAP METAL. WHILE DIGGING HE ONLY THOUGHT HE WOULD GATHER SCRAP METAL, HE DID NOT KNOW THERE WERE REMAINS OF A PILOT THERE. WHEN

HE DUG DOWN, HE SAW THE REMAINS AND THEREFORE GATHERED THEM. LATER THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES TOOK POSSESSION OF THEM AND REPATRIATED THEM TO THE U.S. BECAUSE [WE] HEARD THE PLANE HAD TWO PILOTS [WE] THOUGHT THE REMAINS WERE FROM TWO PEOPLE. AMONG THOSE REMAINS WERE ANIMAL BONES BECAUSE AFTER A WHILE THE PLANE SANK INTO THE GROUND. NEAR THERE [THE CRASH SITE] THERE WAS A SMALL RESTAURANT; THEREFORE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PATRONS, AFTER EATING, THREW THE BONES INTO THE CRATER WHERE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED.

FOLLOWING MR. HUNG'S INTRODUCTION THE TEAM MET WITH AND INTERVIEWED MR. TRAN XUAN RIENG (TRAAN XUAAN RIEENG), 49 YOA, PRESENTLY LIVING IN HAMLET SIX, HOAN TRACH (HOANF TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. MR. RIENG SAID THAT AROUND THE SUMMER OF 1967 A PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN [IT CRASHED] IN MR. HUNG'S GARDEN IN TRUNG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. ONE PILOT PARACHUTED IN TAY TRACH VILLAGE, DIED AND WAS BURIED IN TAY TRACH VILLAGE. DURING THE PERIOD WHEN MR. HUNG DUG FOR WRECKAGE, HE [MR. RIENG] HEARD THERE WERE PEOPLE LOOKING TO BUY AND SELL REMAINS. THEREFORE, MR. RIENG WENT TO RELOCATE THE BURIAL SITE BUT COULD NOT FIND IT, BECAUSE THE TERRAIN AT THE BURIAL SITE HAD CHANGED CONSIDERABLY. THE SPOT WHERE THE PILOT'S BODY LAY WAS NEAR THE MO BA (MOS BAF) BRIDGE. MR. HUNG ALSO SAID THAT THERE WERE PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH (DONG NAI, HO CHI MINH CITY) THAT WERE GOING OUT AND ASKING TO BUY AND SELL REMAINS. THEREFORE, IT IS POSSIBLE THE PILOT'S REMAINS WHICH WERE BURIED IN TAY TRACH VILLAGE WERE DUG UP, STOLEN AND SOLD TO THE REMAINS TRADERS IN THE SOUTH.

VIETNAMESE OFFICE SEEKING MISSING PERSONS
(VNOSMP)

REPORT OF UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0732
(LANG SON PROVINCE)

I. HISTORICAL INFORMATION: (DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES):

- ON 11/6/1967, MAJOR KLEMM AND LIEUTENANT PEARSON WERE ABOARD AN F4-C WHEN IT MID-AIR COLLIDED WITH A SECOND F-4C AND CRASHED IN HUU LUNG (HWU LUNGX) DISTRICT, LANG SON PROVINCE. BOTH CREW MEMBERS OF THE SECOND F-4C WERE CAPTURED AND REPATRIATED IN 1973. IN JULY OF 1988, THE VIETNAMESE RETURNED ONE SET OF REMAINS THAT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS THOSE OF LIEUTENANT PEARSON. THE POSSIBLE CRASH SITE OF MAJOR KLEMM WAS EXCAVATED BY A JOINT TEAM WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

II. PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS:

- JOINTLY INVESTIGATED ON THE 15TH, 20TH, 26TH AND 32ND JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA).
- JOINTLY EXCAVATED ON THE 36TH JFA.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

1/ THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS:

- PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF)	VNOSMP
- NGUYEN THANH HA (NGUYEENX THANH HAF)	VNOSMP
- NGUYEN CHIEN (NGUYEENX CHIEENS)	LANG SON PROVINCE SPECIALIST
- TRUONG NGOC (TRWOWNG NGOCJ)	LANG SON PROVINCE SPECIALIST
- LUONG BA CHIEN (LWOWNG BAS CHIEENS)	LANG SON PROVINCE SPECIALIST
- NGUYEN THANG (NGUYEENX THAWNG)	HUU LUNG DISTRICT SPECIALIST
- NGUYEN VAN SAN (NGUYEENX VAWN SAWNF)	HUU LUNG DISTRICT SPECIALIST

2/ 02 JUNE 1996:

- THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND MIA TEAM OF LANG SON PROVINCE TO REVIEW THE RECORDS OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS AND THE EXCAVATION OF CASE 0732.

- AFTER RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OF THE ASSOCIATED RECORDS, THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM AND THE LANG SON PROVINCIAL

SPECIALISTS BELIEVE THE 02 SETS OF REMAINS THAT MR. HOANG VIET THANG (HOANGF VIEETJ THAWNGS) DECLARED WERE CONTROLLED BY EXCAVATION WORKERS IN 1977, 01 SET AT NGON (NGOON) COMMUNE AND 01 SET AT COT COI (COOTS COI) COMMUNE, TAN THANH (TAAN THANHF) VILLAGE, BELONG TO TWO DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT CRASH CASES. HOWEVER, THE INVESTIGATION TEAM IS STILL RESOLVING THE LOCAL INVESTIGATION AND INTERVIEWING ADDITIONAL WITNESSES.

3/ 03 JUNE 1996:

- THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE HUU LUNG DISTRICT AND TAN THANH VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES.

- THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:

A. LY VAN MAO (LYS VAWN MAOX): 70 YEARS OF AGE (YOA), CURRENT TAN THANH VILLAGE PARTY COMMITTEE SECRETARY. DEPUTY VILLAGE CHAIRMAN FROM 1967-1985. CURRENTLY RESIDING AT DONG COI (DOONGF COWIR) HAMLET, TAN THANH VILLAGE, HUU LUNG DISTRICT. THE WITNESS STATED THAT DURING THE WHOLE TIME HE LIVED AND WORKED IN THE LOCAL AREA, THERE WERE ONLY TWO CIRCUMSTANCES OF AIRCRAFT LOSSES THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- FIRST CIRCUMSTANCE: AT APPROXIMATELY 3-4 IN THE AFTERNOON (UNABLE TO RECALL DATE), ONE AIRCRAFT EXPLODED AND CRASHED TO THE GROUND, HURLING THE FUEL TANK WHICH BURNED TWO HOUSES OF RESIDENTS IN NGON COMMUNE. THE CORPSE OF A LARGE, HEAVY, WHITE-SKINNED PILOT WAS DISCOVERED HANGING OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF THE SAME DAY, MR. MAO ALONG WITH VILLAGE MILITIA MEMBERS BURIED THE PILOT'S CORPSE. MR. MAO DOES NOT KNOW WHAT BECAME OF THE REMAINS AFTER THE EXCAVATION AND REMOVAL. REGARDING THIS PARTICULAR AIRCRAFT CRASH, MR. MAO ONLY SAW THE CORPSE OF ONE PILOT (THESE REMAINS WERE REPATRIATED ON 13/9/1990).

- SECOND CIRCUMSTANCE: ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED WHEN IT WAS NEARLY NOON, SCATTERING WRECKAGE EVERYWHERE, THE FRONT PART OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS DISCOVERED IN THE COC NA (COOCS NAJ) HILL AREA, COT COI (COOTS COOIS) FOREST, COT COI COMMUNE. AFTER THIS, HE HEARD THAT FOREST WORKERS FOUND A SMOLDERING PILE OF FLESH AND BONES EMANATING A FOUL ODOR AND THE WORKERS GATHERED FIREWOOD AND FINISHED BURNING THE PILE. THE REAR SECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN NA NAM (NA NAAMS) HAMLET HA BAC (HAF BAWCS), THE PILOT'S CORPSE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE EDGE OF THE HIGH ROAD AND THE MILITIA BURIED IT. IT IS SAID THAT AFTER THIS, HIGH LEVEL AUTHORITIES RETURNED, DUG UP THE REMAINS AND CARRIED THEM OFF (THESE REMAINS WERE REPATRIATED ON 13/7/1988).

B. MR. HOANG VIET THANG (HOANGF VIEETS THAWNGS): 62 YOA, RETIRED, CURRENTLY RESIDING AT DAN TIEN (DAAN TIEEN) HAMLET, HOA SON (HOAF SOWN) VILLAGE, HUU LUNG DISTRICT.

- MR. HOANG REPORTED ON THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHING IN NGON COMMUNE, TAN THANH VILLAGE. AT THAT TIME HE WAS WORKING ON THE DISTRICT TEAM AND RETURNED TO THE LOCALITY AND DIRECTED THE LOCAL MILITIA TO BURY THE CORPSE OF ONE AMERICAN PILOT.

- REGARDING INSTANCES OF OTHER AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CRASHES IN COT COI COMMUNE, HE DOES NOT KNOW OF ANYTHING ASSOCIATED WITH THAT TIME FRAME, HE WAS WORKING AT A SOUTHERN BATTLEFIELD.

- AFTER WORKING AT THE SOUTHERN BATTLEFIELD, HE RETURNED TO THE DISTRICT TEAM. HE WORKED AS THE DEPUTY POLITICAL OFFICER FOR THE HUU LUNG DISTRICT TEAM. HE RETURNED AND DIRECTED THE TAN THANH MILITIA TO EXHUME ONE SET OF AMERICAN PILOT REMAINS AT NGON COMMUNE AND ONE SET OF REMAINS AT COT COI COMMUNE. THESE TWO SETS OF REMAINS BELONG TO TWO DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT CRASH INCIDENTS IN TWO DIFFERENT VILLAGES AND ARE CERTAINLY NOT OF ONE AIRCRAFT CRASH INCIDENT.

- MR. THANG WAS A WORKER AT THE END OF 1993 WHEN HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY A JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM. HE REPORTED THAT HE HIMSELF DIRECTLY ORDERED THE BURIAL OF THE TWO SETS OF REMAINS BUT THEY (THE REMAINS) DO NOT BELONG TO ONE AIRCRAFT CRASH INCIDENT, BUT BELONG TO TWO DIFFERENT INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE TIME AND LOCATION THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED.

IV. CONCLUSION:

1/ THE TWO SETS OF REMAINS THAT THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERALLY EXCAVATED IN TAN THANH VILLAGE, HUU LUNG DISTRICT BELONG TO TWO DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT CRASH INCIDENTS.

2/ ONE SET OF REMAINS THAT WAS EXCAVATED IN COT COI COMMUNE BELONGS TO CASE 0732 (THE CASE OF ONE F-4C AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED IN 1967). THESE REMAINS WERE REPATRIATED IN JULY OF 1988. THIS SET OF REMAINS WAS IDENTIFIED AS THE REMAINS OF LIEUTENANT PEARSON. REGARDING THE SECOND SET OF REMAINS IN THIS CASE, WORKERS DISCOVERED BONES, POSSIBLY THE REMAINS OF MAJOR KLEMM, AND INCINERATED THEM. JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 36 EXCAVATED THIS LOCATION WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

3/ ONE SET OF REMAINS EXHUMED IN NGON COMMUNE BELONG TO CASE 0427 (THE CASE OF ONE RF-101 THAT CRASHED IN 1966). THE VIETNAMESE RETURNED THESE IN SEPTEMBER 1990.

V. ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT IS THE NARRATIVE OF MR. HOANG VIET THANG THAT WAS LOCALLY NOTARIZED REGARDING THE INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0732.

HANOI, 24 JUNE 1996

INVESTIGATION TEAM

SIGNED

NGUYEN THANH HA (NGUYEENX THANH HAF)

NARRATIVE

I AM HOANG VIET THANG, 62 YEARS OLD. I LIVE AT DAN TIEN HAMLET, HOA SON VILLAGE, HUU LUNG DISTRICT, LANG SON PROVINCE.

DURING 1966 WHILE I WAS ON THE HUU LUNG DISTRICT TEAM, I DIRECTED THE TAN THANH MILITIA TO BURY THE REMAINS OF ONE AMERICAN PILOT IN NGON COMMUNE.

AS FOR THE AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED IN COT COI, I WAS ON THE BATTLEFIELD IN THE SOUTHERN REGION AT THAT TIME.

AFTER RETURNING FROM THE SOUTHERN REGION I WAS THE DEPUTY POLITICAL OFFICER FOR THE DISTRICT TEAM AND I DIRECTED THE TAN THANH VILLAGE MILITIA TO EXHUME THE TWO SETS OF REMAINS.

1, A CASE IN NGON COMMUNE.

2, A CASE IN THE COT COI FOREST AREA, THESE TWO CASES OF AIRCRAFT CRASHES ARE DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER.

I AFFIRM THAT THIS INFORMATION IS TRUE.

(SIGNED 31 MAY 1996)

(SIGNED BY PHAM TEO, NGUYEN CHIEN AND ANOTHER ILLEGIBLE)
(ALSO STAMPED AND NOTARIZED ON 31 MAY 1996)

REPORT
RESULTS OF THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0826
QUANG BINH

I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS: ON 3 SEP 67, CAPTAIN HERBER IW. MOORE JR. WAS THE PILOT OF AN F-105D THAT WAS SHOT DOWN BY AAA FIRE. THE PLANE CRASHED NEAR GRID COORDINATE WL 932 890, 25 KILOMETERS WEST OF TUYEN HOA AND 3 KILOMETERS EAST OF THANH LANG. THE SAR FOUND A PARACHUTE ON THE GROUND NEAR GRID COORDINATE WE 865 884 APPROXIMATELY 3 KILOMETERS WEST OF THANH LANG, BUT DID NOT FIND CAPTAIN MOORE.

II. BACKGROUND: THIS CASE HAS BEEN INVESTIGATED DURING THE 3RD AND 10TH JFAS, THE WITNESSES STATED THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN OVER THE MOUNTAINS OF THANH LANG (THANH LANG) HAMLET, THANH HOA (THANH HOAS) VILLAGE, MINH HOA DISTRICT. THE PILOT PARACHUTED OUT, GOT STUCK IN A TREE AND LATER DIED. THE VILLAGE MILITIA BURIED HIM NEAR THANH LANG HAMLET, THANH HOA VILLAGE. DURING THE 17TH JFA (APRIL 92) AN EXCAVATION OF THE AREA WITNESSES POINTED MET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

DURING THE 27TH JFA A TEAM RE INVESTIGATED THE CASE, BUT RECEIVED NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS:

1. REQUEST THE RESULTS FROM THE TASK PERFORMED BY THE SECURITY OF QUANG BINH PROVINCE ON CONTROLLING AND SURVEYING THE BURIAL SITE IN THANH HOA AND THE EXCAVATION AND TRANSPORTING OF THE REMAINS TO THEIR DETERMINED POSITIONS.

2. FIND THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE FOR RE INTERVIEW:

- MR. THANG (THAWNG), THE VICE COMMANDER OF THE DISTRICT MILITIA.

- MR. DUyen (ZUYEEN), OFFICIAL CADRE OF THE PROVINCE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, APPROXIMATELY IN 1975 HE TRAVELED TO ONE VILLAGE IN TUYEN HOA.

- COMRADE BA (BA), A MEMBER OF THE 280TH AAA REGIMENT POSSIBLY THE COMMANDER OF THE 11TH BATTALION OR THE POLITICAL OFFICER THAT HELD THE PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION AND THE MILITARY IDENTIFICATION OF CAPTAIN MOORE.

IV. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION RESULT:

THE TEAM FOUND AND INTERVIEWED MR. PHAM XUAN THANG (PHAMJ XUAAN THAWNGS) 58 YOA, FORMERLY A MAJOR VICE COMMANDER OF THE TUYEN HOA DISTRICT MILITIA, NOW RETIRED IN PHU SON (PHUS SOWN) HAMLET, DUC HOA (DDWCS HOAS) VILLAGE, TUYEN HOA DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. MR. THANG STATED THAT DURING THE PERIOD OF 1966 TO 1967 HE WENT TO SCHOOL AND WAS ABSENT FROM THE DISTRICT MILITIA. IN 1968 HE RETURNED TO THE DISTRICT MILITIA AND BECAME AN ASSISTANT AND THEN

BECAME VICE COMMANDER OF THE DISTRICT MILITIA TO WATCH OVER THE STAFF'S MISSION. HE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE COLLECTING OF THE REMAINS OF U.S. PILOTS BUT HE DID NOT DETAILS BECAUSE HE DID NOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATED.

THE TEAM BEGAN WORKING WITH THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OF QUANG BINH PROVINCE TO FIND MR. DUYEN (DUYEEN) BUT THE COMRADES OF THE POLICY OFFICE STATED THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OF QUANG BINH PROVINCE NEVER HAD ANY ADMINISTRATOR NAME DUYEN. THE TEAM ALSO ASKED THE VETERANS OF BO TRACH DISTRICT, MINH HOA, TUYEN HOA, LE THUY WITH NO KNOWLEDGE OF MR. DUYEN IN THE PROVINCIAL MILITIA.

THE TEAM WORKED WITH THE PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICE OF QUANG BINH, THE CADRE OF THE SECURITY OFFICE SAID THAT PREVIOUSLY THE PROVINCIAL SECURITY FOLLOWED A DIRECTIVE FROM HIGHER ECHELONS TO SUMMARIZE DOCUMENTS, REPORTS AND SURVEYS, AFTER THAT THEY DID NOT PROCEED ANY FURTHER. THEY RECOVERED REMAINS FROM GRAVES, COMBINED THEM AND SENT THEM TO HIGHER ECHELONS IN ORDER TO REPATRIATE THEM. THE GRAVES THAT DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS IN THE REPORT WERE NOT EXHUMED. THEREFORE THE DISPOSITION OF THESE REMAINS IS UNCLEAR.

REPORT OF RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1065

FROM 15 MAY, THE VIETNAM UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM LED BY MR. NGUYEN NGOC BICH (NGUYEENX NGOCJ BICH) AND MR. TRAN NGOC BICH (TRAANF NGOCJ BICH) OF THE VNOSMP CARRIED OUT THE INVESTIGATION AND SEARCH FOR INFORMATION PERTAINING TO CASE 1065.

CASE 1065 OCCURRED IN HOC MON (HOCS MOON) DISTRICT, HO CHI MINH CITY IN 1968. THE U.S. WAS ABLE TO RECOVER THE REMAINS OF JAMES SCUITIER AT THE SITE. AFTER THE HOSTILITIES IT IS KNOWN THAT ANOTHER AMERICAN IN THIS INCIDENT WAS INJURED, TAKEN CAPTIVE AND ESCORTED OUT OF THE COMBAT AREA: IT IS RUMORED THAT THE INJURED AMERICAN DIED BECAUSE OF A BOMBING RUN ON THE ROAD BACK TO THE LIBERATED AREA. THIS PERSON'S DESCRIPTION WAS SIMILAR TO MR. HUNT. AFTER 1973 SCUITIER'S NAME WAS LISTED ON A ROSTER OF AMERICANS WHO DIED IN CAPTIVITY.

THE TEAM LOCATED THE DOCUMENTS BUT DID NOT SEE ANY DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE DEATH OF SCUITIER (AMONG THE NAMES ON THE ROSTER OF PEOPLE WHO DIED WHILE IN CAPTIVITY).

ON 21 MAY 1996 THE TEAM ENTERED HO CHI MINH CITY TO WORK WITH THE CITY'S MIA TEAM CONSISTING OF MR. PHAM HONG LINH (PHAMJ HOONGF LINHX), MR. NGUYEN VAN HONG (NGUYEENX VAWN HOONGF), AND MR. TRAN VAN TAN (TRAANF VAWN TAAN). BECAUSE WE WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE ANY RELATED DOCUMENTS, THE TEAM SUGGESTED MEETING AGAIN WITH MR. DANG THUAN HOA (DAWNGJ THUAANJ HOAF), FORMER TRANSLATOR AT THE REGIONAL POW CAMP, PRESENTLY RESIDING IN TRAN QUANG DIEU (TRAANF QUANG ZIEEUJ) CITY, PHU NHUAN (PHUS NHUAANJ) DISTRICT, IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE FURTHER.

ON 28 MAY 1996, THE TEAM MET WITH MR. HOA. MR. HOA DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT CASE 1065 BUT HE STATED THAT IF THE POW DIED ON THE ROAD BACK TO CAMP SUCH AS IN THIS INCIDENT, THEN IT WOULD BE ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THERE TO BE DOCUMENTS SUCH AS A DEATH CERTIFICATE OR GRAVE REGISTRATIONS. AS FOR WHY THERE ARE MISTAKES BETWEEN THE NAMES OF THE TWO AMERICANS SUCH AS ON THE ROSTER, MR. HOA SAID IT IS BECAUSE THE AMERICANS WERE INJURED BY ANTI-TANK ARTILLERY; THEREFORE, THE CAPTURED SURVIVORS WERE PROBABLY SERIOUSLY INJURED. CONSEQUENTLY, THE NAMES AND AGES OF THESE PEOPLE WERE BASED PRIMARILY ON PAPERS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS RECOVERED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. BECAUSE OF THE TENSE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CROSS CHECK CAREFULLY. PEOPLE THOUGHT THE INJURED AMERICAN WAS THE ONE MENTIONED ABOVE, AND THEREFORE TOOK THE NAME SCUITIER IN ORDER TO REPORT THAT SCUITIER HAD DIED. CONSEQUENTLY, THE NAME SCUITIER RECENTLY APPEARED ON THE ABOVE ROSTER.

THE TEAM FEELS THIS IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND IN TIMES OF WAR. MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE PRESUMED DEAD DURING THE WAR ACTUALLY SURVIVED AND RETURNED TO THEIR VILLAGES AFTER THE CONFLICT. BECAUSE THEY WERE INJURED, THEY WERE TAKEN TO A MILITARY HOSPITAL, BUT THEIR UNITS STILL MISTAKENLY THOUGHT THEY WERE DECEASED. CONSEQUENTLY, LISTS OF DECEASED CONTAIN INACCURACIES. IN ADDITION, NOT ALL THOSE WHO DIED RECEIVED DEATH CERTIFICATES, WHICH MAKES VERIFICATION OF DECEASED LISTS DIFFICULT.

ON BEHALF OF INVESTIGATION TEAM
[SIGNED BY MR. NGUYEN NGOC BICH]

REPORT

UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION RESULTS CASE 1329 - QUANG BINH

I. CIRCUMSTANCE OF LOSS: ON 25 NOVEMBER 1968

NAME AND LT SAN D. FRANCISCO WERE FLYING AN F4D AND WERE SHOT DOWN NEAR GRID COORDINATE XE 270185, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. RESCUE AIRCRAFT RECEIVED A DISTRESS SIGNAL BUT WERE NOT ABLE TO RESCUE THE TWO PILOT DUE TO BAD WEATHER.

II. INVESTIGATION PROCESS: THIS CASE HAS BEEN UNILATERALLY INVESTIGATED TWICE AND JOINTLY INVESTIGATED DURING THE 3RD, 4TH, 7TH, 13TH, 27TH (PCIT), 32ND (SRT), AND 35TH (PCIT) JFA'S. THE TEAMS INTERVIEWED NUMEROUS WITNESSES, THE MOST IMPORTANT BEING MR. NGUYEN HUU NGOI (HWUX NGOOI) FORMER VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY CADRE NOW RETIRED IN YEN BAI (YEEN BAIS) VILLAGE, THIEU YEN DISTRICT, THANH HOA PROVINCE. HE WAS THE PERSON WHO TOOK A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE CORPSE OF THE TWO PILOTS. ACCORDING TO MR. NGOI, AFTER THE AIRCRAFT GOT HIT BY VIETNAMESE FORCES, BOTH OF THE FLIGHT CREW PARACHUTED AND WERE INJURED. THEY WERE THEN CAPTURED BY YOUTH ASSAULT GROUP MEMBERS, BUT AFTER THAT MANY AIRCRAFT ATTACKED AND BOTH THE FLIGHT CREW AND A NUMBER OF THE ASSAULT GROUP YOUTH WERE KILLED. REGULAR FORCES AND THE YOUTH ASSAULT GROUP BURIED THEM AT KM MARKER 54 ON ROUTE 20. MR. NGOI STILL REMEMBERS THE BURIAL LOCATION OF THESE PILOTS.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS:

SUGGEST THE VIETNAMESE SIDE LOCATE WITNESSES FROM THE PERIOD WHEN THIS CASE OCCURRED.

IV. RESULT OF UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

AFTER STUDYING PAST INVESTIGATION REPORTS, EXCHANGING INFORMATION WITH VIETNAM MIA INVESTIGATORS WHO HAD WORKED THIS CASE, WHEN WORKING WITH THE QUANG BINH MIA TEAM WE LEARNED: THE AREA WHERE THE PILOTS WERE CAPTURED AND BURIED WAS UNDEVELOPED AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. ONLY MILITARY UNITS AND YOUTH ASSAULT PERSONNEL WERE STATIONED THERE. BECAUSE OF THE WAR, THESE UNITS MOVED FREQUENTLY, WERE REPLACED, OR DISPERSED. MANY OF THE MEMBERS HAVE DIED. AFTER THE WAR, MANY OF THESE YOUTH ASSAULT GROUPS WERE DISBANDED, MAKING THE TASK OF LOCATING THESE WITNESSES DIFFICULT AND TIME CONSUMING. ONLY WITH LUCK MIGHT WE FIND THEM.

CURRENTLY, MR. NGOI IS THE ONLY DIRECT WITNESS THAT COULD POSSIBLY REMEMBER THE BURIAL LOCATION AS INDICATED BY THE MAP HE DREW. BUT MR. NGOI IS HALF PARALYZED AND THE WAY TO THE SITE IS DIFFICULT TO TRAVEL. IF THE SITUATION DICTATES, WE CAN ORGANIZE A SURE AND SAFE PASSAGE TO ENABLE MR. NGOI, WHO CURRENTLY LIVES IN YEN BAI (YEEN BAIS) VILLAGE, THIEU YEN DISTRICT, THANH HOA PROVINCE TO COME OUT

TO VERIFY THE BURIAL SITE AND THEN FOLLOW WITH AN EXCAVATION
OPERATION.

INVESTIGATION RESULTS
CASE 1504

ON 15 MAY 1996, THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM OF NGUYEN NGOC BICH (NGOCJ BICHS) AND TRAN NGOC BICH (TRAANF NGOCJ BICHS) OF THE VNOSMP CONDUCTED THE ADVANCE WORK OF CASE 1504.

THE TEAM RESEARCHED THE 23 JAN 1989 TURN OVER DOCUMENTS OF THE REMAINS OF MARTIN H. SCANLO. THE ONLY WRITTEN DOCUMENTATION OF THESE REMAINS ARE AT THE THUAN HAI (THUAANJ HAI) POLICE STATION IN NGUYEN VAN LAI'S (LAI) POSSESSION, HIS ADDRESS IS NOT YET KNOWN. THEREFORE THE TEAM DECIDED TO GO TO THUAN HAI PROVINCE (PRESENTLY COMPRISED OF THE TWO PROVINCES OF BINH THUAN AND NINH THUAN) IN ORDER TO FIND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THIS CASE.

ON 22 MAY 1996, THE TEAM ARRIVED AT BINH THUAN PROVINCE, PHAN THIET (PHAN THIEETS) VILLAGE, THE OLD PROVINCIAL CAPITAL. THE TEAM MET THE PROVINCIAL MIA TEAM LEADER MR. NGUYEN VAN THANH (THANH) AND WORKED WITH THE PROVINCIAL POLICE OF BINH THUAN IN ORDER TO RESEARCH THE RECORDS PERTAINING TO THE SET OF REMAINS AND THE TURN OVER OF THESE REMAINS TO THE VNOSMP IN 1988.

THE BINH THUAN PROVINCIAL CADRE HELPED THE TEAM RESEARCH DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO 10 SETS OF REMAINS THAT THE THUAN HAI POLICE HAD TURNED OVER TO THE VNOSMP IN 1988, THE DOCUMENTS DID NOT HAVE MUCH INFORMATION AND IT WAS RECORDED THAT THE REMAINS WERE DISCOVERED AND TURNED IN BY SMUGGLERS. MANY OF THESE PEOPLE HAVE SINCE LEFT, THEREFORE THEIR ADDRESS IS NOT KNOWN. THE REMAINS OF MARTIN H. SCANLO STILL ARE ONLY REGISTERED UNDER NGUYEN VAN LAI, OTHER THAN THAT, THERE IS NO NEW INFORMATION.

THE TEAM AND PROVINCIAL MIA TEAM THEN WERE INTRODUCED TO A MR. PHAM VAN MEN (PHAMJ MEENS). MR. MEN SOLD THE VNOSMP TEN SETS OF REMAINS IN 1988. PRESENTLY HE WORKS AT THE NINH THUAN POLICE STATION. FORTUNATELY MR. MEN CAN STILL REMEMBER OR RECOUNT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

ON 23 MAY 1996, THE TEAM ARRIVED IN NINH THUAN PROVINCE AND TOGETHER WITH THE PROVINCIAL MIA TEAM LEADER, MR. NGUYEN VAN AN, LOCATED MR. PHAM VAN MEN. MR. MEN STATED THAT HE REMEMBERED SELLING THE REMAINS, BUT HE DID NOT, AND STILL DOES NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON ABOUT NGUYEN VAN LAI.

THE TEAM CONCLUDED THE INVESTIGATION AND RETURNED TO HO CHI MINH CITY.

INVESTIGATION TEAM
(SIGNED)
NGUYEN NGOC BICH

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION RESULTS
CASE 1538

ON 15 MAY 1996, THE UNILATERAL VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTING OF MR. NGUYEN NGOC BICH [NGUYEENX NGOCJ BICHS] AND MR. TRAN NGOC BICH [TRAANF NGOCJ BICHS] OF THE VNOSMP CARRIED OUT ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AND EXAMINED FORENSIC DOCUMENTS RELATED TO CASE 1538.

RESULTS FOLLOW:

- ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1988, MR. HO XUAN DICH [HOOF XUAAN DICHS] AND MR. PHAM TEO [PHAMJ TEOF] RECEIVED FROM DONG NAI PUBLIC SECURITY A NUMBER OF BONES HAVING THE NAME "LONG CARLE" ACCOMPANIED BY AN IDENTIFICATION TAG, AN IDENTIFICATION CARD WITH A PHOTOGRAPH, AND A CREDIT CARD. THESE REMAINS WERE CONFISCATED BY DONG NAI PUBLIC SECURITY FROM A CITIZEN IN 1987.

- DURING THE 2ND JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW, FROM 14 TO 21 JANUARY 1989, THE REMAINS MENTIONED ABOVE WERE CATALOGED AS NUMBER 60 (NUMBER ONE IN THE REMAINS ITEMS HANDED OVER BY DONG NAI PUBLIC SECURITY TO THE VNOSMP).

- THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATION AT FIRST WERE: COMPLICATED, DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY, RECOMMEND TAKE BACK TO CILHI. NEVERTHELESS, ON 21 JANUARY 1989, AFTER THE RE-EXAMINATION, BOTH SIDES ADMITTED THAT THE REMAINS WERE MONGOLOID, AND RECOMMENDED TO LEAVE THEM IN VIETNAM. THE EXAMINATION REPORT RECORDED: MONGOLOID, LEAVE IN VIETNAM.

- AFTER THAT, ACCORDING TO GENERAL GUIDELINES, THE VNOSMP CREMATED THE MONGOLOID REMAINS ALONG WITH ALL OF THE ARTIFACTS IN THE REMAINS PACKAGE. AMONG THEM WAS THE PACKAGE OF REMAINS CARRYING THE NUMBER 60 AS MENTIONED ABOVE. THE VNOSMP CURRENTLY NO LONGER MAINTAINS ANYTHING ASSOCIATED WITH THAT CATALOG NUMBER.

THE TEAM MET MR. PHAM TEO, THE PERSON WHO RECEIVED THE REMAINS FROM DONG NAI AND WHO ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW OF THE ABOVE REMAINS. MR. TEO ALSO ONLY PROVIDED SIMILAR INFORMATION.

REPORT
RESULTS OF THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1843-QUANG BINH

I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS: ON 6 MAY 72 MARVIN B. WILES WAS THE PILOT OF AN A-7E THAT WAS SHOT. THE PILOT TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO HEAD OUT TO SEA AND PARACHUTE OUT BUT THE MILITIA KILLED HIM.

II. INVESTIGATION PROGRESS IN THE PAST: UNILATERALLY INVESTIGATED MANY TIMES IN 1988, 1993, AND 1994. INVESTIGATED DURING THE 10TH AND 25TH JFA. INTERVIEWED SOME WITNESSES INCLUDING MR. TRAN VAN KHUYNH (TRAANF VAWN KHUYNH) FORMERLY VICE CHAIRMAN OF VAN TRACH (VANJ TRACHJ) VILLAGE. THE WITNESSES STATED THAT IN 1972 THERE WAS AN A-37 SHOOT DOWN IN PHU THINH (PHUS THINHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. THE PILOT TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO HEAD OUT TO SEA AND PARACHUTED DOWN TO VAN TRACH (VANJ TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE (6 KILOMETERS FROM PHU THINH VILLAGE). THE VAN TRACH VILLAGE MILITIA ORGANIZED A PARTY TO CAPTURE THE PILOT BUT HE WAS KILLED DURING THE RESISTANCE AND THEN WAS BURIED IN BAC (BAWCS) HAMLET OF VAN TRACH VILLAGE. THREE DAYS LATER THE DISTRICT MILITIA CAME TO EXHUME THE REMAINS OF THE PILOT IN ORDER TO PHOTOGRAPH IT. MR. HOANG VAN LUONG (HOOANGF VAWN LWOWNGF) WAS THE PERSON WHO DIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN EXHUMING THE REMAINS OF THE PILOT. DURING THE 25TH JFA A TEAM EXCAVATED THE SITE BUT THEY ONLY RECOVERED A ZIPPER OF THE FLIGHT SUIT.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS:

CANVASS THE LOCAL VILLAGERS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING REMAINS.

IV. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION RESULTS:

THE TEAM TRAVELED TO VAN TRACH VILLAGE AND MET WITH MR. NGUYEN NGOC TRUONG (NGUYEENX NGOCJ TRWOWNG), THE VILLAGE CHAIRMAN AND THE VILLAGE STAFF. ACCORDING TO MR. TRUONG AND THE VAN TRACH VILLAGE STAFF, IT IS POSSIBLE THE REMAINS WERE NOT RECOVERED [BY THE EXCAVATION TEAM] DUE TO TERRAIN CHANGES, PASSAGE OF TIME, THE WITNESSES ARE TOO OLD TO POINT OUT THE EXACT LOCATION OR THE LEVELING OF THE GROUND DISPLACED THE REMAINS FROM THE ORIGINAL LOCATION CAUSING THE UNSUCCESSFUL EXCAVATION.

THE TEAM MET MR. TRAN VAN KHUYNH (TRAANF VAWN KHUYNH) AND MR. HOANG VAN LUONG (HOANGF VAWN LWOWNG) FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. BOTH PROVIDED THE SAME INFORMATION AS THERE PREVIOUS INTERVIEW. BOTH STATED THE DISTRICT MILITIA, MR. KHUYNH AND MR. DANG (DAWNG) PARTICIPATED. THE TEAM TRIED

LOCATE MR. DANG BUT FOUND OUT MR. DANG PASSED AWAY DURING THE WAR.

THE TEAM MET AND INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN NGOC LAM (NGUYEENX NGOCJ LAMX) 60 YOA, FORMER VICE COMMANDER OF THE BO TRACH DISTRICT MILITIA AND NOW RETIRED IN DINH (ZINH) HAMLET OF VAN TRACH VILLAGE. MR. LAM SAID DURING HIS TIME IN CHARGE AND AFTER RETIRING IN THE LOCAL AREA HE DID NOT KNOW OR HEAR OF ANYONE EXHUMING THE REMAINS OF THE PILOT. ACCORDING TO MR. LAM POSSIBLY MR. KE (KEEF) FORMER POLICY CADRE OF BO TRACH DISTRICT HAS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THIS CASE.

VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEEKING MISSING PERSONS
(VNOSMP)

UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORT OF CASE 1870
(YEN BAI PROVINCE)

I. HISTORICAL SUMMARY (DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE U.S.):

- ON 6 JUN 72, AN F-4D FLOWN BY MAJ JAMES FLOWER AND CPT JOHN SEUELL WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE YEN BAI AREA. WAR RECORDS INDICATE MISSILE REGIMENT 261 SHOT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT AND THAT BOTH PILOTS WERE KILLED.

II. INVESTIGATION PROCESS:

- JOINT INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED ON THE 26TH JFA.
- JOINT RECOVERY CONDUCTED ON THE 28TH JFA.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

1/ UNILATERAL TEAM COMPOSITION:

- PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF) : VNOSMP
- NGUYEN THANH HA (NGUYEENX THANH HAF) : -
- VU THINH (VUX THINHJ) : SPECIALIST, YEN BAI PROVINCE TEAM
- DINH NGOC DUONG (DINH NGOCJ ZWOWNG) : -
- NGUYEN VAN QUANG (NGUYEENX VAWN QUANG) : SPECIALIST, YEN BINH DISTRICT TEAM
- NHAM VAN THANG (NHAAM VAWN THANGS) : -

2/ 27 MAY 96:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE YEN BAI PROVINCE TASK TEAM AND YEN BINH DISTRICT TEAM.

3/ 28 MAY 96:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF DAI DONG (DAIJ DOONGR) VILLAGE AND YEN BINH DISTRICT.
- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

A. NGUYEN VAN DUNG (NGUYEENX VAWN ZUNGX): DURING THE TIME OF THE AIRCRAFT CRASH HE WAS THE COMMANDER OF THE DAI DONG VILLAGE MILITIA. MR. DUNG SAID A JET AIRCRAFT CRASHED JUST AFTER NOONTIME ON A SUNNY DAY. THE AIRCRAFT WAS PROBABLY SHOT DOWN BY

A MISSILE AND IT CRASHED IN THE LOCAL AREA. THE TAIL OF THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED ABOUT ONE KILOMETER AWAY FROM THE VILLAGE. AT THE CRASH SITE THERE WAS EVIDENCE THE PILOT'S BADLY CHARRED BODY, LYING NEXT TO THE AIRCRAFT. ANOTHER BODY HAD FALLEN OUT APPROXIMATELY 700 TO 800 METERS AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT ON THE SIDE OF A HILL. APPROXIMATELY 1600 OR 1700 MR. DUNG AND A NUMBER OF OTHER PEOPLE BURIED THE TWO PILOTS. THEY CONSTRUCTED A COFFIN FROM VARIOUS TYPES OF THIN, PLAIN WOOD AND BURIED IT APPROXIMATELY ONE METER IN DEPTH. THE LOCATION OF THE GRAVE WAS IN AN AREA BELOW THE FOOTHILL, NEAR THE CORNER OF A BEETLE NUT GROVE.

MR. DUNG MET AND LED A RECOVERY TEAM DURING THE 28TH JFA BUT THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY RESULTS FINDING THE BODIES OR ANY PIECES OF WOOD. ACCORDING TO MR. DUNG THE REASON THE GRAVE AREA IS HIDDEN NOW IS THIS AREA WAS PRIMEVAL FOREST BEFORE, THEREFORE IT WAS PROBABLY CARRIED AWAY BY SOME ANIMAL.

THE DAY AFTER THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED A FEW CADRES FROM THE PROVINCIAL UNIT ARRIVED TO COMMAND THE JOB OF COLLECTING THE EVIDENCE, BESIDES THAT NO ONE BELONGING TO THE MISSILE REGIMENT 261 WENT TO THE SITE.

B. MR. LUONG HUU TU (LWOWNG HWU TW): 60 YOA, RETIRED, RESIDING IN LY NHAN (LYS NHAAN) HAMLET, DAI DONG (DAIJ DOONGF) VILLAGE. IN 1972 HE WAS THE VILLAGE CHIEF. MR. TU SAID THE PLANE WAS PROBABLY SHOT DOWN BY A MISSILE, EVIDENCE DISCOVERED WAS ONE DEAD CHARRED BODY OF A PILOT NEXT TO THE STILL BURNING AIRCRAFT, THEY PUT THE FIRE OUT AND CARRIED THE VITAL BODY PARTS AWAY SUCH AS THE BACK, THE HANDS AND FEET WERE BURNT UP. THE OTHER BODY WAS RELATIVELY INTACT AND HAD A PARACHUTE AND EMERGENCY BEEPER. THESE OBJECTS ARE IN THE CUSTODY OF HIGHER ECHELONS. AT ABOUT 1800, MR. TU, MR. BEN (BEENF) AND MR. CHE (CHEES) CARRIED BOTH BODIES DOWN TO A FOOTHILL WHERE THEY BURIED THEM NEAR A BEETLE NUT GROVE. THEY DUG ABOUT A METER DEEP AND BURIED THE CHARRED BODY IN A COFFIN MADE FROM FOUR PIECES OF PLAIN WOOD AND THE INTACT BODY IN A COFFIN MADE FROM SIX PIECES OF WOOD. MR. DUNG PROVIDED THE WOOD. BOTH GRAVES WERE SEPARATE PITS NEXT TO EACH OTHER.

C. THE INVESTIGATION TEAM REQUESTED FOR MR. DUNG AND MR. TU LEAD THE TEAM TO THE SITE.

V. CONCLUSION:

- THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED TOGETHER WITH THE PROVINCE, DISTRICT, VILLAGE, AND INTERVIEWED TWO WITNESSES. INFORMATION RECEIVED CONFIRMED THE CORRECT POSITION OF THE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE AND THE AREA OF WHERE THE TWO DEAD PILOTS WERE BURIED. INFORMATION REGARDING THE DISTANCE OF THE CRASH

SITE TO THE BURIAL SPOT IS EITHER 300 TO 400 METERS OR 700 TO 800 METERS GAUGING BY THE EYE AND CANNOT BE SURE OF ITS EXACTNESS.

- IN THE AREA OF THE BURIAL SITE, THERE IS A DENSE THICK FOREST WITH ELEPHANT GRASS, BEETLE NUT TREES, AND BELOW THE FOOTHILL IS A WIDE OPEN AREA THEREFORE ATTEMPTING TO FIND THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE BURIAL SITE AFTER MANY YEARS WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT.

- AFTER INTERVIEWING MR. TU AND NEW WITNESSES WITH RELATING INFORMATION THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONTINUED TO INTERVIEW MORE WITNESSES AND ADVISED ALL OF THEM AGAIN TO TRY AND FIND THE EXACT BURIAL SITES.

HANOI, JUNE 6 1996
TM/ INVESTIGATION TEAM

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

INVESTIGATION REPORT

DURING THE PERIOD OF WORKING IN YEN BAI PROVINCE, THE
UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTED OF:

- PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF) SENIOR COLONEL TM CHIEF (CENTRAL)
- NGUYEN THANH HA (NGUYEENX THANH HAF) SPECIALIST
- VU THINH (VUX THINHJ) YEN BAI MIA TEAM CHIEF
- DINH NGOC DUONG (DINH NGOCJ ZWOWNG) SPECIALIST

THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE YEN BAI PEOPLE'S
COMMITTEE AND DAI DONG (DAIJ DOONGF) VILLAGE, AND CARRIED OUT THE
INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1870. ACCORDING TO THE INVESTIGATION
REQUIREMENTS, THE TEAM PROCEEDED TO INTERVIEW TWO WITNESSES THAT
DIRECTLY RELATED TO CASE 1870. THEY ARE:

- 1) MR. NGUYEN VAN DUNG (NGUYEENX VAWN ZUNGX)
- 2) MR. LUONG HUU TU (LWOWNG HWU TW)

THE ABOVE WITNESSES ARE THE PEOPLE THAT WERE INVOLVED IN THE
BURIAL OF THE TWO PILOTS FROM CASE 1870 FROM BEGINNING TO END.
THE TWO WITNESSES LED THE INVESTIGATING TEAM TO THE CRASH SITE
AND BURIAL LOCATION OF THE PILOTS. ALL THE SPECIFICS OF THE
DETAILED INVESTIGATION FROM THE CENTRAL MIA ARE ENCLOSED WITH THE
SUBMITTED REPORT.

THE YEN BAI PROVINCE MIA TEAM, THE YEN BINH DISTRICT
PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AUTHORITIES AND DAI DONG VILLAGE AUTHORITIES
CREATED FAVORABLE CONDITIONS AND WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE
INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1870. THEY VERIFIED ALL THE INFORMATION
OBTAINED WAS TRUE, AND COMPLIED WITH THE HUMANITARIAN DIRECTIVE
OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND ITS PEOPLE IN THE SPIRIT OF
LOCATING MISSING AMERICAN SERVICEMEN.

CENTRAL MIA TEAM CHIEF
SENIOR COLONEL
(SIGNED)
PHAM TEO

YEN BAI, 28 MAY 96

YEN BAI PROVINCE TEAM CHIEF 28 MAY 96, SR COL PHAM
TEO, NGUYEN THANH HA - CENTRAL MINISTER, VERIFIED THE ABOVE
CONTENTS, MET WITH WITNESSES AND TOURED THE SITE AS NOTED IN THE
MENTIONED DOCUMENT.

VIETNAMESE OFFICE SEARCHING FOR MISSING PERSONS
(VNOSMP)

UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORT ON CASE 1924
(HA BAC PROVINCE)

I. BRIEF HISTORY (DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED BY THE AMERICANS):

- SEPTEMBER/1990, VIETNAM TURNED OVER THE REMAINS OF COMMANDER DONNELLY, THE SECOND CREW MEMBER, COMMANDER BUELL IS STILL MISSING.

II. PROCESS OF INVESTIGATIONS:

- HAS BEEN JOINTLY INVESTIGATED DURING THE 28TH, 31ST, 33RD, 35TH, AND 39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

1/ THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING:

- PHAM TEO : VNOSMP
- NGUYEN THANH HA : -
- DOAN VAN QUAN : HA BAC PROVINCE SPECIALIST
- NGUYEN DUY THAI : -
- DUONG NGOC THUONG : LUC NAM DISTRICT SPECIALIST

2/ 6/JUNE/1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE LUC NAM PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. THE INVESTIGATION TEAM REQUESTED THE LUC NAM PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE EXAMINE AND PROVIDE THE INVESTIGATION TEAM THE REPORT REGARDING THE CONFISCATION OF REMAINS PREVIOUSLY BELONGING TO MR. NGUYEN TIEN SI.

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:

A. MR. NGUYEN VAN CHANG: 61 YOA, TRAI GIUA HAMLET, FORMER VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER FROM 1963-1974. MR. CHANG STATED THAT AROUND 2 OR 3 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING, WHILE HE WAS ON ALERT DUTY AT THE 12.7 MM AAA EMPLACEMENT, HE SAW A LOW-FLYING

AIRCRAFT COLLIDE INTO ROCK OUTCROPPINGS OF HUYEN DINH MOUNTAIN CAUSING A BIG EXPLOSION, THROWING DEBRIS THROUGHOUT THE SURROUNDING AREA. 2/3 OF THIS MOUNTAIN LIES ON LUC NAM SOIL AND THE REMAINING 1/3 IS ON BAC LUNG TERRITORY. IN THE DAWN, THE VILLAGE MILITIA ASCENDED TO THE CRASH SITE, AT THE PLACE WHERE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED THEY DISCOVERED 1 LONG LEG STILL THERE, ONE ARM, ONE EPIC OF A HEAD, AND MANY PIECES OF BROKEN FLESH. THESE REMAINS WERE GATHERED IN ORDER TO PLACE THEM TOGETHER ON THE SIDE OF THE TRAIL AND AFTERWARDS WERE HASTILY BURIED AT THE FOOT OF THE MOUNTAIN. MR. CHANG HIMSELF ALSO SAW AT THE CRASH SITE DEBRIS THROWN IN THE DIRECTION OF BAC LUNG, IN THAT AREA HE SAY AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AND SCATTERED FLESH. FOLLOWING THIS INSTANCE HE HAS NOT DISCOVERED OR HEARD OF ANY ADDITIONAL REMAINS BEING FOUND.

B. MR. TRAN VAN: 69 YOA, QUAN BONG HAMLET, FORMER VILLAGE CHAIRMAN. MR. VAN STATED THAT AROUND 2 OR 3 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING, AN AIRCRAFT COLLIDED WITH A MOUNTAIN AND EXPLODED, AND A BRIGHT FIRE ILLUMINATED THE ENTIRE AREA. DURING THE DAWN WHEN THEY ASCENDED TO THE CRASH SITE, THE MILITIA DISCOVERED TWO LEGS CONSISTING OF BOTH BONE AND TISSUE, 1/2 PART OF A CHEST, AND A SMALL SKULL FRAGMENT, AND NO ARMS. THESE REMAINS WERE COLLECTED AND PLACED IN A GUNNY SACK AND TAKEN TO BE BURIED.

C. MR. NGUYEN VAN KHAN: 63 YOA, TAM KIEU HAMLET, FORMER ASSISTANT VILLAGE CHAIRMAN. AFTER THE AIRCRAFT EXPLODED, MR. KHAN LED THE MILITIA TO THE CRASH SITE AND OVERSAW THE COLLECTION OF 1 HAND, A FEMUR, AND BROKEN FLESH. ACCORDING TO MR. KHAN, THE REMAINS THEY COLLECTED BELONGED TO ONE PILOT, THE REMAINS WERE BURIED AT THE FOOT OF THE MOUNTAIN.

3/ 07/JUNE/1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM MET WITH AND INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN BA SUNG. MR. SUNG, 36 YOA, PRESENTLY WORKS FOR THE BAC NINH TOWNSHIP POLICE, BAC THAI PROVINCE. MR. SUNG STATED HE PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFISCATION OF REMAINS BELONGING TO MR. NGUYEN TIEN SI, AFTERWARDS HE TURNED OVER THE REMAINS WITH A REPORT TO THE PROVINCIAL TEAM. PRESENTLY, HE CANNOT REMEMBER THE QUANTITY OF THE CONFISCATED REMAINS NOR WHAT THEY CONSISTED OF.

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

- THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE PROVINCE, DISTRICT, VILLAGE, AND PHOTOCOPIED THE REMAINS CONFISCATION REPORT AS REQUESTED.

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES WITH INFORMATION THAT CONFIRMS THE LOCATION OF THE CRASHSITE, AT THE CRASH SITE ON LUC NAM TERRITORY THEY DISCOVERED REMAINS BELONGING TO ONE PILOT AND AT THE CRASH SITE ON BAC LUNG TERRITORY THEY DISCOVERED BROKEN FLESH THAT POSSIBLY BELONGS TO THE SECOND PILOT.

- INFORMATION AND THE RELATED WITNESSES REGARDING THE RECOVERY AND STORING OF THE REMAINS CONFIRM THAT ALL OF THE REMAINS WERE HANDED OVER TO THE UPPER ECHELON.

HA NOI, 24 JUNE 1996
TM/INVESTIGATION TEAM
//SIGNED//

NGUYEN THANH HA

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR CASE 1924

1/ THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM SEARCHING FOR MISSING AMERICANS CONCEITED OF THE FOLLOWING:

- PHAM TEO : COLONEL, TEAM LEADER
- NG. THANH HA : VNOSMP SPECIALIST
- DOAN VAN QUAN : HA BAC PROVINCIAL SPECIALIST
- NG. DUY THAI : PROVINCIAL SPECIALIST
- DUONG NGOC THUONG : LUC NAM DISTRICT SPECIALIST

2/ AFTER WORKING WITH THE LUC NAM DISTRICT AND CAM LY VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES, THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING THREE WITNESSES:

- MR. NGUYEN VAN CHANG: 61 YOA, TRAI GIUA HAMLET
- MR. TRAN VAN: 69 YOA, QUAN BONG HAMLET
- MR. NGUYEN VAN KHAN: 63 YOA, TOM KIEU HAMLET

3/ THE THREE WITNESSES PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING MAIN INFORMATION:

- IN THE EARLY MORNING ON A DAY IN SEPTEMBER 1972, 01 LOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT COLLIDED WITH HUYEN DINH MOUNTAIN, CAM LY VILLAGE, EXPLODED, BURNED, AND THREW MANY SMALL PIECES OVER THE SURROUNDING AREA.

- NEAR THE LOCATION WHERE THE AIRCRAFT IMPACTED, THE LOCAL MILITIA DISCOVERED MANY SMALL PIECES OF REMAINS, THE PIECES COLLECTED CONSISTED OF ONE ARM, TWO LEGS NOT INTACT, ONE PIECE OF SKULL, AND AFTERWARDS BURIED THE REMAINS.

4/ THE SPECIFIC DETAILS FROM THE INVESTIGATION AND INTERVIEWS WILL BE INCLUDED IN AN ATTACHED REPORT BY THE VNOSMP INVESTIGATION.

5/ THE LUC NAM PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES CREATED ALL FAVORABLE CONDITIONS, AND APPOINTED CADRE TO HELP WITH THE COMPLETION OF THIS INVESTIGATION.

LUC NAM DISTRICT, 6 JUNE 1996
AFFIRMED BY THE LUC NAM DISTRICT PEOPLE'S

COMMITTEE

AFFIRMS THAT THE THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF LUC NAM DISTRICT
ABOVE TEAMS INVESTIGATION IS THE TRUTH.

VNOSMP TEAM LEADER HA BAC REPRESENTATIVE
//SIGNED// //SIGNED//

PHAM TEO DOAN VAN QUAN
//STAMPED & SIGNED//

VNOSMP TEAM LEADER HA BAC PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE

REPORT
INVESTIGATION CASE DATA IN THANH HOA PROVINCE

1) U.S INFORMATION:

NAME, NAVY PILOT, FLYING ON AN DATA AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN ON . . OCTOBER 1972 AT GRID COORDINATED WG682819 IN THANH HOA PROVINCE.

2) PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION:

* THE 26TH AND 28TH JFA'S REVEALED:

+ WITNESSES:

- MR. LE XUAN PHUONG (LEE XUAAN PHWONG), FORMER CHROME MINE GUARD, CURRENTLY LIVES IN TAN NINH (TAAN NINH) VILLAGE, TRIEU SON DISTRICT.

- MR. NGUYEN HUU (HWUJ), FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CHROME MINE, RETIRED IN NAM NGAN (NAM NGANJ) WARD, THANH HOA TOWN.

- MR. HOANG NANG PHUC (HOANGF NAWNGJ PHUCS), FORMER VICE-CHAIRMAN OF TAN NINH VILLAGE. AN DATA AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN BY ROCKET AT NIGHT (IN APPROXIMATELY OCTOBER 1973), CRASHED AND SCATTERED INTO MANY PIECES OVER THE NUA (NWA) MOUNTAIN AREA OF TAN NINH VILLAGE, TRIEU SON DISTRICT, THANH HOA PROVINCE. THE PILOT DIED FROM FALLING TO THE GROUND, APPROXIMATELY 170 METERS AWAY FROM THE WRECKAGE. THE PILOT WAS CAUCASIAN WITH REDDISH HAIR. MR. PHUONG STILL RECALLED THE PILOT'S NAME NAME, HIS RANK WAS MAJOR, AND HE WAS ON HIS 35TH SORTIE. AT THE CRASH SITE, HE RECOVERED A PISTOL, A RADIO TRANSMITTER, AND A BLOOD CHIT, BUT HE TURNED THEM OVER TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES. MR. PHUONG AND MILITIA MEMBERS BURIED THE REMAINS ON THE SPOT IN A COFFIN. LATER, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT TEAMS EXHUMED THE REMAINS AND THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS TURNED THE REMAINS OVER TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE U.S. IDENTIFIED THE REMAINS AS BELONGING TO THE OTHER PILOT.

* IN MAY 1996, A UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTING OF MR. PHAM CONG KHOI (PHAMJ COONG KHOOI), MND, AND MR. NGO QUANG HUNG (NGOO QUANG HWNG), MOI, ACCOMPANIED PROVINCE AND DISTRICT MEMBERS TO TAN NINH VILLAGE TO REINVESTIGATE CASE DATA. THE TEAM REINTERVIEWED THE THREE WITNESSES ABOVE: MR. PHUONG AND MR. HUU PROVIDED THE SAME INFORMATION [AS THEY HAD BEFORE]. OF NOTE, MR. PHUC PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: WHEN THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT TEAMS CAME BACK TO EXHUME THE REMAINS, MR. DINH VAN THOI (DINH THOWIS) AND MR. LE KHAC SON (LEE KHAWCS SOWN), FORMER MILITIA VILLAGE CHIEF, ACCOMPANIED MR. PHUC AND PARTICIPATED IN THE EXHUMATION. MR. THOI IS CURRENTLY WITH THE VIET DUC (VIEETJ DWCS) COLLECTIVE COFFEE FARM, DAC LAC PROVINCE, AND MR. SON MOVED TO CHAU PHA (CHAAU PHA) VILLAGE, LONG THANH DISTRICT, DONG NAI PROVINCE. THE GRAVE WAS EXHUMED IN APPROXIMATELY 1974 OR 1975, THE GRAVE HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY UNDISTURBED. THEY DUG 0.5 METER DEEP AND FOUND THE BODY IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE IT WAS IN A COFFIN. THE REMAINS WERE STILL IN THE FLIGHT SUIT. THEY HAD TO REMOVE

FLESH TO REMOVE THE BONES BECAUSE THE BODY HAD ONLY BEEN BURIED FOR TWO YEARS. THE WERE REMAINS RELATIVELY COMPLETE.

THE TEAM LOCATED AND INTERVIEWED TWO PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CADRES WHO EXHUMED THE REMAINS:

- MR. LE VAN HANH (LEE VAWN HANHJ), PROVINCE TEAM RETIREE CADRE LIVED IN DAN LY (ZAAH LY) VILLAGE - TRIEU SON DISTRICT.
- MR. LE DINH KIEN (LEE DINHF KIEENS), DISTRICT TEAM RETIREE CADRE LIVED IN MINH DAN (MINH ZAAH) - TRIEU SON.

BOTH OF THEM AFFIRMED THAT: THERE WAS ONLY ONE GRAVE EXHUMED AT TAN NINH VILLAGE; SPECIFICALLY, AT NUA MOUNTAIN, CHROME MINE AREA. [THEY] FOUND THE REMAINS RIGHT AWAY, AND EXHUMED THEM QUICKLY BECAUSE THE REMAINS WERE STILL IN THE FLIGHT SUIT. THEY THEN CLEANED THE REMAINS, WIPED THEM, AND PUT THEM INTO A PLASTIC BAG, WHICH THEY GAVE TO DISTRICT. ONE WEEK LATER, MR. HANH AND MR. KIEN CAME AND TOOK THE REMAINS TO THE PROVINCE LEVEL. THE REMAINS WERE THEN TURNED OVER TO MILITARY REGION 4.

THE VNOSMP RECEIVED THESE REMAINS AND TURNED THEM OVER TO THE U.S. ON 31 JULY 1989 (NUMBER 14 IN THE LIST). THE LIST NOTED THE LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, AND PLACE OF DEATH (TRIEU SON, THANH HOA). THE U.S. EXAMINATION IDENTIFIED THESE AS THE REMAINS OF CASE 0083 (KARDEL).

ACCORDING TO THE VIETNAMESE RECORDS, KARDEL WENT MISSING ON 9 MAY 196[YEAR MISSING ONE DIGIT] IN NHU XUAN (NHW XUAAN), THANH HOA. THESE REMAINS WERE ALSO RECOVERED AND TURNED OVER ON THE SAME DAY AS REMAINS OF HALL (BOX #12). RECOMMEND THAT THE U.S. RE-EXAMINE THE REMAINS IN BOX #12 HANDED OVER ON 31 JULY 1989.

THE 28TH JFA, THE JOINT TEAM RECOVERED AGAIN THIS LOCATION BUT NO REMAINS WAS FOUND.

VIETNAMESE OFFICE SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP)

REPORT OF UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 1952
(HAI PHONG)

I. SUMMARY (DOCUMENTS SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES):

- MAJOR WARD AND ~~NAME~~ WERE LOST ON A NIGHT MISSION NEAR HANOI ON 18 DECEMBER 1972. THE SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORT WAS STOPPED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF NOT FINDING THE F-111 OR THE CREW.

II. PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS:

- [BLANK]

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

1/ THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING:

-PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF) : VNOSMP
 -NGUYEN THANH HA (NGUYEENX THANH HAF) : -
 - TRUNG (TRUNG) : HAI PHONG CITY
 SPECIALIST
 -NGUYEN HUY HOANG (NGUYEENX HUY HOANGF) : -

2/ 30 MAY 1996:

- THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE HAI PHONG CITY MIA TEAM. THE SPECIALISTS SEARCHED FOR RECORDS WITH POSSIBLE CORRELATION TO THE INVESTIGATION WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

3/ 31 MAY 1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM CONTACTED AND WORKED WITH THE HAI PHONG CITY MUSEUM. THE INVESTIGATION TEAM REQUESTED THE MUSEUM DIRECTOR'S SECTION EXAMINE ALL THE RECORDS AND ARCHIVAL PICTURES TO FIND CORRELATING INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY FOR A "PICTURE OF SECOND LIEUTENANT MCELVAIN." THE HAI PHONG CITY MUSEUM APPOINTED MRS. BUI TUE CHI (BUIF TUEEJ CHI), DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE MUSEUM'S PROPAGANDA EXHIBIT, WHO WORKED AT THE MUSEUM FOR 26 YEARS, WHO HAS MUCH EXPERIENCE, TO GUIDE AND HELP THE INVESTIGATION TEAM SEARCH FOR INFORMATION AND PHOTOGRAPHS ACCORDING TO THE INVESTIGATION REQUEST.

- IN THE "DESTRUCTIVE AMERICAN WAR" ROOM, THE TEAM ONLY SAW: A/ 01 PICTURE WITH THE CAPTION "TA-LOW-THAM XOWN-UY-LAAN," PILOT OF AN A-7E SHOT DOWN IN HAI PHONG ON 21 DECEMBER 1972 (THIS PILOT WAS TURNED OVER TO THE UNITED STATES BY VIETNAM).

B/ 18 DECEMBER 1972: SHOT DOWN 2 PLANES, AMONG THOSE WAS ONE F-111.

- THE DIRECTOR OF THE MUSEUM INFORMED THE TEAM ABOUT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE 18 DECEMBER 1972 SHOOT DOWN OF 2 PLANES. INFORMATION ON ONE OF THESE F-111'S WAS SUPPLIED BY A AN OUTSIDE AGENCY. THE MUSEUM DID NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER RECORDS OR INFORMATION.

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE HAI PHONG CITY MIA TEAM AND THE HAI PHONG MUSEUM BUT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY INFORMATION OR RECORDS CORRELATING TO CASE 1952.

- THE HAI PHONG MUSEUM DOES NOT HAVE AN ARCHIVAL PICTURE OF
~~NAME~~

- THERE IS A GREAT POSSIBILITY THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE OCEAN.

V. ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT IS A HAI PHONG CITY MUSEUM'S CERTIFICATION DOCUMENT.

HANOI, 24 JUNE 1996
INVESTIGATION TEAM

NGUYEN THANH HA

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

CERTIFICATION DOCUMENT

THE PERIOD OF WORK IN HAI PHONG CITY, 23 MAY 1996, THE INVESTIGATION TEAM SEARCHING FOR MISSING AMERICANS BELONGING TO THE VIETNAMESE OFFICE SEEKING MISSING PERSONNEL (VNOSMP) CONSISTING OF MR. PHAM TEO AND MR. NGUYEN THANH HA ALONG WITH HAI PHONG CITY MIA SPECIALISTS ARRIVED AT THE CITY MUSEUM TO INVESTIGATE AND SEARCH FOR INFORMATION AND RECORDS POSSIBLY CORRELATING TO CASE 1952.

THE CITY MUSEUM CREATED ALL FAVORABLE CONDITIONS AND APPOINTED SPECIALISTS TO WORK WITH SPECIALISTS FROM THE INVESTIGATION TEAM. WE EXAMINED AND SEARCHED FILES AND RECORDS RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION AND THE RESULTS FOLLOW:

1/ THE HAI PHONG CITY MUSEUM DOES NOT HAVE AN ARCHIVAL PICTURE OF AMERICAN PILOTS NAMED NAME, WARD RELATED TO CASE 1952.

2/ THE LIST OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN HAI PHONG PROVINCE DURING THE WAR BELONGING TO THE RECORDS THAT THE MUSEUM SOLELY MANAGES HAS AN ITEM: "18 DECEMBER 1972: SHOT DOWN 02 AIRCRAFT, 1 AIRCRAFT IS AN F-111".

INVESTIGATION TEAM LEADER HAI PHONG CITY MIA TEAM LEADER
COLONEL

PHAM TEO

NGUYEN HUY HOANG

[SIGNED]

[SIGNED]

HAI PHONG CITY, 23 MAY 1996
MUSEUM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR
DO XUAN TAM (DOOX XUAAN TAAMR)

[SIGNED]

VIETNAMESE AGENCY SEEKING MISSING PERSONS
(VNOSMP)
UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR CASE 1965
(HOA BINH PROVINCE (HOAF BINHF))

I. CASE HISTORY (FROM DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE U.S. SIDE):

- ON 22 DECEMBER 1972, A B-52D AIRCRAFT PILOTED BY CAPT BENNETT WAS LOST OVER THE HANOI (HAF NOOIJ) AREA. THREE MEMBERS OF THE AIRCREW SAFELY PARACHUTED FROM THE PLANE, WERE CAPTURED, AND REPATRIATED IN 1973. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THE REMAINS OF TWO OTHER CREW MEMBERS IN 1988. CAPT BENNETT IS THE ONLY MEMBER OF THIS AIRCREW WHO IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR.

II. PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS

- INVESTIGATED DURING THE 31ST JFA
- INVESTIGATED DURING THE 32ND JFA

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS

1/ THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS:

MR. PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF): VNOSMP

MR. NGUYEN THANH HA (NGUYEENX THANH HAF): VNOSMP

MR. QUACH NGOC KHIEEN (QUACHS NGOCJ KHIEEN): HOA BINH PROVINCE SPECIALIST

MR. DINH VAN DUNG (DINH VAWN ZUNGF): HOA BINH PROVINCE SPECIALIST

MR. NGUYEN VAN BAY (NGUYEENX VAWN BAYR): LUONG SON DISTRICT (LWONG SOWN) SPECIALIST

MR. BUI VAN HOI (BUIF VAWN HOOIF): LUONG SON DISTRICT SPECIALIST

2/ 18 AND 23 MAY 1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE HOA BINH PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, GOING OVER THE INVESTIGATION TASKS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR CASE 1965. THE INVESTIGATION TEAM REQUESTED THAT THE HOA BINH PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AUTHORITIES GO OUT AND LOCATE ANY DOCUMENTS RELATED TO CASE 1965 IN THE FILES OF PROVINCIAL AGENCIES, PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES, AND ARCHIVAL SECTIONS. THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE WAS TO LET US KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD ANY DOCUMENTS OR RECORDS RELATED TO CASE 1965 REMAINING. DURING THE TERRIBLE WAR, THE TASK OF MAINTAINING DOCUMENTS WAS VERY DIFFICULT AND LIMITED, SO ESSENTIAL INFORMATION WAS REPORTED IN PERSON. AFTER UNEXPECTEDLY MEETING A WITNESS WHO HAD INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE CASE, THE INVESTIGATION TEAM RAISED THE ISSUE OF FINDING MR. TRUC (TRUCS), THE PROVINCIAL UNIT CADRE WHO WENT TO THE SITE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PLANE CRASHED TO RESOLVE THE SITE FOR CASE 1965, BUT MR. TRUC HAS BEEN DEAD SINCE 1994.

3/ 19 MAY 1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM WORKED WITH THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES OF LUONG SON DISTRICT AND TRUNG SON VILLAGE (TRUNG, SOWN).

4/ 20 MAY 1996:

- THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:

A. NGUYEN VAN DICH (NGUYEENX VAWN DICH): 57 YEARS OLD, RETIRED, FARMER, CURRENTLY RESIDING IN BEN CUOI HAMLET (BEENS CUOOIS), TRUNG SON VILLAGE. HE SERVED AS THE VILLAGE CHIEF FROM 1966 TO 1972. MR. DICH TOLD THE FOLLOWING STORY: AT APPROXIMATELY EIGHT O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING (ON AN UNRECALLED DATE/YEAR) HE WAS ON ALERT ON A HILL LISTENING TO THE ROAR OF A PLANE WHEN IT CRASHED NEAR HIM. HE RANG THE ALARM BELL TO ASSEMBLE THE LOCAL MILITIA IN ORDER TO DEPLOY THEIR FORCES. THE EVENTS OCCURRED AS FOLLOWS:

- THE VILLAGE MILITIA DISCOVERED AND CAPTURED ONE AMERICAN PILOT WHO HAD PARACHUTED INTO THE CEMETERY AREA, WHICH WAS A LOW LYING FIELD APPROXIMATELY 300 METERS FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE HOUSE AND NEAR THE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE. THE PILOT WAS TURNED OVER TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES.

- THE ALMOST COMPLETELY INTACT BODY OF ONE PILOT WAS FOUND ABOUT 200 METERS FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE MAIN OFFICE, AND BURIED. AFTERWARD HIGHER LEVEL AUTHORITIES CAME AND DUG UP THE BODY (ACCORDING TO THE REMAINS DOCUMENT, VIETNAM TURNED THE REMAINS OVER TO THE U.S.).

- AT THE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE, THE PLANE WAS PULVERIZED AND IN THE SURROUNDING HIGHLAND AREA, MR. DICH SAW NUMEROUS SMALL PIECES OF FLESH AND BONE STREWN ALL OVER THE AREA. THE MILITIA GATHERED UP THESE SMALL PIECES OF FLESH AND BONE, APPROXIMATELY THREE KILOGRAMS, AND BURIED THEM IN A DIFFERENT PLACE, BUT MR. DICH DID NOT PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY IN THIS ACTIVITY.

- MR. DICH ALSO STATED THAT AFTER THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, MR. TRUC, THE PROVINCIAL UNIT CADRE CAME TO THE SITE TO DIRECT THE EFFORTS AND HE SAID THAT NORMALLY A SINGLE B-52 AIRCRAFT HAS A CREW OF FROM SIX TO SEVEN PEOPLE.

B. MR. LE (LEEX): 59 YEARS OLD, RETIRED, FARMER, CURRENTLY RESIDE IN BEN CUOI HAMLET, TIEN SON VILLAGE (TIEEN SOWN), LUONG SON DISTRICT. FROM 1973 TO 1976 HE WAS THE VILLAGE UNIT CHIEF, BEFORE THAT HE WAS THE VILLAGE MILITIA PLATOON COMMANDER. MR. LE SAID THAT A PLANE WAS BURNING FURIOUSLY AND WHEN IT CRASHED INTO THE GROUND IT CONTINUED TO BURN UNTIL THE MORNING OF THE NEXT DAY. AS FOR THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE, THE BIG PIECES WERE CONCENTRATED ON THE HILL TOP, AND THE SMALLER PIECES WERE THROWN FURTHER OUT. THE VILLAGE MILITIA CAPTURED ONE U.S. PILOT WHO HAD BEEN WOUNDED IN THE LEG AND WAS SENT TO A FIRST AID STATION AND AFTER THAT WAS TURNED OVER TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES.

- IN THE AREA SURROUNDING THE CRASH SITE, IN A HIGHLAND REGION, THE VILLAGE MILITIA COLLECTED HALF A BAG OF FLESH SCATTERED OVER THE AREA. THERE WERE NO BONES. OUTSIDE THIS AREA MR. LE DID NOT SEE NOR HAS HE HEARD ANYONE MENTION ANY OTHER PLACES WHERE BONES OR PILOT REMAINS WERE DISCOVERED. THE HIGHLANDS AREA IS A RICH FIELD. BEHIND THIS AREA FARMERS USUALLY CULTIVATE GRAIN.

C. MRS. BUI THI MIEN (BUI THI MIENS): 53 YEARS OLD, TRUM HAMLET (TRUMX), TRUNG SON VILLAGE, LUONG SON DISTRICT. MRS. MIEN WAS PREVIOUSLY A STANDING MEMBER OF THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE. SHE SAID THAT IN DECEMBER OF 1972, AN AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE LOCAL AREA. SHE KNEW THAT THE MILITIA CAPTURED ONE PILOT, WHO WAS INJURED IN THE CRASH, AT DANG HILL (DANG). THE PILOT WAS BANDAGED AND GIVEN FIRST AID AND THEN HIGHER LEVEL AUTHORITIES CAME TO GET HIM. THE SECOND PILOT WAS KILLED IN THE CRASH AT DONG CHAU - BEN CUOI (DOONGF CHAAUS - BEENS CUOIS) AND A BURIAL WAS ORGANIZED BY THE LOCALS. SHE DOES NOT REMEMBER WHAT YEAR A GROUP OF HIGHER LEVEL CADRE CAME TO TAKE THIS SET OF REMAINS AWAY. THE THIRD PILOT WAS BLOWN TO PIECES AND HIS REMAINS SPREAD ALL OVER PHO HILL (PHOWR) AREA. SHE HEARD THAT THE FOURTH PILOT DIED IN TUY MAI VILLAGE (TUY MAI), MY DUC DISTRICT (MYX DWCS), HA TAY PROVINCE (HAF TAAV). OTHER THAN THIS INFORMATION MRS. MIEN DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING MORE ABOUT THE INCIDENT.

D. MR. NGUYEN VAN BIT (NGUYEENX VAWN BITS): 60 YEARS OLD, TRUM HAMLET, TRUNG SON VILLAGE, LUONG SON DISTRICT, PREVIOUSLY THE VILLAGE UNIT POLITICAL OFFICER DURING THE WAR. MR. BIT PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: DURING THE ENTIRE WAR, THERE WAS ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT CRASH IN THE LOCAL AREA. ONE INJURED PILOT WAS CAPTURED AND GIVEN FIRST. AFTER THAT HIGHER AUTHORITIES SENT A VEHICLE TO COME AND GET HIM. THE SECOND PILOT PARACHUTED FROM THE PLANE AND DIED AT DONG CHAU (DOONGF CHAAUS), LOCAL PEOPLE ORGANIZED A BURIAL FOR THE BODY. MR. BIT IS NOT SURE WHAT YEAR A GROUP OF HIGHER LEVEL CADRE CAME TO RECOVER THE REMAINS. THE THIRD PILOT WAS BLOWN TO PIECES. MR. BIT, THE COMMANDER OF THE MILITIA FORCES HAD THE PEOPLE LINE UP ABREAST TO SEARCH FOR AND COLLECT THE PIECES OF FLESH, INTESTINES, LIVER AND GATHERED APPROXIMATELY FOUR TO FIVE KILOGRAMS OF REMAINS AND TOOK THEM TO THE PHO HILL (PHOWR) AREA AND BURIED THEM. MR. BIT HEARD THAT THE FOURTH PILOT CAME DOWN ON THE TUY LAI (TUY LAI) SIDE, MY DUC DISTRICT, HA TAY PROVINCE.

IV. CONCLUSION:

-THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM SEARCHED FOR RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1965 AT THE PROVINCIAL, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE LEVEL, BUT DID NOT FIND ANY INFORMATION.

-THE INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEWED FOUR WITNESSES, ALL OF WHOM WERE LOCAL OFFICIALS AT THE TIME OF THE PLANE CRASH. ALL THE INFORMATION COLLECTED WAS CONFIRMED:

1/ THE AIRCRAFT WAS BURNING WHEN IT CRASHED AND WAS BLOWN TO BITS.

2/ ONE PILOT EJECTED AND WAS CAPTURED AND THEN TURNED OVER TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES.

3/ ONE PILOT CAME DOWN DEAD AND WAS BURIED, LATER ON HIGHER LEVEL AUTHORITIES CAME AND EXHUMED HIS REMAINS AND TOOK THEM AWAY.

4/ THE LOCAL PEOPLE GATHERED UP PIECES OF THE PILOT'S FLESH AND BURIED THEM AT PHO HILL.

-BASED ON DOCUMENTS AND INVESTIGATION INFORMATION, THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM ARRIVED AT THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS REGARDING CASE 1965:

1/ THREE PILOTS EJECTED AND WERE CAPTURED AND RETURNED TO THE U.S. IN 1973.

2/ THE REMAINS OF ONE DEAD PILOT, BURIED IN TRUNG SON VILLAGE, LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE, VIETNAM WERE UNILATERALLY EXHUMED AND TURNED OVER TO THE U.S. SIDE IN 1988.

3/ THE REMAINS OF ONE DEAD PILOT, BURIED IN TUY LAI VILLAGE, MY DUC DISTRICT, HA TAY PROVINCE, VIETNAM WERE UNILATERALLY EXCAVATED AND THE REMAINS TURNED OVER TO THE U.S. SIDE IN ...

4/ ONE PILOT WAS BLOWN TO BITS, LOCAL PEOPLE GATHERED UP THE PIECES OF FLESH AND BURIED THEM AT PHO HILL IN TRUNG SON VILLAGE, LUONG SON DISTRICT. THIS INSTANCE, ACCORDING TO U.S. DOCUMENTS, MAY BE RELATED TO CAPT BENNETT. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A QUICK BURIAL CONSISTING OF PIECES OF SKIN AND FLESH, AFTER SO MANY YEARS THE ODDS OF FINDING ANYTHING WOULD BE VERY SMALL.

V. ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT ARE THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONFIRMING THE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM.

HANOI, 24 JUN 1996
ON BEHALF OF THE INVESTIGATION TEAM
[SIGNED]
NGUYEN THANH HA

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

LETTER OF CERTIFICATION

THE TRUNG SON VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE CERTIFIES THAT FROM 18 TO 20 MAY 1996, THE VNOSMP GROUP INVESTIGATING MISSING AMERICANS, CONSISTING OF MR. PHAM TEO AND MR. NGUYEN THANH HA, WENT TO THE LOCAL AREA TO SEARCH FOR INFORMATION AND INTERVIEW WITNESSES RELATED TO CASE 1965.

THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES COORDINATED AND CREATED CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO MEETING THE INVESTIGATION TEAM'S REQUESTS.

AFTER THE PROJECT WAS COMPLETED, THE VILLAGE PEOPLES' COMMITTEE ASSESSED AND ANALYZED THE SITUATION AND CONCURRED WITH THE INVESTIGATION TEAM'S CONCLUSIONS.

THE VILLAGE PEOPLES' COMMITTEE TURNED OVER TO THE
INVESTIGATION TEAM A REPORT SENT TO AGENCIES RELATED TO THIS
LETTER OF CERTIFICATION.

INVESTIGATION TEAM CHIEF

SENIOR COLONEL
PEOPLES' COMMITTEE
[SIGNED]
PHAM TEO

TRUNG SON VILLAGE,
DATE MAY 1996
ON BEHALF OF VILLAGE

[SIGNED]
CHAIRMAN NGUYEN DINH DUA
(NGUYEENX DINHF DUA)

REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION
FOR CASE DATA-QUANG TRI

I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS: ON AUGUST 1973, SIX AMERICANS WERE ABOARD A HELICOPTER ON A SUPPORT MISSION TO QUANG TRI. THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE AREA OF COORDINATE YD 342 852, APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER WEST OF QUANG TRI TOWNSHIP. ALL SIX AIRCREW MEMBERS WERE KILLED.

II. INVESTIGATION PROCESS: [THE INVESTIGATION TEAM] CARRIED OUT JOINT INVESTIGATIONS ON THE 25TH, 27TH, 29TH, 30TH, 35TH, AND 37TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES (JFA) INTERVIEWING WITNESSES WHO SAW THE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN AT THE THACH HAN (THACHJ HAAN) RIVER BANK, VICINITY AN MO (AN MOOX) HAMLET, TRIEU LONG (TRIEEUJ LONG) VILLAGE, TRIEU PHONG (TRIEEUJ PHONG) DISTRICT, QUANG TRI PROVINCE. LOCAL CITIZENS RETRIEVED FOUR AMERICAN CORPSES THAT THEY TOOK AND BURIED IN THE GARDEN AT MR. PHAM HUU'S (PHAMJ HWUX) HOUSE (NEAR THE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE) IN AN MO HAMLET, TRIEU LONG VILLAGE.

A NUMBER OF WITNESSES ALSO SAID THAT AROUND 1977-1981 PEOPLE SAID MR4 CADRES RETURNED TO THE AREA AND EXHUMED THREE SETS OF REMAINS AND TOOK THEM AWAY. HOWEVER, CHECKING THE ROSTER OF RETURNED AMERICANS, YOU DO NOT SEE ANY REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA. IN ADDITION, MR. NGUYEN TRUNG NGHIA (NGUYEENX TRUNG NGHIA) DUG UP ONE SET OF REMAINS AND TURNED THEM OVER TO THE VIETNAMESE MIA AGENCY ON 25 JANUARY 1994. JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW ON 6 FEBRUARY 1994 DETERMINED THE BONES WERE OF A CAUCASIAN AND WERE TURNED OVER TO THE AMERICANS.

III. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REQUESTS:

- SEARCH FOR REMAINS
- SEARCH FOR RECORDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RECOVERY OF REMAINS

IV. RESULTS UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION:

ON 21 MAY 1996 A VNOSMP TEAM LED BY MR. NGUYEN THE HUNG (NGUYEENX THEES HUNGF) (TEAM LEADER) REPORTED TO THE QUANG TRI PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE ABOUT THE TEAM'S PLAN OF ACTION. PROVINCE LEADERS CHOSE MR. TRAN KHANH PHOI (TRAANF KHANHS PHOOI) (TEAM LEADER) AND MR. VU CONG BINH (VUX COONG BINHF), QUANG TRI PROVINCE MIA SPECIALIST, TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ACTIVITY. THE TEAM WORKED WITH TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AUTHORITIES AND CHOSE MR. NGUYEN DUY CHONG (NGUYEENX DUY CHOONG), ASSISTANT DISTRICT TEAM LEADER, TO WORK WITH THE TEAM.

THE TEAM SEARCHED FOR ARCHIVAL RECORDS AT THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, THE PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICE, AND THE TRIEU PHONG MILITARY DISTRICT OFFICE, BUT THERE WERE NO ARCHIVAL RECORDS CONCERNING GRAVES FOR CASE DATA. ACCORDING TO CURRENT DISTRICT LEADERS AND SPECIAL LEADERS FROM THE WAR TIME, MR. DIEP (DIEEPJ), FORMER DISTRICT TEAM LEADER, AND MRS. TAM (TAMS), FORMER ASSISTANT DISTRICT TEAM LEADER, SAID THAT EXHUMING GRAVES WAS TOP PRIORITY, PURSUANT TO THE ORDERS OF UPPER ECHELONS. THEREFORE, WHEN DISTRICT AUTHORITIES SAW INTRODUCTION PAPERS [FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL COMING TO EXHUME GRAVES], THEY WILL APPOINTED A PERSON TO COORDINATE WITH THE CENTRAL TEAM. IF THERE

WAS RESULTS, THEY SENT THE REMAINS [OUT] IMMEDIATELY AND DID NOT LEAVE ANY REMAINS OR FILE ANY RELATED RECORDS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL. AT TRIEU PHONG THERE ARE NO RECORDS FILED.

CURRENTLY AT TRIEU LONG DISTRICT MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, THERE IS A 38MM HANDGUN WITH "SMIT AND WESSON 38S & WSPECIAL CTG MADE IN USA" AND A FLIGHT MAP THAT 17 YOA PHAM TU (PHAMJ TU) OF AN MO HAMLET, TRIEU LONG VILLAGE, GATHERED WHILE BATHING IN THE THACH HAN RIVER AT THE SITE OF THE CRASH.

AT THE SITE AREA, THE TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN VAN TIEP (NGUYEENX VAWN TIEEPS), 58 YOA, CURRENTLY LIVING AT AN MO, TRIEU PHONG. ACCORDING TO MR. TIEP, HE DIRECTLY BURIED AND PARTOOK IN THE EXCAVATION OF THE PILOT. MR. TIEP SAID THAT IN APPROXIMATELY JULY 1978 IN MR4, THREE PEOPLE CAME IN A VEHICLE TO LOAD THE REMAINS. THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS WERE MR. CHAN (CHAN), A LIEUTENANT, A PERSON NAMED THUAN (THUAAN), AND THE DRIVER WAS HUNG (HUNGF). THE PARTICIPANT FROM THE DISTRICT LEVEL WAS MRS. TAM. COMRADE HUE (HUEE), VILLAGE COMMANDER, APPOINTED A NUMBER OF GUERILLAS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EXCAVATION.

WE BELIEVE IT IS NOT CORRECT THAT MILITARY REGION CADRE RETRIEVED THE REMAINS IN 1981. WE PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED MR. DO CONG CHAN (DOOX COONG CHAN), LTC, RETIRED AT HAI BINH (HAIR BINHF) VILLAGE, TINH GIA (TINHR GIA) DISTRICT; THANH HOA (THANH HOAS), A FORMER MR4 PROPAGANDA CADRE, THE PERSON DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN GATHERING REMAINS AND EXCAVATIONS. HE SAID MR4 ONLY RECOVERED REMAINS UNTIL 1974. SINCE 1974, THEY HAVE REGULARLY HAD THE PARTICIPATION OF THE VNOSMP. MR4 REMAINS COLLECTION ELEMENTS WERE ACTIVE ONLY UNTIL 1979.

TAB 4

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00068642
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS334 MCN = 96055/00170 TOR = 960550004
 OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS8895 0550004-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
 HEADER
 O 240004Z FEB 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 O 231103Z FEB 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-PA HONOLULU HI
 TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J03/J05/J06/J07/J2/J3/
 J4/J5/J6/FPA/J33//
 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
 RHHMAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//JJJ//
 RUHVPA/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//LGTA/MWXR/AF/DOOU/SG/DO/CEOOE//
 RUHVAAA/PAC ALFT MGT OFC HICKAM AFB HI//PAMO//
 RUHPHMS/COMMARFORPAC//G3//
 RHHJRAP/USARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI//APIN-PO//
 RHCUAAA/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL//XOOMSR/TRK//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
 RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DETACHMENT THREE//
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA/AIRA//
 RUAHBCC/374CES YOKOTA AB JA//SG/AO/AOE//
 RUHAOSS/374OSS YOKOTA AB JA//DOC/DOO/TRO//
 RUHVAAA/PACAF AOS HICKAM AFB HI//AOM//
 RUENMED/BUMED WASHINGTON DC//27//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/DH-3//
 RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RHHEAAA/13AF ANDERSEN AFB GU//CC/LG//
 RUHPKCP/THIRD MAR//S1/S3/S6//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
 RUEHPF/CJTFFA DET FOUR PHNOM PENH CB
 RUHDFTB/CDR703DMIBDE OPS KUNIA HI
 RUHVAAA/15OSS HICKAM AFB HI//DOX//
 RUHPSGG/CDRUSAG-HI SCHOFIELD BKS HI//APVZ-PTP//
 RUHVAMC/635AMSS HICKAM AFB HI//AMCC/TRO//
 RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI//DO/CSE/OSE//
 RHHJRAQ/CDR205THMIBN FT SHAFTER HI//TAGPD//
 RHHMUNE/JFMO PAC HONOLULU HI
 RUHPSGG/CDR USAG-HI SCHOFIELD BKS HI//APVG-GTP/GLS//
 RHHMMCP/FISC PEARL HARBOR HI//00//
 RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI
 RUHDKRF/RSOC KUNIA HI//J3C12/J3C0//

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RHAKAAA/633AMSS KADENA AB JA//TRO//
 RHCUAAA/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL//TRKX//
 BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS//N03460//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO DET TWO
 SECTION 01 OF 04
 PART ONE OF THREE-PART TWO IDENT IS 231106Z FEB 96, PART
 THREE IDENT IS 231109Z FEB 96.

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

OPER/JOINT RECOVERY OPS IN SRV/JTF-FA 40TH JFA//
 MSGID/ORDER/JTF-FA//
 REF/A/DOC/JTF-FA/UNDTD/NOTAL//
 AMPN/FY96 JTF-FA OPLAN//
 REF/B/MSG/USCINCPAC/052100ZJAN94/NOTAL//
 AMPN/USCINCPAC OPORD 5080-93//
 REF/C/MSG/JTF-FA/121733ZJAN96/NOTAL//
 AMPN/JTF-FA/WNGORD/40TH JFA//
 ORDTYP/OPORD/JTF-FA 40TH JFA//
 MAP/1501/NC 48-4/5/AN LOC, VIETNAM; CAMBODIA//
 MAP/1501/NC 48-8/4/PHAN THIET, VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/NC 48-15/5/NAM CAN, VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/NC 49-1/5/DA LAT, VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/ND 48-3/3/THANH HOA, VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/ND 48-8/4/ATTAPU, LAOS; KAMPUCHEA; VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/ND 48-16/6/O RANG, CAMBODIA; VIETNAM//
 MAP 1501/ND 49-1/5/DA NANG (TOURANE), VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/ND 49-13/2/NHA TRANG, VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/ND 49-9/3/KONTUM, VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/NE 48-5/3/VANG VIANG, LAOS; THAILAND//
 MAP/1501/NE 48-7/5/VINH, VIETNAM; LAOS//
 MAP/1501/NE 48-12/5/DONG HOI, VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/NE 48-16/6/HUE, VIETNAM; LAOS//
 MAP/1501/NF 48-11/2/HANOI, VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/NF 48-15/2/HAI DUONG, VIETNAM//
 MAP/1501/NF 48-16/2/HAI PHONG, VIETNAM//
 TIMEZONE/Z//
 ORDREF/OPORD/USCINCPAC.5080-93//
 HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION. SEE ANNEX A//
 GENTEXT/1. SITUATION/
 A. GENERAL. THIS IS THE OPERATIONS ORDER FOR 40TH JOINT
 FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) IN SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
 (SRV). USCINCPAC, JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-
 FA) AND SRV CONDUCT JOINT INVESTIGATIONS AND RECOVERY
 OPERATIONS DURING 40TH JFA IN VIETNAM FROM 21 MAR TO 26
 APR 96.
 B. INTELLIGENCE AND WEATHER. (SEE ANNEX B)
 C. FRIENDLY
 (1) TASK ORGANIZED INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM
 (IRT) FORMED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON) OF CDR

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JTF-FA.

(2) SRV REQUESTED TO:

(A) PROVIDE PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN OPS.

(B) PROVIDE LOCAL TRANSPORTATION, TO INCLUDE PRE-POSITIONING OF ALL JOINT TEAM VEHICLES AT MISSION SITES.

(C) PROVIDE HELICOPTERS TO TRANSPORT TEAM AND EQUIPMENT TO SITES.

(D) PROVIDE HF RADIO FREQUENCIES FOR OPERATION.

(E) PROVIDE MILITARY SECURITY ELEMENT TO CLEAR REQUIRED LANDING ZONES (LZ).

(F) BE PREPARED TO USE HOIST ON MI-17 HELICOPTER TO SUPPORT CUTTING LZ'S//

GENTEXT/2. MISSION/ JTF-FA CONDUCTS INVESTIGATIONS AND EXCAVATIONS OF CASES IN NORTHERN,CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN VIETNAM TO ACHIEVE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED FOR AS A RESULT OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.//

GENTEXT/3. EXECUTION/

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

(1) COMMANDER'S INTENT: MY INTENT FOR THE 40TH JFA IS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH, COMPLETE INVESTIGATIONS AND EXCAVATIONS DURING THIS OPERATION IN VIETNAM. WE MUST MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY TO MINIMIZE DELAYS OR LOST OPPORTUNITIES INVESTIGATING AND/OR EXCAVATING CASES. SUCCESS IS DEFINED AS ACCOMPLISHING ALL OPERATIONS WITH THOROUGHNESS NOT SPEED, LEAVING NO STONE UNTURNED IN OUR EFFORTS TO ATTAIN FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING. CULMINATION WILL BE THE SAFE RETURN OF ALL PERSONNEL, ALL REPORTS COMPREHENSIVELY WRITTEN AND RELEASED, AND THOSE REMAINS OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR WHICH ARE RECOVERED FORWARDED FOR FORENSIC REVIEW.

(2) CONCEPT: INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM (IRT) CONDUCTS 40TH JFA WITH TWO INVESTIGATION ELEMENTS, SIX RECOVERY ELEMENTS, AND ONE UNDERWATER RECOVERY ELEMENT (IE/RE'S/URE'S) FROM 21 MAR TO 26 APR 96. 40TH JFA WILL BE CONDUCTED IN 5 PHASES:

(A) PHASE I (DEPLOYMENT TO THAILAND): IRT (2 IE'S, 6 RE'S) WILL DEPLOY VIA USAF C-141 FROM HICKAM AFB ON 16 MAR 96, QUICK-TURNS AT ANDERSEN AFB, GUAM, AND ARRIVES U'TAPHAO ON 18 MAR 96; TEAMS WILL PREPARE FOR DEPLOYMENT INTO VIETNAM.

(B) PHASE II (DEPLOYMENT TO VIETNAM): IRT WILL DEPLOY TO HANOI, HO CHI MINH CITY AND DA NANG, VIETNAM VIA TWO USAF C-130 AIRCRAFT FLYING A TOTAL OF FOUR SORTIES ON 21 AND 22 MAR 96. UPON ARRIVAL, ELEMENTS MOVE TO MISSION SITES AND PREPARE TO EXECUTE INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS.

(C) PHASE III (FIELD OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM): JTF-FA IE'S INVESTIGATE UP TO 19 CASES IN 11 PROVINCES. RE'S RECOVER UP TO 19 CASES IN 14 PROVINCES.

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(D) PHASE IV (REDEPLOYMENT FROM VIETNAM TO THAILAND): UPON COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS, IRT WILL RE-DEPLOY TO BANGKOK VIA TWO USAF C-130 AIRCRAFT FLYING A TOTAL OF FOUR SORTIES ON 25 AND 26 APR 96. IRT COMPLETES SUMMARY AND DETAILED REPORTS PRIOR TO RETURNING TO HONOLULU.

(E) PHASE V (REDEPLOYMENT TO HONOLULU): IRT WILL REDEPLOY FROM BANGKOK TO HONOLULU ON 28 APR 96 VIA COMMAIR. TRAIL PARTY COMPLETES REPORTS IN BANGKOK AND REDEPLOYS TO HONOLULU ON 30 APR 96 VIA COMMAIR.

B. MANEUVER:

(1) IE 1 WILL INVESTIGATE 6 CASES (0191, 0324, 0570, 1068, 1929 AND 1955) IN YEN BAI, VINH PHU, QUANG NINH, AND HA TAY PROVINCES AND IN HANOI. ON ORDER, IE1 REDEPLOYS TO HANOI.

(2) IE 2 WILL INVESTIGATE 13 CASES (0027, 0300, 0353, 1096, 1273, 1354, 1416, 1419, 1422, 1449, 1515, 1713 AND ONE UNCORRELATED CASE) IN KONTUM, GIA LAI, KHANH HOA, DONG NAI AND SONG BE PROVINCES AND IN HCMC. ON ORDER, IE2 REDEPLOYS TO HCMC.

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

RMKS/

(3) RE 1 WILL CONDUCT RECOVERIES ON 3 CASES (0701, 0854 AND 0579) IN HA BAC AND HA TAY PROVINCES AND HANOI. RE1 REDEPLOYS TO HANOI.

(4) RE 2 WILL CONDUCT RECOVERIES ON 3 CASES (0279, 1878, AND 0680) IN NGHE AN, HA TINH AND HOA BINH PROVINCES. RE2 REDEPLOYS TO HANOI.

(5) RE 3 WILL CONDUCT RECOVERIES ON 3 CASES (1927, 1820 AND 9996) IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN-HUE PROVINCES. RE3 REDEPLOYS TO DA NANG.

(6) RE 4 WILL CONDUCT RECOVERIES ON 2 CASES (1496 AND 1740) IN KONTUM. RE4 REDEPLOYS TO DA NANG.

(7) RE 5 WILL CONDUCT RECOVERIES ON 2 CASES (1046 AND 0258) IN PHU YEN AND DAC LAC PROVINCES. RE5 REDEPLOYS TO DA NANG.

(8) RE 6 WILL CONDUCT RECOVERIES ON 1 CASE (0023) IN MINH HAI PROVINCE. RE6 REDEPLOYS TO HCMC. IF RE 6 IS UNABLE TO RECOVER CASE 0023 THEN THEY WILL REDEPLOY TO QUANG NAM-DA NANG PROVINCE TO RECOVER 4 CASES (1603, 0979, 0381, 0835).

?(9) URE WILL CONDUCT A RECOVERY ON 1 CASE (0465) IN NGHE AN PROVINCE. URE REDEPLOYS TO DA NANG.

C. TASKS

(1) HQ USCINCPAC

(A) DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J3).

1) EXECUTE OPORD AS USCINCPAC OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY.

2) MONITOR ACTIVITIES RELATED TO OPERATION.

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3) COORDINATE OTHER HQ USCINCPAC ELEMENTS AS REQUIRED.

4) PROVIDE WEATHER AND CLIMATOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR YEN BAI, VINH PHU, HA BAC, QUANG NINH, HA NOI, HA TAY, HOA BINH, NGHE AN, HA TINH, QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN HUE, KONTUM, GIA LAI, PHU YEN, DAC LAC, KHANH HOA, DONG NAI, SONG BE, HCMC, AND MINH HAI PROVINCES.

(B) DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE (J2). PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR THREAT BRIEF TO JTF-FA ON AREA OF OPERATIONS.

(C) CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (J01PA)

1) DIRECT PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT AND COORDINATE WITH DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AS REQUIRED.

2) COORDINATE AND APPROVE JTF-FA PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE AND ANNOUNCE OPERATION AS APPROPRIATE.

(D) DIRECTOR FOR LOGISTICS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE (J4).

1) MUNITIONS BRANCH (J423) COORDINATE WITH COMMARFORPAC, CDR PACAF, CDR USARPAC, AND CINCPACFLT TO PROVIDE EOD SUPPORT FOR IRT. PROVIDE SIX EOD TECHNICIANS (E-5 AND ABOVE); IDENTIFY ONE ALTERNATE.

2) MONITOR LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION ACTIVITIES.

(E) COMPTROLLER (J05)

1) PROVIDE IN-COUNTRY OPERATION FUNDING.

2) INDIVIDUAL TEAM MEMBER TRAVEL AND PER DIEM FUNDED PER FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:

A) JTF-FA FUNDS TRAVEL AND PER DIEM FOR JTF-FA PERSONNEL.

B) ALL OTHER TRAVEL AND PER DIEM FUNDED BY PARENT ORGANIZATIONS.

C) FUNDING FOR AMC SAAMS PROVIDED FROM EXISTING USAF FUNDS.

(F) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE (J06). NO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) NEGOTIATED FOR OPERATION.

(G) COMMAND SURGEON (J07). COORDINATE WITH COMSOPAC FOR FOUR (18D) SPECIAL FORCES MEDICS. COORDINATE WITH HQPACAF FOR ONE INDEPENDENT DUTY TECHNICIAN (IDT).

(H) DIRECTOR, COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (J6).

1) COORDINATE WITH COMMARFORPAC TO PROVIDE FOUR COMMUNICATION SPECIALISTS FOR RECOVERY TEAMS.

2) MONITOR COMM REQUIREMENTS AND MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATION. ENCRYPTION IS NOT REQUIRED.

(2) CINCPACFLT. BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT JTF-FA, UIC R33011, HIGH PRIORITY (O-2) REQUISITIONS IN MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS THROUGH FLEET AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER, PEARL HARBOR. URGENT OR WALK THROUGH REQUISITIONS WILL BE GIVEN HIGHEST PRIORITY PROCESSING MEANS AVAILABLE.

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- (3) HQ PACAF
 - (A) COORDINATE AND SCHEDULE ALL USAF SAAM ACFT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.
 - (B) COORDINATE WITH CINCPAC JO7 TO PROVIDE ONE INDEPENDENT DUTY TECHNICIAN (IDT).
 - (C) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION.
 - (4) COMMARFORPAC: COORDINATE WITH USCINCPAC J6 TO PROVIDE FOUR COMMUNICATION SPECIALISTS TO SUPPORT RECOVERY TEAMS.
 - (5) CDR USARPAC
 - (A) BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT JTF-FA, UIC R33011, PERSONNEL WITH ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT (OCIE) THROUGH CENTRAL ISSUE FACILITY (CIF), SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. CIF WILL ALLOW JTF-FA AUGMENTEES MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO ISSUE AND TURN-IN OCIE. CIF WILL TRANSFER OCIE TO JTF-FA J4 FOR HOST NATION TEAM MEMBERS IN SUPPORT OF THIS OPERATION.
 - (6) CDRUSACILHI
 - (A) PROVIDE SIX RECOVERY TEAMS AND ONE UNDERWATER RECOVERY TEAM.
 - (B) PROVIDE TWO IDTS FOR RECOVERY TEAMS.
 - (C) PROVIDE GENERAL AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TO INCLUDE GROUND PENETRATING RADAR (GPR) AND METAL DETECTORS.
 - (D) COORDINATE LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS WITH DETACHMENT ONE 14 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF DEPLOYMENT FROM HAWAII FOR ANY SPECIAL EQUIPMENT/SUPPLIES NEEDED AT U'TAPHAO WAREHOUSE FOR PALLET BUILDING.
 - (F) IDENTIFY TRAIL PARTY TO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT
- //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

RMKS/

MAINTENANCE IN HANOI. SUBMIT NAMES TO JTF-FA/J3 NLT 20 FEB 96.

(G) PROVIDE TEAM ROSTERS, PASSPORT DATA AND PALLET LOAD PLANS TO JTF-FA/J3/AIR NLT 20 FEB 96.

(H) COORDINATE WITH DETACHMENTS ONE AND TWO TO PRE-POSITION RE1 AND RE2 GEAR ON 18 MAR 96 CHANNEL FLIGHT TO HANOI.

(7) CDRSOPAC

(A) COORDINATE WITH USCINCPAC JO7 TO PROVIDE FOUR (18D) SPECIAL FORCES MEDICS.

(8) JTF-FA/J2. PROVIDE DETACHMENT TWO AND THREE WITH NAMES, LOCATIONS, AND LEADS OF SRV WITNESSES TO BE INTERVIEWED IN PREPARATION OF TRI-LATERAL OPERATIONS IN LAOS DURING 96-4L.

(9) JTF-FA/J3. PROVIDE THREE PERSONNEL TO MAN DETACHMENT TWO'S EOC FOR DURATION OF JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY. IN ADDITION, PROVIDE TWO COMMUNICATION SPECIALISTS TO SUPPORT RECOVERY TEAMS.

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(10) JTF-FA/J4. COORDINATE ELECTRONIC TRANSFER OF ADVANCE HOST NATION REIMBURSEMENT, \$200,000, TO VIETNAM OFFICE FOR SEEKING MISSING PERSONS VIETNAM BANK ACCOUNT.

(11) DETACHMENT ONE, BANGKOK, THAILAND

(A) COORDINATE DIPLOMATIC AND LANDING CLEARANCE FOR THAI, LAO AND SRV AIRSPACE FOR ALL AIRCRAFT SUPPORTING 40TH JFA.

(B) COORDINATE VISA REQUESTS WITH THE SRV EMBASSY IN BANGKOK, THAILAND.

(C) PROVIDE 50 CASES OF WATER FOR TEAMS IN PATTAYA, THAILAND.

(D) IN COORDINATION WITH JTF-FA/J4, PROVIDE 16 CASES OF MRE FOR EMERGENCY USE ONLY.

(E) COORDINATE HOTEL RESERVATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION FOR TEAM WHILE IN THAILAND.

(F) RECONFIRM COMMERCIAL AIR TRAVEL FROM BANGKOK TO HAWAII.

(G) COORDINATE WITH CDR DETACHMENT TWO AND TRANSMIT SUMMARY REPORT VIA E-MAIL TO JTF-FA HQ FOR RELEASE.

(H) COORDINATE WITH 633 AMSS PERSONNEL AT U'TAPHAO FOR FORKLIFT SUPPORT IN DA NANG ON 1 APR 96 AND 16 APR 96.

(12) DETACHMENT TWO, HANOI, VIETNAM

(A) COORDINATE HOTEL RESERVATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION FOR TEAM WHILE IN SRV.

(B) PREPOSITION RECOVERY EQUIPMENT FOR SEVEN RE'S.

(C) SERVE AS COMMAND POST FOR OPERATION.

(D) MAINTAIN A 24 HOUR EOC FOR DURATION OF JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY.

(E) MONITOR HF THROUGHOUT DURATION OF OPERATION.

(F) DEVELOP WATER PLAN.

(G) COMPLETE ALL REPORTS IN BANGKOK PRIOR TO TEAM LEADERS RETURNING TO HAWAII; TRANSMIT SUMMARY REPORT FROM BANGKOK TO JTF-FA HQ FOR RELEASE. TEAM LEADERS WILL RELEASE DRI'S FROM HQ JTF-FA.

(H) COORDINATE WITH VNOSMP AND DETACHMENT THREE PERSONNEL FOR INTERVIEW OF SRV WITNESSES CRUCIAL TO TRI-LATERAL OPERATIONS IN LAOS DURING 96-4L. INTERVIEWS FOR 96-4L WILL BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO 30 APR 96. COORDINATE WITH JTF-FA/J2 AND DETACHMENT THREE FOR NAMES AND LOCATIONS OF WITNESSES REQUIRED FOR 96-4L. PROVIDE JTF-FA J3 STATUS ON THE COORDINATION OF WITNESSES NLT 20 APR 96 FOR 96-4L. SEE ANNEX E.

(I) COORDINATION AND DETACHMENT REQUIREMENTS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH JTF-FA TRILATERAL OPERATIONS SOP DATED 8 FEB 95.

(J) COORDINATE FOR SIX 5-TON TRUCKS AND ONE 1-

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TON CRANE TO BE AT DANANG AIRPORT FOR URE EQUIPMENT.

(13) DETACHMENT THREE, VIENTIANE, LAOS.

(A) COORDINATE WITH DETACHMENT TWO REGARDING PREPARATION, MOVEMENT, AND INTERVIEW OF SRV WITNESSES DESCRIBED ABOVE.

(B) COORDINATION AND DETACHMENT REQUIREMENTS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH JTF-FA TRILATERAL OPERATIONS SOP DATED 8 FEB 95.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) PASSPORT. ATTACHED PERSONNEL AND ALTERNATES MUST HAVE A VALID PASSPORT. UNITS PROVIDE NAMES, SSNS, UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT, TELEPHONE NUMBER, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH AND PASSPORT DATA FOR ALL PERSONNEL AUGMENTATIONS AND ALTERNATES DESIGNATED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS TO JTF-FA/J3 NLT 20 FEB 96.

(2) AUGMENTEES MUST FAX A COPY OF THEIR ORDERS TO JTF-FA HQ'S BY 27 FEB 96.

(3) AUGMENTEES MUST BE IN TOP PHYSICAL CONDITION. THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO OPERATE UNDER RIGOROUS FIELD CONDITIONS AND CARRY A HEAVY RUCKSACK FOR EXTENDED DISTANCES IN RUGGED MOUNTAINOUS AND JUNGLE TERRAIN.

(4) ALL PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY WITH FIVE ADDITIONAL PASSPORT PHOTOGRAPHS.

(5) AUGMENTEES WILL REPORT TO JTF-FA CAMP SMITH, HI NLT 10 MAR 96.

(6) DEPLOYING PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMMUNIZATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT INTO VIETNAM: PLAGUE, JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS, TYPHOID, IMMUNE SERUM GLOBULIN OR HEPATITIS A VACCINE (HAVRIX), ORAL POLIO BOOSTER, IPPD (BEFORE DEPLOYMENT AND 8-12 WEEKS AFTER REDEPLOYMENT), RABIES AND TETANUS-DIPHTHERIA (WITHIN 5 YEARS). MALARIA PROPHYLAXIS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED BY JTF-FA MEDICAL PERSONNEL.

(7) ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYING ON 40TH JFA ARE AUTHORIZED CIVILIAN CLOTHING ALLOWANCE (CCA), IMMINENT DANGER PAY (IDP), TWO MONTHS OF FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION, AND FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOWANCE (FSA).

(8) DATE OF OPERATION FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/
RMKS/

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT MADE BY USCINCPAC.

(9) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED.

(10) POC'S THIS HEADQUARTERS ARE LTC DOCHNAL, USA J3/CPT MAUSOLF, USA, DSN 477-3131/2531, FAX (808) 477-5501.//

GENTEXT/4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS/

A. GENERAL. CONCEPT OF SERVICE SUPPORT: SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROVIDED FROM ASSETS ORGANIC TO PARENT UNITS. SEE ANNEX D

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(ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS). EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
TO BE PALLETIZED BY TEAM PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT AND WILL
ACCOMPANY TEAM INTO COUNTRY ON SAAM ACFT.
B. SERVICE SUPPORT. SEE ANNEX D.//

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
 ITEM NO=00120554
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS081 MCN = 96155/22119 TOR = 961551933
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS3634 1551933-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
 HEADER
 R 031933Z JUN 96
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 040722Z JUN 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//CL-1/SV-3A//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 BT
 CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J2//
 SUBJ/REVIEW OF VIETNAM ERA IMAGERY//
 RMKS/1. IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER 1996, JOINT TASK FORCE
 FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA) LAOS ANALYST MR. WILLIAM L. FORSYTH (GS-
 12) WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO DIA TO CONTINUE RESEARCH OF VIETNAM
 ERA IMAGERY FOR CASES INVOLVING UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUALS IN
 LAOS AND VIETNAM. THE TWO PREVIOUS REVIEWS HAVE PROVEN VERY
 PRODUCTIVE AND THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY DIA HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING.
 2. DURING THE MARCH 1996 REVIEW, MR. GEORGE MORGAN OF DIA
 SUGGESTED JTF-FA REQUEST PREDICTED COVERAGE LISTINGS FROM WHICH
 TO SELECT THE SPECIFIC IMAGERY FOR RESEARCH. LISTED BELOW ARE
 THE TEN CASE LOCATIONS FOR WHICH WE REQUIRE PREDICTED IMAGERY
 COVERAGE LISTINGS FOR THIS REVIEW. REQUEST DIA PROVIDE THESE
 LISTINGS TO JTF-FA BY 1 JULY 1996. ONCE THE COVERAGES ARE
 SELECTED, A MESSAGE LISTING THE CASE, MISSION, DATE, SENSOR,
 FRAME, AND DIA FILE NUMBER OF THE REQUIRED IMAGERY WILL BE SENT
 TO DIA AT LEAST 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE IMAGERY REVIEW BY THE JTF-FA
 ANALYST AT DIA. THE CASES, PURPOSE, COORDINATE AND IMAGERY DATE
 RANGES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. CASE 1802: ON 23 MARCH 1972 THIS F4D WAS SHOT DOWN
 RESULTING IN TWO INDIVIDUALS UNACCOUNTED FOR. A JOINT TEAM
 SURVEYED AN F4 CRASH SITE AT 48QXC821848/160816N1064212E THAT MAY
 BE THE CRASH SITE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE; HOWEVER, CLUSTER
 BOMB ORDNANCE AT THE SITE PREVENTED A DETAILED SURVEY OF THE SITE
 AND THE CRASH SITE COULD NOT BE CORRELATED TO A SPECIFIC
 INCIDENT. IMAGERY IS REQUIRED TO CONFIRM WHEN THE AIRCRAFT AT
 THIS SITE CRASHED AND TO DETERMINE IF IT I THE CASE 1802
 AIRCRAFT.

- (1) COORDINATE: 160816N1064212E
- (2) DATES: 1 MARCH 1971 TO 1 MARCH 1973

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B. CASE DATA : THIS ~~DATA~~ AIRCRAFT WITH ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUAL REPORTEDLY CRASHED ON ~~IN~~ IN A REMOTE AREA ON THE LAO/VIETNAM BORDER, NEAR THE MU GIA PASS IN THE VICINITY OF 48QWE780515/ 173901N1054408E. A JOINT TEAM SEARCHED A LIMITED AREA AROUND THE RECORD COORDINATE IN JANUARY 1995, BUT COULD NOT LOCATE THE CRASH SITE. THE TEAM REPORTED THE AREA WAS FAIRLY OPEN AND IT IS POSSIBLE THE CRASH SITE MAY BE VISIBLE ON IMAGERY.

(1) COORDINATE: 173901N1054408E

(2) DATES: 1 JANUARY 1969 TO 1 JANUARY 1971

C. CASE 1519: ON 12 NOVEMBER 1969, THIS F4D WITH A CREW OF TWO CRASHED IN THE VICINITY OF 48QWE735183/172102N1054131E. THE CRASH SITE LOCATION APPEARS TO BE EXTREMELY WELL DOCUMENTED AND IS IN A FAIRLY OPEN AREA; HOWEVER, WHEN A TEAM INVESTIGATED THE CASE IN OCTOBER 1994, VILLAGERS IN THE AREA DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRASH SITE AND A SEARCH OF THE AREA FAILED TO LOCATE ANY WRECKAGE. THE CRASH SITE SHOULD BE DISCERNIBLE ON IMAGERY.

(1) COORDINATE: 172102N1054131E

(2) DATES: 1 NOVEMBER 1968 TO 1 NOVEMBER 1970

D. CASE 1206: ON 9 JUNE 1968, THIS HH3E JOLLY GREEN GIANT HELICOPTER WITH A CREW OF FOUR CRASHED IN THE NORTHERN ASHAU VALLEY IN THE VICINITY OF 48QYD235100/162144N1070534E WHILE ATTEMPTING THE RESCUE OF A MARINE A4 PILOT. THE CRASH SITE REPORTEDLY WAS IN AN OPEN AREA, WITH PORTIONS OF THE TAIL AND ROTOR REMAINING. INVESTIGATIONS IN THE AREA BY JTF-FA HAVE FAILED TO LOCATE THE CRASH SITE. THE CRASH SITE MAY BE DISCERNIBLE ON IMAGERY.

(1). COORDINATE: 162144N1070534E

(2). DATES: 9 JUNE 1968 TO 9 JUNE 1969

E. CASE DATA : TWO TOURISTS, ONE AMERICAN AND ONE AUSTRALIAN, WHERE CAPTURED BY THE PATHET LAO ON AND REPORTEDLY DIED IN CAPTIVITY IN ABOUT DECEMBER 1974. IN JANUARY 1996, A LAOTIAN WHO REPORTEDLY BURIED THE TWO INDIVIDUALS LED A TEAM TO THE BURIAL SITE. HE SAID THE BODIES WERE BURIED IN THE BOTTOM OF A BOMB CRATER; THE AREA HAS SINCE BEEN GRADED AND THE CRATER IS NO LONGER VISIBLE. THE GRAVE SITE IS REPORTEDLY AT 48QWF13822800/ 182036N1050751E; IMAGERY IS NEEDED TO VERIFY THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE CRATER FOR LATER EXCAVATION.

(1) COORDINATE: 182036N1050751E

(2) 1 JANUARY 1973 TO 1 DECEMBER 1976

F. CASE 0079: CAPTAIN CHARLES SHELTON, WHO UNTIL LAST YEAR WAS CARRIED AS THE LAST POW IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WAS CAPTURED BY THE PATHET LAO ON 29 APRIL 1965 AFTER HIS RF-101C WAS HIT BY ENEMY GROUND FIRE. CAPTAIN SHELTON WAS HELD IN A CAVE NEAR VIENGXAI LAOS, WHERE HE REPORTEDLY DIED SEVEN OR EIGHT MONTHS AFTER HIS CAPTURE. IN AUGUST 1995, TWO FORMER PATHET LAO SOLDIERS LED A JOINT TEAM TO THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE OF CAPT SHELTON AT 48QVH153805970/202608N1041119E. THE SITE WAS EXCAVATED, BUT NO REMAINS WERE FOUND. DISTURBANCE OF THE SOIL TO THE DEPTH OF THE GRAVE DESCRIBED BY THE WITNESSES INDICATES THE GRAVE HAD BEEN EXHUMED BY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS. REPORTING SUGGESTS LAO OFFICIALS MAY HAVE EXHUMED THE GRAVE IN 1977.

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IMAGERY IS REQUIRED TO CONFIRM WHEN THE GRAVE WAS EXHUMED.
(NOTE: THE REPORTED GRAVE SITE OF CASE 0084 WILL ALSO BE
RESEARCHED ON THIS SAME IMAGERY.)

(1) COORDINATE: 202608N1041119E

(2) 29 APRIL 1965 TO 1 NOVEMBER 1991 (ANY CLASSIFICATION
IS ACCEPTABLE)

G. CASE 0343: ON 18 MAY 1966, AN O1F FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER
AIRCRAFT WITH TWO UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUALS WAS SHOT DOWN IN
THE VICINITY OF 48QXE256083/171528N1061054E. A JTF-FA
INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN THIS AREA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
A VIETNAMESE WITNESS WHO REPORTEDLY BURIED ONE OF THE CREWMEMBERS
WAS FOUND AND BROUGHT INTO LAOS IN JANUARY 1996; HOWEVER, DUE TO
THE HEAVY BOMBING OF THE AREA SINCE 1966, HE WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE
THE AREA WHERE HE WAS STATIONED AND THE BURIAL SITE. THE
VIETNAMESE WITNESS DESCRIBED THE CAVE HE LIVED IN AS BEING AT THE
BASE OF A KARST, WITH FIELDS AND ORCHARDS AT THE FRONT OF THE
CAVE. HE ASSURED THE TEAM THAT IF HE COULD FIND THIS CAVE, HE
SHOULD BE ABLE TO LOCATE THE GRAVE SITE. IMAGERY FROM THIS TIME
PERIOD SHOULD BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THIS AREA DUE TO THE UNIQUE
FEATURES DESCRIBED BY THE VIETNAMESE WITNESS.

(1) COORDINATE: 171528N1061054E

(2) DATES: 1 JANUARY 1965 TO 31 DECEMBER 1968.

H. CASE 1779: ON 23 NOVEMBER 1971, AN F4E WITH A CREW OF
TWO CRASHED WHILE ON A NIGHT ESCORT MISSION IN XEKONG PROVINCE,
LAOS. ON 27 NOVEMBER 1971, A PROBABLE CRASH CRATER WAS SIGHTED
AND IMAGED BY TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. IN MARCH 1995, A
JOINT TEAM SURVEYED THE CRATER AT 48PYC088079/152624N1065646E AND
FOUND A LIMITED AMOUNT OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE WHICH COULD NOT BE
CORRELATED TO A SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT OR CASE. IMAGERY IS REQUIRED
TO DATE THE CRATER AND DETERMINE IF IT IS IN FACT THE CRASH SITE
OF THE CASE 1779 AIRCRAFT.

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/REVIEW OF VIETNAM ERA IMAGERY//

RMKS/

(1) COORDINATE: 152624N1065646E

(2) DATES: 1 NOVEMBER 1970 TO 23 NOVEMBER 1971

I. CASE 0070: ON 7 APRIL 1965, A B57B WITH A CREW OF TWO
DISAPPEARED WHILE CONDUCTING A STRIKE MISSION IN XIANGKHOANG
PROVINCE, LAOS. ON 14 APRIL 1965, A TOKYO NEWSPAPER ARTICLE
REPORTED A B57 HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN OVER PHOU PHA NIEM ON 7 APRIL.
JOINT TEAMS HAVE INVESTIGATED THE AREA WHERE THE AIRCRAFT
DISAPPEARED AND SEVERAL POTENTIAL AREAS NAMED PHOU PHA NIEM, ALL
WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. RECENT REPORTING SUGGESTS A WITNESS WHO
ASSISTED WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1534, WHICH IS NEAR BAN
KHANG PHA NIEM 48QUG793579/193049N1035058E, ALSO KNEW ABOUT A
1965 CRASH SITE IN THE AREA, WHICH HE HAD NOT TOLD THE TEAM
ABOUT. IMAGERY OF THE BAN KHANG PHA NIEM AREA NEAR THE TIME OF
THE INCIDENT MAY SHOW THE CRASH SITE LOCATION.

(1) COORDINATE: 193049N1035058E

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(2) DATES: 1 OCTOBER 1964 TO 30 APRIL 1966

J. CASE 1955: ON 20 DECEMBER 1972, A B52D WITH A CREW OF SIX WAS HIT BY AN SA-2 MISSILE NEAR HANOI. TWO CREW MEMBERS WERE CAPTURED AND FOUR ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR. TWO VIETNAMESE BOOKS REFERENCE A 20 DECEMBER 1972 CRASH NEAR VAN THANG VILLAGE (48QWJ420495/211454N1052417E), JUST EAST OF HANOI. IMAGERY IS NEEDED TO DATE THE CRATER.

(1) COORDINATE: 211454N1052417E

(2) DATES: 20 DECEMBER 1971 TO 30 JANUARY 1973

3. JTF-FA POINT OF CONTACT IS MR. BILL FORSYTH COMM 808-477-2101, DSN 315-477-2101. SHIP MATERIALS TO SSO USCINCPAC WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO PASS TO JTF-FA J2 SCIF, CAPT WIMBISH 477-2551.//
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INQUIRE=DOC34D

ITEM NO=00493608

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS773 MCN = 96109/32645 TOR = 961092019

OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1865 1092020-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O 182020Z APR 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL

RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//

RUEALGX/SAFE

O R 181528Z APR 96

FM CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PED-F//

TO RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP//

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC //USDP-ISA/DPMO//

RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC//PA/PA-DPL//

RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RHWRVA/HQ AFSVA RANDOLPH AFB TX//SVOM//

RHWRMPC/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//

RUWMEFA/60SVS TRAVIS AFB CA//SVD//

RHCUAAA/HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//MWX//

RUWMEFA/60MAW TRAVIS AFB CA//CVX//

RUENMED/BUMED WASHINGTON DC//332//

RUCAGLK/MEDDEN AFFAIRS GREAT LAKES IL//03B2//

RUEACNP/BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS-663B//

RUENAAA/CHINFO WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-3//

RUHPHQA/CDRJTTF-FA HONOLULU HI

RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOF//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//MHP-10//

RUWGTEC/COMNAVBASE SAN FRANCISCO CA

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS FOUO

BODY

SUBJ: IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS

A. MEMO, TAPC-PED-H, 6 NOV 95, SUBJ: PROPOSED IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS.

1. ON 18 APR 96 THE ARMED FORCES IDENTIFICATION REVIEW BOARD (AFIRB) APPROVED THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE FOLLOWING REMAINS:

PROC NUMBER	NAME	RANK	SERVICE	REF NO.
CILHI 0110-86	BEGLEY, BURRISS NELSON	COL	USAF	0542 0 01

2. UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, COORDINATE SHIPMENT OF REMAINS TO USAF MORTUARY TRAVIS AFB, CA.

3. DO NOT MAKE PUBLIC RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION IN THIS MESSAGE

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UNTIL DIRECTED BY DPMO BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

4. PROTECTIVE MARKING AUTO REMOVED IAW SEC 4-5000, AR 340-17.

ADMIN

BT

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00590549
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS692 MCN = 96122/30617 TOR = 961221938
 PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS5426 1221938-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
 HEADER
 P 011938Z MAY 96
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
 RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 P 292230Z APR 96 ZYB
 FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J30-O//
 TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/BCLTV//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI
 RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
 RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
 RUHPHQA/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
 RUHVAAA/CDR USACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 BT
 CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 BODY
 MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC J30-O//
 SUBJ/17 MAY 96 POW-MIA TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI//
 POC/OLSON/MAJ/USCINCPAC J33/LOC:CAMP SMITH, HI/TEL:808 477-3290
 /TEL:FAX 808 477-0314//
 POC/THEODOSAKIS/MAJ/JTF-FA JS/LOC:CAMP SMITH, HI/TEL:808 477-5711//
 RMKS/1. PROPOSE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS FOR POW-MIA TECHNICAL
 MEETING SCHEDULED 17 MAY 96 IN HANOI. WILL REVISE THIS SCRIPT TO
 REFLECT DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRING AFTER RELEASE OF THIS MESSAGE.
 REQUEST JOINT STAFF CLEARLY INDICATE CHANGES TO FACILITATE REVISING
 FINAL SCRIPT. REQUEST INPUTS NLT 10 MAY 96.
 2. PROPOSED TALKING POINTS.
 A. MR. CHINH {OR MR. PHONG} AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE VIETNAMESE
 TEAM, I AM PLEASED TO MEET WITH YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS OUR ONGOING
 EFFORTS. I WOULD LIKE TO START BY THANKING YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT OF
 THE U.S. HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION. THIS VISIT WAS AN EXCELLENT
 OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
 THE EXTENT OF OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
 B. LET ME BEGIN WITH SUMMARIZING OUR EFFORTS TO RECOVER AND
 IDENTIFY REMAINS.

(1) DURING THE RECENTLY COMPLETED 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY,

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THE JOINT TEAMS RECOVERED AND RECEIVED REMAINS POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH SIX CASES. IN ONE OTHER INSTANCE, REMAINS WERE OBTAINED THAT WERE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY CASE.

(2) THESE SEVEN REMAINS, AND OTHERS ACQUIRED OUTSIDE THE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY, WILL BE EXAMINED BY OUR SPECIALISTS DURING THE JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW. THE REMAINS SELECTED FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS AT CILHI WILL BE REPATRIATED ON 10 JUNE.

(3) SINCE OUR LAST MEETING ON 29 FEBRUARY 1996, THE ARMED FORCES IDENTIFICATION REVIEW BOARD APPROVED THE IDENTIFICATION OF COLONEL BURRIS N. BEGLEY, CASE 0542. THE REMAINS OF COLONEL BEGLEY WERE UNILATERALLY RECOVERED AND REPATRIATED ON 26 NOVEMBER 1986. OF NOTE, COLONEL BEGLEY WAS ONE OF THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS WE PASSED TO YOUR GOVERNMENT THIS JANUARY. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP ON THIS CASE AND DO NOT REQUIRE ANY FURTHER ACTION BY YOUR SIDE. THIS FOLDER CONTAINS THE BASIC DATA FOR THIS CASE, ALONG WITH THE PERTINENT ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND DENTAL SUMMARIES.

(4) IN JANUARY, SRCOL BIEN REQUESTED WE PROVIDE THE STATUS OF REMAINS RECOVERED AND REPATRIATED TO THE UNITED STATES SINCE THESE EVENTS BEGAN IN 1974. MR. HELGESEN, OF THE CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY IN HAWAII, REVIEWED THE CASE FILES ON ALL REMAINS REPATRIATED AND PRODUCED A DOCUMENT SUMMARIZING THE STATUS OF EACH CASE. THIS FOLDER CONTAINS THAT REPORT. WE WELCOME ANY COMMENTS YOU HAVE CONCERNING THE DATA PROVIDED. OF NOTE, MOST OF THE UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS ARE SPARSELY REPRESENTED AND HAVE VERY LIMITED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR RECOVERY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU HAVE ON THESE DIFFICULT CASES, SINCE ADDITIONAL SPECIFICS ON THE RECOVERIES MAY ALLOW US TO NARROW THE LIST OF POTENTIAL CANDIDATES TO CONSIDER FOR IDENTIFICATION.

(5) DURING OUR LAST MEETING WE REQUESTED ACCESS TO THE FILES HELD BY DR. VU NGOC THU, DIRECTOR OF THE PAVN INSTITUTE OF FORENSIC MEDICINE, REGARDING REMAINS REPATRIATED TO THE UNITED STATES. AT THE TIME, YOU STATED YOU WOULD CONSULT WITH DR. THU AND MAKE THE RECORDS AVAILABLE FOR OUR REVIEW. SINCE WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT DR. THU'S FILES COULD PROVIDE VITAL INFORMATION ON REPATRIATED, BUT NOT YET IDENTIFIED REMAINS, WE RENEW OUR REQUEST TO REVIEW THESE RECORDS.

C. I WOULD NOW LIKE TO BRIEFLY DISCUSS AN ONGOING U.S. GOVERNMENT RESEARCH PROJECT IN WASHINGTON D.C. WHICH RESULTED FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW. OUR EXPERTS HAVE IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF ISSUES REGARDING THE RECOVERY OF AMERICAN REMAINS ABOUT WHICH WE BELIEVE YOUR SPECIALISTS CAN PROVIDE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION. ADDITIONALLY, WE BELIEVE ACCESS TO DR. THU'S REMAINS RECORDS WILL PROVIDE VITAL INFORMATION FOR THIS RESEARCH PROJECT. I PROPOSE THAT OUR EXPERTS DISCUSS OUR QUESTIONS WITH DR. THU AND YOUR OTHER EXPERTS DURING WORKING LEVEL MEETINGS STARTING ON 4 AUGUST. OUR QUESTIONS WILL FOCUS ON DOCUMENTS, REMAINS RECOVERED, REMAINS NOT RECOVERED, AND REPORTING ON REMAINS. OUR EXPERTS WILL DEVELOP A SPECIFIC LIST OF QUESTIONS REGARDING THOSE ISSUES, WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU IN JULY.

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THIS WILL ALLOW YOUR SPECIALISTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW OUR QUESTIONS AND DEVELOP AS MANY ANSWERS AS POSSIBLE PRIOR TO THE AUGUST MEETINGS. OUR EXPERTS WILL REMAIN IN HANOI FOR SEVERAL DAYS, IF NECESSARY, TO COMPLETE THE DISCUSSIONS.

D. WE THANK YOU FOR CONTINUING THE ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS ON A REGULAR BASIS. WE HAVE OBSERVED AN EVEN GREATER WILLINGNESS BY OHP WITNESSES TO BE FORTHCOMING AND OPEN WITH OUR INTERVIEWERS. BOTH VNOSMP MEMBERS AND WITNESSES HAVE CITED RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN US-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS AS THE REASON FOR THIS ENHANCED SPIRIT OF COOPERATION. WE AGREE WITH THAT ANALYSIS AND APPRECIATE THAT THE ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM HAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE WITNESSES WITH GENERAL BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ON U.S. LOSS-RELATED SUBJECTS. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR RENEWED THOROUGHNESS IN PLANNING AND THE FOUR UNILATERAL OHP REPORTS RECENTLY TURNED OVER.

E. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR DILIGENT UNILATERAL EFFORTS IN INVESTIGATING CASES 0021, 0096, 0097, 0341, 0732, AND 1819. WE HAVE REVIEWED AND ANALYZED THE REPORTS YOU PROVIDED ON 18 JANUARY 1996. THIS FOLDER PROVIDES OUR COMMENTS ON YOUR REPORTS AND OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIONS REMAINING ON THESE CASES.

F. AT OUR LAST MEETING, WE PROVIDED YOU A LIST OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES FROM PREVIOUS TECHNICAL MEETINGS. WE THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO MEET WITH PERSONNEL FROM DETACHMENT TWO FROM 2-4 MAY TO SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEW THE LIST AND NOTE THE PROGRESS MADE ON EACH POINT. THAT MEETING WAS A SUCCESSFUL START TO ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES. WE REQUEST THAT WE CONTINUE TO HOLD WORKING-LEVEL MEETINGS DURING THE PERIODS BETWEEN JFA'S IN ORDER TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. {WILL BE UPDATED IF NECESSARY AFTER THE 2-4 MAY MEETINGS}

G. ON 27 APRIL 1989, VIETNAM PROVIDED TWELVE BOXES OF REMAINS WITH ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS FOR REPATRIATION TO THE UNITED STATES. DURING A CONVERSATION WITH MR. FLANAGAN, MR. HO XUAN DICH STATED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM THE PHUONG SON AREA WHICH
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
SUBJ/17 MAY 96 POW-MIA TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI//
RMKS/

INDICATED THAT THE REMAINS OF *NAME* WERE INCLUDED AMONG THOSE THEN REPATRIATED. MR. DICH STATED THAT THE REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH *NAME* COULD BE LOCATED IN EITHER BOX THREE, BOX EIGHT, BOX ELEVEN, OR BOX TWELVE. SINCE *NAME* CASE *DATA* CONTINUES TO BE UNACCOUNTED FOR, WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE BASIS OF MR. DICH'S STATEMENT. WHAT SPECIFIC INFORMATION OR DOCUMENTATION DID MR. DICH RECEIVE FROM THE PHUONG SON AREA THAT ALLOWED HIM TO DETERMINE WHICH BOXES MIGHT CONTAIN *NAME* REMAINS? ADDITIONALLY, WE WOULD LIKE A COPY OF ANY DOCUMENTATION PERTAINING TO THE LOCATION AT WHICH THE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED.

H. ON 14 JANUARY 1996, THE VIETNAM NEWS PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE AUTHORED BY LE DUC DUC, ENTITLED "BACK TO TRUONG SON SEARCHING." THE ARTICLE PROVIDES INFORMATION ABOUT PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM

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EFFORTS TO LOCATE AND RECOVER REMAINS OF PAVN SOLDIERS. THE REPORT SPECIFICALLY LISTED THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE REMAINS RECOVERY UNIT, LT COL TRAN QUANG TRUNG, AND UNIT MEMBERS TRAN HUU THANH AND TRAN KIM THANH. WE BELIEVE THAT UNITS SUCH AS THIS COULD HAVE OBTAINED INFORMATION PERTAINING TO AMERICAN LOSSES DURING THEIR RESEARCH. WE REQUEST THAT THE VNOSMP RESEARCH THE ORIGIN OF THIS ARTICLE AND ARRANGE JOINT INTERVIEWS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE INVOLVED IN THESE RECOVERY EFFORTS. WE ARE INTERESTED IN KNOWING HOW THEY LOCATE REMAINS, IF IT IS STANDARD PROCEDURE TO CREMATE ALL REMAINS FOUND, AND IF A REPORT IS MADE OF THEIR FINDINGS. THE NEWSPAPER ARTICLE STATED THAT THE MILITARY UNIT REFERENCED SUFFERS FROM MALARIA. WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE WILLING TO ASSIST THE PAVN RECOVERY EFFORT BY PROVIDING PREVENTATIVE MEDICATIONS TO ITS TEAM MEMBERS.

I. WE HAVE BEGUN TO DEMONSTRATE REAL PROGRESS IN TRILATERAL COOPERATION. DURING THE PAST YEAR, AN EVER-INCREASING NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE VETERANS HAVE COME FORWARD WITH USEFUL INFORMATION WHICH MAY HELP US RESOLVE SOME CASES OF AMERICANS WHO BECAME UNACCOUNTED-FOR IN LAOS. WE ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, WITH THE FREQUENT INABILITY TO DELIVER VIETNAMESE WITNESSES TO THE BORDER CROSSING DURING THE LIMITED TIME FRAMES TO WHICH THE LAO HAVE AGREED. SINCE VIETNAMESE WITNESSES ARE ESSENTIAL TO THESE INVESTIGATIONS, WE ASK THAT YOU RENEW AND REVITALIZE YOUR EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE TRILATERAL PROCESS.

(1) WE WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOUR VETERANS WHO HAVE ALREADY PARTICIPATED IN THE TRILATERAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS. EARLIER THIS MONTH, THE LAO INTERVIEW TEAM MET WITH SEVERAL OF YOUR CITIZENS TO ASSESS THEIR ABILITY TO HELP THE JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATE CASES IN LAOS. EARLIER THIS YEAR, THANKS TO THE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF VIETNAMESE VETERANS, OUR JOINT RECOVERY TEAM COMPLETED THE EXCAVATION OF THE AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0339 WITH POSITIVE RESULTS. WITH YOUR RENEWED EFFORTS, WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE SIMILAR RESULTS DURING THE NEXT TWO TRILATERAL FIELD ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE REQUESTED THAT YOU ASSIST US BY ACCOMPANYING THESE WITNESSES TO THE BORDER IN JUNE, TO SUPPORT THE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN LAOS.

(2) WE ALSO VERY MUCH APPRECIATE THE SUPPORT RECEIVED FROM THE PAVN VETERANS ORGANIZATION, WHICH HAS PROVIDED USEFUL INFORMATION AND POTENTIAL LEADS. WE THEREFORE REQUEST THAT YOU EXPLORE WAYS TO WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH THE PAVN VETERANS ORGANIZATION TO CAPITALIZE ON INFORMATION ITS MEMBERS CAN PROVIDE, WITH EMPHASIS ON CASES IN LAOS.

J. TURNING TO THE RECENTLY COMPLETED 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY, THE JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATED {XX} CASES AND EXCAVATED {XX} SITES. WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS MADE DURING THE 40TH JFA AND COMMEND YOU FOR THE SUPPORT YOU GAVE US IN MOVING TEAMS AND EQUIPMENT THROUGH NOI BAI AND DA NANG AIRPORTS WITH NO PROBLEMS. THIS FOLDER CONTAINS THE SUMMARY REPORT PREPARED FOR THE 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY. {NOTE: WILL UPDATE ABOVE AFTER SUMMARY MSG IS PREPARED.}

(1) OF NOTE, THE UNDERWATER RECOVERY ELEMENT RETRIEVED WRECKAGE OFF THE COAST OF NGHE AN PROVINCE WHICH HAS BEEN CORRELATED TO AN RA-5C, PROBABLY RESOLVED CASE 0247, RATHER THAN

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THE F-4B ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0465. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED OVER NOT FINDING THE WRECKAGE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0465, HOWEVER, WE APPRECIATE THE ASSISTANCE WE RECEIVED IN PLANNING AND CONDUCTING THIS OPERATION, TO INCLUDE GOOD COOPERATION FROM AIRFIELD, PORT, AND CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS. YOUR SUPPORT DURING THE SURVEY AND EXECUTION OF THIS COMPLICATED OPERATION ENSURED ITS SAFE CONDUCT.

(2) WE CONTINUE, HOWEVER, TO HAVE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS REGARDING MATERIAL EVIDENCE ON THIS CASE. WE MUST AGAIN ASK HOW YOU ORIGINALLY ASSOCIATED THIS WRECKAGE WITH CASE 0465, AS YOU STATED DURING THE MARCH AND MAY 1991 TECHNICAL MEETINGS. AT THAT TIME YOU STATED VIETNAMESE DIVERS REMOVED THE TAIL AND WINGS OF THE AIRCRAFT IN 1988. WE NEED TO DETERMINE IF THE RA-5C WHICH WE IDENTIFIED IS THE SAME AIRCRAFT THAT WAS PARTIALLY SALVAGED IN 1988. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS WERE ON THE ITEMS RECOVERED? DID THE SALVAGERS FIND OR RECOVER ANY PERSONAL EFFECTS OR REMAINS? WE AGAIN ASK THAT YOU PURSUE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS, SO THAT WE CAN DETERMINE WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN ON THIS CASE.

(3) ALSO NOTEWORTHY WAS THE RECOVERY OF REMAINS PROBABLY ASSOCIATED WITH PRIORITY CASE 1927. THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR JOINT TEAMS WORKING IN CONJUNCTION WITH YOUR EXCELLENT UNILATERAL EFFORT. IN AUGUST 1995, ONE OF YOUR VETERANS PROVIDED INFORMATION TO DETACHMENT TWO ON POTENTIAL WITNESSES FOR CASE 1927, WHICH LED TO AN INVESTIGATION BY THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM AND YOUR UNILATERAL EFFORTS UNDER COL PHAM TEO. WE ARE ESPECIALLY THANKFUL FOR COL TEO'S WORK IN FINDING THE WITNESSES, WHO WERE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE BURIAL SITE. THIS CASE IS AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF HOW OUR DIFFERENT PROGRAMS, JOINT AND UNILATERAL, WORK EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER TO ACCOMPLISH OUR MISSION.

(4) WE ALSO THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING THE OVERFLIGHT INVESTIGATION OF THREE MOUNTAIN SITES IN THANH SON DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE. YOUR COOPERATION ALLOWED OUR TEAM TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH SEARCH AND COMPLETE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THAT INVESTIGATION.

K. WITH REGARD TO OUR UPCOMING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES, LTC
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/
SUBJ/17 MAY 96 POW-MIA TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI//
RMKS/

BOSSE HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED OUR PLANS FOR THE 41ST JFA, SCHEDULED FOR 1 JULY THROUGH 2 AUGUST 1996.

(1) WE THANK YOU FOR SUPPORTING OUR PROPOSAL TO EMPLOY SIX RECOVERY ELEMENTS, TWO INVESTIGATION ELEMENTS, ONE SPECIAL TEAM, AND THE RESEARCH INVESTIGATION TEAM DURING THE 41ST JFA. THE USE OF THE SPECIAL TEAM WILL HELP RECOUP SOME OF THE TIME LOST BY HAVING ONLY FIVE JFA'S THIS YEAR AND THE SHORTENING OF THE 41ST AND 42ND JFA'S BECAUSE OF THE 8TH PARTY CONGRESS.

(2) WE WILL AGAIN ATTEMPT TO CONDUCT THE RECOVERIES OF

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CASE 1496 IN KONTUM PROVINCE AND UNCORRELATED CASE 9996 IN THUA THIEN-HUE PROVINCE, AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HELP YOU CAN PROVIDE TO FACILITATE WORK ON THESE CASES. WE AGAIN STRESS THE NEED FOR COMPLETION OF ALL ADVANCE WORK TO INCLUDE THE PREPARATION OF IDENTIFIED LANDING ZONES PRIOR TO THE U.S. TEAM'S ARRIVAL IN VIETNAM SO THAT THE JOINT TEAM CAN IMMEDIATELY BEGIN WORK. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT WE KNOW OF ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE ADVANCE TEAM SO THAT WE CAN MAKE ALTERNATE PLANS.

L. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH THE VNOSMP FOR OVER A YEAR TO DETERMINE THE COORDINATES OF TWO LOCATIONS WHERE TWO OF YOUR CITIZENS CROSSED INTO LAOS EN ROUTE TO U.S. CRASH SITES. WE REQUEST THAT YOU USE THE GPS INSTRUMENTS WE PROVIDED TO OBTAIN THESE COORDINATES, SO THAT WE CAN BEGIN JOINT WORK ON THE CRASH SITES ASSOCIATED WITH CASES 1552 AND 1707.

M. AS A RESULT OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS IN THE VIETNAMESE MEDIA, I MUST REITERATE THAT THE U.S. VIEWS THE UNACCOUNTED FOR ISSUE AS BEING STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN. OUR EFFORTS ARE SOLELY FOCUSED ON SEEKING INFORMATION REGARDING THE FATES OF OUR UNACCOUNTED FOR SERVICEMEN. WE HAVE WORKED SCRUPULOUSLY TO MAINTAIN A SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND COOPERATION AND TO RESPECT VIETNAMESE CULTURAL SENSITIVITY, AND HAVE ADJUSTED PLANS TO ENSURE WORK DOES NOT INTRUDE INTO SENSITIVE MILITARY AREAS.

N. WE MUST AGAIN TURN OUR ATTENTION TO THE USE OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. AS WE HAVE MENTIONED BEFORE, RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS IS VITAL TO SUPPORT FIELD OPERATIONS AND ENSURE THE SAFETY OF ALL PERSONNEL. I AM DISAPPOINTED THAT THE NEW VIETNAMESE SATCOM SYSTEM COULD NOT BE TESTED BY MY EXPERTS AND USED DURING THE 40TH JFA. I HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO EVALUATE THE SYSTEM SOON SO THAT WE CAN HAVE A RELIABLE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN PLACE FOR THE 41ST JFA.

O. WE COMPLETED THE THIRD AND FINAL PHASE OF THE PAJERO VEHICLE INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE PLAN ON 9 MAY. THIS PROGRAM HAS BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN ENSURING THAT OUR TEAMS AND VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS HAVE SAFE AND RELIABLE TRANSPORTATION. I WOULD AGAIN LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR COORDINATING THE ENTRY OF AUTOMOTIVE PARTS THROUGH CUSTOMS AND ENSURING THE COOPERATION OF RENCAR V-75.

P. FINALLY, I PROPOSE HOLDING OUR NEXT TECHNICAL MEETING ON THE MORNING OF 8 AUGUST 1996.

Q. BEFORE WE CLOSE TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THIS IS LTC BOSSE'S AND MY FINAL TECHNICAL MEETING, AS WE ARE BOTH DEPARTING THE JOINT TASK FORCE THIS SUMMER. I THANK YOU FOR THE COURTESIES THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT EXTENDED TO ME DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS. I WOULD PERSONALLY LIKE TO THANK MR. CHINH AND SRCOL BIEN FOR THEIR OUTSTANDING WORK WITH OUR JOINT TEAMS AND LOCAL AND PROVINCE OFFICIALS IN SUPPORT OF OUR FIELD OPERATIONS. WITH YOUR APPROVAL, I PROPOSE TO ARRIVE IN HANOI WITH THE NEW JTF-FA COMMANDER ON 29 JUNE TO OBSERVE THE 41ST JFA DEPLOYMENT AND TO MEET WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS ON 1 JULY. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE VNOSMP AND MY SUCCESSOR WILL CONTINUE THE GOOD PROGRESS AND SPIRIT OF COOPERATION WE HAVE ENJOYED.//

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
 ITEM NO=00395054
ENVELOPE
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 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 112109Z JUL 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 100912Z JUL 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
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 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
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 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
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 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP96-019) REPORT: MG VO VAN DAN//
 RMKS/1. SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW: ON 9 APR 96, THE JOINT U.S./VNOSMP
 RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) INTERVIEWED RETIRED MG VO VAN
 DAN, AKA BA HONG, AT THE HO CHI MINH CITY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE.
 MG DAN WAS THE COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALION, PEOPLE'S ARMY OF
 VIETNAM (PAVN) 9TH DIVISION IN SONG BE PROVINCE, AND LATER BECAME
 THE 9TH DIVISION COMMANDER. HE PROVIDED HEARSAY INFORMATION ABOUT
 THREE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN JUN 65. HE DID NOT GO TO ANY OF THE
 CRASH SITES.

A. AT 1300 ONE DAY DURING JUN 65, AFTER THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI,
 3RD BATTALION FORCES STATIONED AT PHU RIENG (NEAR GRID COORDINATE
 48P YT 103 897) SHOT DOWN A POSSIBLE F-105. 3RD BATTALION SOLDIERS
 WENT TO THE CRASH SITE AND DISCOVERED THE BODY OF ONE PILOT. THEY
 BURIED THE BODY ON THE EDGE OF A RUBBER PLANTATION. BATTALION
 SOLDIERS COLLECTED A NUMBER OF PERSONAL ITEMS, INCLUDING A WATCH, A
 COMPASS, AND A BLOOD CHIT. THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH
 UNRESOLVED CASE 0097.

B. LATER THAT SAME DAY, 3RD BATTALION FORCES SHOT DOWN AN L-19.
 MG DAN DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE FATE OF THE CREW. WE CANNOT CORRELATE
 THIS INFORMATION WITH ANY CASE AT THIS TIME.

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C. MG DAN HEARD PAVN FORCES SHOT DOWN A HELICOPTER AT THUAN LOI AIRFIELD (NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 061 818) AFTER THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI IN JUN 65. HE PROVIDED NO OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. WE CANNOT CORRELATE THIS INFORMATION WITH ANY CASE AT THIS TIME.

2. DETAILS OF INTERVIEW:

A. PARTICIPANTS:

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT:

- (A) MSGT RONALD D. WARD, RIT COORDINATOR
- (B) SSGT WILSON R. SIBLEY JR., RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST

(2) VIETNAMESE CONTINGENT:

- (A) COL LE KY (LEE KYR), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE REP
- (B) MS. NGUYEN THI CHIEM (CHIEEM), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REP
- (C) MS. NGUYEN HONG MINH (HOONGF MINH), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR REP
- (D) MR. PHAM MINH HONG (PHAMJ MINH HOONGF), HO CHI MINH CITY TASK TEAM MEMBER
- (E) MR. BUI QUANG PHAP (BUIF QUANG PHAPS), MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HO CHI MINH CITY OFFICE) REP

B. PURPOSE OF INTERVIEW: OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING BATTLES BETWEEN U.S. FORCES AND THE PAVN 9TH DIVISION DURING WHICH U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS BECAME UNACCOUNTED-FOR.

C. WITNESS INTERVIEW: THE JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED MG VO VAN DAN (VOX VAWN ZANF), AKA BA (3) HONG (BA HOONGF), ON 9 APR 96 AT THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE IN HO CHI MINH CITY.

- (1) NAME: MG VO VAN DAN, AKA BA HONG
- (2) AGE: APPROXIMATELY 65 YOA

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE: WARD 25, BINH THANH DISTRICT, HO CHI MINH CITY

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SONG BE PROVINCE AS DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALION, 9TH DIVISION, IN 1965; STATIONED WITH THE 3RD BATTALION UNTIL HE BECAME THE 9TH DIVISION COMMANDER IN 1972.

- (5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED

(6) WITNESS RELIABILITY: EXCELLENT. MG DAN PROVIDED HIS INFORMATION IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. THE JOINT TEAM DID NOT DETECT ANY ATTEMPT BY MG DAN TO MISLEAD THE TEAM IN ANY WAY. THE TEAM JUDGED MG DAN AS A RELIABLE WITNESS; HOWEVER, BECAUSE HE BASED HIS INFORMATION ON HEARSAY, ITS UTILITY IN FINDING THE BURIAL SITE FOR CASE 0097 IS LIMITED.

(7) STATEMENT:

(A) IN 1965, MG DAN WAS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALION, PAVN 9TH DIVISION, WHICH OPERATED IN THE AREA OF PRESENT-DAY SONG BE PROVINCE. THE 3RD BATTALION COMMANDER AT THAT TIME WAS MR. NHU (NHU), AKA CHIN HIEN (CHINS HIEENF). MR. NHU IS A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HO CHI MINH CITY VETERAN'S ASSOCIATION (BAN CHAAPS HANH HOIJ CWUJ CHIEENS BINH THANH PHOOS). THE BATTALION'S POLITICAL OFFICERS HAVE ALL DIED DUE TO DISEASE OR OLD AGE.

(B) BEFORE THE FORMATION OF THE 9TH DIVISION, VARIOUS

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REGIMENTS OPERATED INDEPENDENTLY IN PRESENT DAY SONG BE PROVINCE, NORTH OF HO CHI MINH CITY. AFTER THE SUBORDINATION OF THESE REGIMENTS TO THE 9TH DIVISION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE "LIMITED WAR" (CHIEENS TRANH CUCJ BOOJ), THE DIVISION CLASHED WITH U.S. FORCES MANY TIMES. THE FIRST SERIES OF BATTLES OCCURRED AT PHUOC LONG TOWN (THIJ XAX PHWOC LONG) AND BINH PHUOC (BINHF PHWOC). (NOTE: THE NAMES "PHUOC LONG TOWN" AND "BINH PHUOC VILLAGE" DO NOT EXIST IN THE CURRENT PHUOC LONG DISTRICT {FORMERLY PHUOC LONG PROVINCE}. THE PRESENT PHUOC LONG DISTRICT SEAT IS SON GIANG VILLAGE (XAX SOWN GIANG); THE DISTRICT OFFICES ARE AT GRID COORDINATE 48P YU 178 109. PHUOC BINH VILLAGE IS ROUGHLY CENTERED NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YU 080 060. SEE PAVN 1:100,000 MAP SHEET 6332.) THE SECOND SERIES OF BATTLES OCCURRED IN THE DONG XOAI (DOONGF XOAIF) AREA. (NOTE: DONG XOAI IS CENTERED NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 080 755. DONG XOAI AIRFIELD IS NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 062 755. SEE U.S. 1:50,000 SCALE MAP SHEET 6332 II.) THE THIRD SERIES OF BATTLES WAS NEAR BU DOP (BUF DOOPS). (NOTE: BU DOP AIRFIELD IS NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P XU 976 291. SEE PAVN 1:100,000 MAP SHEET 6333.)

(C) U.S. FORCES SWEEPED THE BATTLEFIELD AFTER EACH BATTLE AND RECOVERED THE BODIES OF DEAD AMERICAN SOLDIERS. MG DAN SAID U.S. FORCES ALSO WANTED TO KEEP PAVN FORCES FROM COLLECTING WAR MATERIEL FOR LATER USE AGAINST THE AMERICANS. THE VIETNAMESE NEVER RECOVERED THE BODIES OF U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS AFTER ANY BATTLES. THE PAVN'S POLICY WAS TO "FIGHT FAST AND WITHDRAW FAST," BECAUSE PAVN FORCES WERE UNABLE TO HOLD THE BATTLEFIELD AFTER A BATTLE.

(D) ACCORDING TO MG DAN, THE 9TH DIVISION NEVER CAPTURED ANY U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS DURING THE WAR. HE ALSO SAID THERE WAS NO POW CAMP IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM AT THAT TIME. IF PAVN FORCES CAPTURED A U.S. SOLDIER, THEY HELD HIM TEMPORARILY FOR A SHORT TIME BEFORE THEY TRANSFERRED THE POW TO NORTH VIETNAM. THE PAVN'S POLICY AFTER THEY CAPTURED POWS WAS TO GIVE WOUNDED POWS MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR THEIR WOUNDS AND TREAT ALL POWS IN A

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP96-019) REPORT: MG VO VAN DAN//
RMKS/

HUMANITARIAN MANNER SO THE POWS WOULD SEE THE "JUSTICE OF THE WAR."

(E) REGARDING PAVN SOLDIERS WHO WERE KILLED IN ACTION, THE 9TH DIVISION DID NOT RECEIVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS FROM UPPER LEVELS CONCERNING THE RECORDING OF BURIAL LOCATIONS UNTIL 1967. AT THAT TIME, UPPER LEVELS REQUIRED THE DIVISION TO MAKE A DIAGRAM OF EACH SOLDIER'S GRAVE AND MARK THE GRAVE IN SOME WAY. IN ADDITION, 3RD BATTALION SOLDIERS CAME UP WITH THE IDEA OF RECORDING THE NAME OF EACH DECEASED SOLDIER ON A PIECE OF PAPER, PUTTING THE PAPER IN AN EMPTY PENICILLIN VIAL, AND BURYING THE VIAL WITH THE BODY. THE DIVISION RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE BURIAL OF THE BODIES OF U.S. SOLDIERS.

(F) IN JUN 65, FORCES FROM THE 2ND BATTALION, PAVN 9TH DIVISION, FOUGHT U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AT DONG XOAI. THE BATTLE AT DONG XOAI LASTED LESS THAN ONE WEEK. DURING THIS TIME,

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THE 3RD BATTALION FOUGHT U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AT PHU RIENG (PHUS RIENG). (NOTE: PHU RIENG AIRFIELD IS NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 103 897.)

((1)) F-105 SHOOT DOWN:

((A)) AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 ON AN UNRECALLED DAY RIGHT AFTER THE BATTLE AT DONG XOAI, 3RD BATTALION FORCES SHOT DOWN A POSSIBLE F-105 USING 12.7MM ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA). MG DAN WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS AN F-105. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED NORTHEAST OF THE BATTALION'S HEADQUARTERS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE PHU RIENG RUBBER PLANTATION. THIS AIRCRAFT WAS THE FIRST AIRCRAFT THE 3RD BATTALION SHOT DOWN. THE PILOT DID NOT EJECT BEFORE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED. AFTER THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, OTHER U.S. AIRCRAFT CAME AND BOMBED THE AREA, BUT MG DAN DID NOT SEE ANY SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) AIRCRAFT. MG DAN RECEIVED A REPORT ABOUT THE AIRCRAFT CRASH, BUT WAS NOT A WITNESS.

((B)) RECONNAISSANCE SOLDIERS FROM THE 3RD BATTALION WENT TO THE CRASH SITE. WHEN THEY RETURNED TO BATTALION HEADQUARTERS, THEY REPORTED THEY HAD BURIED THE BODY OF ONE PILOT AT THE EDGE OF THE RUBBER PLANTATION. THE SOLDIERS HAD ALSO COLLECTED A NUMBER OF ITEMS AT THE CRASH SITE, INCLUDING A BLOOD CHIT, A WATCH, A COMPASS, AND FISHING GEAR.

((C)) MG DAN NEVER WENT TO THE CRASH OR BURIAL SITES AND SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE COORDINATES OF THE BURIAL SITE. HE DID NOT REMEMBER THE NAMES OF ANY OF THE SOLDIERS WHO WENT TO THE SITE AND BURIED THE PILOT.

((D)) BECAUSE HE DID NOT KNOW THE COORDINATES OF THE BURIAL SITE, MG DAN SAID IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND THIS BURIAL SITE. IN ADDITION, HE SAID MANY BATTALION CADRE WERE KILLED AND BURIED IN THE FOREST IN THIS AREA, BUT THE LOCATIONS OF THEIR GRAVES WERE LOST DUE TO CHANGES IN THE TERRAIN.

((2)) ON THE SAME DAY AS THE F-105 INCIDENT, 3RD BATTALION FORCES SHOT DOWN AN L-19 WHICH FLEW OVER THEIR POSITION AT AN ALTITUDE UNDER 2000 METERS. MG DAN DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS A U.S. AIR FORCE, U.S. NAVY, OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT. HE ALSO DID NOT KNOW WHICH AIRFIELD THIS AIRCRAFT HAD TAKEN OFF FROM. HE PROVIDED NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE OF THE CREW.

((3)) MG DAN AND THE 3RD BATTALION COMMANDER, MR. NHU, REPORTED INFORMATION CONCERNING THESE TWO INCIDENTS BY TELEPHONE TO MR. LE TRONG TAN (LEE TRONGJ TAANS) AND MR. TRAN DO (TRAANF DOOJ) AT B2 FRONT HEADQUARTERS. (NOTE: THE TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. TRAN DO, THE FORMER HEAD OF THE B2 FRONT POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, ON 21 AUG 93.)

(G) AFTER THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI, U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES BEGAN LANDING TROOPS AT THUAN LOI (THUANJ LOWIJ) AND PHU RIENG. (NOTE: THUAN LOI AIRFIELD IS NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 061 818.) MG DAN HEARD PAVN FORCES SHOT DOWN A HELICOPTER AT THUAN LOI DURING THIS TIME PERIOD. HOWEVER, HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE OF THE CREW IN THIS INCIDENT.

(H) OTHER THAN THE INCIDENTS MENTIONED ABOVE, MG DAN DID NOT KNOW ABOUT ANY OTHER AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. DURING THE ENTIRE TIME THE PAVN DIRECTLY FOUGHT THE AMERICANS, MG DAN WAS A MEMBER OF THE 3RD BATTALION. IN 1972, MG DAN BECAME THE COMMANDER OF THE 9TH

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DIVISION.

(1) MG DAN PROVIDED THE NAMES OF TWO CAMERAMEN WHO USUALLY FOLLOWED THE 9TH DIVISION: MR. PHAM KHAC (PHAMJ KHAWCS) AND MR. DINH PHONG (DINH PHONG). HE DID NOT KNOW IF THEY FILMED THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI. (NOTE: THE OHP TEAM INTERVIEWED FORMER CAMERAMAN MR. PHAM KHAC, AKA LE MINH, ON 20 JUL 93.)

3. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE

4. COMMENTS:

A. CORRELATIONS:

(1) THE INFORMATION MG DAN PROVIDED IN PARA 2C(7)(F)((1)) ABOUT THE POSSIBLE F-105 INCIDENT POSSIBLY CORRELATES TO UNRESOLVED CASE 0097 BASED ON MONTH AND YEAR OF INCIDENT. ONE INDIVIDUAL IS STILL UNACCOUNTED-FOR. THE ACTUAL AIRCRAFT TYPE FOR THIS CASE IS F-100D. THIS WAS THE ONLY JET AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD IN JUN 65 (SEE COMMENTS, PARA 4C(1), BELOW).

(2) WE CANNOT CORRELATE THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE L-19 INCIDENT IN PARA 2C(7)(F)((2)) TO ANY CASE AT THIS TIME (SEE COMMENTS, PARA 4C(2), BELOW).

(3) THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE HELICOPTER INCIDENT IN PARA 2C(7)(G) IS TOO LIMITED FOR THE TEAM TO CORRELATE WITH ANY CASE AT THIS TIME (SEE COMMENTS, PARA 4C(3), BELOW).

B. POTENTIAL LEADS:

(1) MR. NHU (NHW), AKA CHIN HIEN (CHINS HIEENF), WAS THE FORMER COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALION, 9TH DIVISION. HE IS A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HO CHI MINH CITY VETERAN'S ASSOCIATION (BAN CHAAPS HANHF HOOIJ CWUJ CHIEENS BINH THANH PHOOS).

(2) MR. LE TRONG TAN (LEE TRONGJ TAANS) FORMERLY WORKED AT B2 FRONT HEADQUARTERS. COL KY SAID MR. TAN LATER WAS THE CHIEF OF STAFF (TOONGR THAM MWU TRWONGR) WITH THE RANK OF GENERAL (DAIJ TWONGS). HIS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN.

(3) MR. DINH PHONG (DINH PHONG) WAS A CAMERAMAN WHO WORKED WITH THE 9TH DIVISION. HE POSSIBLE PARTICIPATED IN FILMING THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI. HIS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN.

C. INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS:

(1) BRIGHT LIGHT INDICATES ONLY ONE JET AIRCRAFT CRASHED

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP96-019) REPORT: MG VO VAN DAN//
RMKS/

WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD IN 1965, AN F-100D ASSOCIATED WITH UNRESOLVED CASE 0097 THAT CRASHED ON 12 JUN 65. THE ONLY OTHER JET AIRCRAFT TO CRASH WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD AT ANY TIME WAS AN OPERATIONAL A-37 LOSS ON 4 DEC 69. NO F-105'S CRASHED IN SONG BE PROVINCE DURING THE WAR.

(A) ONE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE INFORMATION MG DAN PROVIDED AND BRIGHT LIGHT IS THE INCIDENT LOCATION. THE CRASH LOCATION FOR CASE 0097 LISTED IN BRIGHT LIGHT, GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 088 795, IS APPROXIMATELY 10.3 KILOMETERS SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD. THE PILOT'S LAST KNOWN LOCATION, GRID

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COORDINATE 48P YT 066 802, IS APPROXIMATELY 10.2 KILOMETERS
SOUTHWEST OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD.

(B) MG DAN ALSO INDICATED HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY
U.S. SAR EFFORTS AFTER THE 3RD BATTALION SHOT DOWN THE POSSIBLE
F-105. BRIGHT LIGHT INDICATES A SAR HELICOPTER LANDED APPROXIMATELY
300 METERS FROM THE DOWNED PILOT ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0097, BUT THE
HELICOPTER WITHDREW WHEN PAVN FORCES FIRED ON IT. HOWEVER, MG DAN
ALSO SAID U.S. AIRCRAFT BOMBED THE AREA AFTER THE CRASH, SO 3RD
BATTALION TROOPS PROBABLY DID NOT SEE THE SAR HELICOPTER BECAUSE THEY
TOOK COVER TO AVOID THE U.S. BOMBING.

(2) BRIGHT LIGHT INDICATES THREE OPERATIONAL O-1 LOSSES
OCCURRED IN JUN 65. BRIGHT LIGHT DOES NOT GIVE GRID COORDINATES FOR
THE CRASH LOCATIONS OF THESE OPERATIONAL LOSSES. NO L-19 LOSSES ARE
LISTED IN BRIGHT LIGHT FOR JUN 65.

(3) BRIGHT LIGHT INDICATES 21 HELICOPTERS CRASHED WITHIN A
15-KILOMETER RADIUS OF THUAN LOI AIRFIELD DURING THE WAR. 20 OF
THESE INCIDENTS ARE OPERATIONAL LOSSES. THE ONLY UNRESOLVED HELI-
COPTER LOSS, CASE 0096, IS ALSO THE ONLY HELICOPTER CRASH IN THIS
AREA THAT OCCURRED IN JUN 65. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE HEARSAY INFORMA-
TION MG DAN PROVIDED IS SO VAGUE, WE CANNOT MAKE A DEFINITE CORRELA-
TION TO CASE 0096 AT THIS TIME.//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
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 CDSN = CFS785 MCN = 96069/04300 TOR = 960690305
 PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS6234 0690304-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 081741Z MAR 96
 FM CDR JTFFA HONOLULU HI
 TO: SAFE
 ZEM

CONTROLS

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BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT FOR CASE 0086//
 //NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

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ZNR UUUUU

P 090304Z MAR 96
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFOCB/OC
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 P 081741Z MAR 96
 FM CDR JTFFA HONOLULU HI
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/PCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
 RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
 RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//
 BT
 UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
 SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTF-FA/-/MAR//
 SUBJ/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT FOR CASE 0086//
 REF: CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 081700Z MAR 95.
 RMKS/1. REFERENCE.

A. REF IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) 96-2C
 CONDUCTED IN THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA (KOC) FROM 8 TO 23 FEBRUARY

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1996.

B. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS BASED ON FIELD ANALYSIS ONLY AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTIC CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION. ON 9 FEBRUARY 1996, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IE1) INTERVIEWED DR. NGUYEN QUOC CHINH ABOUT HIS WARTIME SERVICE AS AN INTERROGATOR IN A VIET CONG PRISONER OF WAR CAMP. HE PROVIDED SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON CAPTAIN WALKER (CASE 0086). THE DOCTOR ALSO PROVIDED A SEVEN AND A HALF PAGE HANDWRITTEN LETTER COVERING HIS TENURE AT THE PRISON CAMP AND INFORMATION REGARDING AMERICAN POW'S. IE1 DID NOT RECEIVE OR RECOVER ANY REMAINS WHILE CONDUCTING THIS INTERVIEW.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION.

A. ON 9 FEBRUARY 1996, A JOINT U.S./KOC INVESTIGATION TEAM ARRIVED IN SIHANOUKVILLE TO INTERVIEW TWO PERSONS AND INVESTIGATE A REPORT OF REMAINS ON AN ISLAND OFF THE COAST OF SIHANOUKVILLE.

B. TEAM COMPOSITION.

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT.

LT COL LAVIOLETTE	MISSION COMMANDER
MAJ MEYER	TEAM LEADER
SFC LUNDGREN	ANALYST/LINGUIST
HMI WILSON	TEAM MEDIC
CPT MUHL	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECHNICIAN

DR. HERRINGTON ANTHROPOLOGIST

(2) KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONTINGENT.

LTG NUON SARETH	TEAM LEADER; MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
BG KIM CHAN NEE	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
BG MUCHARANG CHAN DY	MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

C. ON 9 FEBRUARY 1996, IE1 TRAVELED TO SIHANOUKVILLE TO CONDUCT TWO INTERVIEWS AND INVESTIGATE A REPORT OF REMAINS ON AN ISLAND OFF THE CAMBODIAN COAST. ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS TO BE INTERVIEWED WAS DR. NGUYEN QUOC CHINH, WHO REPORTEDLY MIGHT HAVE POW RELATED INFORMATION AND WAS THOUGHT TO BE RESIDING IN SIHANOUKVILLE. DURING A COORDINATION MEETING AT CITY HALL, THE TEAM INFORMED CITY OFFICIALS OF ITS MISSION. AT THIS TIME, THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN NAVY (RCN) REPRESENTATIVE, LT(JG) SVAY SONTY, DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 2D BUREAU (S-2) OF THE LOCAL RCN UNIT, STATED HE KNEW A VIETNAMESE DOCTOR NAMED CHINH. THE 1ST DEPUTY GOVERNOR, KHIMM BO, AND THE DEPUTY POLICE CHIEF, YIN BUNNATH, ORDERED LT SVAY TO CONTACT THE DOCTOR AND REQUEST HE MEET WITH IE1 AT 1500 HOURS AT THE TEAM'S HOTEL.

D. BIOGRAPHIC DATA:

(1) NAME:	NGUYEN QUOC CHINH
(2) AGE:	49
(3) PLACE OF BIRTH:	HUNG MAY COMMUNE, KAI NUL DISTRICT, MINH HAI PROVINCE
(4) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE:	SIHANOUKVILLE, MORE THAN FIVE YEARS
(5) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	SOUTH VIETNAM
(6) CURRENT OCCUPATION:	DOCTOR SPECIALIZING IN SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES
(7) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	DOCTOR/INTERROGATOR

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AT POW CAMP

(8) LANGUAGES: VIETNAMESE (NATIVE), CAMBODIAN (POOR), ENGLISH (VERY POOR, HAS FORGOTTEN MOST)

(9) BACKGROUND: DR. CHINH WAS A DOCTOR AND INTERROGATOR AT A POW CAMP IN THE 9TH MILITARY REGION FROM 1964-72. AFTER THE POW'S WERE RELEASED AS PART OF THE PEACE TREATY, DR. CHINH STUDIED MEDICINE.

(10) STATEMENT:

(A) DR. CHINH REMEMBERED THREE AMERICAN PRISONERS, WALKER, "BISS", AND "ROYER", WHO WERE PRISONERS IN THE CAMP AT THE SAME TIME. OF "BISS" AND "ROYER" ONE OF THEM WAS BLACK, HE COULD NOT RECALL WHICH ONE, AND WAS CAPTURED IN VIETNAM, AND ONE WAS WHITE AND WAS CAPTURED IN CAMBODIA. HE RECALLED CAPTAIN WALKER WAS CAPTURED IN VIETNAM IN 1963. EITHER THE BLACK OR WHITE PRISONER WAS A SERGEANT FIRST CLASS.

(B) DR. CHINH WAS ASSIGNED TO THE POLITICAL PROTELIZING SECTION, 9TH MILITARY REGION NEAR CU CHI, SOUTH VIETNAM FROM 1964 TO 1972. HE WORKED AS AN INTERROGATOR OF AMERICAN POW'S AT THE CAMP, HE DID NOT SPECIFY THE NAME OF THE CAMP. HE ALSO PROVIDED MEDICAL TREATMENT TO THE AMERICANS. HIS JOB ENDED IN 1972 WHEN THE PRISONERS WERE MOVED NORTH TO BE RELEASED AS PART OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM AND THE U.S.

(C) DR. CHINH REMEMBERS CPT WALKER. HE DESCRIBED HIM AS A BIG MAN, APPROXIMATELY 6 FEET ONE INCH TALL (WITNESS SAID HE WAS AS TALL AS THE OF MISSION COMMANDER), BLOND HAIR AND APPROXIMATELY 105 KILOGRAMS. HE REMEMBERED THAT WALKER DIED AND WAS BURIED BY TWO MEN IN BIENG BAT COMMUNE, THAY BINH DISTRICT. THESE TWO MEN WERE:

TU YUNG - XE HUNG MEY VILLAGE, KAI NAL DISTRICT

MUY THANH - XA PHINE COMMUNE, LONG MAI DISTRICT, HAU YAN PROVINCE. WITNESS WAS NOT SURE OF THEIR CURRENT ADDRESS.

(D) AT THE CLOSE OF THE INTERVIEW, THE DOCTOR AGREED TO WRITE A LETTER COVERING EVERYTHING HE COULD RECALL ABOUT CPT WALKER AND OTHER AMERICAN POW'S. ON 11 FEB 1996, DR. CHINH RETURNED TO THE TEAM HOTEL WITH A SEVEN AND A HALF PAGE LETTER WRITTEN IN VIETNAMESE.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

A. A SEVEN AND A HALF PAGE LETTER IN VIETNAMESE WRITTEN BY THE WITNESS. ON 11 FEB 96, A COPY OF THIS LETTER WAS FAXED TO HQ, JTF-FA (J-2) AND DETACHMENT TWO. THE ORIGINAL WAS HAND CARRIED TO HAWAII BY THE TEAM'S EOD TECHNICIAN.

B. A 45-MINUTE TAPE OF THE INTERVIEW WAS RECORDED AND FORWARDED TO HQ, JTF-FA.

5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS. N/A.

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT FOR CASE 0086//

RMKS/

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES. N/A.

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED. N/A.

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8. ANALYST COMMENTS.

A. WITNESS STATEMENTS: DR. CHINH PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH CORRELATES TO CASE 0086. HIS DESCRIPTION MATCHES THAT OF CPT WALKER. HE PROVIDED THE INFORMATION IN A STRAIGHT FORWARD MANNER AND WITHOUT HESITATION. THE DOCTOR WAS UNAWARE THAT DETACHMENT FOUR HAD ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT HIM FOR THE PAST TWO AND A HALF YEARS.

B. INCIDENT LOCATION SURVEY: NONE.

C. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSION: BASED UPON HIS DEMEANOR AND STRAIGHT FORWARD MANNER, I BELIEVE DR. CHINH TOLD THE TRUTH AS HE KNEW IT. THE LETTER WRITTEN BY THE DOCTOR WAS UNSOLICITED AND APPEARED TO CONTAIN DETAILED INFORMATION. THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED IN VIETNAMESE WITH THE KOC TEAM LEADER TRANSLATING THE DOCTOR'S COMMENTS INTO CAMBODIAN. THE LANGUAGE OBSTACLE ALSO PREVENTED IE1 FROM EXPLOITING THE LETTER. ANOTHER FACTOR IN MY ASSESSMENT THAT INDICATED HE WAS TELLING THE TRUTH WAS HIS ADAMANT REFUSAL OF MONETARY COMPENSATION FOR THE INTERVIEW. IF NEEDED, THE DOCTOR STATED HE WAS WILLING TO BE REINTERVIEWED. THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE OTHER TWO PRISONERS REQUIRES FURTHER ANALYSIS.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS. NONE.

10. TEAM LEADER COMMENTS.

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY: RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS: CONCUR WITH ANALYST COMMENTS.

C. HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION/SUPPORT: HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION WAS EXCELLENT. WITHOUT THEIR ASSISTANCE, IE1 WOULD NEVER HAD FOUND THIS WITNESS. THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE OUTSTANDING COOPERATION THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA PROVIDES DETACHMENT FOUR IN ACCOMPLISHING OUR JOINT MISSION.

D. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: RECOMMEND J-2 AND DETACHMENT TWO FOLLOW-UP ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY DOCTOR NGUYEN QUOC CHINH.//
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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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PAGE:0001

INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00175677
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS694 MCN = 96068/05295 TOR = 960680325
 PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS7107 0680325-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 081700Z MAR 96
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU, HI
 TO: SAFE
 ZEM

CONTROLS

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BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 96-2C JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN THE KINGDOM OF
 //NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS694 MCN = 96068/05295 TOR = 960680325
 PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS7107 0680325-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU

P 080325Z MAR 96
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFOCB/OC
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 P 081700Z MAR 96
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU, HI
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RHMMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
 RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
 RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//
 BT

UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
 MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTF-FA/-/MAR//
 SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 96-2C JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN THE KINGDOM OF
 CAMBODIA (KOC), 08 THROUGH 23 FEBRUARY 1996//
 RMKS/1. SUMMARY: JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA) ELEMENTS
 CONDUCTED JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) 96-2C IN THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA
 (KOC) FROM 08 THROUGH 23 FEBRUARY 1996. THE INVESTIGATION AND
 RECOVERY TEAM (IRT) INCLUDED THIRTEEN (13) U.S. PERSONNEL (TWO
 INVESTIGATION ELEMENTS (IE1 AND IE2) AND ONE RECOVERY ELEMENT (RE1))
 WHO WORKED WITH THEIR KOC COUNTERPARTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION

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- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: FIVE (5) (CASES 1129, 1583, 1585, 1609, AND 1888).
4. RECOVERY ELEMENT 1 (RE1): NO (0) CASES SCHEDULED, ONE CASE ACCOMPLISHED (CASE 1434).
A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 1434).
C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
5. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS.
A. THE 96-2C JFA PROVED SUCCESSFUL. OPERATING IN TWO PROVINCES, TEAMS CONDUCTED ONE RECOVERY AND SEVEN INVESTIGATIONS (BOTH IE TEAMS INVESTIGATED CASE 1588) IN A SAFE AND EFFICIENT MANNER. PRIOR TO THE START OF THE JFA THE COORDINATION TEAM INVESTIGATED CASE 1434. THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL TEAMS WAS OUTSTANDING. AS IN THE PAST, THE SOLDIERS, ONE SAILOR, AIRMEN, AND ONE MARINE ASSIGNED TO THE 96-2C JFA PROVED TO BE A CREDIT TO BOTH THE JOINT TASK FORCE AND THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES.
B. LAND COMPENSATION: NO LAND COMPENSATION PAYMENTS WERE REQUIRED OR PAID.
C. COMMUNICATIONS. SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS WITH JTF-FA HEADQUARTERS, DETACHMENT FOUR AND DETACHMENT ONE WAS EXCELLENT. MOBILE AND LOCAL TELEPHONES ALSO PROVED TO BE A GOOD BACK-UP IN COUNTRY. JTF-FA EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER'S SUPPORT WAS OUTSTANDING.
D. CAMBODIAN COOPERATION AND FLEXIBILITY. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CAMBODIANS AND ALL TEAMS WAS EXCELLENT DURING THE ENTIRE JFA. TEAMS WERE GRANTED UNRESTRICTED MOVEMENT WITHIN THE PROVINCES AND DIRECT ACCESS TO POTENTIAL WITNESSES.
E. WEATHER. THE DRY SEASON PROVIDED IDEAL WEATHER CONDITIONS FOR INVESTIGATIVE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS. ROAD CONDITIONS WERE GOOD AND INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS WERE ABLE TO TRAVEL BY VEHICLE. THIS ALLOWED THEM TO SEEK OUT WITNESSES AT NUMEROUS REMOTE VILLAGES. DRY SOIL WAS ALSO CONDUCIVE TO SCREENING OPERATIONS AND ALLOWED THE TEAM TO COMPLETE THE RECOVERY AHEAD OF SCHEDULE.
F. COSTS. TEAM LEADERS KEPT ACCURATE RECORDS OF ALL AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURES AND LABOR COSTS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE THE 96-2C JFA. THE JFA WAS SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED WELL WITHIN THE ALLOTTED BUDGET. DETACHMENT FOUR WILL FORWARD ALL RECEIPTS TO THE JTF-FA COMPTROLLER.//

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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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CONCERNING THE FATE OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. PRIOR TO THE START OF THIS JFA, JTF-FA AND KOC COUNTERPARTS CONDUCTED A COORDINATION MEETING IN SVAY RIENG CITY, ON 29 JANUARY 1996. ON 08 FEBRUARY 1996, THREE IE TEAM MEMBERS ARRIVED IN PHNOM PENH, KOC ON A COMMERCIAL FLIGHT; ON 10 FEBRUARY 1996, ALL OTHER TEAM MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO PHNOM PENH, KOC, ON ONE C-130 SORTIE. THE TEAMS SUBSEQUENTLY DEPLOYED TO A TOTAL OF TWO (2) PROVINCES. ALL REMAINS RECOVERED OR RECEIVED DURING THIS JFA ARE CURRENTLY IN THE POSSESSION OF THE CILHI ANTHROPOLOGIST. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY:

A. CASES SCHEDULED: FOUR (4) (CASES 0086, 1434, 1588, AND ONE UNCORRELATED CASE ON KOANG KANG ISLAND).

(1) INVESTIGATIONS: FOUR (4) (CASES 0086, 1434, 1588, AND ONE UNCORRELATED CASE).

(2) EXCAVATIONS: ONE (1) (CASE 1434).

B. CASES INVESTIGATED: FOUR (4) (CASES 0086, 1434, 1588, AND ONE UNCORRELATED CASE).

(1) RECOMMENDED CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE: ONE (1) (CASE 1588).

(2) RECOMMENDED TO EXCAVATE: ONE (1) (CASE 1434).

(3) RECOMMENDED N/A: TWO (2) (CASES 0086 AND ONE UNCORRELATED CASE).

C. CASES EXCAVATED: ONE (1) (CASE 1434).

(1) EXCAVATED BY IE1: NONE (0).

(2) EXCAVATED BY IE2: NONE (0).

(3) EXCAVATED BY RE1: ONE (1) (CASE 1434).

D. TOTAL REMAINS OBTAINED: THREE (3).

(1) RECOVERED BY IE1: ONE (1).

(2) RECOVERED BY IE2: NONE (0).

(3) RECOVERED BY RE1: NONE (0).

(4) UNILATERAL TURN-OVERS: TWO (2).

(5) BY CASE LISTING OF REMAINS OBTAINED:

(A) CASE 1434: TWO (2) RECEIVED. THIS INCLUDES TWO (2) BONE FRAGMENTS RECEIVED.

(B) UNCORRELATED CASE: ONE (1) LEG BONE RECOVERED.

E. NUMBER OF WITNESSES INTERVIEWED:

(1) INTERVIEWED BY IE: 56.

(2) INTERVIEWED BY RE: 3.

2. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT 1 (IE1): THREE (3) CASES SCHEDULED (CASES 0086, 1588, AND ONE UNCORRELATED CASE), THREE (3) CASES ACCOMPLISHED.

A. PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (1588).

B. CASES: ONE (1) (UNCORRELATED CASE ON KOANG KANG ISLAND).

C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: ONE (1) (0086-SPECIAL REMAINS CASE).

E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: THREE (3) (CASE 0086, 1588, UNCORRELATED CASE)

3. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT 2 (IE2): TWO (2) CASES SCHEDULED (1434 AND 1588), TWO (2) CASES ACCOMPLISHED.

A. PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (1588).

B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 1434).

C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00284882

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS997 MCN = 96082/09181 TOR = 960820618
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS5153 0820619-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 220619Z MAR 96
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFJII/J2
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 191743Z MAR 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO RUEHPF/CJTFFA DET FOUR PHNOM PENH CB
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J03/J05/J06/J07/J2/J3
/J4/J423/J5/J6/FPA/J33//
RHHMAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/N6/N31/N33/N45/ N4313/NOIM//
RUHVPA/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//LGTA/MWXR/AF/SG/DO/CEOOE//
RUHPHC/COMSOPAC HONOLULU HI
RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUHVAAA/PACAF AOS HICKAM AFB HI//AOM/AOP//
RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOF-IM/OP/APIN/APLG-MU//
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO HANOI//
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA/AIRA//
RUEHBT/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//DAO//
RUHDFTB/CDR703DMIBDE OPS KUNIA HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI//DO/CSC/OSE//
RHHMUNE/JFMO PAC HONOLULU HI
BUMED//27//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO JTFFA DET TWO
SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

OPER/JOINT INVESTIGATION OPS IN CAMBODIA/JTF-FA/JFA 96-3C//
MSGID/ORDER/JTF-FA//
REF/A/MSG/USCINCPAC/052100ZJAN94/NOTAL//
AMPN/USCINCPAC OPORD 5080-93//
REF/B/DOC/JTF-FA/UNDTD/NOTAL//

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AMPN/POW-MIA FY 95 RGC WORKPLAN//
 REF/C/MSG/JTF-FA/211630ZFEB96//
 AMPN/OPERATIONS ORDER FOR JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 96-3C//
 ORDTYP/FRAGORD/JTF-FA/JFA 96-3C//
 AMPN/THIS IS FRAG ORDER ONE TO THE OPERATIONS ORDER FOR JOINT
 FIELD ACTIVITY 96-3C IN CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6231III/AN THANH, VIETNAM; CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6230IV/DUC HUE, VIETNAM; CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6131I/PH KAMPONG TRACH, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6131IV/KRANHUNG, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7014/6030I/HONG NGU, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6031III/PREK THMEI, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6437I/PHUM KHAM DORANG, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6233II/SNUOL, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/1501 AIR/NC 48-5/KAMPOT, KAMPUCHEA; VIETNAM//
 TIMEZONE/Z//
 ORDREF/OPORD/USCINCPAC 5080-93//
 TASK ORGANIZATION. SEE ANNEX A//
 GENTEXT/1. SITUATION/SAME AS BASE OPORD//
 GENTEXT/2. MISSION/JTF-FA, IN COOPERATION WITH THE ROYAL
 GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA (RGC) RECOVERS ONE CASE VICINITY TANG
 ISLAND AND INVESTIGATES NINE CASES IN THE PROVINCES OF KAMPONG
 SOM, KANDAL, KOMPONG CHAM, KRACHEH, SVAY RIENG, AND PREY VENG
 CAMBODIA DURING 96-3C FROM 20 APR 96 TO 20 MAY 96 TO ACHIEVE
 THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED FOR AS
 A RESULT OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.//
 GENTEXT/3. EXECUTION/
 A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

(1) COMMANDER'S INTENT: MY INTENT FOR JFA 96-3C IS TO
 CONDUCT THOROUGH AND COMPLETE INVESTIGATIONS OF CASES 0086,
 0832, 1093, 1588, 1610, 1695, 1728, 1836, AND 2038, AND
 RECOVERY OF CASE 1998. WE MUST MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY TO
 MINIMIZE DELAYS OR LOST OPPORTUNITIES IN
 INVESTIGATING/EXCAVATING THESE CASES. SUCCESS IS DEFINED AS
 ACCOMPLISHING ALL OPERATIONS WITH THOROUGHNESS NOT SPEED,
 LEAVING NO STONE UNTURNED IN OUR EFFORTS TO ATTAIN THE FULLEST
 POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING. CULMINATION WILL BE THE SAFE RETURN OF
 ALL PERSONNEL, ALL REPORTS COMPREHENSIVELY WRITTEN AND
 RELEASED, AND THOSE REMAINS OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR WHICH ARE
 RECOVERED FORWARDED FOR FORENSIC REVIEW.

(2) CONCEPT: INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM (IRT)
 CONDUCTS JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY JFA 96-3C FROM 20 APRIL TO 20 MAY
 1996. JFA 96-3C IS CONDUCTED IN 5 PHASES:

(A) PHASE I (DEPLOYMENT TO THAILAND): SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM
 (SRT) DEPARTS HAWAII VIA COMMAIR ON 10 APR 96 AND ARRIVES BANGKOK ON
 11 APR 96. IRT DEPARTS HAWAII VIA C-141 (THIS IS THE SAME
 A/C THAT WILL BRING THE 40TH JFA UNDER WATER RECOVERY ELEMENT
 BACK TO HOME STATION) ON 16 APR 96 TO ARRIVE IN U'TAPHAO,
 THAILAND ON 18 APR 96. IRT CONDUCTS EQUIPMENT PREP AND
 PALLETIZATION.

(B) PHASE II (DEPLOYMENT TO CAMBODIA): SRT DEPLOYS TO PHNOM

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PENH ON 12 APR 96. IRT DEPLOYS FROM U'TAPHAO TO SIHANOUKVILLE VIA C-130 ON 20 APR 96, RE DEPLANES. C-130 THEN TRAVELS TO PHNOM PENH TO DROP OFF IE. RE DEPLOYS TO TANG ISLAND IN TWO SORTIES:

((1)) SORTIE ONE MEMBERS AND BASE CAMP EQUIPMENT WILL DEPART SIHANOUKVILLE VIA RGC MINISTRY OF FISHERIES BOAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARRIVAL IN SIHANOUKVILLE ON 20 APR 96. MEMBERS OF SORTIE TWO WILL RON IN SIHANOUKVILLE.

((2)) SORTIE TWO MEMBERS AND THE REMAINDER OF EQUIPMENT WILL DEPART SIHANOUKVILLE VIA RGC MINISTRY OF FISHERIES BOAT ON 21 APR 96.

((C)) PHASE III (OPERATIONS): SRT DEPLOYS TO SIHANOUKVILLE ON 13 APR 96, INVESTIGATES CASE 0086 ON 14 APR 96, AND RETURNS TO PHNOM PENH, AND ON TO BANGKOK ON 15 APR 96. RE WILL RECOVER ONE CASE ON TANG ISLAND. IE WILL TRAVEL VIA VEHICLE AND ONE LAO WEST COAST HELICOPTER TO INVESTIGATE UP TO 8 CASES IN KANDAL, PREY VENG, SVAY RIENG, KAMPONG CHAM, AND KRACHEH PROVINCES. UPON COMPLETION OF RECOVERY OPERATIONS ON TANG ISLAND, RE WILL REDEPLOY TO SIHANOUKVILLE, AND ON TO PHNOM PENH.

((D)) PHASE IV (REDEPLOYMENT FROM CAMBODIA TO THAILAND): UPON COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS, IRT WILL REDEPLOY TO U'TAPHAO VIA C-130 ON 20 MAY 96. IRT COMPLETES SUMMARY AND DETAILED REPORTS PRIOR TO RETURNING TO HONOLULU.

((E)) PHASE V (REDEPLOYMENT TO HONOLULU): IRT REDEPLOYS FROM BANGKOK TO HONOLULU ON 23 MAY VIA COMMAIR.

B. MANEUVER: RE ESTABLISHES BASE CAMP ON TANG ISLAND TO RECOVER CASE 1998. IE WILL DEPLOY FROM PHNOM PENH DAILY BY VEHICLE OR ONE LAO WEST COAST HELICOPTER TO THE INVESTIGATION SITES IN KANDAL, PREY VENG, SVAY RIENG, KAMPONG CHAM, AND KRACHEH PROVINCES. UPON COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATIONS EACH DAY, IE WILL RETURN TO PHNOM PENH VIA VEHICLE OR ONE LAO WEST COAST HELICOPTER.

C. TASKS: IN ADDITION TO PREVIOUS TASKINGS, PERFORM THE FOLLOWING:

((1)) DETACHMENT 4, PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA

((A)) COORDINATE ADVANCE DELIVERY OF 95 CASES OF WATER AT SIHANOUKVILLE BY 20 APR 96 FOR SHIPMENT TO TANG ISLAND BY ADVON TEAM.

((B)) ARRANGE FOR THE DELIVERY OF 40X30-LITER CONTAINERS OF NON-POTABLE WATER (FOR SHOWERS) BY 20 APR 96 FOR DELIVERY TO TANG ISLAND BY ADVON TEAM.

((C)) ARRANGE FOR 40 CAMBODIAN WORKERS TO MEET THE FIRST SORTIE TEAM AT TANG ISLAND ON 20 APR 96 TO ASSIST IN BASE CAMP BUILD UP. SUBSEQUENT TO BASE CAMP BUILD UP, ONLY 30 CAMBODIAN WORKERS WILL BE REQUIRED UNTIL END OF OPERATION.

((D)) ARRANGE FOR DETACHMENT CAMBODIAN LINGUIST TO SUPPORT INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0086 IN SIHANOUKVILLE.

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. SAME AS BASE OPORD.

GENTEXT/4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS/SAME AS BASE OPORD// GENTEXT/6. ANNEXES/

A. TASK ORGANIZATION

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B. INTELLIGENCE AND WEATHER

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

RMKS/

C. AIR FLOW

D. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS//

GENTEXT/ANXNO: A/TASK ORGANIZATION/SAME AS BASE OPORD//

GENTEXT/ANXNO: B/INTELLIGENCE AND WEATHER/SAME AS BASE OPORD//

GENTEXT/ANXNO: C/AIR FLOW/

1. SITUATION. PER BASE OPORD.

2. MISSION. PER BASE OPORD.

3. EXECUTION. ADD THE FOLLOWING CHANGES PER BASE OPORD:

(8) FLIGHT PLAN MATRIX (ALL TIMES ARE LOCAL).

DEP DATE TIME	LOCATION	ARR DATE TIME	LOCATION
DEPLOYMENT:			
(C-141 SORTIE)			
16 2245W APR	HICKAM AFB	18 0245K APR	ANDERSEN
18 0500K APR	ANDERSEN AFB	18 0900G APR	U'TAPHAO
(C-130 SORTIE)			
20 0800G APR	U'TAPHAO	20 0915G APR	SIHANOUKVILLE
20 1115G APR	SIHANOUKVILLE	20 1200G APR	PHNOM PENH
20 1400G APR	PHNOM PENH	20 1515G APR	U'TAPHAO
REDEPLOYMENT:			
(C-130 SORTIE)			
20 1100G MAY	PHNOM PENH	20 1215G MAY	U'TAPHAO
(COMMAIR)			
23 0640G MAY	BANGKOK	23 0740W MAY	HONOLULU

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INQUIRE=DOC35D

ITEM NO=00081800

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS721 MCN = 96150/04773 TOR = 961500507

PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS7148 1500505-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 281703Z MAY 96

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

TO: SAFE

ZEM

CONTROLS

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BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 96-3C IN THE KINGDOM
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS721 MCN = 96150/04773 TOR = 961500507

PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS7148 1500505-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

P 290505Z MAY 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEFOCB/OC

RUEALGX/SAFE

P 281703Z MAY 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//

RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//

BT

UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO

SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/-/MAY//

SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 96-3C IN THE KINGDOM

OF CAMBODIA (KOC), 20 APRIL THROUGH 11 MAY 1996//

RMKS/1. SUMMARY: JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA)

ELEMENTS CONDUCTED JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) 96-3C IN THE KINGDOM

OF CAMBODIA (KOC) FROM 20 APRIL THROUGH 11 MAY 1996. THE

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INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM (IRT) INCLUDED EIGHTEEN (18) U.S. PERSONNEL (ONE INVESTIGATIVE ELEMENT (IE1), ONE RECOVERY ELEMENT (RE1) AND AN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) ELEMENT) WHO WORKED WITH THEIR ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA (RGC) COUNTERPARTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE FATE OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. PRIOR TO THE START OF THIS JFA, JTF-FA AND RGC COUNTERPARTS CONDUCTED COORDINATION MEETINGS IN PREY VENG CITY ON 18 MARCH 1996, KAMPONG CHAM CITY ON 20 MARCH 1996, KRACHEH CITY ON 2 APRIL 1996, KANDAL CITY ON 4 APRIL 1996, SIHANOUKVILLE CITY ON 18 APRIL 1996 AND SVAY RIENG CITY ON 25 APRIL 1996. ON 20 APRIL 1996, THREE (3) EOC TEAM MEMBERS ARRIVED IN PHNOM PENH, KOC VIA USAF C-130. THE C-130 CONTINUED ON TO KANG KENG AIRFIELD, SIHANOUKVILLE DEPLOYING FIVE (5) IE1 TEAM MEMBERS AND TEN (10) RE1 TEAM MEMBERS. THE IE1 TEAM MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO SIHANOUKVILLE CITY, KOC BY VEHICLE. EIGHT RE1 MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO TANG ISLAND, KOC VIA TWO ROYAL CAMBODIAN AIR FORCE (RCAF) MI-17 HELICOPTER SORTIES. THE OTHER TWO MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO THE ISLAND WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE TEAM EQUIPMENT VIA KOC DEPARTMENT OF FISHERY BOAT. THE TEAMS SUBSEQUENTLY DEPLOYED TO A TOTAL OF SIX (6) PROVINCES. ALL REMAINS RECEIVED DURING THIS JFA ARE CURRENTLY IN THE POSSESSION OF THE CILHI ANTHROPOLOGIST. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY:

- A. CASES SCHEDULED: ELEVEN (11) (CASES 0086, 0832, 1093, 1599, 1610, 1695, 1728, 1836, PLUS 1998, 2003 AND 2038 ON TANG ISLAND).
 - (1) INVESTIGATIONS: TEN (10) (CASES 0086, 1093, 1588, 1610, 1695, 1728, 1836, 1998, 2003 AND 2038).
 - (2) EXCAVATIONS: ONE (1) (CASE 1998).
 - B. CASES INVESTIGATED: TEN (10) (CASES 0086, 1093, 1588, 1610, 1695, 1728, 1836, 1998, 2003 AND 2038).
 - (1) RECOMMENDED CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE: FIVE (5) (CASES 0086, 1588, 1610, 1695, AND 1836).
 - (2) RECOMMENDED TO EXCAVATE: NONE (0).
 - (3) RECOMMENDED N/A: FIVE (5) (CASES 1093, 1728, 1998, 2003, AND 2038).
 - C. CASES EXCAVATED: ONE (1) (CASE 1998).
 - (1) EXCAVATED BY IE1: NONE (0).
 - (2) EXCAVATED BY SRT: NONE (0).
 - (3) EXCAVATED BY RE1: ONE (1) (CASE 1998).
 - D. TOTAL REMAINS OBTAINED: THREE (3).
 - (1) RECOVERED BY IE1: NONE (0).
 - (2) RECOVERED BY SRT: NONE (0).
 - (3) RECOVERED BY RE1: NONE (0).
 - (4) UNILATERAL TURN-OVERS: THREE (3).
 - (5) BY CASE LISTING OF REMAINS OBTAINED:
- CASE 1695: THREE (3) RECEIVED. THIS INCLUDES TWO (2) POSSIBLE BONE FRAGMENTS AND ONE (1) POSSIBLE CROWN OF A TOOTH.
- E. NUMBER OF WITNESSES INTERVIEWED:
- (1) INTERVIEWED BY IE1: THIRTY NINE (39).
 - (2) INTERVIEWED BY SRT: TWO (2).
 - (3) INTERVIEWED BY RE1: THREE (3).

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2. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT 1 (IE1): SEVEN (7) CASES SCHEDULED (CASES 0832, 1093, 1588, 1610, 1695, 1728 AND 1836); SIX (6) CASES ACCOMPLISHED. (1093, 1588, 1610, 1695, 1728 AND 1836).
- A. PRIORITY CASES: TWO (2) (1588 AND 1836).
 - B. CASES: THREE (3) (1728, 1610, AND 1695).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: ONE (1) (1093).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: TWO (2)
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0)
3. SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM (SRT): ONE (1) CASE SCHEDULED (0086), TWO (2) CASES ACCOMPLISHED (CASE 0086 AND ONE INTERVIEW FOR CASE 1588).
- A. PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (1588)
 - B. CASES: NONE (0).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (0086).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONF (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
4. RECOVERY ELEMENT 1 (RE1): ONE (1) RECOVERY CASE (1998) AND THREE (3) INVESTIGATIONS SCHEDULED (CASES 1998, 2003 AND 2038).
- A. PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (1998).
 - B. CASES: NONE (0).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: THREE (3) (CASES 1998, 2003 AND 2038).
5. RGC POW/MIA TEAM/DET FOUR: ONE (1) CASE ACCOMPLISHED (0832).
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: NONE (0).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: ONE (1) (0832).
6. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS.
- A. THE OBJECTIVES OF 96-3C JFA WERE COMPLETED. OPERATING IN SIX PROVINCES, TEAMS CONDUCTED ONE RECOVERY AND 11 INVESTIGATIONS IN A SAFE AND EFFICIENT MANNER. THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL TEAMS WAS OUTSTANDING. AS IN THE PAST, THE SOLDIERS, SAILORS, MARINES, AIRMEN, AND CIVILIANS ASSIGNED TO THE 96-3C JFA PROVED TO BE A CREDIT TO BOTH THE JOINT TASK FORCE AND THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES.
 - B. LAND COMPENSATION: NO LAND COMPENSATION PAYMENTS WERE REQUIRED OR PAID.
 - C. COMMUNICATIONS. SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS WITH JTF-FA HEADQUARTERS, DETACHMENT FOUR EOC AND THE TEAMS WAS SATISFACTORY. MOBILE AND LOCAL TELEPHONES ALSO PROVED TO BE A GOOD BACK-UP IN //
- /***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
- SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 96-3C IN THE KINGDOM RMKS/
COUNTRY.
- D. CAMBODIAN COOPERATION AND FLEXIBILITY. COOPERATION

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BETWEEN THE CAMBODIANS AND ALL TEAMS WAS EXCELLENT DURING THE JFA. TEAMS WERE GRANTED UNRESTRICTED MOVEMENT WITHIN THE PROVINCES AND DIRECT ACCESS TO POTENTIAL WITNESSES UNLESS THERE WAS A POTENTIAL KHMER ROUGE THREAT IN THE AREA.

E. WEATHER. THE DRY SEASON PROVIDED IDEAL WEATHER CONDITIONS FOR INVESTIGATIVE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS. ROADS WERE DRY AND INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS WERE ABLE TO OFTEN TRAVEL BY VEHICLE. THIS ALLOWED THEM TO SEEK OUT WITNESSES AT NUMEROUS REMOTE VILLAGES. DRY SOIL WAS ALSO CONDUCTIVE TO SCREENING OPERATIONS AND ALLOWED THE TEAM TO COMPLETE THE RECOVERY AHEAD OF SCHEDULE.

F. COSTS. TEAM LEADERS KEPT ACCURATE RECORDS OF ALL AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURES, LABOR COSTS AND FLIGHT HOURS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 96-3C. THE FINANCIAL DATA WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE JTF-FA COMPTROLLER.//
BT

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00138941

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS104 MCN = 96158/05811 TOR = 961580354
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS4755 1580354-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 051809Z JUN 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE
ZEM

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SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT 003//

//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS104 MCN = 96158/05811 TOR = 961580354

PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS4755 1580354-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

P 060354Z JUN 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL

RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//

RUEADADI/AFOSI IOC BOLLING AFB DC//DTA//

RHEFOCB/OC

RUEALGX/SAFE

P 051809Z JUN 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//

RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//

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UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/-/JUN//

SUBJ/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT 003//

REF: A. CDR JTFFA HONOLULU, HI, 081741Z MAR 96.

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B. CDR JTFFA DET FOUR, PHNOM PENH FAX, 11 FEB 96.

C. CDR JTFFA HONOLULU, HI, 200002Z OCT 93.

RMKS/1. REFERENCE.

A. REF A IS AN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT FOR CASE 0086 FROM JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 96-2C (8 TO 23 FEBRUARY 1996).

B. REF B IS A LETTER MR. NGUYEN QUOC CHINH PROVIDED TO DET 4 DESCRIBING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN MILITARY REGION 9.

C. REF C IS THE SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM (SRT) REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0086.

D. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS BASED ON FIELD ANALYSIS ONLY AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTIC CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION. ON 17 APRIL 1996, A JOINT SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM (SRT) INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN QUOC CHINH REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN MILITARY REGION 9, WHERE HE SERVED AS A MEDIC AND OCCASIONAL ENGLISH TRANSLATOR FROM 1964 TO 1972. MR. CHINH CLARIFIED INFORMATION HE GAVE TO A PREVIOUS JOINT TEAM (REF A & B), AND PROVIDED LIMITED ADDITIONAL DETAILS REGARDING AMERICAN POW'S. HE WAS UNABLE TO CONFIRM THE IDENTITIES OF THE AMERICANS WHO DIED IN THE CAMP OR THEIR EXACT BURIAL LOCATIONS. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MR. CHINH PROBABLY CORRELATES TO CASES 0086, 0021, AND 0047. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MR. CHINH PROBABLY CORRELATES TO CASES 0086, 0021, AND 0047. THE SRT DID NOT RECEIVE OR RECOVER ANY REMAINS DURING THIS INVESTIGATION.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION.

A. ON 17 APRIL 1996, A JOINT U.S./ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA (RGC) SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM RE-INTERVIEWED A VIETNAMESE WITNESS IN SIHANOUKVILLE.

B. TEAM COMPOSITION:

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT.

LT COL LAVIOLETTE	MISSION COMMANDER
CW4 CARLANTONIO	TEAM LEADER
MSGT MOSER	ANALYST/LINGUIST

(2) RGC CONTINGENT.

LTG NUON SARETH	CHAIRMAN RGC POW/MIA COMMITTEE, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
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C. THE WITNESS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

1. NAME: MR. NGUYEN QUOC CHINH (QUOOC CHINHS).

2. AGE: 49 YOA.

3. CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE:

SIHANOUKVILLE (GRID 48P US 365 765), KAMPONG SOM PROVINCE, KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA (KOC), SINCE ABOUT 1990 FOLLOWING HIS RETIREMENT IN 1988.

4. RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: MILITARY REGION (MR) 9,

VIETNAM.

5. CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED, PART TIME DOCTOR.

6. OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: MEDIC, PHYSICIAN'S

ASSISTANT, OCCASIONAL ENGLISH TRANSLATOR FOR INTERROGATORS EXPLOITING AMERICAN POW'S.

D. MR. CHINH BEGAN WORK IN THE MR 9 AMERICAN POW CAMP AS A MEDIC IN LATE 1963. HE KNEW OF NO OTHER NAME FOR THIS CAMP. IN LATE 1964 HE LEFT THE CAMP FOR PHYSICIAN'S ASSISTANT TRAINING AND RETURNED TO

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THE CAMP IN LATE 1965. HE LEFT AGAIN IN MID-1966 TO STUDY ENGLISH, RETURNING THE END OF THAT YEAR. HE REMAINED AT THE CAMP UNTIL 1968, WHEN HE LEFT FOR FURTHER MEDICAL TRAINING. MR. CHINH'S INVOLVEMENT WITH AMERICAN POW'S PRIMARILY CONSISTED OF PROVIDING MEDICAL TREATMENT. HOWEVER, AFTER HIS ACCELERATED COURSE IN ENGLISH, HE OCCASIONALLY ASSISTED IN INTERROGATIONS. HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE MEDICAL SERVICES SECTION OF THE REGIONAL POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, NOT TO THE PROSELYTIZING SECTION OF THAT DIRECTORATE.

E. THE FIRST AMERICAN POW'S TO ARRIVE IN THE CAMP MR. CHINH KNEW OF WERE WALKER, PITZER, AND ROWE IN 1964. THESE THREE WERE CAPTURED IN MINH HAI PROVINCE. SHORTLY AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN THE CAMP, IT CAME UNDER ATTACK, PRESUMABLY BY SEARCH AND RESCUE FORCES. FOLLOWING THIS, THE CAMP RELOCATED TO U MINH HA, IN THE VICINITY OF CANAL 20 (VIC OF GRID COORDINATES 48P VR 995 516). ABOUT ONE YEAR LATER THE CAMP MOVED TO CANAL 22, AND TO CANAL 25 AFTER ABOUT ONE MORE YEAR. AFTER THAT, THE CAMP MOVED TO CANAL 13 IN U MINH THUONG. THE CAMP MOVED ABOUT EIGHT TIMES FROM 1964 TO 1972, BUT MR. CHINH COULD NOT RECALL THE TIMES OF THESE MOVEMENTS WITH ANY PRECISION.

F. MR. CHINH RECALLED THREE AMERICAN POW'S WHO DIED IN THE CAMP; WALKER, A POSSIBLY ASIAN (ZA VANGF) SERGEANT, AND A WHITE CAPTAIN. HE WAS PRESENT AT THE BURIALS OF THESE MEN, BUT COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER DETAILS OF THE BURIAL LOCATIONS BEYOND THOSE IN HIS LETTER (REF B). IN 1972 HE HELPED RECOVER THE REMAINS FROM ONE OF THESE SITES, IN NHAN MIEN (NHAAN MIEEN) VILLAGE, NAM CAN DISTRICT, MINH HAI PROVINCE. THE OTHER TWO BURIAL SITES WERE IN TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FORCES, SO HE WAS UNABLE TO RECOVER THEM. HE TURNED THE RECOVERED REMAINS OVER TO MR 9 AUTHORITIES, WHO HE BELIEVES RETURNED THEM TO THE U.S. HE SAID THE REMAINS HE RECOVERED WERE A COMPLETE SET, BUT HE COULD NOT RECALL WHICH POW'S REMAINS THEY WERE. IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC QUESTION, MR. CHINH SAID HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LOCATE THE OTHER TWO BURIAL SITES ON HIS OWN. HE IDENTIFIED MR. NGUYEN THANH THAN (THANHF THAAN, AKA MUOI THANH/MWOIF THANH) AND MR. NGUYEN DUNG (ZUNGX, AKA TU DUNG/TW ZUNGX) AS THE TWO WHO BURIED WALKER, AND WHO SHOULD KNOW THE BURIAL LOCATION {NOTE: A JOINT SRT INTERVIEWED BOTH OF THESE MEN IN OCTOBER 1993, REF C}. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE HAS NO WRITTEN RECORDS FROM THE WAR.

G. MR. CHINH CLARIFIED ONE POINT IN HIS LETTER, WHERE HE STATES THAT IN 1968 HE TEMPORARILY REPLACED MR. NGUYEN CHI CONG (CHIR COONG) IN THE CAMP. MR. CONG IS IDENTIFIED ELSEWHERE IN THE LETTER AS A FORMER CAMP COMMANDER. HOWEVER, MR. CHINH EXPLAINED THAT WHEN HE STOOD IN FOR MR. CONG IT WAS WHEN CONG WAS WORKING AS AN ENGLISH TRANSLATOR. THE CAMP COMMANDER AT THE TIME WAS MR. NGUYEN THANH HO (THANHF HOOJ), AKA SAU HO (SAUS HOOJ/6 HO). MR. CHINH LAST HEARD OF MR. HO SIX YEARS AGO WHEN HE WAS THE DIRECTOR OF THE DONG TAM TRAINING CENTER (TRUNG TAAM HUAANS LUYEENJ DOONG TAWMS) IN TIEN GIANG PROVINCE. MR. CHINH STRESSED THAT, AS HE SAID IN HIS LETTER, MR. HAI KHU (HAIF KHAUR) IS THE ONE FORMER CAMP CADRE MOST LIKELY TO HAVE

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
SUBJ/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT 003//

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RMKS/

DETAILED INFORMATION ON PRISONER'S NAMES, FATES, AND BURIAL SITES. MR. KHAU WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR POW INTERROGATIONS IN THE MR 9 CAMP, AND CURRENTLY RESIDES IN NGUYEN TRAI (TRAI) STREET, DISTRICT 1, HO CHI MINH CITY.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE. N/A.

5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS. N/A.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES. N/A.

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED. N/A.

8. ANALYST COMMENTS.

A. WITNESS STATEMENT: MR. CHINH WAS OPEN AND SINCERE IN ALL RESPONSES. MINOR DISCREPANCIES CONCERNING EXACT DATES AND PRISONER IDENTIFICATION ARE UNDOUBTEDLY DUE TO THE PASSAGE OF TIME.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSION: MR. CHINH WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION ON BURIAL SITE LOCATIONS, AND ADMITTED HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RE-LOCATE THEM ON HIS OWN. HOWEVER, HE IDENTIFIED TWO FORMER CAMP CADRE, MR. KHAU AND MR. HO, WHO MAY BE ABLE TO ASSIST IN IDENTIFYING THESE SITES.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS. N/A.

10. TEAM LEADER COMMENTS.

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY: MR. CHINH RESPONDED TO ALL QUESTIONS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. HE PROVIDED HIS INFORMATION AS BEST AS HE COULD RECALL AFTER 30 YEARS.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS: THE PURPOSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION WAS TO DETERMINE IF MR. NGUYEN QUOC CHINH COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE BURIAL LOCATIONS OF CAPTAIN WALKER (REFNO 0086) AND THREE OTHER AMERICANS (REFNOS 0021, 0047 AND 0048) WHO DIED IN THE MR 9 POW CAMP. IT IS CLEAR FROM TALKING WITH MR. CHINH THAT HE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH AND/OR KNEW ABOUT THE MR 9 POW CAMP AT VARIOUS TIMES FROM 1964 TO 1972. HOWEVER, HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT GRAVE LOCATIONS.

1) THE SRT SHOWED MR. CHINH PHOTOGRAPHS OF SIX CADRE FROM THE MR 9 POW CAMP WHO WERE INTERVIEWED IN VIETNAM IN OCTOBER 1993 CONCERNING CASES 0021, 0047, 0048 AND 0086. MR. CHINH RECOGNIZED AND CORRECTLY NAMED ALL SIX, THUS CONFIRMING HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THE CAMP OR AT LEAST THE CADRE.

2) MR. CHINH RECALLED THREE AMERICAN POWS WHO DIED IN THE CAMP; WALKER, AN ASIAN SERGEANT AND A WHITE CAPTAIN. CAPTAIN WALKER (REFNO 0086) WAS WHITE. RETURNED POWS STATED HE ARRIVED IN THE CAMP IN JANUARY 1966 IN VERY POOR HEALTH AND DIED IN EARLY FEBRUARY 1966. CAPTAIN VERSACE (REFNO 0021), A PUERTO RICAN, WAS THE ONLY OTHER CAPTAIN HELD IN THE CAMP. HE WAS CAPTURED ALONG WITH 1LT ROWE (REFNO 0022) AND SGT PITZER (REFNO 0022). CAPTAIN VERSACE WAS EXECUTED IN 1965, POSSIBLY IN FEBRUARY. WHEN ASKED, MR. CHINH DID NOT RECALL A POW BY THAT NAME. THE ASIAN SERGEANT UNDOUBTEDLY REFERS TO SGT LEONARD TADIOS (REFNO 0047), AN ASIAN AMERICAN FROM HAWAII, WHO DIED IN MARCH 1966. MR. CHINH DID NOT RECALL THE NAME TADIOS. SSG PARKS (REFNO 0048), AN AFRICAN AMERICAN, WAS THE FOURTH POW TO DIE IN THE CAMP ON 31 DECEMBER 1966. WHEN ASKED, MR. CHINH DID NOT RECALL THE NAME PARKS OR THE DEATH OF A BLACK POW. MR. CHINH'S INABILITY TO RECALL SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE POWS MAY BE A RESULT OF FAILING

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MEMORY. HOWEVER, IT ALSO SUGGESTS A LESS DIRECT ASSOCIATION WITH THE POWS THAN HE CLAIMS.

3) MR. CHINH'S REPORTED RECOVERY OF A COMPLETE SET OF REMAINS IN 1972 AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT TURNOVER TO MR 9 AUTHORITIES IS SIGNIFICANT, IF TRUE. IT IS THE FIRST REPORT OF REMAINS BEING RECOVERED IN MR 9. HOWEVER, THE LOCATION IN NHAN MIEN VILLAGE, NAM CAN DISTRICT DOES NOT CORRELATE TO THE KNOWN POW CAMP LOCATIONS IN THOI BINH DISTRICT, MINH HAI PROVINCE AND AN MINH DISTRICT, KIEN GIANG PROVINCE. NAM CAN DISTRICT IS SIGNIFICANTLY FARTHER SOUTH. WHEN THE SRT POINTED OUT THIS DISCREPANCY TO MR. CHINH, HE SAID HE WAS SURE ABOUT THE LOCATION IN NAM CAN DISTRICT. WHEN ASKED WHERE HE TOOK THE REMAINS FOR TURN OVER, HE SAID BIEN BACH VILLAGE, THOI BINH DISTRICT. MR. CHINH CONFIRMED THE BIEN BACH VILLAGE LOCATION ON A 1:100,000 SCALE MAP (SHEETS 5927,5928) DEPICTING VIETNAMESE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS. THIS SUGGESTS MR. CHINH IS CONFUSED ABOUT WHERE HE ACTUALLY RECOVERED THE REMAINS. MOST LIKELY, IF A RECOVERY DID TAKE PLACE, IT WAS IN THE AREA OF KNOWN POW CAMP LOCATIONS.

4) MR. CHINH'S IDENTIFICATION OF MR. HAI KHAI AS A POTENTIAL WITNESS IS PROMISING. SIGNIFICANTLY, ALL FOUR POWS WHO RETURNED FROM THE MR 9 CAMP MENTION A POLITICAL CADRE NAMED HAI KHAI IN THEIR DEBRIEF STATEMENTS. HE CONDUCTED INTERROGATIONS AND INDOCTRINATION OF THE AMERICAN POWS. RECOMMEND MR. HAI KHAI AND MR. NGUYEN THANH HO BE LOCATED AND INTERVIEWED.

C. HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION/SUPPORT: THEIR SUPPORT OF THIS MISSION WAS EXCELLENT.

D. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: I ALSO RECOMMEND MR. HAI KHAI AND MR. NGUYEN THANH HO BE FOUND AND INTERVIEWED.//
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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 112109Z JUL 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 100912Z JUL 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
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 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
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CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP96-019) REPORT: MG VO VAN DAN//
 RMKS/1. SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW: ON 9 APR 96, THE JOINT U.S./VNOSMP
 RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) INTERVIEWED RETIRED MG VO VAN
 DAN, AKA BA HONG, AT THE HO CHI MINH CITY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE.
 MG DAN WAS THE COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALION, PEOPLE'S ARMY OF
 VIETNAM (PAVN) 9TH DIVISION IN SONG BE PROVINCE, AND LATER BECAME
 THE 9TH DIVISION COMMANDER. HE PROVIDED HEARSAY INFORMATION ABOUT
 THREE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN JUN 65. HE DID NOT GO TO ANY OF THE
 CRASH SITES.

A. AT 1300 ONE DAY DURING JUN 65, AFTER THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI,
 3RD BATTALION FORCES STATIONED AT PHU RIENG (NEAR GRID COORDINATE
 48P YT 103 897) SHOT DOWN A POSSIBLE F-105. 3RD BATTALION SOLDIERS
 WENT TO THE CRASH SITE AND DISCOVERED THE BODY OF ONE PILOT. THEY
 BURIED THE BODY ON THE EDGE OF A RUBBER PLANTATION. BATTALION
 SOLDIERS COLLECTED A NUMBER OF PERSONAL ITEMS, INCLUDING A WATCH, A
 COMPASS, AND A BLOOD CHIT. THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH
 UNRESOLVED CASE 0097.

B. LATER THAT SAME DAY, 3RD BATTALION FORCES SHOT DOWN AN L-19.
 MG DAN DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE FATE OF THE CREW. WE CANNOT CORRELATE
 THIS INFORMATION WITH ANY CASE AT THIS TIME.

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C. MG DAN HEARD PAVN FORCES SHOT DOWN A HELICOPTER AT THUAN LOI AIRFIELD (NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 061 818) AFTER THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI IN JUN 65. HE PROVIDED NO OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. WE CANNOT CORRELATE THIS INFORMATION WITH ANY CASE AT THIS TIME.

2. DETAILS OF INTERVIEW:

A. PARTICIPANTS:

- (1) U.S. CONTINGENT:
 - (A) MSGT RONALD D. WARD, RIT COORDINATOR
 - (B) SSGT WILSON R. SIBLEY JR., RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST
- (2) VIETNAMESE CONTINGENT:
 - (A) COL LE KY (LEE KYR), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE REP
 - (B) MS. NGUYEN THI CHIEM (CHIEEM), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REP
 - (C) MS. NGUYEN HONG MINH (HOONGF MINH), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR REP
 - (D) MR. PHAM MINH HONG (PHAMJ MINH HOONGF), HO CHI MINH CITY TASK TEAM MEMBER
 - (E) MR. BUI QUANG PHAP (BUIF QUANG PHAPS), MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HO CHI MINH CITY OFFICE) REP

B. PURPOSE OF INTERVIEW: OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING BATTLES BETWEEN U.S. FORCES AND THE PAVN 9TH DIVISION DURING WHICH U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS BECAME UNACCOUNTED-FOR.

C. WITNESS INTERVIEW: THE JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED MG VO VAN DAN (VOX VAWN ZAANF), AKA BA (3) HONG (BA HOONGF), ON 9 APR 96 AT THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE IN HO CHI MINH CITY.

- (1) NAME: MG VO VAN DAN, AKA BA HONG
- (2) AGE: APPROXIMATELY 65 YOA
- (3) CURRENT RESIDENCE: WARD 25, BINH THANH DISTRICT, HO CHI MINH CITY
- (4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SONG BE PROVINCE AS DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALION, 9TH DIVISION, IN 1965; STATIONED WITH THE 3RD BATTALION UNTIL HE BECAME THE 9TH DIVISION COMMANDER IN 1972.

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED

(6) WITNESS RELIABILITY: EXCELLENT. MG DAN PROVIDED HIS INFORMATION IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. THE JOINT TEAM DID NOT DETECT ANY ATTEMPT BY MG DAN TO MISLEAD THE TEAM IN ANY WAY. THE TEAM JUDGED MG DAN AS A RELIABLE WITNESS; HOWEVER, BECAUSE HE BASED HIS INFORMATION ON HEARSAY, ITS UTILITY IN FINDING THE BURIAL SITE FOR CASE 0097 IS LIMITED.

(7) STATEMENT:

(A) IN 1965, MG DAN WAS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALION, PAVN 9TH DIVISION, WHICH OPERATED IN THE AREA OF PRESENT-DAY SONG BE PROVINCE. THE 3RD BATTALION COMMANDER AT THAT TIME WAS MR. NHU (NHU), AKA CHIN HIEN (CHINS HIEENF). MR. NHU IS A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HO CHI MINH CITY VETERAN'S ASSOCIATION (BAN CHAAPS HANH HOOIJ CWUJ CHIEENS BINH THANH PHOOS). THE BATTALION'S POLITICAL OFFICERS HAVE ALL DIED DUE TO DISEASE OR OLD AGE.

(B) BEFORE THE FORMATION OF THE 9TH DIVISION, VARIOUS

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REGIMENTS OPERATED INDEPENDENTLY IN PRESENT DAY SONG BE PROVINCE, NORTH OF HO CHI MINH CITY. AFTER THE SUBORDINATION OF THESE REGIMENTS TO THE 9TH DIVISION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE "LIMITED WAR" (CHIEENS TRANH CUCJ BOOJ), THE DIVISION CLASHED WITH U.S. FORCES MANY TIMES. THE FIRST SERIES OF BATTLES OCCURRED AT PHUOC LONG TOWN (THIJ XAX PHWOC LONG) AND BINH PHUOC (BINHF PHWOC). (NOTE: THE NAMES "PHUOC LONG TOWN" AND "BINH PHUOC VILLAGE" DO NOT EXIST IN THE CURRENT PHUOC LONG DISTRICT {FORMERLY PHUOC LONG PROVINCE}. THE PRESENT PHUOC LONG DISTRICT SEAT IS SON GIANG VILLAGE (XAX SOWN GIANG); THE DISTRICT OFFICES ARE AT GRID COORDINATE 48P YU 178 109. PHUOC BINH VILLAGE IS ROUGHLY CENTERED NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YU 080 060. SEE PAVN 1:100,000 MAP SHEET 6332.) THE SECOND SERIES OF BATTLES OCCURRED IN THE DONG XOAI (DOONGF XOAI) AREA. (NOTE: DONG XOAI IS CENTERED NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 080 755. DONG XOAI AIRFIELD IS NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 062 755. SEE U.S. 1:50,000 SCALE MAP SHEET 6332 II.) THE THIRD SERIES OF BATTLES WAS NEAR BU DOP (BUF DOOPS). (NOTE: BU DOP AIRFIELD IS NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P XU 976 291. SEE PAVN 1:100,000 MAP SHEET 6333.)

(C) U.S. FORCES SWEEPED THE BATTLEFIELD AFTER EACH BATTLE AND RECOVERED THE BODIES OF DEAD AMERICAN SOLDIERS. MG DAN SAID U.S. FORCES ALSO WANTED TO KEEP PAVN FORCES FROM COLLECTING WAR MATERIEL FOR LATER USE AGAINST THE AMERICANS. THE VIETNAMESE NEVER RECOVERED THE BODIES OF U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS AFTER ANY BATTLES. THE PAVN'S POLICY WAS TO "FIGHT FAST AND WITHDRAW FAST," BECAUSE PAVN FORCES WERE UNABLE TO HOLD THE BATTLEFIELD AFTER A BATTLE.

(D) ACCORDING TO MG DAN, THE 9TH DIVISION NEVER CAPTURED ANY U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS DURING THE WAR. HE ALSO SAID THERE WAS NO POW CAMP IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM AT THAT TIME. IF PAVN FORCES CAPTURED A U.S. SOLDIER, THEY HELD HIM TEMPORARILY FOR A SHORT TIME BEFORE THEY TRANSFERRED THE POW TO NORTH VIETNAM. THE PAVN'S POLICY AFTER THEY CAPTURED POWS WAS TO GIVE WOUNDED POWS MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR THEIR WOUNDS AND TREAT ALL POWS IN A

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
SUBJ/ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP96-019) REPORT: MG VO VAN DAN//
RMKS/

HUMANITARIAN MANNER SO THE POWS WOULD SEE THE "JUSTICE OF THE WAR."

(E) REGARDING PAVN SOLDIERS WHO WERE KILLED IN ACTION, THE 9TH DIVISION DID NOT RECEIVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS FROM UPPER LEVELS CONCERNING THE RECORDING OF BURIAL LOCATIONS UNTIL 1967. AT THAT TIME, UPPER LEVELS REQUIRED THE DIVISION TO MAKE A DIAGRAM OF EACH SOLDIER'S GRAVE AND MARK THE GRAVE IN SOME WAY. IN ADDITION, 3RD BATTALION SOLDIERS CAME UP WITH THE IDEA OF RECORDING THE NAME OF EACH DECEASED SOLDIER ON A PIECE OF PAPER, PUTTING THE PAPER IN AN EMPTY PENICILLIN VIAL, AND BURYING THE VIAL WITH THE BODY. THE DIVISION RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE BURIAL OF THE BODIES OF U.S. SOLDIERS.

(F) IN JUN 65, FORCES FROM THE 2ND BATTALION, PAVN 9TH DIVISION, FOUGHT U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AT DONG XOAI. THE BATTLE AT DONG XOAI LASTED LESS THAN ONE WEEK. DURING THIS TIME,

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THE 3RD BATTALION FOUGHT U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AT PHU RIENG (PHUS RIEENG). (NOTE: PHU RIENG AIRFIELD IS NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 103 897.)

((1)) F-105 SHOOT DOWN:

((A)) AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 ON AN UNRECALLED DAY RIGHT AFTER THE BATTLE AT DONG XOAI, 3RD BATTALION FORCES SHOT DOWN A POSSIBLE F-105 USING 12.7MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA). MG DAN WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS AN F-105. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED NORTHEAST OF THE BATTALION'S HEAD-QUARTERS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE PHU RIENG RUBBER PLANTATION. THIS AIRCRAFT WAS THE FIRST AIRCRAFT THE 3RD BATTALION SHOT DOWN. THE PILOT DID NOT EJECT BEFORE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED. AFTER THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, OTHER U.S. AIRCRAFT CAME AND BOMBED THE AREA, BUT MG DAN DID NOT SEE ANY SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) AIRCRAFT. MG DAN RECEIVED A REPORT ABOUT THE AIRCRAFT CRASH, BUT WAS NOT A WITNESS.

((B)) RECONNAISSANCE SOLDIERS FROM THE 3RD BATTALION WENT TO THE CRASH SITE. WHEN THEY RETURNED TO BATTALION HEADQUARTERS, THEY REPORTED THEY HAD BURIED THE BODY OF ONE PILOT AT THE EDGE OF THE RUBBER PLANTATION. THE SOLDIERS HAD ALSO COLLECTED A NUMBER OF ITEMS AT THE CRASH SITE, INCLUDING A BLOOD CHIT, A WATCH, A COMPASS, AND FISHING GEAR.

((C)) MG DAN NEVER WENT TO THE CRASH OR BURIAL SITES AND SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE COORDINATES OF THE BURIAL SITE. HE DID NOT REMEMBER THE NAMES OF ANY OF THE SOLDIERS WHO WENT TO THE SITE AND BURIED THE PILOT.

((D)) BECAUSE HE DID NOT KNOW THE COORDINATES OF THE BURIAL SITE, MG DAN SAID IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND THIS BURIAL SITE. IN ADDITION, HE SAID MANY BATTALION CADRE WERE KILLED AND BURIED IN THE FOREST IN THIS AREA, BUT THE LOCATIONS OF THEIR GRAVES WERE LOST DUE TO CHANGES IN THE TERRAIN.

((2)) ON THE SAME DAY AS THE F-105 INCIDENT, 3RD BATTALION FORCES SHOT DOWN AN L-19 WHICH FLEW OVER THEIR POSITION AT AN ALTITUDE UNDER 2000 METERS. MG DAN DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS A U.S. AIR FORCE, U.S. NAVY, OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT. HE ALSO DID NOT KNOW WHICH AIRFIELD THIS AIRCRAFT HAD TAKEN OFF FROM. HE PROVIDED NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE OF THE CREW.

((3)) MG DAN AND THE 3RD BATTALION COMMANDER, MR. NHU, REPORTED INFORMATION CONCERNING THESE TWO INCIDENTS BY TELEPHONE TO MR. LE TRONG TAN (LEE TRONGJ TAANS) AND MR. TRAN DO (TRAANF DOOJ) AT B2 FRONT HEADQUARTERS. (NOTE: THE TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. TRAN DO, THE FORMER HEAD OF THE B2 FRONT POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, ON 21 AUG 93.)

((G)) AFTER THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI, U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES BEGAN LANDING TROOPS AT THUAN LOI (THUAANJ LOWIJ) AND PHU RIENG. (NOTE: THUAN LOI AIRFIELD IS NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 061 818.) MG DAN HEARD PAVN FORCES SHOT DOWN A HELICOPTER AT THUAN LOI DURING THIS TIME PERIOD. HOWEVER, HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE OF THE CREW IN THIS INCIDENT.

((H)) OTHER THAN THE INCIDENTS MENTIONED ABOVE, MG DAN DID NOT KNOW ABOUT ANY OTHER AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. DURING THE ENTIRE TIME THE PAVN DIRECTLY FOUGHT THE AMERICANS, MG DAN WAS A MEMBER OF THE 3RD BATTALION. IN 1972, MG DAN BECAME THE COMMANDER OF THE 9TH

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DIVISION.

(1) MG DAN PROVIDED THE NAMES OF TWO CAMERAMEN WHO USUALLY FOLLOWED THE 9TH DIVISION: MR. PHAM KHAC (PHAMJ KHAWCS) AND MR. DINH PHONG (DINH PHONG). HE DID NOT KNOW IF THEY FILMED THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI. (NOTE: THE OHP TEAM INTERVIEWED FORMER CAMERAMAN MR. PHAM KHAC, AKA LE MINH, ON 20 JUL 93.)

3. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE

4. COMMENTS:

A. CORRELATIONS:

(1) THE INFORMATION MG DAN PROVIDED IN PARA 2C(7)(F)((1)) ABOUT THE POSSIBLE F-105 INCIDENT POSSIBLY CORRELATES TO UNRESOLVED CASE 0097 BASED ON MONTH AND YEAR OF INCIDENT. ONE INDIVIDUAL IS STILL UNACCOUNTED-FOR. THE ACTUAL AIRCRAFT TYPE FOR THIS CASE IS F-100D. THIS WAS THE ONLY JET AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD IN JUN 65 (SEE COMMENTS, PARA 4C(1), BELOW).

(2) WE CANNOT CORRELATE THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE L-19 INCIDENT IN PARA 2C(7)(F)((2)) TO ANY CASE AT THIS TIME (SEE COMMENTS, PARA 4C(2), BELOW).

(3) THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE HELICOPTER INCIDENT IN PARA 2C(7)(G) IS TOO LIMITED FOR THE TEAM TO CORRELATE WITH ANY CASE AT THIS TIME (SEE COMMENTS, PARA 4C(3), BELOW).

B. POTENTIAL LEADS:

(1) MR. NHU (NHU), AKA CHIN HIEN (CHINS HIENF), WAS THE FORMER COMMANDER OF THE 3RD BATTALION, 9TH DIVISION. HE IS A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HO CHI MINH CITY VETERAN'S ASSOCIATION (BAN CHAAPS HANH HOOIJ CWUJ CHIEENS BINH THANH PHOOS).

(2) MR. LE TRONG TAN (LEE TRONGJ TAANS) FORMERLY WORKED AT B2 FRONT HEADQUARTERS. COL KY SAID MR. TAN LATER WAS THE CHIEF OF STAFF (TOONGR THAM MWU TRWONGR) WITH THE RANK OF GENERAL (DAIJ TWONGS). HIS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN.

(3) MR. DINH PHONG (DINH PHONG) WAS A CAMERAMAN WHO WORKED WITH THE 9TH DIVISION. HE POSSIBLY PARTICIPATED IN FILMING THE BATTLE OF DONG XOAI. HIS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN.

C. INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS:

(1) BRIGHT LIGHT INDICATES ONLY ONE JET AIRCRAFT CRASHED

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP96-019) REPORT: MG VO VAN DAN//
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WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD IN 1965, AN F-100D ASSOCIATED WITH UNRESOLVED CASE 0097 THAT CRASHED ON 12 JUN 65. THE ONLY OTHER JET AIRCRAFT TO CRASH WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD AT ANY TIME WAS AN OPERATIONAL A-37 LOSS ON 4 DEC 69. NO F-105'S CRASHED IN SONG BE PROVINCE DURING THE WAR.

(A) ONE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE INFORMATION MG DAN PROVIDED AND BRIGHT LIGHT IS THE INCIDENT LOCATION. THE CRASH LOCATION FOR CASE 0097 LISTED IN BRIGHT LIGHT, GRID COORDINATE 48P YT 088 795, IS APPROXIMATELY 10.3 KILOMETERS SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD. THE PILOT'S LAST KNOWN LOCATION, GRID

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COORDINATE 48P YT 066 802, IS APPROXIMATELY 10.2 KILOMETERS
SOUTHWEST OF PHU RIENG AIRFIELD.

(B) MG DAN ALSO INDICATED HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY
U.S. SAR EFFORTS AFTER THE 3RD BATTALION SHOT DOWN THE POSSIBLE
F-105. BRIGHT LIGHT INDICATES A SAR HELICOPTER LANDED APPROXIMATELY
300 METERS FROM THE DOWNED PILOT ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0097, BUT THE
HELICOPTER WITHDREW WHEN PAVN FORCES FIRED ON IT. HOWEVER, MG DAN
ALSO SAID U.S. AIRCRAFT BOMBED THE AREA AFTER THE CRASH, SO 3RD
BATTALION TROOPS PROBABLY DID NOT SEE THE SAR HELICOPTER BECAUSE THEY
TOOK COVER TO AVOID THE U.S. BOMBING.

(2) BRIGHT LIGHT INDICATES THREE OPERATIONAL O-1 LOSSES
OCCURRED IN JUN 65. BRIGHT LIGHT DOES NOT GIVE GRID COORDINATES FOR
THE CRASH LOCATIONS OF THESE OPERATIONAL LOSSES. NO L-19 LOSSES ARE
LISTED IN BRIGHT LIGHT FOR JUN 65.

(3) BRIGHT LIGHT INDICATES 21 HELICOPTERS CRASHED WITHIN A
15-KILOMETER RADIUS OF THUAN LOI AIRFIELD DURING THE WAR. 20 OF
THESE INCIDENTS ARE OPERATIONAL LOSSES. THE ONLY UNRESOLVED HELI-
COPTER LOSS, CASE 0096, IS ALSO THE ONLY HELICOPTER CRASH IN THIS
AREA THAT OCCURRED IN JUN 65. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE HEARSAY INFORMA-
TION MG DAN PROVIDED IS SO VAGUE, WE CANNOT MAKE A DEFINITE CORRELA-
TION TO CASE 0096 AT THIS TIME.//

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INQUIRE=DOC36D
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 ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 031706Z SEP 96
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 TO: SAFE
 ZEM

CONTROLSUNCLASBODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0121//
 //NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

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 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 P 031706Z SEP 96 ZFD
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 INFO AIG NINE SIX ZERO
 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J32//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTF-FA/-/AUG//
 SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0121//
 REF/A/MSG/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI/161503Z AUG 96//
 REF/B/MSG/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI/090942Z FEB 96//
 REF/C/MSG/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI/031703Z AUG 95//
 REF/D/MSG/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI/181102Z MAY 94//
 REF/E/MSG/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH/291012Z MAY 92//
 REF/F/MEMO/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI/27 MAY 92//
 RMKS/1. REFERENCES

A. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 41ST JOINT FIELD
 ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 5 JULY TO 2 AUGUST
 1996.

B. REF B IS THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT)

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT: LIST OF U.S. AIRCRAFT
CRASHES IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

C. REF C IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0121 CONDUCTED DURING THE 36TH JFA FROM 23 JUNE TO 25 JULY 1995.

D. REF D IS THE ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION OBTAINED FROM THE CENTRAL ARMED FORCES MUSEUM IN HANOI RELATING TO REFNO 0121 IN MAY 1994.

E. REF E IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION ON AN AIRCRAFT CRASH IN DONG HOI TOWN PROBABLY ASSOCIATED WITH REFNO 0121 DURING THE 17TH JFA FROM 21 APRIL TO 20 MAY 1992.

F. REF F IS THE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY REGION IV AIR DEFENSE JOURNAL ON 9 APRIL 1992.

G. THIS REPORT IS BASED ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION:

A. ON 23 JULY 1996, IE1 INVESTIGATED CASE 0121 IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE. ONE WITNESS PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE CASE 0121 CRASH AND BURIAL SITE IN DONG HOI TOWN, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THE ALLEGED CRASH AND BURIAL SITE IS IN FRONT OF THE CURRENT QUANG BINH MUSEUM IN DONG HOI TOWN. JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATED THIS SITE DURING THE 17TH AND THE 36TH JFA'S.

B. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE 7 AUGUST 1965 LOSS OF AN A-1H AIRCRAFT WHILE ON A BOMBING MISSION NEAR THE DONG HOI CITADEL, RESULTING IN ONE UNACCOUNTED-FOR SERVICE MEMBER.

C. IE1 DID NOT RECOVER OR RECEIVE ANY REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS WHILE INVESTIGATING CASE 0121.

D. RECOMMENDATION: N/A.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION.

A. PURPOSE:

(1) INTERVIEW MR. NGUYEN VAN NHI WHO RESIDES AT 6 BU HUYEN STREET, THANH HOA (THANH HOAS) VILLAGE, TUYEN HOA DISTRICT. (ACCOMPLISHED. SEE PARA. 3.D., BELOW.)

(2) SURVEY THE CRASH SITE MR. NHI IDENTIFIES. (ACCOMPLISHED. SEE PARA. 5., BELOW.)

B. ON 5 JULY 1996, IE1 ARRIVED IN DA NANG TO BEGIN THE 41ST JFA. MEMBERS OF THE JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT:

MR. JAMES M. WEBB

MSG STEPHEN E. THOMPSON

MSG ROBERT C. MAVES

MSGT SOMKIAT HORTON

SSGT TIMOTHY M. KELLIHER

SSGT ROBERT M. FLYNN

SSGT HAI V. DOAN

TEAM LEADER

ASSISTANT

TEAM LEADER

ANALYST

TEAM MEDIC

ANALYST

ANALYST

LINGUIST

ANALYST

LINGUIST

(2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT:

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MR. NGUYEN THANH HA (NGUYENX THANH HAF)	TEAM LEADER; MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LTC LE TRAN TUAN (LEE TRAANF TUAANS)	MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
LTC LE KIM DUNG (LEE KIM ZUNGX)	MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
MR. NGUYEN QUOC TIEN (NGUYEENX QUOOC TIEENS)	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
MR. TRAN VIET HUONG (TRAANF VIEETS HWONGF)	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

(3) QUANG BINH PROVINCE TASK TEAM:

MR. PHAN VAN MAI (PHAN VAWN MAIJ)	TEAM LEADER
MR. NGUYEN VAN TANH (NGUYEENX VAWN TANHF)	TEAM MEMBER
MR. NGUYEN NGOC SON (NHUYENX NGOCJ SOWN)	TEAM MEMBER
MR. PHAM XUAN NAO (PHAMJ XUAAN NAO)	TEAM MEMBER
MR. NGUYEN VAN SON (NGUYEENX VAWN SOWN)	TEAM MEMBER

C. ON 21 JULY 1996, THE JOINT TEAM MET WITH THE VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, MR. HA, AT THE HUU NGHI HOTEL IN DONG HOI TOWN, QUANG BINH PROVINCE, TO DISCUSS THE TEAM'S INVESTIGATION PLANNING AND STRATEGY. THE PROVINCIAL TASK TEAM WAS WORKING WITH A 41ST JFA RECOVERY TEAM AND COULD NOT ATTEND THE MEETING. THE JOINT TEAM REVIEWED THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH CASE AND ESTABLISHED AN INVESTIGATION SCHEDULE. MR. HA TOLD IE1 THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM COMPLETED ALL ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR CASE 0121. AS PART OF THEIR ADVANCE PREPARATIONS, THE VNOSMP LOCATED MR. NHI, WHO POSSIBLY HAD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO CASE 0121.

D. ON 23 JULY 1996, IE1 INTERVIEWED ONE WITNESS FOR CASE 0121 AT THE HUU NGHI HOTEL, DONG HOI CITY, OBTAINING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) WITNESS ONE:

(A) WITNESS NAME: MR. NGUYEN VAN NHI
(NGUYEENX VAWN NHIJ).

(B) AGE: 67 YOA.

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME
THERE: 8 HAI BA TRUNG STREET (8 HAI BAF TRWNG), HUE (HUEES)
CITY; APPROXIMATELY EIGHT MONTHS.

(D) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED PUBLIC
AFFAIRS OFFICER, PROPAGANDA OFFICE.
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0121//
RMKS/

(E) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: MAJOR IN
THE PROPAGANDA OFFICE, POLITICAL SECTION, QUANG BINH
PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND.

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(F) BACKGROUND INFORMATION: MR. NHI WAS A MAJOR IN THE ARMY IN THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND. HIS OFFICE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TURNING OVER ITEMS RECOVERED FROM AIRCRAFT CRASH SITES IN THE DONG HOI AREA TO MILITARY REGION FOUR (MR4). THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. NHI ON 17 SEPTEMBER 1995 (REF B). HE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON 11 CASES. SOME OF THE INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATED TO CASE 0121. THE WITNESS AGREED TO A RE-INTERVIEW DURING A LATER JFA.

(G) STATEMENT:

((1)) SOMETIME BETWEEN 1150 AND 1230 ON 17 AUGUST 1965, MR. NHI SAW AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF A-4D'S AND SIX AD-6'S ATTACK THE TWO-STORY QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL BUILDING. THE AIRCRAFT WERE FLYING WEST TO EAST. ONE OF THE AD-6'S DOVE TOWARDS THE OFFICE WHEN IT WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE FROM THE 3RD COMPANY (NOTE: THE COMPANY WAS KNOWN AS THE NGUYEN VIET XUAN (NGUYEENX VIEETS XUAN) COMPANY BECAUSE MR. XUAN RECEIVED CREDIT FOR THE FIRST SHOOTDOWN IN THE UNIT), 14TH ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA) BATTALION'S (BN) 37 MILLIMETER AAA GUNS. THE AD-6 DID NOT RELEASE ITS BOMBS BEFORE NOSE DIVING STRAIGHT INTO THE GROUND IN FRONT OF THE PROVINCIAL BUILDING.

((2)) MR. NHI ARRIVED ON THE SCENE TEN MINUTES AFTER THE AD-6 HIT THE GROUND. THE AD-6 HAD MADE A HUGE CRATER IN THE GROUND. THE AIRCRAFT WAS ON FIRE AND WRECKAGE AND BURNT FLESH WERE SCATTERED EVERYWHERE. THE FIRE WAS SO HOT THAT THE FLAMES WERE BLUE. THE PILOT BURNED UP INSIDE THE COCKPIT. THERE WAS A BAD ODOR DUE TO BURNING FUEL AND FLESH. AFTER THE AD-6 CEASED BURNING, THE LOCAL PEOPLE COVERED THE PILOT'S ASHES WITH DIRT FROM THE CRATER. THEY WANTED TO GIVE THE PILOT A PROPER BURIAL AND THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SANITATION.

((3)) MR. NHI WAS NOT AN EYEWITNESS TO THE BURIAL OF THE ASHES BECAUSE HE HAD TO GO TO THE 14TH AAA BN TO CONFIRM THAT THEY SHOT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT. HE WAS AWARE OF CONFLICTING INFORMATION ABOUT ANOTHER BURIAL SITE FOR THE PILOT, BUT MR. NHI REITERATED THAT HIS JOB DURING THE WAR WAS TO RECORD AND REPORT ALL CRASHES/BURIALS OF AMERICAN SERVICEMEN TO MR4 HEADQUARTERS. HE BELIEVED NOBODY TOOK THE ASHES AND REBURIED THEM ELSEWHERE. ALL OF MR. NHI'S INFORMATION CAME FROM HIS WARTIME JOURNAL.

((4)) MR. NHI ALWAYS ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING PILOTS AND THEIR AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MR4 AND THE NEWSPAPERS WITH UPDATED INFORMATION ON CRASHES, A PILOT'S DEATH OR HIS CAPTURE. IN THIS CASE, THERE WAS NO WRECKAGE OR PILOT RELATED EVIDENCE FORWARDED TO MR4. TO MR. NHI'S KNOWLEDGE, NOBODY TOOK ANY PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE CRASH SITE.

((5)) MR. NHI SAID THAT EXCAVATING THIS SITE WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. SOMETIME IN 1957, HO CHI MINH VISITED THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL OFFICE. TODAY, THERE IS A

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MONUMENT BUILT ON TOP OF THE CRASH SITE IN COMMEMORATION OF HO CHI MINH'S VISIT. IN 1967, WHEN THEY WERE BUILDING THE MONUMENT, SOME OF THE LOCAL VILLAGE WORKERS COULD HAVE DUG UP SOME OF THE ASHES AND REBURIED THEM, BUT MR. NHI BELIEVED THIS WAS VERY UNLIKELY. MR. NHI PROVIDED IE1 WITH A MEMORY SKETCH OF THE CRASH/BURIAL SITE FROM HIS WARTIME JOURNAL.

((6)) AS A FORMER MILITARY OFFICER, HE UNDERSTANDS THE PAIN OF THE FAMILIES NOT KNOWING ABOUT THE FATE OF THEIR LOVED ONES. BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) HAVE SUFFERED LONG ENOUGH. HE WAS GLAD THAT THE U.S. AND SRV REESTABLISHED THEIR RELATIONS AND COOPERATION. MR. NHI WANTED TO HELP BY PROVIDING IE1 WITH ALL THE INFORMATION HE HAD RECORDED IN HIS WARTIME JOURNAL.

((7)) MR. NHI WOULD NOT LET IE1 COPY HIS PERSONAL JOURNAL BECAUSE IT CONTAINS PERSONAL AND VIETNAMESE MILITARY INFORMATION, AS WELL AS INFORMATION ON CRASH SITES AND CAPTURED PILOTS. HE AGREED TO PROVIDE THE U.S. SIDE WITH EXTRACTS OF THIS INFORMATION, BUT STATED IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME. MR. NHI ALSO AGREED TO BE RE-INTERVIEWED AT A LATER DATE.

((8)) IE1 WENT TO THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q XE 72800 31736. THE ALLEGED CRASH/BURIAL SITE WAS APPROXIMATELY 15 METERS LONG BY 15 METERS WIDE AND ONE AND A HALF METERS DEEP. THE MONUMENT SITS ALMOST IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CRASH SITE. TODAY, THE GROUND IS LEVEL. BEHIND THE MONUMENT IS THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE MUSEUM. IE1 SEARCHED THE AREA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

A. MATERIAL EVIDENCE RETAINED BY JTF-FA: NONE.

B. MATERIAL EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHED AND LEFT IN PLACE: NONE.

C. REMAINS: NONE.

5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS: ON 23 JULY 1996, IE1 SURVEYED AN ALLEGED CRASH SITE POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0121 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

A. PROJECT LOCATION.

(1) VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATE 48Q XE 72800 31736 (OBTAINED BY USING THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM TRACKING FOUR SATELLITES).

(2) MAP DATA: MAP NAME - DONG HOI, MAP NO. - 6343 IV, MAP SERIES - L7014, PRINTED - 1969.

B. OUTSTANDING FEATURES: A MONUMENT IN MEMORY OF HO CHI MINH'S VISIT SITS ALMOST IN THE CENTER OF THE CRASH SITE.

C. TERRAIN: FLAT.

D. SOIL CONDITIONS: HARD PACKED DIRT. PART OF THE SITE IS THE ROADWAY LEADING INTO THE MUSEUM.

E. VEGETATION: GRASS AND TWO TREES.

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/
 SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0121//
 RMKS/

F. METHOD OF SEARCH: SURFACE SEARCH.

G. HAZARDS: HO CHI MINH'S MONUMENT.

H. LOGISTICS: A STANDARD SIZE RECOVERY TEAM CAN
 EXCAVATE THIS ISOLATED GRAVE SITE IN 12 DAYS.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE.

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE

8. ANALYST COMMENTS:

(1) THE WITNESS ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS IN A
 STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. ALL OF MR. NHI'S INFORMATION CAME
 FROM HIS JOURNAL. HIS STATEMENTS CORRELATE TO CASE 0121.

(2) AFTER DISCUSSING THREE CASES WITH THE WITNESS,
 THE VNOSMP AGREED TO ALLOW A U.S. TEAM TO MEET WITH MR. NHI
 AT A LATER DATE. MR. NHI AGREED TO BEGIN TRANSCRIBING THE
 INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICAN CRASH SITES, BURIAL SITES, AND
 CAPTURED PILOTS IN THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE AREA FROM HIS
 WARTIME JOURNAL.

B. CANVASSING RESULTS: N/A.

C. INCIDENT LOCATION SURVEY: IE1 SURVEYED A POSSIBLE
 INCIDENT LOCATION FOR CASE 0121 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

D. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSION:

(1) MR. NHI'S STATEMENT CORRELATE TO CASE 0121
 BASED ON DATE, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. HIS
 INFORMATION MATCHED THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE
 "MILITARY REGION IV AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS JOURNAL FROM 1964
 TO 1973; REFERENCE MATERIAL" ON PAGE 12, ENTRY NUMBER 288
 THAT POSSIBLY CORRELATED TO CASE 0121 (REF F). MR. NHI'S
 CRASH SITE WAS WITHIN 100 METERS OF THE LOCATION REPORTED
 DURING THE 17TH JFA AND THE BURIAL LOCATION DURING THE 36TH
 JFA WHICH POSSIBLY CORRELATED TO CASE 0121.

(2) BASED ON MR. NHI'S STATEMENT, RECOMMEND
 REEVALUATING THE TWO PHOTOS POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH CASE
0121 FROM THE CENTRAL ARMED FORCES MUSEUM IN HANOI (REF D).

(3) BASED ON THE LOCATION OF THE POSSIBLE CRASH AND
 BURIAL SITE FOR CASE 0121, IE1 DOES NOT RECOMMEND EXCAVATING
 THE SITE BECAUSE OF HO CHI MINH'S MONUMENT ALMOST IN THE
 CENTER OF THE SITE.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS: NONE.

10. TEAM LEADER COMMENTS:

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY: THE WITNESS WAS RELIABLE AND
 CREDIBLE.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS:

(1) RECOMMEND A JOINT INTERVIEW OF MR. NHI AGAIN
 FOR INFORMATION THAT HAS NOT BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE U.S.

(2) CONCUR WITH ANALYST COMMENTS.

C. HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION/SUPPORT: DURING THIS
 JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY, THE U.S. CONTINGENT RECEIVED EXCELLENT
 SUPPORT FROM ALL LEVELS OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

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D. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: NONE.

11. RECOMMENDATION: N/A.//
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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
 ITEM NO=00600492
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS605 MCN = 96222/04201 TOR = 962220331
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS2463 2220123-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
 HEADER
 R 090123Z AUG 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
 RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 070902Z AUG 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEACNP/BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS-663P//
 RHWRAAA/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
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 CONTROLS
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 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION: "DEAD AMERICAN PILOTS
 DISCOVERED ON SON LA TERRITORY FROM 1965 TO 1972"/>
 REF/A/RMG/JCRC LIAISON BKK/160141ZMAR90//
 REF/B/RMG/JCRC LIAISON BKK/171000ZAPR90//
 REF/C/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/070732ZJAN94//
 REF/D/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/111132ZJAN94//
 REF/E/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/131122ZJAN94//
 REF/F/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/070702ZFEB94//
 REF/G/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/101812ZFEB94//
 REF/H/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/151122ZFEB94//
 REF/I/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/220603ZNOV94//
 REF/J/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/060742ZOCT95//
 REF/K/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/250922ZAPR96//
 NARR/REF A IS AN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT FROM THE 9TH JOINT
 FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) ABOUT A CRASH INCIDENT IN SON LA PROVINCE.
 REF B IS A HEARSAY REPORT FROM THE 9TH JFA OF THE CAPTURE AND DEATH
 OF AN AMERICAN PILOT IN FORMER NGHIA LO PROVINCE. REF C IS THE ANA-

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LYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED "SKETCH OF AIRCRAFT CRASH AT HUA LA VILLAGE 23/6/65." REF D IS THE ANALYSIS OF A HAND-DRAWN SKETCH OF THE LOCATION OF A U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN ON 12 APR 67 IN THE VICINITY OF TEAM 65, MOC CHAU STATE FARM, SON LA PROVINCE. REF E IS THE ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION ON U.S. PILOTS SHOT DOWN WHO DIED IN NGHIA LO AND SON LA PROVINCES. REF F IS THE ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED "SKETCH MAP OF AIRCRAFT DOWNED AT TU NANG VILLAGE." REF G IS THE ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED "SKETCH OF THE AREA WHERE AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN ON 3/11/65." REF H IS THE ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION ON U.S. PILOTS SHOT DOWN WHO DIED IN SON LA. REF I IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0147 FROM THE 32ND JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY. REF J IS THE DETAILED SEARCH AND RECOVERY REPORT OF A SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0254. REF K IS THE ANALYSIS OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT BEARING THE SAME TITLE AS SUBJECT DOCUMENT.//RMKS/1. ON 30 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER SEVEN SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THESE SETS OF DOCUMENTS REPRESENT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION RESEARCH TEAM'S EFFORTS IN THE PROVINCES OF HA BAC, LANG SON, HAI HUNG, HAI PHONG, QUANG NINH, BAC THAI AND SON LA PROVINCES. A REPORT OF ACTIVITY FOR EACH OF THE PROVINCES WAS INCLUDED WITH EACH SET OF DOCUMENTS.

2. WITHIN THE SON LA SET OF DOCUMENTS, THE REPORT OF ACTIVITY DETAILS THE EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA RELEVANT INFORMATION IN THAT PROVINCE. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS THE TEAM RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED. TWO OF THE DOCUMENTS ARE TITLED: "NUMBER OF DEAD AMERICAN MILITARY AIR CREW DISCOVERED IN SON LA TERRITORY FROM 1965 TO 1972." AS IT IS UNCLEAR WHICH OF THESE TWO LATTER DOCUMENTS IS THE ORIGINAL, AND AS ENTRIES IN SUBJECT DOCUMENT HELP CLARIFY ENTRIES IN REF I (WHICH ANALYZES A POOR PHOTOCOPY OF A CRUMPLED, FOXED ORIGINAL), JTF-FA DECIDED TO ANALYZE BOTH DOCUMENTS SEPARATELY.

3. SUBJECT DOCUMENT PROVIDES LIMITED CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED PARAGRAPH ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH THE FOLLOWING RESOLVED CASES: 0432, 0482, 0619, 0658; AND THE FOLLOWING UNRESOLVED CASES: 0105, 0124, 0131, 0147, 0150, 0182, 0254, 0648, 1882.

4. SUBJECT DOCUMENT IS A TWO-PAGE REPORT CONSISTING OF A TITLE, A HEADER, 14 NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS AND FOOTER INFORMATION. THE HEADER AND FOOTER PROVIDE DATE AND SOURCE INFORMATION. IN THE TRANSLATION AND EVALUATION THAT FOLLOW, TRANSLATED TEXT IS ENCLOSED IN QUOTATION MARKS. ANALYST COMMENTS ARE ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES.

((HEADER))

"NUMBER OF DEAD AMERICAN PILOTS DISCOVERED ON SON LA TERRITORY FROM 1965 TO 1972" ((IN LEFT MARGIN, NEXT TO HEADER))

"DOCUMENT NUMBER 168

22-7-68

(COMRADE THI PROVIDED DOCUMENT NUMBER)"

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "1. ON *DATA* 65, ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY TROOPS AND VILLAGE MILITIA SHOT DOWN AN *DATA* WHICH CRASHED IN THE AREA OF MONG HAMLET, HUA LA VILLAGE. THE BANDIT PILOT EJECTED AND THE

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MILITARY MEDICAL STUDENTS AND GUERRILLAS SHOT HIM DEAD BEFORE LANDING. THE MEDICAL STUDENTS AND THE NORTH WEST SOLDIERS BURIED ((HIM)). (1 GUY)" ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA AN UNRESOLVED CASE INVOLVING THE DATA 65 LOSS OF AN AREA AND ONE PILOT AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q UJ 876592 IN SON LA PROVINCE. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED ON MONTH AND YEAR OF INCIDENT, SIMILAR AIRCRAFT TYPE, APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF LOSS AND SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. THIS PARAGRAPH LISTS MONG HAMLET, AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q UJ 8654, AS THE LOCATION OF THE CRASH SITE. MONG HAMLET IS WITHIN 6 KM OF THE CASE DATA RECORD LOSS LOCATION. NAME WING MAN THOUGHT HE SAW NAME EJECT AFTER HIS AIRCRAFT WAS HIT. DURING SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS FOR NAME NO PARACHUTE WAS SEEN AND NO BEEPER SIGNALS WERE HEARD. THE PARAGRAPH ENTRY RELATING TO "THE PILOT EJECTED, BUT WAS SHOT DEAD BEFORE LANDING", CORRELATES WELL WITH THE KNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS FOR CASE DATA. INFORMATION IN THIS PARAGRAPH ENTRY IS SIMILAR TO A SKETCH MAP (REF C) THAT ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM 1 EXAMINED AT THE JOINT DOCUMENTS CENTER IN HANOI, VIETNAM ON 31 AUG 93. JTF-FA ANALYSTS IDENTIFIED INFORMATION ON THE SKETCH MAP AS POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH CASE DATA.))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "2. ON 20-11-1965, LOCAL GUERRILLA FORCES OF NANGHUI VILLAGE SHOT AN AIRCRAFT WHICH WENT DOWN IN THE MUONG LAN AREA. ONE GUY DIED IN THE AIRCRAFT ON THE SPOT." ((THIS INFORMATION PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0150, AN UNRESOLVED CASE WHICH INVOLVED THE 20 SEP 65 LOSS OF AN F-105D AND ONE PILOT AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q UJ 561096 IN SON LA PROVINCE. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED ON APPROXIMATE DATE OF LOSS, APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF LOSS AND SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. THE CASE 0150 LOSS INCIDENT OCCURRED WITHIN A 10-KILOMETER RADIUS OF MUONG LAN VILLAGE (48Q UJ 6700). NO ONE IN CAPTAIN HAWKINS' FLIGHT SAW HIM EJECT BEFORE HIS AIRCRAFT CRASHED. ADDITIONALLY, NO BEEPER SIGNALS WERE HEARD. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS OF CASE 0150 SUGGEST THE PILOT DIED IN THE CRASH OF THE AIRCRAFT, AS NOTED IN THIS PARAGRAPH ENTRY. LINE ENTRY 3 OF REF H PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT AN F-105 THAT WENT DOWN IN THE AREA OF

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION: "DEAD AMERICAN PILOTS RMKS/

BAN NA KHU, MUONG LA VILLAGE ON 20 SEP 65. JTF-FA ANALYSTS IDENTIFIED THIS INFORMATION AS PROBABLY CORRELATING WITH CASE 0150.))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "3. ON 19-8-1965, LOCAL GUERRILLA FORCES OF SONG KHUA VILLAGE, MOC CHAU SHOT ONE CAPTAIN DEAD ON THE SPOT." ((THIS INFORMATION PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0124, AN UNRESOLVED CASE INVOLVING THE 13 AUG 65 LOSS OF AN RF-101C AND ONE PILOT, AN AIR FORCE CAPTAIN, AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 841232. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED ON MONTH AND YEAR OF LOSS, RANK OF PILOT AND APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF LOSS. SONG KHUA VILLAGE AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 8818, IS WITHIN A 5 KILOMETER RADIUS OF THE CASE 0124 RECORD LOSS LOCATION. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WERE NO OTHER U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN MOC CHAU DISTRICT IN AUG 65. FIELD INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE IN SONG KHUA VILLAGE OBTAINED INFORMATION SIMILAR TO THAT REPORTED IN THIS

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ENTRY.))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "4. ON [REDACTED] 1965, LOCAL GUERRILLA FORCES OF CHIENG ((SIC.)) SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT. THE BANDIT PILOT'S BODY DISINTEGRATED." ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA AN UNRESOLVED CASE WHICH INVOLVED THE DATA 65 LOSS OF AN DATA AND ONE PILOT AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 230340 IN SON LA PROVINCE. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED ON EXACT DATE OF LOSS, PROVINCE OF LOSS AND SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. THE CASE DATA AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND EXPLODED ON IMPACT. NO EJECTION WAS SEEN AND NO BEEPER SIGNALS WERE HEARD. THE INFORMATION THAT "THE BODY DISINTEGRATED", IS CONSISTENT WITH THE KNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS OF CASE DATA INFORMATION IN THIS ENTRY IS SIMILAR TO THAT ON A SKETCH MAP (REF D) EXAMINED BY ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM 1 AT THE JOINT DOCUMENTS CENTER IN HANOI, VIETNAM ON 31 AUG 93. JTF-FA ANALYSTS IDENTIFIED THIS INFORMATION AS POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH CASE DATA "CHIENG" PROBABLY REFERS TO CHIENG DONG VILLAGE (VJ 2235), THE VILLAGE IN WHICH THE COORDINATES OF THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION ARE TO BE FOUND.))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "5. ON DATA 1965, POT HAMLET OF THE MUNICIPALITY SHOT ONE GUY DEAD." ((WRITTEN IN THE LEFT MARGIN IS THE FOLLOWING TEXT:)) "*DONE ON 20-01-1989. DID NOT SEE THE PILOT'S REMAINS." ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA AN UNRESOLVED CASE WHICH INVOLVED THE DATA 65 LOSS OF AN DATA AND ONE PILOT AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q UJ 894555 IN SON LA PROVINCE. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED ON LOCATION, YEAR OF LOSS AND SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. "BAN POT OF THE MUNICIPALITY" IS THE HAMLET LABELED "BAN POT LUONG" ON U.S. MAPS AND "BAN POT NOI" ON SRV MAPS. THE HAMLET LIES AT 48Q UJ 863577 IN CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA MUNICIPALITY. NO U.S. LOSSES OCCURRED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON 10 OCT 65. WHILE THERE WERE THREE U.S. LOSS INCIDENTS IN SON LA PROVINCE IN OCT 65, NONE OF THESE TOOK PLACE ANYWHERE NEAR SON LA MUNICIPALITY. FIELD INVESTIGATION HAS SHOWN THAT THE ONLY INCIDENT KNOWN TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN POT NOI HAMLET IS CASE DATA THE PHRASE "*DONE ON 20-01-1989" REFERS TO THE FIRST JOINT INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA WHICH WAS CONDUCTED ON 20 JAN 89 IN POT NOI HAMLET.))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "6. IN 1965, GUERRILLA MILITIA OF KIM BON VILLAGE, PHU YEN ((DISTRICT)) SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT. THE BANDIT PILOT(S) DIED." ((THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN THIS ENTRY TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH ANY INCIDENT IN JTF-FA FILES. ACCORDING TO U.S. RECORDS, FIVE AIRCRAFT WERE LOST WITHIN 20 KM OF KIM BON VILLAGE (48Q VJ 6036), BUT NONE IN KIM BON VILLAGE ITSELF. TWO OF THE LOSSES OCCURRED IN 1965. ONE OF THESE INVOLVES A RETURNEE; THE CRASH SITE OF THE OTHER HAS BEEN LOCATED 10 KM NE OF KIM BON VILLAGE. OF THE OTHER THREE INCIDENTS, ONE INVOLVES A RETURNEE, ANOTHER TOOK PLACE IN A NEARBY VILLAGE AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH ENTRY 11 IN THIS DOCUMENT AND THE THIRD TOOK PLACE IN 1966 IN A VILLAGE 20 KM TO THE EAST OF KIM BON.))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "7. ON 8-2-1966, LOCAL GUERRILLA FORCES OF TU NANG VILLAGE SHOT DOWN AN A6A. TWO GUYS DIED ON THE SPOT IN THE AIRCRAFT." ((THIS INFORMATION PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0254, AN UNRESOLVED CASE WHICH INVOLVED THE 18 FEB 66 LOSS OF AN A-6A AND TWO CREWMEN. IN NOV 95 A JOINT TEAM EXCAVATED A CRASH SITE IN TU

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NANG VILLAGE AND RECOVERED WRECKAGE SUFFICIENT TO CORRELATE THE SITE WITH CASE 0254 (REF J).))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "8. ON 17-6-1966, A BANDIT PILOT DIED AT CO NOI, MAI SON. ONE GUY WAS IN THE AIRCRAFT." ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0147, BASED ON LOCATION OF LOSS ONLY. CASE 0147 INVOLVES THE 17 SEP 65 LOSS OF THE PILOT OF AN F-105 AIRCRAFT OVER SON LA PROVINCE. FIELD INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0147 IN CO NOI VILLAGE OBTAINED INFORMATION CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION ABOUT CASE 0147 CONTAINED IN JTF-FA FILES, AND NOTED THAT ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT INCIDENT TOOK PLACE IN CO NOI VILLAGE DURING THE WAR (REF I).))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "9. ON 12-3-1967, MOC CHAU STATE FARM SELF DEFENSE FORCES (HOA HAMLET) SHOT ONE GUY DEAD." ((THIS INFORMATION PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0619, A RESOLVED CASE WHICH INVOLVED THE 12 MAR 67 LOSS OF AN RF-4C AND TWO CREWMEN AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 705146 IN SON LA PROVINCE. BOTH PILOTS EJECTED FROM THE AIRCRAFT; HOWEVER, ONE PILOT WAS KILLED AND THE OTHER WAS CAPTURED. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED ON EXACT DATE OF LOSS, DISTRICT AND PROVINCE OF LOSS AND SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. THE PARAGRAPH ENTRY RELATING TO "ONE PILOT WAS SHOT DEAD", CORRELATES WELL WITH THE KNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS OF CASE 0619.))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "10. ON DATA 67, TEAM #65 MOC CHAU STATE FARM AND BATTALION 14 SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT. TWO GUYS DIED ON THE SPOT IN THE AIRCRAFT." ((THIS INFORMATION CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA AN UNRESOLVED CASE WHICH INVOLVED THE 24 APR 67 LOSS OF AN DATA AND TWO CREWMEN AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 711011 IN SON LA PROVINCE. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED ON EXACT DATE OF LOSS, DISTRICT AND PROVINCE OF LOSS AND NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE LOSS. INFORMATION IN THIS PARAGRAPH ENTRY IS SIMILAR TO A SKETCH MAP (REF G) EXAMINED BY ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM 1 AT THE JOINT DOCUMENTS CENTER IN HANOI, VIETNAM ON 30 AUG 93. JTF-FA ANALYSTS IDENTIFIED INFORMATION ON THE SKETCH MAP AS BEING GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH JTF-FA RECORDS FOR CASE DATA

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "11. IN 1967, LOCAL GUERRILLA FORCES OF QUANG HUY VILLAGE, PHU YEN DISTRICT, SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT. TWO GUYS DIED IN THE AIRCRAFT." ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION: "DEAD AMERICAN PILOTS RMKS/

0432, A RESOLVED CASE WHICH INVOLVED THE 17 AUG 66 LOSS OF AN F-105F AND TWO CREWMEN AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 655515 IN SON LA PROVINCE. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED ON APPROXIMATE TIME FRAME OF LOSS, APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF LOSS AND NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE LOSS. CASE 0432 IS THE ONLY U.S. LOSS INCIDENT WITHIN A 10 KILOMETER RADIUS OF QUANG HUY VILLAGE, WHICH IS LOCATED AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 6555. DURING THE NINTH SERIES OF JOINT INVESTIGATIONS (REF B), A VIETNAMESE CITIZEN PROVIDED INFORMATION OF AN F-105 CRASH AND THE DEATH OF TWO PILOTS IN TAI UM HAMLET, QUANG HUY VILLAGE, PHU YEN DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE. JCRC ANALYSTS IDENTIFIED THIS INFORMATION AS CORRELATING WITH CASE 0432.))

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- ((PARAGRAPH)) "12. ON 5-7-1967, GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF CHIENG CONG VILLAGE, MUONG LA SHOT DEAD ONE GUY." ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0658, A RESOLVED CASE WHICH INVOLVED THE 28 APR 67 LOSS OF AN F-105D AND ONE PILOT AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 308460 IN SON LA PROVINCE. THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION OF THE PILOT WAS GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 273461. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED . ON APPROXIMATE DATE OF LOSS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. THE CASE 0658 LOSS INCIDENT IS THE ONLY SINGLE-SEAT AIRCRAFT LOSS INCIDENT OCCURRING IN SON LA PROVINCE IN 1967. ON 2 MAR 90, DURING THE NINTH ITERATION OF JOINT INVESTIGATIONS (REF A), A VIETNAMESE OFFICER SHOWED A JOINT U.S.-SRV TEAM A DIARY. INCLUDED IN THE DIARY WAS A LISTING OF AN AMERICAN PILOT SHOT AND BURIED BY THE MEO ETHNIC MINORITY MILITIA OF CHIENG CONG VILLAGE, MUONG LA DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE. THIS INFORMATION IS VERY SIMILAR TO INFORMATION IN THIS PARAGRAPH AND WAS IDENTIFIED BY JCRC ANALYSTS AS CORRELATING WITH CASE 0658.))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "13. IN 1968, GUERRILLA MILITIA FORCES OF PHIENG BAN SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT. THE PILOT DIED IN THE AIRCRAFT." ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0658, A RESOLVED CASE, BASED ON LOCATION OF LOSS ONLY. DOCUMENTS FROM SON LA PROVINCE INDICATE THAT REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0658 WERE BURIED IN PHIENG BAN VILLAGE. THIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS, BEFORE FIELD INVESTIGATION COULD TAKE PLACE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ACTUAL LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 0658 HAS NEVER BEEN VERIFIED.))

- ((PARAGRAPH)) "14. IN 1972, LOCAL GUERRILLA FORCES OF MUONG DO VILLAGE, PHU YEN SHOT ONE GUY DEAD." ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1882, AN UNRESOLVED CASE WHICH INVOLVED THE 24 JUN 1972 LOSS OF AN F-4D, THE LOSS OF ONE CREWMAN, AIR FORCE 1ST *NAME* AND THE CAPTURE OF ONE CREWMAN, AIR FORCE 1ST LIEUTENANT CHARLES A. JACKSON, AT GRID COORDINATE 48Q VJ 801407 IN SON LA PROVINCE. THIS CORRELATION IS BASED ON YEAR OF LOSS, LOCATION OF LOSS, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. OF THE SIX LOSS INCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED IN PHU YEN DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE, THE CASE 1882 LOSS INCIDENT WAS THE ONLY ONE THAT OCCURRED IN 1972. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1882 LIES IN MUONG DO VILLAGE. LINE ENTRY 6 OF THE DOCUMENT (REF E), TITLED "LIST OF PILOTS SHOT DOWN AND DIED IN NGHIA LO AND SON LA", PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT AN F-4H SHOT DOWN IN MUONG DO, PHU YEN ON 24 JUN 72. JTF-FA ANALYSTS IDENTIFIED THIS INFORMATION AS PROBABLY CORRELATING WITH CASE 1882.))

- THE DOCUMENT CLOSSES WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "THE ENTIRE PROVINCE HAS 14 INCIDENTS OF DEAD PILOTS."

5. FOR HQ AFPC/DPWCM AND BUPERS/PERS 663P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A COPY OF THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND TRANSLATION WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

ADMIN

6. EVAL: BLH//

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PAGE:0001

INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00298428

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS347 MCN = 96179/27352 TOR = 961791731
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1100 1791732-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O 271732Z JUN 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

O P 251733Z JUN 96

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC/CA/OCS/ACS/RAP//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:RSA//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/DOF//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI //CJTFFA DET 2//

RUHPGG/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//

RHWRAAA/HQ AFMWSA RANDOLPH AFB TX//MWD//

RUEACNP/BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS-663P//

RUENMED/BUMED WASHINGTON DC//332//

RUEAHOF/CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PED-P/TAPC-PED-F//

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//MHP-10/INTC/INTM//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03000//

BODY

MSGID/SYS.RRM/CDR JTF-FA//

SUBJ/REPATRIATION OF REMAINS FROM SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF

VIETNAM (SRV)//

RMKS/1. SUMMARY: A JOINT FORENSIC TEAM REVIEWED ALLEGED AMERICAN REMAINS IN HANOI 7 - 8 JUNE, 1996. FOLLOWING THE JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER SELECTED REMAINS TO U.S. CONTROL ON 10 JUNE 1996. THE REMAINS WERE PLACED ABOARD A USAF C-141 AIRCRAFT WHICH DEPARTED HANOI ON 10 JUNE, 1996 AND ARRIVED AT HICKAM AFB ON 12 JUNE, 1996, WITH CEREMONY ON 13 JUNE, 1996.

2. SUMMARY OF REMAINS:

A. THE JOINT FORENSIC TEAM EXAMINED TEN GROUPS OF REMAINS. OF THESE TEN GROUPS, JOINT FIELD TEAMS RECOVERED SIX GROUPS OF REMAINS AND VIETNAMESE CITIZENS TURNED OVER THREE. THE REMAINING GROUP OF REMAINS WAS FROM CASE DATA EXCAVATED DURING THE 39TH JFA.

B. THE JOINT FORENSIC TEAM SELECTED SEVEN GROUPS OF REMAINS TO RETURN TO THE U.S. FOR ANALYSIS. IN THE MULTIPLE PERSON CASES, WE WILL NOT KNOW THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS THE REMAINS REPRESENT UNTIL

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SPECIALISTS AT CILHI ANALYZE THEM.

(1) THE JOINT FORENSIC TEAM SELECTED THE FOLLOWING REMAINS RECOVERED DURING THE 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH CASES:

- (A) CASE DATA
- (B) CASE 0835
- (C) CASE 0854
- (D) CASE 1927

(2) THE JOINT FORENSIC TEAM SELECTED THE FOLLOWING REMAINS RECEIVED DURING THE 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY:

- (A) UNCORRELATED TO ANY CASE (CO-EXAMINATION NUMBER 7CE96).
- (B) UNCORRELATED TO ANY CASE (CO-EXAMINATION NUMBER 8CE96).

(3) THE JOINT FORENSIC TEAM SELECTED REMAINS OBTAINED DURING THE 39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA

C. THE JOINT FORENSIC TEAM DETERMINED THE FOLLOWING TWO GROUPS OF REMAINS RECOVERED DURING THE 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY CONTAINED NON-HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS AND THEREBY EXCLUDED THEM FROM REPATRIATION:

- (1) CASE 1740
- (2) CASE 1878

D. THE FINAL GROUP OF REMAINS RECEIVED WAS RETAINED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT UNTIL FURTHER INFORMATION CAN BE OBTAINED.

3. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF REMAINS IS UNKNOWN FOR ALL CASES.

4. THE REMAINS WERE RETURNED IN 7 TRANSFER CASES.//

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00123343

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS115 MCN = 96156/09036 TOR = 961560709
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS7556 1560710-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 040710Z JUN 96
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFJII/J2
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 030742Z JUN 96 ZYB
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//
SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA//
SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM DETAILED REPORT OF
/INVESTIGATION OF SPECIAL REMAINS CASE 0338//
REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI/080902ZJAN96//
NARR/REF A IS THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0338 CONDUCTED DURING THE 37TH JFA
(24 AUG-19 SEP 95).//
RMKS/1. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION. THE RIT INVESTIGATED SPECIAL
REMAINS CASE 0338 ON 28 MAR 96 IN TAN NINH VILLAGE AND DONG HOI TOWN,
QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THE RIT INTERVIEWED TWO WITNESSES. NONE OF THE
WITNESSES PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ABOUT THE BURIAL OF THE
PILOT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. THE TEAM RECOVERED NO REMAINS,
PERSONAL EFFECTS, OR AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE DURING THIS INVESTIGATION.
RECOMMENDATION: CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE.
2. PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION: LOCATE AND INTERVIEW THE FOLLOWING
INDIVIDUALS:

- A. MR. MIENG (MIEENG), A FORMER WARTIME CADRE AT THE QUANG BINH
PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS IDENTIFIED DURING THE 37TH JFA (SEE REF A).
HE REPORTEDLY LIVES IN TAN NINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT, QUANG
BINH PROVINCE. (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D.).
- B. MR. NGUYEN CHUONG (CHWONG), THE FORMER DONG HOI TOWN PEOPLE'S

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COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ALSO IDENTIFIED DURING THE 37TH JFA (SEE REF A). HE REPORTEDLY LIVES IN MY DUC HAMLET. (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.E.).

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION. ON 28 MAR 96, THE RIT INVESTIGATED CASE 0338 IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THE VNOSMP TEAM LEADER COORDINATED WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS AND LOCATED THE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED TWO WITNESSES.

A. PARTICIPANTS.

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT:

- (A) CW4 CLYDE GREEN, RIT TEAM LEADER.
- (B) SSG ALFRED S. IVERSEN, RIT NCOIC.
- (C) TSGT VY V. TRAN, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST.
- (D) TSGT KELLY RAY, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST.
- (E) SSG WILLIAM E. COX, RIT SEARCH AND RECOVERY

SPECIALIST.

(2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT:

- (A) COL PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE.
- (B) SR COL NGUYEN MINH TRI (MINH TRIJ), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REPRESENTATIVE.
- (C) MR. TRAN MINH TUAN (TRAAN MINH TUAANS), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

(3) QUANG BINH PROVINCE TASK TEAM:

- (A) MR. LE DUC DUONG (LEE DWCS ZWUONG), MIA TEAM LEADER.
- (B) MR. NGUYEN TIEN DUAN (TIEEN ZUAANR), TEAM MEMBER.
- (C) MR. DOAN THANH TUYEN (DOANF THANH TUYEN), TEAM MEMBER.

B. ON 2 MAR 96, THE RIT HELD A PLANNING MEETING WITH THE VNOSMP CONTINGENT AT THE JOINT DOCUMENTS CENTER (JDC) IN THE ARMY MUSEUM, HANOI. AT THE MEETING, THE RIT PRESENTED THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS CASE TO THE VNOSMP.

C. THE TEAM MET THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE TASK TEAM ON 22 MAR 96, AND ARRANGED TO INTERVIEW MR. NGUYEN VAN MIENG ON 28 MAR 96.

D. WITNESS ONE. ON THE MORNING OF 28 MAR 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN VAN MIENG AT THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OFFICE, TAN NINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

- (1) NAME: MR. NGUYEN VAN MIENG.
- (2) AGE: 52 YOA.
- (3) CURRENT RESIDENCE: NGUYEN ANG (NGUYEENX ANG) HAMLET, TAN NINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.
- (4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: QUANG TRI PROVINCE.
- (5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.
- (6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: PAVN SOLDIER.
- (7) BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
- (8) STATEMENT. MR. MIENG WAS A PAVN SOLDIER STATIONED IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE FROM 1968 TO 1970. IN 1970, HE TRANSFERRED TO ROUTE 8 NEAR THE VIET-LAO BORDER. BEFORE 1968, HE WORKED AT A SUGAR MILL IN TAN NINH VILLAGE. MR. MIENG NEVER WITNESSED THE SHOOT DOWN OF AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE DEATH OR CAPTURE OF ANY AMERICAN DURING THE WAR. MR. MIENG WAS NEVER A CADRE AT THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS.

E. WITNESS TWO. ON 28 MAR 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN

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CHUONG AT THE HUU NGHI HOTEL IN DONG HOI TOWN, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(1) NAME: NGUYEN CHUONG.

(2) AGE: 58 YOA.

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE: DONG HOI TOWN, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS ABOVE.

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: CHAIRMAN OF DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES,
DONG HOI TOWN, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: FORMER DONG HOI TOWN PEOPLE'S
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN.(7) STATEMENT. MR. CHUONG DID NOT PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION
CONCERNING THIS CASE. HE ONLY PROVIDED INFORMATION THE RIT
CORRELATED TO CASE 0121. SEVERAL TEAMS HAVE ALREADY INTERVIEWED
MR. CHUONG CONCERNING THIS CASE.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE.

5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS: NONE.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE.

7. AREA OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE.

8. ANALYST COMMENTS:

A. CORRELATIONS: NONE.

B. POTENTIAL LEADS: DURING THE 37TH JFA, THE RIT INTERVIEWED
MR. NGUYEN VAN NHI (NHIR) (REF A). HE PROVIDED THE NAME OF MR. MIENG
AND SAID MR. MIENG WAS A FORMER WARTIME CADRE AT THE QUANG BINH
PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS. MR. MIENG REPORTEDLY LIVED IN TAN NINH
VILLAGE, QUANG NINH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. DURING THIS JFA,
THE RIT INTERVIEWED THE ONLY MR. MIENG RESIDING IN TAN NINH VILLAGE,
QUANG NINH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. RECOMMEND THE VNOSMP
CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR A MR. MIENG WHO WAS A FORMER WARTIME CADRE AT
THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS.C. WITNESS RELIABILITY: EXCELLENT. BOTH WITNESSES ANSWERED ALL
QUESTIONS IN AN HONEST, STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER.D. THE RIT BASED THE ASSESSMENTS IN THIS REPORT ON FIELD
ANALYSIS ALONE AND DOES NOT INTEND FOR THESE ASSESSMENTS TO
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM DETAILED REPORT OF
RMKS/

CONSTITUTE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY COMMENTS: NONE.

10. TEAM CHIEF COMMENTS:

A. THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE OFFICIALS WERE VERY COOPERATIVE AND
PROVIDED EXCELLENT SUPPORT TO THE RIT. MR. TUAN, THE VNOSMP MFA
REPRESENTATIVE, CONDUCTED THE ADVANCE WORK FOR THIS CASE. ALTHOUGH
MR. TUAN FOUND MR. MIENG LIVING IN TAN NINH VILLAGE, QUANG NINH
DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE, HE REALIZED THAT MR. MIENG DID NOT
HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING AIRCRAFT CRASHES OR REMAINS OF
UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. MR. MIENG WAS NEVER A FORMER DONG HOI
TOWN PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE PROVINCE CADRE. DESPITE THIS FACT, MR. TUAN
HAD THE FULL JOINT TEAM TRAVEL FOR THE INTERVIEW WASTING VALUABLE
INVESTIGATION TIME.

B. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: NONE.

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11. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS: CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE.//
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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00007468

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS134 MCN = 96138/36272 TOR = 961382341
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS5749 1382341-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 172006Z MAY 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE

ZEM

CONTROLS

UNCLAS

BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/DETAILED SEARCH AND RECOVERY REPORT OF SPECIAL REMAINS
CASE 0105//

//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS134 MCN = 96138/36272 TOR = 961382341
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS5749 1382341-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

P 172341Z MAY 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEFOCB/OC

RUEALGX/SAFE

P 172006Z MAY 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUHVAAB/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//

RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//

BT

UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/-/MAY//

SUBJ/DETAILED SEARCH AND RECOVERY REPORT OF SPECIAL REMAINS

CASE DIA//

REF: A. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 161733Z MAY 96

B. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 060902Z MAR 96

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RMKS/1. REFERENCES.

A. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED FROM 21 MARCH TO 25 APRIL 1996.

B. REF B IS THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) INVESTIGATION REPORT OF CASE DATA CONDUCTED BETWEEN 12 AND 14 JANUARY 1996.

2. SUMMARY OF EXCAVATION.

A. SPECIAL REMAINS CASE DATA BETWEEN 13 AND 19 APRIL 1996, DURING THE 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA), RECOVERY ELEMENT SIX (RE6) JOINTLY EXCAVATED TWO BURIAL SITES ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87218 56162 AND 48Q UJ 87177 56208, IN SON LA DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE, SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE DATA 1965 LOSS OF AN DATA AIRCRAFT ON A PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE MISSION RESULTING IN ONE UNACCOUNTED-FOR INDIVIDUAL. RE6 RECOVERED FOUR PIECES OF POSSIBLE HUMAN BONE DURING THIS EXCAVATION. THE JOINT TEAM LEADER, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE TEAM ANTHROPOLOGIST, CLOSED THE TWO PROJECT AREAS ON 19 APRIL 1996. ALL REMAINS ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF THE VNOSMP AND WILL BE AVAILABLE AT THE NEXT JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW. THROUGHOUT THE JOINT EXCAVATION, THE U.S. TEAM RECEIVED EXCELLENT COOPERATION FROM ITS VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS.

B. US TEAM MEMBERS:

CPT TODD T. GOEHLER	TEAM LEADER
MR. ROBERT W. MANN	CILHI ANTHROPOLOGIST
GYSGT WAYNE WESTT	TEAM NCOIC
MSGT CHARLES H. YOUNGBLOOD	LIFE SUPPORT TECHNICIAN
MSGT DENNIS P. ASKIN	EOD TECHNICIAN
CTI2 DOUGLAS J. MC CAULEY	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SFC ARDEN J. GAGE	MEDIC
SFC BRENDA L. KING	PHOTOGRAPHER
SSG CHARLES P. HALLMAN	MORTUARY AFFAIRS SERGEANT
SSG JOHN E. SPEARNOCK	MORTUARY AFFAIRS SERGEANT
SPC KURRY T. ARAKI	MORTUARY AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
SPC DAVID T. BRADLEY	MORTUARY AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
SPC TED M. SCHWINN	MORTUARY AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
SPC CHRISTOPHER M. RODY	MORTUARY AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
RM2 SHAWN A. SMITH	COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALIST

C. SRV TEAM:

PHAM HOANG KIM (PHAMJ HOANGF KIM)	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PHAM CONG KHOI (PHAMJ COONG KHOOI)	MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
HOANG NGOC GIAN (HOANGF NGOCJ GIANR)	MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
PHAM THANH THANG (PHAMJ THANH F THAWNG)	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
NGUYEN VAN KIEM (NGUYEENX VAWN KIEEMJ)	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

D. SON LA TASK TEAM:

DO DANG CHEN (DOOX DAWNG CHEN)	TEAM LEADER
LE QUOC DUNG (LEE QUOOC S ZUNGX)	TEAM MEMBER
LUONG QUOC DUNG (LWONG QUOOC S ZUNGX)	TEAM MEMBER
NGUYEN THU HA (NGUYEENX THU HAF)	TEAM MEMBER
LE BINH THANH (LEE BINHF THANH)	TEAM MEMBER

E. SON LA DISTRICT TASK TEAM:

NGUYEN VAN TUAN (NGUYEENX VAWN TUAANS)	TEAM LEADER
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LUONG VAN THONG (LWONG VAWN THUNGF) TEAM MEMBER
LE VAN KIEM (LEE VAWN KIEEM) TEAM MEMBER

3. BACKGROUND.

A. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE DATA 1965 LOSS OF AN DATA AIRCRAFT, IN A FLIGHT OF TWO ON A PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER SON LA PROVINCE, VIETNAM. AT 0927 LOCAL TIME THE AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY SMALL ARMS GROUND FIRE AT 1,000 FEET ALTITUDE. THE WINGMAN OBSERVED A SYMMETRICAL OBJECT, WHICH HE BELIEVED WAS THE PILOT AND SEAT, EXIT THE COCKPIT AREA AS THE PLANE ROLLED 90 DEGREES AND THE LEFT WING SNAPPED OFF. HIS WINGMAN THEN BROKE THROUGH THE CLOUDS AND LOST SIGHT OF THE STRICKEN AIRCRAFT. NO PARACHUTE WAS SIGHTED AND NO ELECTRONIC BEEPER SIGNALS WERE HEARD. SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS WERE TERMINATED BY U.S. FORCES AT 1100 LOCAL WITHOUT SUCCESS.

B. ON 12 JANUARY 1996, A RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) INVESTIGATED THIS CASE IN SON LA DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE. THE RIT INTERVIEWED A TOTAL OF SIX WITNESSES WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DEATH OF A U.S. PILOT IN SON LA TOWN DURING THE DRY SEASON IN 1965. NONE OF THE WITNESSES PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ABOUT THE BURIAL OF THE PILOT. HOWEVER, MR. NGUYEN TAN HUNG, WHO IS NOW BLIND, PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ABOUT THE REBURIAL OF THE PILOT'S BODY AFTER MR. PHAN DONG TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE REMAINS. THE RIT SURVEYED TWO ALLEGED BURIAL SITES OUTSIDE OF HUA LA VILLAGE, SON LA TOWN AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87218 56162 AND 48Q UJ 87177 56208. THE TEAM RECOVERED NO REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, OR AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE DURING THIS EXCAVATION.

4. PROJECT LOCATION.

A. HUA LA VILLAGE
SON LA DISTRICT
SON LA PROVINCE

B. GRID COORDINATES: 48Q UJ 87218 56162 (UNIT A) AND 48Q UJ 87177 56208 (UNIT B). THE TEAM USED A GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING SIX SATELLITES TO OBTAIN THE GRID COORDINATES.

C. MAP: SON LA; EDITION 2-AMS; SERIES L7014; SHEET 5751 I; SCALE 1:50,000; HORIZONTAL DATUM: INDIAN DATUM, 1960.

5. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT AREA.

A. WE DROVE FIFTEEN MINUTES (5 KILOMETERS) TO THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITES (UNITS A AND B) FROM OUR HOTEL IN SON LA. THE GRAVE SITES (PROJECT AREAS) ARE ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF A MOUNTAIN SLOPING 20 DEGREES TO THE WEST. UNIT A IS IN A 15 X 15-METER CULTIVATED FIELD OF 3-METER HIGH SAWGRASS (THE VILLAGERS USE THIS GRASS TO WEAVE MATS AND RUGS). UNIT B IS 95 METERS NORTH (345 DEGREES MAGNETIC) OF UNIT A AND IS ADJACENT TO A LARGE STAND OF BAMBOO. THE SITES ARE SURROUNDED BY BAMBOO AND CULTIVATED FALLOW FIELDS OF MANIOC AND CASSAVA. MR. AN, WHO WITNESSED THE BURIAL AND REBURIAL OF THE PILOT, SHOWED US A TREE STUMP (IN UNIT A) THAT HE USED AS A LANDMARK NEAR
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/DETAILED SEARCH AND RECOVERY REPORT OF SPECIAL REMAINS
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THE GRAVE. MR. AN SAID THAT WHEN THE PILOT WAS BURIED, THE .5 TO

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.7-METER DIAMETER STUMP WAS 2 METERS UPHILL OF THE GRAVE. WE EXCAVATED UNIT B BASED ON INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED BY THE RIT.

B. HUA LA VILLAGE AND CHIENG HOI VILLAGE ARE WITHIN 300 METERS OF THE GRAVE SITE.

6. FIELD METHOD.

A. THE TEAM EXCAVATED THE TWO BURIAL SITES USING STANDARD ARCHAEOLOGICAL PROCEDURES.

B. ON 13 APRIL 1996 WE VISUALLY SURVEYED A 15 X 15-METER AREA (UNIT A) IN AND AROUND THE ALLEGED GRAVE. MR. AN LED US TO THE PAINTED (RIT) TREE STUMP ON 13 APRIL 1996 AND IDENTIFIED AN AREA 2 METERS DOWNHILL (WEST) AS THE GRAVE SITE.

C. ON 17 APRIL 1996 WE VISUALLY SURVEYED A 5 X 5-METER AREA (UNIT B) PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED BY THE RIT. THE RIT INTERVIEWED WITNESSES WHO POINTED OUT THIS AREA AS A POSSIBLE BURIAL LOCATION OF AN AMERICAN PILOT.

D. BASED ON A VISUAL SURVEY AND WITNESS INFORMATION, WE GRIDDED AND EXCAVATED A 10 X 10-METER PROJECT AREA (UNIT A). THE AREA WE GRIDDED ENCOMPASSED THE PAINTED TREE STUMP AND TWO TEST PITS THAT A U.S. TEAM PREVIOUSLY EXCAVATED.

E. BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED TO US BY THE RIT, WE GRIDDED AND EXCAVATED A 4 X 4-METER AREA IN UNIT B.

F. WE REMOVED THE TREE STUMP FROM UNIT A, PHOTOGRAPHED IT AND MEASURED ITS TRUNK TO SEE IF IT WAS .5 TO .7 METER IN DIAMETER.

G. U.S. TEAM MEMBERS SIFTED AND EXAMINED THE SOIL EXCAVATED FROM UNITS A AND B. WE EXCAVATED UNITS A AND B TO CULTURALLY STERILE SOIL.

H. THE TEAM PHOTOGRAPHED UNITS A AND B BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER EXCAVATION.

7. ARCHAEOLOGICAL FINDINGS.

A. THE GROUND WITHIN UNITS A AND B CONSISTS OF LOOSE BROWNISH SOIL (ORGANIC LAYER) ABOVE MOIST BROWNISH CLAY.

B. REG DID NOT FIND ANY EVIDENCE OF A GRAVE IN UNIT A. HOWEVER, WE DID FIND EVIDENCE OF A POSSIBLE GRAVE LOCATION IN UNIT B.

C. WE RECOVERED FOUR PIECES OF POSSIBLE HUMAN BONE FRAGMENTS FROM UNIT B BUT DID NOT RECOVER ANY PERSONAL EFFECTS.

D. THE TREE TRUNK THAT MR. AN IDENTIFIED AS BEING 2 METERS FROM THE PILOT'S GRAVE IN UNIT A MEASURED 6 CENTIMETERS IN DIAMETER. ON 16 APRIL 1996, WE INTERVIEWED VILLAGERS FAMILIAR WITH THE PROJECT AREA AND THEY SAID THE TREE WAS LESS THAN 10 YEARS OLD. THEY ALSO TOLD US THE TREE TRUNK WOULD NOT HAVE MEASURED .5 TO .7 METER IN DIAMETER.

8. MATERIAL EVIDENCE (EXAMINED BUT NOT RETAINED FROM UNIT B).

A. PIECES OF TWO BATTERIES

B. ONE RIFLE CARTRIDGE (UNKNOWN CALIBER)

C. ONE VIETNAMESE SANDAL (TIRE SOLE)

D. FOUR PIECES OF METALLIC FENCE WIRE

E. PIECE OF BOTTLE GLASS

F. RUBBER WASHER (GASKET TYPE)

G. UNIDENTIFIED PIECE OF STEEL

H. PIECE OF CERAMIC (PROBABLY A RICE BOWL)

9. LIFE SUPPORT ANALYST COMMENTS: NONE.

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10. ANALYST/LINGUIST COMMENTS: THE JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES ON 13 APRIL 1996. THE WITNESSES' PERSONAL INFORMATION AND STATEMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. WITNESS ONE:

(1) NAME: MR. LO VAN AN (LOF VAWN AAN).
 (2) AGE: 64 YOA.
 (3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: TRAN KHOI VILLAGE (TRAANF KHOWI), SON LA PROVINCE. WITNESS LIVED AT THIS RESIDENCE HIS ENTIRE LIFE.
 (4) RESIDENCE DURING TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME.
 (5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.
 (6) OCCUPATION DURING TIME OF INCIDENT: MILITARY.
 (7) RELIABILITY: RELIABLE.
 (8) STATEMENT: DURING THE INCIDENT, THE WITNESS WAS AT HIS HOUSE, APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER NORTH OF WHERE THE PILOT LANDED. AT APPROXIMATELY 1100 TO 1200, HE SAW A MAN AND PARACHUTE DESCEND AND GET STUCK IN A TREE ON THE CLIFF TO THE NORTH OF THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE. HE RECALLED THIS TO HAVE HAPPENED IN EITHER FEBRUARY OR MARCH OF 1965. AT APPROXIMATELY 1600 TO 1700, HE WENT TO THE SITE AND SAW THE PILOT WAS OUT OF THE TREE. SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVING AT THE SITE, FOUR MILITARY MEN CAME UP THE HILL AND BEGAN BURYING THE PILOT. HE WITNESSED THE BURIAL FROM APPROXIMATELY TEN METERS AND SAID IT TOOK A LITTLE OVER AN HOUR TO COMPLETE. THEY BURIED THE PILOT IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE HIS UNDERGARMENTS, WITHOUT HIS BOOTS AND HELMET. APPROXIMATELY A WEEK LATER, UNIDENTIFIED MEN EXHUMED THE PILOT AND TOOK PICTURES OF THE REMAINS. THE WITNESS SAW THE MEN EXHUME AND BEGIN TAKING PICTURES OF THE PILOT, BUT LEFT BEFORE HE SAW THE PILOT REBURIED. THE NEXT DAY HE RETURNED AND SAW TWO SMALL FRESH MOUNDS OF DIRT: THE FIRST BEING WHERE THE PILOT WAS ORIGINALLY BURIED, THE SECOND TEN METERS TO THE WEST OF THE FIRST, HE WAS UNSURE OF WHICH MOUND WAS THE REBURIAL LOCATION. THE WITNESS DID NOT REMEMBER HOW DEEP THE FIRST GRAVE WAS. HE SAYS THAT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, THE AREA WAS FAIRLY DENSE JUNGLE, AND THAT IT WAS SLASHED AND BURNED. IT HAS SINCE BEEN CULTIVATED WITH RICE, CORN, MANIOC, AND ELEPHANT GRASS.

B. WITNESS TWO:

(1) NAME: MR. LO VAN EN (LOF VAWN ENS).
 (2) AGE: 65 YOA.
 (3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: TRAN KHOI VILLAGE (TRAANF KHOWI), SON LA PROVINCE. WITNESS LIVED AT THIS RESIDENCE HIS ENTIRE LIFE.
 (4) RESIDENCE DURING TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME.
 (5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED.
 (6) OCCUPATION DURING TIME OF INCIDENT: MILITARY.
 (7) RELIABILITY: RELIABLE.
 (8) STATEMENT: AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, THE

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

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RMKS/

WITNESS' UNIT WAS TAKING COURSES IN FIELD MEDICINE, APPROXIMATELY 200 METERS TO THE NORTH OF WHERE THE PILOT LANDED IN A TREE. HE AND MOST OF HIS UNIT CAME TO SEE WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE SAW THAT THE PILOT WAS DEAD, AND THE UNIT RETURNED TO CONTINUE ITS STUDIES. HE DID NOT WITNESS THE BURIAL, AND HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION TO OFFER.

C. WITNESS 3:

(1) NAME: LONG BIEN (LONG BIEENS).

(2) AGE: 76 YOA.

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE:

THONG LENH VILLAGE (THOONG LEENHJ), THUAN CHAU DISTRICT (THUAAIJ CHAAU), SON LA PROVINCE. WITNESS LIVED AT THIS RESIDENCE SINCE 1970.

(4) RESIDENCE DURING TIME OF INCIDENT: TRAN KHOI VILLAGE (TRAAIJ KHOWI), SON LA DISTRICT.

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED.

(6) OCCUPATION DURING TIME OF INCIDENT: ARMY CAPTAIN.

(7) RELIABILITY: RELIABLE.

(8) STATEMENT: AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, THE WITNESS COMMANDED THE 31ST COMPANY. HE SAW THE INCIDENT FROM APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER AWAY. HE SENT TWO PEOPLE TO INVESTIGATE, AND THESE TWO HELPED BURY THE PILOT. HE DID NOT SEE THE PILOT, AND REMEMBERED THE INCIDENT TO HAVE HAPPENED IN 1965, BETWEEN MARCH AND MAY. THE WITNESS PROVIDED THE NAMES OF THE TWO MEN HE SENT TO INVESTIGATE: THAN AI QUY (THAAN AI QUYS) AND TRAN NHU (TRAAIJ NHU). HE KNOWS THAT THEY LIVE IN SON LA PROVINCE, BUT DOES NOT KNOW WHICH DISTRICT. THE WITNESS ALSO POINTED OUT A BURIAL SITE OF A VIET CONG SOLDIER. THIS SITE WAS APPROXIMATELY TWENTY METERS AWAY FROM THE SECOND SITE WHICH REG EXCAVATED.

11. EOD TECHNICIAN COMMENTS. NONE.

12. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. WE RECOVERED FOUR PIECES OF POSSIBLE HUMAN BONE FRAGMENTS FROM UNIT B. REG DID NOT RECOVER ANY PERSONAL EFFECTS OR FIND ANY EVIDENCE OF CLOTHING, A COFFIN OR GRAVE SHAFT IN UNIT B.

B. THE VIETNAMESE ITEMS RECOVERED FROM UNIT B ARE TYPICAL DISCARD ITEMS AND SUGGEST THE AREA WAS USED AS A VIETNAMESE CAMP (BIVOUAC) SITE DURING THE WAR.

C. REG DID NOT RECOVER ANY HUMAN REMAINS FROM UNIT A. WE DID NOT FIND ANY EVIDENCE OF A BURIAL OR GROUND DISTURBANCE BELOW THE CULTIVATION LAYER IN UNIT A.

D. THE TREE (IN UNIT A) MR. AN SHOWED REG WAS MUCH TOO SMALL TO HAVE BEEN THE .5 TO .7-METER DIAMETER TREE HE REMEMBERED AS BEING 2 METERS UPHILL FROM THE PILOT'S GRAVE. WE DID NOT FIND ANY EVIDENCE (TRUNK, ROOTS OR SOIL STAIN) OF ANOTHER TREE IN UNIT A.

13. TEAM LEADER COMMENTS.

A. CONCUR WITH THE ANTHROPOLOGIST'S RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE UNITS A AND B.

B. ON 19 APRIL 1996, OUR VNOSMP COUNTERPARTS GAVE US THE NAMES OF THREE VIETNAMESE CITIZENS WHO ALLEGEDLY KNEW THE BURIAL LOCATION OF CASE 5516. MR. LO VAN UA (LOF VAWN UAJ) IS A FIRSTHAND

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WITNESS WHO LIVES IN SUOI COP (SUOOIS COOPJ) VILLAGE, SONG MA (SOONG MAX) DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE. MRS. HUANG THI UAN (HOANGF THIJ UAANJ) IS A FIRSTHAND WITNESS WHO LIVES IN BAN ME (BANR MES) HAMLET, CHIENG LOI (CHIEENG F LOWI) VILLAGE, SON LA CITY. MR. CA VAN THAI (CAF VAWN THAIS) IS A SECONDHAND WITNESS WHO LIVES IN HUA LA VILLAGE, SON LA DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE. RECOMMEND AN INVESTIGATION TEAM INTERVIEW THESE WITNESSES TO SEE IF THEY CAN PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE PILOT'S GRAVE.

C. HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION: THROUGHOUT THE JOINT EXCAVATION, THE U.S. ELEMENT RECEIVED EXCELLENT COOPERATION FROM OUR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS (CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT).

D. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: NONE.//

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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00000154
ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS433 MCN = 96138/03654 TOR = 961380303
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS7988 1380303-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 161733Z MAY 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE
ZEM

CONTROLSUNCLASBODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED IN
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----
CDSN = CFS433 MCN = 96138/03654 TOR = 961380303
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS7988 1380303-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

P 170303Z MAY 96
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFOCB/OC
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 161733Z MAY 96 ZYB
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCs/ACS/EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
INFO RUHGMII/FISC GU
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//
BT
UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
SECTION 01 OF 04

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/-/MAY//
SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED IN
VIETNAM FROM 21 MARCH THROUGH 25 APRIL 1996//
RMKS/1. SUMMARY: JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA) ELEMENTS
CONDUCTED THE 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) IN THE SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) FROM 21 MARCH THROUGH 25 APRIL 1996. THE

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INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM (IRT) INCLUDED ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (124) U.S. PERSONNEL (TWO INVESTIGATION ELEMENTS, SIX RECOVERY ELEMENTS, ONE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM, AND ONE UNDERWATER RECOVERY ELEMENT) WHO WORKED WITH THEIR SRV COUNTERPARTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE FATE OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. PRIOR TO THE START OF THIS JFA, JTF-FA AND SRV COUNTERPARTS CONDUCTED COORDINATION MEETINGS IN HANOI, DA NANG, AND HO CHI MINH CITY ON 6, 8, AND 9 MARCH 1996, RESPECTIVELY. ON 21 MARCH 1996, THREE (3) TEAMS DEPLOYED INTO HANOI ON ONE (1) C-130 SORTIE; AND THREE (3) TEAMS DEPLOYED INTO DA NANG ON ONE (1) C-130 SORTIE; ON 22 MARCH 1996, TWO (2) TEAMS DEPLOYED INTO DA NANG ON ONE (1) C-130 SORTIE; ON 1 APRIL 1996, THE UNDERWATER RECOVERY TEAM DEPLOYED INTO DA NANG ON ONE (1) C-141 SORTIE AND ONE (1) C-130 SORTIE. THE TEAMS SUBSEQUENTLY DEPLOYED TO A TOTAL OF EIGHTEEN (18) PROVINCES AND HO CHI MINH CITY. ALL REMAINS THE JOINT TEAMS RECOVERED OR RECEIVED DURING THIS JFA ARE CURRENTLY IN THE POSSESSION OF THE VIETNAMESE OFFICE SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) AND SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW SCHEDULED FOR 6 TO 9 JUNE 1996 IN HANOI, SRV. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY:

A. CASES SCHEDULED: FORTY-SIX (46).

(1) INVESTIGATIONS: THIRTY (30).

(2) EXCAVATIONS: SIXTEEN (16).

B. CASES INVESTIGATED: THIRTY (30). (SRT CASE 0021, 0027, 0191, SRT CASE 0251, 0259, 0300, 0324, SRT CASE 0338, PCIT CASE 0453, 0570, SRT CASE 0591, 1068, 1096, SRT CASE 1248, SRT CASE 1250, 1273, 1354, 1355, 1416, 1419, 1422, 1449, 1515, 1713, SRT CASE 1842, 1929, 1955, AND THREE UNCORRELATED CASES.)

(1) RECOMMENDED CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE: EIGHT (8). (SRT CASE 0251, SRT CASE 0338, PCIT CASE 0453, SRT CASE 0591, SRT CASE 1248, 1515, 1842, 1929.)

(2) RECOMMENDED TO EXCAVATE: THREE (3). (0191, 1068, 1955.)

(3) RECOMMENDED N/A: NINETEEN (19). (SRT CASE 0021, 0027, 0259, 0300, 0324, 0570, 1096, 1273, SRT CASE 1250, 1354, 1355, 1416, 1419, 1422, 1449, 1713, AND THREE UNCORRELATED CASES.)

C. CASES EXCAVATED: (11) (SRT CASE DATA PCIT CASE DATA DATA DATA 0835, 0854, DATA 1740, PCIT CASE 1820, 1878, AND PCIT CASE 1927.)

(1) EXCAVATED BY IE: NONE (0).

(2) EXCAVATED BY RIT: NONE (0).

(3) EXCAVATED BY RE: ELEVEN (11) (SRT CASE DATA PCIT CASE DATA DATA DATA 0835, 0854, DATA 1740, PCIT CASE 1820, 1878, AND PCIT CASE 1927.)

(A) RE1: ONE (1) (CASE 0854).

(B) RE2: ONE (1) (CASE 1878).

(C) RE3: TWO (2) (PCIT CASES 1927 AND 1820).

(D) RE4: TWO (2) (CASES DATA AND 1740).

(E) RE5: TWO (2) (PCIT CASE DATA AND CASE 0835).

(F) RE6: TWO (2) (SRT CASE DATA AND CASE DATA)

(G) URE: ONE (1) (CASE DATA)

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D. TOTAL REMAINS OBTAINED:

- (1) OBTAINED BY IE: ELEVEN (11).
- (2) OBTAINED BY RIT: NONE (0).
- (3) OBTAINED BY RE: ONE HUNDRED-THIRTY (130).

THIS INCLUDES FOURTEEN (14) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH APPARENTLY WITHOUT RESTORATIONS/FIVE (5) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH APPARENTLY WITH RESTORATIONS. THIS TOTAL DOES NOT REFLECT THE REMAINS RE3 RECOVERED FROM THE CASE 1927 SITE. THE REMAINS WERE IN A FLIGHT SUIT AND THE TEAM LEADER OPTED NOT TO OPEN THE FLIGHT SUIT TO AVOID DAMAGING THE REMAINS.

- (4) UNILATERAL TURN-OVERS: ONE (1).
- (5) BY CASE LISTING OF REMAINS OBTAINED:
 - (A) SRT CASE 0474 FOUR (4) RECOVERED/NONE (0)

RECEIVED.

- (B) CASE 0835: FORTY-THREE (43) RECOVERED/NONE

(0) RECEIVED.

- (C) CASE 0854: THIRTY-THREE (33) RECOVERED/NONE

(0) RECEIVED.

- (D) CASE 1740: TWENTY-NINE (29) RECOVERED/NONE

(0) RECEIVED.

- (E) CASE 1878: TWO (2) RECOVERED/NONE (0)

RECEIVED.

(F) PRIORITY CASE 1927: RE3 RECOVERED AN AS-YET UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF REMAINS, MOSTLY INSIDE A FLIGHT SUIT. THESE REMAINS INCLUDED FOURTEEN (14) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH, APPARENTLY WITHOUT RESTORATIONS, AND FIVE (5) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH, APPARENTLY WITH RESTORATIONS. TO AVOID DAMAGING THE REMAINS, THE RE3 TEAM LEADER AND ARCHAEOLOGIST, WITH THE DET 2 COMMANDER'S CONCURRENCE, DID NOT OPEN THE FLIGHT SUIT TO EXAMINE THE REMAINS.

(G) UNCORRELATED: NONE (0) RECOVERED/ONE (1) RECEIVED. THIS WAS A UNILATERAL TURN-OVER TO THE DET TWO CRS OFFICE.

(H) UNCORRELATED: NONE (0) RECOVERED/ELEVEN (11) RECEIVED. A VIETNAMESE CITIZEN TURNED THESE REMAINS OVER TO IE2. THIS TURN-OVER IS THE SUBJECT OF AN IE2 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT.

E. NUMBER OF WITNESSES INTERVIEWED:

- (1) INTERVIEWED BY IE: FORTY-FOUR (44).
- (2) INTERVIEWED BY RIT: TWENTY-EIGHT (28).
- (3) INTERVIEWED BY RE: SEVENTEEN (17).

2. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IE1): SIX (6) CASES SCHEDULED, SIX (6) INVESTIGATED.

A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

B. CASES: SIX (6) (CASES 0191, 0324, 0570, 1068, 1929, AND 1955).

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED IN RMKS/

C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).

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- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: THREE (3).
3. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT TWO (IE2): FOURTEEN (14) CASES SCHEDULED, FOURTEEN (14) INVESTIGATED.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- B. CASES: FOURTEEN (14) (CASES 0027, 0300, 1096, 1273, 1354, 1355, 1416, 1419, 1422, 1449, 1515, 1713, AND TWO UNCORRELATED CASES).
- C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: FIVE (5).
4. RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT): TEN (10) CASES SCHEDULED, TEN (10) INVESTIGATED. (CASE 0689 TRANSFERRED TO THE OHP.)
- A. PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (0453).
- B. CASES: TEN (10) (SRT CASES 0021, 0251, 0259, 0338, 0591, 1248, 1250, 1842, AND ONE UNCORRELATED CASE).
- C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: TWO (2).
5. RECOVERY ELEMENT ONE (RE1): ONE (1) CASE.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0854).
- C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
- F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
6. RECOVERY ELEMENT TWO (RE2): ONE (1) CASE.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 1878).
- C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
- F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
7. RECOVERY ELEMENT THREE (RE3): TWO (2) CASES.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: TWO (2) (CASES 1820 AND 1927).
- B. CASES: NONE (0).
- C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
- F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
8. RECOVERY ELEMENT FOUR (RE4): TWO (2) CASES.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- B. CASES: TWO (2) (CASES 0579 AND 1740).
- C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: ONE (1) (CASE 1496).
- F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
9. RECOVERY ELEMENT FIVE (RE5): TWO (2) CASES.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0258).
- B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0835).
- C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).

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- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: ONE (1) (CASE 9996).
- F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 10. RECOVERY ELEMENT SIX (RE6): TWO (2) CASES.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (SRT CASE DATA).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0979).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 11. UNDERWATER RECOVERY ELEMENT: ONE (1) CASE.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0465). (DETERMINED TO BE A RESOLVED CASE.)
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 12. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS.
 - A. THE 40TH JFA PROVED EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL. OPERATING IN 18 PROVINCES AND HO CHI MINH CITY, TEAMS, TO INCLUDE THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM, COMPLETED TEN RECOVERIES AND 30 INVESTIGATIONS IN A SAFE AND EFFICIENT MANNER. ONE RECOVERY SITE, CASE 0854 IN HA TAY, WILL REQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL JFA TO COMPLETE. THE TEAM CLOSED THE PROJECT AREA, BUT NOT THE SITE. ADDITIONALLY, TEAMS COMPLETED SITE PREPARATION FOR TWO RECOVERIES SCHEDULED FOR THE 41ST JFA: CASE 1496 (KONTUM PROVINCE) AND AN UNCORRELATED CASE IN THUA THIEN-HUE PROVINCE. THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF ALL TEAMS PROVED OUTSTANDING.
 - B. COMMUNICATIONS: UNFORTUNATELY, THE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM PROMISED BY THE VIETNAMESE POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY REMAINED UNAVAILABLE FOR USE DURING THIS JFA. THE JTF DEPLOYED A COMMUNICATIONS TEAM TO INSPECT THE SYSTEM PRIOR TO THE JFA, BUT THE VIETNAMESE NEVER DELIVERED THE SYSTEM FOR INSPECTION. WE'VE AGAIN REQUESTED TO INSPECT THE SYSTEM PRIOR TO THE START OF THE 41ST JFA (1 JULY 96). THE VNOSMP ASSURED US THE SYSTEM WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR BOTH INSPECTION AND USE DURING FUTURE JFA'S. THE USE OF COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS WITH EACH RECOVERY ELEMENT AGAIN PAID DIVIDENDS. BECAUSE OF THEIR WORK AND THE OUTSTANDING MAINTENANCE EFFORT PLACED ON COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT BY THE JTF BETWEEN JFA'S, HF COMMUNICATIONS THROUGHOUT THE 40TH JFA REMAINED OUTSTANDING; IT'S NOW THE BEST I'VE EXPERIENCED IN THE LAST YEAR.
 - C. DURING THIS JFA, INVESTIGATION TEAMS WORKING IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCE OF KONTUM EXPERIENCED COORDINATION

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED IN RMKS/

PROBLEMS. ADVANCE WORK REQUIRED TO EXPEDITE THE

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INVESTIGATIONS REMAINED UNFINISHED UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF THE JOINT TEAM. LANDING ZONES PROMISED AT THE COORDINATION CONFERENCE DID NOT GET CUT. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE IE REINFORCES MY COMMENTS AFTER THE PROVINCIAL COORDINATION CONFERENCE IN FEBRUARY CONCERNING THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE CENTRAL PROVINCES TO EXECUTE THIS JFA. THE PROVINCES OF KONTUM AND DAC LAC SEEMED MORE INTENT ON PRESENTING OBSTACLES PREVENTING SPEEDY CASE COMPLETION THAN IN LOOKING FOR WAYS TO MOVE CASES AHEAD. BECAUSE OF THEIR INABILITY TO COMPLETE ADVANCE WORK IN A TIMELY MANNER OR DIFFICULTIES THEY EXPRESSED OVER CASES, RECOVERIES SCHEDULED FOR CASE 1496 (KONTUM) AND PRIORITY CASE 1046 (DAC LAC) HAD TO BE CANCELED WITH TEAMS MOVING TO ALTERNATE SITES. THE INABILITY OF DAC LAC TO PREPARE PRIORITY CASE 1046 FOR EXCAVATION REMAINS PARTICULARLY DISTURBING SINCE I PUT A SPECIAL TEAM IN ON THE SITE DURING THE 39TH JFA FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING AND MARKING LANDING ZONES THAT THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM COULD CLEAR IN PREPARATION FOR THE 40TH JFA. DAC LAC COMPLETED NONE OF THE WORK. ADDITIONALLY, WHEN IE2 HELD ITS FINAL OUTBRIEF IN KONTUM, OFFICIALS CLEARLY BROUGHT UP THE ISSUE OF WAR REPARATIONS AND SAID THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD TO PAY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE POPULATION OF THE PROVINCE. THE TEAM LEADER, OPERATING UNDER STANDARD GUIDANCE FROM THE DETACHMENT, REFUSED TO DISCUSS REPARATIONS. I'VE ALREADY DISCUSSED THE REQUIREMENT FOR PROVINCES TO ATTEND COORDINATION CONFERENCES PREPARED AND READY TO DISCUSS CASE SPECIFICS; THE VNOSMP AGREED AND PROMISED THAT PROVINCES ATTENDING FUTURE CONFERENCES WOULD BE PROPERLY PREPARED PRIOR TO ATTENDING THE MEETING. I'LL ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF WAR REPARATIONS AT THE JFA AFTER ACTION REVIEW HELD JOINTLY WITH THE VNOSMP. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN RAISED IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS.

D. VIETNAMESE COOPERATION DURING THIS JFA, EXCEPT FOR COMMENTS LISTED ABOVE (PARAGRAPH C) REMAINED EXCELLENT. ALL RECOVERY TEAM LEADERS COMMENTED POSITIVELY ON COOPERATION AT THE CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL LEVELS. IE1'S TEAM LEADER, OPERATING IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, DESCRIBED COOPERATION AND THE UNILATERAL PREPARATION DONE TO SUPPORT THE JOINT TEAM WORK AS THE BEST HE'S SEEN IN VIETNAM. OF PARTICULAR NOTE DURING THIS JFA WAS THE VIETNAMESE COOPERATION PROVIDED DURING THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL EVACUATION OF A TEAM MEMBER FROM RE 6 IN QUANG NAM-DA NANG PROVINCE. THE VNOSMP COORDINATED AIRCRAFT CLEARANCES, LANDING PROCEDURES, AND MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR THIS OPERATION. BECAUSE OF THEIR EFFORTS, THE MEDICAL EVACUATION PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY AND EFFICIENTLY. ADDITIONALLY, QUANG TRI PROVINCE PROVIDED EFFECTIVE GUARD SUPPORT FOR THE SITE ASSOCIATED WITH PRIORITY CASE 1927 BETWEEN THE 39TH AND 40TH JFA. BECAUSE OF THEIR EFFORTS, THE SITE REMAINED UNDISTURBED RESULTING IN A SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY OPERATION DURING THIS JFA.

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E. THE USE OF THE VIETNAMESE NAVAL VESSEL FOR THE UNDERWATER RECOVERY ATTEMPTED FOR CASE 0465 (DETERMINED TO BE A RESOLVED CASE) OFF OF NGHE AN PROVINCE PROVED SUCCESSFUL. ALL REPORTS INDICATE THE CREW WAS PROFESSIONAL, COMPETENT, AND FULLY SUPPORTIVE THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE RESULTS OF THE RECOVERY DEMONSTRATE AGAIN THE DIFFICULTY OF UNDERWATER OPERATIONS OFF THE COAST OF VIETNAM. GIVEN THE EXPERIENCE OF THIS OPERATION, SIMILAR UNDERWATER RECOVERIES SHOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN UNLESS WE HAVE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE AIRCRAFT AND IS LOCATED IN AN AREA WHERE RECOVERY IS POSSIBLE AND SAFE. THESE OPERATIONS ARE INHERENTLY DANGEROUS AND NOT TO BE VIEWED AS ROUTINE.

F. WEATHER IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY REMAINED POOR THROUGHOUT THE JFA, SLOWING AND IN SOME CASES STOPPING WORK. FOR THE SECOND TIME, A RECOVERY TEAM OCCUPIED A BASE CAMP AND ATTEMPTED TO BEGIN RECOVERY ON CASE 0279 (NGHE AN), ONLY TO HAVE WEATHER FORCE THE ABANDONMENT OF THE SITE. I'VE RECOMMENDED THIS SITE BE INCLUDED ON THE 41ST JFA WORK PLAN. THE BASE CAMP AND SUPPORTING LANDING ZONE ARE READY FOR USE; ALL WE NEED IS A BREAK IN THE WEATHER TO SUCCESSFULLY EXCAVATE THIS SITE.

G. TWO CASES LISTED FOR THE 40TH JFA INCLUDED EXCAVATIONS IN VIETNAMESE CEMETERIES REQUIRING THE MOVEMENT OF VIETNAMESE GRAVES. IN BOTH CASES, THE VNOSMP DID NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION OF THE FAMILIES OR VILLAGES INVOLVED TO DISTURB THE GRAVE SITES. BEFORE A JOINT TEAM RETURNS TO COMPLETE CASE 0854 IN HA TAY, THE VNOSMP MUST GET THE REQUIRED PERMISSION. THE SAME APPLIES TO CASE 0381 IN DA NANG. THE DA NANG CASE IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AS EXCAVATION REQUIRES THE REMOVAL OF NINE VIETNAMESE GRAVES. IF PERMISSION CANNOT BE OBTAINED FOR A JOINT TEAM TO EXECUTE THESE RECOVERIES, WE SHOULD PRESS THE VIETNAMESE TO EXECUTE UNILATERAL RECOVERIES AT THESE SITES. OBTAINING PERMISSION TO DISTURB VIETNAMESE GRAVES REMAINS A DELICATE ISSUE. WE SHOULD NOT PROCEED WITH THE IDEA THAT WE WILL ALWAYS RECEIVE PERMISSION. THE VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WILL NOT FORCE A FAMILY TO DISINTER FAMILY REMAINS TO SUPPORT A JOINT EXCAVATION.

H. THE ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP) ENJOYED TREMENDOUS SUCCESS DURING THE 40TH JFA. THE VIETNAMESE MADE SOME OF THEIR HIGHEST RANKING OFFICIALS EVER INTERVIEWED BY JTF PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO THE JOINT TEAM. INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED WITH THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND FORMER COMMANDERS OF THE PAVN 9TH AND 10TH DIVISIONS ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT. ADDITIONALLY, THE 9TH
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/
SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED IN
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DIVISION COMMANDER REMAINS AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE PAVN VETERANS' ORGANIZATION. HE PLEDGED FULL SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS. HE ASKED WHO WE NEEDED TO MEET AND INTERVIEW AND PROMISED HIS ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING AND MAKING THESE INDIVIDUALS AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW. ALL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS PROVIDED THE TEAM WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION AND NEW LEADS. REPORTS OF THESE INTERVIEWS WILL BE PUBLISHED UNDER SEPARATE COVER. I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT SOME OF OUR BEST LEADS IN UPCOMING JFA'S WILL RESULT FROM INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE OHP TEAM.//
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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00560738
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS686 MCN = 96118/06957 TOR = 961180432
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1246 1180432-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 270432Z APR 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEKJSA/STOC
 RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
 RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 250922Z APR 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEACNP/BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS-663P//
 RHWRMPC/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCs/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHMMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 BT
CONTROLS
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 SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION: "NUMBER OF DEAD AMERICAN
 MILITARY AIRCREW DISCOVERED IN SON LA TERRITORY FROM 1965 TO 1972"//
 REF/RMG/JCRC LIAISON/160930ZMAR90//
 AMPN/REF IS AN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT FROM THE 9TH JOINT FIELD
 ACTIVITY CONCERNING A CRASH INCIDENT IN SON LA PROVINCE//
 RMKS/1. ON 30 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER SEVEN
 SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THESE
 SETS OF DOCUMENTS REPRESENT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI) SPECIAL
 RESEARCH INFORMATION TEAM'S EFFORTS IN THE PROVINCES OF HA BAC, LANG
 SON, HAI HUNG, HAI PHONG, QUANG NINH, BAC THAI AND SON LA PROVINCES.
 A REPORT OF ACTIVITY FOR THE RESPECTIVE PROVINCE WAS INCLUDED WITH
 EACH SET OF DOCUMENTS.
 2. WITHIN THE SON LA SET OF DOCUMENTS, THE REPORT OF ACTIVITY
 DETAILS THE EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA RELEVANT INFOR-
 MATION IN SON LA PROVINCE. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND
 SKETCH MAPS RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN SON LA PROVINCE BY THE

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SPECIAL RESEARCH INFORMATION TEAM. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS IS TITLED:
 "NUMBER OF DEAD AMERICAN MILITARY AIRCREW DISCOVERED IN SON LA
 TERRITORY FROM 1965 TO 1972."

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES SOME CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA
 ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED POSSIBLE CORRELATIONS WITH THE FOLLOWING
 UNRESOLVED CASES: DATA , 0124-1-01, 0147-1-01, 0150-0-01,
 DATA , 0254-0-01, DATA AND DATA , AND RESOLVED CASES 0432,
 0482-1-01, 0619-1-01 AND 0658-1-01.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS TRANSLATED BELOW WITH JTF-FA ANALYST COMMENTS
 ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES (()).

((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

- "NUMBER OF DEAD AMERICAN MILITARY AIRCREW DISCOVERED IN SON LA
 TERRITORY FROM 1965 TO 1972.

- 1) 23 JUNE 1965, ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND VILLAGE
 SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF THE TOWN ((I.E. SON LA TOWN)) SHOT DOWN AN
 B-77, WHICH CRASHED IN THE AREA OF MONG HAMLET, HUA LA VILLAGE. THE
 PILOT PARACHUTED OUT AND WAS SHOT TO DEATH BEFORE HE REACHED THE
 GROUND BY ARMY MEDICAL SCHOOL AND GUERRILLA MILITIA. THE ARMY
 MEDICAL SCHOOL AND "NORTHWEST SOLDIER" NEWSPAPER BURIED HIM (1 GUY).
 ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA , AN UN-
 RESOLVED CASE. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON APPROXIMATE INCIDENT
 DATE, AIRCRAFT TYPE, LOCATION OF LOSS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS.
 FIELD INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE OBTAINED INFORMATION SIMILAR TO THAT
 CONTAINED IN THIS ENTRY. CASE DATA TOOK PLACE ON 14 JUN 65. NO U.S.
 REFNO LOSSES OCCURRED ON 23 JUN 1965.))

- 2) 19 AUG 65, GUERRILLA MILITIA OF SONG KHUA VILLAGE, MOC CHAU
 SHOT ONE CAPTAIN TO DEATH ON THE SPOT.
 ((HANDWRITTEN BELOW THIS LINE ENTRY WAS THE FOLLOWING)):
 "VERIFYING COMMITTEE." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH
 CASE 0124-1-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE, BASED ON APPROXIMATE INCIDENT
 DATE, LOCATION OF LOSS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. NO U.S. LOSSES
 OCCURED ON 19 AUG 65. FIELD INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE IN SONG KHUA
 VILLAGE OBTAINED INFORMATION SIMILAR TO THAT REPORTED IN THIS LINE
 ENTRY.))

- 3) 20 NOVEMBER 1965, GUERRILLA MILITIA IN NA NGHIU VILLAGE SHOT
 DOWN AN AIRPLANE WHICH CAME DOWN IN THE MUONG LAN AREA WITH ONE DEAD
 PILOT IN THE AIRCRAFT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH
 CASE 0150-0-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON
 APPROXIMATE INCIDENT DATE AND APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF LOSS ONLY. A
 SEARCH OF JTF-FA FILES REVEALED THAT NO U.S. LOSSES OCCURRED IN SON
 LA PROVINCE ON 20 NOV 65, AND THAT NO LOSSES OCCURRED IN NA NGHIU OR
 MUONG LAN VILLAGES. HOWEVER, THE COORDINATES OF THE INCIDENT LOCA-
 TION LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES FOR CASE 0150-0-01, WHICH LIE IN MUONG
 VA VILLAGE, ARE WITHIN 11 KM OF THE NEAREST PORTION OF ADJACENT MUONG
 LAN VILLAGE. IN ADDITION, OTHER DOCUMENTARY INFORMATION OBTAINED
 DURING FIELD INVESTIGATIONS IN SON LA PROVINCE (REF) REPLICATES THE
 INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LINE ENTRY, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE
 DATE PROVIDED IN THE LATTER INFORMATION IS THAT OF THE 0150 INCIDENT.
 THE NAME OF THE VILLAGE VARIES ACCORDING TO SOURCE. IT IS WRITTEN
 "NA NGHIU" IN SUBJECT DOCUMENT, "NA NGUU" IN REF AND IN THE "CATA-
 LOGUE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS," AND APPEARS AS "NA NGIU" ON

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SRV 1:100000-SCALE MAPS.))

- 4) 11 OCTOBER 1965, QOT HAMLET IN THE TOWN ((I.E., SON LA)) SHOT 1 GUY DEAD. ((THREE AIRCRAFT LOSSES OCCURRED IN SON LA PROVINCE DURING OCTOBER 1965. HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS INSUFFICIENT TO CORRELATE WITH ANY OF THESE OR ANY OTHER CASE. "QOT HAMLET" (BANR QOOTJ) DOES NOT APPEAR ON ANY MAP OR IN ANY GAZETTEER AVAILABLE TO JTF-FA. IT MAY BE A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR.))

- 5) 3 NOVEMBER 1965 GUERRILLA MILITIA IN CHIENG SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT 300 METERS FROM NA QAN HAMLET. THE BANDIT PILOT'S BODY DISINTEGRATED. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE

DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON INCIDENT DATE AND PROVINCE OF LOSS ONLY. CASE DATA IS THE ONLY U.S. AIR LOSS THAT OCCURRED ON 11 OCT 65 IN SON LA PROVINCE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE DATA LIES IN CHIENG DONG VILLAGE, ABOUT 2 KM SE OF NA PAN HAMLET.))

- 6) IN 1965 GUERRILLA MILITIA OF KIM BON VILLAGE, PHU YEN SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT, THE PILOT DIED AT THE CRASH SITE IN THE AIRCRAFT. ((TWO U.S. REFNO LOSSES OCCURRED WITHIN 24 KM OF KIM BON VILLAGE, PHU YEN DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE, DURING 1965. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH NEITHER OF THESE, NOR IS IT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO CORRELATE WITH ANY OTHER CASE IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- 7) 8 FEBRUARY 1966, GUERRILLA MILITIA OF TU NANG VILLAGE SHOT DOWN AN A-6A AIRCRAFT, KILLING TWO INDIVIDUALS IN THE AIRCRAFT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0254-0-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON APPROXIMATE INCIDENT DATE, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH OF JTF-FA DATA BASES REVEALED ONLY ONE A6 LOSS OCCURRED IN SON LA PROVINCE DURING FEBRUARY 1966, CASE 0254. IN NOV 95 A JOINT TEAM EXCAVATED A SITE IN TU NANG VILLAGE, RECOVERING ITEMS SUFFICIENT TO CORRELATE THIS SITE WITH CASE 0254.))

- 8) ON 17 JUNE 1966 AN ENEMY PILOT DIED AT CO NOI MAI SON; ONE GUY WAS IN THE AIRCRAFT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0147-1-01, BASED ON LOSS LOCATION ONLY. CASE 0147 TOOK PLACE ON 17 SEP 65, IN CO NOI VILLAGE. THERE ARE NO OTHER LOSSES IN THAT

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION: "NUMBER OF DEAD AMERICAN RMKS/
VILLAGE.))

- 9) ON 12 MAR 1967 SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF THE MOC CHAU STATE FARM (HOA HAMLET) SHOT 1 GUY DEAD. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0619-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON INCIDENT DATE, CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE INFORMATION REGARDING THE SHOOTING IS CORROBORATED BY A U.S. WITNESS DEBRIEFING REPORT. DURING HIS DEBRIEFING, THE SECOND CREW MEMBER INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT, A RETURNEE, STATED THE PILOT FOR CASE 0619-1-01 PARACHUTED 200 METERS FROM HIS LOCATION INTO SOME BUSHES, A SHORT TIME LATER HE HEARD GUNFIRE AND ASSUMED THE 0619-1-01 INDIVIDUAL HAD BEEN SHOT. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 0619 LIES 12 KM DUE EAST OF HOA HAMLET, MOC CHAU STATE FARM.))

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- 10) ON 04 APR 1967 THE 65TH PLATOON OF THE MOC CHAU STATE FARM AND THE 14TH BN SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT, KILLING TWO GUYS IN THE AIRCRAFT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE, BASED ON INCIDENT DATE, NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- 11) IN 1967 GUERRILLA MILITIA OF QUANG HUY VILLAGE, PHU YEN DISTRICT, SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT, KILLING 2 INDIVIDUALS IN THE AIRCRAFT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0432, BASED ON LOSS LOCATION ONLY. FIELD INVESTIGATION OF CASES IN PHU YEN DISTRICT HAS REVEALED THAT THE ONLY INCIDENT TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN QUANG HUY VILLAGE IS CASE 0432, WHICH INVOLVES THE LOSS OF BOTH CREW MEMBERS.))

- 12) 5 JULY 1967, GUERRILLA MILITIA IN CHIENG CONG VILLAGE, MUONG LA, SHOT 1 GUY DEAD. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0482-1-01 BASED ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. NO U.S. REFNO LOSSES OCCURRED IN SON LA PROVINCE DURING JULY 1967. FIELD INVESTIGATION AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT CASE 0482, WHICH INVOLVES THE LOSS OF ONE OF THE TWO-MAN CREW OF AN F-4C AIRCRAFT, TOOK PLACE IN CHIENG CONG VILLAGE.))

- 13) IN 1968, GUERRILLA MILITIA IN PHIENG BAN VILLAGE SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT KILLING 1 INDIVIDUAL IN THE AIRCRAFT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0658-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON LOCATION OF LOSS ONLY. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF THIS CASE LIES IN MUONG KHOA VILLAGE, 10 KM WEST OF PHIENG BAN VILLAGE. OTHER DOCUMENTS FROM SON LA PROVINCE INDICATE THAT REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0658 WERE BURIED IN PHIENG BAN VILLAGE. THIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS PROVIDED BY THE SRV IN 1987, BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF JOINT FIELD INVESTIGATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, CASE 0658 WAS NEVER INVESTIGATED, AND AN ADJUSTMENT OF THE LOSS LOCATION BASED ON FIELD INVESTIGATION WAS NEVER MADE. THE ONLY AIRCRAFT LOSS WHICH OCCURRED IN SON LA PROVINCE IN 1968 TOOK PLACE TOO FAR FROM PHIENG BAN VILLAGE TO CORRELATE WITH THIS LINE ENTRY.))

- 14) IN 1972 GUERRILLA MILITIA OF MUONG DO VILLAGE, PHU YEN SHOT 1 GUY DEAD. ((THE FOLLOWING WAS HANDWRITTEN BELOW LINE ENTRY 14)): "ME RIVER (MRUNG 8/8/72)." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON YEAR AND LOCATION OF LOSS. CASE DATA TOOK PLACE ON DATA JUN 72; ITS RECORD LOSS LOCATION LIES IN MUONG DO VILLAGE.)) ((END TRANSLATION))

5. FOR AFPC/DPWCM AND BUPERS/PERS 663P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

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6. EVAL: DWO//

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 ITEM NO=00560674
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 CDSN = CFS655 MCN = 96118/06652 TOR = 961180410
 PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1224 1180410-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
 HEADER
 P 270410Z APR 96
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 P 270250Z APR 96 ZYB
 FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J30//
 TO AIG 960
 RUEAHOF/CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PAO//
 RUEVAAN/VA CENTRAL OFC WASHINGTON DC//OOF//
 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
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 CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC J30//

SUBJ/JTF-FA SITREP 96-17//

RMKS/1. THIS SITREP COVERS THE PERIOD FROM 182000ZAPR96 TO 252000ZAPR96. SUMMARY. IN VIETNAM, 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) (21 MAR-26 APR 96) CONCLUDED WITH TWO INVESTIGATION ELEMENTS (IE) AND SIX RECOVERY ELEMENTS (RE) REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND. PRIOR TO REDEPLOYMENT, IE1 INVESTIGATED TWO CASES IN HA TAY PROVINCE. IE2 CONTINUED AN INVESTIGATION IN DONG NAI PROVINCE. RE1 FINISHED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED PORTION OF AN A-4E CRASH SITE IN HA TAY PROVINCE. RE2 PREPARED EQUIPMENT FOR REDEPLOYMENT. RE3 FINISHED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED BURIAL SITE ASSOCIATED WITH AN OV-10 CRASH IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. RE4 FINISHED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED AN F-105D SITE IN HANOI. RE5 PREPARED SITE ASSOCIATED WITH AN UNCORRELATED CASE FOR FUTURE EXCAVATION. RE6 FINISHED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED BURIAL SITE ASSOCIATED WITH AN RF-101C SITE IN SON LA PROVINCE. IN LAOS, PREPARATIONS CONTINUE FOR JFA 96-4L (12 JUN-12 JUL 96). IN CAMBODIA, JFA 96-3C (20 APR-20 MAY 96) BEGAN WITH ONE IE AND ONE RE. IE INVESTIGATED ONE CASE EACH IN PREY VENG AND SVAY RIENG PROVINCES. RE BEGAN EXCAVATING A POSSIBLE BURIAL SITE ON TANG ISLAND.

2. OPERATIONS

A. VIETNAM

(1) 40TH JFA CONCLUDED ON 25 APR 96. INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND ON 24 AND 25 APR 96.

(A) IE1 INVESTIGATED FOLLOWING CASES: IN HA TAY: PROVINCE, CASES 0570 (RF-4C, TWO UNACCOUNTED FOR) AND 1955 (B-52D, FOUR UNACCOUNTED FOR). REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND ON 25 APR 96.

(B) IE2 IN DONG NAI PROVINCE CONTINUED INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0027 (B-26B, TWO UNACCOUNTED FOR). INTERVIEWED WITNESS WHO

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PROVIDED INFORMATION ON UNCORRELATED CRASH SITE. TEAM EXAMINED REMAINS WHICH WITNESS ALLEGEDLY EXHUMED FROM SITE. VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) TOOK POSSESSION OF REMAINS FOR JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW. TEAM ALSO EXAMINED WRECKAGE WITH POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION DATA. DATA SENT TO HQ JTF-FA FOR ANALYSIS. IN HO CHI MINH CITY, INTERVIEWED WITNESS WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE LOCATION OF REMAINS IN THUA THIEN-HUE PROVINCE. REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND ON 25 APR 96.

(C) RE1. IN HA TAY PROVINCE, COMPLETED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED PROJECT AREA AT SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0854 (A-4E, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). RECOVERED POSSIBLE AIR CREW-RELATED EQUIPMENT. SITE NOT CLOSED; ANOTHER AREA REQUIRES EXCAVATION DURING LATER JFA. REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND ON 25 APR 96.

(D) RE2. CONDUCTED EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE, WROTE REPORTS. REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND ON 25 APR 96.

(E) RE3. IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, COMPLETED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED ALLEGED BURIAL SITE ASSOCIATED WITH PRIORITY CASE 1820 (OV-10, TWO UNACCOUNTED FOR). TEAM DID NOT RECOVER ANY REMAINS, WRECKAGE, OR PERSONAL EFFECTS. REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND ON 25 APR 96.

(F) RE4. IN HANOI MUNICIPALITY, COMPLETED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA (F-105D, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). DID NOT RECOVER REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS. REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND ON 24 APR 96.

(G) RE5. IN THUA THIEN-HUE PROVINCE, PREPARED BASE CAMP AND LANDING ZONE AREAS FOR UNCORRELATED CASE DESIGNATED 9996. REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND ON 25 APR 96.

(H) RE6. IN SON LA PROVINCE, COMPLETED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED ALLEGED BURIAL SITES ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA (RF-101C, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). DID NOT RECOVER ANY REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS. REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND ON 24 APR 96.

(2) CASUALTY RESOLUTION SPECIALIST (CRS) OFFICE

(A) RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT). IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, CONTINUED INVESTIGATING PRIORITY CASE 0453 (A-1E, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). TEAM INTERVIEWED INDIVIDUAL WHO ALLEGEDLY FOUND REMAINS, PILOT'S HELMET, PAIR OF BOOTS, AND DATA PLATE AT CRASH SITE IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. WITNESS BURIED REMAINS IN LAOS. TRAVELED TO LAO BAO CEMETERY TO SURVEY AN ALLEGED U.S. SERVICEMAN'S GRAVE; RESULTS WERE NEGATIVE.

(B) ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP) TEAM. IN BINH DINH PROVINCE, INTERVIEWED ONE WITNESS WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, INTERVIEWED WITNESS WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REMAINS RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAOS.

(C) TRILATERAL WITNESS PROGRAM. CRS OFFICE PERSONNEL COORDINATED WITH VNOSMP CONCERNING LAO GOVERNMENT INTERVIEWS OF VIETNAMESE WITNESSES FOR JFA 96-4L. ACTING DIRECTOR, VNOSMP, INFORMED DET TWO HE HAD DIRECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE WITNESSES READY FOR INTERVIEW IN HANOI FROM 6-9 MAY 96.

(D) VIETNAMESE MAIL. RECEIVED LETTER FROM VIETNAMESE CITIZEN CONTAINING INFORMATION ALLEGEDLY ASSOCIATED WITH AN UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICAN, PHOTOGRAPH OF REMAINS, AND POSSIBLE BONE

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CHIP. INFORMATION DOES NOT CORRELATE TO ANY UNACCOUNTED FOR PERSONNEL. ALLEGED BONE CHIP WILL BE FORWARDED TO JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW (6-9 JUN 96).

(E) WALK-IN INTERVIEWS. ON 20 APR 96, CRS OFFICE PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED A WALK-IN WHO PROVIDED SECOND HAND UNCORRELATED INFORMATION ON AN ALLEGED CRASH SITE AND REMAINS IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE. ON 23 APR 96, CRS OFFICE PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED A WALK-IN WHO PROVIDED SECOND HAND INFORMATION ON AN INDIVIDUAL WHO ALLEGEDLY HAD THE REMAINS OF TWO U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS. REMAINS ALLEGEDLY WERE RECOVERED IN CAMBODIA. REPORT FORWARDED TO HQ JTF-FA.

B. LAOS

(1) FIELD ACTIVITY. PLANNING ONGOING FOR JFA 96-4L. DET BEGAN FINAL COORDINATION FOR LAO OFFICIALS TRIP TO HANOI TO INTERVIEW SIX VIETNAMESE WITNESSES DURING WEEK OF 5 MAY 96.

(2) ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM (ART). LAOS ART DID NOT REVIEW ANY FILMS THIS WEEK AT LAO NATIONAL FILM ARCHIVE AND VIDEO CENTER. FILM EDITING/REVIEWING MACHINE HAS BEEN REPAIRED.

C. CAMBODIA. JFA 96-3C ONGOING.

(1) ON 18 APR 96, CAMBODIAN POW/MIA COMMITTEE MEMBERS TRAVELED TO TANG ISLAND AND BEGAN CONSTRUCTION OF THEIR BASE CAMP. SECURITY AND LABOR WERE ARRANGED; FUEL AND WATER WERE DELIVERED TO THE ISLAND. EXCAVATION AND INVESTIGATIONS SITES WERE IDENTIFIED AND CLEARED. LAO WEST COAST HELICOPTER ARRIVED IN PHNOM PENH TO SUPPORT JFA.

(2) SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. CHUM HOL WHO PROVIDED NO RELEVANT INFORMATION ON UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS.

(3) ON 20 APR 96, JFA 96-3C INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM (IRT) ARRIVED IN PHNOM PENH AND CONTINUED ON TO SIHANOUKVILLE SAME DAY. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT REMAINED IN SIHANOUKVILLE TO INTERVIEW PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES CONCERNING POSSIBLE REMAINS ON TANG ISLAND. RECOVERY ELEMENT CONTINUED ON TO TANG ISLAND. ON 21 AND 22 APR 96, //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/JTF-FA SITREP 96-17//

RMKS/

IE INTERVIEWED WITNESSES IN SIHANOUKVILLE CONCERNING POSSIBLE GRAVESITES ON TANG ISLAND. ON 21 APR 96, RE TEAM MEMBER SUSTAINED MINOR CUTS ON LEG WHILE OPERATING A CHAIN SAW; WAS MEDICALLY EVACUATED TO BANGKOK ON 22 APR 96. ON 26 APR 96, DOCTOR WILL DETERMINE IF SERVICE MEMBER CAN RETURN TO DUTY ON TANG ISLAND.

(4) ON 22 APR 96, RE BEGAN EXCAVATING POSSIBLE GRAVESITE IN WELL ON TANG ISLAND AND IE ACCOMPANIED TWO WITNESSES TO TANG ISLAND. WITNESSES COULD ONLY PROVIDE GENERAL LOCATION OF POSSIBLE GRAVESITES ON EASTERN BEACH AREA. WITNESSES SUBSEQUENTLY LED IE ON SEARCH OF WESTERN BEACH AREA FOR POSSIBLE CAVE WHERE THREE AMERICANS WERE ALLEGEDLY BURIED IN 1975; RESULTS WERE NEGATIVE. WITNESSES WILL REMAIN ON TANG ISLAND WITH RE AND CONTINUE ATTEMPT TO PINPOINT CAVE.

(5) IE INVESTIGATED FOLLOWING CASES: IN PREY VENG PROVINCE, 0832 (BOAT, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). IN SVAY RIENG PROVINCE, 1588 (MOTORCYCLE, TWO UNACCOUNTED FOR).

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3. INTELLIGENCE. SIX NOTIFICATIONS SENT TO THE SERVICE CASUALTY OFFICES FOR RELEASE TO NEXT OF KIN.

4. LOGISTICS

A. DET ONE. COORDINATED DEPLOYMENT OF TEAMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR JFA 96-3C AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS IN LAOS. PLANNED REDEPLOYMENT OF 40TH JFA TEAM AND EQUIPMENT FROM VIETNAM. DIRECTED 19 APR 96 RESUPPLY CHANNEL FLIGHT TO PHNOM PENH, WHICH INCLUDED CARGO FOR USAID AND EMBASSY. USMC KC-130 FLEW CHANNEL FLIGHT TO VIENTIANE ON 24 APR 96 AND SUPPORTED REDEPLOYMENT OF 40TH JFA TEAMS FROM HANOI ON 24 AND 25 APR 96. USAF C-130 AIRCRAFT REDEPLOYED 40TH JFA TEAM FROM DA NANG ON 25 APR 96.

B. DET TWO. REDEPLOYED 40TH JFA TEAM AND EQUIPMENT TO THAILAND. CONTINUED PREPARATIONS FOR U.S. ARMY MAINTENANCE TEAM TO COMPLETE REPAIRS TO PAJERO VEHICLES IN HO CHI MINH CITY AND TO BEGIN INSPECTION OF VEHICLES USED DURING 40TH JFA.

C. DET THREE. FILM EDITING MACHINE AT LAO FILM ARCHIVE FACILITY WAS REPAIRED. PROJECT BAKER LADDER (IRRIGATION PUMP) COMPLETED ON 23 APR 96. PROJECT BAKER LEADER (CONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOL HOUSE) UNDERWAY AND ON SCHEDULE. COORDINATION FOR PROJECT BAKER LLAMA (HOSPITAL UPGRADE) AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE PROGRAM CONTINUES.

D. DET FOUR. CONTINUED SUPPORT OF JFA 96-3C. PREPARING FOR ARRIVAL OF U.S. ARMY MAINTENANCE TEAM TO REPAIR PAJERO VEHICLES.

E. HQ JTF-FA. COORDINATING WITH THE NAVY REGIONAL CONTRACTING CENTER IN SINGAPORE TO RESOLVE CHARGES UNDER DISPUTE WITH VEHICLE MAINTENANCE CONTRACTOR IN VIETNAM. COMPTROLLER IS CURRENTLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL RECORDS AT EACH DETACHMENT. INVENTORY OF DETACHMENT PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY.

5. COMMUNICATIONS/CONNECTIVITY. NTR.

6. PERSONNEL. JTF-FA MANNING REMAINS AT 151 MILITARY PERSONNEL (159 AUTHORIZED) AND 22 CIVILIANS (22 AUTHORIZED), WITH NINE EXCESS AND FIVE ATTACHED PERSONNEL.

7. SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC/MILITARY/PAO EVENTS.

A. DET ONE

(1) ON 18 APR 96, OPS OFFICER BRIEFED COL KULLANDER, COMMANDER, 633 AMSS, KADENA AB, JAPAN, ON JTF-FA MISSION AND PROVIDED TOUR OF JTF-FA WAREHOUSE AREA ON U'TAPHAO NAVAL AIRBASE.

(2) ON 22 APR 96, OPS OFFICER PROVIDED AN UPDATE ON JTF-FA OPERATIONS TO MR. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY AND MG JOHN M. HALL, DIRECTOR, ASIA PACIFIC REGION, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DURING A COUNTRY TEAM BRIEF.

B. DET TWO

(1) ON 20 APR 96, MS. LES KANER, DANISH PHOTO JOURNALIST, CONTACTED DET TWO OPS NCO CONCERNING HER RECENT VISIT TO VIETNAM.

(2) ON 23 APR 96, MS. KRISTIN HUCKSHORN, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, INTERVIEWED DET CDR.

(3) ON 25 APR 96, CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AT NOI BAI AIRPORT CONFISCATED SOME DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE-ISSUED MATERIAL (VIETNAMESE) BELONGING TO RE2 LINGUIST. MATERIAL WAS REPORTEDLY SENT TO THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE SINCE SOME OF THE VIETNAMESE PHRASES WERE

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"NOT IN LINE WITH POLICY." DET TWO WORKING THROUGH VNOSMP TO GET LANGUAGE MATERIAL RETURNED. DET TWO ALSO NOTIFIED DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, U.S. EMBASSY OF INCIDENT.

C. DET THREE

(1) DET CDR BRIEFED MR. MIKE TRIAL, PHOENIX GROUP, ON JTF-FA MISSION. MR. TRIAL REPRESENTS AN ORGANIZATION OF VETERANS AND CIVILIANS WHO CONDUCT FRIENDSHIP PARACHUTE JUMPS WITH FOREIGN MILITARY AIRBORNE UNITS.

(2) DET CDR AND CASUALTY RESOLUTION SPECIALIST MET WITH MR. GREGG DAVIS, TIME MAGAZINE PHOTOGRAPHER, AND MR. PHILIP GRIFFITHS, MAGNUM PHOTOS, NEW YORK. THEY WERE INTERESTED IN CURRENT STATUS OF CASE 2062 WHICH INVOLVES AN UNACCOUNTED FOR PHOTO-JOURNALIST. DET THREE BRIEFED ON CURRENT EFFORTS TO LOCATE CRASH SITE.

D. DET FOUR. ON 17 APR 96, DET FOUR PERSONNEL MET WITH AMBASSADOR GORDON BROWN, STATE DEPARTMENT INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICE, AND DISCUSSED EMBASSY SUPPORT AND RELATIONSHIP WITH DET FOUR.

E. HQ JTF-FA

(1) ON 20 APR 96, CJTF-FA WAS THE KEYNOTE SPEAKER FOR THE REUNION OF THE 37TH INFANTRY DIVISION VETERAN'S ASSOCIATION IN FREDRICKSBURG, TEXAS.

(2) ON 23 APR 96, CJTF-FA PRESENTED THE JTF-FA MISSION BRIEF AT USARPAC COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR'S CONFERENCE AT FT SHAFTER, HI.

(3) CJTF-FA HOSTED JTF-FA BRIEFINGS FOR BG AND MRS. JACKSON, USCINCPAC J4, ON 24 APR 96; AND FOR MR. JOHNSON, DEP DIR, JOINT COMSEC MONITORING, AND LTC MARSHALL, ASST GEN COUNSEL, INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY, NSA, ON 25 APR 96.

8. CJTF-FA'S TDY SCHEDULE: CONUS 2-5 MAY 96 AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 14-24 MAY 96 (17 MAY TECHNICAL TALKS VIETNAM).

9. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: NTR.

10. USCINCPAC POC: CPT MARC LOVELL, J33, DSN (315) 477-3490.

11. BG DONALD, J30 SENDS.//

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ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS008 MCN = 96111/07597 TOR = 961110421
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ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 200303Z APR 96
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 200300Z APR 96 ZYB
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J30//
TO AIG 960
RUEAHOF/CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PAO//
RUEVAAN/VA CENTRAL OFC WASHINGTON DC//OOF//
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
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CONTROLS

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SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC J30//
SUBJ/JTF-FA SITREP 96-16//
RMKS/1. THIS SITREP COVERS THE PERIOD FROM 112000ZAPR96 TO
182000ZAPR96. SUMMARY. IN VIETNAM, 40TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA)
(21 MAR 96-26 APR 96) CONTINUES OPERATIONS WITH TWO INVESTIGATION
ELEMENTS (IE) AND SIX RECOVERY ELEMENTS (RE). IE1 INVESTIGATED ONE
CASE IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. IE2 INVESTIGATED ONE CASE IN DONG NAI
PROVINCE. RE1 CONTINUED EXCAVATING AN A-4E CRASH SITE IN HA TAY
PROVINCE; RECOVERED REMAINS. RE2 FINISHED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED AN
A-7A SITE IN HA TINH PROVINCE. RE3 EXCAVATING AN ALLEGED BURIAL SITE
ASSOCIATED WITH AN OV-10 CRASH SITE. RE4 CONTINUED EXCAVATING AN
F-105D SITE IN HANOI. RE5 FINISHED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED A GROUND
LOSS SITE IN QUANG NAM-DA NANG PROVINCE; RECOVERED REMAINS. RE6
EXCAVATING TWO ALLEGED BURIAL SITES ASSOCIATED WITH AN RF-101C CRASH
SITE IN SON LA PROVINCE; RECOVERED REMAINS. IN LAOS, PREPARATIONS
UNDERWAY FOR JFA 96-4L (12 JUN 96-12 JUL 96). IN CAMBODIA, ADVANCE
TEAM IN PLACE FOR JFA 96-3C (20 APR 96-20 MAY 96).

2. OPERATIONS

A. VIETNAM

(1) 40TH JFA ONGOING.

(A) IE1 INVESTIGATED FOLLOWING CASES: IN VINH PHU
PROVINCE, ONE UNCORRELATED CASE. IN HANOI, EXAMINED POSSIBLE HUMAN
REMAINS AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE TURNED OVER BY VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR
SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) AND POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH AN
UNCORRELATED CASE IN LAO CAI PROVINCE. VNOSMP WILL LOCATE WITNESS
FOR INTERVIEW. CLEANED WRECKAGE RECOVERED DURING INVESTIGATION OF
CASE 1068 (A-6A, TWO UNACCOUNTED FOR) CRASH SITE IN QUANG NINH
PROVINCE; FORWARDED INFORMATION AND SERIAL NUMBERS TO HQ JTF-FA FOR

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ANALYSIS.

(B) IE2 INVESTIGATED FOLLOWING CASES: IN DONG NAI PROVINCE, CASES 0027 (B-26B, TWO UNACCOUNTED FOR) AND 1273 (O-1F, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). IN NINH THUAN PROVINCE, INTERVIEWED WITNESS CONCERNING ALLEGED CRASH SITE AND POSSIBLE HUMAN REMAINS HE EXHUMED IN 1983. VNOSMP TOOK POSSESSION OF REMAINS; U.S. ANTHROPOLOGIST WILL EXAMINE REMAINS FROM 16-17 APR 96 IN HO CHI MINH CITY. ON 18 APR 96, MEDIC TREATED THREE TEAM MEMBERS FOR APPARENT FOOD POISONING.

(C) RE1. IN HA TAY PROVINCE, EXCAVATING SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0854 (A-4E, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). RECOVERED POSSIBLE HUMAN REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, CLOTHING, AIR CREW-RELATED EQUIPMENT, AND WRECKAGE. ON 15 APR 96, ANTHROPOLOGIST FLEW TO HO CHI MINH CITY TO EXAMINE UNILATERALLY TURNED OVER REMAINS.

(D) RE2. IN HA TINH PROVINCE, COMPLETED EXCAVATING AND CLOSED SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1878 (A-7A, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). RECOVERED WRECKAGE.

(E) RE3. IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, EXCAVATING ALLEGED BURIAL SITE ASSOCIATED WITH PRIORITY CASE 1820 (OV-10, TWO UNACCOUNTED FOR). RECOVERED INERT ORDNANCE; MOVED IT TO SAFE LOCATION.

(F) RE4. IN HANOI MUNICIPALITY, EXCAVATING SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA (F-105D, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). RECOVERED AIR CREW-RELATED EQUIPMENT AND WRECKAGE.

(G) RE5. IN QUANG NAM-DA NANG PROVINCE, COMPLETED OPERATIONS WITH CASE 0835 (GROUND, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). RECOVERED POSSIBLE HUMAN REMAINS, CLOTHING, AND PIECE OF POSSIBLE PARACHUTE MATERIAL (VICE AIR CREW-RELATED EQUIPMENT AS REPORTED LAST WEEK). IN THUA THIEN-HUE PROVINCE, SURVEYED SITE CURRENTLY DESIGNATED UNCORRELATED CASE 9996. RECOVERED PERSONAL EFFECTS, AIR CREW-RELATED EQUIPMENT, AND WRECKAGE. WORKED ON IMPROVING TRAIL FROM BASE CAMP TO SITE AND CLEARING LANDING ZONE. TEAM LEADER UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH PROVINCE OFFICIALS ON LAND COMPENSATION. DET TWO AND VNOSMP WILL RESOLVE LAND COMPENSATION ISSUE WITHOUT FURTHER INVOLVEMENT FROM PROVINCE OFFICIALS.

(H) RE6. IN SON LA PROVINCE, EXCAVATING TWO ALLEGED BURIAL SITES ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA (RF-101C, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). RECOVERED POSSIBLE HUMAN REMAINS, UNIDENTIFIED NON-U.S. ORDNANCE, SOLE FROM VIETNAMESE SANDAL, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS MATERIAL EFFECTS FROM ONE BURIAL SITE.

(2) CASUALTY RESOLUTION SPECIALIST (CRS) OFFICE

(A) RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT). IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, INVESTIGATED PRIORITY CASE 0453 (A-1E, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR) AND AN UNCORRELATED CASE. ALSO INVESTIGATED CASE 1842 (A-6A, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR); INTERVIEWED WITNESS WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATING TO CASE DATA (RF-4C, ONE UNACCOUNTED FOR). ON 14 APR 96, RIT'S VIDEO CAMERA WAS STOLEN. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI) INVESTIGATING.

(B) ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP) TEAM. VNOSMP REPORTED THEY ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE MEMBERS OF 524TH MILITARY GROUP. OHP TEAM WRITING REPORTS.

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(1) FIELD ACTIVITY

(A) SUMMARY OF JFA 96-3L (7 MAR-5 APR 96).
INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM (ONE IE AND THREE RE'S) INVESTIGATED TEN CASES AND EXCAVATED SITES ASSOCIATED WITH FOUR CASES. POSSIBLE HUMAN REMAINS RECOVERED FROM SITES ASSOCIATED WITH THREE CASES ARE CURRENTLY UNDER ANALYSIS AT THE U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, HAWAII (CILHI).

(B) PLANNING ONGOING FOR JFA 96-4L (12 JUN-12 JUL 96).
COORDINATED FOR UPCOMING LAO TRIP TO HANOI TO INTERVIEW WITNESSES FOR CASES IN LAOS.

(2) ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM (ART). LAOS ART DID NOT REVIEW ANY FILMS THIS WEEK AT THE LAO NATIONAL FILM ARCHIVE AND VIDEO CENTER DUE TO DEPARTURE OF ART LAO LINGUIST AND MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS WITH FILM EDITING/REVIEWING MACHINE. NEW ART LAO LINGUIST WILL ARRIVE ON 27 APR 96.

(3) ART STILL WAITING FOR LAO TO ASSIGN DEDICATED MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND) REPRESENTATIVE TO MILITARY MUSEUM SURVEY PROJECT. ACCORDING TO MFA OFFICIAL, THIS IS ONLY ISSUE THAT PRECLUDES SURVEY FROM BEGINNING. DET CDR HAS QUERIED MFA ON STATUS OF SURVEY EVERY WEEK OVER THE LAST SEVEN WEEKS.

C. CAMBODIA. PREPARATIONS ONGOING FOR JFA 96-3C.

(1) FROM 11-13 APR 96, CAMBODIAN POW/MIA COMMITTEE ATTEMPTED TO LOCATE TWO WITNESSES IDENTIFIED IN JFA 96-3C TASK LIST; BOTH DETERMINED TO BE DECEASED.

(2) ON 15 APR 96, CAMBODIAN ADVANCE PARTY DEPLOYED TO SIHANOUKVILLE TO PREPARE FOR JFA 96-3C. ON 16 APR 96, SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM (SRT) DEPLOYED TO SIHANOUKVILLE AND WERE MET BY CAMBODIAN ADVANCE TEAM. ON 17 APR 96, SRT INTERVIEWED WITNESS DR. NGUYEN QUOC CHINH. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FOR BASE CAMP ARRIVED TANG ISLAND ON 18 APR 96.

3. INTELLIGENCE

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/JTF-FA SITREP 96-16//

RMKS/

A. DET TWO. INTERVIEWED ONE WALK-IN CONCERNING ALLEGED CRASH SITE IN YEN BAI PROVINCE.

B. HQ JTF-FA. SENT 24 NOTIFICATIONS TO SERVICE CASUALTY OFFICES FOR RELEASE TO NEXT OF KIN.

4. LOGISTICS

A. DET ONE. COORDINATED REDEPLOYMENT OF UNDERWATER RECOVERY TEAM FROM VIETNAM. CONTINUED PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FOR JFA 96-3C AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS IN LAOS. PREPARING FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF 40TH JFA PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. DIRECTED 16 APR 96 RESUPPLY CHANNEL FLIGHT TO HANOI AND VIENTIANE.

B. DET TWO. CONTINUED SUPPORT OF 40TH JFA. PREPARING FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF JFA TEAM AND EQUIPMENT TO U'TAPHAO.

C. DET THREE. BEGAN PREPARATIONS FOR SUPPORT OF JFA 96-4L. BAKER LADDER (IRRIGATION PUMP PROJECT) CONTINUES ON SCHEDULE.

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR BAKER LEADER (SCHOOL HOUSE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT) HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. COORDINATION FOR BAKER LLAMA (HOSPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECT) CONTINUES. CIVIL AFFAIRS LIAISON TEAM SURVEYED TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND LIVING FACILITIES FOR USE DURING UPCOMING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE REMOVAL PROGRAM.

D. DET FOUR. COMPLETED ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR JFA 96-3C.

E. HQ JTF-FA. COMPTROLLER DEPARTED FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA TO CONDUCT AUDIT OF FINANCIAL RECORDS AT EACH DETACHMENT. COMPLETED ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY MAINTENANCE TEAM TO VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA TO COMPLETE REPAIRS ON PAJERO VEHICLES. COORDINATED WITH DET THREE REGARDING MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS WITH FILM REVIEWING/EDITING MACHINE AT LAO NATIONAL FILM AND ARCHIVE CENTER.

5. COMMUNICATIONS/CONNECTIVITY. NSTR.

6. PERSONNEL. JTF-FA MANNING AT 151 MILITARY PERSONNEL (159 AUTHORIZED) AND 22 CIVILIANS (22 AUTHORIZED), WITH NINE EXCESS AND FIVE ATTACHED PERSONNEL. LOSS: CTI3 MALIN, USN.

7. SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC/MILITARY/PAO EVENTS

A. DET ONE

(1) ON 10 APR 96, DET CDR BRIEFED RICHARD MOOSE, STATE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, ON RESULTS OF JFA 96-3L.

(2) ON 16 APR 96, OPS OFFICER ATTENDED COUNTRY TEAM BRIEF FOR USCINCPAC.

B. DET TWO

(1) ON 10 APR 96, A TV NEWS-AUSTRIA CREW VISITED RE3 SITE AND INTERVIEWED THE TEAM LEADER, ANTHROPOLOGIST, AND TEAM PHOTOGRAPHER. FOOTAGE IS SCHEDULED TO AIR IN AUSTRIA ON 30 APR 96.

(2) ON 13 APR 96, MS. KRISTIN HUCKSHORN, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, AND MR. JASON BLEIBTREU, WTN NEWS, VISITED RE1 SITE AND INTERVIEWED TEAM MEMBERS.

(3) ON 16 APR 96, MS. JULIE JAMES, TV NEWS-AUSTRIA, CONTACTED OPS NCO CONCERNING SITE VISIT BY THEIR TELEVISION CREW CURRENTLY IN VIETNAM.

C. HQ JTF-FA

(1) ON 15 APR 96, CJTF-FA HOSTED BRIEFINGS AND DINNER FOR AMBASSADOR MALIGNA SAIGNAVONGS, DIRECTOR OF AMERICAS AND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, MFA, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. AMB MALIGNA RECEIVED BRIEFINGS AT CAMP SMITH ON JTF-FA MISSION, CURRENT OPERATIONS, AND WORK REMAINING IN LAOS. COMMANDER, CILHI ALSO PROVIDED BRIEFING FOR AMBASSADOR MALIGNA AND HOSTED LUNCHEON ON 15 APR 96. ON 16 APR 96, CJTF-FA HELD GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR MALIGNA IN THE GOVERNOR'S LOUNGE ANNEX, HONOLULU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, AND BID HIM FAREWELL.

(2) ON 15 APR 96, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) PRESENTED COMMAND BRIEFING TO MS. KAREN HITCHO, A SENIOR US GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE.

(3) ON 17 APR 96, CJTF-FA GAVE A PRESENTATION ON JTF-FA MISSION TO THE OFFICERS OF THE BANK OF HAWAII.

(4) PA RESPONDED TO ADDITIONAL QUERIES REGARDING JTF-FA EXPENDITURES FROM MR. TIM LARIMER, FREE LANCE JOURNALIST, AND MS. KRISTIN HUCKSHORN, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, IN HANOI.

8. CJTF-FA TDY SCHEDULE: 18-22 APR 96 (CONUS) AND 2-5 MAY 96 (CONUS).

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9. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: IN LAOS, SLOW MOVING BUREAUCRACY CONTINUES TO PREVENT EXPANDED ARCHIVAL RESEARCH. LAO MND FAILURE TO PROVIDE REPRESENTATIVE TO MILITARY MUSEUM RESEARCH PROJECT HAS DELAYED THAT PROJECT FOR SEVEN WEEKS. EFFORTS TO VIEW LAO FILMS HELD IN HANOI ALSO MOVING SLOWLY. LAO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR UPGRADES TO THEIR FILM STORAGE FACILITIES BEFORE TRANSFER OF FILMS FROM HANOI.

10. USCINCPAC POC, CPT MARC LOVELL, USA, J33, DSN (315) 477-3490.

11. BG DONALD, J30 SENDS.//

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 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 292036Z MAR 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 270942Z MAR 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
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CONTROLS
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 SECTION 01 OF 03
 SECTION 1 OF 2

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/REPORT OF VNOSMP UNILATERAL ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE
 RIT (39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA))//
 RMKS/1. AT A 10 JAN 96 RIT MEETING IN HANOI, VNOSMP RIT TEAM LEADER
 COL PHAM TEO INFORMED HIS AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS THAT HE WAS PREPARING
 A WRITTEN REPORT OF THE UNILATERAL ACTIVITIES THE VNOSMP HAD DONE AND
 WOULD BE DOING TO SUPPORT THE RIT INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 39TH JFA. ON
 13 FEB 96, HE PROVIDED THE COMPLETED REPORT WHICH IS TRANSLATED IN
 FULL BELOW. THE REPORT IS HANDWRITTEN AND CONSISTS OF 15 PAGES.
 TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS APPEAR WITHIN DOUBLE PARENTHESES.
 ((BEGIN TRANSLATION))
 ((PAGE 1))

39TH ITERATION
 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM
 RESULTS OF THE ADVANCE PARTY

ON 4 AND THE MORNING OF 5 JAN 96, VIETNAM UNILATERALLY WORKED
 WITH THE ARTILLERY COMMAND, MEETING AND WORKING WITH MR. DUONG XUAN
 TOAN ((ZWONG XUAAN TOANS)), MR. PHAN VAN THAI ((PHAN VAWN THAIS)) AND
 MR. NGUYEN DINH BINH ((NGUYEENX DINHF BINHF)). THEY SAID THEY WERE
 READY TO LEAD THE JOINT TEAM TO THE SITE IF THERE WERE NO DUTY CON-

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TINGENCY.

FROM 6 AND 7 JAN 96, THE ADVANCE TEAM RETURNED TO HA BAC PROVINCE TO WORK WITH THE HA BAC PROVINCE MIA TEAM; MR. NGUYEN VAN LOC ((NGUYEENX VAWN LOOCJ)), TEAM LEADER; MR. NGUYEN XUAN QUYEN ((NGUYEENX XUAAN QUYEEFN)) AND MR. NGUYEN VAN THANH ((THANH)). COL. PHAM TEO SUBMITTED THE PURPOSE, REQUIREMENTS, CONTENT, METHODS AND TIME OF THE ADVANCE PARTY, ((AND)) THE ARRIVAL TIME OF THE JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM. THE TEAM ALSO WORKED WITH THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF LUC NAM DISTRICT: MR. GIAP NGOC LAN ((GIAPS NGOCJ LAN)), ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR ((CHANHS VAWN PHONGF)); MR. DUONG VAN THUONG ((ZWONG VAWN THWONGF)), SPECIALIST; MR. NGUYEN TRUNG LUU ((NGUYEENX TRUNG LWU)) ((AND)) MR. PHAM TRONG TUAN ((PHAMJ TRONGJ TUAANS)). AFTER ((WE)) FINISHED WORKING WITH THE LUC NAM DISTRICT TEAM, THE DISTRICT OFFICIALS ORDERED PEOPLE TO LEAD THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SPECIALIST TEAM ((I.E., THE ADVANCE TEAM)) AND THE PROVINCE TEAM TO WORK IN HUYN SON VILLAGE.

THE HUYN SON VILLAGE CADRE INCLUDED:

MR. PHAM VAN CACH ((PHAMJ VAWN CACHS)), PARTY CHAPTER SECRETARY; MR. NGUYEN DUC BAN ((NGUYEENX DWCS BAN)), PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN; MR. PHAM MINH ((PHAMJ MINH)), PUBLIC SECURITY; MR. NGUYEN VAN TRUONG ((NGUYEENX VAWN TRWONGF)), MILITIA COMMANDER; AND MR. PHAN VAN HAU ((PHAN VAWN HAAUJ)), GENERAL CADRE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OFFICE.

THE LOCAL LEADERS LET US KNOW THAT OF THE 4 WITNESSES THE AMERICAN SIDE REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW DURING THIS ITERATION, TODAY 3 PERSONS REMAIN, MR. TE ((TEES)), MR. PHA ((PHAR)) AND MR. CHUC ((CHUCS)). MR.

((PAGE 2))

DAU ((ZAAU)) DIED IN 1995. THE REMAINING WITNESSES ARE READY TO TAKE THE TEAM TO THE SITE.

FROM 08-10 JANUARY 1996, THE ADVANCE TEAM WAS IN BAC THAI PROVINCE. PROVINCE CADRE INCLUDED:

MR. DUONG VAN KHANH, PROVINCE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR ((PHOS VAWN PHONGF UBND TINHR)); MR. PHAM VAN TAN ((PHAMJ VAWN TAAN)), DISTRICT ((MIA)) TEAM LEADER; MR. NGUYEN VAN KIEN ((NGUYEENX VAWN KIEENJ)), MR. VU DINH TUYEN ((VUX DINHF TUYEENS)) AND MR. NGUYEN VAN PHUC ((PHUCS)) ARE THE PROVINCE MIA TEAM MEMBERS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT REQUESTS, THE JOINT TEAM WILL VISIT 3 (THREE) COORDINATES, (1) WJ 838804, (2) XJ 014699, (3) WJ 908928

THE RESULTS OF THE ADVANCE WORK WERE AS FOLLOWS:

1) COORDINATE WJ 838804 AT CUONG TANG HAMLET, THINH DUC VILLAGE, DONG HY DISTRICT, THAI NGUYEN CITY, BAC THAI PROVINCE: AT THIS COORDINATE, ((WE)) INTERVIEWED FOUR (4) WITNESSES, THEY ALL TOLD US THAT THEY HAD LIVED THERE FOR SEVERAL DECADES AND THAT NO AIRCRAFT EVER WENT DOWN IN THAT AREA (THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM ALREADY INVESTIGATED ON 10 NOV 95; THE U.S. TEAM LEADER WAS KEVIN D. SOUSER.)

2) COORDINATE XJ 014699: AN AIRCRAFT AND PILOT WENT DOWN AT QUYET THANG VILLAGE, HIEP HUE DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE. VIETNAM RETURNED THE REMAINS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON 31/7/1989. ((DURING)) THE 20 JFA, IN 10/1993, ((DIDN'T)) A JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM RETURN TO THIS LOCATION?

3) GRID COORDINATE WJ 903923 AT KHE MO VILLAGE, DONG HY DISTRICT,

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BAC THAI: NO AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT THIS LOCATION. ACCORDING TO WHAT THE LOCALITY TOLD US, A CHINESE MILITARY UNIT WAS STATIONED THERE DURING THE WAR AND THERE WAS A CHINESE MEDICAL AID STATION THERE. AN AIRCRAFT AND PILOT WENT DOWN AT BINH SON VILLAGE; 01 ((ONE)) PILOT WAS WOUNDED. CHINESE TROOPS TOOK THE PILOT TO THE CHINESE AID STATION AT NA NUA HAMLET, KHE MO VILLAGE, DONG HI DISTRICT FOR TREATMENT, BUT WHEN THEY GOT TO KHE MO THE PILOT HAD DIED. THE CHINESE TROOPS TRANSFERRED ((RESPONSIBILITY FOR)) THE BURIAL OF THE PILOT TO KHE MO VILLAGE. THE REMAINS WERE RETURNED TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON 6 APRIL 1988.

(CONTINUED)

((PAGE 3))

FROM 10 TO 11/01/96: ADVANCE WORK ACTIVITIES IN SON LA PROVINCE ((CASE DATA)) LOCAL SPECIALISTS INCLUDED:

- MR. NGUYEN VAN THO ((THOJ)) -- SON LA MIA TEAM LEADER
- MR. CAM PHUONG ((CAAMF PHWONG)) -- TEAM MEMBER
- MR. CAM HOANG ((CAAMF HOANGF)) -- TEAM MEMBER
- MR. BUI THANH ((BUIF THANF)) -- TEAM MEMBER
- MR. LE VAN DIN ((LEE VAWN DINHR)) -- TEAM MEMBER (SON LA CITY)
- MR. NGUYEN VAN CHAT ((CHAATS)) -- TEAM MEMBER (SON LA CITY)

RESULTS OF THE ADVANCE WORK WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- LOCATED AND MET WITH WITNESS NGUYEN TAN HUNG ((TANS HUNG)) - 70 YEARS OLD, WHO NOW LIVES IN SON LA CITY (SON LA PROVINCE)-- MR. HUNG PROMISED THAT HE WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE AMERICAN SIDE.
- LOCATED AND MET WITH MR. NGUYEN HUY HOANG ((HUY HOANGF)) - 53 YEARS OLD, A FORMER PAVN 1LT NOW RETIRED AND LIVING IN SON LA TOWNSHIP. THIS MR. NGUYEN HUY HOANG DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE AMERICAN PILOT. (THIS MR. NGUYEN HUY HOANG HAS THE SAME NAME AS CAPTAIN NGUYEN HUY HOANG WHO DIED IN 1970 IN LAOS, ((AND)) WHO IS THE PERSON THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS BEEN SEEKING TO INTERVIEW.)
- LOCATED AND MET WITH MR. LE HUY GAM ((LEE HUY GAAMS)) - 72 YEARS OLD, PRESENTLY LIVING IN SUBDIVISION 2, CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/REPORT OF VNOSMP UNILATERAL ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE RMKS/

TOWNSHIP, FORMERLY A CAPTAIN OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OF THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION. MR. GAM PROMISED TO PROVIDE RELEVANT INFORMATION THAT HE KNOWS. MR. GAM DOES NOT KNOW ANY INFORMATION ABOUT MR. DONG ((DOONGS)) ("NORTHWEST SOLDIER" NEWSPAPER), MR. DUONG ((ZWONG)) OR MR. CAM MINH CHE ((CAAMF MINH CHEES)). AS FOR MR. TRAN HUU TRUNG ((TRAANF HUU TRUNG)), HE DIED FROM ILLNESS.

- LOCATED AND MET WITH MR. LO VAN AN ((LOF VAWN AAN))-63 YEARS OLD, NOW LIVING IN LA HAMLET, CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA TOWNSHIP. DURING THE PERIOD 1964-1967 MR. AN WAS A LOCAL MILITIAMAN, INSTRUCTOR, AND AGRICULTURE COOPERATIVE ACCOUNTANT IN CHIENG COI VILLAGE. MR. AN KNEW ABOUT THE MATTER OF THE AMERICAN PILOT WHO DIED ON LAN KINH HILL ((DOOIF LAN KINHR)) (WHICH IN THAI MEANS ROLLING ROCK HILL) AND PROMISED HE WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE AMERICAN SIDE.

- LOCATED AND MET MR. LO VAN EN ((LOF VAWN ENS))-65 YEARS OLD, A

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FORMER MILITARY MEDICAL SPECIALIST STATIONED NEAR WHERE THE AMERICAN PILOT DIED IN 1965. HE NOW LIVES AT SUBDIVISION 1 CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA TOWNSHIP. MR. EN INFORMED US THAT WHEN THE AMERICAN PILOT PARACHUTED DOWN THE GROUND HE WAS HIT BY BULLETS, GASPED TWICE, THEN DIED. THIS PILOT WAS CAUCASIAN, BIG AND TALL, HANDSOME, AND HAD A FRESH HAIRCUT..., BECAUSE HE WAS STATIONED NEAR THAT AREA, HE WAS ABLE TO RUN OVER TO TAKE A LOOK; HE SAW A DIFFERENT MILITARY UNIT ((PAGE 4))

TAKING CARE OF THE BURIAL. SINCE HE HAD NO RESPONSIBILITY ((FOR THIS MATTER)) HE WENT BACK TO AVOID BEING ATTACKED BY AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. HE PROMISED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE AMERICAN SIDE.

- LOCATED AND MET WITH MRS. TRIEU THI THU ((TRIEUJ THJ THW)), 44 YEARS OLD, A FORMER TEACHER AT THE ETHNIC MINORITY SCHOOL OF SON LA, ((NOW)) RETIRED AND LIVING IN SUBDIVISION-1, CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA TOWNSHIP. MRS. THU DOES NOT KNOW ANYTHING.

- LOCATED AND MET WITH MR. NGUYEN LONG BIEN ((LONG BIEN)), 75 YEARS OLD, FORMERLY A CAPTAIN COMMANDING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION. PRESENTLY LIVING AT SUBDIVISION TONG LENH (CHIENG PAI), TONG LENH VILLAGE, THUAN CHAU DISTRICT, SON LA. MR. BIEN, DESPITE A PAINFUL KNEE, WAS HAPPY TO BE BACK IN SON LA TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE US SIDE AND TRAVEL TO THE SITE. MR. LONG BIEN INFORMED US THAT THERE WAS NO ONE NAMED CAM MINH CHE WHO WORKED IN THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION BEFORE. THERE WAS ONLY MR. CAM VINH TRI ((CAMF VINHX TRI)), A RETIRED FORMER COLONEL WHO DIED IN SON LA IN 1995. PERHAPS THESE TWO PERSONS ARE THE SAME.

ADVANCE ACTIVITIES IN HAI HUNG PROVINCE (16-17 JANUARY 1996). FROM NOON OF 16 JANUARY UNTIL THE MORNING OF 17 JANUARY 1996: ADVANCE ACTIVITIES IN HAI HUNG PROVINCE - PURPOSE: CLARIFY, LOCATE AND MEET WITH MR. LY ((LY)) AND MR. LAM ((LAM)) (WITNESSES FOR CASE 1927 IN QUANG TRI) FOR THE AMERICAN SIDE TO REQUEST TO INTERVIEW AND INVITE BOTH THESE GENTLEMEN TO GO ON THE JOINT INVESTIGATION IN QUANG TRI FROM 26 JAN TO 1 FEB 1996.

RESULT: CENTRAL MIA SPECIALISTS MET AND WORKED WITH MR. PHAM VAN HOAN ((PHAMJ VAWN HOANF)) (EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SECTION OF HAI HUNG PROVINCE), THE MIA TEAM LEADER OF HAI HUNG PROVINCE, AND AT THE SAME TIME WORKED WITH MR. PHAM VAN NAM ((NAWN)) AND MR. LE OANH ((LEE OANH)), HAI HUNG PROVINCE MIA SPECIALISTS. WE SUGGESTED THE HAI HUNG MIA TEAM CLARIFY AND LOCATE MR. LY AND MR. LAM. THESE TWO GENTLEMEN WERE VETERANS, FOUGHT IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE DURING 1972-73 WITH THE 9TH COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION, 45TH REGIMENT, 351ST DIVISION. THERE IS RECENT INFORMATION THAT BOTH THESE GENTLEMEN ARE CITIZENS LIVING IN HAI HUNG PROVINCE. BECAUSE THE NAMES OF THESE TWO GENTLEMEN ARE NOT CLEAR AND THERE IS NO SPECIFIC ADDRESS FOR THEM, ((PAGE 5))

THE HAI HUNG PROVINCE MIA TEAM SPECIALISTS PROMISED TO FIND AND CLARIFY AND REPORT THE RESULTS TO THE CENTRAL MIA TEAM IMMEDIATELY.

NEXT, THE HAI HUNG MIA TEAM INTRODUCED MR. LE XUAN TRUONG ((LEE XUAAN TRWONGF)) (REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HAI HUNG VETERANS ASSOCIATION). WE PRESENTED THE MATTER ABOVE, AND ASKED THE HAI HUNG VETERAN COMMITTEE FOR HELP. MR. LE XUAN TRUONG PROMISED TO ASK EACH DISTRICT AND CITY VETERANS ASSOCIATION BRANCH IN THE PROVINCE TO REPORT THE

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RESULTS.

ADVANCE ACTIVITIES IN HANOI, NAM HA.
 TIME: MORNING OF 16 JAN, AFTERNOON OF 17 JAN AND ALL DAY OF 18 JAN 96.

PURPOSE: FIND WITNESS MR. PHAN DONG ((PHAN DOONGS)), PHOTOGRAPHER OF THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION COMMAND POST, NOW LIVING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COLLEGE HOUSING COMPLEX.

RESULTS: (*) MET MR. HOANG BAO - OF #8 ALLEY 2, 800A STREET, DOD COLLEGE HOUSING COMPLEX. MR. BAO IS THE REPRESENTATIVE FOR RESIDENT ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE DOD COLLEGE HOUSING COMPLEX. MR. HOANG BAO TOLD US THAT HE KNEW OF 2 MEN NAMED DONG IN THIS DOD COLLEGE HOUSING COMPLEX.

A) MR. DUONG XUAN DONG ((ZWONG XUAAN DOONGS)) - A RETIRED LTC, NOW LIVING AT #6 ALLEY 2, 800A STREET, DOD COLLEGE HOUSING COMPLEX. IT IS KNOWN THAT THIS MR. DONG FOUGHT IN THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION DURING THE WAR.

B) MR. HOANG THO DONG ((HOANGF THOJ DOONGS)) - A RETIRED COL, WORKED IN THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION, THEN RETURNED TO TEACH AT THE DOD COLLEGE. HE HAS RETIRED AND IS NOW LIVING IN NAM HA PROVINCE. MR. BAO AFFIRMED THAT NO ONE NAMED PHAN DONG IS LIVING IN THE HOUSING COMPLEX NOW.

*- MET MR. NGUYEN VAN DOI ((DOOIF)) - A RETIRED SR. COLONEL CURRENTLY LIVING AND SELLING REFRESHMENTS AT THE FRONT ENTRANCE OF THE DOD COLLEGE HOUSING COMPLEX. MR. DOI WAS THE CHIEF OF THE SECURITY OFFICE ((OF THE DOD COLLEGE HOUSING COMPLEX)). MR. DOI HAS WORKED AT THE DOD COLLEGE FOR MANY YEARS BUT DOES NOT KNOW ANYONE AT ALL WHO MIGHT BE MR. PHAN DONG. MR. DOI SAID IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MR. HOANG TONG ((HOANGF TOONGS)), FORMERLY A REPORTER AND PHOTOGRAPHER FOR THE "NORTHWEST SOLDIER" NEWSPAPER (NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION), WAS THE PERSON WHO TOOK THE PICTURE OF THE AMERICAN PILOT.

*- MET MR. NGUYEN QUANG TAM ((QUANG TAAM)) COLONEL OF THE DOD COLLEGE, NOW LIVING IN ROOM 214/B2 NGOC KHANH SECTOR. FROM 1960-1969 HE WAS

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AN ARTILLERY ASSISTANT OF THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION. - MR. TAM
 //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/REPORT OF VNOSMP UNILATERAL ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE
 RMKS/

DOES NOT KNOW WHO WAS THE PHAM DONG WHO WAS A PHOTOGRAPHER IN THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION. WHEN HE SAW THE PICTURE MR. TAM ASSERTED THAT PICTURE WAS TAKEN BY MR. HOANG TONG.

*- MET MR. DUONG XUAN DONG ((ZWONG XUAAN DOONGS)), 64 YEARS OLD (PEN NAME WAS THANH DUONG), A RETIRED LTC NOW LIVING IN ROOM 6 / ALLEY 2, 800A STREET, DOD COLLEGE HOUSING COMPLEX. FROM 1962-1976 MR. DUONG XUAN DONG WORKED AT THE POLITICAL OFFICE OF THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION. HE WORKED AS A REPORTER AND PHOTOGRAPHER FOR THE "NORTHWEST SOLDIER" NEWSPAPER. MR. DUONG XUAN DONG ASSURED US THAT HE DID NOT TAKE THE PICTURE OF THE DEAD AMERICAN PILOT. ((THE PREVIOUS SENTENCE IS UNDERLINED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT)) (PERHAPS AT THAT TIME HE WAS

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WORKING AT DIEN BIEN, LAI CHAU.) HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT NO ONE NAMED PHAM DONG TOOK THIS PICTURE. MR. DUONG XUAN DONG THINKS MAYBE MR. HOANG TONG (EDITOR/WRITER FOR THE "NORTHWEST SOLDIER" NEWSPAPER AT THE TIME) TOOK THIS PICTURE. MR. HOANG TONG'S FAMILY CURRENTLY LIVES IN ROOM 411/D9, VINH HO HOUSING COMPLEX, DONG DA QUARTER, HANOI.

IN ADDITION, MR. DUONG XUAN DONG SUGGESTED WE MEET WITH MR. DO TRONG THUY ((DOOX TRONGJ THUYJ)) - ALSO FORMERLY A REPORTER FOR THE "NORTHWEST SOLDIER" NEWSPAPER, NOW RETIRED AND LIVING AT HOUSE #D5, MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX, 3B ONG ICH KHIEM ST., HANOI, MIGHT KNOW MORE INFORMATION.

*- AFTERNOON OF 17 JAN 96: FOUND AND VISITED ROOM 411/D9, VINH HO HOUSING COMPLEX, DONG DA QUARTER, HANOI. MET MRS. TA THI HA BAC ((TAJ THIJ HAF BAWCS)) (WIFE OF MR. HOANG TONG) - MRS. BAC INFORMED US:

- MR. HOANG TONG IS CURRENTLY LIVING IN COC LEU WARD, LAO CAI TOWNSHIP, LAO CAI PROVINCE. MR. HOANG TONG CURRENTLY SERVES AS A FATHERLAND FRONT CADRE FOR COC LEU WARD, LAO CAI TOWNSHIP.

- DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE U.S., MR. HOANG TONG WAS THE CHIEF EDITOR /WRITER FOR THE "NORTHWEST SOLDIER " NEWS PAPER OF THE NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION.- IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT MR. TONG TOOK THE PICTURE OF THE DEAD AMERICAN PILOT.

- IF WE WANT TO LOCATE AND MEET WITH MR. HOANG TONG WE HAVE TO GO UP TO LAO CAI TOWNSHIP. VIETNAM SPECIALISTS WILL ARRANGE TO BRING MR. HOANG TONG TO HANOI AND ARRANGE FOR THE U.S. TEAM TO INTERVIEW MR. HOANG TONG AT A CONVENIENT TIME.

((PAGE 7))

*- ON THE SAME AFTERNOON OF 17 JAN 96: LOCATED AND MET MR. DO TRONG THUY- FORMER NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION POLITICAL CADRE, RETIRED AND LIVING AT HOUSE NUMBER D5, ONG ICH KHIEM, HANOI. MR. THUY LET US KNOW:

- IN THE PERIOD HE LIVED IN THE NORTHWEST, FROM 1960-1970, HE DID NOT KNOW ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE MATTER OF A DEAD AMERICAN PILOT IN SON LA IN 1965.

- MR. THUY KNEW OF MR. HOANG TONG OF THE "NORTHWEST SOLDIER" NEWSPAPER, BUT DOES NOT KNOW FOR SURE IF MR. HOANG TONG TOOK THE PICTURE OF THE DEAD AMERICAN PILOT OR NOT. IN 1970 BOTH MR. THUY AND MR. TONG TRANSFERRED TO WORK IN LAOS.

*- DAY 18 JAN 96, ADVANCE WORK ACTIVITY IN NAM HA.

PURPOSE - LOCATE AND MEET WITH MR. HOANG THO DONG TO CLARIFY IF HE IS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA OR NOT.

- FIND MR. LAM AND MR. LY (WITNESSES FOR CASE 1927 IN QUANG TRI) RESULT WERE AS FOLLOWS:

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 CDSN = CFS114 MCN = 96089/31990 TOR = 960892035
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 ZNR UUUUU
 HEADER
 R 292034Z MAR 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 270942Z MAR 96 ZYB
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 TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
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 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
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 SECTION 01 OF 03
 FINAL SECTION 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/REPORT OF VNOSMP UNILATERAL ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE
 RIT (39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA))//
 RMKS/

- WORKED WITH MR. PHAM XUAN KHON ((PHAMJ XUAAN KHOONR)), 53 YEARS OLD, NOW ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NAM HA VETERANS ASSOCIATION. AND NOW LIVING AT NUMBER 1C/43 GIAI PHONG STREET, TRUONG THI WARD, NAM DINH CITY, NAM HA PROVINCE. MR. KHON HAD INVESTIGATED AND TOLD US: MR. HOANG THO DONG, FORMER SR. COLONEL, RETIRED, NOW IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE VETERANS ASSOCIATION OF HA LONG WARD, NAM DINH CITY. ((HIS)) HOUSE IS LOCATED AT NUMBER 5I/APARTMENT 18, HA LONG WARD, NAM DINH CITY.

- SUGGESTED TO MR. PHAM XUAN KHON THAT HE LOCATE AND MEET WITH MR. LAM AND MR. LY (CASE 1927 QUANG TRI), FORMER SOLDIERS OF THE 9TH COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION, 45TH REGIMENT, 351ST DIVISION, IN COMBAT IN QUANG TRI FROM 1972-1973. THERE IS RECENT INFORMATION THAT BOTH GENTLEMEN ARE LIVING IN NAM HA. MR. KHON ACKNOWLEDGED OUR REQUEST AND TOLD US: BECAUSE THE NAMES AND AGES OF THE TWO GENTLEMEN LAM AND LY WERE NOT CLEAR, ((AND)) THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC ADDRESSES, HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LOCATE THEM IMMEDIATELY. HE PROMISED THAT HE WOULD

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PASS ((THE REQUEST)) ON TO THE VETERANS ASSOCIATION OF EACH DISTRICT, CITY AND TOWNSHIP IN NAM HA PROVINCE TO HELP LOCATE ((PAGE 8))

THE TWO PEOPLE MENTIONED ABOVE. AT THE SAME TIME HE WOULD PASS ((THE REQUEST)) ON TO THE VETERAN LIAISON SECTION OF THE 351ST DIVISION TO HELP LOCATE THEM. IF THERE IS ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE TWO GENTLEMEN, LAM AND LY, HE WILL REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM'S SPECIALISTS.

*- AFTERNOON OF 18 JAN 96: LOCATED AND MET WITH MR. HOANG THO DONG, 66 YEARS OLD, RETIRED SR COLONEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE HA LONG WARD VETERANS ASSOCIATION, CITY OF NAM DINH. WHO PRESENTLY RESIDES AT 51/APARTMENT 18, HA LONG WARD, NAM DINH CITY, NAM HA PROVINCE. MR. HOANG THO DONG INFORMED US:

-WHEN THEY WERE FIGHTING THE FRENCH, HE FOUGHT WITH THE 308TH DIVISION IN THE NORTHWEST.

-WHEN THEY WERE FIGHTING THE AMERICANS, MR. HOANG THO DONG DID NOT FIGHT IN THE NORTHWEST AREA AGAIN, BUT FOUGHT IN QUANG BINH, THUA THIEN, THE TRUONG SON ROAD ((I.E., THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL))..... SO HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE MATTER OF AN AMERICAN PILOT WHO DIED IN SON LA IN 1965.

- FROM 1977-1990 HE TAUGHT AT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACADEMY (FORMERLY THE UPPER LEVEL MILITARY ACADEMY) HE DID NOT KNOW OF A PHAM DONG ALSO TEACHING THERE.

CONCLUSION: AFTER MEETING WITH MANY VETERANS ((WHO WERE)) IN THE NORTHWEST DURING THE WAR WITH AMERICA, THEY ALL AFFIRMED THERE WAS NO ONE NAMED PHAM DONG.

- MANY PEOPLE RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBILITY THAT MR. HOANG TONG WAS THE ACTUAL PERSON WHO TOOK THE PHOTOGRAPH OF THE DEAD AMERICAN PILOT IN SON LA IN 1965.

((PAGE 9))

FROM 27 JANUARY TO 2 FEBRUARY 1996, THE VIETNAMESE TEAM BROUGHT 3 WITNESSES, MR. DUONG XUAN TOAN ((ZWONG XUAAN TOANF)), MR. NGUYEN DINH BINH ((DINH BINH)), AND MR. PHAN VAN THAI ((PHAN VAWN THAIS)) FROM HANOI TO QUANG TRI TO THE BURIAL SITE OF THE PILOT INVOLVED IN CASE 1927.

THE TEAM WORKED WITH MR. NGUYEN MINH KY ((MINH KYF)), VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE QUANG TRI PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE. MR. PHOI ((PHOIR)), THE TEAM LEADER, MR. DOAN ((DOAN)) ((AND)) MR. QUAN ((QUAAN)) WERE THE PROVINCE MIA TEAM MEMBERS. ALSO ON 27 JANUARY THE TEAM WENT TO WORK WITH THE CAM LO DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE. MR. TRAN VAN HONG ((HOONGF)), ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE ((AND)) MR. NGUYEN ANH TUAN ((ANH TUAANS)), DISTRICT PUBLIC SECURITY. AFTER WORKING WITH THE DISTRICT WE WENT TO WORK WITH THE CAM CHINH VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1927. THE VILLAGE CADRES ARE:

1) MR. NGUYEN VAN DAT ((DAATJ)), PARTY SECRETARY

2) MR. NGUYEN HUU THOANG ((HWUX THOANGR)), CHAIRMAN OF THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE

3) NGUYEN HUU SINH ((HWUX SINH)), VICE CHAIRMAN ((AND)) PUBLIC SECURITY CHIEF

AFTER MR. PHAM TEO POINTED OUT THE PURPOSE, REQUIREMENTS, AND

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CONTEXT OF THE RE-INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1927 WITH THE WITNESSES FROM HANOI. THESE GENTLEMEN PROMISED TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM AS WELL AS FOR THE JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM. THE VILLAGE WILL APPOINT CADRE TO ACCOMPANY, HAVE A WITNESS TO GUIDE THE TEAM TO THE CRASH SITE, AND ASSIGN SOMEONE TO CLEAR THE PATH FOR EASY PASSAGE.

DURING THE TWO DAYS OF 30 AND 31 JANUARY THE WITNESSES FOUND THE EXACT BUNKER FROM 24 YEARS AGO. ALL THE POSITIONS OF THE COMMAND BUNKER, COMBAT BUNKER ((AND)) LIVING AREA WERE STILL THE SAME. BECAUSE OF THAT THESE GENTLEMEN POINTED OUT THE CORRECT BURIAL LOCATION OF THE AMERICAN PILOT'S BODY OF THE PAST. THE WITNESSES AFFIRMED THE EXACT LOCATION 100 PERCENT. THERE IS NO OTHER LOCATION. THESE GENTLEMEN ALSO LET US KNOW THAT WHEN THEY PUT THE AMERICAN IN THE BOMB CRATER, THEY ALSO TOOK SOME BOMB CASING AND PLACED IT OVER THE FACE OF THE PILOT. ON 2 FEBRUARY 1996, THE JOINT TEAM USED ARMY ENGINEER TECHNICAL FORCES TO DETECT METAL. THE ARMY ENGINEERS DETECTED A LARGE PIECE OF METAL AT THE EXACT POSITION THAT THE WITNESSES SAID THEY BURIED THE AMERICAN. SINCE THEY WERE NOT ORGANIZED ((TO EXCAVATE)) THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT LAY BENEATH THE SURFACE. ON 01 AND 02 FEB THE WITNESSES RETURNED TO HANOI.
((PAGE 10))

ON 01 FEB 96 THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM RETURNED TO HAI LANG DISTRICT, QUANG TRI PROVINCE TO WORK WITH MR. LE HUU HAU ((LEE HWUX HAAUJ)) DISTRICT PUBLIC SECURITY, ABOUT THE WITNESS MR. LE PHUC ((LEE PHUCS)) OF ((PRODUCTION)) TEAM 1, HAI XUAN VILLAGE, HAI LANG DISTRICT. ((MR. PHUC)) INFORMED US THAT ((WHILE)) SEARCHING FOR AIRCRAFT SCRAP ALONG THE VIETNAM-LAOS BORDER HE RECOVERED SOME LONG BONES SOME PAPERS OF A PILOT. HE IS READY TO TURN THE BONES TO THE JOINT VIETNAM-U.S. TEAM.

THE TEAM RETURNED TO HAI XUAN VILLAGE AND LOCATED THE ADDRESS OF TEAM 1.

VILLAGE CADRES INCLUDED:

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/REPORT OF VNOSMP UNILATERAL ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE

1) MR. LE QUANG KHUE ((LEE QUANG KHUEE)), VILLAGE CHAIRMAN

2) MR. CAP XUAN DUE ((CAPS XUAAN ZUEEJ)) VILLAGE PARTY CHAPTER SECRETARY

3) MR. LE DINH TRUNG ((LEE DINHJ TRUNG)) VILLAGE PUBLIC SECURITY THE TEAM AND SOME VILLAGE CADRE WENT TO MR. PHUC'S HOUSE, BUT NEIGHBORS INFORMED US THAT MR. PHUC HAD GONE TO KHE XANH A FEW DAYS AGO AND THEY HAD NOT SEEN HIM RETURN. THE TEAM THEN TURNED THIS MATTER OVER TO THE VILLAGE, DISTRICT AND PROVINCE, TO REPORT TO THE HANOI CENTRAL MIA OFFICE WHEN THEY MET MR. PHUC.

THE SAME DAY THE UNILATERAL TEAM WENT TO INVESTIGATE A LEAD IN HAMLET 9, TRIEU VAN VILLAGE, TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT ((THAT)) THERE WAS AN AIRCRAFT ((THAT)) CRASHED ((THERE)) DURING THE WAR YEARS. SOME VILLAGERS DUG THE AIRCRAFT IMPACT CRATER
((PAGE 11))

TO FIND ALUMINUM, AND IN THE PROCESS OF DIGGING FOUND REMAINS. THEY

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SUSPENDED THE EXCAVATION AND REPORTED TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. THE TEAM MET WITH THE DISTRICT SECURITY HEAD, MR. LE MINH HIEN ((LEE MINH HIEENF)), AND WENT DOWN TO TRIEU VAN VILLAGE. AT THE VILLAGE THE TEAM WORKED WITH MR. HO XUAN DUC ((HOOF XUAAN DWCS)), VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER. THE WITNESSES ((WERE)) MR. HO XUAN KHIEEN ((KHIEEN)) OF HAMLET 9 TRIEU VAN VILLAGE, MR. HO VAN THOA ((THOAR)), THE PERSON WHO ORGANIZED THE EXCAVATION OF THE AIRCRAFT IMPACT AREA, MR. PHAN TIEN ((TIEEN)) ((AND)) MR. PHAN THI ((THIS)), 77 YEAR OLD. ALL THE WITNESSES AND VILLAGE CADRES PROVIDED INFORMATION ((AS FOLLOWS)): AT ABOUT 1600 HR ((ONE DAY)) IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER OF 1968 A BURNING JET PLANE ((COMING)) FROM THE NORTH PLUNGED STRAIGHT INTO HAMLET 9, TRIEU VAN VILLAGE AND THERE WAS A LOUD EXPLOSION. THE PILOT WAS NOT SEEN TO EJECT. IN OCTOBER 1995, A FIFTEEN-DAY EXCAVATION WAS ORGANIZED. ((THEY)) DUG 2M DEEP, RECOVERING NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT PIECES AND SOME ROTTEN PARACHUTE MATERIAL, BUT FOUND NO REMAINS. AT THE END OF 1994 A JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM INVESTIGATED AND TOOK THE COORDINATES OF THIS LOCATION.

((THE TEAM)) ALSO INVESTIGATED ANOTHER MATTER IN HAI AN VILLAGE, HAI LANG DISTRICT. INFORMATION: ON OR ABOUT 1500 ONE AFTERNOON IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER 1968 A CAUCASIAN AMERICAN STATIONED AT THE MY THUY FORT ((DOONF MYX THUYR)) DESERTED THE FORT AND WENT WITHOUT TAKING A WEAPON, WITH PAPERS EVERYWHERE. ON HIS WAY HE MET MRS. NGUYEN THI VAO ((VAOJ)), A LOCAL GUERRILLA WHO LURED HIM AND TURNED HIM OVER TO A GUERRILLA, MR. PHUC ((PHUCS)), ((WHO)) LED HIM ((AWAY)). MR. PHAM VAN LANH ((PHAMJ VAWN LANHJ)) WENT ALONG ((WITH THEM)). ON THE WAY, THE AMERICAN SNATCHED A GUN AND ((PAGE 12))

FOUGHT WITH THE TWO GUERRILLAS AND THE AMERICAN WAS ABLE TO GET AWAY. ((HE)) TRAVELED ALL NIGHT UNTIL NEAR DAYBREAK, THEN THIS AMERICAN DID NOT DARE TRAVEL ANY FURTHER, BUT CLIMBED UP INTO A TREE TO REST AND HIDE. THE GUERRILLAS CONTINUED THE PURSUIT, DISCOVERED THE AMERICAN SITTING IN THE TREE AND SHOT HIM DEAD. ((NOTE: THE ORIGINAL TEXT RENDERS THE LAST CLAUSE AS "VAF DAX BIJ BAWNS CHEETS" (AND HAD BEEN SHOT DEAD). THIS MAKES NO SENSE GRAMATICALLY, AND, AS THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE SHOWS, NONE LOGICALLY EITHER. IF UNDERSTOOD LITERALLY, IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE PURSUING GUERRILLAS FOUND THE AMERICAN SITTING IN THE TREE, DEAD OF A GUNSHOT WOUND, AND THAT THE BODY FELL FROM ITS PERCH AS THEY CAME UPON IT.))

THE AMERICAN TUMBLED FROM THE TREE DOWN TO THE BEACH. TEN MINUTES LATER, MR. DAT AND MR. LANH WERE THOSE APPOINTED TO DO THE BURIAL. THE TWO INDIVIDUALS TOSSED THE AMERICAN DOWN INTO A WATERY PIT AND PILED SAND ((ON TOP OF HIM)). IN THE FOLLOWING YEARS PEOPLE PILED ((UP)) MORE SAND AND NOW IT HAS BECOME THE SIDE OF A DIKE. IN 1994 MR. MAI VAN DAT TRIED TO DIG ((THE GRAVE)), BUT BECAUSE IT WAS A DIKE HE DARED NOT DIG. HE AFFIRMS THAT THAT LOCATION STILL CONTAINS THE AMERICAN'S REMAINS. BECAUSE THERE WAS NO TIME, THE TEAM DID NOT GO TO THE SITE TO DO A STUDY.

MR. PHAM VAN LANH NOW LIVES IN LONG KHANH DISTRICT, DONG NAI PROVINCE. MRS. NGUYEN THI VAO NOW LIVES IN BINH CHAU VILLAGE, XUYEN MOC DISTRICT, DONG NAI.

BESIDE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION, THE TEAM ALSO SENT SPECIALISTS

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TO COC LEU WARD, LAO CAI TOWNSHIP, LAO CAI PROVINCE FROM 02-04 FEB 96 TO ESCORT MR. HOANG TONG, WHO IS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA IN SON LA. BECAUSE HIS MOTHER IN-LAW WAS SERIOUSLY ILL, HE COULD NOT TRAVEL BACK IN THE SAME CAR ((WITH THE TEAM SPECIALISTS)). HE PROMISED WHENEVER HIS MOTHER IN-LAW IMPROVES HE WOULD CALL THE VIETNAMESE MIA OFFICE TO ARRANGE FOR PICKUP.
((PAGE 13))

RESULTS OF ADVANCE WORK IN NGHE AN
(CASES 0621,1936,0391)

1) CASE 0621: IN THE PERIOD FROM 27 JAN 96 TO 30 JAN 96, THE VIETNAMESE SIDE FOUND AND BROUGHT THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES TO THE HUU NGHI HOTEL FOR THE AMERICAN SIDE TO INTERVIEW;

*) MR. NGUYEN VIET DANG ((VIETS DANGR)), 71 YEARS OLD, FORMER POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE 75TH BORDER DEFENSE POST (NAM CAN POST) FROM 1960-1976, NOW RETIRED AND LIVING AT HAMLET 6, THINH SON VILLAGE, DO LUONG DISTRICT, NGHE AN.

*) MR. PHAM XUAN LIEU ((PHAMJ XUAN LIEEJ)), 62 YEARS OLD, FORMER STATION CHIEF OF THE NAM CAN BORDER CHECK POINT (PART OF THE NAM CAN BORDER DEFENSE POST, KY SON, NGHE AN.) FROM 1959 TO 1974, NOW RETIRED AND LIVING AT HAMLET 1, HUNG XUAN VILLAGE, HUNG NGUYEN DISTRICT, NGHE AN PROVINCE. MR. PHAM XUAN LIEU WAS THE PERSON WHO ACTUALLY SHOT DOWN THE AMERICAN F-105 AIRCRAFT (CRASHED AT NAM CAN VILLAGE, KY SON DISTRICT, NGHE AN), AND WHO WAS REWARDED WITH A CERTIFICATE OF MILITARY MERIT.

*) MR. VI VAN TUM ((VI VAWN TUM)), 60 YEARS OLD, THAI ETHNIC MINORITY, FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE 75TH BORDER DEFENSE POST (NAM CAN) FROM 1965-1971. NOW RETIRED IN HOA BINH TOWNSHIP, TUONG DUONG DISTRICT, NGHE AN PROVINCE.

BY INTERVIEWING THE THREE WITNESSES ABOVE, THE VIETNAM-AMERICA JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM FOUND OUT THAT MR. LO VAN NGHE ((LOF VAWN NGHEEJ)) WAS THE PERSON WHO DIRECTLY BURIED THE AMERICAN PILOT. CURRENTLY MR. LO VAN NGHE IS RETIRED AND LIVING AT KIM DA VILLAGE, TUONG DUNG DISTRICT, NGHE AN.

THE VIETNAMESE SIDE SENT SOMEONE TO FIND AND ESCORT MR. LO VAN

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/REPORT OF VNOSMP UNILATERAL ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE NGHE BACK TO VINH CITY FOR THE AMERICAN SIDE TO INTERVIEW, BUT BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE (OVER 200 KM FROM VINH, AND TAKING SIX HOURS BY MOTOR BOAT TO THE PLACE WHERE MR. NGHE WAS STAYING), THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO INVITE MR. LO VAN NGHE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JOINT INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0621 IN NAM CAN, KY SON, NGHE AN PROVINCE FROM 1 - 5 FEBRUARY 1996.

IN ADDITION, THE ADVANCE WORK GROUP ALSO ORGANIZED TO SEARCH FOR THE WITNESSES
((PAGE 14))

NAMED HUY (COMMANDER OF BORDER DEFENSE POST 75 IN THE PERIOD FROM 1960 TO 1970) AND VI VAN PHAN ((VI VAWN PHAN)) (RECONNAISSANCE SOLDIER OF THE 75TH BORDER DEFENSE POST), BUT BECAUSE BOTH MEN LIVE FAR AWAY WE COULD NOT BRING THEM TO VINH TO BE INTERVIEW BY THE U.S.

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SIDE.

AFTER INTERVIEWING THE THREE WITNESSES, NGUYEN VIET DANG, PHAM XUAN LIEU AND VI VAN TUM, THE U.S. SIDE RECOMMENDED THAT WE GO TO THE CASE 0621 SITE FROM 4 TO 6 FEBRUARY 1996 FOR JOINT INVESTIGATION. THEY RECOMMENDED THAT WITNESSES VI VAN TUM AND LO VAN NGHE BE INVITED TO GO TO THE SITE TO PINPOINT THE BURIAL LOCATION OF THE PILOT. THE ADVANCE PREPARATION FOR JOINT INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE WITH ACCOMPANYING WITNESSES WILL BE DESCRIBED IN A LATER SECTION.

ALSO DURING THE 27-30 JAN 96 PERIOD, A VIETNAMESE ADVANCE WORK GROUP WENT TO CLARIFY AND LOCATE MR. TUONG ((TWONGF)) (OR CUONG ((CWONGF))), A FORMER COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER ((WHO WAS)) THE ASSISTANT POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE NGHI LOC DISTRICT MILITARY COMMAND, NGHE AN PROVINCE, ((AND)) THE PERSON WHO MIGHT BE THE WITNESS OF CASE 0391 WHO KNEW OF THE RECOVERY OF AN AMERICAN PILOT'S REMAINS IN NGHI TRUNG VILLAGE, NGHI LOC DISTRICT, NGHE AN PROVINCE.

RESULTS ((UNDERLINED)): THIS ADVANCE GROUP VERIFIED ((AND)) INTERVIEWED 10 PERSONS NAMED TUONG AND CUONG, ALL OF THEM VETERANS OF THE AMERICAN WAR IN NGHE AN PROVINCE. ALL 10 OF THOSE PERSONS RESPONDED THAT THEY KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE RECOVERY OF A PILOT'S REMAINS IN NGHI TRUNG VILLAGE, NGHI LOC DISTRICT, NGHE AN PROVINCE.

RESULTS OF PHASE 2 ADVANCE WORK IN NGHE AN (FROM 1 TO 4 FEBRUARY 1996) TO PREPARE FOR JOINT INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0621 IN NAM CAN, KY SON, NGHE AN.

* FROM 1 TO 4 FEBRUARY 1996, THE VIETNAM ADVANCE GROUP ORGANIZED AND CONDUCTED ADVANCE WORK TO PREPARE FOR THE JOINT VIETNAM-U.S. INVESTIGATION TEAM TO VISIT THE SITE OF CASE 0621 (NAM CAN, KY SON DISTRICT, NGHE AN PROVINCE).

- REQUESTED PERMISSION FROM NGHE AN PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, TUONG DUNG AND KY SON DISTRICTS, NAM CAN VILLAGE...AND OTHER FUNCTIONAL OFFICES TO ALLOW THE VIETNAM-U.S. JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM ((PAGE 15))

TO WORK IN NAM CAN VILLAGE, KY SON DISTRICT, NGHE AN PROVINCE
- HIRED MOTORCARS ((AND)) MOTORBOATS AND REQUESTED PERMISSION FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES (IN KIM DA VILLAGE AND HOA BINH TOWN, TUONG DUONG DISTRICT) TO ESCORT THE TWO WITNESSES VI VAN TUM AND LO VAN NGHE TO THE SITE WITH THE JOINT VIETNAM-U.S. INVESTIGATION TEAM.

RESULTS: BY 4 FEBRUARY 1996, ALL ADVANCE WORK WAS COMPLETE; THE WITNESSES GATHERED AT MUONG XEN TOWN AND ON 5 FEBRUARY WENT TO THE SITE OF CASE 0621.

((END TRANSLATION))//

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ITEM NO=00168466

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS206 MCN = 96067/08163 TOR = 960670505

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ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 070112Z MAR 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEFJII/J2

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 060912Z MAR 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

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CONTROLS

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SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION OF PRIORITY CASE 1927//

REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/250912ZSEP95//

AMPN/REF REPORTED A 14 AUG 95 INTERVIEW OF MR. DUONG XUAN TOAN.//

RMKS/1. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: THE RIT INVESTIGATED PRIORITY CASE 1927 ON 2 FEB 96 IN CAM CHINH VILLAGE, CAM LO DISTRICT, QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THE RIT DID NOT INTERVIEW ANY WITNESSES FOR THIS CASE. THE VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, COL PHAM TEO, INTERVIEWED TWO FIRSTHAND WITNESSES TO THE BURIAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. THE WITNESSES LED COL TEO TO THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY COL TEO LED THE TEAM TO THE ALLEGED SITE. THE TEAM SURVEYED THE BURIAL SITE, BUT DID NOT RECOVER OR RECEIVE ANY REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS.

2. BACKGROUND:

A. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS: THIS CASE INVOLVES THE 24 SEP 72 LOSS OF AN A-7B ON A STRIKE MISSION OVER QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THE PILOT EJECTED SAFELY. CREW MEMBERS ABOARD OTHER U.S. AIRCRAFT SAW HIS PARACHUTE HANGING FROM THE TREES IN THE VICINITY OF (GC) 48Q YD 138 537. TEN MINUTES LATER THE PARACHUTE WAS PULLED FROM THE TREES AND DISAPPEARED INTO THE JUNGLE.

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B. INVESTIGATION RESULTS TO DATE:

(1) A JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED THIS CASE DURING THE 4TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) (JAN 89). THE TEAM VIEWED LIMITED WRECKAGE BUT THEY COULD NOT CORRELATE THE WRECKAGE TO ANY SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT.

(2) A JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED THIS CASE DURING SEP 91. A JOINT U.S./LAO TEAM INVESTIGATED ALLEGED PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE UNACCOUNTED-FOR PILOT IN THIS CASE. THE PURVEYORS OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS ALSO ALLEGED THE PILOT WAS ALIVE IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAOS. THE TEAM FOUND, MET, INTERVIEWED, AND FINGERPRINTED THE SUBJECT OF THE PHOTOS. THE MAN IS A 66-YEAR-OLD LAO NATIVE, OF LAO-VIET DESCENT, AND NOT THE UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICAN IN THIS CASE. THE TEAM DID NOT RECOVER OR RECEIVE ANY REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS.

(3) A JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED THIS CASE DURING THE 21ST JFA (JAN 93). THE TEAM INTERVIEWED NINE WITNESSES, THREE OF WHOM PROVIDED HEARSAY INFORMATION OF AN ALLEGED BURIAL SITE. THE TEAM EXCAVATED THIS SITE WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE TEAM ALSO SURVEYED THE LAST KNOWN ALIVE LOCATION WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE TEAM DID NOT RECOVER OR RECEIVE ANY HUMAN REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS.

(4) A JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED THIS CASE DURING THE 24TH JFA (JUN 93). THE TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES AND SURVEYED A CRASH SITE. THE TEAM DID NOT RECOVER OR RECEIVE AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR HUMAN REMAINS.

(5) THE PRIORITY CASE INVESTIGATION TEAM (PCIT) INVESTIGATED THIS CASE DURING PCIT PHASE III (JAN 94). THE TEAM DID NOT INTERVIEW ANY WITNESSES WITH INFORMATION RELATING TO THIS CASE. THE QUANG TRI PROVINCE OFFICIALS DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF ANY SUPPORTING ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE.

C. PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION: DETERMINE THE BURIAL LOCATION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. (ACCOMPLISHED: SEE PARAS 3E THROUGH 3F)

3. DETAILS:

A. PARTICIPANTS:

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT:

- (A) CW4 CLYDE GREEN, RIT TEAM LEADER
- (B) SSG ALFRED S. IVERSEN, RIT ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
- (C) TSGT VY V. TRAN, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST
- (D) THOMAS R. MCKAY, LIVE SIGHTING INVESTIGATOR
- (E) SSG WILLIAM E. COX, RIT SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
- (F) MR. JAMES M. COYLE, JTF-FA FIELD RESEARCH DIRECTOR

(2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT:

- (A) COL PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REP
- (B) MR. TRINH THE HUNG (TRINHJ THEES HUNGF), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REP

(3) QUANG TRI PROVINCE MIA TASK TEAM:

- (A) MR. TRAN KHANH PHOI (TRAANF KHANHS PHOIR), MIA TEAM LEADER
- (B) MR. LE VAN DOAN (DOAN), TEAM MEMBER
- (C) MR. NGUYEN VAN QUAN (QUAAN), TEAM MEMBER

(4) CAM LO DISTRICT TASK TEAM:

- (A) MR. TRAN VAN HONG (HOONGF), CHIEF OF STAFF,

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PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OFFICE

- (B) MR. NGUYEN ANH TUAN (TUAANS), PROVINCE SECURITY CADRE
- (5) CAM CHINH VILLAGE TASK TEAM:
- (A) MR. NGUYEN VAN DAT (DATJ), PARTY SECRETARY
- (B) MR. NGUYEN HUU THOANG (THOANGF), CHAIRMAN
VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE
- (C) MR. NGUYEN HUU SINH (SINH), VICE-CHAIRMAN
VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE

B. ON 5 JAN 96, THE RIT HELD A PLANNING MEETING WITH THE VNOSMP CONTINGENT AT THE JOINT DOCUMENT CENTER (JDC) IN THE CENTRAL ARMY MUSEUM, HANOI. AT THE MEETING, THE RIT PRESENTED THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS CASE TO THE VNOSMP.

C. ON 31 JAN 96 THE TEAM TRAVELED TO QUANG TRI PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE THIS CASE. COL TEO INFORMED THE TEAM THE WITNESSES LOCATED THE BURIAL SITE, AND THE TEAM ARRANGED TO SURVEY THE SITE ON 2 FEB 96.

D. ON 1 FEB 96, THE TEAM MET THE PROVINCE MIA TASK TEAM AND THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THE PROVINCE TEAM INFORMED THE TEAM THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE AT THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE. THE TEAM ARRANGED FOR TWO VIETNAMESE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) SPECIALISTS TO ACCOMPANY THE JOINT TEAM ON 2 FEB 96.

E. ON 2 FEB 96, THE TEAM SURVEYED TWO POSSIBLE BURIAL SITES. BOTH SITES ARE WITHIN 10 METERS OF EACH OTHER. THE TEAM SEARCHED THE AREA BUT DID NOT FIND ANY EVIDENCE OF REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS.

F. ON 7 FEB 96, COL TEO, VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, PRESENTED A DOCUMENT OUTLINING HIS TEAM'S ADVANCE WORK FOR THE 39TH JFA TO THE RIT TEAM LEADER. THE PORTION OF THIS DOCUMENT WHICH ADDRESSES THIS CASE IS TRANSLATED AS FOLLOWS:

(BEGIN TRANSLATION)

ON 18 JAN 96, CONDUCTED ADVANCE WORK IN NAM HA PROVINCE.

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) REPORT OF RMKS/

PURPOSE:

- LOOK FOR MR. HOANG THO DONG (HOANGF THOJ DOONGS) TO DETERMINE IF HE WAS INVOLVED IN CASE DATA IN SON LA OR NOT.
- LOOK FOR MR. LAM AND MR. LY (WITNESSES OF CASE 1927 IN QUANG TRI)

RESULTS:

- WORKED WITH MR. PHAM XUAN KHON (PHAMJ XUAAN KHOONR), 53 YEARS OLD, CURRENT CHIEF OF NAM HA PROVINCE VETERANS ASSOCIATION OFFICE, WHO NOW LIVES AT NR.10/43, GIAI PHONG ROAD, TRANG THI WARD, NAM DINH TOWN, NAM HA PROVINCE. MR. KHON INVESTIGATED AND SAID: MR. HOANG THO DONG, FORMER COLONEL, NOW RETIRED, IS CURRENTLY CHAIRMAN OF HA LONG WARD VETERANS ASSOCIATION, NAM DINH CITY. HE LIVES AT NR.51/018, HA LONG WARD, NAM DINH CITY.
- WE RECOMMENDED MR. PHAM XUAN KHON LOOK FOR MR. LAM AND MR. LY (CASE 1927 IN QUANG TRI), FORMER SOLDIERS FROM COMPANY 9, BATTALION

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3, REGIMENT 45, DIVISION 351, WHO FOUGHT IN QUANG TRI DURING 1972-1973. BOTH WERE REPORTED TO BE CURRENTLY RESIDING IN NAM HA. MR. KHON RECORDED OUR REQUIREMENT AND STATED THAT: AS MR. LAM'S AND MR. LY'S FULL NAMES AND ADDRESSES WERE NOT CLEAR AND SPECIFIC, HE COULD NOT LOCATE THEM IMMEDIATELY. MR. KHON PROMISED TO LOOK FOR THE TWO MEN THROUGH VETERANS ASSOCIATIONS AT THE CITY, TOWN AND DISTRICT LEVELS, AND AT THE SAME TIME THROUGH THE LIAISON BOARD OF THE DIVISION 351 VETERANS GROUP. IF HE OBTAINS INFORMATION ABOUT MR. LAM AND MR. LY, HE WILL SEND A TELEGRAM TO THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM SPECIALISTS IMMEDIATELY.

BETWEEN 27 JAN AND 2 FEB 96, THE VIETNAM TEAM BROUGHT THREE WITNESSES, MR. DUONG XUAN TOAN (DUWOWNG XUAAN TOANF), MR. NGUYEN DINH BINH (DINH BINHF) AND MR. PHAN VAN THAI (THAIS), FROM HANOI TO QUANG TRI TO PINPOINT THE BURIAL SITE OF THE PILOT RELATED TO CASE 1927.

- THE TEAM WORKED WITH MR. NGUYEN MINH KY (KYF), VICE CHAIRMAN OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, MR. PHOI, QUANG TRI MIA TEAM LEADER, MR. DOAN (DOANF) AND MR. QUAN (QUAAN), QUANG TRI MIA SPECIALISTS. ON 29 JANUARY THE TEAM WORKED WITH CAM LO DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, WITH MR. TRAN VAN HONG (HOONGF), CHIEF OF PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OFFICE, MR. NGUYEN ANH TUAN (TUAANS), PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY CADRE. AFTER WORKING WITH DISTRICT MILITARY COMMAND, THE TEAM WORKED WITH CAM CHINH VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE ON PREPARATION FOR CASE 1927 INVESTIGATION. THE VILLAGE CADRES INCLUDED:

- MR. NGUYEN VAN DAT (DATJ), SECRETARY OF THE PARTY, MR. NGUYEN HUU THOANG (THOANGR), CHAIRMAN OF VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND MR. NGUYEN HUU SINH (SINH), VICE CHAIRMAN OF VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND CHIEF OF VILLAGE PUBLIC SECURITY.

- AFTER COL PHAM TEO RAISED THE PURPOSE, REQUIREMENT AND INTENT OF THE RE-INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1927 WITH THE PRESENCE OF THE HANOI WITNESSES, THESE CADRE PROMISED TO FACILITATE THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM AS WELL AS THE JOINT TEAM. VILLAGE AUTHORITIES WOULD ASSIGN CADRE TO ACCOMPANY THE WITNESSES TO THE CRASH SITE, AND WOULD ASK VILLAGERS TO CUT TREES ON THE PATH TO THE SITE FOR THE TEAM.

- ON 30 AND 31 JAN 96, THE WITNESSES LOCATED THE CORRECT LOCATION OF RESIDENT'S SHELTERS 24 YEARS AGO. ALL THE POSITIONS OF COMMAND SHELTERS, FIGHTING POSITIONS, LIVING AND ROUTINE ACTIVITIES SHELTERS WERE COMPLETELY INTACT. THIS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE WITNESSES TO LOCATE THE BURIAL SITE OF THE PILOT. THE WITNESSES CONFIRMED THAT THE BURIAL SITE WAS 100 PERCENT CORRECT AND THERE WAS NO OTHER LOCATION. THEY STATED ADDITIONALLY THAT WHEN THEY PUT THE PILOT INTO THE BOMB CRATER, THEY ALSO PUT A BOMB CANISTER OVER THE FACE OF THE PILOT. ON 2 FEB 1996, THE JOINT TEAM USED A PAVN ENGINEER TEAM (EOD) TO DETECT METAL {BELOW THE SURFACE}. THE PAVN TEAM DETERMINED THERE WAS A LARGE CONCENTRATION OF METAL AT THE EXACT BURIAL SITE THE WITNESSES SPECIFIED. WE DID NOT EXCAVATE THIS SITE, SO WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE RESULTS WILL BE.

- ON 1 AND 2 FEB 96, THE WITNESSES RETURNED TO HANOI.
(END TRANSLATION)

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4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE
 5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS: ON 2 FEB 96, THE RIT TEAM SURVEYED AN ALLEGED BURIAL SITE WHILE INVESTIGATING CASE 1927
 - A. PROJECT LOCATION:
 - (1) VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATE 48Q YD 14171 53759
 - (2) MAP DATA: MAP NAME- QUANG TRI, MAP NO. -6442 4, MAP SERIES -L7014, PRINTED -1969
 - B. OUTSTANDING FEATURES: NONE
 - C. TERRAIN: HILLY WITH THREE PERCENT SLOPE
 - D. SOIL CONDITIONS: HARD PACKED CLAY SOIL WITH ROCKS
 - E. VEGETATION: SHRUBS, SMALL TREES AND THICK UNDERGROWTH
 - F. METHOD OF SEARCH: SURFACE SEARCH OF A 30 X 30-METER AREA
 - G. HAZARDS: THE PROVINCE REPORTED CBU'S IN THE AREA, SNAKES AND INSECTS
 - H. RESULTS:
 - (1) REMAINS SEEN: NONE
 - (2) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE
 - (3) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE
 - (4) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: NONE
 - I. LOGISTICS: A STANDARD-SIZED RECOVERY ELEMENT WITH STANDARD EQUIPMENT CAN EXCAVATE THE SITE. IT WILL TAKE 5 TO 10 DAYS TO COMPLETE THIS SITE USING 20 TO 30 WORKERS. THE WORKERS CAN COME FROM CAM CHINH HAMLET. THERE IS NO WATER SOURCE WITHIN 500 TO 600 METERS OF THE SITE. BECAUSE OF SOIL CONDITIONS IT WOULD BE BETTER TO PERFORM THIS RECOVERY DURING THE DRY SEASON. THE SITE WILL ENCOMPASS TWO SMALL AREAS. THE FIRST IS 4.5 X 3.8 METERS, AND THE SECOND IS A 4.2 X 3 METER AREA.
 6. AREA OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: THE TEAM DID NOT INTERVIEW THE TWO FIRSTHAND WITNESSES, MR. THAI AND MR. BINH.
 7. ANALYST'S COMMENTS:
 - A. CORRELATIONS: BASED ON THE WALK-IN REPORT (REF A), THE INFORMATION CORRELATES TO THIS CASE BY NAME, DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT, LOCATION OF LOSS, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND GENERAL PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION.
 - B. POTENTIAL LEADS:
 - (1) MR. PHAN VAN THAI. SHOULD AN EXCAVATION MEET WITH
- //
- /***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/
- SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) REPORT OF RMKS/
- NEGATIVE RESULTS, A JOINT TEAM SHOULD INTERVIEW MR. THAI.
- (2) MR. NGUYEN DINH BINH. SHOULD AN EXCAVATION MEET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, A JOINT TEAM SHOULD INTERVIEW MR. BINH.
- (3) MR. LY. THE VNOSMP WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE MR. LY FOR INTERVIEW. SHOULD AN EXCAVATION MEET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, A JOINT TEAM SHOULD INTERVIEW MR. LY.
- (4) MR. LAM. THE VNOSMP WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE MR. LAM FOR INTERVIEW. SHOULD AN EXCAVATION MEET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, A JOINT TEAM SHOULD INTERVIEW MR. LAM.
- C. WITNESS RELIABILITY: N/A

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D. THE FIELD ASSESSMENTS IN THIS REPORT DO NOT CONSTITUTE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

8. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS. A FIRSTHAND WITNESS DID NOT LEAD THE TEAM TO THE SITE. A FIRSTHAND WITNESS LED VNOSMP COL PHAM TEO TO THE SITE AND HE IN TURN POINTED IT OUT TO THE TEAM.

9. TEAM CHIEF'S COMMENTS:

A. DURING THIS INVESTIGATION THE TEAM RECEIVED THOROUGH SUPPORT FROM VIETNAMESE PROVINCIAL, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE GOVERNMENT CONTINGENTS. THE RIT'S VNOSMP COUNTERPARTS PREPARED AND BRIEFED THE PROVINCE ON THE TEAM'S REQUIREMENTS.

B. ACCORDING TO COL TEO, DUE TO THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE WITNESSES' JOBS, THE TEAM WAS NOT ALLOWED TO INTERVIEW TWO OF THE FIRSTHAND WITNESSES. COL TEO INTERVIEWED THE WITNESSES AND ACCOMPANIED THEM TO THE SITE. WHEN THE TEAM SURVEYED THE SITE, NO FIRST HAND WITNESS WAS PRESENT. COL TEO LED THE TEAM TO THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE BASED ON THE WITNESSES EFFORTS. BASED ON THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION, THIS SITE IS RECOMMENDED FOR EXCAVATION. HOWEVER, SHOULD AN EXCAVATION MEET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, RECOMMEND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ALLOW A JOINT TEAM ACCESS TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE WITNESSES.

10. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS: EXCAVATE//

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 ITEM NO=00168434
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS048 MCN = 96067/07895 TOR = 960670453
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS6760 0670057-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
 HEADER
 R 070057Z MAR 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 060902Z MAR 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DEMO//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAHA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
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 SECTION 01 OF 05
 FINAL SECTION 2

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED
 REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF SPECIAL REMAINS CASE DATA //
 RMKS/

I. WITNESS #4: ON 13 JAN 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN LONG BIEN (NGUYEENX LONG BIEEN) AT THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION CENTER IN SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE.

- (1) NAME: MR. NGUYEN LONG BIEN
- (2) AGE: 76 YOA
- (3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE: TONG LANH VILLAGE (XAX TONGF LANHJ), THUAN CHAU DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE, LENGTH OF TIME UNKNOWN
- (4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: STATIONED IN THE NWMR, SON LA PROVINCE.
- (5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED FROM THE PAVN IN 1970
- (6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: SECTION COMMANDER (TRWONGR BAN) IN THE NWMR, AS WELL AS COMMANDER OF BATTALION 31, DIVISION 316
- (7) BACKGROUND INFORMATION: THE VNOSMP UNILATERALLY INTERVIEWED MR. BIEN DURING THE 2ND JFA. THE JOINT TEAM REPORTED MR. NGUYEN LONG BIEN'S NAME AS MR. LONG BIEN. THE RIT IS THE FIRST JOINT

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TEAM TO INTERVIEW MR. BIEN.

(8) STATEMENT:

(A) AT APPROXIMATELY 0900 ON AN UN-RECALLED DATE IN 1968, WHEN MR. BIEN WAS IN THE NWMR HOSPITAL RECEIVING TREATMENT FOR WOUNDS, HE HEARD ABOUT AN INCIDENT IN WHICH AN F-1 (SIC) AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND THE PILOT EJECTED FROM THE AIRCRAFT. THE PILOT WAS KILLED WHILE DESCENDING TO THE GROUND. MR. BIEN APPOINTED MR. TAN AI QUY AND MR. TRAN NHU TO INVESTIGATE THE BURIAL SITE AND REPORT ABOUT THE DEATH AND BURIAL OF THE PILOT. MR. QUY AND MR. NHU BOTH PARTICIPATED IN THE PILOT'S BURIAL. MR. QUY AND MR. NHU REPORTED BACK TO MR. BIEN, AND MR. BIEN REPORTED THIS INFORMATION TO HIS SUPERIORS (NFI).

(B) TWO DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT, THE NWMR RECEIVED ORDERS FROM HANOI TO EXHUME, PHOTOGRAPH, AND RE-BURY THE PILOT'S BODY. ONE OR TWO DAYS AFTER THAT, HANOI ORDERED MR. BIEN TO GO TO THE BURIAL SITE TO INSPECT THE GRAVE AND ENSURE IT WAS STILL PROPERLY COVERED. THIS WAS THE ONLY TIME MR. BIEN WENT TO THE BURIAL SITE.

(C) MR. BIEN SAID HE ONLY ORDERED MR. QUY AND MR. NHU TO INVESTIGATE THE BURIAL SITE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHO GAVE ORDERS FOR OTHER PEOPLE TO GO TO THE BURIAL SITE.

(D) MR. BIEN HEARD THAT VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES LATER TRIED TO FIND AND EXHUME THE REMAINS, BUT COULD NOT FIND THE GRAVE SITE. {NOTE: DURING THE FINAL PLANNING MEETING AT THE JDC IN HANOI ON 11 JAN 96, COL TEO STATED HE WENT TO SON LA PROVINCE IN LATE 1972 IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND THE REMAINS FOR THIS CASE. HE SAID HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.}

(E) MR. BIEN KNEW OF ONE OTHER INCIDENT IN WHICH A PILOT WAS CAPTURED ALIVE. HE SHOWED THE RIT A CERTIFICATE OF COMMENDATION FOR HIS PARTICIPATION IN THIS EVENT.

(BEGIN TRANSLATION)

CERTIFICATE OF COMMENDATION

SR CAPT LONG BIEN

UNIT: TEAM 33, STAFF, MILITARY REGION

HOME: THANH CHUNG (V), YEN KHANH (D), NINH BINH (P)

HAD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CAPTURING AN AIR PIRATE AND

PARTICIPATING IN THE SHOOTING DOWN OF AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT.

CERTIFICATE NO. 2885

28-8-65

(SEAL OF NW MILITARY REGION)

(SIGNATURE SEAL, SR COL VU LAP)

(END TRANSLATION)

{NOTE: COL THO SAID THIS INCIDENT CORRELATES TO CASE 0101 IN WHICH THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT LATER RELEASED THE PILOT. THE CASE 0101 INCIDENT DATE IS 20 JUN 65, ALTHOUGH THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS CONFUSED MANY ARCHIVAL ITEMS FROM THIS RESOLVED CASE WITH CASE DATA.} WHEN THE RIT ASKED MR. BIEN WHY THE CERTIFICATE IDENTIFIED HIS UNIT AS "TEAM 33," HE SAID THIS DESIGNATION WAS A COVER-TERM FOR ALL UNITS NUMBERED IN THE 30'S.

(F) MR. BIEN KNEW MR. NGUYEN TAN HUNG. ACCORDING TO MR. BIEN, MR. HUNG WORKED IN THE NWMR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICE. MR. HUNG WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISPOSITION OF CAPTURED PILOTS.

(G) MR. BIEN ALSO KNEW THE PHOTOGRAPHER, MR. PHAN DONG.

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MR. DONG PHOTOGRAPHED THE PILOT'S REMAINS AND SENT THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND A REPORT TO HIS SUPERIORS (NFI).

(H) MR. BIEN SAID MR. GAM WAS A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AIDE. MR. BIEN WORKED AS A SECTION CHIEF AND MR. GAM WORKED IN AN OFFICE SUBORDINATE TO MR. BIEN'S SECTION.

(I) MR. BIEN ALSO KNEW MR. NGUYEN HUY HOANG. MR. BIEN SAID MR. HOANG NEVER WENT TO THE BURIAL SITE, BUT ONLY ASKED ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AT THE SITE AND REPORTED TO HIS SUPERIORS. ACCORDING TO MR. BIEN, MR. HOANG DIED NEAR THE VIETNAM-LAOS BORDER DURING THE WAR.

(J) MR. BIEN REPORTED MR. CAM VINH TRI (CAAMF VINHX TRI) WAS A FORMER SENIOR COLONEL IN THE NWMR'S MILITIA OFFICE. {NOTE: THE SRT TEAM REPORTED MR. TRI'S NAME AS MR. CAM MINH CHE (CHEES). SEE REF E.} THIS OFFICE WAS IN CHARGE OF THE VILLAGE MILITIAS IN THE THREE PROVINCES THAT COMPRISED THE NWMR. HOWEVER, MR. BIEN SAID MR. TRI IS DECEASED. {NOTE: MR. THO REPORTED BECAUSE A VILLAGE MILITIA UNIT SHOT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT IN THIS CASE, MR. TRI PROBABLY WENT TO THE VILLAGE WHERE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT.}

J. WITNESS #5: ON 13 JAN 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. LO VAN AN (LOF VAWN AAN) AT THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION CENTER IN SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE.

(1) NAME: MR. LO VAN AN

(2) AGE: 64 YOA

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE:

BAN LANG HAMLET, CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS CURRENT RESIDENCE

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: FARMER AND MEMBER OF BAN LANG

HAMLET MILITIA

(7) STATEMENT:

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED

RMKS/

(A) BETWEEN 1500 AND 1700 ON AN UN-RECALLED DATE IN OCT OR NOV (AFTER THE RAINY SEASON HARVEST) IN 1965, MR. AN WAS CLIMBING A MOUNTAIN LOCATED ABOUT A KILOMETER FROM HIS HOUSE, LOOKING FOR FIREWOOD. HE SAW A JET AIRCRAFT BURNING IN THE SKY AND SAW ONE PILOT EJECT FROM THE BURNING AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE MOUNTAINS FAR AWAY.

(B) MR. AN WATCHED AS THE PILOT DESCENDED TO THE GROUND UNDER A MULTICOLORED PARACHUTE. THE PILOT LANDED ABOUT 20 METERS FROM WHERE MR. AN STOOD, AND ABOUT 20 METERS FROM THE BASE OF THE MOUNTAIN. MR. AN DID NOT KNOW IF THE PILOT WAS DEAD OR ALIVE WHEN HE REACHED THE GROUND.

(C) WHEN MR. AN ARRIVED AT THE LOCATION WHERE THE PILOT HAD LANDED, THE PILOT WAS DEAD. SOLDIERS WERE ALREADY AT THE SITE, AND PREVENTED MR. AN FROM GETTING CLOSE TO THE BODY. AT FIRST, THE

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PILOT WAS WEARING A FLIGHT SUIT. HOWEVER, MR. AN RECALLED LATER SEEING THE PILOT WITHOUT HIS FLIGHT SUIT OR BOOTS. HE DID NOT KNOW WHO COLLECTED THE PILOT'S CLOTHING. MR. AN HEARD THE SOLDIERS BURIED THE PILOT'S BODY ABOUT 20 METERS FROM THE BASE OF THE MOUNTAIN. MR. AN DID NOT SEE THE SOLDIERS CONDUCT THE BURIAL. HOWEVER, THE DAY AFTER THE BURIAL, MR. AN SAW A 20 CENTIMETER HIGH BURIAL MOUND IN THE SAME AREA. HE SAW THE PILOT'S LEGS STICKING UP FROM THE GROUND, SO HE COVERED THE LEGS UP WITH MORE DIRT.

(D) LOCAL RESIDENTS HAVE CUT DOWN MOST OF THE TREES IN THE AREA OF THE BURIAL SITE AND ONLY THE STUMPS REMAIN. AFTER CUTTING DOWN THE TREES, THEY PLANTED MANIOC IN THE AREA. AS FAR AS MR. AN KNEW, NO ONE FOUND ANY REMAINS WHILE DIGGING IN THE GROUND TO PLANT THE MANIOC.

(E) MR. AN SAID THE BURIAL MOUND IS NO LONGER RECOGNIZABLE. HOWEVER, HE STILL REMEMBERED A TREE STUMP NEAR THE GRAVE SITE. THE GRAVE WAS DOWN THE HILL FROM THE STUMP NEAR A BAMBOO THICKET. LAST YEAR, A JOINT TEAM EXCAVATED NEAR THIS SITE, BUT DUG IN THE WRONG LOCATION. MR. AN SAID HE CAN LEAD A JOINT TEAM TO THE CORRECT BURIAL SITE. HE ALSO SAID ANY OTHER WITNESSES WHO KNOW ABOUT BURIAL SITE ARE DECEASED.

K. ON 14 JAN 96, MR. AN, MR. GAM, MR. BIEN, AND MR. EN LED THE RIT TO TWO POSSIBLE BURIAL SITES ON THE SIDE OF A HILL IN BAN PONG HAMLET, HUA LA VILLAGE, SON LA TOWN. MR. AN INDICATED ONE AREA AS POSSIBLY CONTAINING THE GRAVE, WHILE MR. GAM, MR. BIEN, AND MR. EN INDICATED THE GRAVE WAS POSSIBLY IN ANOTHER LOCATION.

(1) FIRST POSSIBLE BURIAL SITE:

(A) MR. AN POINTED OUT AN AREA OF EIGHT TO 10-FOOT-TALL SAW GRASS AS POSSIBLY CONTAINING THE GRAVE. HE SAID THE GRAVE WAS IN A 6 X 8-METER AREA DOWNHILL FROM A TREE STUMP AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87218 56162. THE STUMP WAS APPROXIMATELY 10 METERS FROM THE NORTHERN EDGE OF THE SAW GRASS AREA. ACCORDING TO MR. AN, THE MOST LIKELY BURIAL LOCATION WAS APPROXIMATELY THREE METERS DOWNHILL FROM THE STUMP. WHEN THE RIT HAD HIM MARK OUT A SIMILAR SIZE AREA OUTSIDE OF THE SAW GRASS, THE ACTUAL MEASUREMENTS TURNED OUT TO BE A 20 X 20-METER AREA.

(B) THE TEAM SAW TWO SHALLOW HOLES APPROXIMATELY 3.8 METERS DOWNHILL FROM THE STUMP AT AN AZIMUTH OF 315 DEGREES. MR. AN SAID HE DUG THESE TWO HOLES LAST YEAR AFTER THE JOINT TEAM COMPLETED ITS EXCAVATION ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA. {NOTE: THE RECOVERY TEAM DURING THE 28TH JFA EXCAVATED AN AREA APPROXIMATELY 100 METERS NORTH OF THE AREA IN WHICH MR. AN HAD DUG.} WHEN A RIT MEMBER ASKED MR. AN WHY HE DUG THE HOLES, HE SAID HE WAS MERELY LOOKING FOR THE BONES. HE DID NOT SAY WHY HE WANTED TO FIND THE REMAINS. MR. AN ALSO STATED HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN HIS ATTEMPT TO FIND THE REMAINS.

(C) MR. AN HEARD THAT APPROXIMATELY SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE BURIAL OF THE PILOT, A WOUNDED PAVN SOLDIER RETURNED TO HIS HOME IN THE LOCAL AREA. MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY CAME TO THE BURIAL SITE AND DUG IN THE AREA, HOPING TO FIND THE BONES TO MAKE A MEDICINAL CONCOCTION TO TREAT THE SOLDIER'S WOUNDS. MR. AN HEARD THEY WERE UNABLE TO FIND THE BURIAL SITE.

(2) SECOND POSSIBLE BURIAL SITE:

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(A) MR. GAM, MR. BIEN, AND MR. EN INDICATED THE BURIAL SITE WAS POSSIBLY WITHIN A 9 X 7-METER AREA IN A BAMBOO THICKET. MR. EN SAID HE WAS STANDING APPROXIMATELY 10 METERS DOWNHILL FROM THE MEDICAL SCHOOL'S SLEEPING QUARTERS WHEN HE SAW THE PILOT DESCEND TO THE GROUND. THE SLEEPING QUARTERS WERE NEAR A LARGE BOULDER NEAR GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87248 56213 {VERIFIED USING THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) TRACKING FIVE SATELLITES}. THE PILOT'S LANDING SITE WAS NEAR GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87177 56208, APPROXIMATELY 35 TO 40 METERS DOWNHILL FROM THE SLEEPING QUARTERS.

(B) ACCORDING TO MR. AN, DURING THE WAR, RESIDENTS OF SON LA TOWN MOVED INTO THE FOREST TO ESCAPE THE BOMBING. THEY USED THE AREA WITHIN THE BAMBOO THICKET AS A COOKING AREA. MR. AN WAS ADAMANT THAT THE BURIAL SITE WAS NOT INSIDE THE BAMBOO THICKET. HE VERIFIED HIS LOCATION FURTHER UP THE HILL BY THE AGE OF THE BAMBOO ON THE MOUNTAIN AND A MOUND OF BOULDERS IN THE FIELD DIRECTLY NORTH OF THE SAW GRASS.

(C). THE TEAM SAW SIX TRENCHES THAT WERE PREVIOUSLY DUG IN THE BAMBOO THICKET. NONE OF THE WITNESSES KNEW WHO DUG THE TRENCHES OR WHY THEY HAD DUG THEM.

L. WITNESS #6: WHILE SURVEYING THE TWO ALLEGED BURIAL SITES, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. LO VAN KHUT (LOF VAWN KHUTJ).

(1) NAME: MR. LO VAN KHUT

(2) AGE: 70 YOA

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE: BAN LA HAMLET, CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE, SINCE CHILDHOOD

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS CURRENT ADDRESS

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: DIRECTOR OF AN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE. {NOTE: ONE OF THE LOCAL OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE COOPERATIVE OWNED THE LAND CONTAINING THE TWO LOCATIONS ALLEGED TO CONTAIN THE BURIAL SITE.}

(7) STATEMENT:

(A) MR. KHUT RECALLED AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED DURING THE MORNING HOURS ON AN UN-RECALLED DATE IN 1964. THIS WAS THE FIRST //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/
SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED
RMKS/

AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE AREA. HE SAW A BURNING AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH. MANY UNITS IN THE AREA WERE FIRING AT THE AIRCRAFT. MR. KHUT SAW A PILOT EJECT FROM THE AIRCRAFT AND DESCEND TO THE GROUND, LANDING ABOUT 20 TO 30 METERS FROM WHERE MR. KHUT WAS STANDING.

(B) MR. KHUT IMMEDIATELY WENT TO THE PILOT'S LANDING SITE. AT FIRST, SOLDIERS AT THE SITE WOULD NOT LET HIM GET CLOSE, BUT THEY EVENTUALLY LET HIM THROUGH. THE PILOT WAS ALREADY DEAD. MR. KHUT DESCRIBED THE PILOT'S ARM AS HAIRY. AFTER ABOUT FIVE MINUTES, SOLDIERS FORCED MR. KHUT AWAY FROM THE BODY.

(C) MR. KHUT DID NOT WITNESS THE BURIAL AND NEVER SAW

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THE GRAVE. HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANYONE IN THE AREA WHO EXHUMED THE REMAINS TO MAKE MEDICINE. MR. KHUT INDICATED THE BURIAL SITE WAS POSSIBLY WITHIN THE SAME GENERAL AREA MR. AN HAD IDENTIFIED.

(D) MR. KHUT INDICATED HE SAW THE PILOT'S BODY NEAR A GULLY AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87266 56101 (VERIFIED USING THE GPS TRACKING FOUR SATELLITES), BUT DID NOT KNOW IF THE GRAVE SITE WAS NEAR WHERE HE SAW THE BODY. MR. KHUT ALSO SAID THE BODY WAS LYING NEAR A TERMITE MOUND. HOWEVER, AS THE TEAM WAS LEAVING THE SITE, SEVERAL OF THE WITNESSES HELD AN ANIMATED DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE LOCATIONS OF TERMITE MOUNDS IN THE AREA. THEY COULD NOT AGREE ON WHETHER THERE WAS A TERMITE MOUND IN THE AREA MR. KHUT INDICATED HE SAW THE PILOT'S BODY.

M. ON 18 JAN 96, COL TEO INFORMED THE TEAM THAT THE MR. DONG WE REQUESTED IS ACTUALLY MR. TONG. MR. TONG CURRENTLY LIVES IN LAO CAI PROVINCE. THE TEAM REQUESTED MR. TONG BE BROUGHT TO HANOI FOR INTERVIEW.

N. ON 5 FEB 96, COL TEO INFORMED THE TEAM THAT MR. TONG'S FATHER-IN-LAW WAS SERIOUSLY ILL AND MR. TONG WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW PRIOR TO THE END OF THE JFA. COL TEO STATED HE WOULD CONTINUE WORKING WITH LAO CAI PROVINCE AND ARRANGE FOR A TEAM TO INTERVIEW MR. TONG AT A LATER DATE. UPON INTERVIEW, MR. TONG'S INFORMATION WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

O. ON 7 FEB 96, COL TEO PROVIDED A COPY OF HIS UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION EFFORTS TO LOCATE MR. TONG. A TRANSLATION OF COL TEO'S REPORT FOLLOWS:

(BEGIN TRANSLATION)

IN THE AFTERNOON ON 18 JAN 96: WE MET MR. HOANG THO DONG, 66 YEARS OLD, RETIRED COLONEL, CHAIRMAN OF HA LONG WARD VETERANS ASSOCIATION, NAM DINH CITY, NAM HA PROVINCE. MR. HOANG THO DONG STATED:

- DURING THE FRENCH RESISTANCE, HE WAS IN DIVISION 308 IN TAY BAC.
- DURING THE AMERICAN RESISTANCE, MR. HOANG THO DONG NO LONGER FOUGHT IN TAY BAC BUT IN QUANG BINH, THUA THIEN, TRUONG SON ROUTE. THAT IS WHY HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT DEAD AMERICAN PILOT IN SON LA IN 1965.
- DURING 1977-1990, HE LECTURED IN NATIONAL DEFENSE INSTITUTE (FORMER HIGH LEVEL MILITARY INSTITUTE). HE DID NOT KNOW A MR. PHAN DONG WHO ALSO TAUGHT THERE.

CONCLUSION: WE MET WITH MANY TAY BAC VETERANS OF THE AMERICAN RESISTANCE BUT ALL OF THEM CONFIRMED THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW ANY ONE NAMED PHAN DONG.

- MANY PEOPLE STATED IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MR. HOANG TONG WAS THE PERSON WHO TOOK PICTURES OF THE DEAD AMERICAN PILOT IN SON LA IN 1965.

(END TRANSLATION)

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE

5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS: ON 14 JAN 96, THE RIT SURVEYED TWO SITES WHILE INVESTIGATING CASE DATA.

A. FIRST SITE:

(1) PROJECT LOCATION:

(A) GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87218 56162 (VERIFIED BY THE GPS USING FOUR SATELLITES)

(B) MAP DATA: MAP NAME - SON LA, MAP NO. - 5751 I,

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MAP SERIES - L7014, PRINTED - 1966

- (2) OUTSTANDING FEATURES: NONE
- (3) TERRAIN: HILLY, WITH A FIVE TO 10 DEGREE SLOPE
- (4) SOIL CONDITIONS: BROWN, HARD-PACKED SOIL
- (5) VEGETATION: SAW GRASS, EIGHT TO 10 FEET IN HEIGHT
- (6) SURVEY METHOD: SURFACE SEARCH OF A 30 X 30-METER AREA
- (7) HAZARDS: STANDARD BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS, INCLUDING SNAKES

AND INSECTS

- (8) RESULTS:

- (A) REMAINS SEEN: NONE
- (B) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE
- (C) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE
- (D) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: NONE

B. SECOND SITE:

(1) PROJECT LOCATION:

(A) GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87177 56208 (VERIFIED

BY THE GPS USING SIX SATELLITES)

(B) MAP DATA: MAP NAME - SON LA, MAP NO. - 5751 I,

MAP SERIES - L7014, PRINTED - 1966

- (2) OUTSTANDING FEATURES: NONE
- (3) TERRAIN: HILLY, WITH A FIVE TO 10 DEGREE SLOPE
- (4) SOIL CONDITIONS: BROWN, HARD-PACKED SOIL
- (5) VEGETATION: BAMBOO
- (6) SURVEY METHOD: SURFACE SEARCH OF A 30 X 30-METER AREA
- (7) HAZARDS: STANDARD BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS, INCLUDING SNAKES

AND INSECTS

(8) RESULTS:

- (A) REMAINS SEEN: NONE
- (B) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE
- (C) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE
- (D) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: NONE

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE

7. AREA OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED:

A. THE RIT DID NOT INTERVIEW SENIOR CAPTAIN NGUYEN HUY HOANG. THREE WITNESSES, MR. HUNG, MR. GAM, AND MR. BIEN, INDICATED SENIOR CAPTAIN HOANG IS DECEASED.

B. THE RIT DID NOT INTERVIEW MR. CAM VINH TRI. MR. BIEN INDICATED MR. TRI IS DECEASED.

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED

RMKS/

C. THE RIT DID NOT INTERVIEW ANY CADRE FROM THE NORTHWEST SOLDIER NEWSPAPER.

8. ANALYST'S COMMENTS:

A. CORRELATIONS:

(1) WITNESS #1: THE INFORMATION MR. HUNG PROVIDED CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA BASED ON NAME, MONTH AND YEAR OF INCIDENT, AIRCRAFT TYPE, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS.

(2) WITNESS #2: THE INFORMATION MR. EN PROVIDED PROBABLY

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CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA BASED ON YEAR OF INCIDENT, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS.

(3) WITNESS #3: THE INFORMATION MR. GAM PROVIDED PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA BASED ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS.

(4) WITNESS #4:

(A) THE INFORMATION MR. BIEN PROVIDED ABOUT THE PILOT WHO WAS KILLED AND BURIED PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA BASED ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS.

(B) THE INFORMATION MR. BIEN PROVIDED IN PARA 31(8) (E) ABOUT THE CAPTURED PILOT WHO WAS CAPTURED PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0130 BASED ON DATE, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS.

(5) WITNESS #5: THE INFORMATION MR. AN PROVIDED PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA BASED ON YEAR, LOCATION, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS.

(6) WITNESS #6: THE INFORMATION MR. KHUT PROVIDED PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA BASED ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS.

B. POTENTIAL LEADS:

(1) RECOMMEND A JOINT RECOVERY TEAM EXCAVATE THE TWO AREAS THE WITNESSES INDICATED AS POSSIBLE BURIAL SITES FOR CASE DATA.

(2) INTERVIEW MR. HOANG TONG OF LAO CAI PROVINCE.

C. WITNESS RELIABILITY: EXCELLENT. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, THE WITNESSES ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. MR. AN DID NOT REVEAL WHY HE DUG TWO HOLES AT THE SITE AFTER THE RECOVERY TEAM COMPLETED ITS WORK DURING THE 28TH JFA. SINCE HE DID NOT ANSWER, WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON HIS MOTIVATION FOR DIGGING THESE HOLES.

D. THE RIT BASED THE ASSESSMENTS IN THIS REPORT ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND DOES NOT INTEND FOR THESE ASSESSMENTS TO CONSTITUTE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

E. THE RIT BELIEVES THE FIRST SITE, THE AREA MR. AN AND MR. KHUT INDICATED AS POSSIBLY CONTAINING THE GRAVE, IS MORE LIKELY TO BE THE CORRECT LOCATION THAN THE SECOND SITE, WHICH MR. GAM, MR. BIEN, AND MR. EN POINTED OUT. MR. GAM, MR. BIEN, AND MR. EN HAVE NOT BEEN TO THE BURIAL SITE SINCE THE WAR. IN ADDITION, THE REMOVAL OF TREES IN THE AREA AND RE-PLANTING WITH MANIOC WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR MR. GAM, MR. BIEN, AND MR. EN TO FIND THE CORRECT BURIAL LOCATION. MR. BIEN AND MR. EN ALSO USED A SMALL BANYAN TREE, NOW GONE, LOCATED HIGHER UP ON THE KARST AS A POINT OF REFERENCE, BUT THEY COULD NOT AGREE ON WHERE THE TREE HAD BEEN LOCATED. ON THE OTHER HAND, MR. AN AND MR. KHUT HAVE LIVED IN THE LOCAL AREA FOR MOST OF THEIR LIVES. THEY MORE LIKELY HAVE SEEN THE AREA AS IT CHANGED AND ARE PROBABLY MORE SURE OF THE CORRECT SITE. MR. AN USED A ROCK BURIED IN THE CENTER OF THE CLEARED AREA JUST NORTH OF THE FIRST SITE AS A POINT OF REFERENCE. THE TEAM RECOMMENDS THE RECOVERY ELEMENT FIRST EXCAVATE THE SITE MR. AN INDICATED.

F. BOTH MR. GAM AND MR. BIEN SAID THEY ORDERED MR. NHU AND MR. QUY TO INVESTIGATE THE PILOT'S DEATH AND BURIAL. WE NOTE THAT MR. GAM WORKED IN AN OFFICE SUBORDINATE TO MR. BIEN'S SECTION. IT

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IS POSSIBLE MR. BIEN ORDERED MR. GAM TO SEND MR. NHU AND MR. QUY TO THE BURIAL SITE, AND MR. GAM THEN ISSUED THE ORDER DIRECTLY TO MR. NHU AND MR. QUY. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT SEVERAL DIFFERENT AGENCIES SHOWED OFFICIAL INTEREST IN THIS INCIDENT, SINCE IT WAS THE FIRST SHOOT DOWN OF A PILOT IN THE AREA.

G. DURING THE 9TH JFA, MR. TAN AI QUY REPORTED CAPTAIN (SIC) NGUYEN HUY HOANG ARRIVED AT THE BURIAL SITE AN HOUR AFTER THE BURIAL. CPT HOANG ORDERED MR. QUY'S PLATOON TO EXHUME THE BODY SO MR. HOANG COULD PHOTOGRAPH IT. MR. QUY ALSO SAID CPT HOANG COLLECTED THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS (SEE REF B). DURING THE RIT INVESTIGATION, MR. GAM INDICATED SENIOR CAPTAIN NGUYEN HUY HOANG WENT TO THE BURIAL SITE ONE OR TWO DAYS AFTER THE BURIAL, EXHUMED THE BODY AND PHOTOGRAPHED IT, BECAUSE HIS OFFICE HAD THE ONLY CAMERA. HOWEVER, DURING THIS INVESTIGATION, MR. HUNG SAID HE AND MR. DONG ARRIVED AT THE SITE APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS AFTER THE BURIAL, EXHUMED THE REMAINS AND TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS. MR. QUY AND MR. GAM MAY HAVE CONFUSED THE NAMES "HOANG" AND "HUNG." SENIOR CAPTAIN HOANG POSSIBLY NEVER WENT TO THE BURIAL SITE.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY COMMENTS: BASED ON THE WITNESSES' STATEMENTS, THE RIT RECOMMENDS EXCAVATING BOTH SITES. THE RECOVERY TEAM SHOULD FIRST EXCAVATE SITE NUMBER ONE. THE TWO SITES ARE APPROXIMATELY FOUR KILOMETERS, OR A 20-MINUTE DRIVE, FROM THE HOA BAN HOTEL IN SON LA. THE RECOVERY ELEMENT CAN TRAVEL BY VEHICLE TO WITHIN 200 METERS OF THE SITES. THE LAST 200 METERS IS ALONG A STEEP INCLINE TO THE BASE OF THE KARST. BOTH SITES ARE WITHIN 70 METERS OF EACH OTHER. THE CENTER POINT BETWEEN THE TWO SITES IS A MOUND OF ROCKS NOW SPRAY-PAINTED WITH RED ARROWS. AZIMUTH READINGS FROM SITE ONE ARE MARKED IN RED PAINT IN TWO PLACES ON THE KARST FACE, 200 DEGREES AND 38 METERS TO THE NORTH AND 235 DEGREES TO THE NORTH-EAST OF THE STUMP AT SITE NUMBER ONE.

A. SITE NUMBER 1 - LOGISTICS: A RECOVERY ELEMENT CAN EXCAVATE THIS SITE WITH A STANDARD-SIZED TEAM USING STANDARD EQUIPMENT. IT WILL TAKE 15 TO 20 DAYS TO COMPLETE THIS SITE USING 30 TO 40 WORKERS. THE TEAM CAN HIRE WORKERS IN BAN PONG HAMLET OR HUA LA VILLAGE. THE CLOSEST WATER SOURCE IS 300 METERS WEST OF THE SITE; HOWEVER, THIS WILL NOT CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS BECAUSE THE SITE CAN BE DRY-SCREENED. THE SITE ENCOMPASSES A 20 X 20-METER AREA. DEPENDING ON THE TIME OF YEAR, THE RECOVERY ELEMENT WILL NEED PROTECTION FROM THE SUN. THE RIT MARKED THE REFERENCE STUMP WITH RED PAINT.

B. SITE NUMBER 2 - LOGISTICS: A RECOVERY ELEMENT CAN EXCAVATE THIS SITE WITH A STANDARD-SIZED TEAM USING STANDARD EQUIPMENT. IT //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED RMKS/

WILL TAKE FIVE TO 10 DAYS TO COMPLETE THIS SITE USING 30 TO 40 WORKERS. THE TEAM CAN HIRE WORKERS IN BAN PONG HAMLET OR HUA LA VILLAGE. THE CLOSEST WATER SOURCE IS 300 METERS WEST OF THE SITE; HOWEVER, THIS WILL NOT CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS BECAUSE THE SITE CAN BE DRY SCREENED. THE SITE ENCOMPASSES A 9 X 7-METER AREA. THE RIT MARKED

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TWO ROCKS WITHIN THE ALLEGED BURIAL AREA WITH RED PAINT.

10. TEAM CHIEF'S COMMENTS:

A. THE VNOSMP, SON LA PROVINCE AND HUA LA VILLAGE OFFICIALS WERE VERY COOPERATIVE AND PROVIDED EXCELLENT SUPPORT TO THE RIT. ADVANCE WORK BY BOTH VNOSMP AND PROVINCE OFFICIALS WAS THOROUGH. THE RIT'S VNOSMP COUNTERPARTS PREPARED AND BRIEFED THE PROVINCE ON THE TEAM'S REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO THE TEAM'S ARRIVAL. THIS PREPARATION ALLOWED THE TEAM TO BEGIN AND COMPLETE THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE IN AN EXPEDITIOUS MANNER.

B. ALL THE WITNESSES APPEARED TO MAKE SINCERE EFFORTS TO LOCATE THE BURIAL SITE FOR THE TEAM. MR. BIEN, DESPITE A PAINFULLY SWOLLEN LEFT KNEE, STRUGGLED UP THE HILL TO THE SITE, SEVERAL TIMES REMARKING THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR BOTH SIDES TO WORK HARD TOGETHER TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IN ORDER TO PUT THE PAST BEHIND US. DESPITE THEIR SINCERITY, THE WITNESSES COULD NOT AGREE UPON A SINGLE LOCATION AS MOST LIKELY CONTAINING THE GRAVE. DRAMATIC TERRAIN CHANGES IN THE 30 YEARS SINCE THE INCIDENT HAVE DESTROYED MOST OF THEIR POINTS OF REFERENCE. WHAT REMAINS IS THEIR FADING COLLECTIVE MEMORY. FOR THIS REASON, THE RIT RECOMMENDS EXCAVATING BOTH SITES, WITH PRIORITY TO THE FIRST. THE TEAM ESTABLISHED THIS PRIORITY BOTH FOR THE REASONS NOTED IN PARA 8E ABOVE, AND BECAUSE THE SECOND SITE IS IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA AS SEVERAL PREVIOUS UNSUCCESSFUL EXCAVATIONS.

C. THE ONLY DISCREPANCY AMONG THE WITNESSES' STATEMENTS IS WHO ACTUALLY PHOTOGRAPHED THE BODY OF THE PILOT. TWO WITNESSES, MR. HUNG AND MR. BIEN SAID MR. DONG PHOTOGRAPHED THE PILOT'S BODY. MR. HUNG SAID MR. DONG ACCOMPANIED HIM TO THE GRAVE SITE. SINCE THE BODY WAS ALREADY BURIED THEY ORDERED THE SOLDIERS AT THE SITE TO EXHUME THE BODY. AFTER THE EXHUMATION, MR. DONG PHOTOGRAPHED THE BODY AND THE SOLDIERS RE-BURIED THE BODY IN THE SAME HOLE. ACCORDING TO MR. HUNG, THE EXHUMATION AND SUBSEQUENT RE-BURIAL TOOK PLACE THE SAME DAY THE PILOT WAS KILLED. ACCORDING TO MR. GAM, ABOUT ONE OR TWO DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT, THE NWMR RECEIVED ORDERS FROM HANOI TO EXHUME THE PILOT'S BODY AND PHOTOGRAPH THE REMAINS. SENIOR CAPTAIN HOANG WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS MISSION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE BODY WAS EXHUMED TWICE IN ORDER TO PHOTOGRAPH IT, ONCE FOR MR. DONG AND ONE OR TWO DAYS LATER FOR SENIOR CAPTAIN HOANG. REGARDLESS, ALL WITNESSES INDICATED THE BODY WAS RE-BURIED IN THE SAME HOLE FROM WHICH IT WAS EXHUMED.

11. FIELD RESEARCH DIRECTOR'S COMMENTS: SEVERAL THINGS BECAME CLEAR IN THE COURSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION:

A. FIRST, THE CONFUSING AND OFTEN CONFLICTING INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE EARLIER INVESTIGATION REPORTS ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT. NO ONE WAS IN CHARGE, THE VIETNAMESE WERE OPERATING ON AN AD HOC BASIS, WITHOUT AN ESTABLISHED POLICY. HANDLING OF THE INCIDENT WAS FURTHER CONFUSED BY THE LOCATION IN WHICH IT TOOK PLACE: JUST OUTSIDE THE NWMR HEADQUARTERS. THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES WERE DEFERRING TO THE NWMR, BUT THE NWMR MADE NO COORDINATED RESPONSE TO THE INCIDENT. IN ADDITION, AIR ATTACKS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THIS TIME, ADDING THE "FOG OF WAR" TO EXISTING CONFUSION.

B. WE HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH, 30 YEARS AFTER THE FACT,

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A MINUTE-BY-MINUTE ACCOUNT OF WHAT TOOK PLACE AT THE SITE. WHAT WE HAVE IS ANECDOTAL INFORMATION FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS AGENCIES WHO WENT TO THE DEATH/BURIAL LOCATION AND THEN WENT BACK TO THEIR UNITS.

C. THERE ARE MANY WITNESSES TO THE BURIAL OR ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH. ALMOST EVERYONE WHO WAS LIVING IN HUA LA VILLAGE OR CHIENG COI VILLAGE DURING THE WAR EITHER SAW OR HEARD ABOUT THE BURIAL SITE. HARDLY ANY OF THESE WITNESSES CAN AGREE ABOUT THE SPECIFIC LOCATION OF THE BURIAL SITE. THE ACTUAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE INCIDENT WHOM THE TEAM INTERVIEWED WERE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A SINGLE LOCATION BECAUSE THE TERRAIN HAS CHANGED SO COMPLETELY. THEIR POINTS OF REFERENCE (TREES, TERMITE MOUNDS, ETC.) HAVE LONG SINCE DISAPPEARED.

D. EVENTUALLY, WE WILL INTERVIEW MR. TONG, THE PHOTOGRAPHER. (VNOSMP DESERVES CREDIT FOR FINDING HIM.) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY INFORMATION HE PROVIDES WILL AFFECT THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE. HIS INTERVIEW WILL MERELY SERVE TO CLOSE THE FINAL LOOP IN THE INVESTIGATION.

E. THE BOTTOM LINE ON THIS CASE IS THAT IT IS CERTAIN MAJ LINDSEY DIED AND WAS BURIED ON A HILLSIDE IN BAN PONG HAMLET, HUA LA VILLAGE, 31 YEARS AGO. IT IS NOT CERTAIN EXACTLY WHERE ON THE HILLSIDE HE WAS BURIED. IT IS EQUALLY UNCERTAIN THAT HIS REMAINS ARE INTACT. THE TWO GENERAL AREAS POINTED OUT BY THE TWO GROUPS OF WITNESSES (WHO FIRMLY DISAGREED WITH EACH OTHER) SHOULD BE EXCAVATED. IF WE FIND NO REMAINS AFTER THESE EXCAVATIONS, WE SHOULD CEASE ACTIVITY. ITS A BIG HILLSIDE. MAJ LINDSEY'S REMAINS, IF THEY STILL EXIST, COULD BE ANYWHERE.

12. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS: EXCAVATE//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00167892

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS995 MCN = 96067/07720 TOR = 960670447

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HEADER

R 070046Z MAR 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEFJII/J2

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 060902Z MAR 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

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CONTROLS

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SECTION 01 OF 04

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF SPECIAL REMAINS CASE DATA //

REF/A/RMG/JCRC LNO BKK/091017ZNOV88//

REF/B/RMG/JCRC LNO BKK/091027ZFEB89//

REF/C/RMG/JCRC LNO BKK/220903ZMAR90//

REF/D/FAX/CJTFFA DET TWO/30AUG93/797-93/NOTAL//

REF/E/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/070802ZFEB94//

REF/F/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/281953ZMAR94//

NARR/REF A IS THE REPORT OF THE JOINT U.S./SRV INVESTIGATION OF

CASE DATA CONDUCTED DURING THE 2ND JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA)

(24 OCT-3 NOV 88). REF B IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

(DRI) OF CASE DATA CONDUCTED DURING THE 4TH JFA (14-26 JAN 89).REF C IS THE DRI OF CASE DATA CONDUCTED DURING THE 9TH JFA

(16 FEB-6 MAR 90). REF D IS A FAX MESSAGE DESCRIBING A DOCUMENT

ENTITLED "PILOTS WHO DIED IN SON LA." THE DATE ON THIS DOCUMENT

IS 10 NOV 72. LINE 9 OF THIS DOCUMENT, POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH

CASE DATA, INDICATES PERSONNEL FROM THE NORTHWEST SOLDIER NEWSPAPER

EXHUMED AND PHOTOGRAPHED THE BODY OF A PILOT NEAR THE NORTHWEST

MILITARY REGION'S (NWMR) MEDICAL SCHOOL. REF E IS THE SPECIAL

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REMAINS TEAM DRI OF CASE DATA CONDUCTED ON 9 DEC 93. REF F IS THE DETAILED SEARCH AND RECOVERY REPORT OF CASE DATA CONDUCTED DURING THE 28TH JFA (24 FEB-22 MAR 94).//

RMKS/1. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: THE RIT INVESTIGATED SPECIAL REMAINS CASE DATA FROM 12 THROUGH 14 JAN 96 IN SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE, AND ON 18 JAN 96 IN HANOI. THE RIT INTERVIEWED A TOTAL OF SIX WITNESSES WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DEATH AND BURIAL OF A U.S. PILOT IN SON LA TOWN DURING THE DRY SEASON IN 1965. NONE OF THE WITNESSES PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ABOUT THE BURIAL OF THE PILOT. HOWEVER, MR. NGUYEN TAN HUNG, WHO IS NOW BLIND, PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ABOUT THE RE-BURIAL OF THE PILOT'S BODY AFTER MR. PHAN DONG TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE REMAINS. THE RIT SURVEYED TWO ALLEGED BURIAL SITES IN BAN PONG HAMLET, HUA LA VILLAGE, SON LA TOWN AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87218 56162 AND 48Q UJ 87177 56208 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE TEAM RECOVERED NO REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE DURING THIS INVESTIGATION.

2. BACKGROUND:

A. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS: THIS CASE INVOLVES THE DT JUN 65 DATA OVER SON LA PROVINCE, VIETNAM. THE LAST RADIO CONTACT TOOK PLACE IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 876 592. SEARCH AND RESCUE AIRCRAFT COULD NOT LOCATE ANY AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE OR SIGNS OF THE PILOT. ONE U.S. SERVICE MEMBER REMAINS UNACCOUNTED-FOR.

B. INVESTIGATION RESULTS TO DATE:

(1) DURING THE 2ND JFA, FROM 27 THROUGH 29 OCT 88, A JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED CASE DATA IN SON LA PROVINCE. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED EIGHT WITNESSES, SIX OF WHOM PROVIDED INFORMATION PROBABLY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. THE TEAM EXCAVATED TWO ALLEGED BURIAL SITES NEAR GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 874 561 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE TEAM ALSO SURVEYED THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION AS LISTED IN U.S. RECORDS NEAR GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 876 592, BUT FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF AN AIRCRAFT CRASH AT THAT LOCATION. THE TEAM ALSO VISITED THE SON LA MUSEUM (SEE REF A).

(2) DURING THE 4TH JFA, FROM 19 THROUGH 21 JAN 89, A JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED CASE DATA IN SON LA TOWN. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED ONE WITNESS WHO PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ABOUT THIS CASE. THE TEAM SURVEYED AND EXCAVATED AN ALLEGED BURIAL SITE NEAR GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 874 561 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE TEAM ALSO VISITED THE SON LA MUSEUM (SEE REF B).

(3) DURING THE 9TH JFA, FROM 18 THROUGH 23 FEB 89, A JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED CASE DATA IN BAN PONG HAMLET (THOON BANR PONGJ), HUA LA VILLAGE, SON LA TOWN. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE FIRSTHAND WITNESSES WHO IDENTIFIED THREE POSSIBLE BURIAL SITES IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATE 48Q UJ 8739 5623. THE TEAM EXCAVATED THESE THREE SITES WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE TEAM ALSO VISITED THE SON LA MUSEUM WHERE THEY OBSERVED A PHOTOGRAPH OF AN APPARENTLY DEAD AMERICAN PILOT WITH THE RANK OF CAPTAIN. INFORMATION RECORDED ON THE BACK OF THE PHOTOGRAPH INDICATED THE PILOT WAS SHOT DOWN IN SON LA ON 27 JUN 65. THE TEAM COULD NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE BODY IN THE PHOTOGRAPH AS THE INDIVIDUAL

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ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. A U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY-HAWAII (CILHI) ANTHROPOLOGIST EXAMINED THE PHOTOGRAPH, BUT ONLY DETERMINED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PHOTOGRAPH APPEARED TO BE DEAD (SEE REF C).

(4) ON 9 DEC 93, THE JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATED CASE DATA IN SON LA TOWN. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED ONE FIRSTHAND WITNESS WHO IDENTIFIED AN ALLEGED BURIAL SITE WITHIN A 7 X 10-METER AREA NEAR GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87213 56375. THE TEAM DUG TWO TEST PITS WITHIN THIS AREA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE TEAM RECOMMENDED EXCAVATION (SEE REF E).

(5) DURING THE 28TH JFA, FROM 3 THROUGH 7 MAR 94, A JOINT RECOVERY TEAM EXCAVATED A POSSIBLE BURIAL SITE NEAR GRID COORDINATES 48Q UJ 87242 56356. A WITNESS LED THE TEAM TO THE SITE WHERE HE CLAIMED HE BURIED THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN PILOT. THE TEAM EXCAVATED AN 11 X 10-METER AREA, BUT FOUND NO HUMAN REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (SEE REF F).

C. PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION:

(1) RE-INTERVIEW MR. NGUYEN TAN HUNG (NGUYEENX TAAN HUNGFI) TO CLARIFY PORTIONS OF THE INFORMATION HE PROVIDED DURING THE SECOND JFA (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3F).

(2) INTERVIEW MR. NGUYEN HUY HOANG (NGUYEENX HUY HOANGFI), FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO THE NWMR INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, WHO REPORTEDLY TOOK CUSTODY OF THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3P).

(3) INTERVIEW MR. DONG (DOONGS), A PHOTOGRAPHER FROM NWMR HEADQUARTERS, WHO REPORTEDLY PHOTOGRAPHED THE DEAD PILOT (NOT ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3P).

(4) INTERVIEW MR. CAM MINH CHE (CAAMF MINH CHEES), A FORMER PLATOON LEADER IN COMPANY 32, SUBORDINATE TO THE NWMR COMMAND, STATIONED NEAR SON LA TOWN IN 1965, WHO MAY HAVE SUPERVISED THE BURIAL OF THE PILOT (NOT ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3I).

(5) ATTEMPT TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW FORMER CADRE AND STAFF

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED
RMKS/

FROM THE NORTHWEST SOLDIER NEWSPAPER, WHO POSSIBLY EXHUMED AND PHOTOGRAPHED THE PILOT'S BODY (SEE REF D) (NOT ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3P).

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION. FROM 12 THROUGH 14 JAN 96, THE RIT INVESTIGATED CASE DATA IN SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE, AND ON 18 JAN 96 IN HANOI. THE VNOSMP TEAM LEADER COORDINATED WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS AND LOCATED THE WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED A TOTAL OF SIX WITNESSES.

A. PARTICIPANTS:

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT:

- (A) CW4 CLYDE GREEN, RIT TEAM LEADER
- (B) SFC PATRICK A. FRANCO, JR., RIT ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
- (C) SSG ALFRED S. IVERSEN, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST
- (D) TSgt VY V. TRAN, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST

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- (E) SSGT WILSON R. SIBLEY, JR., RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST
- (F) SSG WILLIAM E. COX, RIT SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
- (G) MR. JAMES M. COYLE, JTF-FA FIELD RESEARCH DIRECTOR
- (2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT:
 - (A) COL PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REP
 - (B) MR. TRINH THE HUNG (TRINHJ THEES HUNG), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REP
- (3) SON LA PROVINCE TASK TEAM:
 - (A) MR. NGUYEN VAN THO (NGUYEENX VAWN THOJ), MIA TEAM LEADER
 - (B) MR. CAM PHUONG (CAAMF PHWONG), TEAM MEMBER
 - (C) MR. CAM HOANG (CAAMF HOANGF), TEAM MEMBER
 - (D) MR. BUI THANH (BUIF THANH), TEAM MEMBER
 - (E) MR. TAN THANH (TAANF THANH), TEAM MEMBER
- (4) SON LA TOWN TASK TEAM:
 - (A) MR. NGUYEN VAN CHAT (NGUYEENX VAWN CHAATS), TEAM MEMBER
 - (B) MR. LE DINH (LEE DINHR), TEAM MEMBER
- (5) QUYET THANG WARD (PHWONGF QUYETS THAWNGS) TASK TEAM:
 - (A) MR. (LNU) QUANG (QUANGF), TEAM MEMBER
 - (B) MR. (LNU) THONG (THOONG), TEAM MEMBER

B. ON 5 JAN 96, THE RIT HELD A PLANNING MEETING WITH THE VNOSMP CONTINGENT AT THE JOINT DOCUMENT CENTER (JDC) IN THE ARMY MUSEUM, HANOI. AT THE MEETING, THE RIT PRESENTED THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS CASE TO THE VNOSMP.

C. ON 10 JAN 96, THE RIT MET AGAIN WITH VNOSMP CONTINGENT AT THE JDC. COL TEO REPORTED SON LA PROVINCE OFFICIALS HAD FOUND MR. NGUYEN TAN HUNG, BUT WERE STILL LOOKING FOR THE OTHER THREE WITNESSES. COL TEO ALSO REPORTED MR. DONG'S FULL NAME WAS PHAN DONG (PHAN DOONGS). COL TEO INDICATED THE VNOSMP WOULD LOOK FOR MR. DONG IN HANOI IF SON LA OFFICIALS DID NOT FIND HIM IN SON LA PROVINCE. COL TEO ALSO INTIMATED THAT LOCAL ETHNIC MINORITY RESIDENTS MAY HAVE EXHUMED THE BONES, GROUND THEM INTO POWDER, AND MIXED THE POWDER WITH ALCOHOL IN ORDER TO MAKE A FOLK MEDICINE FOR PROTECTION AGAINST MALARIA.

D. ON 11 JAN 96, THE RIT TRAVELED TO SON LA PROVINCE BY VEHICLE.

E. ON THE MORNING OF 12 JAN 96, THE TEAM MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE SON LA PROVINCE TASK TEAM. MR. NGUYEN VAN THO, THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM LEADER, REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO THE TEAM.

(1) THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM FOUND MR. NGUYEN TAN HUNG. THE TEAM ARRANGED TO INTERVIEW MR. HUNG ON THE AFTERNOON OF 12 JAN 96.

(2) THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM FOUND TWO PEOPLE NAMED NGUYEN HUY HOANG IN SON LA PROVINCE. THE FIRST MR. HOANG, A SENIOR CAPTAIN (DAIJ UYS) DURING THE WAR, DIED IN 1970. THE SECOND MR. HOANG WAS A 1LT (TRUNG UYS) DURING THE WAR. FORMER 1LT HOANG SAID HE WAS WILLING FOR THE RIT TO INTERVIEW HIM, IF NECESSARY.

(3) THE JOURNALIST MR. PHAN DONG WAS POSSIBLY LIVING IN HANOI.

(4) MR. CAM MINH CHE RETIRED IN 1976 AND WENT BACK TO HIS

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HOME PROVINCE. HE POSSIBLY LIVES IN EITHER VINH PHU PROVINCE OR HA BAC PROVINCE.

(5) THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM ALSO ARRANGED FOR THE RIT TO INTERVIEW THREE WITNESSES ON 13 JAN: MR. LE HUY GAM (LEE HUY GAAM), MR. LONG BIEN (LONG BIEN), AND A THAI ETHNIC MINORITY NAMED MR. AN (AAN).

(6) THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM ARRANGED FOR THE RIT TO SURVEY ANY POSSIBLE BURIAL SITES THE WITNESSES INDICATED ON 14 JAN 96.

F. WITNESS #1: ON THE AFTERNOON 12 JAN 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN TAN HUNG AT THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION CENTER (TRUNG TAAM HUAANS LUYEENJ NGHIEEPJ VUJ VAF GIANGR ZAYJ NGOAIJ NGWX) IN SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE.

(1) NAME: MR. NGUYEN TAN HUNG

(2) AGE: 68 YOA

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE: UNIT 7 (TOOR 7), CHIENG LE WARD (PHWONGF CHIEENG F LEEF), SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE, LENGTH OF TIME UNKNOWN

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: STATIONED AT THE NWMR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SON LA PROVINCE

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: STAFF AIDE, INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION

(7) BACKGROUND INFORMATION: A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. HUNG DURING THE SECOND JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA)

(8) STATEMENT:

(A) DURING THE WAR, MR. HUNG WORKED AS AN AIDE IN THE NWMR'S MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICE IN SON LA PROVINCE. THE OFFICE'S DUTIES INCLUDED THE INVESTIGATION OF AIRCRAFT CRASH SITES IN ORDER TO CAPTURE AND INTERROGATE ANY U.S. PILOTS AND EXPLOIT ANY INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. BATTLE TACTICS THEY GAINED FROM THE INTERROGATIONS.

(B) MR. HUNG HEARD ABOUT AN AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED BETWEEN 1400 AND 1500 ON 26 JUN 65. MR. HUNG DID NOT WITNESS THE CRASH. HE AND A PHOTOGRAPHER, MR. PHAN DONG, WENT TO A SITE WHERE A U.S. PILOT HAD PARACHUTED TO THE GROUND. THEY ARRIVED AT THE SITE ABOUT 1600. FOUR OR FIVE SOLDIERS FROM RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY 31
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED

RMKS/

WERE AT THE SITE WHEN MR. HUNG AND MR. DONG ARRIVED. SQUAD 1, SUBORDINATE TO COMPANY 31, WAS STATIONED IN THE AREA. THE SOLDIERS AT THE SITE TOLD MR. HUNG THE AIRCRAFT THAT WAS SHOT DOWN WAS AN F-4H.

(C) THE PILOT WAS DEAD AND THE SOLDIERS HAD ALREADY BURIED HIM. MR. HUNG ORDERED THE SOLDIERS TO DIG UP THE PILOT'S BODY. AFTER THEY EXHUMED THE BODY, MR. DONG TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT. THE PILOT HAD DIED FROM A GUNSHOT WOUND IN THE CHEST. MR. HUNG DID NOT KNOW WHO SHOT THE PILOT.

(D) WHILE HE WAS AT THE SITE, MR. HUNG EXAMINED THE PILOT'S IDENTIFICATION CARD. FROM THE CARD, HE READ THE PILOT'S

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RANK AND NAME AS " NAME ." ALTHOUGH NEITHER MR. HUNG NOR MR. DONG SPOKE ENGLISH, MR. HUNG WAS ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THE PILOT'S RANK BECAUSE THE RANKS IN ENGLISH WERE SIMILAR TO THE RANKS IN FRENCH. {NOTE: MR. THO INTERJECTED THAT NO ONE IN SON LA PROVINCE SPOKE ENGLISH AT THAT TIME.} MR. HUNG ALSO SAW A BLOOD CHIT, A PISTOL, A PACK, A LIFE VEST, A RADIO AND A PARACHUTE AT THE SITE. MR. HUNG SPECULATED THAT A SERGEANT FROM THE SQUAD TURNED OVER ALL OF THESE PERSONAL EFFECTS TO A MEMBER OF RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY 31, BUT DID NOT KNOW WHO COLLECTED THEM. USUALLY A PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS WERE HANDED OVER TO THE NWMR'S ENEMY PROSELYTIZING OFFICE. {NOTE: COL TEO STATED THESE ITEMS MIGHT BE DISPLAYED IN THE UNIT'S TRADITION HOUSE.}

(E) MR. HUNG DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE RE-BURIAL, BUT WATCHED AS THE SOLDIERS PUT THE PILOT'S BODY BACK INTO THE SAME HOLE FROM WHICH THEY HAD EXHUMED IT. THE SOLDIERS COMPLETED THE RE-BURIAL ABOUT 1800. AFTER THE RE-BURIAL WAS COMPLETE, MR. HUNG WENT HOME.

(F) MR. HUNG REMEMBERED THE NAMES OF TWO OF THE SOLDIERS WHO RE-BURIED THE PILOT'S BODY: MR. TRAN NHU (TRAANF NHU) AND MR. TAN AI QUY (TAAN AIS QUYX). MR. NHU CURRENTLY LIVES IN SON TAY. MR. HUNG SAID MR. NHU WAS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE BURIAL, AND DID NOT SUPERVISE, AS PREVIOUS REPORTS INDICATED.

(G) MR. HUNG SAID LOCAL NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED THE PHOTO MR. DONG HAD TAKEN OF THE PILOT'S BODY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. MOST NEWSPAPERS PROBABLY PRINTED THE PHOTO IN THEIR SEP OR OCT 1965 ISSUES.

(H) MR. HUNG REPORTED ORALLY TO HIS COMMANDER, LTC NGUYEN TRI NGUYEN (NGUYEENX TRIS NGUYEEN), AT THE NWMR'S MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICE. MR. NGUYEN, A NATIVE OF HA BAC PROVINCE, DIED IN 1995. MR. HUNG ALSO REPORTED BY TELEPHONE TO MILITARY REGION 2, BUT DID NOT REMEMBER TO WHOM HE REPORTED. HE DID NOT WRITE DOWN ANY INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT HE SAW AT THE BURIAL SITE OR KEEP A DIARY.

(I) MR. HUNG HEARD LOCAL RESIDENTS IN THE AREA WHERE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED COLLECTED FILM FROM THE CRASH SITE. HOWEVER, THEY EXPOSED THE FILM TO SUNLIGHT AND DESTROYED IT.

(J) AFTER THE INCIDENT, MR. HUNG PASSED THROUGH THE AREA MANY TIMES BUT NEVER RETURNED TO THE BURIAL SITE UNTIL HE WENT THERE WITH A JOINT TEAM. HE NEVER HEARD OF ANYONE FINDING OR EXHUMING THE REMAINS. HE ADDED THAT VIETNAMESE ARE VERY SUPERSTITIOUS ABOUT DEALING WITH REMAINS AND WOULD NOT INTENTIONALLY DISTURB THE REMAINS. MR. HUNG WAS WOUNDED IN 1970 WHEN PAVN FORCES MISTAKENLY SHOT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT HE WAS FLYING IN. BECAUSE OF HIS WOUNDS, MR. HUNG IS NOW BLIND. HE RETIRED IN 1972 AND HAS LIVED IN SON LA CITY SINCE THAT TIME.

(K) MR. HUNG LAST WENT TO THE BURIAL SITE WITH A JOINT TEAM IN OCTOBER OF 1988. HE REMEMBERED THE BURIAL LOCATION, BUT LOCAL RESIDENTS HAD ALTERED THE TERRAIN IN THE AREA, CLEARING THE TREES IN ORDER TO BUILD HOUSES AND PLANT CROPS.

(L) MR. HUNG SAID HE DID NOT KNOW MR. CAM MINH CHE OR MR. LO VAN SANG. IN ADDITION, THE NWMR DID NOT HAVE A SUBORDINATE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY 32. MR. HUNG KNEW SENIOR CAPTAIN NGUYEN HUY

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HOANG, BUT SAID HE DIED IN LAOS IN MAY 68. MR. HUNG ALSO STATED SENIOR CAPTAIN HOANG HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THIS INCIDENT. CONCERNING 1LT NGUYEN HUY HOANG, MR. HUNG SAID HE WAS STILL YOUNG AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT AND ALSO HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE PILOT'S DEATH AND BURIAL. {NOTE: BASED ON MR. HUNG'S INFORMATION ABOUT FORMER 1LT HOANG, THE RIT DECIDED NOT TO INTERVIEW HIM.}

G. WITNESS #2: ON 13 JAN 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. LO VAN EN (LOF VAWN ENS) AT THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION CENTER IN SON LA TOWN.

- (1) NAME: MR. LO VAN EN
- (2) AGE: 65 YOA
- (3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE: SUB-ZONE 1 (TIEUR KHU 1), CHIENG COI VILLAGE (XAX CHIEENG COWI), SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE, LENGTH OF TIME UNKNOWN
- (4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: MEDICAL STUDENT AT THE NWMR MEDICAL SCHOOL (TRWONGF Y CUAR QUAAN KHU TAAY BAWCS), CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA PROVINCE, UNTIL JUL 66
- (5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED
- (6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: MEDIC
- (7) STATEMENT:

(A) IN 1965, MR. EN, A THIRD LIEUTENANT (CHUAANR UYS) IN THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN), WAS A STUDENT AT THE NWMR MEDICAL SCHOOL. ABOUT 1600 OR 1700 ON AN UN-RECALLED DATE, WHILE ATTENDING A MEDICAL CLASS AT THE SCHOOL, HE HEARD THE SOUND OF AN AIRCRAFT IN THE SKY. HE DID NOT SEE THE AIRCRAFT OR KNOW WHERE IT CRASHED. WHEN HE LOOKED INTO THE SKY, HE SAW A PILOT DESCEND TO THE GROUND UNDER A MULTICOLORED PARACHUTE AND LAND ABOUT 30 METERS FROM HIS LOCATION. MR. EN AND TWO OR THREE OTHER PERSONNEL FROM THE MEDICAL SCHOOL IMMEDIATELY WENT TO THE PILOT'S LANDING SITE. MR. EN REMEMBERED THAT HIS CLASS LEADER MR. TONG VAN BAC (TOONG VAWN BAWCS), WAS ONE OF THE PERSONNEL WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM TO THE SITE. MR. BAC CURRENTLY LIVES IN CAO BANG PROVINCE. MR. EN DID NOT REMEMBER THE NAMES OF THE OTHER MEDICAL SCHOOL PERSONNEL WHO WENT TO THE SITE. ABOUT 20 TO 30 OTHER PEOPLE, MOSTLY SOLDIERS FROM A NEARBY RECONNAISSANCE UNIT, WERE AT THE SITE WHEN THEY ARRIVED.

(B) THE PILOT WAS ALREADY DEAD WHEN THEY ARRIVED, THEREFORE, HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE PILOT DIED. MR. EN ONLY VIEWED THE BODY BRIEFLY BEFORE THE SOLDIERS FORCED HIM AWAY FROM THE SITE.

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED RMKS/

HE SAID THE PILOT WAS CAUCASIAN, HANDSOME, HAD LIGHT BROWN HAIR, AND WORE A HELMET WITH A DARK-COLORED VISOR. MR. EN DID NOT PAY ATTENTION TO THE COLOR OF THE PILOT'S FLIGHT SUIT AND DID NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE PILOT. HE DID NOT KNOW WHO COLLECTED THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS.

(C) WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE MEDICAL SCHOOL, THE SOLDIERS WERE PREPARING TO BURY THE PILOT'S BODY, BUT HAD NOT YET STARTED THE BURIAL. ACCORDING TO MR. EN, THEY WERE PREPARING TO

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BURY THE PILOT ABOUT 30 METERS FROM A SHED THAT WAS PART OF THE MEDICAL SCHOOL'S FACILITIES. SINCE THE RECONNAISSANCE SOLDIERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR BURYING THE PILOT, NO PERSONNEL FROM THE MEDICAL SCHOOL PARTICIPATED IN THE BURIAL.

(D) MR. EN HEARD THAT, ABOUT TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTER THE BURIAL, AN UNKNOWN PERSON OR PERSONS EXHUMED THE REMAINS AND TOOK PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE BODY. MR. EN DID NOT KNOW IF THE UNKNOWN PERSON OR PERSONS RE-BURIED THE REMAINS. IF THEY DID, MR. EN DID NOT KNOW IF THEY RE-BURIED THEM IN THE SAME LOCATION.

(E) MR. EN STAYED AT THE MEDICAL SCHOOL UNTIL IT DISBANDED IN JUL 66. AT THAT TIME, ALL THE MEDICAL STUDENTS TRANSFERRED TO DIFFERENT MILITARY UNITS. MR. EN WENT TO A UNIT (NFI) IN MAI SON DISTRICT, SON LA PROVINCE. HE NEVER RETURNED TO THE BURIAL SITE. MR. EN NEVER HEARD IF ANYONE EXHUMED THE REMAINS AFTER JUL 66. IN 1980, MR. EN RETIRED FROM THE PAVN WITH THE RANK OF SECOND LIEUTENANT. MR. EN DID NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER INCIDENTS FROM THE WAR INVOLVING U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS.

(F) ACCORDING TO MR. EN, THE BURIAL LOCATION WAS IN A FOREST, BUT LOCAL RESIDENTS HAVE CUT DOWN ALL OF THE TREES IN THE AREA. MR. EN SAID HE COULD IDENTIFY THE GENERAL AREA CONTAINING THE BURIAL SITE.

(G) MR. EN SAID MR. LONG BIEN (LONG BIEEN), THE COMMANDER OF RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION 31 DURING THE WAR, ALSO KNEW ABOUT THIS INCIDENT.

H. WITNESS #3: ON 13 JAN 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. LE HUY GAM AT THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION CENTER IN SON LA TOWN.

(1) NAME: MR. LE HUY GAM

(2) AGE: 72 YOA

(3) RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE: SUB-ZONE 2 (TIEEUR KHU 2), CHIENG COI VILLAGE, SON LA TOWN, SON LA PROVINCE, SINCE 1975

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: STATIONED IN OFFICE 2 (PHONGF 2), NWMR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICE (PHONGF QUAAN BAOS)

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: STAFF AIDE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT, NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION

(7) BACKGROUND INFORMATION: A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. GAM DURING THE SECOND JFA. THAT JOINT TEAM REPORTED HIS NAME AS LE VAN GAM.

(8) STATEMENT:

(A) MR. GAM RECALLED ONE INCIDENT INVOLVING A U.S. PILOT WHO EJECTED NEAR SON LA TOWN. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE DRY SEASON OF EITHER 1966 OR 1967. MR. GAM DID NOT KNOW THE PILOT'S NAME OR RANK.

(B) ON THE DAY THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, MR. GAM SENT MR. TAN AI QUY AND MR. TRAN NHU TO INVESTIGATE. THEIR MISSION WAS TO CAPTURE THE PILOT SO NWMR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS COULD INTERROGATE HIM. MR. QUY AND MR. NHU REPORTED BACK TO MR. GAM THAT THE PILOT DIED BEFORE HE REACHED THE GROUND. THEY ALSO REPORTED THAT THREE PEOPLE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR BURYING THE PILOT'S BODY. MR. GAM

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DID NOT REMEMBER THE NAMES OF THESE THREE PERSONS, BUT SAID THEY ARE ALL DECEASED. THE NWMR WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR GATHERING THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS, BUT MR. GAM DID NOT KNOW WHO COLLECTED THEM. MR. GAM NEVER WENT TO THE BURIAL SITE.

(C) IN 1975, MR. GAM RETIRED FROM THE PAVN AND MOVED BACK TO THE LOCAL AREA WITH HIS FAMILY.

(D) MR. GAM ALSO SAID SENIOR CAPTAIN NGUYEN HUY HOANG, A RESEARCH AIDE (TROWJ LYS NGHIEN CWUS) IN THE NWMR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, ALSO INVESTIGATED THIS INCIDENT. SENIOR CAPTAIN HOANG'S DUTIES INCLUDED THE MANAGEMENT AND INTERROGATION OF CAPTURED PILOTS. ONE OR TWO DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT, THE NWMR RECEIVED ORDERS FROM HANOI TO EXHUME THE PILOT'S BODY AND PHOTOGRAPH THE REMAINS. SENIOR CAPTAIN HOANG WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS MISSION, AND HE HAD THE ONLY CAMERA IN THE OFFICE. ACCORDING TO MR. GAM, SENIOR CAPTAIN HOANG DIED IN LAOS IN 1969.

(E) MR. GAM SAID HE DID NOT KNOW A PHOTOGRAPHER NAMED MR. PHAN DONG.

(F) MR. GAM KNEW OF ANOTHER WITNESS TO THIS INCIDENT, A MR. AN. MR. GAM HAS KNOWN MR. AN SINCE 1966 OR 1967. MR. AN WAS A MILITIA MEMBER IN THE AREA OF THE INCIDENT AND CURRENTLY LIVES NEAR MR. GAM. MR. GAM ONLY FOUND OUT ABOUT MR. AN'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT AFTER 1993.

(G) MR. GAM SAID THAT HE HAS ACTED AS AN UNOFFICIAL POINT-OF-CONTACT FOR INFORMATION ON THIS INCIDENT SINCE RETIREMENT. THE LOCAL VILLAGERS FORWARD ALL INFORMATION ABOUT THE POSSIBLE LOCATION OF THE BURIAL SITE TO HIM, DUE TO HIS PREVIOUS MILITARY STATUS. HE SAID IF ANYONE ELSE HAD INFORMATION ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND BURIAL SITE, HE WOULD KNOW ABOUT IT.//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00051329

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS911 MCN = 96053/01948 TOR = 960530147
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS3171 0530146-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O P 211703Z FEB 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE

ZEM

CONTROLS

UNCLAS

BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM,
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS911 MCN = 96053/01948 TOR = 960530147
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS3171 0530146-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

O 220146Z FEB 96
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFOCB/OC

RUEALGX/SAFE

O P 211703Z FEB 96 ZYB
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/PCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//

BT

UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTF-FA/-/SEP//
SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM,
11 JANUARY THROUGH 9 FEBRUARY 1996//
RMKS/1. SUMMARY: JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA)
ELEMENTS CONDUCTED THE 39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) IN THE
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) FROM 11 JANUARY THROUGH

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9 FEBRUARY 1996. THE INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM (IRT) INCLUDED ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN (127) U.S. PERSONNEL (TWO INVESTIGATION ELEMENTS, SIX RECOVERY ELEMENTS, ONE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM, AND ONE ADVANCE ELEMENT) WHO WORKED WITH THEIR SRV COUNTERPARTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE FATE OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. PRIOR TO THE START OF THIS JFA, JTF-FA AND SRV COUNTERPARTS CONDUCTED COORDINATION MEETINGS IN HO CHI MINH CITY AND HANOI ON 6 AND 9 DECEMBER 1995, RESPECTIVELY. ON 11 JANUARY 1996, FIVE (5) TEAMS DEPLOYED INTO HANOI ON TWO (2) C-130 SORTIES; ON 12 JANUARY, TWO (2) TEAMS DEPLOYED INTO DANANG AND TWO (2) TEAMS DEPLOYED INTO HO CHI MINH CITY ON ONE (1) C-130 SORTIE EACH. THE TEAMS SUBSEQUENTLY DEPLOYED TO A TOTAL OF NINETEEN (19) PROVINCES AND HO CHI MINH CITY. ALL REMAINS THE JOINT TEAMS RECOVERED OR RECEIVED DURING THIS JFA ARE CURRENTLY IN THE POSSESSION OF THE VIETNAMESE OFFICE SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) AND SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW SCHEDULED FOR 1 TO 4 MARCH 1996 IN HANOI, SRV. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY:

- A. CASES SCHEDULED: FORTY-THREE (43).
 - (1) INVESTIGATIONS: THIRTY-ONE (31).
 - (2) EXCAVATIONS: TWELVE (12).
- B. CASES INVESTIGATED: TWENTY-NINE (29).
 - (1) RECOMMENDED CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE: FOUR (4) (0126, 0219, 0224, 0319).
 - (2) RECOMMENDED TO EXCAVATE: SEVEN (7) (SRT CASE 0105, 0241, 0512, 0540, SRT CASE 0621, 0629, PRIORITY CASE 1927).
 - (3) RECOMMENDED N/A: EIGHTEEN (18) (0025, 0036, 0126, 0131, 0182, 0205, 0217, 0272, 0273, 0491, 0543, 0762, 0843, 0881, 1386, AND THREE UNCORRELATED CASES).
- C. CASES EXCAVATED: SIX (6) (CASES 0125, 0397, 0584, 0815, 1848, 1954).
 - (1) EXCAVATED BY IE: NONE (0).
 - (2) EXCAVATED BY RIT: NONE (0).
 - (3) EXCAVATED BY RE: SIX (6) (CASES 0125, 0397, 0584, 0815, 1848, AND 1954).
 - (A) RE1: ONE (1) (CASE 0125).
 - (B) RE2: ONE (1) (CASE 1954).
 - (C) RE3: ONE (1) (CASE 0815).
 - (D) RE4: ONE (1) (CASE 1848).
 - (E) RE5: ONE (1) (CASE 0584).
 - (F) RE6: ONE (1) (CASE 0397).
- D. TOTAL REMAINS OBTAINED:
 - (1) RECOVERED BY IE: NONE (0).
 - (2) RECOVERED BY RIT: NONE (0).
 - (3) RECOVERED BY RE: THREE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (313).
 - (4) UNILATERAL TURN-OVERS: ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE (121).
 - (5) BY CASE LISTING OF REMAINS OBTAINED:
 - (A) CASE 0125: TWENTY-NINE (29) RECOVERED/NONE (0) RECEIVED. THIS INCLUDES FIVE (5) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH RECOVERED. TWO (2) APPARENTLY WITH RESTORATIONS AND THREE (3) APPARENTLY WITHOUT RESTORATIONS.

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(B) CASE DATA: TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN (267)
RECOVERED/NONE (0) RECEIVED. THIS INCLUDES TWO (2) TEETH WITH
RESTORATIONS.

(C) CASE 0815: NONE (0) RECOVERED/NONE (0) RECEIVED.

(D) CASE 1848: SEVENTEEN (17) RECOVERED/NONE (0)
RECEIVED. THIS INCLUDES ONE (1) POSSIBLE HUMAN TOOTH APPARENTLY
WITH RESTORATIONS.

(E) CASE 0584: NONE (0) RECOVERED/ELEVEN (11)
RECEIVED.

(F) CASE 0397: NONE (0) RECOVERED/NONE (0) RECEIVED.

(G) CASE DATA: NONE (0) RECOVERED/FIFTY-FIVE (55)
RECEIVED. THIS INCLUDES SEVEN (7) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH APPARENTLY
WITHOUT RESTORATIONS.

(H) UNCORRELATED: NONE (0) RECOVERED/FIFTY-FIVE (55)
RECEIVED. THIS INCLUDES ONE (1) POSSIBLE HUMAN TOOTH APPARENTLY
WITHOUT RESTORATIONS.

E. NUMBER OF WITNESSES INTERVIEWED:

(1) INTERVIEWED BY IE: FORTY-TWO (42).

(2) INTERVIEWED BY RIT: EIGHTEEN (18).

(3) INTERVIEWED BY RE: ELEVEN (11).

2. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IE1): THIRTEEN (13) CASES SCHEDULED,
TWELVE (12) INVESTIGATED.

A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

B. CASES: TWELVE (12) (CASES 0126, 0131, 0182, 0217, 0219,
0272, 0319, 0491, 0512, 0540, 0629, 0881).

C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).

E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: TWO (2).

3. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT TWO (IE2): TEN (10) CASES SCHEDULED, TEN
(10) INVESTIGATED.

A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

B. CASES: TEN (10) (CASES 0025, 0036, 0205, 0224, 0241,
0273, 0543, 0762, 0843, 1386).

C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).

E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).

4. RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT): EIGHT (8) CASES
SCHEDULED, SEVEN (7) INVESTIGATED.

A. PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (1927).

B. CASES: SIX (6) (SRT CASE 0105, SRT CASE 0621, 1936, AND
THREE UNCORRELATED CASES).

C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).

E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM,
RMKS/

5. RECOVERY ELEMENT ONE (RE1): ONE (1) CASE.

A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

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- B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0125).
- C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
- F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 6. RECOVERY ELEMENT TWO (RE2): ONE (1) CASE.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 1954).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 7. RECOVERY ELEMENT THREE (RE3): ONE (1) CASE.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0815).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: ONE (1).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 8. RECOVERY ELEMENT FOUR (RE4): ONE (1) CASE.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 1848).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 9. RECOVERY ELEMENT FIVE (RE5): ONE (1) CASE.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0584).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 10. RECOVERY ELEMENT SIX (RE6): ONE (1) CASE.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0397).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: ONE (1).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 11. SPECIAL ADVANCE TEAM: ONE (1) CASE.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 1046).
 - B. CASES: NONE (0).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: TWO (2).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: ONE (1).
- 12. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS.
 - A. THE 39TH JFA PROVED EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL. OPERATING IN 19 PROVINCES AND HO CHI MINH CITY, TEAMS, TO INCLUDE THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM, CONDUCTED SIX RECOVERIES AND 31 INVESTIGATIONS

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IN A SAFE AND EFFICIENT MANNER. THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL TEAMS PROVED OUTSTANDING. AS IN THE PAST, THE SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES ASSIGNED TO THE 39TH JFA PROVED TO BE A CREDIT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES AND THE JOINT TASK FORCE. IN ALL CASES THEY LEFT THE VIETNAMESE WITH A POSITIVE IMPRESSION OF AMERICA AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY.

B. THIS WAS THE THIRD JFA CONDUCTED USING THE LAND COMPENSATION CONTRACT DETACHMENT TWO, JTF-FA AND THE VNOSMP JOINTLY DEVELOPED. AGAIN THE SYSTEM WORKED. IN ONLY ONE CASE (RES/CASE 0584) DID THE PROVINCE OFFICIALS (LAM DONG) ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE PRICE AT THE END OF THE EXCAVATION. THE U.S. TEAM LEADER REFUSED TO AGREE TO A NEW PRICE AND ELEVATED THE ISSUE TO THE DETACHMENT LEVEL. THE SRV CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENED AND REITERATED THE FACT THAT THE PRICE AGREED TO IN THE INITIAL CONTRACT REMAINED VALID.

C. COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES CONTINUED TO PLAGUE THE JFA, ESPECIALLY WITH RE3 IN QUANG NINH PROVINCE. ALTHOUGH DETACHMENT TWO IN HANOI COULD TALK TO ALL OTHER SITES ON MOST DAYS, THE INABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH A TEAM WORKING ON A DANGEROUS KARST (CASE 0815), PROVED UNACCEPTABLE. ONLY THE PRESENCE OF A PHONE LOCATED IN A BUILDING AT THE BASE OF THE SITE ALLOWED THIS EXCAVATION TO CONTINUE. THE USE OF THE 100 WATT HF RADIOS BY RES (CASE 0584-LAM DONG) AND RE6 (CASE 0397-LONG AN) SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SOUTHERN SITES. AGAIN, THE EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMMUNICATIONS NCO'S WITH ALL RECOVERY ELEMENTS IMPROVED NOT ONLY TEAM COMMUNICATIONS, BUT INFORMATION FLOW DURING THE JFA. THE VNOSMP INFORMED DETACHMENT TWO DURING THIS JFA THAT BEGINNING WITH THE 40TH JFA (21 MARCH - 26 APRIL 1996), THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONWIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM BY THE VIETNAMESE POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY SHOULD PROVIDE POSITIVE COMMUNICATIONS AT EVEN THE MOST REMOTE SITES WITHIN VIETNAM. IT REMAINS UNCLEAR IF THIS NEW SYSTEM USES SATCOM OR CELLULAR TECHNOLOGY. DETACHMENT TWO ASKED FOR THE SPECIFICS AND EXPECTS AN ANSWER DURING THE NEXT TECHNICAL TALKS ON 29 FEBRUARY 1996.

D. VIETNAMESE COOPERATION DURING THIS JFA REMAINED EXCELLENT. ALL RECOVERY AND INVESTIGATION TEAM LEADERS COMMENTED POSITIVELY ON COOPERATION AT THE CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL LEVELS. FLEXIBILITY, HOWEVER, RECEIVED MIXED REVIEWS. ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS, DETACHMENT TWO DID NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION TO EXECUTE OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE INITIAL JFA PLAN. WHEN THE SPECIAL SURVEY TEAM FINISHED LOCATING LANDING ZONES FOR CASE 1046 (DAC LAC), THE DETACHMENT ASKED TO MOVE THE TEAM TO KONTUM TO EXECUTE A SIMILAR RECONNAISSANCE FOR CASE 1496. THE VNOSMP COULD NOT LOCATE AN APPROPRIATE LANDING ZONE FOR THIS CASE WHEN THEY ACCOMPLISHED
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RMKS/

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THE UNILATERAL WORK IN ADVANCE OF THE 39TH JFA. THE SURVEY TEAM, USING AN MI-17 HELICOPTER, FELT CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD LOCATE A SUITABLE LANDING ZONE CLOSE TO THE SITE. THE VNOSMP, HOWEVER, DID NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION TO MOVE THE TEAM TO KONTUM; THEREFORE, I REDEPLOYED THE SURVEY TEAM BACK TO HAWAII. IN ANOTHER SITUATION, THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM IDENTIFIED A POSSIBLE BURIAL SITE FOR PRIORITY CASE 1927 (QUANG TRI) AND ASKED FOR PERMISSION TO EXECUTE AN IMMEDIATE EXCAVATION. DETACHMENT TWO WAS IN THE PROCESS OF SENDING AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AND EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE TECHNICIAN TO THE SITE WHEN THE VNOSMP NOTIFIED THE DETACHMENT THAT THE EXCAVATION COULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE 40TH JFA. WE REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS, BUT STILL DID NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION TO EXCAVATE. THE VNOSMP AND PROVINCE INSURED THE DETACHMENT THAT THE SITE WILL REMAIN UNDER GUARD AND UNDISTURBED UNTIL THE NEXT JFA.

B. WEATHER DURING THE 39TH JFA CONTINUED TO HAMPER FLYING OPERATIONS. A STATIONARY LOW PRESSURE SYSTEM REMAINED OVER THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY FOR MOST OF THE JFA MAKING THE WEATHER CLOUDY, COOL, AND MISTY. HELICOPTER OPERATIONS COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED FOR A PERIOD OF 14 DAYS. THE SRV CANCELED DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LE MAI'S SITE VISIT BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER. THE JTF PROVIDED WET WEATHER GEAR AND BOOTS FOR ALL LOCAL WORKERS CONDUCTING WET SCREENING OPERATIONS DURING THIS JFA. TEAM LEADERS COLLECTED THIS EQUIPMENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE JFA FOR USE DURING FUTURE JFA'S. DESPITE COLD AND WET CONDITIONS, TEAMS REPORTED NO SIGNIFICANT HEALTH PROBLEMS AMONG EITHER THE TEAM MEMBERS OR LOCAL WORKERS.

F. DURING THIS JFA, THE WESTPAC SALVAGE OFFICER DEPLOYED INTO VIETNAM TO WITNESS THE OPERATIONAL TEST OF THE VIETNAMESE NAVAL VESSEL PROPOSED FOR THE UNDERWATER RECOVERY OF CASE 0465 DURING THE 40TH JFA. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SEA TRIAL, THE RECOMMENDATION FROM BOTH THE WESTPAC SALVAGE OFFICER AND THE MOBILE DIVE TEAM COMMANDER AT PEARL HARBOR IS TO USE THE VIETNAMESE PLATFORM FOR THE RECOVERY.//

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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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INQUIRE=DOC33D
 ITEM NO=00714492
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS412 MCN = 96044/03817 TOR = 960440235
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS0180 0440109-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 130109Z FEB 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEKJSA/STOC
 RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 090942Z FEB 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J252//
 TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
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CONTROLS
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 SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA//
 SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
 REPORT: LIST OF U.S. AIRCRAFT CRASHES IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE//
 REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/080902ZJAN96//
 AMPN/REF IS THE RIT REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0338//
 RMKS/1. SUMMARY: ON 17 SEP 95, DURING THE RIT INVESTIGATION OF CASE
 0338, A WITNESS PROVIDED A LIST OF 11 WARTIME AIRCRAFT CRASH INCI-
 DENTS IN THE DONG HOI AREA OF QUANG BINH PROVINCE. FIELD ANALYSIS
 ASSOCIATES THIS INFORMATION WITH SEVEN RESOLVED AND THREE UNRESOLVED
 INCIDENTS. ONE ENTRY LACKED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO PERMIT CORRE-
 LATION.
 2. DETAILS: ON 17 SEP 95, THE RIT INVESTIGATED CASE 0338. DURING
 THAT INVESTIGATION, THE TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN VAN NHI (NHIJ),
 A FORMER PAVN MAJOR WHO SERVED IN THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE QUANG
 BINH PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND. HIS OFFICE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
 TURNING OVER TO THE MILITARY REGION (MR-4) ITEMS RECOVERED FROM AIR-
 CRAFT CRASH SITES AND CAPTURED PILOTS. HE PROVIDED THE TEAM A LIST
 OF U.S. AIRCRAFT CRASHES IN THE DONG HOI AREA, WHICH HE CLAIMED TO
 HAVE COMPILED FROM MEMORY.

A. PARTICIPANTS:

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- (1) U.S. CONTINGENT:
 - (A) CWO3 KEVIN D. SOUSER, TEAM LEADER
 - (B) SSG ALFRED S. IVERSEN, ANALYST/LINGUIST
 - (C) TSGT HUNG M. NGUYEN, ANALYST/LINGUIST
 - (D) SSG THOMAS L. JONES, SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
- (2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT:
 - (A) LTC PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REP
 - (B) MR. PHAM TUAN (PHAMJ TUAANS), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REP
- (3) QUANG BINH PROVINCE MIA TASK TEAM:
 - (A) MR. LE DUC DUONG (LEE DWCS ZWONG), MIA TEAM LEADER
 - (B) MR. DOAN THINH TUYEN (DOANF THANH TUYEEN), TEAM MEMBER
 - (C) MR. NGUYEN VAN TANG (TANGF), TEAM MEMBER

B. SOURCE DATA:

- (1) WITNESS NAME: MR. NGUYEN VAN NHI
- (2) AGE: 65 YOA
- (3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE: 6 BU HUYEN, THANH HOA (THANH HOAS) VILLAGE, THANH HOA DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. HIS SECOND HOME IS AT 8 HAI BA TRUNG STREET, HUE CITY, THUA THIEN-HUE PROVINCE.
- (4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: DONG HOI, QUANG BINH PROVINCE FROM 1965-1968, AND QUANG TRI PROVINCE FROM 1969-1975.
- (5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: MILITARY RETIREE
- (6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: MAJOR IN THE POLITICAL SECTION, QUANG BINH PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND.

C. LIST: (BEGIN TRANSLATION)

1965

- (1) CAPTURED MAJOR SUMECKER ON 11 FEB 1965 IN LY NINH VILLAGE.
- (2) CAPTURED 1LT HAYDEN LOCKHART (FROM OHIO), WHO FLEW AN F105D AIRCRAFT, AT 1100 ON 9 MARCH 1965 IN TRUONG THUY VILLAGE. IDENTIFICATION CARD: 4218301
SERVICE NUMBER: 626694
MAJOR RONCA WAS DEAD.
- (3) ROARK WILLIAM MARSHALE - 1LT
SERVICE NUMBER: 641458
IDENTIFICATION CARD: 9405248
BORN ON 23 OCT 1938
ON 7 APRIL 1965, WHEN THE AIRCRAFT BURNED, HE PARACHUTED BUT THE PARACHUTE DID NOT OPEN, SO HE FELL INTO THE SEA OFF DUC TRACH (VILLAGE), DEAD. HE WAS BURIED 800 METERS FROM THE SHORE.
- (4) SMIT, WHO FLEW AN A4D AIRCRAFT, WAS SHOT DOWN AT THE GIANH RIVER MOUTH AND CAPTURED ON 25 APR 1965.
- (5) LTC JENKIN, WHO FLEW AN A4D AIRCRAFT, WAS SHOT DOWN BY AAA FIRE IN CAM LY AND CAPTURED AT 0820 ON 13 NOV 65.
- (6) ON 16 APR 1966, AN F4H AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN AT SON TRACH. SAMUELE JOHNSON (IDENTIFICATION CARD 5364345) AND 1LT CHERLEY WERE CAPTURED BY MILITIA.
- (7) ON 7 AUG 1965: AT 1230 ONE AD6 AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN - IT NOSED DOWN AND BURST INTO FLAMES - IN THE CITADEL OF DONG HOI TOWN,

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1966

(9) AT 0345 ON 10 MAY 1966, SON THUY MILITIA SHOT DOWN ONE F105 AIRCRAFT AT XUAN HOA HAMLET. THE PILOT DIED; HIS BODY WAS NOT INTACT. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO MUD.

(10) 12 MAY 1966: THE SON THUY MILITIA AND LE NINH STATE FARM SELF-DEFENSE FORCE FIRED AND HIT ONE F105 AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT DISINTEGRATED, AND A PIECE FROM THE AIRCRAFT WAS PICKED UP: MOD F105D.

(11) ON 28 MAY 1968: ONE F105 AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN. THE PILOT, MAJOR INDERVANXIN, WAS 40 YEARS OLD. PHAM GIAO, 13 YEARS OLD, WHO WAS COMING HOME FROM SCHOOL SAW THE PILOT PARACHUTING. HE SHOUTED "HANDS UP", AND THE PILOT RAISED HIS GUN TO SHOOT HIM. GIAO PICKED STONES TO THROW AT THE PILOT AND HIT HIS LEG. AT THAT TIME, MILITIA ARRIVED AND CAPTURED HIM. ON THE WAY BACK, HE DIDN'T ANSWER ANY QUESTION, BUT WHEN HE MET GIAO AGAIN HE CRIED AND MADE SIGNALS TO EXPRESS THAT HE HAD A SON OF THAT AGE.

(END TRANSLATION)

D. MR. NHI MADE OBSERVATIONS ABOUT SEVERAL OF THE ENTRIES:

(1) 1ST ENTRY ("SUMECKKER"): MR. NHI SAID HE HEARD LATER THAT "SUMECKKER" RETURNED TO THE U.S.

(2) 2ND ENTRY (LOCKHART): MR. NHI SAID HE TOOK THE IDENTIFICATION CARD FROM LT LOCKHART AND GAVE IT TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. LT LOCKHART TOLD HIM THAT MAJOR "JONCA" ACCOMPANIED HIM.

(3) 3RD ENTRY (ROARK). MR. NHI SAID HE OBTAINED THE

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RMKS/

IDENTIFICATION CARD.

(4) 5TH ENTRY: MR. NHI SAID HE HEARD THAT LTC JENKIN RETURNED TO THE U.S.

(5) 8TH ENTRY: "RF84" SHOT DOWN ON 13 SEP 65 IN DA MAI (DAS MAIF). MR. NHI SAID HE SAW REMAINS CONSISTING OF HAIR, RIBS, INTESTINES AND FLESH ABOUT FIVE METERS FROM THE CRASH AREA.

(6) 9TH ENTRY: MR. NHI SAID THE PILOT'S BODY WAS DESTROYED, WITH ONLY SMALL PIECES OF REMAINS SCATTERED OVER A LARGE AREA. LOCAL PEOPLE GATHERED AND BURIED WHAT THEY FOUND. MR. NHI DID NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE PILOT.

3. ANALYST'S COMMENTS:

A. CORRELATIONS:

(1) 1ST ENTRY: AIRCRAFT CRASH IN DONG HOI ON 11 FEB 66, PILOT

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"SUMECKKER" CAPTURED AND SENT TO HANOI. THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH SHUMAKER, RESOLVED CASE 0055.

(2) 2ND ENTRY: F-105D SHOT DOWN ON 9 MAR 65 INVOLVING THE CAPTURE OF 1LT "HAYDEN LOCKHART." THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0058. FIELD ANALYSIS CANNOT CORRELATE THE NAME RONCA.

(3) 3RD ENTRY: 7 APR 65, "ROARK." THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0071.

(4) 4TH ENTRY: 25 APR 65, "SMIT." THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0291.

(5) 5TH ENTRY: 13 NOV 65, "JENKIN." THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0189.

(6) 6TH ENTRY: 16 APR 66, JOHNSON AND CHERLEY. THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0303.

(7) 7TH ENTRY: 7 AUG 65; AD-6 CRASHED IN THE DONG HOI CITADEL. THIS ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0121, AN UNRESOLVED INCIDENT, BASED ON DATE, LOCATION AND AIRCRAFT TYPE.

(8) 8TH ENTRY: "RF84" SHOT DOWN ON 13 SEP 65 IN DA MAI (DAS MAIF). THIS ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH SPECIAL REMAINS CASE 0143, AN UNRESOLVED INCIDENT, BASED ON DATE OF INCIDENT AND INCIDENT LOCATION. DA MAI BRIDGE (XE 603 335) IS LOCATED WITHIN THE VIET TRUNG STATE FARM.

(9) 9TH ENTRY: F-105 SHOT DOWN AT 0345 ON 10 MAY 66 IN XUAN HOA HAMLET, SON THUY (SOWN THUYR) VILLAGE, LE THUY DISTRICT. THIS ENTRY MAY CORRELATE WITH CASE 0335, AN UNRESOLVED INCIDENT, IS BASED ON DATE OF INCIDENT, INCIDENT LOCATION AND AIRCRAFT TYPE.

(10) 10TH ENTRY: 12 MAY 66, F-105D STRUCK BY FIRE FROM THE SON THUY VILLAGE MILITIA AND LE NINH STATE FARM SELF-DEFENSE FORCE. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO PERMIT FIELD CORRELATION.

(11) 11TH ENTRY: 28 MAY 68; MAJOR "INDERVANXIN." THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 1194, INGVALDSON.

4. ANALYST'S COMMENTS:

A. MR. NHI CLAIMED TO HAVE RECONSTRUCTED THIS LIST FROM MEMORY. HOWEVER, THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL AND LEVEL OF ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT MR. NHI HAS ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS CONCERNING UNACCOUNTED-FOR U.S. SERVICEMEN. IT IS UNLIKELY MR. NHI COULD HAVE REMEMBERED ALL THESE DETAILS WITHOUT ACCESS TO WRITTEN SOURCES. IT ALSO SUGGESTS THAT MR. NHI MAY HAVE OTHER INFORMATION THAT HE DID NOT DIVULGE TO THE JOINT TEAM.

B. RECOMMEND A JOINT OR UNILATERAL INTERVIEW OF MR. NHI, FOCUSING ON THE ORIGIN OF THE INFORMATION ON HIS LIST.

5. TEAM LEADER'S COMMENTS:

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY: EXCELLENT. HE ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. MR. NHI THANKED THE TEAM FOR THE EXTENT OF OUR COOPERATION AND APPEARED EAGER TO ASSIST THE TEAM.

B. HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT: DURING THIS INVESTIGATION THE TEAM RECEIVED SATISFACTORY SUPPORT FROM VIETNAMESE PROVINCIAL AND VILLAGE GOVERNMENT CONTINGENTS.

6. RECOMMENDATION: RE-INTERVIEW.//

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INQUIRE=DOC33D

ITEM NO=00693715

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS298 MCN = 96041/03668 TOR = 960410223

RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS8326 0410220-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 100220Z FEB 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEKJSA/STOC

RHEFJII/J2

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 090942Z FEB 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J252//

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//

SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA//

SUBJ/RIT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT: LIST OF U.S. AIRCRAFT CRASHES

/IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE//

REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/080902ZJAN96//

AMPN/REF IS THE RIT REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0338.//

RMKS/1. SUMMARY: ON 17 SEP 95, DURING THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0338, A WITNESS PROVIDED A LIST OF ELEVEN WARTIME AIRCRAFT CRASH INCIDENTS IN THE DONG HOI AREA OF QUANG BINH PROVINCE. FIELD ANALYSIS ASSOCIATES THIS INFORMATION WITH SEVEN RESOLVED AND THREE UNRESOLVED INCIDENTS. ONE ENTRY LACKED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO PERMIT CORRELATION.

2. DETAILS: ON 17 SEP 95 THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM INVESTIGATED CASE 0338. DURING THAT INVESTIGATION, THE TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN VAN NHI (NHIJ), A FORMER PAVN MAJOR WHO SERVED IN THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND. HIS OFFICE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TURNING OVER TO THE MILITARY REGION (MR-4) ITEMS RECOVERED FROM AIRCRAFT CRASH SITES AND CAPTURED PILOTS. HE PROVIDED THE TEAM A LIST OF U.S. AIRCRAFT CRASHES IN THE DONG HOI AREA, WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE COMPILED FROM MEMORY.

A. PARTICIPANTS:

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- (1) U.S. CONTINGENT:
 - (A) CWO3 KEVIN D. SOUSER, TEAM LEADER
 - (B) SSG ALFRED S. IVERSEN, ANALYST/LINGUIST
 - (C) TSGT HUNG M. NGUYEN, ANALYST/LINGUIST
 - (D) SSG THOMAS L. JONES, SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST

- (2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT:
 - (A) LTC PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER,

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REP

- (B) MR. PHAM TUAN (PHAMJ TUAANS), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER,

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REP

- (3) QUANG BINH PROVINCE MIA TASK TEAM:

- (A) MR. LE DUC DUONG (LEE DWCS ZWONG), MIA TEAM LEADER
- (B) MR. DOAN THINH TUYEN (DOANF THANH TUYEEN), TEAM

MEMBER

- (C) MR. NGUYEN VAN TANG (TANGF), TEAM MEMBER

B. SOURCE DATA:

- (1) WITNESS NAME: MR. NGUYEN VAN NHI

- (2) AGE: 65 YOA

- (3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE:

6 BU HUYNH, THANH HOA (THANH HOAS) VILLAGE, THANH HOA DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. HIS SECOND HOME IS AT 8 HAI BA TRUNG STREET, HUE CITY, THUA THIEN-HUE PROVINCE.

- (4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: DONG HOI, QUANG BINH PROVINCE FROM 1965-1968, AND QUANG TRI PROVINCE FROM 1969-1975.

- (5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: MILITARY RETIREE

- (6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: MAJOR IN THE POLITICAL SECTION, QUANG BINH PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND.

C. LIST: (BEGIN TRANSLATION)

1965

- (1) CAPTURED MAJOR SUMECHKER ON 11 FEB 1965 IN LY NINH VILLAGE.

- (2) CAPTURED 1LT HAYDEN LOCKHART (FROM OHIO), WHO FLEW AN F105D AIRCRAFT, AT 1100 ON 9 MARCH 1965 IN TRUONG THUY VILLAGE.

IDENTIFICATION CARD: 4218301

SERVICE NUMBER: 626694

MAJOR RONCA WAS DEAD.

- (3) ROARK WILLIAM MARSHALE - 1LT

SERVICE NUMBER: 641458

IDENTIFICATION CARD: 9405248

BORN ON 23 OCT 1938

ON 7 APRIL 1965, WHEN THE AIRCRAFT BURNED, HE PARACHUTED BUT THE PARACHUTE DID NOT OPEN, SO HE FELL INTO THE SEA OFF DUC TRACH (VILLAGE), DEAD. HE WAS BURIED 800 METERS FROM THE SHORE.

- (4) SMIT, WHO FLEW AN A4D AIRCRAFT, WAS SHOT DOWN AT THE GIANH RIVER MOUTH AND CAPTURED ON 25 APR 1965.

- (5) LTC JENKIN, WHO FLEW AN A4D AIRCRAFT, WAS SHOT DOWN BY AAA FIRE IN CAM LY AND CAPTURED AT 0820 ON 13 NOV 65.

- (6) ON 16 APR 1966, AN F4H AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN AT SON TRACH. SAMUELE JOHNSON (IDENTIFICATION CARD 5364345) AND 1LT CHERLEY WERE CAPTURED BY MILITIA.

- (7) ON 7 AUG 1965: AT 1230 ONE AD6 AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN - IT NOSED DOWN AND BURST INTO FLAMES - IN THE CITADEL OF DONG HOI TOWN,

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PAGE:0003

AT VO NGUYEN GIAP ROAD. IT WAS SHOT DOWN BY COMPANY 3 OF AAA FORCE. I WENT TO THE CRASH SITE AND SAW BLUE FIRE. THE AIRCRAFT COMPLETELY BURNED, LEAVING ONLY SMALL PIECES OF SCATTERED WRECKAGE AND ROLLED ALUMINIUM PIPES. THE PILOT BURNED; A PIECE OF ABDOMINAL FLESH WAS EJECTED.

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

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6. RECOMMENDATION: RE-INTERVIEW.//

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PAGE:0001

INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00158995
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS145 MCN = 96066/06837 TOR = 960660345
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS7247 0660046-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 060046Z MAR 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 050932Z MAR 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 BT
CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) ADDITIONAL
 INFORMATION REPORT: VNOSMP INVESTIGATION OF REPORTED CRASH
 SITE LOCATION IN BAC THAI PROVINCE//
 REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/290942ZNOV95//
 REF/B/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/311802ZJAN94//
 REF/C/RMG/CJTFFA DET ONE BKK/220329ZNOV93//
 REF/D/DOC/WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM COL TEO, VNOSMP//
 NARR/REF A IS THE REPORT OF THE RIT DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
 OF UNCORRELATED CRASH SITE LOCATIONS IN BAC THAI PROVINCE DURING THE
 38TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) (12 OCT TO 10 NOV 95). REF B IS THE
 JTF-FA/J2 ANALYSIS OF THE 1:100,000 SCALE VIETNAMESE MAP TITLED "MAP
 DEPICTING U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN BAC THAI PROVINCE." REF C IS
 THE DETAILED REPORT OF FIELD INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA FROM THE
 26TH JFA (21 OCT TO 16 NOV 93). REF D IS A VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
 REPORT OF PREPARATIONS FOR RIT ACTIVITIES FOR THE 39TH JFA.//
 RMKS/1. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: DURING THE 39TH JFA, THE RIT
 PLANNED TO INVESTIGATE A POSSIBLE CRASH SITE AT GRID COORDINATES
 (GC) 48Q XJ 014 699 IN THANH NINH VILLAGE, PHU BINH DISTRICT, BAC
 THAI PROVINCE. DURING A JOINT TEAM PLANNING MEETING ON 10 JAN 96,
 THE VIETNAMESE TEAM LEADER TOLD THE RIT THAT WHILE CONDUCTING ADVANCE

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PREPARATION FOR THE CASE ON THE PREVIOUS DAY, HE HAD FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF A CRASH SITE AT THE LOCATION. THE THANH NINH VILLAGE SITE WAS WHERE THE LOCAL FORCES WERE WHEN THEY SHOT DOWN THE CASE DATA AIRCRAFT, WHICH CRASHED IN NEIGHBORING HA BAC PROVINCE. HE PROVIDED DOCUMENTATION OF THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE. BASED ON THE VIETNAMESE TEAM LEADER'S REPORT, THE RIT DECIDED TO FORGO A JOINT SURVEY OF THE SITE AT THANH NINH VILLAGE (XJ 014 699).

2. BACKGROUND:

A. REF B MAP INDICATED THREE UNCORRELATED SITES IN BAC THAI PROVINCE. THE RIT INVESTIGATED ONE OF THESE SITES (WJ 835 804) DURING THE 38TH JFA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THAT RIT ALSO DETERMINED THAT THE SECOND SITE (WJ 903 923) WAS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0615, AND CONSEQUENTLY DID NOT CONDUCT A SURVEY. TIME CONSTRAINTS PREVENTED A JOINT SURVEY OF THE THIRD SITE (XJ 014 699) (REF B).

B. PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION: DETERMINE WHETHER AN AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT (GC) 48Q XJ 014 699. IF AN AIRCRAFT CRASHED THERE, SURVEY THE AREA AND ATTEMPT TO CORRELATE ANY WRECKAGE FOUND WITH A SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT AND CASE.

3. DETAILS:

A. PARTICIPANTS:

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT:

- (A) CW4 CLYDE GREEN, RIT TEAM LEADER
- (B) SFC PATRICK A. FRANCO, JR., RIT ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
- (C) SSG ALFRED S. IVERSEN, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST
- (D) TSGT VY V. TRAN, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST
- (E) SSG WILLIAM E. COX, RIT SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
- (F) MR. JAMES M. COYLE, JTF-FA FIELD RESEARCH DIRECTOR

(2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT:

- (A) COL PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REP
- (B) MR. TRINH THE HUNG (TRINHJ THEES HUNGF), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REP

(3) BAC THAI PROVINCE TASK TEAM:

- (A) MR. DUONG VAN KHANH (ZWONG VAWN KHANH), MIA TEAM LEADER
- (B) MR. NGUYEN VAN KIEM (KIEEMJ), TEAM MEMBER
- (C) MR. VU DINH TUYEN (VUX DINHF TUYEENS), TEAM MEMBER
- (D) MR. NGUYEN VAN PHUC (PHUCS), TEAM MEMBER

(4) DONG HY DISTRICT TASK TEAM:

- (A) MR. PHAM VAN TAN (PHAMJ VAWN TAAN), TEAM LEADER

B. ON 5 JAN 96, THE RIT HELD A PLANNING MEETING WITH THE VNOSMP CONTINGENT AT THE JOINT DOCUMENT CENTER (JDC) IN THE CENTRAL ARMY MUSEUM, HANOI. AT THE MEETING, THE RIT PRESENTED THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS CASE TO THE VNOSMP.

C. ON 10 JAN 96, THE RIT MET AGAIN WITH THE VNOSMP CONTINGENT AT THE JDC. COL TEO REPORTED BAC THAI PROVINCE OFFICIALS VISITED THE REPORTED CRASH SITE AT (GC) 48Q XJ 014 699 THE PREVIOUS DAY, BUT FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF A CRASH SITE. VILLAGERS IN THE AREA WERE

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UNAWARE OF A CRASH SITE AT THAT LOCATION. COL TEO STATED THIS WAS ACTUALLY THE SITE FROM WHICH LOCAL FORCES SHOT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA. COL TEO SAID THE U.S. CONTINGENT WAS WELCOME TO VISIT THE SITE, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A CRASH SITE THERE. THE RIT TEAM LEADER REQUESTED COL TEO PROVIDE A WRITTEN REPORT OF THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION (SEE REF D).

D. ON 19 JAN 96, COL TEO PRESENTED A DOCUMENT OUTLINING HIS TEAM'S ADVANCE WORK FOR THE 39TH JFA TO THE RIT TEAM LEADER. THE PORTION OF THIS DOCUMENT WHICH ADDRESSES THIS CASE IS TRANSLATED AS FOLLOWS:

(BEGIN TRANSLATION)

FROM 8 TO 10 JAN 96, THE ADVANCE TEAM WAS IN BAC THAI PROVINCE. THE PROVINCE TEAM CONSISTED OF:

MR. DUONG VAN KHANH (ZWONG VAWN KHANH), DEPUTY OFFICE CHIEF OF THE PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE; MR. PHAM VAN TAN (PHAMJ VAWN TAAN), DISTRICT MILITARY TEAM LEADER; MR. NGUYEN VAN KIEM (KIEEMJ); MR. VU DINH TUYEN (VUX DINH TUYEENS) AND MR. NGUYEN VAN PHUC (PHUCS), PROVINCE MIA TEAM MEMBERS. ACCORDING TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S REQUIREMENTS THE JOINT TEAM WILL TRAVEL TO THREE COORDINATES:

- (1) WJ 835 804,
- (2) XJ 014 699,
- (3) WJ 903 923.

THE RESULTS OF OUR ADVANCE WORK WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) AT COORDINATES WJ 835 804 IN CUONG TANG (CWONG TAWNG) HAMLET, THINH DUC (THINHJ DWCS) VILLAGE, DONG HY DISTRICT, THAI NGUYEN CITY, BAC THAI: WE HAD (ALREADY) INTERVIEWED FOUR WITNESSES. THEY ALL TOLD US THEY HAD LIVED THERE FOR SEVERAL DECADES AND NO AIRCRAFT HAD EVER CRASHED IN THE LOCALITY. (THE RIT ALREADY INVESTIGATED HERE ON 10 NOV 95 WITH KEVIN D. SOUSER AS TEAM LEADER).

(2) AT COORDINATES XJ 014 699, THE AIRCRAFT AND PILOT WENT DOWN IN QUYET THANG (QUYEETS THAWNGS) VILLAGE, HIEP HOA DISTRICT, HA BAC //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) ADDITIONAL RMKS/

PROVINCE: VIETNAM REPATRIATED THE REMAINS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON 31 JUL 89. DID A JOINT INVESTIGATIVE TEAM NOT GO BACK TO THIS LOCATION TO RE-INVESTIGATE DURING THE 26TH JFA?

(3) AT COORDINATES WJ 903 923, IN KHE MO (KHE MO) VILLAGE, DONG HY DISTRICT, BAC THAI PROVINCE: NO AIRCRAFT EVER CRASHED AT THIS LOCATION. ACCORDING TO WHAT THE LOCAL INHABITANTS TOLD US, DURING THE WAR A CHINESE MILITARY UNIT WAS STATIONED THERE AND THERE WAS ALSO A CHINESE MILITARY AID STATION. THE AIRCRAFT AND PILOT WENT DOWN AT BINH SON (BINHF SOWN) VILLAGE; THERE WAS ONE WOUNDED PILOT. CHINESE TROOPS BROUGHT THE WOUNDED PILOT TO THE CHINESE AID STATION IN NA NUA (NA NWA) HAMLET, KHE MO VILLAGE, DONG HY DISTRICT FOR TREATMENT, BUT WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN KHE MO VILLAGE THE PILOT DIED AND THE CHINESE MILITARY PERSONNEL GAVE THE BURIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO KHE MO VILLAGE. THE REMAINS WERE REPATRIATED TO THE U.S. GOVERN-

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MENT ON 6 APR 88.
(END TRANSLATION)

E. BASED ON THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN COL TEO'S ORAL REPORT, SUPPLEMENTED BY HIS WRITTEN STATEMENT, THE TEAM DECIDED A JOINT SURVEY OF THE THIRD LOCATION WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY.

4. ANALYST'S COMMENTS:

A. CORRELATIONS:

(1) ACCORDING TO COL TEO, AN AIR DEFENSE UNIT SHOT DOWN THE CASE DATA AIRCRAFT ON THE DATE LISTED ON THE MAP (SEE REF B). HOWEVER, THE COORDINATE ON THE MAP IS NOT THE CRASH LOCATION, BUT THE ACTUAL SITE WHERE THE AIR DEFENSE UNIT WAS LOCATED WHEN IT ENGAGED THE AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT ACTUALLY CRASHED IN HA BAC PROVINCE. THE DISTANCE FROM THE AIR DEFENSE UNIT TO THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION FOR THE CASE DATA AIRCRAFT IS NINE KILOMETERS.

(2) ON 31 JUL 89, THE SRV REPATRIATED REMAINS THEY ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA. U.S. RECORDS INDICATED THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT REMAINS, SO A JOINT TEAM RE-INVESTIGATED CASE DATA DURING THE 26TH JFA. THIS EXPLAINS WHY COL TEO ASKED IF WE RE-INVESTIGATED IT DURING THE 26TH JFA (SEE REF D).

(3) DURING THE 26TH JFA (21 OCT 93 TO 16 NOV 93) MR. LE XUAN BIEN (LEE XUAN BIEN) TOLD A JOINT TEAM HE DISCOVERED AND ASSISTED IN EXHUMING THE REMAINS WHICH THE SRV REPATRIATED IN JUL 89. HE ALSO SAID HE HEARD THE AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED WAS AN DATA. THE AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA IS AN DATA. MR. BIEN LED THE JOINT TEAM TO THE ALLEGED BURIAL LOCATION AT (GC) XJ 0523 6662. THE TEAM SAW EVIDENCE OF A SHALLOW HOLE. HE ALSO LED THE TEAM TO THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE AT (GC) XJ 0531 6676. THE TEAM DID NOT FIND ANY AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AT THIS LOCATION. HOWEVER, WHEN THE TEAM RETURNED TO THEIR VEHICLES AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN SHOWED THE TEAM A PIECE OF WRECKAGE HE ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED FROM THE SITE. THE SITE DEPICTED ON THE 1:100,000 SCALE MAP IS APPROXIMATELY FOUR KILOMETERS FROM THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE THE TEAM VISITED DURING THE 26TH JFA. U.S. FILES INDICATE THE CASE DATA AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE AND FELL SPINNING TO THE EARTH. DEPENDING ON THE ALTITUDE OF THE CASE DATA AIRCRAFT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AN AIR DEFENSE UNIT SHOT IT DOWN FROM THE SRV REPORTED UNIT LOCATION AT (GC) 48Q XJ 014 699. (SEE REF C)

(4) THE DATE WRITTEN ON THE MAP IS 4-3-66. IF THIS DATE IS CONSIDERED AS A LUNAR DATE, IT IS EQUIVALENT TO DATA, THE EXACT INCIDENT DATE OF CASE DATA.

(5) THE COORDINATES ON THE MAP AND THE INFORMATION THE VNOSMP PROVIDED CORRELATE WELL WITH CASE DATA BY DATE, CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND GENERAL LOCATION.

B. THE FIELD ASSESSMENTS IN THIS REPORT DO NOT CONSTITUTE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

5. TEAM LEADER'S COMMENTS:

A. BASED ON COL TEO'S ASSURANCE THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY INVESTIGATED THIS LOCATION AND FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF A CRASH SITE, AND THE PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION HE OBTAINED THERE FOR THE NOTATION ON REF B MAP, THE RIT SAW NO NEED TO DUPLICATE HIS EFFORT, AND CHOSE TO FORGO A JOINT SURVEY.

B. THE ADVANCE WORK OF BOTH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVINCE

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TEAMS IS COMMENDABLE. COL TEO AND MR. HUNG CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS, AND WERE ABLE TO EXECUTE THEM, WITH ASSISTANCE FROM THE LOCAL OFFICIALS, TO THE POINT WHERE A JOINT SURVEY BECAME UNNECESSARY.

6. FIELD RESEARCH DIRECTOR'S COMMENT: BECAUSE COL TEO REPORTED IN SUCH DETAIL, AND PROVIDED TWO DAYS LATER A WRITTEN REPORT OF HIS ACTIVITIES IN BAC THAI PROVINCE, THE TEAM DECIDED TO ACCEPT HIS FINDINGS AND CANCEL THEIR PROPOSED VISIT TO BAC THAI. COL TEO'S PRESENTATION WAS CREDIBLE AND THOROUGH. HAD THE TEAM DECIDED TO GO TO BAC THAI ANYWAY, COL TEO WOULD HAVE PERCEIVED THIS AS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE TEAM'S LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN HIS WORK.

7. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS: N/A//

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 ITEM NO=00404789
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 CDSN = CFS989 MCN = 96194/38376 TOR = 961942354
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS8415 1942355-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
 HEADER
 R 122355Z JUL 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 110922Z JUL 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEACNP/BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS-663P//
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//MPH-10/INTC/INTM//
 RHWRAAA/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
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 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "SITUATION OF
 AMERICAN BANDIT PILOT GRAVES IN THANH HOA TERRITORY"//
 REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/170802ZSEP92//
 REF/B/RMG/CJTFFA DET ONE/230214ZNOV93//
 REF/C/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/171812ZFEB94//
 REF/D/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/220633ZNOV94//
 REF/E/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/211812ZNOV95//
 REF/F/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/300902ZAPR96//
 NARR/REF A IS THE JTF-FA ANALYSIS OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED
 "STATISTICS OF AMERICAN INVADER AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE ARMY AND
 PEOPLE OF THANH HOA FROM 5 AUG 64 TO 31 OCT 65." REF B IS THE
 DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (DRI) OF CASE DATA FROM THE 26TH
 JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA). REF C IS THE JTF-FA ANALYSIS OF A
 VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED "COMBAT HISTORY OF THE THANH HOA ARMED
 FORCES." REF D IS THE DRI OF CASE DATA FROM THE 32ND JFA. REF E
 IS THE DRI OF CASE 0578 FROM THE 38TH JFA. REF F IS THE JTF-FA
 ANALYSIS OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED "LIST OF AMERICANS MISSING

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DURING THE WAR IN THANH HOA."//

RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 1995, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THREE SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ONE SET OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A REPORT TITLED: "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP." THIS REPORT INCLUDED TEN DOCUMENTS. THE SECOND SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A REPORT FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) MIA SPECIALIST TEAM TITLED: "REPORT OF RESULTS OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS TO COLLECT MIA INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS." THIS REPORT INCLUDED THREE DOCUMENTS. THE THIRD SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A VIETNAM OFFICE OF SEEKING PERSON (VNOSMP) ASSESSMENT OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM (SRT) CASES.

2. THE MOI REPORT, "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MOI'S SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP" DETAILS A 4-12 MAY 95 EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION IN VINH PHU, TUYEN QUANG, YEN BAI, HOA BINH, NINH BINH AND THANH HOA PROVINCES. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES BY THE SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS WAS TITLED, "SITUATION OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOT GRAVES IN THANH HOA TERRITORY."

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES LIMITED CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH UNRESOLVED CASES 0597-0-01, 0272, 0350, AND 1940-0-01; AND RESOLVED CASES: 0093, 0667, 0457, 0255, 1789, 0375-0-01, 0575-1-01, 0083-0-01 AND 1915-1-01.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS A LIST OF 19 LINE ITEMS IN TABULAR FORM, WITH THREE DATA COLUMNS ON EACH LINE. THE TRANSLATION BELOW LISTS HEADING INFORMATION FOR THE DOCUMENT FOLLOWED BY EACH LINE ENTRY. THE THREE DATA COLUMNS ARE SET APART BY SEMICOLONS (;). DIRECT TRANSLATIONS FROM THE DOCUMENT ARE ENCLOSED IN QUOTATIONS. EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES (()).

A. THE DOCUMENT HEADING INFORMATION READS AS FOLLOWS:
((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

- "SITUATION OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOT GRAVES
- IN THANH HOA TERRITORY
- (ACCORDING TO THANH HOA PROVINCE UNIT RESEARCH DOCUMENT
DATED 19-4-1973)

- THE NUMBER OF DEAD BANDIT PILOTS FROM 1964-1968 AND 1971-1972 TOTALS 36 GUYS. ((WE)) ONLY KNOW THE FIRST AND LAST NAMES FOR 9 PILOTS, ((AND)) THE AGE AND IDENTIFICATION FOR 10 PILOTS. THE REMAINDER HAVE DIED ((AND THEIR)) BODIES DISINTEGRATED OR BURNED, ((SO)) THERE ARE NO PAPERS OR TRACE ((OF THEM)).

- ((REGARDING)) THE SITUATION ON GRAVES OF PILOTS BURIED IN THE LOCAL AREA ((THAT WE)) WANT TO FIND, THERE WERE NO COFFINS, ONLY DIRT SPREAD CURSORILY OVER ((THE BODIES)) AND NO MARKINGS, THEREFORE NOW THERE ARE ONLY 19 GUYS WHO STILL HAVE GRAVES. ((WE)) DID NOT FIND GRAVES FOR THE REMAINING 17 GUYS.

- ACCORDING TO LOCAL RECORDS THERE ARE GRAVES FOR AMERICAN BANDIT PILOTS AS FOLLOWS:"
((END TRANSLATION))

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B. THE DOCUMENT LINE ENTRIES READ AS FOLLOWS:

((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "1"; QUANG VINH (QUANG XUONG); 4 GUYS; GRAVES OF 2 GUYS STILL EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0093, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 0093 WAS THE ONLY CASE IN QUANG VINH VILLAGE TO INVOLVE THE LOSS OF FOUR U. S. SERVICE MEMBERS. THE BURIAL SITE COORDINATES ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0093 ARE LOCATED IN QUANG VINH VILLAGE. IN ADDITION, ENTRY 8 OF REF B NAMES THE FOUR PERSONS BURIED IN QUANG VINH VILLAGE. THE FOUR NAMES CORRELATE WITH THE FOUR PERSONS LOST IN THE REFNO 0093 INCIDENT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "2"; QUANG YEN (QUANG XUONG); 1 GUY; GRAVE NO LONGER EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE, BASED ON LOSS LOCATION. INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES, INCLUDING U.S. AND SRV DOCUMENTATION, AND THE RESULTS OF FIELD INVESTIGATION AND EXCAVATION, INDICATES THAT CASE DATA WAS THE ONLY CASE TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN QUANG YEN VILLAGE. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE BURIAL SITE NOTED IN THIS DOCUMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE RESULTS OF FIELD INVESTIGATION.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "3"; QUANG CHAU (QUANG XUONG); GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0667, BASED ON LOCATION AND PRESENCE OF A GRAVE. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON THIS VILLAGE (WG 9285) SHOWS 19 AIRCRAFT LOSSES. OF THESE 19, 12 WERE EITHER OPERATIONAL LOSSES OR RETURNEES. OF THE REMAINING SEVEN, ONLY TWO ARE CLOSE TO QUANG CHAU VILLAGE, ACCORDING TO SEALOSS. BOTH OF THESE, CASES 0092 AND 0667, WERE RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF JOINT FIELD INVESTIGATIONS, SO THE ACTUAL BURIAL LOCATIONS WERE NEVER CONFIRMED. REF C SHOWS THAT THE 0092 AIRCRAFT CRASHED OFF THE COAST OF QUANG NHAM VILLAGE. THIS LOCATION IS ABOUT 20 KM SOUTH OF QUANG CHAU VILLAGE. REF B PLACES THE CRASH SITE OF THE ENTRY CORRELATED WITH 0667 BETWEEN QUANG VINH AND QUANG HUNG VILLAGES, ABOUT 4 KM SOUTH OF QUANG CHAU VILLAGE. //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "SITUATION OF RMKS/

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION IN THE CASE 0667 FILE, THE INDIVIDUAL LOST IN THIS INCIDENT EJECTED SAFELY FROM HIS AIRCRAFT, AND DISAPPEARED INTO A TREE LINE AT THE EDGE OF QUANG CHAU VILLAGE. HE WAS NEVER HEARD FROM AGAIN. THE NOTATION IN A DOCUMENT THAT A GRAVE SITE STILL EXISTS IS ALMOST ALWAYS AN INDICATION THAT THE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH A RESOLVED CASE. LTJG GRAHAM WAS EITHER KILLED BY LOCAL FORCES DURING OR AFTER CAPTURE, OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES SUFFERED PRIOR TO OR UPON LANDING. HE WAS PROBABLY BURIED IN QUANG CHAU VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "4"; QUANG CHINH (QUANG XUONG); GRAVE LOST." ((THIS ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0457, BASED ON LOCATION OF LOSS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SEVERAL CASES IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA, U.S. RECORDS PLACE CASE 0457 CLOSEST TO QUANG CHINH VILLAGE. THIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS PRIOR

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TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF FIELD INVESTIGATIONS, SO THE DATA IN U.S. FILES OF THIS CASE HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED IN THE FIELD. NEVERTHELESS, DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF ANOTHER CASE IN THE AREA, A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED A WITNESS IN QUANG CHINH VILLAGE WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH CORRELATES WITH CASE 0457, TO INCLUDE BURIAL AND SUBSEQUENT RECOVERY OF REMAINS IN THE VILLAGE (REF E). THERE ARE NO OTHER CASES IN QUANG CHINH VILLAGE. NOTE: SUBJECT DOCUMENT INDICATES THAT THE GRAVE IN QUANG CHINH WAS LOST. NEVERTHELESS, THE SRV REPATRIATED THE REMAINS OF CASE 0457 IN 1983. THIS INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT THE SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY OF REMAINS TOOK PLACE AFTER SUBJECT DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED. THE WITNESS FROM QUANG CHINH VILLAGE DID NOT INDICATE WHEN HE GUIDED THE OFFICIAL RECOVERY PARTY TO THE BURIAL SITE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "5); QUANG HAI (QUANG XUONG); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0255. ONE OF THE TWO CREWMEN IN THIS CASE IS A RETURNEE. THE OTHER WAS RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS IN DEC 88, BEFORE A JOINT INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE TOOK PLACE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ACTUAL LOSS LOCATION HAS NEVER BEEN DETERMINED. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION IS IN QUANG NHAM VILLAGE, 7 KM SOUTH OF QUANG HAI VILLAGE. HOWEVER, AN INTERVIEW REPORT IN THE CASE 0255 FILE PROVIDES INFORMATION WHICH CORRELATES VERY CLOSELY WITH THE TESTIMONY OF THE RETURNEE IN THIS INCIDENT. THE INTERVIEWEE STATED THAT THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE IN QUANG HAI VILLAGE. IN ADDITION, REF C CONTAINS AN ENTRY WHICH CORRELATES WITH CASE 0255 WHICH PLACES THE CRASH SITE OFF THE COAST OF QUANG HAI VILLAGE. THERE WERE NO OTHER INCIDENTS IN THIS AREA ON 18 FEB 66. INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING THE REPATRIATED REMAINS INDICATES THAT THEY WERE RECOVERED IN TINH GIA DISTRICT. NO OTHER DETAILS ARE PROVIDED. ALTHOUGH THIS INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CORRELATION PROPOSED ABOVE, IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT BY ITSELF TO OVERRULE IT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "6); QUANG DINH (QUANG XUONG); 2 GUYS; GRAVES EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 1789, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 1789 WAS THE ONLY CASE TO INVOLVE THE LOSS OF TWO U. S. SERVICE MEMBERS WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF QUANG DINH VILLAGE. IN ADDITION, A WARTIME NEWS REPORT CORRELATED WITH THIS CASE PLACES THE INCIDENT LOCATION IN QUANG DINH VILLAGE. THE REMAINS OF BOTH SERVICEMEN WERE REPATRIATED IN APR 88, BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF JOINT FIELD INVESTIGATION. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LOSS LOCATION OF THIS INCIDENT HAS NEVER BEEN CONFIRMED. INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING THE REPATRIATED REMAINS INDICATES THAT THEY WERE RECOVERED IN HOANG HOA DISTRICT, THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF WHICH LIES 4 KM NORTH OF QUANG DINH VILLAGE. ALTHOUGH THIS INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CORRELATION ESTABLISHED ABOVE, IT IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERRULE IT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "7); HAI LINH (TINH GIA); 1 GUY; GRAVE LOST." ((THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES TO PERMIT CORRELATION OF THIS ENTRY. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HAI LINH VILLAGE (WG 8455) SHOWS 13 AIRCRAFT LOSSES, NONE OF THEM IN HAI LINH VILLAGE ITSELF. OF THESE 13 INCIDENTS, 7 INVOLVE OPERATIONAL LOSSES OR RETURNEES. OF THE REMAINING SIX, TWO ARE OVERWATER LOSSES NEAR

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HON ME ISLAND, 15 KM SE OF HAI LINH VILLAGE. TWO OTHERS, BOTH RESOLVED CASES, CORRELATE MORE CLOSELY WITH OTHER ENTRIES IN THIS DOCUMENT. OF THE TWO REMAINING INCIDENTS, FIELD INVESTIGATION SHOWS THAT UNRESOLVED CASE 0578 PROBABLY TOOK PLACE IN HAI CHAU VILLAGE, 10 KM DUE NORTH OF HAI LINH VILLAGE (REF E). THE LAST INCIDENT IS RESOLVED CASE 0255, RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS IN 1983. INFORMATION IN THE CASE FILE AND IN SRV DOCUMENTS, INDICATES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL KILLED IN THIS INCIDENT DIED IN QUANG HAI VILLAGE, QUANG XUONG DISTRICT, 20 KM DUE NORTH OF HAI LINH VILLAGE. THE NOTATION THAT THE GRAVE HAS BEEN LOST IS A STRONG INDICATION THAT NO REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INCIDENT HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED. RECOMMEND INVESTIGATION OF THIS INFORMATION IN HAI LINH VILLAGE. NO JOINT TEAM HAS YET VISITED HAI LINH VILLAGE, AS NO INCIDENT IN JTF-PA FILES IS KNOWN TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE THERE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "8); HAI HOA (TINH GIA); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0375-0-01, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 0375-0-01 WAS THE ONLY CASE TO INVOLVE THE LOSS OF A U. S. SERVICE MEMBER WITHIN 12 KM OF HAI HOA VILLAGE. THIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS ON 15 DEC 88, BEFORE THE CASE UNDERWENT JOINT INVESTIGATION, CONSEQUENTLY, THE LOSS LOCATION WAS NEVER CONFIRMED. THE REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE WERE REPATRIATED AS UNIDENTIFIED, RECOVERED IN TINH GIA DISTRICT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "9); HAI THANH (TINH GIA); 1 GUY; GRAVE LOST." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, WHICH INVOLVES ONE RESOLVED AND ONE UNRESOLVED INDIVIDUAL. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. FIELD INVESTIGATION IN HAI THANH VILLAGE OBTAINED INFORMATION CONSISTENT WITH CASE DATA, INCLUDING DISCOVERY OF ONE CAUCASIAN BODY ON THE BEACH OF THE VILLAGE, BURIAL OF THE BODY, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DESTRUCTION OF THE GRAVE SITE BY A STORM (REF D). IT IS NOT CLEAR TO WHICH OF THE TWO CREWMEN THIS INFORMATION PERTAINS. ONE INDIVIDUAL WAS RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS IN DEC 88, BEFORE THE CASE UNDER-
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/
SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "SITUATION OF RMKS/
WENT JOINT INVESTIGATION. INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING THE REMAINS INDICATED ONLY THAT THE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED IN TINH GIA DISTRICT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "10); HAI THUONG (TINH GIA); 1 GUY; GRAVE LOST." ((THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IS TOO LIMITED TO CORRELATE WITH A SPECIFIC U. S. LOSS. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HAI THUONG VILLAGE SHOWED REVEALED 10 INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE LOSS OF 15 U. S. SERVICE MEMBERS. SEVEN INCIDENTS AND TWELVE CREWMEN REMAIN UNRESOLVED. NONE OF THESE INCIDENT LOCATIONS LIES WITHIN HAI THUONG VILLAGE ITSELF.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "11); HOANG TRUONG (HOANG HOA); 1 GUY; GRAVE LOST." ((THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IS TOO LIMITED TO CORRELATE WITH A SPECIFIC U. S. LOSS. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HOANG TRUONG

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VILLAGE (WG 9997) SHOWS 26 AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS, NONE OF WHICH TOOK PLACE WITHIN THE VILLAGE. NINE INCIDENTS INVOLVED THE DEATH OF CREW MEMBERS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "12; THO BINH (TRIEU SON); 7 GUYS; GRAVES EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0350, WHICH INVOLVES THE LOSS OF EIGHT CREWMEN, FIVE OF WHOM REMAIN UNRESOLVED. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS, AND IS CONFIRMED BY FIELD INVESTIGATION AND SRV DOCUMENTS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "13; TAN NINH (TRIEU SON); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS, AND PRESENCE OF A GRAVE. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON TAN NINH VILLAGE SHOWS THAT TWO INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE THERE, CASES 0095 AND DATA. THIS FINDING HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY FIELD INVESTIGATION (REF B). INFORMATION OBTAINED IN THESE INVESTIGATIONS INDICATES THAT THE BODY OF THE CASE DATA PILOT WAS BURIED IN THE VILLAGE, WHILE THE SCATTERED, FRAGMENTED REMAINS IN CASE 0095 WERE NOT. THIS ENTRY, THEREFORE, CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "14; HA TIEN (HA TRUNG); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXISTS." ((THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES TO PERMIT CORRELATION OF THIS ENTRY. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HA TIEN VILLAGE SHOWS 13 AIRCRAFT LOSSES, NONE OF THEM IN HA TIEN VILLAGE. EIGHT OF THESE INCIDENTS INVOLVE RETURNEES OR OPERATIONAL LOSSES. OF THE REMAINING FIVE, THE LOSS LOCATION HAS BEEN DETERMINED BY FIELD INVESTIGATION FOR TWO AND THE LOCATION FROM WHICH THE SRV REPATRIATED REMAINS HAS BEEN DETERMINED FOR THREE. NONE OF THESE LOCATIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH HA TIEN VILLAGE OR HA TRUNG DISTRICT. WHILE THE NOTATION "GRAVE EXTANT" STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THESE REMAINS HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED, THE THREE REMAINS REPATRIATED FROM THIS AREA CAME FROM BIM SON TOWN AND NGA SON DISTRICT, NOT HA TRUNG DISTRICT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "15; THONG NHAT STATE FARM; 3 GUYS; GRAVES LOST" ((THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN THIS ENTRY TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH ANY INCIDENT IN JTF-FA FILES. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON THE THONG NHAT STATE FARM (WH 4721) SHOWS SIX LOSSES, NONE OF THEM WITHIN THE STATE FARM. NONE OF THESE INCIDENTS IS UNRESOLVED, AND NONE INVOLVED MORE THAN TWO PERSONS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "16; DONG LOC (HAU LOC); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0575-1-01, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. A GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON DONG LOC VILLAGE (WG 9008) SHOWS CASE 0575 WAS THE ONLY CASE INVOLVING THE LOSS OF A U. S. SERVICE MEMBER TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN DONG LOC VILLAGE. THE RESULTS OF THE GRID SEARCH ARE SUPPORTED BY WARTIME REPORTING IN THE CASE FILE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "17; THUONG NINH (NHU XUAN); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0083-0-01, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 0083 WAS THE ONLY CASE INVOLVING THE LOSS OF A U. S. SERVICE MEMBER TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THUONG NINH VILLAGE. THE LOSS LOCATION HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY FIELD INVESTIGATION, AS THE CASE WAS RESOLVED THROUGH UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS BEFORE THE CASE COULD BE INVESTIGATED. INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING THE REMAINS

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INDICATED THAT THEY WERE RECOVERED IN NHU XUAN DISTRICT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "18; TAM CHUNG (QUAN HOA); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 1915, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 1915 WAS THE ONLY U. S. LOSS THAT OCCURRED WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF TAM CHUNG VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "19 ME ISLAND; 6 GUYS; GRAVES LOST." ((THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN THIS ENTRY TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH ANY INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS IN JTF-FA FILES. A 20-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HON ME (WG 9842) SHOWS A TOTAL OF 20 AIRCRAFT LOSSES. ONE OF THESE, AN OPERATIONAL LOSS, OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND. THE WATERS AROUND THE ISLAND SHOW FIVE LOSSES INVOLVING EIGHT UNACCOUNTED-FOR CREWMEN, SOME OF WHOM MAY HAVE BEEN INTERRED ON HON ME. FIELD INVESTIGATION OF THESE CASES HAS BEEN LIMITED AND INCONCLUSIVE, AS HON ME IS IN A MILITARY RESTRICTED AREA.))

- TOTAL: 36 PILOTS (9 HAVE NAMES, 10 DO NOT HAVE NAMES, 17 HAVE NAMES AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE"
((END TRANSLATION))

5. COMMENTS: THE DOCUMENT IS HANDWRITTEN IN A SINGLE HAND. IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN EXTRACTED FROM A LARGER DOCUMENT, AS THE SUB-TITLE SUGGESTS. INFORMATION IN THE DOCUMENT, WHEN COMPARED WITH OTHER CONTEMPORARY SRV DOCUMENTS AND THE RESULTS OF FIELD INVESTIGATIONS, SUGGESTS IT WAS WRITTEN SOMETIME IN THE PERIOD 1972-75.

6. FOR HQ APFC/DPWCM, CMC WASH DC/MHP-10 AND BUPERS/PERS 663P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A COPY OF THE VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTS AND TRANSLATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

ADMIN

7. EVAL: BEM/JMC//

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
 ITEM NO=00120863
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS383 MCN = 96155/25494 TOR = 961552049
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 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 032049Z JUN 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
 RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 030902Z JUN 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RHRMPC/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 BT
CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "REPORT: NUMBER
 OF DEAD BANDIT PILOTS"//
 REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/041802ZJAN94//
 REF/B/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/050942ZJAN96//
 REF/C/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/250912ZAPR96//
 NARR/REF A IS JTF-FA ANALYSIS OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED "LIST
 OF PILOTS SHOT DOWN AND DIED IN VINH PHU." REF B IS A REEVALUATION
 OF REF A. REF C IS THE JTF-FA ANALYSIS OF A HANDWRITTEN DOCUMENT
 BEARING THE TITLE: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOTS WHO DIED IN VINH
 PHU." THE DOCUMENT ANALYZED BELOW IS SIMILAR TO THE DOCUMENT
 EVALUATED IN REF A. THE DATA ELEMENTS IN BOTH DOCUMENTS ARE SIMILAR
 AND CORRELATE TO THE SAME CASES. HOWEVER, ENOUGH DIFFERENCES WERE
 NOTED BETWEEN THE TWO DOCUMENTS TO JUSTIFY A SEPARATE EVALUATION.
 ADDITIONALLY, THREE NEW LINE ENTRIES ARE INCLUDED IN SUBJECT MESSAGE
 THAT DO NOT APPEAR IN REF A. FINALLY, REF C DOCUMENT APPEARS TO BE
 AN EARLIER, MORE COMPLETE VERSION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING AMERICAN
 REMAINS IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. REF C PROVIDES INFORMATION USEFUL IN
 THE EVALUATION OF SUBJECT DOCUMENT.//

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RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THREE SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ONE SET OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A REPORT TITLED: "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP." THIS REPORT INCLUDED TEN DOCUMENTS. THE SECOND SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A REPORT FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) MIA SPECIALIST TEAM TITLED: "REPORT OF RESULTS OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS TO COLLECT MIA INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS." THIS REPORT INCLUDED THREE DOCUMENTS. THE THIRD SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A VIETNAM OFFICE FOR SEEKING PERSONS (VNOSMP) ASSESSMENT OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM (SRT) CASES.

2. THE MOI REPORT, "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MOI'S SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP" DETAILS A 4 - 12 MAY 95, EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION IN VINH PHU, TUYEN QUANG, YEN BAI, HOA BINH, NINH BINH AND THANH HOA PROVINCES. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES BY THE SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS WAS TITLED, "REPORT: NUMBER OF DEAD BANDIT PILOTS."

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES LIMITED CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH THE FOLLOWING UNRESOLVED CASES: 0112-0-01, 0430-1-01, 0579-0-01, 0875-0-01, 0897-0-01 AND 1934; AND THE FOLLOWING RESOLVED CASES: 0396-0-01, 0533-1-01, 0544, 0659-0-01, 0914, 0781, 1939-0-01 AND 1939-0-02.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS A TYPEWRITTEN LIST OF 17 LINE ITEMS IN TABULAR FORM, WITH 9 DATA COLUMNS FOR EACH LINE. THE TRANSLATION BELOW LISTS HEADING INFORMATION FOR THE DOCUMENT FOLLOWED BY THE INDIVIDUAL LINE ENTRIES. THE DOCUMENT HEADING INFORMATION READS AS FOLLOWS: "MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, VINH PHU PROVINCE, POLITICAL OFFICE, NO.--/05-6," "REPORT: NUMBER OF DEAD BANDIT PILOTS," "=10B=". A HANDWRITTEN ANNOTATION TO THE RIGHT OF THE TITLE READS: "TOTAL NUMBER DEAD 17 GUYS - (ILLEGIBLE) 31." (NOTE: IN THE REF C DOCUMENT THE NUMBER "(ILLEGIBLE) 49" APPEARS NEXT TO THE DOCUMENT TITLE. THE FIGURE IS WRITTEN IN A HAND SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE PRESENT DOCUMENT.) EACH OF THE NINE DATA COLUMNS FOR THE LINE ENTRIES IS SET APART BY A SEMICOLON (;). THE 9 DATA COLUMNS OF THE DOCUMENT READ AS FOLLOWS: "ENTRY NUMBER; SURNAME AND NAME; BIRTH DATE; RANK; MILITARY NUMBER; AIRCRAFT TYPE; DATE OF DEATH; PLACE OF BURIAL; COMMENTS." (NOTE: THE DATA COLUMNS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE ON THE REF C DOCUMENT, WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS: REF C CONTAINS FIELDS FOR THE UNIT CREDITED WITH SHOOTING DOWN THE AIRCRAFT, FOR WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A COFFIN, AND FOR WHETHER THE GRAVE WAS EXTANT OR HAD BEEN LOST. REF C HAD NO COLUMN FOR NOTES.) DATA FIELDS LEFT BLANK ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ARE INDICATED BY A HYPHEN (-). ANY INFORMATION ILLEGIBLE ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS REPLACED WITH A QUESTION MARK (?). EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ((ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES)).

5. THE DOCUMENT LINE ENTRIES READ AS FOLLOWS:

((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "1; GOORBERGMONT BLAKVL; 18-7-1939; CPT;

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FR 8269?; F105; 02-12-1966; NGUYET DUC VILLAGE, YLAC; BURIED IN A COFFIN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0533, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON SIMILARITY IN NAME, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE, DAY AND YEAR OF BIRTH, AND PROVINCE OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0533. THE SERIAL NUMBER DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0533, NOR DOES IT CORRELATE WITH ANY U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.))
 - ((LINE ENTRY)) "2; NAME ARBDT; DATA ; -; DATA ; DATA ; DATA ; HA PAGODA CEMETERY, VINH YEN TOWN; BURIED IN A COFFIN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA , AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, MONTH AND YEAR OF BIRTH, SERIAL NUMBER, AND AIRCRAFT TYPE. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE DATA.))
 - ((LINE ENTRY)) "3; DIAMOND STEPHEN; 21-7-1940; 1LT; AC3147934; F105; 19-7-1966; TAM CANH VILLAGE, B/XUYEN; TRANSFERRED TO AN EARTHENWARE JAR" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0396-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND PROVINCE OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0396.))
 - ((LINE ENTRY)) "4; GION LOL, T HAO; 31-10-1924; 2LT; FV941711; F105; 18-11-67; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, K/ANH; BURIED IN A COFFIN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0914-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND PROVINCE OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0914.))
 - ((LINE ENTRY)) "5; WINTONSCHARLESC RTHNESS; 10-3-1938; CPT; FR72444; RF10; 1-8-67; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, K/ANH; BURIED IN A COFFIN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0781, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON SIMILARITY IN NAME, DATE OF BIRTH AND PROVINCE OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0781. THE SERIAL NUMBER PROVIDED DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0781 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSS IN SOUTHEAST
 //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "REPORT: NUMBER RMKS/

ASIA. THE AIRCRAFT TYPE IS LISTED AS "RF10", THE AIRCRAFT TYPE FOR CASE 0781 WAS ACTUALLY AN RF101C.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "6; -; -; -; -; -; 8-11-67; DONG TINH VILLAGE, T/DUONG; -"

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "7; -; -; -; -; -; 8-11-67; -; -"

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "8; -; -; -; -; -; 8-11-67; XUAN LOI VILLAGE, B/XUYEN; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((FOUR AIRCRAFT LOSSES OCCURRED IN VIETNAM ON 8 NOV 67. ONLY ONE OF THESE OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. LINE ENTRIES 6, 7 AND 8 REFER TO TWO INCIDENTS INVOLVING THREE PERSONS OCCURRING IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON THAT DATE. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN LINE ENTRIES 6 AND 7 IS INSUFFICIENT TO CORRELATE WITH THE SINGLE AIRCRAFT LOSS THAT OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 8 NOV 67. HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION IN ENTRY 8 APPEARS

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TO BE A VARIANT OF THAT WHICH APPEARS IN ENTRY 2 OF REF C. THE PLACE OF BURIAL IN THE REF C ENTRY IS LISTED AS "SON LOI VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN", AS CONTRASTED WITH "XUAN LOI VILLAGE B/XUYEN." "B/XUYEN" PRESUMABLY REFERS TO BINH XUYEN DISTRICT. "XUAN" LOI VILLAGE LIES IN FORMER KIM ANH DISTRICT, "SON" LOI VILLAGE IN FORMER BINH XUYEN DISTRICT. BASED ON THE FOREGOING, ENTRY 8 OF THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT APPEARS TO BE IN ERROR, AND SHOULD HAVE READ "SON LOI VILLAGE, B/XUYEN." JTF-FA ANALYSTS CORRELATED ENTRY 2 OF REF C WITH CASE 0897, BASED ON DATE AND LOCATION. ENTRY 8 OF THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT, THEREFORE, SHOULD ALSO BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0897.))

((LINE ENTRY)) "9; -; -; -; -; -; 21-11-67; BAC SON VILLAGE, DA PHUC; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((THERE WERE NO U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES ON 21 NOV 67. ONE AIRCRAFT LOSS OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 20 NOV 67; HOWEVER, THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN THAT LOSS IS LISTED AS A RETURNEE. A 10KM GRID SEARCH OF THE AREA AROUND BAC SON VILLAGE REVEALS FIVE LOSS INCIDENTS, ONLY ONE OF WHICH, CASE DATA, TOOK PLACE WITHIN BAC SON ITSELF. CASE DATA TOOK PLACE ON DATA. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE DATE MAY HAVE BEEN TRANSCRIBED IN ERROR. ENTRY 23 OF REF C CONTAINS SIMILAR INFORMATION TO THIS ENTRY, AND JTF-FA ANALYSTS CORRELATED IT WITH CASE DATA.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "10; -; -; -; -; -; 25-10-67; MINH PHU VILLAGE, K/ANH; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((TWO U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 25 OCT 67, AND ONE IN HA NOI MUNICIPALITY. THE TWO VINH PHU LOSSES, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN A PORTION OF THE PROVINCE WHICH IS NOW PART OF HANOI MUNICIPALITY, OCCURRED WITHIN 5 KM OF MINH PHU VILLAGE. ONLY ONE OF THESE, CASE 0875, INVOLVES AN UNACCOUNTED FOR CREWMAN. THIS ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0875-0-01 BASED ON EXACT DATE, LOCATION, AND FATE OF THE CREW.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "11; ASTVE DONOL; -; MAJ; 6019537; F105; 8-12-66; DI NAU VILLAGE, T/NONG; TRANSFERRED TO AN EARTHENWARE JAR" ((THIS ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0544 BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, AIRCRAFT TYPE, DATE OF INCIDENT AND LOCATION OF LOSS. ((NOTE: THE COORDINATES OF THE ORIGINAL LAST KNOWN LOCATION FOR THIS INCIDENT LIE IN THE VILLAGE IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO DI NAU VILLAGE. THE CURRENT INCIDENT LOCATION CARRIED IN BRIGHTLIGHT IS THE PRODUCT OF WARTIME SOURCE REPORTING. IT APPEARS THAT IN THIS INSTANCE THE ORIGINAL REPORTED LOCATION WAS THE MORE ACCURATE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "12; -; -; -; -; -; 29-4-67; YEN SON VILLAGE, T/SON; -" ((THIS ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0659, BASED ON DATE OF INCIDENT AND LOSS LOCATION.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "13; -; -; -; -; -; 24-7-65; VO MIEU VILLAGE, T/SON; DATA, REMAINS LOST" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0112, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON INCIDENT DATE AND LOSS LOCATION. THE COORDINATES OF THE LOSS LOCATION CARRIED IN BRIGHTLIGHT LIE WITHIN VO MIEU VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "14; -; -; -; -; -; 15-10-65; QUAT THUONG VILLAGE, VTRI; REMAINS DISPERSED UPON CRASH" ((NO U.S. LOSSES OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 15 OCT 65. ONE AIRCRAFT LOSS OCCURRED ON 15 OCT 65 IN THE NEIGHBORING PROVINCE OF SON LA; HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO CORRELATE TO THAT LOSS, OR TO ANY LOSSES IN THE VIET TRI AREA.

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JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO LOCATE A QUAT HUONG VILLAGE OR WARD WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF VIET TRI CITY.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "15; GRATHAMALEN; -; ?; -; F111A; 17-10-72; TIEN CHAN VILLAGE YLANG; BODY DISINTEGRATED." ((THIS LINE PROBABLY CORRELATES TO CASE 1939-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON SIMILARITY OF NAME, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1939.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "16; HOC/CORIT/CIEM ALON; -; CPT; -; -; -; -; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((THIS ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 1939-0-02, BASED ON SIMILARITY OF NAME ONLY.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "17; -; -; 1LT; -; FA; 06-10-72; VAN LUONG VILLAGE, T/DONG; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON LOSS LOCATION AND DATE OF BURIAL. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE OF CASE DATA. JCRC INVESTIGATORS VISITED VAN LUONG VILLAGE DURING THE 12TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY. INFORMATION THEY OBTAINED THERE ABOUT THE ONLY AIRCRAFT LOST IN THAT VILLAGE DURING THE WAR CORRELATED WITH CASE DATA. U.S. RECORDS ALSO INDICATE THAT NO AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN THAT OF CASE DATA CRASHED IN VAN LUONG VILLAGE.))

6. THE DOCUMENT CLOSES WITH THE FOLLOWING NOTES AND FIGURES ANNOTATED AT THE BOTTOM: "COMMENTS BY SEQUENCE NUMBER: 6 AND 7: THESE TWO GUYS WERE BURIED AS ONE BECAUSE ONE GUY STILL HAD HANDS AND HEAD AND ONE GUY STILL HAD LEGS. THEY WERE IN THE SAME AIRCRAFT SO COULD NOT BE TOLD APART. 15 + 16 THERE REMAINS A SMALL PORTION OF FLESH AND BONE FRAGMENTS BURIED IN AN EARTHENWARE JAR." ((THE INFORMATION RELATING TO ENTRIES 6 AND 7 IS INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC TO CORRELATE WITH ANY CASE IN JTF-FA FILES. THE INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH ENTRIES 15 AND 16 CORRELATES WITH CASE 1939 BASED ON THE ENTRY NUMBERS.))

((END TRANSLATION))

7. FOR HQ AFPC/DPWCM: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A COPY OF THE VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT AND TRANSLATION WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

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8. EVAL: BEM/AV/JC//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00560820
ENVELOPE
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 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1266 1180453-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 270453Z APR 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 250912Z APR 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEAHOF/CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PED-P//
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 BT
CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 BODY
 MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT
 PILOTS WHO DIED IN VINH PHU"//
 RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THREE
 SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ONE
 SET OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A REPORT TITLED: "REPORT ON RESULTS OF
 OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION
 SEEKING GROUP." THIS REPORT INCLUDED TEN DOCUMENTS. THE SECOND SET
 OF DOCUMENTS WAS A REPORT FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) MIA
 SPECIALIST TEAM TITLED: "REPORT OF RESULTS OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS
 TO COLLECT MIA INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS." THIS REPORT INCLUDED
 THREE DOCUMENTS. THE THIRD SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A VIETNAM OFFICE
 SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) ASSESSMENT OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS
 TEAM (SRT) CASES.
 2. THE MOI REPORT, "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY
 OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP," DETAILS A
 4 - 12 MAY 95 EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION IN
 VINH PHU, TUYEN QUANG, YEN BAI, HOA BINH, NINH BINH AND THANH HOA
 PROVINCES. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS
 RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES BY THE SPECIAL

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INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS WAS TITLED: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOTS WHO DIED IN VINH PHU".

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES SOME CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH THE FOLLOWING UNRESOLVED CASES: 0112-1-01, 0430-1-01, 0579-0-01, 0897-0-01 AND 1955, AND THE FOLLOWING RESOLVED CASES: 0396-0-01, 0533-1-01, 0544-0-01, 0659-0-01, 0781-1-01, 0914-1-01, 1939-0-01, 1939-0-02, 1953-0-01, 1953-0-02, 1958-0-01, 1958-0-02, 1958-1-07 AND 1961. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE LINE ENTRIES IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH DATA CONTAINED IN JTF-FA RECORDS.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS A LIST OF 27 LINE ITEMS WITH 11 DATA COLUMNS. EACH OF THE 11 DATA COLUMNS FOR THE LINE IS SET APART BY A SEMI-COLON(;). ANY INFORMATION ILLEGIBLE ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS INDICATED BY A QUESTION MARK (?). THE DATA FIELDS LEFT BLANK ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ARE INDICATED BY A HYPHEN (-). THE 11 DATA COLUMNS READ AS FOLLOWS: "ENTRY NUMBER; UNIT NAME; SURNAME AND NAME OF BANDIT PILOT; DATE OF BIRTH; RANK; MILITARY NO.; TYPE OF AIRCRAFT FLOWN; DATE OF DEATH; PLACE BANDIT BURIED; HAVE COFFIN OR NOT; GRAVE EXTANT OR LOST." EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ((ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES)).

5. THE DOCUMENT LINE ENTRIES READ AS FOLLOWS:

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 1; BINH XUYEN; EIAMONDSTEPHN(EIAMONDSTEPHEN); 1-7-1940; 1LT; AC31147934; F105; 19-7-1966; TAM CANH VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN; HAVE COFFIN; TRANSFERRED TO EARTHENWARE POT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0396-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 2; BINH XUYEN; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 8-11-1967; SON LOI VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0897-0-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 3; KIM ANH; GION LOL THOO; 31-10-1924; 2LT; EV910711; F105; 18-11-1967; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE WAS EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0914-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE, LOCATION OF LOSS AND PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER. THE NAME LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CAN NOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0914 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSSES LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES. THE RANK LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0914.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 4; KIM ANH; WHTONSCHARIESCRITNESS; 10-3-1938; CAPT; FR72444; RF101; 1-8-1967; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE WAS EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0781-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 5; KIM ANH; NAME UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; 25-10-1967; MINH PHU VILLAGE, KIM ANH; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((FIVE LOSSES OCCURRED WITHIN 10 KM OF MINH PHU VILLAGE IN LATE 1967, FOUR RESOLVED CASES AND UNRESOLVED CASE

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DATA. NONE OF THESE CASES TOOK PLACE ON 25 OCT 67. IN FACT, NO LOSSES OCCURED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 25 OCT 67. TWO AIRCRAFT WERE LOST WITHIN THE PROVINCE ON 24 OCT 67, BOTH A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM MINH PHU VILLAGE. THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CONTAIN ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE A CORRELATION TO ANY OF THESE CASES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 6; YEN LAC; MOORBERGMONTERAKVE; 18-7-1939; CAPT; FR62699; F105; 2-12-1966; NGUYET DUC VILLAGE, YEN LAC; HAVE COFFIN; NO. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0533-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 7; VINH YEN; NAME ' ; 1-7-1924; CAPT; DATA ; F105; DATA ; HA PAGODA CEMETERY, VINH YEN TOWN; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE

DATA , AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE RANK LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE DATA.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 8; THANH SON; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 29-4-1967; YEN SON VILLAGE, THANH SON; NO; GRAVE (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0659, BASED ON DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 9; THANH SON; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 24-7-1965; VO MIEU VILLAGE, THANH SON; NO; GRAVE INTACT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0112-1-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON EXACT INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 10; VIET TRI; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 15-10-1965; QUAT HUONG VILLAGE, VIET TRI CITY; BODY DISINTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((JTF-FA DATA BASES LIST NO LOSSES IN VINH PHU PROVINCE IN OCT 65. A 20-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON VIET TRI CITY (WJ 2366; QUAT HUONG VILLAGE IS NOT LISTED IN ANY SOURCE AVAIL-
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT RMKS/

TABLE TO JTF-FA) SHOWS ONLY FOUR INCIDENTS, NONE OF WHICH CAN BE CORRELATED WITH THIS ENTRY. BRIGHT LIGHT LISTS TWO CASES WITH AN INCIDENT DATE OF 15 OCT 65 BUT THE LOCATIONS OF LOSS LISTED FOR THESE CASES (SON LA PROVINCE) DO NOT CORRELATE WITH THIS ENTRY. THE ENTRY DOES NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE A CORRELATION TO ANY U.S. LOSS IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 11; TAM DUONG; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 8-11-1967; DONG TINH VILLAGE, TAM DUONG;

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 12; TAM DUONG; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 8-11-1967; DONG TINH VILLAGE, TAM DUONG; ((THESE TWO ENTRIES ARE JOINED BY A BRACKET AT COLUMNS 10 AND 11, INDICATING THAT THE DATA IN THOSE COLUMNS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS APPLYING TO BOTH ENTRIES. COLUMN 10 READS: "THESE TWO GUYS BURIED (ILLEGIBLE)." COLUMN 11 IS LARGELY ILLEGIBLE, BUT MAY READ: "GRAVE (ILLEGIBLE)"

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THERE IS STILL (ILLEGIBLE).")) ((THE DATE OF THESE ENTRIES CORRELATES WITH CASE 0897, THE ONLY LOSS IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 8 NOV 67. HOWEVER, THE LOSS LOCATION REPORTED IN LINE ENTRY 2 (SON LOI VILLAGE, WJ 5371) CORRELATES MORE CLOSELY WITH CASE 0897 THAN DOES THAT PROVIDED IN ENTRIES 11 AND 12 (DONG TINH VILLAGE, WJ 6856). IN ADDITION, CASE 0897 INVOLVED ONLY ONE CREW MEMBER. THESE ENTRIES INVOLVE THE BURIAL OF TWO CREWMEN. THERE ARE 11 LOSS INCIDENTS, ALL INVOLVING THE DEATH OR CAPTURE OF U.S. PERSONNEL, LOCATED WITHIN 15 KM OF DONG TINH VILLAGE. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN LINE ENTRIES 11 AND 12 IS INSUFFICIENT TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH ANY OF THESE INCIDENTS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 13; YEN LANG; GWTAIHAMALEN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; F111A; 17-10-1972; TIEN CHAU VILLAGE, YEN LANG; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED (?) BURIED (?); (?) 2 GUYS (?).

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 14; YEN LANG; HOCCORITCTIEMALON; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; F111A; 17-10-1972; TIEN CHAU VILLAGE, YEN LANG; TOO LITTLE (?); (?). ((THESE TWO LINE ENTRIES PROBABLY CORRELATE WITH CASES 1939-0-02 AND 1939-0-01 RESPECTIVELY. BOTH INDIVIDUALS ARE RESOLVED. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAMES, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS. CASE 1939 IS THE ONLY CASE LISTED IN JTF-FA DATA BASES WITH AN INCIDENT DATE OF 17 OCT 72 AND A LOSS LOCATION IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. THE CASE 1939 RECORD LOSS LOCATION LIES WITHIN TIEN CHAU VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 15; YEN LANG; NAME UNKNOWN ((SIX ILLEGIBLE WORDS ARE WRITTEN TO THE LOWER RIGHT OF THIS COLUMN, IN PARENTHESES, WITH AN ARROW POINTING TO THE DATA)); UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 21-12-1972; THANH LANG VILLAGE, YEN LANG; THERE IS 1 (?); (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1961, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. CASE 1961 IS THE ONLY CASE LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES WITH AN INCIDENT DATE OF 21 DEC 72 AND A LOSS LOCATION IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. THE PROVINCE OF LOSS FOR CASE 1961 IS LISTED IN BRIGHT LIGHT AS HA NOI. DURING THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH EAST ASIA THIS LOCATION WAS IN SOC SON DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE. THANH LANG VILLAGE IS CENTERED ON WJ 6448, THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1961 IS WJ 7949, JUST 15 KM EAST OF THANH LANG.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 16; TAM NONG; ASTVEDONOL; 8-7-1923; MAJ; 6019537; F105; 8-12-1966; DI NAU VILLAGE, TAM NONG; BODY DISINTEGRATED; (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0544-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE RANK AND SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DO NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0544, NOR DOES THE SERIAL NUMBER CORRELATE WITH ANY U.S. LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 17; TAM NONG; UNCLEAR; CAPT; UNCLEAR; F111A; 17-10-1972; VAN LUONG VILLAGE, TAM NONG; BODY DISINTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((THE AIRCRAFT TYPE AND INCIDENT DATE ARE CONSISTENT WITH CASE 1939, WHICH INVOLVES THE ONLY F-111 AIRCRAFT LOST ANYWHERE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON 17 OCT 72. HOWEVER, LINE ENTRIES 13 AND 14 ABOVE CORRELATE MUCH MORE CONCLUSIVELY WITH CASE 1939 THAN DOES THIS ENTRY. IN ADDITION, JCRC INVESTIGATORS VISITED VAN LUONG VILLAGE DURING THE

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12TH JFA AND DETERMINED THAT THE ONLY AIRCRAFT TO HAVE CRASHED IN THAT VILLAGE DURING THE WAR WAS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN THIS ENTRY TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH CASE DATA OR ANY OTHER CASE LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 18; PHUC YEN; LYNNROBERTRAY; 6-16-1940; CAPT; FE3147063; B52; 21-12-1972; HOSPITAL 74 CEMETERY; THERE IS 1 ARM; (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1958-0-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND INCIDENT DATE.))

((LINE ENTRY)) 19; PHUC YEN; BEENSLVNNRICHARD BAGGE09322; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 2730126; B52; 12-21-1972; HOSPITAL 74 CEMETERY; THERE ARE 4 ARMS; AND (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1958-0-07, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND INCIDENT DATE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 20; KIM ANH; BEBUSCHARLESJAMES; 4-2-1951; UNCLEAR; 562801771; B52; 19-12-1972; GIA TRUNG HAMLET, QUANG MINH VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; LOST (?). ((THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1958-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, SERIAL NUMBER AND AIRCRAFT TYPE.))

((THE LOCATIONS OF LOSS LISTED IN LINE ENTRIES 18 AND 19 DO NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 1958, LYING 23 KM NNW OF THE LOCATION CARRIED IN JTF-FA FILES. HOWEVER, WARTIME REPORTING IN THE CASE 1958 FILE INDICATES A POSSIBLE LOSS LOCATION IN PHUC YEN TOWN, THE LOCATION PROVIDED IN THIS LINE ENTRY. THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN LINE ENTRY 19 DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 1958 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSSES LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES. THE INCIDENT LOCATION PROVIDED IN LINE ENTRY 20 ALSO DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH INFORMATION CARRIED IN JTF-FA FILES, LYING 17 KM NORTH OF THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION. THERE ARE OTHER DISCREPANCIES WORTHY OF NOTE. FIRST, ALL THREE ENTRIES INDICATE BURIAL OF ASSOCIATED REMAINS. HOWEVER, THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED IN ENTRY 19 WAS CAPTURED AND RETURNED TO U.S. CONTROL IN 1973. SECOND, THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED IN ENTRY 20 WAS RESOLVED THROUGH THE RETURN OF REMAINS, BUT HIS INCIDENT LOCATION DIFFERS FROM THAT PROVIDED FOR ENTRIES 18 AND 19. PRESUMABLY, THE TWO CREW MEMBERS RESOLVED THROUGH RETURN OF REMAINS WOULD HAVE BEEN RECOVERED FROM THE CRASHED AIRCRAFT, AS NOTED

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT RMKS/

IN THE WARTIME REPORTING CITED ABOVE, ALTHOUGH, GIVEN THE ALTITUDE FROM WHICH B-52 AIRCRAFT CRASHED, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT REMAINS FROM THE SAME AIRCREW MIGHT HAVE BEEN RECOVERED IN DIFFERENT AREAS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THESE DISCREPANCIES AND INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE COMPILER(S) OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY HAVE GARBLED OR MISUNDERSTOOD SOME DATA.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 21; KIM ANH; RISSIDONALDLOUIS; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 359243061; B52; 18-12-1972; DONG TAO COOPERATIVE, DONG XUAN VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1953-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF

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LOSS. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION IS 15 KM WEST OF DONG XUAN VILLAGE, BUT WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO B-52 LOSSES, THIS IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT DISCREPANCY. DONG XUAN VILLAGE IS LOCATED IN WHAT IS NOW SOC SON DISTRICT, HA NOI CITY. IT SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH DONG XUAN VILLAGE, THANH HOA DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 22; KIM ANH; FERGUSONWALTERLCSC772; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; CARD4183186; B52; 18-12-1972; PHU LO VILLAGE, KIM ANH DISTRICT; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1953-0-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 1953 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSSES LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES. THE LOSS LOCATION LISTED IN THIS ENTRY LIES IMMEDIATELY TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DONG XUAN VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 23; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 21-11-1967; BAC SON VILLAGE, DA PHUC; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE, BASED ON LOCATION AND PARTIAL DATE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE DATA LIES WITHIN BAC SON VILLAGE, IN WHAT IS NOW SOC SON DISTRICT OF HA NOI CITY. THE DATE OF LOSS IS 21 JAN 67. GIVEN THE ACCURACY OF THE LOSS LOCATION, AND THE LACK OF CARE EVIDENT IN CERTAIN OTHER ENTRIES IN THIS DOCUMENT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE COMPILER(S) MAY HAVE MISTAKENLY TRANSCRIBED AN ADDITIONAL "1" IN THE MONTH PLACE WITHIN THE DATE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 24 DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; THANG THUC HAMLET, TIEN DUOC VILLAGE; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT.

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 25; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; THANG THUC HAMLET TIEN DUOC VILLAGE; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THESE LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATE WITH CASE 1955, WHICH INVOLVES FOUR UNRESOLVED INDIVIDUALS AND TWO RELEASEES. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF LOSS CITED IN THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1965, THE ONLY B52 LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES THAT OCCURRED ON 22 DEC 72. HOWEVER, THE LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1965 HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY EXCAVATION IN LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1955 LIES WITHIN TIEN DUOC VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 26; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; XUAN GIANG VILLAGE, DA PHUC; GRAVE EXTANT; HAVE COFFIN.

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 27; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; XUAN GIANG VILLAGE; DA PHUC; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THESE LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATE WITH CASE 1955, WHICH INVOLVES FOUR UNRESOLVED INDIVIDUALS AND TWO RELEASEES. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF LOSS CITED IN THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1965, THE ONLY B52 LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES THAT OCCURRED ON 22 DEC 72. HOWEVER, THE LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1965 HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY EXCAVATION IN LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1955 LIES WITHIN TIEN DUOC VILLAGE. XUAN GIANG VILLAGE LIES BETWEEN ONE AND TWO KM DUE EAST OF TIEN DUOC VILLAGE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT

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PORTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE FALLEN IN BOTH VILLAGES.))
6. FOR CDR PERSCOM/TAPC-PED-P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.
COPIES OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

ADMIN

7. EVAL: DWO/JMC//

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00300049

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS191 MCN = 96179/34305 TOR = 961792130
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS2163 1792130-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 272130Z JUN 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

R 271645Z JUN 96

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP: ISA/DPMO//

TO RUHPHQA/CDR JFT-FA HONOLULU HI

INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI

RUEALGX/SAFE

ACCT ABC 123

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CONTROLS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02

I-96/22321

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

REF: A. USCINCPAC J3 050510Z JUN 96
SUBJ: REMAINS RECOVERY AND STORAGE IN VIETNAM STUDY
B. SECDEF DPMO 051751Z JUN 96
SUBJ: STATUS OF STUDY OF VIETNAM'S REMAINS RECOVERY PROCESS
AND QUESTIONS RAISED TO DATE

SUBJECT: QUESTIONS FOR AUGUST RESEARCH MEETING IN HANOI

1. REF A REQUESTED QUESTIONS FOR THE VNOSMP TO SUPPORT THE AUGUST RESEARCH MEETING. REF B PROVIDED STATUS OF REMAINS STUDY.
2. THE FOLLOWING ARE QUESTIONS TO BE PASSED IN ADVANCE TO THE VNOSMP. PLEASE CONVEY THE MESSAGE THAT DURING THESE MEETINGS WE WISH TO EXPLAIN THE INTENT OF OUR ONGOING REMAINS STUDY, DISCUSS OUR METHODOLOGY, SOLICIT VIETNAMESE COMMENT AND ASSISTANCE, AND EXPLAIN THE BENEFITS FOR BOTH SIDES IN COOPERATION ON THIS STUDY. WE HOPE TO ENGAGE OUR COUNTERPARTS IN AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF THE REMAINS RECOVERY PROGRAM IN GENERAL. IN SPECIFIC, THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE INTENDED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION AND PROVIDE THE VIETNAMESE WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE WISH TO ADDRESS.

A. TOPIC: CLARIFICATION OF INFORMATION FROM VIETNAMESE RECORDS. QUESTIONS: WE HAVE FOUND MANY OF THE WARTIME AND POSTWAR RECORDS PROVIDED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO BE VERY USEFUL IN ANSWERING

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QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT HAPPENED TO UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS AND TO THEIR REMAINS. RECENTLY, WE HAVE BEEN COMPARING INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RECORDS COVERING SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC AREAS--FOR INSTANCE A MILITARY REGION, PROVINCE, OR DISTRICT--WITH CASES KNOWN TO BE LOST IN THE SAME LOCATIONS. THESE RECORDS HAVE HELPED US SORT OUT WHAT HAPPENED TO INDIVIDUALS LOST IN SPECIFIC AREAS. IN A FEW INSTANCES, WE STILL HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DOCUMENTS, OR INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THEM. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THESE QUESTIONS MIGHT BE ANSWERED BY THE VIETNAMESE SPECIALISTS MOST FAMILIAR WITH THIS ISSUE. IN INSTANCES WHERE THESE SPECIALISTS MAY NOT HAVE THE ANSWERS, THEY ARE PROBABLY THE PERSONS MOST QUALIFIED TO SUGGEST METHODS TO GO ABOUT FINDING OUT WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW. EXAMPLES:

(1) ON 4 AUGUST 1995, VIETNAM TURNED OVER A TYPEWRITTEN REPORT, DATED 16 MAY 1973, FROM THE CHIEF OF THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCY TO THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY. THIS DOCUMENT REPORTS ON THE LOCATIONS OF GRAVES OF U.S. PILOTS IN THE PROVINCE AND NOTES THE PRESENCE OF 24 GRAVES IN VARIOUS SCATTERED RURAL LOCATIONS. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, ONE GRAVE IN THANH HOA VILLAGE, TUYEN HOA DISTRICT, AND ONE GRAVE IN DAN HOA VILLAGE, MINH HOA DISTRICT, HAD NOT BEEN CHECKED AS OF THE TIME THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED. THANH HOA VILLAGE IS THE SAME VILLAGE WHERE CAPT MOORE (CASE 0826) WAS REPORTEDLY BURIED. DAN HOA VILLAGE IS WHERE ONE MEMBER OF THE VNOSMP SAID MAJ O'GRADY (0641) WAS BURIED AND WHERE LOCAL PEOPLE HAD REPORTEDLY TOLD HIM THAT PERSONS UNKNOWN TO THE LOCAL VILLAGERS HAD LATER COLLECTED THE REMAINS. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, THE QUANG BINH PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCY INTENDED TO CHECK AND TO SURVEY THE REMAINING GRAVES TO EXHUME AND MOVE THE REMAINS TO STIPULATED LOCATIONS.

(2) IN MAY 1995, VIETNAM PROVIDED A RECORD ENTITLED "SITUATION ON AMERICAN PILOT GRAVES IN THANH HOA TERRITORY (ACCORDING TO THANH HOA PROVINCE UNIT RESEARCH DOCUMENT DATED 19-4-1973)." THIS DOCUMENT LISTS GRAVES IN DIFFERENT VILLAGES IN THANH HOA. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CORRELATE MOST OF THESE ENTRIES, AND THIS INFORMATION HAS HELPED US UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED TO AMERICANS KILLED IN THANH HOA. HOWEVER, WE NEED MORE INFORMATION ON FOUR ENTRIES. FOR INSTANCE, ONE ENTRY REFERS TO SIX PERSONS BURIED ON HON ME BUT NOTES THAT THE GRAVES CANNOT BE FOUND; ANOTHER ENTRY STATES THAT THREE PERSONS WERE BURIED AT THE NONG TRUONG THUONG NHAT. WE DO NOT KNOW WHO WAS BURIED AT EITHER LOCATION. FINALLY, BASED ON THE DOCUMENT'S TITLE, WE HAVE INFERRED THAT THE RECORD PROVIDED US IS A HANDWRITTEN COPY TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL. WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF GETTING A PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORIGINAL.

(3) IN 1993, SENATOR KERRY WAS PROVIDED A MAP DEPICTING U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN BAC THAI PROVINCE AND A SIMILAR MAP FOR SON LA. CAN VIETNAMESE SPECIALISTS ENLIGHTEN US AS TO THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THESE MAPS? WE HAVE ALSO BEEN PROVIDED SEVERAL SKETCH MAPS SHOWING WHERE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, POWS WERE CAPTURED, AND AMERICANS WERE BURIED. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS TYPE OF REPORTING TO MAKE SURE WE UNDERSTAND IT. AGAIN, VIETNAMESE SPECIALISTS MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE INSIGHTS ON THE VARIOUS SOURCES AND PURPOSES OF THESE ITEMS.

B. TOPIC: NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON U.S. CASUALTIES AND U.S.

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GRAVES. QUESTION: AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, WE HAVE FOUND VIETNAMESE WARTIME AND POSTWAR RECORDS VERY VALUABLE. IN SOME AREAS OF NORTHERN VIETNAM WE HAVE MULTIPLE RECORDS COVERING SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, AND WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO USE THE COMBINED DATA TO SORT OUT WHAT HAPPENED TO AMERICANS LOST IN THE AREA. IN OTHER AREAS, HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO RECORDS THAT CAN ASSIST IN CLEARING UP AS MANY UNCERTAINTIES. ONE AREA WHERE WE HAVE NO RECORDS IS HANOI MUNICIPALITY. WHAT DO VIETNAMESE SPECIALISTS BELIEVE WOULD BE THE BEST PLACE TO FIND SUCH RECORDS?

C. TOPIC: CASES IN WHICH LOCAL PEOPLE HAVE INDICATED THAT VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS COLLECTED THE REMAINS, BUT THESE REMAINS HAVE NOT BEEN REPATRIATED. QUESTION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THESE REMAINS? CASES OF INTEREST INCLUDE: 0350 (ALBERTON, EDMONDSON, NAME SHINGLEDECKER, STICKNEY); DATA NAME, AND 1978 (DATA, DEANE, LAUTERIO, STINSON, NAME).

D. TOPIC: CHAIN OF CUSTODY ON REMAINS UNILATERALLY RETURNED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. QUESTIONS: REQUEST ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF RECOVERY FOR 31 SETS OF REMAINS WHICH HAVE BEEN UNILATERALLY REPATRIATED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT BUT CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED WITHOUT FURTHER INFORMATION. IN GENERAL, WE NEED TO LEARN FROM WHERE THESE REMAINS WERE ORIGINALLY COLLECTED, WHEN THEY WERE COLLECTED, AND BY WHOM. IN SOME INSTANCES, WE NEED VIETNAMESE ASSISTANCE IN FOLLOWING UP WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHO PRESUMABLY ACQUIRED THEM FROM VIETNAMESE CITIZENS AND MAY STILL HAVE RECORDS OR RECEIPTS CONCERNING THE REMAINS. THE REMAINS IN QUESTION INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 3 JUNE 1983, BOX 8; 4 DECEMBER 1985, BOX 3; 2 MARCH 1988, BOX 16; 6 APRIL 1988, BOXES 3, 6, 8, AND 16; 3 NOVEMBER 1988, BOXES 12 AND 19; 23 JANUARY 1989, BOXES 13, 21, AND 23; 27 APRIL 1989, BOXES 2, 3, 8, 11, 12; 21 JUNE 1989, BOXES 1, 3, 5, 8, 16, 23, 24, AND 25; 10 APRIL 1990, BOXES 3, 7, AND 9; 13 SEPTEMBER 1990, BOXES 7 AND 13; 20 NOVEMBER 1990, BOX 6.

E. TOPIC: CASES IN WHICH THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT UNILATERALLY

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

REPATRIATED REMAINS SAID TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH A PARTICULAR AMERICAN, THE REMAINS WERE IDENTIFIED AS ANOTHER AMERICAN, AND THE INDIVIDUAL ORIGINALLY NAMED IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR. QUESTIONS: ON SOME OCCASIONS, WHEN VIETNAM UNILATERALLY REPATRIATED REMAINS, NAMES OR OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA WERE MISTAKENLY ASSOCIATED WITH AN INCORRECT SET OF REMAINS OR INFORMATION HAS BEEN CONFUSED BETWEEN TWO BOXES OF REMAINS. IN MOST INSTANCES, ALL THE AMERICANS IN QUESTION WERE EVENTUALLY IDENTIFIED, AND THE MIX-UP CAN READILY BE EXPLAINED. IN CASES WHERE ONE AMERICAN HAS BEEN NAMED BUT HIS REMAINS ARE STILL NOT IDENTIFIED, HOWEVER, QUESTIONS REMAIN. CASES WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS: 0266 (SMI TH); CASE 0476 (TAYLOR); AND DATA (NAME).

F. TOPIC: CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF REMAINS RETURNED AND IDENTIFIED IN CASES WHERE ONE MEMBER OF THE INCIDENT IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR. QUESTION: REQUEST ADDITIONAL DETAILED INFORMATION ON REMAINS UNILATERALLY REPATRIATED AND IDENTIFIED, INCLUDING THE LOCATION OF THE ORIGINAL BURIAL AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DATE OF THE LATER RECOVERY OF REMAINS. WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN ANY MATERIALS,

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INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION MEDIA, THAT ACCOMPANIED THE REMAINS. WE HOPE DR. THU CAN ASSIST US WITH THIS MATTER. IN A FEW CASES IN WHICH A FELLOW CREWMAN IS STILL NOT ACCOUNTED FOR, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE ORIGINAL BURIAL AND RECOVERY WILL ASSIST US IN ASSESSING WHAT MORE CAN BE KNOWN. CASES OF INTEREST INCLUDE: DATA (NAME); (DATA) (NAME); (0732) KLEMM.

G. TOPIC: REMAINS RECOVERY IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM. QUESTION: WE HAVE LEARNED MUCH ABOUT VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO RECOVER REMAINS IN NORTHERN VIETNAM AND IN THE SOUTH IN MILITARY REGION 5. WE KNOW LITTLE, HOWEVER, ABOUT OPERATIONS IN OTHER AREAS. FOR THIS REASON, WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE CASES OF TWO INDIVIDUALS, 1610 (VARNADO) AND 1414 (ARROYO-BAEZ), BOTH OF WHOM DIED IN CAPTIVITY IN THE SOUTH AND WHOSE REMAINS HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED UNILATERALLY AND IDENTIFIED BY CILHI.

H. TOPIC: PHOTOS. QUESTION: WE HAVE ACQUIRED SEVERAL PHOTOS OF CORPSES OF AMERICANS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE NOT YET BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD BY MANY VILLAGERS THAT SIMILAR PHOTOS, WHICH WE HAVE NOT SEEN, WERE TAKEN IN SEVERAL OTHER LOCATIONS. SOME OF THE PHOTOS WE HAVE SEEN CAME FROM THE FILES OF THE VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY. KNOWING THAT EACH INDIVIDUAL CASE IS UNIQUE, CAN THE VIETNAMESE SPECIALISTS HELP US UNDERSTAND AT LEAST IN A GENERAL WAY WHY NOT ALL OF THESE REMAINS HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED.

I. TOPIC: ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINS RECOVERY EFFORT. QUESTION: DURING ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK WITH SEVERAL PERSONS WHO TOOK PART IN THIS EFFORT. SOME OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE INVOLVED AT THE CENTRAL LEVEL, BUT MANY TOOK PART AT LOWER ECHELONS, INCLUDING MILITARY REGION, PROVINCE, AND DISTRICT. WE HAVE ALSO NOTICED ARCHIVALLY THAT THE LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATIONS INVOLVED IN REMAINS RECOVERY VARIED AND INCLUDED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THESE ELEMENTS. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS THE HANDLING OF THE REMAINS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO DIED IN CAPTIVITY.

3. UPDATE ON STUDY PROJECT AND DIVISION OF REQUIREMENTS. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH DJ2/JTFFA, THE FOLLOWING WERE DISCUSSED AS POSSIBLE JTFFA/J2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY. AS THE STUDY PROCEEDS OUTWARD PROVINCE BY PROVINCE IN NORTH VIETNAM, THE ANALYSTS, INCLUDING THE J2 ANALYST ASSIGNED TDY, ARE REVIEWING ALL INDICATIONS OF POTENTIAL RECOVERY SUCH AS GRAVES AND RECOVERY REPORTS, GRAVES REGISTRATION, ARCHIVAL INDICATIONS, PHOTOS, AND REFUGEE REPORTING. LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING JOINT ASSIGNMENT AND LIMITATION OF THESE TASKS AS APPROPRIATE. SHOULD JTF AGREE, POTENTIAL TASKS OF ASSISTANCE TO THE STUDY WOULD BE:

A. IDENTIFICATION OF VALID GRAVES REPORTING RELATING TO RECOVERIES PROVINCE BY PROVINCE (A REVIEW DESCRIBED AS UNDERWAY);

B. ASSISTANCE IN COORDINATION, ESPECIALLY AT DET TWO, IN IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF ARCHIVAL TURNS TO DATE (DISCUSSED ON THE RECENT VISIT);

C. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT OF SUCH COLLECTION TASKS AS ARE IDENTIFIED JOINTLY DURING THE STUDY;

D. AN IMMEDIATE HIGHLIGHTING AND REPORTING OF UNILATERAL RESPONSES TO LEADS AS MAY BE APPLICABLE;

E. ASSISTANCE IN COORDINATION OF THE ARCHIVAL AND PHOTO (OF

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CASUALTIES) DATA BASES;

F. ASSISTANCE OF DET TWO IN FACILITATING THE STUDY DISCUSSIONS IN HANOI, AND IN IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF DOCUMENT COPIES AS NOTED IN B. ABOVE;

G. COMPLETION BY J2 ANALYST OF PROVINCE MAPPING PROJECT CURRENTLY UNDERWAY;

H. ANALYTIC COORDINATION OF FINAL RESULTS OF THE PROVINCE-BY-PROVINCE SWEEP OF ALL CASES.

4. POCS ARE GARY SYDOW (703) 602-2202, EXT 220; AND MELINDA COOKE (703) 602-2202, EXT 236.

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INQUIRE-DOC35D
ITEM NO=00204998

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS046 MCN = 96166/26910 TOR = 961661744
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS5031 1661745-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 141745Z JUN 96
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFJII/J2
RUEALGX/SAFE

R 120722Z JUN 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO RUHPSGG/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J2//

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA

REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/230945ZFEB96//

AMPN/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA

RMKS/1. ON 19 JANUARY 1996, A JOINT US/SRV TEAM INVESTIGATED A
SUSPECTED F-105F CRASH SITE AT GRID COORDINATES 48QXJ3732642473 IN HA
BAC PROVINCE, VIETNAM. JTF-FA ANALYSIS INDICATES THE ITEM
PHOTOGRAPHED CAN NOT BE CORRELATED TO A SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT TYPE OR
CASE.

2. THE TEAM PHOTOGRAPHED THE FOLLOWING ITEM:

ONE METAL CYLINDER WITH THE LETTER "V" INSIDE

3. JTF-FA ANALYSIS INDICATES: THE ITEM PHOTOGRAPHED COULD NOT BE
IDENTIFIED OR ASSOCIATED TO ANY SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT OR CASE.

7. JTF-FA COMMENTS: JTF-FA FILES INDICATE THERE ARE 11 CRASH SITES
WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF GRID COORDINATES 48QXJ3732642473. THE SITE
SURVEYED IS WITHIN THREE KILOMETERS OF THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION FOR
CASE DATA. JTF-FA ANALYSIS INDICATES THE ITEM PHOTOGRAPHED CAN NOT
BE CORRELATED TO A SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT TYPE OR CASE.

8. FOR HQ AFPC: THIS INFORMATION IS FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.
A COPY OF REF A WAS PROVIDED ON 29 FEB 96.

9. EVAL/TT/RTR//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00256053
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS535 MCN = 96079/02998 TOR = 960790148
 OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS8060 0790147-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O P 230946Z FEB 96
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 TO: SAFE
 ZEM

CONTROLSUNCLASBODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0512//
 //NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS535 MCN = 96079/02998 TOR = 960790148
 OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS8060 0790147-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU

O 190147Z MAR 96
 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFOCB/OC
 RUEALGX/SAFE

O P 230946Z FEB 96 ZEL
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
 RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
 RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//
 BT
 UNCLAS //N03000/VOL-CCN//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
 SECTION 01 OF 02
 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CORRECTS DTG OF PART ONE IDENT
 PART TWO OF TWO-PART ONE IDENT IS 230945Z FEB 96

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTFFA/-/SEP//
 SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA//
 REF: A. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 211703Z FEB 96
 B. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 141700Z FEB 96

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- C. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 051440Z APR 95
- D. JTF-FA J2, MEMO, 04 AUG 1994
- E. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 132033Z DEC 93
- F. JCRC LIAISON, BANGKOK, TH, 300445Z JAN 88

RMKS/8. ANALYST COMMENTS:

A. WITNESS STATEMENTS:

(1) WITNESSES ONE AND TWO: THESE TWO WITNESSES PROVIDED CREDIBLE ACCOUNTS OF A 1965 CRASH OF A U.S. AIRCRAFT AND THE SUBSEQUENT CAPTURE OF ITS PILOT IN AN HONEST AND STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. THEY ATTEMPTED TO ANSWER THE TEAM'S QUESTIONS AS BEST THEY COULD AND DID NOT SEEM TO EMBELLISH THEIR ACCOUNTS OF THE INCIDENT. IF THEY DID NOT KNOW THE ANSWER TO A QUESTION, OR WERE UNSURE, THEY FREELY TOLD THE TEAM SO. WITNESS TWO ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING A SEPARATE CRASH IN CAM LY VILLAGE, HA BAC PROVINCE. THAT INFORMATION, WHICH APPEARED TO CORRELATE TO A DIFFERENT UNRESOLVED CASE, IS REPORTED SEPARATELY (SEE REF B, ABOVE).

(2) WITNESSES THREE, FOUR, AND FIVE: THE WITNESSES PROVIDED THEIR ACCOUNTS OF A 1966 CRASH OF A U.S. AIRCRAFT IN AN HONEST AND STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. THEY APPEARED PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO ASSIST IN THIS INVESTIGATION AND FREELY ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS PUT TO THEM. THEY DID NOT SEEM TO BE EMBELLISHING THEIR ACCOUNTS OR INVOLVEMENT IN THE INCIDENT.

B. CANVASSING RESULTS: AS PART OF THEIR ADVANCE WORK FOR THE 39TH JFA, THE VIETNAMESE TEAM UNILATERALLY CANVASSED LE LOI VILLAGE, DONG CONG HAMLET, CAM LY VILLAGE, DAN HOI VILLAGE, AND TRI YEN VILLAGE. THEY DID NOT FIND ANY WITNESSES WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CASE 0176 INCIDENT AT THOSE LOCATIONS (SEE PARA 3.D., ABOVE).

C. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSION:

(1) WITNESSES ONE AND TWO'S ACCOUNT OF A 1965 CRASH AND SUBSEQUENT CAPTURE OF A PILOT CORRELATES TO RESOLVED CASE 0176 BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THE GENERAL TIME FRAME IS CLOSE CONSIDERING 30 YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. THE WITNESSES' RECOLLECTION OF THE INCIDENT DATE IS JULY (LUNAR CALENDAR, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER SOLAR CALENDAR) 1965; THE CASE 0176 INCIDENT OCCURRED IN OCTOBER 1965.

(B) BOTH WITNESSES SAW THE AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE DIRECTION OF HA BAC PROVINCE. THE CASE 0176 AIRCRAFT'S TARGET WAS IN HA BAC PROVINCE.

(C) ACCORDING TO U.S. RECORDS THE CASE 0176 CRASH SITE IS AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 435 465, ONLY TWO KILOMETERS AWAY FROM THE WITNESS IDENTIFIED CRASH SITE AT THE FISH POND LOCATED AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 44786 44946 (SEE PARA 3.G., ABOVE).

(D) BOTH WITNESSES SAID THE PILOT OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS CAPTURED AFTER PARACHUTING FROM THE PLANE. WITNESS TWO DESCRIBED THE CAPTURED PILOT AS A BIG, TALL MAN, OVER TWO METERS IN HEIGHT, WITH TAN COLORED SKIN, AND BLACK CURLY HAIR. THE CASE 0176 INDIVIDUAL WAS CAPTURED AND LATER RELEASED. HE WAS A BLACK MAN

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AND WAS 77 INCHES TALL.

(E) WHILE WITNESS TWO WAS NOT SURE WHAT TYPE OF AIRCRAFT HAD CRASHED, HE THOUGHT HE HEARD THAT IT WAS A F-105. THE CASE 0176 AIRCRAFT WAS AN F-105.

(2) WITNESSES TWO, THREE, AND FOUR'S ACCOUNTS OF A LATE 1966 CRASH PROBABLY CORRELATE TO CASE DATA BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THE WITNESSES STATED THE INCIDENT OCCURRED EARLY IN THE AFTERNOON IN THE LATER PART OF 1966 (SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER). THE CASE DATA INCIDENT OCCURRED AT 1445 ON 4 NOVEMBER 1966.

(B) ALL THREE WITNESSES SAID THE BURNING JET FLEW FROM THE DIRECTION OF HA BAC PROVINCE. THIS CORRELATES TO INFORMATION GATHERED ON THE 34TH JFA CONCERNING AN INCIDENT WHERE A PILOT PARACHUTED FROM A LOW-FLYING BURNING AIRCRAFT (SEE REF C, ABOVE). ACCORDING TO WITNESSES ON THE 34TH JFA, THAT AIRCRAFT CONTINUED FLYING IN A SOUTH-SOUTHEASTERLY DIRECTION. DURING THIS INVESTIGATION, THE WITNESS-IDENTIFIED CRASH SITE (SEE PARA 3.I., ABOVE) IS ONLY FOUR KILOMETERS SOUTH OF WHERE THE INCIDENT WAS INVESTIGATED ON THE 34TH JFA.

(C) ALL THREE WITNESSES STATED THAT THERE WERE SCATTERED REMAINS AT THE CRASH SITE. WITNESS ONE SAID HE HEARD THERE WAS ONLY ONE PERSON IN THE AIRCRAFT AT THE TIME OF THE CRASH. THIS CORRELATES TO THE INFORMATION GATHERED ON THE 34TH JFA THAT ONLY ONE PILOT PARACHUTED FROM THE BURNING AIRCRAFT. IF THAT IS TRUE, THEN THE OTHER CREWMEMBER COULD HAVE BEEN IN THE AIRCRAFT WHEN IT CRASHED.

(3) THERE IS ONE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE WITNESSES' STATEMENTS AND U.S. INCIDENT REPORTS OF CASE DATA. WHILE WITNESS THREE STATED HE SAW ONLY ONE BURNING AIRCRAFT, WHICH CORRELATES TO CASE DATA, WITNESSES FOUR AND FIVE STATED THERE WERE OTHER PLANES FLYING IN THE AREA. ACCORDING TO U.S. REPORTS, THE OTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE SAME FLIGHT AS THE CASE DATA AIRCRAFT LAST SAW THE CASE DATA AIRCRAFT TRAILING FIRE OVER THE TARGET AREA IN HA BAC PROVINCE. FURTHER ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE IF OTHER U.S. AIRCRAFT COULD HAVE BEEN FLYING NEAR THE IDENTIFIED CRASH LOCATION. CONSIDERING THAT ALMOST 30 YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, THE WITNESSES' RECOLLECTION OF OTHER AIRCRAFT FLYING IN THE AREA MAY BE DISMISSED AS POSSIBLY FAULTY MEMORIES OF THE INCIDENT; THOUGH IT CAN NOT BE DISCOUNTED THAT OTHER U.S. AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE AREA. A SEARCH OF U.S. LOSSES WITHIN A 30 KILOMETER CIRCLE AROUND THE IDENTIFIED CRASH LOCATION DID NOT REVEAL ANY OTHER INCIDENTS CORRELATING TO THE WITNESSES' ACCOUNT.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS: THE APPROXIMATE AREA
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA
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OF THE CRASH SITE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED AS THE TEAM FOUND ONLY MINIMAL AMOUNTS OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. DUE TO THE HARD, ROCKY SOIL

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ON THE RIDGE, THE CRASH DID NOT CREATE A CRATER ON IMPACT. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CRASH SITE PRODUCING REMAINS IS LOW. THE ALLEGED BURIAL LOCATION IS A 10 X 10-METER SQUARE AREA IN A GARDEN. THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING REMAINS AT THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE IS MORE PROBABLE THAN AT THE CRASH SITE.

10. TEAM LEADER COMMENTS.

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY: ALL WITNESSES APPEARED RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS: CONCUR WITH ANALYST COMMENTS.

C. HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION/SUPPORT: HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION WAS GOOD WHILE INVESTIGATING THIS CASE.

D. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: NONE.

11. RECOMMENDATION: EXCAVATE.//

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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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PAGE:0001

INQUIRE=DOC35D
 ITEM NO=00539428
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS582 MCN = 96213/27520 TOR = 962131930
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS7505 2131931-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 311931Z JUL 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 300902Z JUL 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEACNP/BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS-663P//
 RHWRAAA/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 BT
CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION: "LANG SON: NUMBER OF
 CASES OF MISSING AMERICANS"//
 REF/A/RMG/JCRC LIAISON/230443ZDEC91//
 REF/B/RMG/JCRC LIAISON/191008ZFEB92//
 REF/C/RMG/JCRC LIAISON/220620ZJAN92//
 REF/D/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/230321ZNOV92//
 REF/E/RMG/CJTFFA DET ONE/310901ZJAN92//
 REF/F/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/032053ZDEC92//
 NARR/REF A IS A DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0168. REF
 B IS A DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE DATA. REF C IS A
 DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0167. REF D IS A FIELD
 INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR CASE 0706. REF E IS A DETAILED REPORT OF
 INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 0732. REF F IS A FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT
 FOR CASE 0162.//
 RMKS/1. ON 30 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER SEVEN
 SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THESE
 SETS OF DOCUMENTS REPRESENT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI) SPECIAL
 INFORMATION RESEARCH TEAM'S EFFORTS IN THE PROVINCES OF HA BAC, LANG

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SON, HAI HUNG, HAI PHONG, QUANG NINH, BAC THAI AND SON LA PROVINCES. A REPORT OF ACTIVITY FOR THE RESPECTIVE PROVINCE WAS INCLUDED WITH EACH SET OF DOCUMENTS.

2. WITHIN THE LANG SON SET OF DOCUMENTS, THE REPORT OF ACTIVITY DETAILS THE EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA RELEVANT INFORMATION IN LANG SON PROVINCE. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN LANG SON PROVINCE BY THE SPECIAL INFORMATION RESEARCH TEAM. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS IS TITLED: "LANG SON: NUMBER OF CASES OF MISSING AMERICANS."

3. THE TRANSLATION BELOW LISTS NINE LINE ENTRIES. EACH ENTRY CONTAINS FOUR DATA COLUMNS WHICH ARE SET APART BY A SEMICOLON (;). THE FOUR DATA COLUMNS READ AS FOLLOWS: "ENTRY NUMBER; U.S. INFORMATION; INFORMATION AND RESULT FROM VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION; WITNESS + BURIAL PLACE." EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ((ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES)).
(BEGIN TRANSLATION)

- ((LINE ENTRY)) ((NOTE: LINE ENTRY 1 DIFFERS FROM THE REST IN THAT THE DISTRICT, CASE NUMBER, AND NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED ARE WRITTEN ABOVE THE BOX FOR THE ENTRY, AS IF ADDED AFTER THE LIST WAS COMPLETE. THIS ENTRY READS AS FOLLOWS:)) "CAO LOC 0123" ((0213 WRITTEN ABOVE THE PRECEDING NUMBER)) "MIMS)" "1. - CRASHED ON 24 DEC 65, - F4C AIRCRAFT, - GRID COORDINATE XY675689 IN HA BAC; - LOCAL INVESTIGATION IN JUN 91, - CRASHED IN HOP THANH VILLAGE, CAO LOC, LANG SON, - THE PILOT'S BODY WAS BURIED BUT WAS DISTURBED BY BOMBING AND LOST, + JOINTLY INVESTIGATED ON 6 DEC 91, - CRASH SITE COORDINATES 185 832; + COORDINATES 184831, - MR. LANG VAN GIONG + NONG QUOC CHI (PEOPLE WHO BURIED), + WITNESSES: - HOANG CONG MINH (FORMER DISTRICT PARTY CHAPTER SECRETARY) OF CAO LOC, - HOANG DO, FORMER DISTRICT PUBLIC SECURITY CHIEF, - HOANG VAN SAU: KHON SAI HAMLET, CAO LOC, LANG SON. ((THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES FOR CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THIS LINE ENTRY PROVIDES NO NEW INFORMATION THAT CAN BE CORRELATED WITH CASE DATA.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 2; CHI LANG (4 CASES); * 0168 MAYER; CRASHED ON 17 OCT 65, - INVESTIGATED IN SEP 88, BUT DID NOT FIND GRAVE, - SECOND INVESTIGATION FOUND REMAINS, BUT NOT THOSE OF MAYER, - CRASHED IN NA CHUOI, LAM SON, CHI LANG, - BURIAL SITE: A HAMLET ALONG ROUTE 1A, CHI LANG WARD, LANG SON CITY; + UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION: BURIED BEHIND THE GARAGE OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY POST, + JOINT INVESTIGATION ON 4 DEC 91, - BURIED AT KILOMETER 1.5 ALONG ROUTE 1A, GRID COORDINATE 1779, MADE INTO A ROAD IN '81 OR '82. GRADED, SO LOST GRAVE; - MR. THIEN, NOW DECEASED, WAS THE PERSON WHO BURIED, - WITNESSES: + MRS. VI THI HANH (NURSE), + NGO VAN NO (CAO LOC PSS), BURIED NEAR THE GRAVE OF HUA VIET GOC, EXHUMED ((ILLEGIBLE, POSSIBLY "THE HEAD OF")) DINH DUOC COOC WHO WAS EXECUTED HAD A BULLET HOLE IN THE SKULL - THE PILOT'S GRAVE WAS NEAR MRS. TRUC'S HOUSE + INTERVIEWED MR. VU KIM ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF A)), CHIEF OF THE CRIMINAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF LANG SON PUBLIC SECURITY, THE PERSON WHO KNEW AND MOVED MAYER FROM CHI LANG TO THE HOSPITAL FOR THE AUTOPSY, + MR. DO QUANG HANG OF AREA 1, CHI LANG WARD, LANG SON CITY, THE SON-IN-LAW OF MR. KY WHO BURIED, + MR. DIEN ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF A))

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DIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN BURYING MAYER, + DR. KIM ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF A)) WHO PERFORMED THE AUTOPSY, NOW HAS MOVED TO HANOI. ((THE INFORMATION IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES FOR CASE 0168, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THIS LINE ENTRY PROVIDES NO NEW INFORMATION THAT CAN BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0168.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 3; * DATA ((SYMBOL FOR 0-3 RANK)), - CRASHED 25 SEP 66, - F105D AIRCRAFT, - GRID COORDINATE: XY 501 927 15 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF LANG MET; + UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION IN JUN 91, - CRASHED AT COC PHEO - BURIED IN CAO BANG, WILD ANIMALS CARRIED THE BODY AWAY, THE BURIAL SITE HAS BECOME A RICE FIELD, + JOINT INVESTIGATION ON 4 DEC 91 ((REF B)), - CRASHED AT COC PHEO, BURIED AT LANG THUONG VILLAGE, GRID COORDINATE 905521, A FLOOD WASHED AWAY THE GRAVE, THE BURIAL SITE HAS BECOME A RICE FIELD; - MR. TRAN VAN TAI, 71 YOA, COC PHEO, Y TICH, CHI LANG, - MR. TRAN VAN CHUONG, 74 YOA, COC PHEO, Y TICH, - MR. CHUONG, 74 YOA, Y TICH, SAID THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN LANG GIA, THE PILOT WAS BURIED ABOUT 150 METERS FROM MR. CHUONG'S HOUSE IN COC BAY HAMLET (PHAI KHON), - MR. NGUYEN HAI TRANG, 71 YOA, - MR. TRIEN TICH SAID ABOUT 1989 HE WENT TO PHO STREAM AND SAW 1 SKULL IN THE STREAM. ((THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION LOCATED IN JTF-FA FILES FOR CASE DATA AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THIS LINE ENTRY PROVIDES NO NEW INFORMATION THAT CAN BE CORRELATED WITH CASE DATA))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 4; CASE: 0406 (1 PERSON), - CRASHED ON 17 SEP 66, -F105D AIRCRAFT, -XY 552 946 (NEAR ((CASE)) 0471), -COULD NOT CONTACT, DID NOT SEE PARACHUTE; + JOINT INVESTIGATION, THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN VAN LINH, THE PILOT LANDED IN Y TICH AND DIED, AFTER 7 DAYS FOUND BODY OF PILOT, ONE LEG SEVERED, LOCAL MILITIA CARRIED THE BODY INTO A MINE SHAFT AND COVERED IT WITH TREE BRANCHES, GRID COORDINATE 565 892; -LUONG HAI THANH, PUBLIC SECURITY, 42 YOA, Y TICH VILLAGE, - NGUYEN VAN DUC, 44 YOA, - HA DINH HIEN, 25 YOA. ((THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION-
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION: "LANG SON: NUMBER OF RMKS/
TION LOCATED IN JTF-FA FILES FOR CASE 0406, A RESOLVED CASE. THIS LINE ENTRY PROVIDES NO NEW INFORMATION THAT CAN BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0406.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 5; CASE: DATA (LOST 1 PERSON), - CRASHED ON 17 OCT 65 ((SYMBOL FOR 0-4 RANK, FOLLOWED BY THE WORD "NAVY")), - F4 AIRCRAFT, - XY 605 872, 3 KM EAST SOUTHEAST OF DONG BANH, - 1 CAPTURED, RELEASED IN 73, STATED THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO MAKE CONTACT AND DID NOT SEE A PARACHUTE; + JOINT INVESTIGATION ON 6 DEC 91, - FOUND WRECKAGE AT GRID COORDINATE 602 875 IN KHUN THUAN, DIDN'T SEE PARACHUTE, WENT TO THE BURNT LOCATION AND WAS ABLE TO "SMELL THE BURN"; - NONG DUC HAI ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF C)), 46 YOA, VILLAGE MILITIA CHIEF, - NONG VAN BA ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF C)), 50 YOA, AS ABOVE. ((THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION LOCATED IN JTF-FA FILES FOR

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CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THIS LINE ENTRY PROVIDES NO NEW INFORMATION THAT CAN BE CORRELATED WITH CASE DATA))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 6; *CASE 0706 (2 PEOPLE), - CRASHED ON 22 MAY 67 ((SYMBOL FOR O-3)) F4C AIRCRAFT, - GRID COORDINATE XY 553-835 NEAR C460, 15 KM NORTHWEST OF MET VILLAGE, - COULD NOT CONTACT, DID NOT SEE PARACHUTE, - ON 24 MAY 67, VIETNAM RADIO SAID THERE WERE 2 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN AND 2 PILOTS CAPTURED; -CRASH AT COT COI, TAN THANH VILLAGE, HUU LUNG, 2 PILOTS DEAD ((WHO)) FELL ALONG WITH THE NOSE AND TAIL OF THE AIRCRAFT. GRID COORDINATE OF TAIL: 694 478, NOSE: 713 469, - THE PILOT WHO DIED AND FELL WITH THE TAIL WAS BURIED, LATER, IN 1982, MR. HOANG VIET THANG TOGETHER WITH A NUMBER OF PAVN CAME TO RECOVER HIM IN NGAN VILLAGE, - JOINTLY INVESTIGATED ON 11 DEC 91; - HOANG VIET THANG, FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE HUU LUNG DISTRICT MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, - TRIEU VAN TU, CADRE OF THE HUU LUNG DISTRICT MILITARY UNIT, HOME IS DONG NGAN, KAN KINH, HUU LUNG. MR. THANG IS FROM HOA SON, HUU LUNG. - LY VAN BINH ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF D)), THE ONE WHO BURIED THE BODY (COT COI, TAN THANH), -DUNG THANH TINH ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF D.)), DIRECTED THE BURIAL, FORMER HEAD OF THE FORESTRY SECTION OF COT LOI, NOW RETIRED IN MET TOWNSHIP, - TRUONG THANH XUAN ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF D)), COT COI, TAN THANH, WENT WITH MR. TINH TO BURY THE PILOT AND POINTED OUT THE CRASH SITE. ((THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION LOCATED IN JTF-FA FILES FOR CASE 0706, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THIS LINE ENTRY PROVIDES NO NEW INFORMATION THAT CAN BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0706.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 7; *CASE 0732 (2 PEOPLE), - CRASHED ON 11 JUN 67 ((SYMBOL FOR O-4 RANK)) F4C AIRCRAFT, - XY 433687, 2 F4'S COLLIDED, 2 PILOTS ALIVE AND RETURNED, SAID POSSIBLY 2 PILOTS WERE SEVERELY INJURED, - HA BAC PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY, -CHI LAC, LUC NAM, HA BAC; - CRASHED AT LANG NGON, TAN THANH, HUU LUNG, LANG SON, GRID COORDINATE 763469, - PILOT DEAD, BURIED 150M FROM THE CRASH SITE, GRID COORDINATE 761469, - AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO THE HOUSE OF MR. TRIEU VAN KIT AND MR. KIT WAS BURNED, - JOINT INVESTIGATION ON 4 AND 12 DEC 91; - LY VAN LY, -TRIEU VAN KIT, OF LANG NGON, TAN THANH, - LY VAN MAI, AS ABOVE ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF E)), - HOANG VAN TUT, AS ABOVE ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF E)). ((THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES FOR CASE 0732, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THIS LINE ENTRY PROVIDES NO NEW INFORMATION THAT CAN BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0732.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 8; *CASE 0162 (1 PERSON) ((SYMBOL FOR O-3 RANK)), - CRASHED 5 OCT 65, F105D AIRCRAFT, - GRID COORDINATE XY 401786, - HUU LONG VILLAGE; + JOINT INVESTIGATION ON 13 DEC 91, - CRASHED AT BRIDGE 10, MET TOWNSHIP, HUU LUNG DISTRICT - GRID COORDINATE 785385, - 1 RED PARACHUTE DRIFTED IN THE DIRECTION OF MINH SON VILLAGE, DIDN'T HEAR WHETHER PILOT WAS CAPTURED OR DEAD; - NONG PHUC BAI, BRIDGE 10, MET TOWNSHIP, 56 YOA, - DANG VAN KHONG ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF F)), 53 YOA, - NGUYEN VAN NGHI ((PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED, SEE REF F)), 59 YOA. ((THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES FOR CASE

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0162, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THIS LINE ENTRY PROVIDES NO NEW INFORMATION THAT CAN BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0162.))
 - ((LINE ENTRY)) 9; *CASE 0200 (1 PERSON) ((SYMBOL FOR O-3 RANK)),
 - CRASHED ON 1 DEC 65, F10SD AIRCRAFT, - GRID COORDINATE XY 535 835 (NEAR CASE 0706), -12 KM NORTHEAST OF HUU LUNG, -COULD NOT CONTACT, DIDN'T SEE THE PARACHUTE, -ON 6 APR 88, FOUND BONES, BUT NOT FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL; -; -;." ((THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES FOR CASE 0200, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THIS LINE ENTRY PROVIDES NO NEW INFORMATION THAT CAN BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0200.))
 ((END TRANSLATION))

4. COMMENT: THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDATED AND UNATTRIBUTED. IT APPEARS TO BE A LATE 1992 OR EARLY 1993 SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO DATE ON NINE UNRESOLVED CASES IN LANG SON PROVINCE, POSSIBLY FOR THE USE OF THE LANG SON PROVINCE PSS. IT APPEARS ACCURATE WITH REGARD TO JOINT ACTIVITIES, BUT OFFERS NO NEW INFORMATION ON THE CASES IT RECORDS.

5. FOR AFPC/DPWCM AND BUPERS/PERS 663P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.

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5. EVAL: DWO//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00273998

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS643 MCN = 96080/35169 TOR = 960802134
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS3855 0802134-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 202134Z MAR 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEKJSA/STOC

RHEFJII/J2

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 200942Z MAR 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO RHRMPC/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//

SUBJ/EVALUATION OF JTF-FA REPORT VN95-044 (WALK-IN): VIETNAMESE

CITIZEN PROVIDES INFORMATION ON A U.S. AIRCRAFT AND PILOT LOSS

INCIDENT IN LANG SON PROVINCE//

REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/120321ZJAN93//

REF/B/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/100902ZJAN96//

REF/C/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/071746ZFEB95//

REF/D/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/220943ZNOV93//

REF/E/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/220713ZNOV94//

REF/F/RMG/CJTFFA DET ONE/220943ZNOV93//

REF/G/RMG/CJTFFA DET ONE/310901ZJAN92//

NARR/REF A IS THE FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT OF CASE 0706. REF B IS

JTF-FA REPORT VN95-044 (WALK-IN): VIETNAMESE CITIZEN PROVIDES INFOR-

MATION ON A U.S. AIRCRAFT AND PILOT LOSS INCIDENT IN LANG SON PRO-

VINCE. REF C IS A DETAILED SEARCH AND RECOVERY REPORT OF CASE 0732.

REF D IS A DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0732. REF E IS

A DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0570. REF F IS A FIELD

INVESTIGATION REPORT OF CASE 0732. REF G IS A DETAILED REPORT OF

INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0732.//

RMKS/1. BACKGROUND: ON 24 NOV 95, MR. VU PHU SINH VISITED DET 2,

IN HANOI, PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT THE JUN 67 SHOOTING DOWN OF A

U.S. AIRCRAFT AND THE REMAINS OF TWO U.S. CREW MEMBERS IN LANG SON

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PROVINCE. MR. SINH STATED ONE DAY IN JUN 67, WHILE ON THE WAY HOME FROM WORK BETWEEN 1500-1700, HE SAW ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SHOOT DOWN A LOW-FLYING U.S. AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT EXPLODE IN THE AIR, BUT BROKE INTO TWO SECTIONS. THE TWO SECTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN TAN THANH VILLAGE, APPROXIMATELY THREE KILOMETERS FROM EACH OTHER.

A. MR. SINH AND OTHERS, INCLUDING VILLAGERS, LOCAL MILITIA, AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TROOPS, IMMEDIATELY DISCOVERED THE TAIL SECTION AND A DEAD U.S. AVIATOR NEAR THE WRECKAGE. MILITIA MEMBERS BURIED THE AVIATOR IN A DEPRESSION CREATED BY THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE.

B. APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT, MR. SINH, MR. NGUYEN PHI SUONG, WHO NOW LIVES IN HANOI, AND MR. TRINH QUOC LAP, WHO IS NOW DECEASED, DISCOVERED THE COCKPIT SECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE SECOND AVIATOR'S BODY. MR. SINH SAID THIS SITE WAS APPROXIMATELY THREE KILOMETERS FROM THE TAIL SECTION SITE. SINCE THE BODY OF THE SECOND AVIATOR WAS BADLY DECOMPOSED WHEN THEY DISCOVERED IT, THEY BURNED THE BODY AND DID NOT BURY IT.

C. MR. SINH BELIEVED HE COULD STILL FIND THESE SITES AND VOLUNTEERED TO PARTICIPATE IN A JOINT INVESTIGATION. MR. SINH ALSO OFFERED TO LET AN INVESTIGATION TEAM EXAMINE AND POSSIBLY PHOTOGRAPH HIS DIARIES, WHICH HE CLAIMS HAS THE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT AS WRITTEN AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT.

2. EVALUATION: THE INFORMATION IN SUBJECT REPORT PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0732, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THE TIME OF DAY OF THE INCIDENT, MONTH AND YEAR OF INCIDENT, NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED, AND GENERAL LOSS LOCATION PROVIDED BY MR. SINH CORRELATE WITH INFORMATION CONTAINED IN JTF-FA FILES OF CASE 0732.

A. THERE IS A DISCREPANCY IN MR. SINH'S STATEMENT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. MR. SINH SAID THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY. THE ACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCE OF LOSS WAS A MID-AIR COLLISION BETWEEN THE AIRCRAFT OF CASE 0732 AND THE AIRCRAFT OF CASE 0733.

B. CASES 0732 AND 0733 ARE THE ONLY TWO INCIDENTS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES THAT OCCURRED IN LANG SON PROVINCE IN JUN 67. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS DESCRIBED BY MR. SINH CONCERNING THE DISCOVERY OF REMAINS PRECLUDE CORRELATION WITH CASE 0733. CASE 0733 IS RESOLVED; BOTH CREW MEMBERS SURVIVED THE INCIDENT AND WERE RETURNED IN 1973.

C. MR. SINH POINTED OUT THE GENERAL LOCATION OF THE CRASH SITE ON A MAP PROVIDED BY DET 2 ANALYSTS. THIS LOCATION, 48Q XJ460720, CLOSELY MATCHES A PREVIOUSLY EXCAVATED SITE (REF C). THIS SITE WAS VISITED DURING THE 32ND JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) (REF C), THE 26TH JFA (REFS D AND F) AND THE 15TH JFA (REF G). TWO PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED WITNESSES TO CASE 0732, MR. NGUYEN KHANH TINH (REF D) AND MR. LY THANH BINH (REFS D AND C) PROVIDED ACCOUNTS THAT CLOSELY RESEMBLE MR. SINH'S.

3. COMMENTS:

A. IN JUL 88, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT REPATRIATED UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS WHICH THEY SAID WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SHOOTING DOWN OF AN AIRCRAFT ON 11 JUN 67 IN TAN THANH VILLAGE, HUU LUNG DISTRICT, LANG

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00138690

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS029 MCN = 96158/05393 TOR = 961580323
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS4636 1580324-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 051733Z JUN 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE
ZEM

CONTROLS

UNCLAS

BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 1093//
MAP/L7016/6232-IV/MEMOT//
MAP/1501 AIR/ND48-16/MEMOT CAMBODIA//
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS029 MCN = 96158/05393 TOR = 961580323
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS4636 1580324-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

P 060324Z JUN 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEPOCB/OC

RUEALGX/SAFE

P 051733Z JUN 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RHEMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//

RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//

BT

UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/-/JUN//
SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 1093//
MAP/L7016/6232-IV/MEMOT//
MAP/1501 AIR/ND48-16/MEMOT CAMBODIA//

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SON PROVINCE. THESE REMAINS WERE LATER IDENTIFIED BY THE CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY-HAWAII (CILHI) AS CASE 0732-0-02. THE SECOND SITE DESCRIBED BY MR. SINH IS THE LOCATION WHERE HE STATES THE AIRCRAFT COCKPIT WAS LOCATED AND THE LOCATION WHERE THE REMAINS WERE BURNED. THIS SITE HAS BEEN EXCAVATED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS (REF C). THE DESCRIPTION OF THESE TWO SITES MATCHES PREVIOUS WITNESS DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SITE (REFS C, D, E, F AND G).

B. BECAUSE THE SECOND SITE HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN EXCAVATED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS THERE IS NO NEED TO RE-EXCAVATE OR HAVE MR. SINH LEAD A TEAM TO THE SITE.

C. RECOMMEND OBTAINING BOTH A COPY AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF MR. SINH'S DIARY AS A WRITTEN HISTORY OF CASE 0732.

D. RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL, IDENTIFIED BY MR. SINH AS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF THIS INCIDENT, BE LOCATED AND INTERVIEWED: MR. NGUYEN PHI SUONG.

E. THE REMAINS IDENTIFIED AS 0732-0-02 SHOWED NO EVIDENCE OF BURNING. IF MR. SINH'S DESCRIPTION OF THE BURNING OF THE DECOMPOSED REMAINS IS ACCURATE (AND IT IS CORROBORATED BY THE TESTIMONY OF OTHER WITNESSES), THEN THE SECOND (COCKPIT) SITE SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0732-0-01, THE UNACCOUNTED-FOR INDIVIDUAL IN THIS CASE. IF ALL WITNESSES AGREE ON THE LOCATION OF THE SECOND SITE, IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT THERE ARE NO LONGER ANY EXTANT REMAINS.

4. FOR HQ AFPC/DPWCM: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A SANITIZED COPY OF REF B WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

ADMIN

5. EVAL: DWO//
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- REFS: A. CDR JTFFA HONOLULU HI, 281703Z MAY 96.
 B. CDR JTFFA HONOLULU HI, 140702Z FEB 95.
 C. CDR JTFFA HONOLULU HI, 120712Z OCT 94.
 D. CJTFFA DET FOUR, PHNOM PENH, 170306Z MAR 94.
 E. CJTFFA DET ONE, BANGKOK, 240412Z NOV 92.
 F. CDR JCRC, BARBERS PT, 110940Z MAY 89.

RMKS/1. REFERENCES.

A. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT FOR JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) 96-3C CONDUCTED IN THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA (KOC) FROM 20 APR TO 11 MAY 96.

B. REF B IS ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM INTERVIEW: LE QUANG HUY.

C. REF C IS THE SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT OF CASE 1093.

D. REF D IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1093 DURING FEBRUARY 1994 IN CAMBODIA.

E. REF E IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1093 IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1992 IN VIETNAM.

F. REF F IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1093 IN APRIL 1989.

G. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS BASED ON FIELD ANALYSIS ONLY AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTIC CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION.

A. ON 4 MAY 96, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IE1) OF JFA 96-3C INVESTIGATED CASE 1093 IN TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT, KAMPONG CHAM PROVINCE, KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA (KOC). THE TEAM INTERVIEWED FIVE WITNESSES WHO DISCUSSED VIETNAMESE WARTIME BASE LOCATIONS. THREE WITNESSES REPORTED SEEING VIETNAMESE TROOPS LEADING CAPTURED AMERICANS THROUGH THE AREA. ONE WITNESS REPORTED SEEING PROBABLE UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS ALONG THE PREK CHOR STREAM IN 1991.

B. CASE 1093 INVOLVES THE 18 MARCH 1968 VIETNAMESE CAPTURE OF AN AMERICAN RADIO OPERATOR ON AN ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) ROAD CLEARING OPERATION IN LAM DONG PROVINCE, VIETNAM. THE UNIT WAS AMBUSHED AND THE RADIO OPERATOR, A U.S. ARMY OFFICER, AND 12 MONTAGNARDS WERE CAPTURED. THE OFFICER WAS EVENTUALLY RELEASED AND REPORTED THE RADIO OPERATOR HAD DIED IN A VIETNAMESE CAMP HE NICKNAMED "CAMP GOLF."

C. RECOMMENDATION: N/A.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION.

A. PURPOSE:

(1) INVESTIGATE THE CASE AT PHUM SAAM (XU114025) AND OTHER VILLAGES IN THE AREA OF THE TB-21 CAMP GIVEN BY MR. HUY (VIC GRID 48P XU 122 045). IF LOCATED, SEARCH THE CAMP AREA FOR EVIDENCE OF A CEMETERY OR GRAVES. (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3F)

(2) REINTERVIEW SAU PHIM, A MONK AT SAAM PAGODA, SAAM VILLAGE (VIC GRID 48P XU 119 021) TO FIND OUT ANY MORE INFORMATION HE MAY HAVE CONCERNING THE VIET CONG CAMPS IN THE AREA DURING THE WAR. (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3E)

B. ON 20 APR 96, A JOINT U.S./ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA (RGC) INVESTIGATION/RECOVERY TEAM ARRIVED IN THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA (KOC) TO BEGIN INVESTIGATION OPERATIONS.

C. TEAM COMPOSITION:

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(1) U.S. CONTINGENT.

LT COL NED LAVIOLETTE
MR. JOEL PATTERSON
TSGT JOSEPH FRALEY
HMCS STEWART SOUDERS

MISSION COMMANDER
TEAM LEADER
ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
MEDIC

(2) RGC CONTINGENT.

COL KHIEV SAMON
COL KHON SOKHON
COL CHUM SOYATH

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
REPRESENTATIVE
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
REPRESENTATIVE
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
REPRESENTATIVE

D. ON 4 MAY 96, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IE1) INVESTIGATED CASE 1093 IN TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT, KAMPONG CHAM PROVINCE. THE TEAM FLEW BY HELICOPTER FROM PHNOM PENH TO SAAM VILLAGE (GRID 48P XU 107 026), TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT AND INTERVIEWED FIVE WITNESSES; TWO AT THE SAAM SCHOOL, AND TWO AT THE SAAM PAGODA, AND ONE AT CHKA VILLAGE (GRID 48P XU 117 050). THE WITNESSES PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE VIETNAMESE WARTIME CAMP STRUCTURE IN THE AREA. THREE WITNESSES REPORTED SEEING VIETNAMESE FORCES LEADING CAPTURED AMERICANS THROUGH THE AREA.

(1) WITNESS ONE.

(A) NAME: MR. HIN MON.
(B) AGE: 63 YOA.
(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE: RESIDENT OF SAAM
(GRID WT 107 026), TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT, KAMPONG CHAM PROVINCE.
(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS (C).
(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: VILLAGE CHIEF.
(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: VILLAGER.
(G) STATEMENT:

((1)) MR. HIN HAD LIMITED INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE WARTIME BASES IN THE AREA. REPORTEDLY, VIETNAMESE FORCES HAD A BASE IN VIETNAMESE TERRITORY NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER PRIOR TO 1971, BUT IN 1971, BECAUSE OF U.S. ATTACKS, THE VIETNAMESE MOVED INTO CAMBODIAN TERRITORY AT PREY CHHMANG (GRID 48P XU 110 010). WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE AREA OF SPEAN VILLAGE (GRID 48P XU 149 068), HE SAID THERE WERE NO VIETNAMESE BASES IN THE AREA DURING THE WAR. HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE BASES.

((2)) MR. HIN REPORTED HE SAW VIETNAMESE FORCES LEADING A CAPTURED AMERICAN THROUGH THE AREA IN MAY 1971. HE SAID HE SAW THE AMERICAN BEING LED ALONG NATIONAL ROUTE 7 FROM WEST TO EAST. HE DESCRIBED THE AMERICAN AS CAUCASIAN, APPROXIMATELY 1.8M TALL, NO SHIRT WITH BROWN HAIR AND HAD HIS HANDS TIED. MR. HIN COULD NOT REMEMBER WHAT COLOR TROUSERS THE AMERICAN WAS WEARING, BUT HIS SKIN WAS RED BECAUSE HE WAS NOT WEARING A SHIRT. HE SAID THE AMERICAN WAS IN SAAM FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES WHEN THE VIETNAMESE PUT HIM IN A HORSE
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 1093/
RMKS/

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CART AND TOOK HIM TO THE EAST. HE NOTED THE VIETNAMESE LEADING THE AMERICAN WERE WEARING HELMETS AND GREEN UNIFORMS. HE ADDED THAT HE SAW AN AMERICAN HELICOPTER CRASH ALONG NATIONAL ROUTE 7 AT THE END OF 1971 OR EARLY 1972, BUT ANOTHER HELICOPTER CAME AND RESCUED THE CREWMEMBERS.

(2) WITNESS TWO.

(A) NAME: MR. YIM CHIN.

(B) AGE: 66 YOA.

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE: RESIDENT OF SAAM

(GRID WT 107 026), TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT, KAMPONG CHAM PROVINCE.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS (C).

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: FARMER.

(G) STATEMENT:

((1)) ALTHOUGH MR. YIM WAS A FARMER DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, HE KNEW THE NAMES OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMANDERS IN THE VICINITY OF SAAM. VIETNAMESE COLONEL BA THAN REPORTEDLY COMMANDED THE AREA TO THE WEST OF THE PREK CHOR STREAM, WHILE COLONEL NAM YAU COMMANDED THE AREA TO THE EAST. MR. YIM ALSO SAW A VIETNAMESE WAREHOUSE IN THE VICINITY OF SVAY BOH ON THE VIETNAMESE BORDER.

((2)) HE STATED THAT DURING MAY 1972, LOCAL VILLAGERS WERE TASKED TO GUARD THE ROUTE 7 BRIDGE OVER THE PREK CHOR STREAM. DURING THAT TIME, AT APPROXIMATELY 1800 HE SAW VIETNAMESE FORCES TRANSPORTING A NAKED AMERICAN MALE ON A MOTORCYCLE. THE MOTORCYCLE STOPPED IN SAAM AND THE VIETNAMESE ATTEMPTED TO FEED THE AMERICAN. HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN ONLY CRIED. HE DESCRIBED THE AMERICAN AS APPROXIMATELY 1.7M TALL WITH BLUE EYES, BROWN CURLY HAIR AND A CLEAN SHAVED FACE. HE HEARD FROM THE VIETNAMESE THAT THE AMERICAN WAS CAPTURED AT "TRI BEE." THE VIETNAMESE STAYED IN THE AREA FOR 30 MINUTES AND THEN CONTINUED ON TO THE EAST.

E. AFTER IEL COMPLETED INTERVIEWS AT THE SAAM SCHOOL, THE TEAM MOVED TO THE SAAM PAGODA (GRID 48P XU 115 024) AND INTERVIEWED TWO WITNESSES.

(1) WITNESS THREE.

(A) NAME: MR. SAU PHIM.

(B) AGE: 72 YOA.

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE: RESIDENT OF THE SAAM PAGODA, SAAM VILLAGE (GRID WT 107 026), TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT, KAMPONG CHAM PROVINCE.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAAM VILLAGE.

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: MONK.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: VILLAGER.

(G) STATEMENT:

((1)) MR. SAU REPORTEDLY MOVED TO SAAM VILLAGE FROM TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT WHEN HE WAS SEVEN YEARS OLD. HE DID NOT VOLUNTARILY PROVIDE MUCH INFORMATION ON HIS PAST HISTORY. HE SAID ONLY THAT HE WAS IN THE AREA OF SAAM DURING THE WAR.

((2)) MR. SAU SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL BASES IN THE VICINITY OF SAAM DURING THE WAR. HOWEVER, HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC LOCATIONS, AND REFERRED TO HIS ASSISTANT FOR ANSWERS. THOSE ANSWERS ARE DETAILED IN WITNESS FOUR'S STATEMENT.

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(3) CONCERNING FORMER VIETNAMESE COMMANDERS IN THE AREA, MR. SAU KNEW ONE COMMANDER WAS NAMED HUY. HE ALSO REMEMBERED A COLONEL NAM YAU, AND OK RONG. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT POSITIONS THEY HELD. HE REMEMBERED THAT A COLONEL OK PHON WAS IN CHARGE OF THE FOOD WAREHOUSE IN THE AREA.

(2) WITNESS FOUR.

(A) NAME: MR. CHAP CHAN.

(B) AGE: 60 YOA.

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE: RESIDENT OF THE SAAM PAGODA, SAAM VILLAGE (GRID WT 107 026), TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT, KAMPONG CHAM PROVINCE.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAAM VILLAGE.

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: ASSISTANT AT THE SAAM PAGODA.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: VILLAGER.

(G) INTERVIEWER'S NOTE: MR. CHAP CHAN APPEARED TO KNOW A LOT ABOUT FORMER VIETNAMESE BASES IN THE VICINITY OF SAAM, AND PROVIDED MOST OF MR. SAU PHIM'S ANSWERS CONCERNING BASES. THEREFORE, ALL RESPONSES CONCERNING BASES ARE DETAILED UNDER WITNESS FOUR.

(H) STATEMENT:

((1)) MR. CHAP CHAN STATED HE KNEW MUCH ABOUT FORMER VIETNAMESE BASES IN THE AREA BECAUSE HE TRADED WITH VIETNAMESE FORCES DURING THE WAR. MR. CHAP CHAN POINTED OUT THE LOCATIONS OF FORMER VIETNAMESE BASES IN THE AREA ON A 1:50,000 SCALE MAP.

- SVAY BOH (ALSO KNOWN AS BOH SVAY) WAS LOCATED IN THE JUNGLE ON THE CAMBODIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER. HE WAS NOT SURE PRECISELY WHERE.

- ON THE CHOR STREAM (PREK CHOR) IN VIETNAM NEAR GRID 48P XU 120 000.

- AT TRAPEANG TA ONG (GRID 48P XU 115 012).

- 12KM SOUTH OF SAAM ON THE BORDER NEAR THE "AMERICAN ROAD 15" (UNLOCATED).

((2)) MR. CHAP PROVIDED A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CAMPS IN THE AREA. IN APPROXIMATELY 1968 OR 1969, THERE WAS A LARGE VIETNAMESE BASE IN THE VIETNAMESE TERRITORY NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. HE SAID THE BASE HAD A WAREHOUSE, A BILLETING AREA, A COMMUNICATIONS POST, AND A PRISON CAMP. ON A CHART HE INDICATED THE CAMP WAS IN THE VICINITY OF GRID 48P XU 12 00 AND WAS CALLED "21" OR "TB21." MR. CHAP SAID THE CAMP COMMANDER'S NAME WAS COLONEL BA THAN DURING 1969 AND 1970, AND COMMENTED THAT ONCE AMERICAN ATTACKS BEGAN IN THE AREA, THE BASE WAS MOVED INTO CAMBODIAN TERRITORY NORTH OF MEMAY (GRID 48P XU 100 080). THE AREA IS ALSO CALLED PREY CHHMONG. WHEN THE BASE WAS MOVED THERE THE NAME WAS CHANGED TO "41." HE SAID THE BASE WAS DISBANDED IN 1970. HE ADDED THAT IN 1968 OR 1969, HE WAS WORKING IN THE JUNGLE NEAR THE BASE (VIC GRID 48P XU 117 050) WHEN HE SAW AN AMERICAN BEING GUARDED BY VIETNAMESE TROOPS. HE DESCRIBED THE MAN AS CAUCASIAN WITH BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, WEARING A GREEN UNIFORM AND BOOTS. THE AMERICAN'S HANDS WERE TIED.

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/
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RMKS/

F. FOLLOWING INTERVIEWS AT THE SAAM PAGODA, IE1 MOVED TO CHKA VILLAGE (GRID 48P XU 117 050), TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT. VILLAGERS IN THE AREA REPORTED THAT DURING THE WAR THERE WAS A VIETNAMESE BASE LOCATED ALONG THE CHOR STREAM IN THE AREA. THEY NOTED ONE VILLAGER SAW UNIDENTIFIED PROBABLE REMAINS WRAPPED IN A TARP NEAR THE STREAM AT GRID 48P XU 117 053.

(1) WITNESS FIVE.

(A) NAME: MS. DANG KEA.

(B) AGE: 26 YOA.

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE:
LIFETIME RESIDENT OF THE CHAKA VILLAGE, TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: N/A.

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: VILLAGER.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: N/A.

(G) STATEMENT: ONE DAY WHILE FISHING IN THE CHOR STREAM IN APPROXIMATELY 1991, THERE WERE TWO MEN DIGGING A DITCH CONNECTING TO THE STREAM. AT ONE POINT THEY DUG UP REMAINS WRAPPED IN A TARP. SHE SAID SHE DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE REMAINS, BUT STATED THAT THE MEN JUST TOSSED THE REMAINS ASIDE. SHE HAS NOT SEEN THE REMAINS SINCE. SHE LED IE1 TO THE AREA OF GRID 48P XU 117053 05365. THE AREA CONSISTS OF A BEAN FIELD ON THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE CHOR STREAM AND THERE ARE FEW TREES IN THE AREA. SHE LED THE TEAM TO A DITCH THROUGH THE BERM ON THE EDGE OF THE STREAM. IE1 SEARCHED THE AREA, BUT FOUND NO REMAINS.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE. N/A.

5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS. N/A.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES. N/A.

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED. NONE.

8. ANALYST COMMENTS.

A. WITNESS STATEMENTS: ALL WITNESSES PROVIDED THEIR STATEMENTS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER.

B. CANVASSING RESULTS: VILLAGERS WERE EASILY APPROACHED AND WERE EAGER TO ASSIST THE TEAM IN LOCATING WITNESSES.

C. INCIDENT LOCATION SURVEY: NONE.

D. COMMENTS: THE INTERVIEW WITH MR. SAU PHIM WAS DELICATE. MR. SAU IS THE HEAD MONK OF THE PAGODA. BECAUSE OF THIS, HE IS ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED BY A NUMBER OF ASSISTANTS AND OTHER MONKS WHO ARE EAGER TO HELP. HOWEVER, IN THIS CASE, THESE ASSISTANTS APPEARED OVER EAGER TO HELP MR. SAU REMEMBER THINGS TO THE POINT THAT THEY WOULD ANSWER BEFORE MR. SAU HAD A CHANCE TO RESPOND. EVEN WITH THIS PROBLEM IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DISRESPECTFUL TO OBJECT, AND ANY OBJECTION WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE INTERVIEW TO AN END. ADDITIONALLY, DURING INTERVIEWS PERTAINING TO ANOTHER CASE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE FORMER KHMER ROUGE COMMANDER OF THE KHMER ROUGE BAUPHEA FRONT IN THE AREA DURING THE WAR WAS CALLED SAU PHIM. THE MONK SAU PHIM MAY BE THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS. N/A.

10. TEAM LEADER COMMENTS.

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY: RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE.

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B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS: CONCUR WITH ANALYST COMMENTS.

C. HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION/SUPPORT: HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION WAS GOOD DURING THIS INVESTIGATION.

D. COMMENTS: ALTHOUGH WITNESS THREE POINTED TO A SPECIFIC LOCATION WHERE SHE OBSERVED THE REMAINS DROPPED, I DECLINED THE OPTION OF EXCAVATING FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(1) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A GRAVEYARD OR A SPECIFIC GRAVE.

(2) THE AREA WAS THE SITE OF HEAVY U.S. BOMBING, AND BATTLES SUGGESTING NUMEROUS VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST CASUALTIES.

(3) CAMBODIANS IN THE AREA DO NOT MARK THEIR GRAVE SITES.

(4) THERE WAS NO TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR UNIFORMS WITH THE REMAINS.

(5) THERE WAS NO TESTIMONY OR REPORTS OF AN AMERICAN KILLED OR BURIED IN THAT LOCATION.

E. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: DETERMINE WHETHER ANY OF THE VIETNAMESE INDIVIDUALS NAMED BY THE WITNESSES WOULD BE HELPFUL IN RESOLVING THIS CASE.

11. RECOMMENDATION: N/A.//

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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00120069

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS093 MCN = 96061/07390 TOR = 960610412
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS6041 0610411-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 010411Z MAR 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

R 281730Z FEB 96

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J03/J05/J06/J07/J2/J3

/J4/J423/J5/J6/FPA/J33//

RHHMAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/N6/N31/N33/N45/ N4313/NOIM//

RUHVPA/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//LGTA/MWXR/AF/SG/DO/CEOE//

RUHVAAA/PACAF AOS HICKAM AFB HI//AOM/AOP//

RUEAHIC/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP-IM/OP/APIN/APLG-MU//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO HANOI//

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTF-FA DET THREE//

RUEHPF/CJTFFA DET FOUR PHNOM PENH CB

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA/AIRA//

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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/DHO-9/DHO-3//

RUHPHQC/COMSOPAC HONOLULU HI

RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//DAO//

RUHDFTB/CDR703DMIBDE OPS KUNIA HI

RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI//DO/CSC/OSE//

RHHMUNE/JFMO PAC HONOLULU HI

RUENMED/BUMED WASHINGTON DC//27//

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CONTROLS

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SECTION 01 OF 04

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

OPER/JOINT INVESTIGATION OPS IN CAMBODIA/JTF-FA/JFA 96-3C//

MSGID/ORDER/JTF-FA//

REF/A/MSG/USCINCPAC/052100ZJAN94/NOTAL//

AMPN/USCINCPAC OPORD 5080-93//

REF/B/DOC/JTF-FA/UNDTD/NOTAL//

AMPN/POW-MIA FY 95 RGC WORKPLAN//

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ORDTYP/WARNORD/JTF-FA/JFA 96-3C//
 MAP/L7016/6231III/AN THANH, VIETNAM; CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6230IV/DUC HUE, VIETNAM; CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6131I/PH KAMPONG TRACH, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6131IV/KRANHUNG, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7014/6030I/HONG NGU, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6031III/PREK THMEI, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6437I/PHUM KHAM DORANG, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/L7016/6233II/SNUOL, CAMBODIA//
 MAP/1501 AIR/NC 48-5/KAMPOT, KAMPUCHEA; VIETNAM//
 TIMEZONE/Z//

ORDREF/OPORD/USCINCPAC 5080-93//

TASK ORGANIZATION. SEE ANNEX A//

GENTEXT/1. SITUATION/

A. GENERAL: THIS IS AN OPERATIONS ORDER FOR 96-3C JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA). USCINCPAC, JOINT TASK FORCE - FULL. ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA), AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA (RGC) WILL CONDUCT JOINT RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA FROM 20 APR 96 TO 20 MAY 96.//

B. INTELLIGENCE AND WEATHER. (SEE ANNEX B)

C. FRIENDLY

(1) TASK ORGANIZED INVESTIGATION/RECOVERY TEAM (IRT) FORMED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON) OF CDR JTF-FA.

(2) RGC REQUESTED TO PROVIDE:

(A) PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN OPS.

(B) SECURITY PERSONNEL.

(C) HF RADIO FREQUENCIES FOR OPERATION.//

GENTEXT/2. MISSION/JTF-FA, IN COOPERATION WITH THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA (RGC) RECOVERS ONE CASE VICINITY TANG ISLAND AND INVESTIGATES SIX CASES IN THE PROVINCES OF KAMPONG SOM, KANDAL, KOMPONG CHAM, KRACHEH, AND PREY VENG CAMBODIA DURING 96-3C FROM 20 APR 96 TO 20 MAY 96 TO ACHIEVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED FOR AS A RESULT OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.//

GENTEXT/3. EXECUTION/

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

(1) COMMANDER'S INTENT: MY INTENT FOR JFA 96-3C IS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH AND COMPLETE INVESTIGATIONS OF CASES 0832, VIETNAMESE CASE 1093, 1588, 1610-1-05, 1695, 1728, 1836, AND 2038, AND RECOVERY OF CASE 1998. WE MUST MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY TO MINIMIZE DELAYS OR LOST OPPORTUNITIES IN INVESTIGATING/EXCAVATING THESE CASES. SUCCESS IS DEFINED AS ACCOMPLISHING ALL OPERATIONS WITH THOROUGHNESS NOT SPEED, LEAVING NO STONE UNTURNED IN OUR EFFORTS TO ATTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING. CULMINATION WILL BE THE SAFE RETURN OF ALL PERSONNEL, ALL REPORTS COMPREHENSIVELY WRITTEN AND RELEASED, AND THOSE REMAINS OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR WHICH ARE RECOVERED FORWARDED FOR FORENSIC REVIEW.

(2) CONCEPT: INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM (IRT) CONDUCTS JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY JFA 96-3C FROM 20 APRIL TO 20 MAY 1996. JFA 96-3C IS CONDUCTED IN 5 PHASES:

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(A) PHASE I (DEPLOYMENT TO THAILAND): IRT DEPARTS HAWAII VIA C-141 (THIS IS THE SAME A/C THAT WILL BRING THE 40TH JFA UNDER WATER RECOVERY ELEMENT BACK TO HOME STATION) ON 16 APR 96 TO ARRIVE IN U'TAPHAO, THAILAND ON 18 APR 96. IRT CONDUCTS EQUIPMENT PREP AND PALLETIZATION.

(B) PHASE II (DEPLOYMENT TO CAMBODIA): IRT DEPLOYS FROM U'TAPHAO TO PHNOM PENH VIA C-130 ON 20 APR 96, IE DEPLANES. C-130, THEN TRAVELS TO SIHANOUKVILLE TO DROP OFF RE.

(C) PHASE III (OPERATIONS): RE WILL TRAVEL TO TANG ISLAND VIA COMMERCIAL BOAT TO RECOVER ONE CASE ON THE ISLAND. IE WILL TRAVEL VIA VEHICLE AND ONE LAO WEST COAST HELICOPTER TO INVESTIGATE UP TO 6 CASES IN KANDAL, PREY VENG, KAMPONG CHAM, AND KRACHEH PROVINCES.

(D) PHASE IV (REDEPLOYMENT FROM CAMBODIA TO THAILAND): UPON COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS, IRT WILL REDEPLOY TO U'TAPHAO VIA C-130 ON 20 MAY 96. IRT COMPLETES SUMMARY AND DETAILED REPORTS PRIOR TO RETURNING TO HONOLULU.

(E) PHASE V (REDEPLOYMENT TO HONOLULU): IRT REDEPLOYS FROM BANGKOK TO HONOLULU ON 23 MAY VIA COMMAIR.

B. MANEUVER: RE ESTABLISHES BASE CAMP ON TANG ISLAND TO RECOVER CASE 1998. IE WILL DEPLOY FROM PHNOM PENH DAILY BY VEHICLE OR ONE LAO WEST COAST HELICOPTER TO THE INVESTIGATION SITES IN KANDAL, PREY VENG, KAMPONG CHAM, AND KRACHEH PROVINCES. UPON COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATIONS EACH DAY, IE WILL RETURN TO PHNOM PENH VIA VEHICLE OR ONE LAO WEST COAST HELICOPTER.

C. TASKS:

(1) HQ USCINCPAC

(A) DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J3)

1) EXECUTE OPORD AS USCINCPAC OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY.

2) MONITOR ACTIVITIES RELATED TO OPERATION.

3) COORDINATE WITH OTHER HQ USCINCPAC ELEMENTS AS REQUIRED.

4) PROVIDE WEATHER AND CLIMATOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR 96-3C'S AREAS OF OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA.

(B) DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE (J2). PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR THREAT BRIEF TO JTF-FA PERSONNEL ON AREA OF OPERATIONS.

(C) CHIEF, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (J01PA)

1) DIRECT PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT AND COORDINATE WITH DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AS REQUIRED.

2) COORDINATE AND APPROVE JTF-FA PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.

(D) DIRECTOR FOR LOGISTICS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE (J4).

1) MUNITIONS BRANCH (J423) PROVIDE ONE EOD

TECHNICIAN (E-5 AND ABOVE) AND IDENTIFY ONE ALTERNATE EOD TECHNICIAN TO SUPPORT AN IRT.

2) MONITOR LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION ACTIVITIES.

(E) COMPTROLLER (J05)

1) PROVIDE IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONAL FUNDING.

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- (6) DETACHMENT 3 VIENTIANE, LAOS:
 (A) COORDINATE WITH LAO WEST COAST HELICOPTER TO PROVIDE ONE ASU-350 HELICOPTER TO SUPPORT JFA 96-3C.
- (7) DETACHMENT 4, PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA
 (A) COORDINATE CAMBODIAN DIPLOMATIC AND LANDING CLEARANCE FOR ALL AIRCRAFT SUPPORTING 96-3C.
 (B) ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION AND HOTELS FOR TEAM WHILE IN CAMBODIA.
 (C) ARRANGE FOR MFA REPRESENTATIVES TO MEET ARRIVING ELEMENT AT POCHENTONG TO PROCESS VISAS.
 (D) PURCHASE WATER TO SUPPORT TEAM WHILE OPERATING IN COUNTRY.
 (E) BRIEF RGC POW/MIA COMMITTEE ON OPERATION.
 (F) MONITOR COMMUNICATIONS THROUGHOUT OPERATION.
 (G) ASSIST IE TEAM LEADER AND HQ JTF-FA IN COORDINATION AND PAYMENT OF HOST NATION SUPPORT.
 (H) COORDINATE WITH RGC TO ALLOW ONE LAO WEST COAST HELICOPTER FOR OPERATIONS JFA 96-3C.
 (I) ARRANGE RESUPPLY SCHEDULE BY COMMERCIAL/FISHERY BOAT FOR RE BASE CAMP ON KOH TANG.
- C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
 (1) PASSPORT: ALL ATTACHED PERSONNEL, INCLUDING ALTERNATES AND USAF AIRCREWS, REQUIRE VALID PASSPORTS. UNITS PROVIDE PERSONNEL ROSTER, COMPLETE PASSPORT DATA AND OTHER DATA INCLUDING FULL NAME, RANK, SSAN, SERVICE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, PASSPORT NUMBER, DATE OF ISSUE, PLACE OF ISSUE, DATE OF EXPIRATION, SECURITY CLEARANCE ASSIGNED UNIT, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER TO JTF-FA/J3 NLT 16 MAR 96.
 (2) ATTACHED PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY WITH FIVE PASSPORT PHOTOGRAPHS FOR ANY UNFORESEEN TRAVEL WITHIN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
 (3) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED.
 (4) DATES OF OPERATION ARE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT MADE BY SECSTATE OR SECDEF.
 (5) AUGMENTEES WILL REPORT TO HQ JTF-FA, CAMP SMITH, HAWAII NLT 10 APR 96.
 (6) DEPLOYING PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMMUNIZATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA: PLAGUE, JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS, TB/IPPD (BEFORE DEPLOYMENT AND 8-12 WEEKS AFTER DEPLOYMENT), RABIES, IMMUNE SERUM GLOBULIN OR HEPATITIS A VACCINE (HAVRIX), ORAL POLIO BOOSTER, AND TYPHOID. MALARIA CHEMOPROPHYLAXIS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED BY JTF-FA PERSONNEL.
 (7) DEPLOYING PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED IMMINENT DANGER PAY FOR APRIL AND MAY. IF DEPLOYED FOR 30 DAYS OR MORE, THEY WILL BE AUTHORIZED FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOWANCE, AND CIVILIAN CLOTHING ALLOWANCE.//
- GENTEXT/4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS/
 A. GENERAL. CONCEPT OF SUPPORT: SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION ARE PROVIDED FROM ORGANIC ASSETS. BOTTLED WATER IS PREPOSITIONED IN PHNOM PENH. ELEMENTS PALLETIZE PERSONAL EQUIPMENT AND REMAINING SUPPLIES

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

RMKS/

2) INDIVIDUAL TEAM MEMBER TRAVEL AND PER DIEM FUNDED IAW FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:

A) JTF-FA FUNDS TRAVEL AND PER DIEM FOR JTF-FA PERSONNEL.

B) ALL OTHER TRAVEL AND PER DIEM FUNDED BY PARENT ORGANIZATIONS.

3) FUNDING FOR AMC SAAMS PROVIDED FROM EXISTING USAF FUNDS.

(F) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE (J06). NO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) NEGOTIATED FOR OPERATION. PURSUANT TO AN EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC NOTES COMPLETED ON 24 JAN 96, TEMPORARY DUTY AND DEPLOYED U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND DOD CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ARE AFFORDED THE SAME LEGAL STATUS AS PROVIDED TO THE TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF OF THE U.S. EMBASSY.

(G) DIRECTOR FOR COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (J6). MONITOR COMM REQUIREMENTS AND MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATION. COMM SECURITY NOT REQUIRED.

(H) COMMAND SURGEON (J07) COORDINATE WITH CINCPACFLT FOR ONE INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN (IDC).

(2) HQ PACAF

(A) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT AERIAL EVACUATION AS REQUIRED.

(B) COORDINATE AND SCHEDULE ALL USAF SAAM ACFT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

(3) CINCPACFLT:

(A) BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT JTF-FA, UIC R33011, HIGH PRIORITY (O-2) REQUISITIONS IN MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS THROUGH FLEET AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER, PEARL HARBOR. URGENT OR WALK THROUGH REQUISITIONS WILL BE GIVEN HIGHEST PRIORITY PROCESSING MEANS AVAILABLE.

(B) COORDINATE WITH JO7 AND PROVIDE ONE INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMAN (IDC).

(4) CDRUSACILHI:

(A) PROVIDE ONE RECOVERY TEAM INCLUDING AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AND ONE SPECIAL FORCES MEDIC (18D); IDENTIFY ALTERNATES.

(B) COORDINATE LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS WITH JTF-FA DET 1 THROUGH JTF-FA, J-3 FOR 14 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF DEPLOYMENT FROM HAWAII FOR ANY SPECIAL EQUIPMENT/SUPPLIES NEEDED AT U'TAPHAO WAREHOUSE FOR PALLET BUILDING.

(5) DETACHMENT 1 BANGKOK, THAILAND:

(A) CONFIRM DIPLOMATIC AND LANDING CLEARANCE FOR THAI AND CAMBODIAN AIRSPACE FOR ALL AIRCRAFT SUPPORTING JFA 96-3C.

(B) COORDINATE HOTEL RESERVATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION FOR TEAM WHILE IN THAILAND.

(C) COORDINATE THAI IMMIGRATION ENTRY AND EXIT STAMPS IN PASSPORTS.

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PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

B. SERVICE SUPPORT. SEE ANNEX D (SERVICE SUPPORT).//

GENTEXT/5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL.

(1) CDR JTF-FA HAS OPCON OF TASK ORGANIZATION.

(2) LTCOL LAVIOLETTE IS MISSION COMMANDER.

(3) MR. PATTERSON IS INVESTIGATION ELEMENT TEAM LEADER.

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

RMKS/

(4) CPT NAYLOR IS RECOVERY ELEMENT TEAM LEADER.

B. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

(1) PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION IS TACSAT.

(2) ALTERNATE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION IS HF RADIO
(FREQUENCY-9.2150 MHZ).(3) TEAMS ESTABLISH HF COMMS BETWEEN BASE CAMP, LWC
HELICOPTER BASE, DET FOUR.

(4) DAILY RADIO CHECKS BETWEEN 0545-0645G AND 1800 -1900G.

(5) DAILY SITREPS SENT VIA COMPUTERIZED TACSAT OR EMAIL TO
HQ JTF-FA NLT 1900G.

GENTEXT/6. ANNEXES/

A. TASK ORGANIZATION

B. INTELLIGENCE AND WEATHER

C. AIR FLOW

D. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS//

GENTEXT/ANXNO: A/TASK ORGANIZATION/

1. IE ORGANIZED UNDER OPCON OF CJTF-FA. PERSONNEL ARE TASK
ORGANIZED INTO ONE INVESTIGATION ELEMENT.

2. PERSONNEL ARE FROM FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS:

JTF-FA (9 PERSONNEL)

USACILHI (8 PERSONNEL)

COMMO TBD (1 PERSONNEL)

EOD TBD (1 PERSONNEL)

MEDIC TBD (1 PERSONNEL)

TOTAL PERSONNEL (20)//

GENTEXT/ANXNO: B/INTELLIGENCE AND WEATHER/

1. SITUATION.

A. THREAT ASSESSMENT (GENERAL).

B. TOPOGRAPHY (GENERAL). CAMBODIA CONSISTS MAINLY OF A PLAIN THAT STRETCHES FROM THE FOOT-HILLS OF THE ANNAM MOUNTAINS IN THE EAST TO THE THAI BORDER IN THE WEST. IN THE VICINITY OF PHNOM PENH, IN THE SOUTHEAST, THE PLAIN MERGES INTO THE MEKONG DELTA PLAIN. THE CAMBODIAN PLAIN IS VERY FLAT AROUND THE TONLE SAP LAKE; ELSEWHERE IT IS UNDULATING AND IN PLACES IS BROKEN BY HILLS AND RIDGES. THE TONLE SAP BASIN - MEKONG LOWLANDS REGION CONSISTS CHIEFLY OF PLAINS WITH ELEVATIONS GENERALLY LESS THAN 100 METERS. AS THE ELEVATION INCREASES, THE TERRAIN BECOMES MORE ROLLING AND DISSECTED. VEGETATION ON THESE PLAINS IS MAINLY OPEN RICE FIELDS, DECIDUOUS FOREST INTERSPERSED WITH AREAS OF REGROWTH, AND PATCHES OF RAIN FOREST.

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C. WEATHER.

(1) GENERAL. APRIL AND MAY IS THE TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN THE NORTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST MONSOONS THROUGHOUT CAMBODIA. BY THE END OF APRIL AND CONTINUING IN MAY, THUNDERSTORMS AND RAINSHOWERS INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY AS THE SOUTHWEST MONSOON GAINS STRENGTH.

(2) TEMPERATURES. SOUTHEASTERN CAMBODIA TEMPERATURES RANGE FROM 95'S TO THE LOW 90'S. TANG ISLAND TEMPERATURES RANGE FROM 91 TO THE LOW OF 77 DEGREES.

2. MISSION PER BASE OPORD.

3. EXECUTION. PER BASE OPORD.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. PER BASE OPORD AND ANNEX D.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. PER BASE OPORD.//

GENTEXT/ANXNO: C/AIR FLOW/

1. SITUATION. PER BASE OPORD.

2. MISSION. PER BASE OPORD.

3. EXECUTION. FLIGHT PLAN MATRIX (ALL TIMES ARE LOCAL).

DEP DATE TIME	LOCATION	ARR DATE TIME	LOCATION
DEPLOYMENT:			
(C-141 SORTIE)			
16 2245W APR	HICKAM AFB	18 0245K APR	ANDERSEN
18 0500K APR	ANDERSEN AFB	18 0900G APR	U'TAPHAO
(C-130 SORTIE)			
20 1000G APR	U'TAPHAO	20 1115G APR	PHNOM PENH
20 1200G APR	PHNOM PENH	20 1230G APR	SIHANOUKVILLE
20 1330G APR	SIHANOUKVILLE	20 1500G APR	U'TAPHAO
REDEPLOYMENT:			
(C-130 SORTIE)			
20 1100G MAY	PHNOM PENH	20 1215G MAY	U'TAPHAO
(COMMAIR)			
23 0640G MAY	BANGKOK	23 0740W MAY	HONOLULU

GENTEXT/ANXNO: D/ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS/

1. SITUATION. PER BASE OPORD AND ANNEX B.

2. MISSION. PER BASE OPORD.

3. EXECUTION. PER BASE OPORD AND ANNEX C.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. GENERAL. ALL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ARE PRE-POSITIONED IN U'TAPHAO AND PHNOM PENH TO SUPPORT 30-DAY FIELD ACTIVITY, EXCEPT FOR FUEL AND SELECTED SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES WILL BE PALLETIZED AT U'TAPHAO PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

B. MATERIAL AND SERVICES.

(1) SUPPLY.

(A) DET FOUR ASSISTS TEAM LEADER AND HQ JTF-FA IN COORDINATION AND PAYMENT OF HOST NATION REIMBURSABLE COSTS.

(B) HOST NATION PROVIDES LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IAW SITUATION PARA (1.C).

(C) MEDICAL SUPPLIES WILL BE PROVIDED BY JTF-FA AND ACCOMPANY MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO CAMBODIA DURING DEPLOYMENT

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PHASE.

(D) EMERGENCY RESUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES BY USAF SAAM/CHANNEL ACFT. HQ JTF-FA/J3, AIR OPS, WILL COORDINATE (808-477-3501).

(E) PURCHASE OF MEDICATIONS, DRUGS OR PHARMACEUTICALS OUTSIDE OF U.S. BOUNDARIES BY NON-MEDICAL PERSONNEL OPCON TO JTF-FA IS NOT AUTHORIZED. THIS INCLUDES PURCHASES FROM DRUG STORES, PHARMACIES, CLINICS OR OTHER PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY STORES. PROCURE MEDICAL SUPPLIES THROUGH ESTABLISHED CHANNELS.

(2) TRANSPORTATION.

(A) AIR. SEE ANNEX C.

(B) GROUND. DET ONE COORDINATES PASSENGER AND CARGO TRANSPORTATION FOR TEAM IN THAILAND. DET FOUR
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/
RMKS/

COORDINATES IN-COUNTRY TRANSPORTATION IN CAMBODIA.

(C) MEDICAL SERVICE.

1) MEDICAL EVACUATION TO PHNOM PENH OR SIHANOUKVILLE BY LAO WEST COAST OR VIA GROUND TRANSPORTATION, COORDINATION BY MISSION COMMANDER.

2) MEDEVAC FROM PHNOM PENH TO BANGKOK BY U'TAPHAO BASED USAF C-130.

3) ON ORDER, 374AES PROVIDES MEDEVAC FROM BANGKOK. COORDINATION BY HQ JTF-FA/AIR OPS AND CJTF-FA DET ONE BANGKOK.

(D) PERSONNEL.

1) UNIFORM. NEAT AND APPROPRIATE CIVILIAN CLOTHING WORN DURING ALL PHASES OF OPERATION.

2) IMMUNIZATIONS. SEE COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

3) NO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT WITH CAMBODIA.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. PER BASE OPORD.//

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00600499

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS609 MCN = 96222/04211 TOR = 962220331
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS2477 2220126-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 090126Z AUG 96
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFJII/J2
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 070912Z AUG 96 ZYB
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
TO RUEAHOF/CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PED-P//
RHWRAAA/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//
SECTION 01 OF 04

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J251//
SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF SRV UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS//
RMKS/1. ON 11 MAR 96, THE VIETNAMESE PROVIDED THE U.S. COPIES OF
SEVEN REPORTS OF UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS OF PRIORITY CASES 0054,
0094, 0607, 0703, 0805, 0867, AND 1112. ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS AND
JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS FOR EACH UNILATERAL REPORT ARE PRESENTED
BELOW.

2. REFNO 0054:

A. JTF-FA TRANSLATION FOR REFNO 0054 REPORT
(BEGIN TRANSLATION)
REFERENCE DOCUMENT

REPORT OF UNILATERAL MIA INVESTIGATION
CASE 0054 IN SONG BE PROVINCE
12 OCTOBER 1988

ON 8 - 10 OCTOBER 1988 THE VIETNAM MIA TEAM CONSISTING OF MR.
PHAM TEO, TEAM LEADER, AND MR. NGUYEN HONG DUNG, SPECIALIST, WENT TO
SONG BE PROVINCE TO UNILATERALLY INVESTIGATE CASE 0054. THE TEAM MET
WITH MR. NGUYEN VAN CUONG, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVINCE PEOPLE'S
COMMITTEE; MRS. THAI THI TUY LIEN, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS BOARD AND

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PROVINCE MIA TEAM LEADER; MR. NGUYEN DUC CHINH, SPECIALIST; AND MR. NGUYEN NGOC MINH, SPECIALIST. THE TEAM HEARD REPORTS BY LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE PROVINCE MIA TEAM. THE SUMMARY OF THE INCIDENT WAS: IN EARLY 1965, DURING A BATTLE IN BU DANG DISTRICT, {WE} CAPTURED AN AMERICAN, A MEDIC, AND BROUGHT HIM TO THE PRISONER OF WAR CAMP AT DAK NHAU. THE CAMP WAS BOMBED BY U.S. B-52 AIRCRAFT; LIBERATION TROOPS SUFFERED MANY LOSSES AND THE AMERICAN PRISONER WAS ALSO BOMBED AND HIS BODY WAS TORN APART, LEAVING NOTHING TO BURY. THE CENTRAL MIA TEAM TOGETHER WITH THE SONG BE PROVINCE MIA TEAM WENT TO BU DANG DISTRICT AND MET MR. NGUYEN VAN SIA, CHAIRMAN OF DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, AND MR. KA BA XANG, A FORMER CADRE FROM DISTRICT MILITARY HEADQUARTERS H19 (BU DANG DISTRICT). CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN SIA AND MR. KA BA XANG PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT WAS SIMILAR TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY PROVINCE CADRE. THEY CONFIRMED THAT DAK NHAU ZONE WAS A LIBERATION ARMY BASE SO THE AMERICANS USED BOMBS TO COMPLETELY DESTROY THIS ZONE. MANY LIBERATION TROOPS DIED AND THEIR REMAINS COULD NOT BE RECOVERED. THE REMAINS OF THE AMERICAN WAS ALSO IN THE CATEGORY OF BEING SMASHED, IMPOSSIBLE TO RECOVER.

TEAM LEADER
(SIGNED)
PHAM TEO

(END TRANSLATION)

B. JTF-FA ANALYSIS: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORT IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH REFNO 0054 AND WITH SUBSEQUENT WITNESS ACCOUNTS REGARDING SPECIALIST MCCLEAN'S CAPTURE, MOVEMENT WHILE IN CAPTIVITY AND ALLEGED DEATH WHILE IN VIETNAMESE CUSTODY. THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION WAS PROBABLY CONDUCTED IN PREPARATION FOR THE INITIAL JOINT INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE WHICH OCCURRED DURING JFA 6, 1-17 JUN 89. ONE OF THE WITNESSES NOTED IN THE UNILATERAL REPORT, MR. KHA BARANG, IDENTIFIED IN THE VIETNAMESE REPORT AS KA BA XANG, WAS INTERVIEWED BY THE JOINT TEAM DURING JFA 6.

3. REFNO 0094:

A. JTF-FA TRANSLATION FOR REFNO 0094 REPORT
(BEGIN TRANSLATION)
REFERENCE DOCUMENT

REPORT OF UNILATERAL MIA INVESTIGATION

ON 5 - 7 AUGUST 1988 THE VIETNAM TEAM UNILATERALLY WENT TO TRA VINH PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 0094, ARMY LIEUTENANT DALE CHARLES AND CORPORAL DEMMON DAVID, WHO BECAME MISSING ON 9 JUNE 1965. THE VIETNAM TEAM CONSISTED OF MR. NGO HOANG, TEAM LEADER; MR. NGUYEN MINH CHAU AND MR. TRAN VAN TRIEN, SPECIALISTS. THE TEAM WENT TO TRA VINH PROVINCE AND WORKED WITH MRS. PHAM THI XUAN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE; MR. NGUYEN VAN CHUONG, THE PROVINCE MIA TEAM LEADER; MR. NGUYEN XUAN VINH; AND MR. HUYNH VAN THIN. THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES PROVIDED INFORMATION AS FOLLOWS: IN 1965, THEY HEARD AT CON TRUNG HAMLET, TRUONG LONG HOA VILLAGE, DUyen HAI DISTRICT, THAT AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN OFFSHORE ABOUT 2 - 3 KILOMETERS FROM THE COAST. A BODY WAS WASHED ON SHORE AND ANOTHER BODY WAS FLOATING WHERE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED BECAUSE IT WAS ENTANGLED IN A PARACHUTE LINE, THEREFORE LOCAL RESIDENTS ROWED BOATS OUT AND CUT THE

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LINE AND PULLED THE BODY ON SHORE. THEY BURIED THE TWO BODIES IN THE BEACH SAND, ABOUT 1500 - 2000 METERS APART. THE TEAM TOGETHER WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES WENT TO DUYN HAI DISTRICT TO MEET MR. NGUYEN VAN CACH, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND A NUMBER OF DISTRICT FUNCTIONAL CADRE. THE DISTRICT OFFICIALS ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY PROVINCE OFFICIALS. THE TEAM WENT DIRECTLY TO CON TRUNG HAMLET, TRUONG LONG HOA VILLAGE, AND MET WITH WITNESSES MR. LE HOANG SAM (TAM SAM) AND MR. PHAM VAN LICH (HAI LICH) AND A NUMBER OF RESIDENTS IN CON TRUNG HAMLET. THEY PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT WAS SIMILAR TO THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE PROVINCE OFFICIALS. THE WITNESSES LED THE TEAM TO EACH AMERICAN BURIAL SITE FROM THE AMERICAN WAR.

8 AUGUST 1988

(END TRANSLATION)

B. JTF-FA ANALYSIS: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION IS CONSISTENT WITH ALLEGED EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OBTAINED BY JOINT TEAMS DURING THE JOINT FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OF THIS CASE. THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION WAS PROBABLY CONDUCTED IN PREPARATION FOR JFA 6. DURING THIS JFA, THE JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED WITNESSES IN CON TRUNG HAMLET, TRUONG LONG HOA VILLAGE. THE WITNESSES REPORTED THAT BOTH CREW MEMBERS HAD DIED IN THE CRASH OFF SHORE AND THEIR BODIES WERE BURIED SUBSEQUENTLY BURIED. DURING JFA 20, A JOINT TEAM EXCAVATED THE ALLEGED GRAVES WHERE WITNESSES CLAIM THE BODIES OF THE TWO INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE WERE BURIED. THE EXCAVATIONS PRODUCED NO REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS. BOTH WITNESS IDENTIFIED IN THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL REPORT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY INTERVIEWED BY JOINT TEAMS.

4. REFNO 0607:

A. JTF-FA TRANSLATION FOR REFNO 0607 REPORT

(BEGIN TRANSLATION)

REFERENCE DOCUMENT

REPORT OF UNILATERAL MIA INVESTIGATION

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF SRV UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS//

RMKS/

ON 4 - 7 JUNE 1988, THE VIETNAM TEAM UNILATERALLY WENT TO NGHIA BINH PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 0607, CORPORAL BURT C. SMALL, JUNIOR, WHO BECAME MISSING ON 6 MARCH 1967.

THE VIETNAM TEAM CONSISTED OF MR. NGO HOANG, TEAM LEADER; MR. NGUYEN MINH CHAU AND MR. TRAN VAN TRIEN, SPECIALISTS. THE TEAM WENT TO NGHIA BINH PROVINCE AND WORKED WITH MR. PHAM THANH QUE, ACTING MIA TEAM LEADER; MR. NGUYEN NHAN; MR. VU TAT THANH; AND MR. NAM HA, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE. THEY PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT IN ABOUT MARCH 1967, LIBERATION TROOPS CONDUCTED AN AMBUSH IN LONG SON VILLAGE, MINH LONG DISTRICT. DURING THIS BATTLE, {THEY} HEARD THAT AN AMERICAN SOLDIER, WHO WAS WOUNDED IN HIS LEFT LEG, WAS CAPTURED BY LIBERATION TROOPS. A BLACK AMERICAN DIED ON THE EDGE OF A STREAM BUT NO ONE BURIED HIM. LATER THEY HEARD THAT SOME RESIDENT BURIED THE AMERICAN'S HEAD AT THE FOOT OF A THI

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{PERSIMMON} TREE ON THE DAM SLOPE, XA TON HAMLET, LONG SON VILLAGE, MINH LONG DISTRICT. LOCAL AUTHORITIES PROMISED TO LOCATE FIRSTHAND WITNESSES TO THIS INCIDENT.

THE TASK TEAM TOGETHER WITH A NUMBER OF PROVINCE MIA TEAM CADRE WENT TO MINH LONG DISTRICT AND MET MR. DINH TRONG BOM, CHAIRMAN OF THE DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE; MR. NGUYEN DUC THINH, THE DISTRICT PARTY SECRETARY; AND A NUMBER OF CADRE FROM OTHER BRANCHES IN THE DISTRICT. THEY PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT WAS SIMILAR TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE PROVINCE AUTHORITIES. AFTER THAT THE TEAM WENT TO THE LOCALITY TO MEET WITH MR. CU, THE WITNESS. HE PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT HE HEARD MANY TIMES ABOUT THE BURIAL OF THE AMERICAN'S HEAD AT THE FOOT OF A THI TREE ON THE DAM SLOPE. HE LED THE TEAM TO THE THI TREE AND DUG A TEST PIT WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. RECOMMEND FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

7 JUNE 1988

(END TRANSLATION)

B. JTF-FA ANALYSIS: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE VIETNAMESE IN THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORT REGARDING THE BATTLE NEAR LONG SON VILLAGE, MINH LONG DISTRICT, WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF ONE AMERICAN AND THE CAPTURE OF ANOTHER IS CONSISTENT WITH WITNESS ACCOUNTS OBTAINED BY JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATING THE REFNO 0607 LOSS INCIDENT. DURING JFA 11, A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN DANG CU, IDENTIFIED AS A POTENTIAL WITNESS IN THE VIETNAMESE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION. MR. CU CONFIRMED HIS PREVIOUS ACCOUNT REGARDING THE POSSIBLE AMERICAN REMAINS WHICH WERE BURIED AT THE THI TREE. HE GAVE THE JOINT TEAM REMAINS HE CLAIMS WERE RECOVERED FROM THAT SITE. THE VIETNAMESE REPATRIATED THESE REMAINS ON 20 NOV 90. FORENSIC ANALYSIS INDICATES THESE REMAINS, FOUR BADLY ERODED BONE FRAGMENTS, ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR IDENTIFICATION. CIL 0224-90 REFERS. THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION WAS PROBABLY CONDUCTED IN PREPARATION FOR JFA 5, 12-30 APR 89, THE INITIAL JOINT INVESTIGATION OF REFNO 0607.

5. REFNO 0703:

A. JTF-FA TRANSLATION FOR REFNO 0703 REPORT

(BEGIN TRANSLATION)

REFERENCE DOCUMENT

HUONG LONG 22 AUGUST 1977

REPORT

CASE 0703 INVESTIGATION

TODAY, 22 AUGUST 1977, WE CONSISTED OF:

- LUU VAN THO, VNOSMP SPECIALIST, TEAM LEADER
- BUI XUAN KHANG, TEAM MEMBER
- PHAM HUNG MANH, TEAM MEMBER

{WE} WENT TO HUONG LONG VILLAGE, A LUOI DISTRICT, BINH TRI THIEN PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 0703.

ACCORDING TO U.S. RECORDS, CASE 0703 WAS A UH-1C HELICOPTER SHOOT DOWN INCIDENT ON 21 MAY 1967, AT GRID COORDINATE YC 458 874, BELONGING TO THE A SHAU VALLEY; THREE PILOTS WERE RESCUED AND ONE PILOT IS MISSING.

AFTER WORKING WITH THE LEADERS OF THE HUONG LONG PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, THE TEAM WAS LED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES TO THE WITNESSES: MR. QUYNH KHANG AND MR. QUYNH TO, RESIDENTS OF HONG THUONG VILLAGE, A LUOI DISTRICT, WHO OBSERVED

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THE AIRCRAFT CRASH.

MR. KHANG AND MR. TO STATED THAT: IN 1967 (THEY DON'T REMEMBER THE DAY AND MONTH), A HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS FROM THEIR HOUSES (ONLY ESTIMATED, NOT EXACT). AT THAT TIME, THE BATTLE IN THAT AREA WAS FIERCE, THEY DID NOT DARE TO GO THERE. TWO DAYS LATER, WHEN THE BATTLE ENDED, THEY WENT THERE. THEY SAW THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE WITH MANY PIECES SCATTERED IN AN AREA OF SEVERAL HUNDRED SQUARE METERS. NEAR THE AIRCRAFT WAS A SWOLLEN BODY STARTING TO SMELL BAD. THE LOCATION OF THE BODY WAS ABOUT 50 METERS FROM THE CENTRAL POINT OF CRASH SITE. BECAUSE THE SITE WHERE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND THE PILOT DIED WAS FAR FROM RESIDENTIAL AREAS, NO ONE BURIED ANYTHING.

IN RECENT YEARS, PEOPLE WENT THERE TO COLLECT AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE FOR SALE. NO ONE NOW KNOWS IF THERE IS STILL ANYTHING AT THE CRASH SITE OR NOT AND MR. KHANG AND MR. TO ALSO HEARD NOTHING ABOUT RECOVERING THE REMAINS OF THE PILOT.

THIS REPORT WAS COMPLETED AT 1100 ON 22 AUGUST 1967. IT WAS READ AGAIN TO EVERYBODY WHO TOOK PART IN THIS INVESTIGATION AND ALL AGREED AS RECORDED.

REPRESENTATIVE OF	REPRESENTATIVE OF	REPRESENTATIVE OF
INVESTIGATION TEAM	VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE	WITNESSES
(SIGNED)		

LUU VAN THO
(END TRANSLATION)

B. JTF-FA ANALYSIS: THE INFORMATION REPORTED BY THE VIETNAMESE REGARDING THE 1967 HELICOPTER CRASH NEAR HONG THUONG VILLAGE, A LUOI DISTRICT, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERY OF THE DEAD BODY (OF AN AMERICAN CREW MEMBER) NEAR THE CRASH SITE IS CONSISTENT WITH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OBTAINED BY JOINT TEAMS DURING THE FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OF THIS CASE. JOINT TEAMS HAVE INTERVIEWED BOTH WITNESSES IDENTIFIED IN THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION REPORT. DURING JFA 13, 21 JAN-7 FEB 91, WITNESSES LED THE JOINT TEAM TO THE CRASH SITE, WHERE THE TEAM OBSERVED WRECKAGE CONSISTENT WITH A UH-1 HELICOPTER. A SEARCH OF THE AREA WHERE THE WITNESSES REPORTEDLY LAST SAW THE AMERICAN'S BODY
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/
SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF SRV UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS//
RMKS/
PRODUCED NO REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS.

6. REFNO DATA:

A. JTF-FA TRANSLATION FOR REFNO DATA REPORT
(BEGIN TRANSLATION)
REFERENCE DOCUMENT

CONG DA, 13 JUNE 1990

REPORT
CASE DATA INVESTIGATION
TODAY, 13 JUNE 1990, WE CONSISTED OF:
- LUU VAN THO, VNOSMP SPECIALIST, TEAM LEADER
- NGUYEN CHI PHA, VNOSMP SPECIALIST, TEAM MEMBER
- NGUYEN HUY CHUONG, VNOSMP SPECIALIST, TEAM MEMBER

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{WE} WENT TO CONG DA VILLAGE, YEN SON DISTRICT, TUYEN QUANG PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE DATA

ACCORDING TO U.S. RECORDS, CASE DATA WAS AN F-4 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN ON 23 AUGUST 1967 AT GRID COORDINATE WK 420 160, AND INVOLVED TWO PILOTS, ONE OF THEM WAS RELEASED IN 1973 AND ANOTHER IS MISSING.

MR. NGUYEN TRUNG DUNG, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, WORKED WITH THE TEAM. AFTER THAT MR. DUNG LED THE TEAM TO THE WITNESSES: LUONG VAN NGU, 45 YEARS OLD; LUONG KIEN, 37 YEARS OLD; NONG THI HANH, 44 YEARS OLD, LUONG TOAN, 41 YEARS OLD AND A NUMBER OF OTHER PERSONS.

THE WITNESSES STATED THAT THEY WITNESSED THE AIRCRAFT CRASH AND THEY ORGANIZED TO SURROUND AND CAPTURE THE PILOT WHO PARACHUTED INTO THEIR VILLAGE. AFTER THEY CAPTURED THE PILOT, THEY TURNED HIM OVER TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES. THE PILOT WAS A CAUCASIAN, TALL, BIG, WITHOUT ANY WOUNDS EXCEPT FOR A SMALL SCRATCH INADVERTENTLY CAUSED BY A GUERRILLA WHEN HE USED A KNIFE TO CUT THE RIGHT SLEEVE.

THE AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN IN THE AFTERNOON IN AUGUST 1967 (THE MAJORITY OF THE WITNESSES DID NOT REMEMBER THE DATE BUT ONLY MR. LUONG TOAN REMEMBERED CLEARLY THAT IT WAS 23 AUGUST 1967 AS HE HAD RECORDED THAT DATE).

ABOUT THREE DAYS LATER, THEY HEARD THAT ON THE ABOVE DATE THERE WAS A PILOT WHO PARACHUTED INTO THE NEXT VILLAGE. THEY SEARCHED FOR HIM UNTIL THAT DAY TO CAPTURE HIM. THEY DID NOT HEAR ANY NEWS ABOUT ANY OTHER PILOTS AT THAT TIME.

IN 1970, THAT IS TO SAY THREE YEARS AFTER THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, THEY DISCOVERED A PARACHUTE HANGING IN A TREE WITH HUMAN REMAINS BELOW AND SOME ARTIFACTS SUCH AS CLOTHING, SHOES AND A MAP SCATTERED ON THE GROUND IN A THICK FOREST ON A SLOPE. THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES SENT MR. LUONG TOAN AND MR. CHI THERE TO COLLECT THE REMAINS FOR BURIAL. MR. TOAN AND MR. CHI COLLECTED ALL THE REMAINS AND ARTIFACTS AND BURIED THEM RIGHT AT THE LOCATION WHERE THEY WERE DISCOVERED.

IN THE FOLLOWING YEARS, THIS AREA WAS SLASHED AND BURNED TO MAKE CULTIVATED LAND AND WAS WASHED OUT MANY TIMES SO THE TERRAIN GREATLY CHANGED. MR. TOAN AND MR. CHI DID NOT REMEMBER EXACTLY THE BURIAL SITE OF THE REMAINS AND ARTIFACTS THEY HAD FOUND.

THIS REPORT WAS COMPLETED AT 1500 ON 13 JUNE 1990 AND IT WAS REPEATED FOR EVERYBODY AND ALL AGREED AS RECORDED.

REPRESENTATIVE OF	REPRESENTATIVE OF
INVESTIGATION TEAM	VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE
(SIGNED)	WITNESSES

LUU VAN THO

(SIGNED)

(END TRANSLATION)

LUONG TOAN

B. JTF-FA ANALYSIS: THE INFORMATION PRESENTED IN THE VIETNAMESE REPORT REGARDING THE SHOOTING DOWN OF A U.S. AIRCRAFT IN AUG 67 NEAR CONG DA VILLAGE, YEN SON DISTRICT, TUYEN QUANG PROVINCE, THE CAPTURE OF ONE OF THE AMERICAN PILOTS INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT AND THE SEARCH FOR ANOTHER PILOT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REFNO 0804 DATA LOSS INCIDENT AND EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OBTAINED BY JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATING THIS CASE. JOINT TEAMS HAVE INTERVIEWED ALL THE WITNESSES IDENTIFIED IN THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION REPORT. THE VIETNAMESE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED

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ONLY THREE MONTHS AFTER THE INITIAL JOINT INVESTIGATION OF THE REFNO 0804 DATA LOSS INCIDENT DURING JFA 9, 16 FEB-6 MAR 90, IN PROBABLE ANTICIPATION OF FOLLOW-UP JOINT INVESTIGATIONS. DURING JFA 17, 20 APR - 20 MAY 67, THE JOINT TEAM EXCAVATED TWO REPORTED BURIAL SITES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. THE EXCAVATION AT THE FIRST ALLEGED GRAVE, THE SITE IDENTIFIED IN THE VIETNAMESE REPORT, PRODUCED PARTS OF AN AIRCRAFT EJECTION SEAT, AIR CREW LIFE SUPPORT AND SURVIVAL GEAR, FLIGHT CLOTHING AND A CHARRED TOOTH. FORENSIC ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED THE TOOTH AS BELONGING TO ANOTHER F-4C CREWMAN WHOSE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN WITH THE REFNO DATA AIRCRAFT. THE EXCAVATION AT THE SECOND ALLEGED GRAVE PRODUCED PIECES OF AIR CREW SURVIVAL GEAR, BUT NO REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR EVIDENCE OF A BURIAL.

7. REFNO DATA:

A. JTF-FA TRANSLATION FOR REFNO 0867 REPORT
(BEGIN TRANSLATION)
REFERENCE DOCUMENT

REPORT

CASE DATA UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION IN SONG BE PROVINCE
ON 4 JUNE 1988, THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM CONSISTED

OF:

1. MR. PHAM CONG KHOI, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
2. MR. NGUYEN HUNG MANH, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

THE TEAM WENT TO SONG BE PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE DATA ACCORDING TO RECORDS FROM THE U.S. SIDE. THE TEAM WAS RECEIVED BY THE CHIEF OF THE PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OFFICE AND HE ASSIGNED CAPTAIN NGUYEN VAN NAM, PROVINCE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS CADRE TO ACCOMPANY THE TEAM TO BEN CAT DISTRICT. IN BEN CAT DISTRICT, THE TEAM MET MR. TRAN VAN BINH, DISTRICT {PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE} OFFICE ADMINISTRATOR TO REPORT THE PURPOSE, REQUIREMENTS, AND PLAN FOR THE CASE DATA INVESTIGATION. MR. BINH COMPLETELY AGREED WITH THE UPPER LEVEL POLICY AND THE TASK TEAM'S PLAN AND HE WAS READY TO CREATE ADVANTAGEOUS CONDITIONS FOR THE TEAM SO THAT THE TEAM COULD COMPLETE ITS MISSION. SIMULTANEOUSLY, HE ASSIGNED MR. TRUONG VAN HA, DISTRICT PUBLIC SECURITY CADRE TO ACCOMPANY THE
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/
SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF SRV UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS//
RMKS/
TEAM.

ON THE AFTERNOON ON 4 JUNE 1988, AT THE LONG HA VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OFFICE, BEN CAT DISTRICT, THE TASK TEAM WORKED WITH:
- LUONG VAN DUNG, VICE CHAIRMAN OF VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE
- TRAN QUANG HOA, VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER
- PHAM THANH KHIET, FORMER VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER IN THE 1960S.

THEY PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
ABOUT 1966 OR 1967, NO ONE REMEMBERED EXACTLY, THERE WAS A FIERCE BATTLE BETWEEN LIBERATION TROOPS AGAINST U.S. AND PUPPET TROOPS IN

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THE AREA OF LONG HOA VILLAGE. BOTH SIDES SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES. TWO AMERICANS DIED BUT NO ONE BURIED THEM (ACCORDING TO REPORTS FROM THE MILITIA PLATOON AT THAT TIME). THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES DID NOT KNOW WHO KNEW EXACTLY ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. THEY PROMISED THEY WOULD TRY TO LOCATE WITNESSES AND THEN REPORT TO DISTRICT AND PROVINCE AUTHORITIES.

MR. KHIET AND MR. HOA WERE FORMER VILLAGE MILITIA CADRE AND PRESENTLY LED THE TASK TEAM TO THE FORMER BATTLEFIELD BUT NO ONE KNEW THE LOCATION WHERE THE TWO AMERICANS DIED BECAUSE THE TERRAIN WAS GREATLY CHANGED.

PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION: CONTINUE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE WITNESSES TO THIS INCIDENT AND DETERMINE IF THE TWO AMERICANS WERE BURIED OR NOT?

12 JUNE 1988
INVESTIGATION CADRE
(SIGNED)
PHAM KHOI

(END TRANSLATION)

B. JTF-FA ANALYSIS: THE INFORMATION PRESENTED IN THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION REPORT REGARDING THE BATTLE WITH OCCURRED NEAR LONG HOA VILLAGE, BEN CAT DISTRICT, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERY OF THE BODIES OF TWO DEAD AMERICAN SOLDIERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REFNO DATA LOSS INCIDENT AND WITNESS ACCOUNTS OBTAINED BY JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATING THIS CASE. THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION WAS PROBABLY ACCOMPLISHED IN ANTICIPATION OF THE INITIAL JOINT INVESTIGATION OF REFNO DATA WHICH OCCURRED DURING JFA 20, 22 OCT-17 NOV 92. A REVIEW OF JTF-FA FILES INDICATES JOINT TEAMS HAVE NOT YET INTERVIEWED THE THREE WITNESSES IDENTIFIED IN THE VIETNAMESE REPORT.

8. REFNO 1112:

A. JTF-FA TRANSLATION FOR REFNO 1112 REPORT
(BEGIN TRANSLATION)
REFERENCE DOCUMENT

REPORT OF UNILATERAL MIA INVESTIGATION

ON 1 - 3 JUNE 1988, THE VIETNAM TEAM UNILATERALLY WENT TO GIA LAI - KON TUM PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 1112, SPECIALIST 4 CICHON, WALTER ALAN WHO BECAME MISSING ON 30 MARCH 1968.

THE VIETNAM TEAM CONSISTED OF MR. NGO HOANG, TEAM LEADER; MR. NGUYEN MINH CHAU AND MR. TRAN VAN TRIEN, SPECIALISTS. THE TEAM WORKED WITH MR. DUNG, {PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE} OFFICE ADMINISTRATOR; MR. NGO NGOC SINH, MIA TEAM LEADER, AND MR. NGUYEN VAN TRUNG, PROVINCE MIA SPECIALIST. AFTERWARDS MR. NGO HOANG REPORTED SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CASE 1112 INVESTIGATION,

THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND PROVINCE MIA TEAMS ONLY PROVIDED GENERAL, NONSPECIFIC CONTENT THAT IN 1968, REGIMENT 66 FOUGHT A BATTLE AT THE CHU PHANG KHA HIGH POINT. MANY AMERICANS DIED IN THIS BATTLE BUT THE U.S. FORCE CAME AND TOOK AWAY ALL THE BODIES. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION TEAM TOGETHER WITH THE PROVINCE MIA TEAM WENT TO SA THAY DISTRICT AND MET MR. NGUYEN XUAN VINH, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, AND A NUMBER OF DISTRICT CADRE. THEY DID NOT KNOW IF THEY CAPTURED ANY PRISONERS OR NOT

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BECAUSE THIS BATTLE WAS CONDUCTED BY THE MAIN FORCE THIRD CORPS; THEREFORE, THEY PROMISED THEY WOULD MEET WITH FORMER CADRE TO ASK ABOUT THIS. WHENEVER THEY GET RESULTS, THEY WILL REPORT TO THE VNOSMP.

3 JUNE 1988

(END TRANSLATION)

B. JTF-FA ANALYSIS: THE VERY LIMITED INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION REPORT REGARDING A 1968 BATTLE BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF THE 66TH (PAVN) REGIMENT, B-3 FRONT, AND U.S. FORCES WHICH OCCURRED NEAR CHU TAN KRA (CHU PHANG KHA), SA THAY DISTRICT, KON TUM PROVINCE, IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. RECORDS CONCERNING THE BATTLE IN WHICH SPECIALIST CICHON WAS LOST. THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION, WHICH WAS PROBABLY CONDUCTED IN PREPARATION FOR THE INITIAL JOINT INVESTIGATION OF REFNO 1112 DURING JFA 12, 28 NOV-19 DEC 90, IDENTIFIES NO LEADS FOR FUTURE JOINT INVESTIGATIONS.

9. FOR HQ AFPC/DPWCM AND CDRPERSCOM/TAPC-PED-P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.

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10. EVAL: KLE//
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INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00541709
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS789 MCN = 96115/33057 TOR = 961152205
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1307 1152205-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 242205Z APR 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 241956Z APR 96
 FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO-RA//
 TO RUHPHQA/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 INFO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//CL-1B/DH-3//
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//POW-MIA/J5//
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J233//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP-VLC//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 BT
CONTROLS
 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW
 REFS: A. CDR JTF-FA MSG, DTG 080932Z FEB 96; SUBJ: JTF-FA REPORT
 VN96-005: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE PROVIDES REMAINS RECOVERY
 EFFORTS ALONG HO CHI MINH TRAIL
 B. CDR JTF-FA, MSG DTG 180912Z MAR 96, SUBJ: EVALUATION OF
 JTF-FA REPORT VN 96-005: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE PROVIDES
 INFORMATION ON PAVN REMAINS RECOVERY EFFORTS ALONG THE
 HO CHI MINH TRAIL//
 C. AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE MSG DTG 310833Z MAR 93; SUBJ:
 SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT U.S.- LAO JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 93-4L, 4-
 27 MARCH 1993
 D. CDR JTF-FA MSG DTG 071953Z JAN 94; SUBJ: DETAILED REPORT
 OF EXCAVATION: PRIORITY CASE 1719 (CORRECTED COPY)
 E. AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE, 191022Z AUG 93, SUBJ: DETAILED
 REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: CASE 0233.
 1. REF A IS A JTF-FA REPORT ABOUT AN ARTICLE FROM THE VIETNAM
 NEWS, VIETNAM'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY NEWSPAPER. THE
 ARTICLE PROVIDES INFORMATION ABOUT PAVN EFFORTS TO LOCATE,
 EXHUME, AND REPATRIATE REMAINS OF PAVN WAR DEAD IN LAOS.
 THE ARTICLE IDENTIFIES A UNIT AND THREE INDIVIDUALS IN THE
 UNIT, INCLUDING THE OFFICER WHO HAS COMMANDED THE GROUP
 SINCE ITS INCEPTION. COMMANDER'S COMMENT RECOMMENDED JTF-
 FA ANALYSTS ASSESS THE ARTICLE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC
 NEW INTERVIEW OR INVESTIGATIVE LEADS.
 2. REF B IS JTF-FA EVALUATION OF REF A. JTF-FA NOTED THAT THE
 ARTICLE CONTAINED NO INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICAN LOSSES,

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BUT RECOMMENDED THAT A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEW THE UNIT COMMANDER AND KEY CADRE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE UNIT HAS ANY INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. CASUALTIES BURIED IN PROXIMITY TO PAVN RECOVERIES.

3. WE FULLY CONCUR WITH JTF-FA COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A JOINT INTERVIEW OF THE COMMANDER AND KEY CADRE OF THE PAVN UNIT CHARGED WITH SEARCHING FOR WAR DEAD ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL.

4. DPMO RESEARCH HAS IDENTIFIED SEVERAL SPECIFIC INSTANCES WHERE AMERICANS MAY HAVE BEEN BURIED IN PROXIMITY TO PAVN GRAVES, AS FOLLOWS:

A) A WARTIME LIVESIGHTING/GRAVE REPORT, DATA (DATA) INDICATES THAT AT LEAST ONE UNIDENTIFIED U.S. POW MAY HAVE DIED AT NVA HOSPITAL 42 AND BEEN BURIED IN ITS CEMETERY. THE HOSPITAL WAS PART OF NVA FRONT B70. THIS REPORT WAS ASSESSED DURING THE RECENT COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW AS A POSSIBLE CORRELATION TO EITHER REFNO DATA, REFNO 1719, OR REFNO DATA DURING JTF 93-6L RESIDENTS OF THE VILLAGE OF BAN VANGLEUK (48QXD583538 164547N 1062907E), LOCATED NEAR THE HOSPITAL'S PROBABLE LOCATION VIC 48QXD560540 (164555N 1062750E) WERE INTERVIEWED (REF C). THEY STATED THAT IN 1988 AND 1989 VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS EXHUMED REMAINS FROM THE GRAVES OF THE HOSPITAL'S CEMETERY. DURING JFA 94-2L TWO ISOLATED, DISINTERRED GRAVES WERE EXCAVATED, WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS (REF D).

B: SEVERAL WARTIME REPORTS HAVE INDICATED AN AMERICAN OR AMERICANS WERE BURIED NEAR KHANG KHAY ALONG ROUTE 7 IN XIANG KHOUANG PROVINCE. THESE REPORTS WERE INVESTIGATED DURING A JFA 93-6L. A POSSIBLE SITE WAS EXCAVATED AND ALTHOUGH NO REMAINS WERE FOUND, THE TEAM RECOVERED PORTIONS OF A POSSIBLE HARNESS STRAP. DURING THE INVESTIGATION, LOCAL VILLAGERS TOLD A JOINT TEAM THAT VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAD EXHUMED THE REMAINS OF TWO VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS BURIED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE REPORTED AMERICAN GRAVESITE (REF E).

C. NAME, CASE DATA, DIED AFTER HE WAS CAPTURED AT ARVN FIRE SUPPORT BASE #6, SOUTHWEST OF DAK TO, KONTUM, AND WAS BEING ESCORTED TO NORTH VIETNAM. HIS NAME APPEARED ON THE 1973 PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S DIED IN CAPTIVITY LIST, WHICH SAID HE DIED IN TAY NGUYEN (WESTERN HIGHLANDS) ON 15 AUGUST 1971. ANOTHER AMERICAN BEING EVACUATED WITH NAME STATED THAT HE HELPED BURY HIM IN THE VICINITY OF YC221384 IN LAOS. ONE WARTIME SOURCE STATED THAT NAME WAS BURIED APPROXIMATELY TWO KILOMETERS FROM COMMO LIAISON STATION 60 IN LAOS. SINCE HIS DEATH WAS CLEARLY DOCUMENTED, AS EVIDENCED IN THE OFFICIAL DIED IN CAPTIVITY ROSTER, WE NEED TO EXPLORE WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE ATTEMPTED TO LOCATE AND RECOVER HIS REMAINS DURING THE POSTWAR PERIOD.

D. WO1 SOLOMON H. GODWIN WAS CAPTURED IN HUE DURING TET 1968 AND TAKEN ON A STRETCHER TO A POINT IN THE LAO

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BORDER AREA WHERE HE DIED AND WAS BURIED. WITNESSES HAVE TOLD THE JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAMS HIS GRAVE WAS IN A DEN/A ZEN HAMLET, WEST OF A LUOI, IN LAOS. VIETNAM IN 1989 RETURNED A DEATH CERTIFICATE FOR WO1 GODWIN, INDICATING ADHERENCE TO STANDARD PROCEDURES CALLING FOR DOCUMENTATION OF THE DEATH OF U.S. POWS. SINCE THIS DOCUMENTATION WAS IN VIETNAMESE HANDS, WE NEED TO EXPLORE WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE ATTEMPTED TO LOCATE AND RECOVER HIS REMAINS DURING THE POSTWAR PERIOD.

3. IN ADDITION, ALTHOUGH XIANG KHOUANG PROVINCE IS NOT TRADITIONALLY CONSIDERED PART OF THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, REF E INDICATES THAT REMAINS OF VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS WERE RECOVERED IN NORTHERN LAOS AS WELL. FOR YOUR INTERVIEW OF THE COMMANDER AND ASSOCIATED SUBORDINATES AND CADRE, DPMO REQUESTS THAT INTERVIEWERS SPECIFICALLY COVER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS OR AREAS OF INTEREST:

A. DETERMINE THE VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATIONAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE ENTITY IN CHARGE OF THIS ACTIVITY. IF MILITARY, PROVIDE UNIT DESIGNATOR AND SUBORDINATION, TO INCLUDE, FOR INSTANCE, WHICH MAJOR STAFF DIRECTORATE THIS FELL UNDER (I.E. GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, ETC), WHETHER IT WAS ATTACHED TO A PARTICULAR MILITARY REGION, ETC. IF CIVILIAN, PROVIDE SIMILAR INFORMATION, TO INCLUDE MINISTRY, DEPARTMENT, ETC. WAS THIS A MULTI-ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT? WAS THERE ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OR THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR?

B. WHEN WAS THIS UNIT FORMED? WHAT, IF ANY, WERE ITS PRECURSOR ORGANIZATIONS? FROM WHERE WERE ITS PERSONNEL DRAWN? DID THEY HAVE ANY SPECIAL TRAINING? HOW LONG DO/DID CADRE USUALLY SERVE IN THIS UNIT? WHICH MEMBERS HAVE SERVED THE LONGEST?

C. WHAT WERE THE LIMITS OF THIS UNIT'S GEOGRAPHICAL

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

JURISDICTION, I.E. DID ELEMENTS GO INTO ALL PARTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, TO INCLUDE LAOS, CAMBODIA, SOUTH VIETNAM, NORTH VIETNAM? WITH A MAP, EXPLORE THE ROUTES TRAVELED, DOCUMENTING ROUTE NUMBERS, VILLAGES VISITED, HOW THEY PASSED INTO LAOS AND RETURNED, ETC. HOW WERE

BORDER/CUSTOMS MATTERS MANAGED?

D. HOW LARGE A UNIT OR GROUP CARRIED OUT THE RECOVERY OPERATIONS; DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF THE UNIT. DOES AN ANTHROPOLOGIST OR FORENSIC SCIENTIST NORMALLY ACCOMPANY THE TEAM TO DETERMINE THE RACE OF THE REMAINS RECOVERED? EVEN IF NOT FORMALLY TRAINED, DO THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN TELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAUCASOID OR MONGOLOID REMAINS? ARE THE RECOVERED REMAINS REVIEWED FOR DETERMINATION OF RACE, AND IF SO, WHEN AND WHERE? DO THEY BELIEVE THEY EVER RECOVERED CAUCASOID OR NEGROID REMAINS, AND IF SO, WHAT DID THEY DO WITH THEM? WERE REPORTING PROCEDURES DIFFERENT FOR THESE DIFFERENT REMAINS?

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E. DETERMINE WHERE AND WHEN THEIR REMAINS RECOVERY EFFORTS OCCURRED IN LAOS. OF SPECIAL INTEREST ARE THEIR REMAINS RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN LAOS.

F. DETERMINE THE LOCATIONS OF ALL PAVN CEMETERIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY THAT U.S. CASUALTIES OR POWS WHO DIED IN CAPTIVITY MAY HAVE BEEN BURIED IN EACH OF THE CEMETERIES IDENTIFIED. DID THE UNIT VISIT CRASHSITES OR ISOLATED GRAVESITES AS WELL AS ESTABLISHED CEMETERIES? DID THE UNIT VISIT THE SITES OF HOSPITALS, REAR SUPPORT AREAS, STORAGE FACILITIES, COMMO LIAISON STATIONS, BINH TRAMS, OR SIMILAR LOCATIONS, AND IF SO, WHICH? IF POSSIBLE, HAVE WITNESSES LOCATE THESE SITES ON A MAP AND DESCRIBE THE ROUTE OF TRAVEL TO THEM.

G. ASK ABOUT THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION THEY HAVE USED TO DETERMINE VIETNAMESE GRAVE/CEMETERY LOCATIONS. WERE PARTICULAR VETERANS BROUGHT ALONG TO HELP LOCATE SPECIFIC SITES? IF AN AMERICAN HAD BEEN BURIED IN ONE OF THE VIETNAMESE CEMETERIES, OR OTHER WARTIME LOCATIONS, WOULD THEIR RECORDS HAVE REFLECTED THIS FACT? ARE THESE SOURCES IN THE FORM OF RECORDS? WERE WITNESSES INTERVIEWED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION THAT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IN THE RECORDS? WHERE ARE THESE RECORDS KEPT; WOULD THE LAO GOVERNMENT HAVE COPIES; IF NOT WOULD THE LAO HAVE ACCESS TO THE RECORDS? WOULD THERE HAVE BEEN SEPARATE RECORDS MAINTAINED ON U.S. GRAVE SITES IN LAOS? IF SO, WHERE ARE THEY KEPT?

H. AFTER REMAINS WERE RECOVERED, WERE NEW AND ADDITIONAL RECORDS PREPARED TO REFLECT AND DETAIL THE RECOVERIES? WHAT HAPPENED TO THE REMAINS RECOVERED IN LAOS? HOW WERE THESE REMAINS MOVED TO VIETNAM?

I. SPECIFICALLY COVER THE FOUR INCIDENTS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 2. WHERE RELEVANT, ASK ABOUT THE NUMBER OF REMAINS THEY RECOVERED IN EACH INSTANCE AND HOW THEY DETERMINED THE RACE AND IDENTITY OF EACH SET OF REMAINS. DISCUSS WITH THEM THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OF THE REMAINS MAY HAVE BEEN THOSE OF U.S. SERVICEMEN.

J. BRIEFLY EXPLAIN THAT U.S. AND VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE INTERVIEWED FORMER CADRE OF OTHER UNITS THAT WERE TASKED WITH FINDING U.S. REMAINS IN VIETNAM. INQUIRE WHETHER ANY OF THE CADRE KNOW OF ANY OTHER VIETNAMESE OR LAO UNITS THAT HAVE EVER BEEN SPECIFICALLY TASKED WITH SEARCHING FOR AND RECOVERING U.S. REMAINS ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL AND/OR IN NORTHERN LAOS. IF SO, WHAT IS THE UNIT DESIGNATOR? WHAT ARE THE NAMES OF THE COMMANDER AND KEY CADRE? IS THE UNIT STILL IN EXISTENCE? INQUIRE WHETHER ANYONE KNOWS ABOUT SIMILAR OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA OR VIETNAM.

K. DID THE UNIT EVER FIND REMAINS THEY KNEW OR BELIEVED WERE AMERICAN, SUCH AS IN THE VICINITY OF A FORMER BATTLEFIELD OR AT A CRASH SITE? IF SO, DETERMINE WHERE THE REMAINS WERE FOUND AND THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE REMAINS.

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WHAT WERE THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE UNIT SHOULD IT
INADVERTENTLY FIND OR EXHUME AMERICAN REMAINS?

L. ARE THERE FUTURE PLANS TO CONDUCT RECOVERY
OPERATIONS; WHERE WILL THESE OPERATIONS OCCUR, AND WHEN?

M. WHO WERE THE LAO ESCORTS FOR THE VIETNAMESE
DURING THE RECOVERY OPERATIONS? WHO WOULD THE
VIETNAMESE SOURCES RECOMMEND THE TEAM INTERVIEW ON THE
LAO SIDE FOR THE SAME TYPE INFORMATION IDENTIFIED ABOVE? IS
THERE A SIMILAR RECOVERY UNIT WITHIN THE LAO MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT; WHAT IS ITS DESIGNATOR, AND WHO IS THE
COMMANDER?

4. THE DPMO POC FOR THIS ACTION IS C.W. MCCAIN, INTEL ANALYST,
CURRENT OPS DIV, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIR, 703-602-2202 EXT 245.

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00048965

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS176 MCN = 96052/23579 TOR = 960521840
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1051 0521839-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 201740Z FEB 96

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

TO: SAFE

ZEM

CONTROLS

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BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF PRIORITY CASE 1719//
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS176 MCN = 96052/23579 TOR = 960521840

PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1051 0521839-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

P 211839Z FEB 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEFOCB/OC

RUEALGX/SAFE

P 201740Z FEB 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//

RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//

BT

UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO JTFFA DET TWO

SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTF-FA/-/FEB//

SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF PRIORITY CASE 1719//

REF/A/RMG/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE/140932ZFEB96//

REF/B/RMG/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE/160900ZNOV89//

REF/C/RMG/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE/220516ZJUL92//

REF/D/RMG/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE/050402ZSEP92//

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PAGE:0002

REF/E/RMG/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE/300436ZMAR93//
 REF/F/RMG/CDR-JTF-FA/071953ZJAN94//
 REF/G/MAP/SERIES L7015, SHEET 6242 I, NAME: BAN NATHON//
 REF/H/MAP/SERIES L7015, SHEET 6242 II, NAME: BAN DONGHAI//
 REF/I/MAP/SERIES L7015, SHEET 6342 III, NAME: BAN VANG-ALA//
 RMKS/1. REFERENCES:

A. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT U.S./LAO ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN THE LAO PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (PDR) DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) 96-2L, FROM 6 JAN TO 6 FEB 1996.

B. REF B IS THE REPORT OF SITE SURVEYS IN LAOS, 13-15 NOV 1989.

C. REF C IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF SURVEY FOR CASE 1719 DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 92-6L.

D. REF D IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION/SURVEY FOR CASE 1719 DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 92-7L.

E. REF E IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 1719 DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 93-4L.

F. REF F IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF EXCAVATION FOR PRIORITY CASE 1719 DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 94-2L.

G. REF?S G, H, AND I ARE THE 1:50,000 SCALE MAP SHEETS COVERING THE AREA OF INVESTIGATION.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION:

A. ON 30 JAN 1996, THE INVESTIGATION ELEMENT (IE) INVESTIGATED CASE 1719 IN KEPON DISTRICT, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAO PDR.

B. CASE 1719 INVOLVED THE LOSS OF TWO U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS. ON 7 MAR 1971, AN OH-58 WAS SHOT DOWN WITH FOUR INDIVIDUALS ABOARD. ONE INDIVIDUAL WAS TRAPPED IN THE AIRCRAFT AND ANOTHER WAS SEVERELY WOUNDED. THE TWO REMAINING INDIVIDUALS WERE FORCED TO EVADE, DUE TO ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA, AND WERE LATER RESCUED. THE TWO INDIVIDUALS LEFT BEHIND WERE NOT HEARD FROM AGAIN. ON 18 MAR 1971, SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCES FOUND THE CRASH SITE, BUT FOUND NO BODIES OR EVIDENCE OF GRAVES IN THE AREA.

C. ON 30 JAN 1996, THE IE TRAVELED TO BAN THAHEUA AND BAN TAI, WHERE THE TEAM INTERVIEWED TWO INDIVIDUALS. THE INDIVIDUALS WERE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION THAT COULD BE CORRELATED TO CASE 1719 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSS.

D. THE TEAM THEN TRAVELED TO THE U.S. WITNESS CRASH SITE LOCATION. THE TEAM CONDUCTED A GROUND SEARCH OF THE AREA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

E. RECOMMENDATION: N/A.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

A. PURPOSE:

1. INVESTIGATE AND CONDUCT A GROUND SEARCH OF THE AREA IDENTIFIED BY THE U.S. WITNESS (XD660404).

2. AT BAN CHAKUA (BAN THAHEUA, XD555512), INTERVIEW VILLAGERS TO DETERMINE IF THEY LED A VIETNAMESE RECOVERY TEAM TO THE HOSPITAL CEMETERY. ALSO, DETERMINE IF ONLY VIETNAMESE REMAINS WERE TAKEN.

3. ASK VILLAGERS IF THEY HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE UNIT, LOCATION, OR NAMES OF ANY OF THE VIETNAMESE WHO MAY HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE RECOVERY.

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B. ON 6 JAN 1996, THE JOINT U.S./LAO INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ARRIVED AT BOUALAPHA DISTRICT, KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE, LAO PDR, TO BEGIN JFA 96-21.

C. TEAM COMPOSITION:

1. U.S.:

CPT LOUIS J. PLEVELL, TEAM LEADER
CTIC(NAC) WILLIAM J. BRADFORD, ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
SGT BRADLEY D. VANHORN, ANALYST
SSGT SOMPATANA PHISAYAVONG, LINGUIST
SGT CHRISTOPHER L. PAUL, SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
HMCM(SS) MICHAEL S. DALZELL, MEDIC
SSGT CRAIG N. HJULER, EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECHNICIAN

2. LAO:

MR. SONEPHAPHAY VILAY, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

3. PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT OFFICIALS:

MR. KIKEO SIVORASAK, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE OFFICIAL

MR. KHAMKEO SANKOT, XEPON DISTRICT OFFICIAL

D. ON 30 JAN 1996, THE TEAM TRAVELED TO BAN THAHEUA (BAN CHAKUA ON MAP) (XD553511), AND INTERVIEWED THE VILLAGE CHIEF, MR. MIE (NO LAST NAME, 30 YOA). MR. MIE STATED THAT NO TEAM OF FOREIGNERS, VIETNAMESE OR ANY OTHER, HAD EVER BEEN TO HIS VILLAGE. MR. MIE NEVER HEARD OF THE B-70 HOSPITAL OR ANY CEMETERY OTHER THAN THE CEMETERY IN HIS VILLAGE. MR. MIE NEVER HEARD OF MR. KEU, FROM BAN TAI. WHEN TOLD THAT MR. KEU TOLD A JOINT U.S./LAO TEAM THAT VIETNAMESE WERE LED TO A CEMETERY BY VILLAGERS FROM BAN THAHEUA, MR. MIE STATED THAT NO SUCH INCIDENT OCCURRED AND HE DID NOT KNOW WHY THE TEAM HAD BEEN GIVEN THAT INFORMATION. MR. MIE HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT INCIDENTS INVOLVING U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS TO PROVIDE.

E. THE TEAM THEN TRAVELED TO BAN TAI (XD530535), AND INTERVIEWED MR. KEU (50+ YOA). INITIALLY MR. KEU DENIED HAVING TALKED TO A JOINT TEAM. THEN MR. KEU STATED THAT HE MET A JOINT TEAM AS THE TEAM WAS WALKING TO THE B-70 HOSPITAL LOCATION, BUT CONTINUED TO DENY GIVING THEM ANY INFORMATION. WHEN QUESTIONED BY THE LAO OFFICIALS, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE U.S. TEAM MEMBERS, MR. KEU FINALLY ADMITTED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE TEAM ABOUT THE VILLAGERS FROM BAN THAHEUA LEADING THE VIETNAMESE RECOVERY TEAM TO THE CEMETERY. HE THEN CLARIFIED HIS STORY BY STATING THAT NO ONE HAD LED THE VIETNAMESE TEAM TO THE CEMETERY, BUT THAT THEY HAD COME ON THEIR OWN AND HAD DUG UP THE GRAVES WITHOUT TELLING ANYONE. MR. KEU SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHICH UNIT CAME TO REMOVE THE REMAINS. THE LAO OFFICIAL LATER STATED THAT AN AGREEMENT EXISTS BETWEEN THE LAO AND VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS ALLOWING THEM TO EXCAVATE GRAVE SITES OF VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL. THE OFFICIAL INDICATED THAT THE
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF PRIORITY CASE 1719//
RMKS/
VIETNAMESE APPARENTLY CAME TO THIS SITE WITHOUT FIRST ASKING PERMISSION, AS REQUIRED, AND DUG UP THE REMAINS FROM THE CEMETERY.

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F. THE TEAM THEN TRAVELED TO A LANDING ZONE (LZ) (XD656397), AND MOVED APPROXIMATELY 850 METERS TO THE U.S. WITNESS LOCATION (XD660404). THE AREA IS COVERED WITH DENSE VEGETATION CONSISTING PRIMARILY OF SMALL BAMBOO STANDS. THE TEAM CONDUCTED A SKIRMISH SEARCH OF THE AREA, COVERING AN AREA OF APPROXIMATELY 100 BY 150 METERS AND FOUND NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT THIS WAS THE CASE 1719 INCIDENT LOCATION.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE:

- A. MATERIAL EVIDENCE RETAINED BY JTF-FA: NONE.
- B. MATERIAL EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHED AND LEFT IN PLACE: NONE.
- C. REMAINS: NONE.

5. SURVEY RESULTS: ONE AREA WAS SEARCHED DURING THE COURSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION, THE U.S. WITNESS LOCATION (XD660404). THERE WAS NOTHING FOUND AT THIS LOCATION TO INDICATE THAT IT IS THE CASE 1719 INCIDENT LOCATION.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: BAN THAHEUA (XD553511), IS THE PROPER NAME OF WHAT IS DEPICTED ON THE MAP AS BAN CHAKUA. THERE IS NO VILLAGE NAMED CHAKUA IN XEPON DISTRICT.

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE.

8. ANALYST COMMENTS:

A. WITNESS STATEMENTS: NONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED WITNESSED THE CASE 1719 INCIDENT, NOR DID THEY HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT ANY OTHER U.S. LOSS. INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED DID NOT PRODUCE ANY LEADS WHICH COULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1719.

B. SITE SURVEY: ONE AREA WAS SEARCHED DURING THE COURSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF WRECKAGE, PERSONAL EFFECTS, OR REMAINS FOUND AT THE SITE.

C. FIELD ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS: NONE.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS: NONE.

10. TEAM LEADER COMMENTS:

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY: MOST OF THE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED DURING THE COURSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION APPEARED TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS FREELY AND HONESTLY TO THE BEST OF THEIR RECOLLECTION. HOWEVER, MR. KEU WAS EVASIVE DURING THE INVESTIGATION ELEMENT'S QUESTIONING, AND HE WAS UNWILLING TO PROVIDE THE IE WITH FACTUAL INFORMATION WITHOUT THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF THE LAO OFFICIALS. IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT MR. KEU WAS NOT ENTIRELY FACTUAL DURING THE PREVIOUS INVESTIGATION AS WELL.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS: RECOMMENDATION: N/A. CONCUR WITH THE ANALYST'S COMMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 8,C.

C. HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION: EXCELLENT AT THE CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT LEVELS.

11. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATION: N/A.//

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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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PAGE:0001

INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00316201

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFSS05 MCN = 96086/30666 TOR = 960862117
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS2148 0862100-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 262100Z MAR 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEFJII/J2

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 250932Z MAR 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO RHRMPC/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//

SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED: "REPORT: ROSTER OF

U.S. PILOT BANDITS WHO DIED IN YEN BAI PROVINCE."//

RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THREE

SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ONE

SET OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A REPORT TITLED: "REPORT ON RESULTS OF

OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION

SEEKING GROUP." THIS REPORT INCLUDED TEN DOCUMENTS. THE SECOND SET

OF DOCUMENTS WAS A REPORT FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) MIA

SPECIALIST TEAM TITLED: "REPORT OF RESULTS OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS

TO COLLECT MIA INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS." THIS REPORT INCLUDED

THREE DOCUMENTS. THE THIRD SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A VIETNAM OFFICE

SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) ASSESSMENT OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS

TEAM (SRT) CASES.

2. THE MOI REPORT, "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY

OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP", DETAILS A

4 - 12 MAY 95 EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION IN

VINH PHU, TUYEN QUANG, YEN BAI, HOA BINH, NINH BINH AND THANH HOA

PROVINCES. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS

RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES BY THIS GROUP.

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ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS WAS TITLED: "REPORT: ROSTER OF AMERICAN PILOT BANDITS WHO DIED IN YEN BAI PROVINCE."

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES SOME CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH THE FOLLOWING UNRESOLVED CASES: 0349-1-01, 0402-0-01, 0425-1-01, 0679-1-01, 1870-0-01, 1870-0-02; AND THE FOLLOWING RESOLVED CASES: 0116-0-01, 0541-1-01, 1931. MOST OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE LINE ENTRIES IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH DATA CONTAINED IN JTF-FA FILES.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS A LIST OF NINE LINE ITEMS IN TABULAR FORM, WITH 11 DATA COLUMNS FOR EACH LINE. THE TRANSLATION BELOW LISTS EACH LINE WITH THE DATA COLUMNS FOR EACH LINE SEPARATED BY A SEMI-COLON (;). ANY INFORMATION ILLEGIBLE ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS REPLACED WITH A QUESTION MARK (?). THE DATA FIELDS LEFT BLANK ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ARE INDICATED BY A HYPHEN (-). THE 11 COLUMNS READ AS FOLLOWS: "UNIT NAME; PILOT NAME; BIRTH DATE; RANK; SERVICE NUMBER; AIRCRAFT TYPE; DATE DIED; BURIAL LOCATION; IS THERE A CASKET; GRAVE STATUS; REMARKS;" EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ((ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES)).

5. THE DOCUMENT IS TRANSLATED AS FOLLOWS:
((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

"SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS

- MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
- REPORT
- ROSTER OF AMERICAN PILOT BANDITS WHO DIED IN YEN BAI PROVINCE
((BEGIN TABLE))
- NUMBER; UNIT NAME; PILOT NAME; BIRTH DATE; RANK; SERVICE NUMBER; AIRCRAFT TYPE; DATE DIED; BURIAL LOCATION; IS THERE A CASKET; GRAVE STATUS; REMARKS;"
- ((LINE ENTRY)) 1. YEN BAI TOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNK; UNKNOWN; RF101; 29/07/65; CHEP BU MOUNTAIN; IN A NYLON BAG; -; -; ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0116-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE, LOCATION OF LOSS AND INCIDENT DATE.))
- ((LINE ENTRY)) 2. TIEN YEN DISTRICT; ALLINSON DAVID J.; 17/9/32; CAPT; A03038260; F105; 12/8/66; BO CHUM MOUNTAIN, MO VANG, VAN YEN; NONE; LOST; INVESTIGATED CASE 0425, DID NOT FIND REMAINS;. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0425-1-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, RANK, SERIAL NUMBER, INCIDENT DATE, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))
- ((LINE ENTRY)) 3. TIEN YEN DISTRICT; WARREN ARTHUR; 20-4-36; CAPT; A031E31127; F105; 5/12/66; CAY HONG RISE, LUONG TINH, TRAN YEN; NYLON BAG; -; -;. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0541-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, LOCATION OF LOSS, AND MISSION DATE. THE AIRCRAFT TYPE LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0541.))
- ((LINE ENTRY)) 4. TIEN YEN DISTRICT; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; MAJ; UNKNOWN; F105; 12/5/67; THAC CA STREAM, CONG VAN YEN; NONE; LOST; INVESTIGATED CASE 0679, DID NOT FIND REMAINS;. ((THIS LINE ENTRY

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POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0679-1-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE, MISSION DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. ONLY TWO F105'S WERE SHOT DOWN IN YEN BAI PROVINCE DURING 1967 AND ONLY ONE INCIDENT HAD AN INDIVIDUAL WITH THE RANK OF MAJOR.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 5. YEN BAI DISTRICT; SEUELL JOHN WAYNE; 24-2-46; CAPT; 197489 (A1FV; F4; 6/6/72; KM 7 DA CHONG HAMLET, DAI DONG, YEN BAI; NONE; LOST; CASE 1870 TWO PILOTS IN ONE PLANE (COMRADE TU RECEIVED 5 + 6). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1870-0-02, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, MISSION DATE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 6. YEN BAI DISTRICT; FOWLER JAMES A; UNKNOWN; MAJ; 502302458; F4; 6/6/72; NONE; NONE; LOST; INVESTIGATED, EXCAVATED, BUT DID NOT RECOVER ANYTHING;. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1870-0-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, MISSION DATE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 7. YEN BAI DISTRICT; WEATHEY JACK W.; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; 72023A; F4; 10/09/72; DONG SON, BA TRANG, PHUC AN, YEN BAI; NONE; LOST;-;. ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY REPRESENTS A CONFLATION OF INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS, BOTH RESOLVED: CASE 0116-0-01 AND CASE 1931. THE NAME, SERIAL NUMBER AND LOCATION OF LOSS CORRELATE WITH CASE 0116. THE AIRCRAFT TYPE, DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS CORRELATE WITH CASE 1931. CASE 1931 IS UNUSUAL WITH RESPECT TO THIS LIST IN THAT BOTH MEMBERS OF THE AIRCREW WERE CAPTURED AND REPATRIATED.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 8. YEN BAI DISTRICT; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; F105; 21/7/66; VAN CHINH, YEN BAI; NONE; LOST; TRIED TO FIND OUT ABOUT CASE 0402: WE WERE ONLY ABLE TO CONFIRM COORDINATES BECAUSE THE GRAVE HAS SUNK BELOW THE WATER OF A SMALL STREAM. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0402-0-01, AN
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED: "REPORT: ROSTER OF RMKS/
UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE, LOCATION OF LOSS, AND MISSION DATE. CASE 0402-0-01 WAS THE ONLY F105 LOSS IN YEN BAI ON 21 JULY 1966.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 9. TIEN (CHUONG) DISTRICT; STEEN MARTIN; UNKNOWN; CAPT; UNKNOWN; F105; 31/05/66; (BAI STREAM), VAN CHAN; NONE; LOST; CASE 0349 WAS INVESTIGATED MANY TIMES, HAVE NOT YET EXCAVATED;." ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0349-1-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE, MISSION DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

((END TABLE))

((END TRANSLATION))

6. FOR HQ AFPC/DPWCM: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. COPIES OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.
ADMIN

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7. EVAL: DWO/JC//
BT

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PAGE:0001

INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00190119

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFSS45 MCN = 96165/01759 TOR = 961650128
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS9144 1650128-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 130128Z JUN 96
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFSYD/SY-4D
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 110732Z JUN 96 ZYB
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//
SECTION 01 OF 04

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA//
SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM DETAILED REPORT OF
/INVESTIGATION OF SPECIAL REMAINS CASE 1248//
REF/A/RMG/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH/100706ZFEB89//
REF/B/RMG/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH/080800ZJUN90//
REF/C/RMG/CJTFFA HONOLULU HI/280702Z OCT93//
REF/D/RMG/CJTFFA HONOLULU HI/271353Z SEP94//
REF/E/RMG/CJTFFA HONOLULU HI/220833Z NOV94//
REF/F/RMG/CJTFFA HONOLULU HI/031747Z AUG95//
NARR/REF A IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR SPECIAL
REMAINS CASE DATA CONDUCTED DURING THE 4TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY
(JFA). REF B IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE DATA
CONDUCTED DURING THE 10TH JFA. REF C IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION FOR CASE DATA CONDUCTED DURING THE 25TH JFA.
REF D IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FOR CASE 1248 CONDUCTED
DURING THE 31ST JFA. REF E IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
OF CASE DATA CONDUCTED DURING THE 32ND JFA. REF F IS THE DETAILED
REPORT OF EXCAVATION OF CASE DATA CONDUCTED DURING THE 36TH JFA.//
RMKS/1. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION. THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION
TEAM (RIT) INVESTIGATED SPECIAL REMAINS CASE DATA ON 26 MAR 96 IN
DONG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THE RIT

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INTERVIEWED FOUR WITNESSES WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EXHUMATION OF ALLEGED AMERICAN REMAINS SOMETIME BETWEEN 1974 AND 1978. NONE OF THE WITNESSES PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF REMAINS THAT THE PROVINCIAL TEAM ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED OR WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THEY EXHUMED THEM. THE RIT SURVEYED THE AREA WHERE THE PROVINCIAL TEAM ALLEGEDLY EXHUMED THE REMAINS IN DONG TRACH VILLAGE AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XE 62745 47042. THE SITE IS IN A LOCAL CEMETERY WITH NUMEROUS GRAVES. ON 16 APR 96, THE TEAM INTERVIEWED ONE ADDITIONAL WITNESS IN DONG HA TOWN, QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THE WITNESS PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BURIAL AND EXCAVATION OF REMAINS IN DONG TRACH VILLAGE. THE TEAM RECOVERED NO REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE DURING THIS INVESTIGATION. RECOMMENDATION: CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE.

2. BACKGROUND:

A. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE 15 AUG 68 LOSS OF AN RF-4C ON A PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER NORTHERN VIETNAM IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATE 48Q XE 450 450. SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS BEGAN IMMEDIATELY, BUT WERE CALLED OFF. AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE IF A DISTRESS CALL AND AN EXPLOSION WERE RELATED TO THE AIRCRAFT FOR THIS CASE. BASED ON A DEBRIEF OF ONE OF THE TWO CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED IN CASE DATA AIRCRAFT, BOTH HE AND THE OTHER CREWMEMBER EJECTED SUCCESSFULLY. DURING HIS DESCENT, HE OBSERVED A COLLAPSED ORANGE AND WHITE PARACHUTE AND HEARD A MAYDAY CALL ON THE SURVIVAL RADIO. MILITIA MEMBERS CAPTURED THE DEBRIEFED AVIATOR WITHIN SECONDS OF HIS LANDING. WHILE THE MILITIA WAS LEADING THE AVIATOR AWAY, HE HEARD SMALL ARMS FIRE COMING FROM THE AREA WHERE HE SAW THE COLLAPSED PARACHUTE. LATER A VIETNAMESE SOLDIER GAVE HIM A PAIR OF BOOTS BELONGING TO THE OTHER CREWMEMBER, BUT HE NEVER SAW OR HEARD OF THE OTHER CREWMEMBER AGAIN. ONE U.S. SERVICE MEMBER REMAINS UNACCOUNTED-FOR FROM THIS CASE.

B. PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION:

(1) ASK BO TRACH DISTRICT OFFICIALS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE REBURIAL OF REMAINS IN DONG TRACH VILLAGE AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER TO QUANG BINH PROVINCE AND HANOI. (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.J.).

(2) INTERVIEW RESIDENTS OF DONG TRACH VILLAGE FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE BURIAL OF AMERICAN REMAINS IN THE VILLAGE. THERE IS NO RECORD OF A JOINT TEAM EVER VISITING THIS VILLAGE. (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D.).

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION. ON 26 MAR 96, THE RIT INVESTIGATED SPECIAL REMAINS CASE DATA IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THE VNOSMP TEAM LEADER COORDINATED WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS AND LOCATED THE FOUR WITNESSES FOR INTERVIEW.

A. PARTICIPANTS.

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT:

- (A) CW4 CLYDE GREEN, RIT TEAM LEADER.
- (B) SSG ALFRED S. IVERSEN, RIT NCOIC.
- (C) TSGT VY V. TRAN, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST.
- (D) TSGT KELLY R. RAY, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST.
- (E) SSG WILLIAM E. COX, RIT SEARCH AND RECOVERY

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SPECIALIST.

(2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT:

(A) COL PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER,
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE.

(B) SR COL NGUYEN MINH TRI (MINH TRIJ), VNOSMP TEAM
MEMBER, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REPRESENTATIVE.

(C) MR. TRAN MINH TUAN (TRAN MINH TUAANS), VNOSMP TEAM
MEMBER, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

(3) QUANG BINH PROVINCE TASK TEAM:

(A) MR. LE DUC DUONG (LEE DWCS ZWUONG), MIA TEAM LEADER.

(B) MR. NGUYEN TIEN DUAN (TIEN ZUAANR), TEAM MEMBER.

(C) MR. DOAN THANH TUYEN (DOANF THANH TUYEN), TEAM

MEMBER.

(4) BO TRACH DISTRICT TASK TEAM:

(A) MR. NGUYEN NHU DUONG (NHU DWONG), TEAM MEMBER.

(B) MR. NGUYEN VAN XUAN (XUAAN), TEAM MEMBER.

(C) MR. LE VAN THANH (LEE VAWN THANH), TEAM MEMBER.

B. ON 2 MAR 96, THE RIT HELD A PLANNING MEETING WITH THE
VNOSMP CONTINGENT AT THE JOINT DOCUMENTS CENTER (JDC) IN THE ARMY
MUSEUM, HANOI. AT THE MEETING, THE RIT PRESENTED THE
INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS CASE TO THE VNOSMP.

C. WITNESS ONE. ON THE MORNING 26 MAR 96, THE RIT
INTERVIEWED MR. TRAN KHACH BA (TRAAN KHACHS BA), AT THE PEOPLE'S
COMMITTEE HOUSE IN DONG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG
BINH PROVINCE.

(1) NAME: MR. TRAN KHACH BA.

(2) AGE: 56 YOA.

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE: HAMLET THREE, DONG TRACH VILLAGE, BO
TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS ABOVE.

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: MILITIA CADRE AND FARMER.

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM DETAILED REPORT OF
RMKS/

(7) STATEMENT. ON AN UNRECALLED DATE SOMETIME AFTER 1974,
MR. BA, MR. LAM (LAMJ) AND MR. SI (SIX) WENT TO GUARD AN AREA WHERE
15 PROVINCIAL SOLDIERS WERE ALLEGEDLY EXHUMING AMERICAN REMAINS.
THE SOLDIERS COMPLETED THE EXCAVATION IN THREE DAYS. MR. BA DID NOT
KNOW EXACTLY HOW MANY REMAINS THE SOLDIERS EXHUMED, BUT HE THOUGHT
THEY RECOVERED THREE SETS. AFTER THEY RECOVERED THE REMAINS, THE
SOLDIERS WASHED THE REMAINS WITH ALCOHOL, BOXED THEM UP AND LOADED
THEM ON A VEHICLE. MR. BA DID NOT KNOW WHERE THE SOLDIERS TOOK THE
REMAINS OR WHAT HAPPENED TO THEM.

D. WITNESS TWO. ON 26 MAR 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. PHAM HONG
LAM (PHAMJ HOONG LAMJ).

(1) NAME: PHAM HONG LAM.

(2) AGE: 48 YOA.

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE: HAMLET TWO, DONG TRACH VILLAGE, BO

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TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS ABOVE.

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(7) STATEMENT. ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN 1974, 1975 OR 1976, AN UNRECALLED DONG TRACH VILLAGE CADRE SENT MR. LAM AND MR. BA TO GUARD AN AREA WHERE SOLDIERS FROM THE PROVINCE WERE EXHUMING ALLEGED AMERICAN REMAINS. MR. LAM WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR GUARDING THE AREA AND NOT THE ACTUAL GRAVE SITES. HE DID NOT TALK WITH ANY OF THE SOLDIERS AND THEREFORE DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY REMAINS THE SOLDIERS EXHUMED.

E. WITNESS THREE. ON 26 MAR 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN DINH PHUNG (NGUYEENX DINH PHUNGS).

(1) NAME: NGUYEN DINH PHUNG.

(2) AGE: 61 YOA.

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE: DONG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS ABOVE.

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: 1965-1967 DONG TRACH VILLAGE CHAIRMAN; 1968-1974 SOLDIER IN THE VILLAGE MILITIA; 1974-1987 SERVED AS A CADRE IN THE VILLAGE POLITICAL OFFICE.

(7) STATEMENT. ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN 1977 OR 1978, A PROVINCIAL TEAM CAME TO DONG TRACH VILLAGE AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE ON A SPECIAL PROJECT. SINCE MR. PHUNG WORKED IN THE VILLAGE POLITICAL OFFICE, HE SENT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE TO SERVE AS GUARDS FOR THE TEAM. THE PROJECT ONLY LASTED ONE DAY AND DURING THAT TIME MR. PHUNG NEVER WENT TO SITE. THE PROVINCE TEAM REPORTED TO HIM AFTER THEY COMPLETED THEIR MISSION THAT THEY HAD EXHUMED ALLEGED AMERICAN REMAINS. THE TEAM NEVER TOLD HIM HOW MANY REMAINS THEY EXHUMED, ONLY THAT THEY RECOVERED ALL THE REMAINS.

F. WITNESS FOUR. ON 26 MAR 96, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. DUONG THAI (ZWONG THAI).

(1) NAME: DUONG THAI.

(2) AGE: 50 YOA.

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE: HAMLET SEVEN, DONG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS ABOVE.

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: 1973-1975 DONG TRACH VILLAGE POLITICAL SECRETARY AND YOUTH PROGRAM DIRECTOR; 1975-1981 ASSISTANT VILLAGE CHAIRMAN.

(7) STATEMENT.

(A) ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN 1977, UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS BURIED A NUMBER OF ALLEGED AMERICAN REMAINS IN DONG TRACH VILLAGE. MR. THAI DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY REMAINS THE INDIVIDUALS BURIED. IN 1978, A PROVINCIAL TEAM CAME TO DONG TRACH VILLAGE AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FOR A SPECIAL PROJECT. THE TEAM DID NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL WORKERS FOR THE PROJECT, ONLY THAT THE VILLAGE PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE TEAM. MR. THAI APPOINTED A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS FROM THE VILLAGE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE TEAM NEAR DONG DINH HILL (DOOIF DOONGF DINHS) IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATE

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48Q XE 62745 47042.

(B) AFTER THE PROVINCIAL TEAM COMPLETED THEIR MISSION, THEY REPORTED TO MR. THAI THEY RECOVERED THE REMAINS OF ALLEGED U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS. THE TEAM DID NOT REVEAL THE NUMBER OF REMAINS THEY RECOVERED.

G. AFTER THE INTERVIEWS, THREE OF THE WITNESSES LED THE TEAM TO THE AREA WHERE THE PROVINCIAL TEAM ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED THE REMAINS. THE AREA IS IN THE MIDDLE OF A LOCAL CEMETERY AND IS SURROUNDED BY NUMEROUS LOCAL GRAVES.

H. ON 27 MAR 96, MR. TUAN, THE VNOSMP MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE, TRAVELLED TO CU NAM VILLAGE TO GATHER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS CASE. HE TALKED TO CU NAM VILLAGE AUTHORITIES AND LEARNED ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED THE REMAINS OF THE UNACCOUNTED-FOR INDIVIDUAL IN THIS CASE. THE INDIVIDUAL ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED THE REMAINS TO GATHER THE KNEE CAPS FOR MEDICINAL PURPOSES. CU NAM VILLAGE AUTHORITIES SAID THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE THIS INFORMATION AND WOULD REPORT THEIR FINDINGS TO THE TEAM. MR. TUAN ALSO OBTAINED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE IDENTIFICATION CARD OF THE UNACCOUNTED-FOR INDIVIDUAL IN THIS CASE. AFTER THE MILITIA KILLED THE UNACCOUNTED-FOR INDIVIDUAL, THEY TOOK HIS IDENTIFICATION CARD AND TURNED IT OVER TO THE QUANG TRACH DISTRICT AUTHORITIES, WHO FORWARDED THE ID CARD TO MILITARY REGION 4 (MR4) HEADQUARTERS.

I. ON 16 APR 96 THE TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. MAI TUONG (MAI TOWNGR) AT THE DONG TRUONG SON HOTEL, DONG HA TOWN, QUANG TRI PROVINCE. MR. MAI PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

(1) NAME: MAI TUONG.

(2) AGE: 64 YOA.

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE: 24/6 TAY LAP WARD, (PHWONG TAA Y LAAPJ), HUE CITY, THUA THIEN-HUE PROVINCE.

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: STATIONED IN VIET TRI, VINH PHU PROVINCE.

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED.

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: SOLDIER. IN 1972 WAS PUT IN CHARGE OF LOCATING AND RECOVERING AMERICAN REMAINS THROUGHOUT MR4.

(7) BACKGROUND: JOINT TEAMS HAVE INTERVIEWED MR. TUONG ON

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/
SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM DETAILED REPORT OF
RMKS/
FOUR OTHER OCCASIONS.

(8) STATEMENT.

(A) AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PARIS PEACE TREATY IN 1972, MR. TUONG'S JOB REQUIRED HIM TO GATHER ALL U.S. REMAINS LOST DURING THE WAR. AFTER GATHERING THE REMAINS HE SECURED THEM, MARKED THEM, AND MOVED THEM TO NORTH. HE ORGANIZED A TEAM OF NINE OR TEN INDIVIDUALS AND APPOINTED MR. TRAN HUU (TRAN HWU) TO LEAD THE TEAM.

(B) THE TEAM FOUND FIVE SETS OF REMAINS IN BO TRACH DISTRICT AND THEY REBURIED THEM IN SAND DUNES, IN THE DONG TRACH VILLAGE CEMETERY. AT THAT TIME, THE TEAM HAD NOTHING TO ASSIST IN

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DOCUMENTING WHO THE REMAINS BELONGED TO OR WHERE THE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED. MR. TUONG ONLY REMEMBERED MR. HUU'S TEAM RECOVERED ALL FIVE SETS IN BO TRACH DISTRICT. SINCE THE TEAM HAD NO WAY OF ACCURATELY IDENTIFYING WHO THE REMAINS BELONGED TO, THEY IDENTIFIED THE REMAINS BY THEIR "BEST GUESS."

(C) AFTER HE RECEIVED THE ORDER FROM HANOI TO RECOVER THE REMAINS, HIS JOB WAS TO ACCOUNT FOR AND TRANSPORT THE REMAINS TO HANOI. MR. TUONG ORGANIZED THE REMAINS RECOVERY TEAM, BUT HE DID NOT REMEMBER WHO HE APPOINTED TO LEAD THE TEAM OR THE NAMES OF ANY OF THE OTHER TEAM MEMBERS. HE REMEMBERED THREE INDIVIDUALS FROM THE "FILM AGENCY" (COW QUAN CHIEUS BONGS) FILMED THE EXCAVATION.

(D) MR. TUONG WAS PRESENT WHEN THE TEAM EXHUMED THE REMAINS IN DONG TRACH VILLAGE AND HE VERIFIED THE TEAM RECOVERED FIVE SETS. THE TEAM EXCAVATED AND PROCESSED ONE SET OF REMAINS AT A TIME. THEY CLEANED THEM WITH A BRUSH AND CHEMICALS, DRIED THEM, WRAPPED THEM IN A PLASTIC BAG AND PUT THEM IN SEPARATE BOXES. AFTER THEY BOXED THE REMAINS, THE TEAM LOADED THEM INTO A TRUCK AND TRANSPORTED THEM TO HANOI.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE.

5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS:

A. PROJECT LOCATION.

(1) GRID COORDINATES 48Q XE 62745 47042 (VERIFIED BY THE GPS USING FOUR SATELLITES).

(2) MAP DATA: MAP NAME - QUANG KHE, MAP NO. - 6244 2, MAP SERIES - L7014, PRINTED - 1966.

(3) OUTSTANDING FEATURES: NONE.

(4) TERRAIN: HILLY, WITH A FIVE TO 10 DEGREE SLOPE.

(5) SOIL CONDITIONS: SAND.

(6) VEGETATION: NONE.

(7) SURVEY METHOD: SURFACE SEARCH OF A 30 X 30-METER AREA.

(8) HAZARDS: STANDARD BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS, INCLUDING SNAKES AND INSECTS.

(9) RESULTS.

(A) REMAINS SEEN: NONE.

(B) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE.

(C) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE.

(D) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: NONE.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE.

7. AREA OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE.

8. ANALYST COMMENTS:

A. CORRELATIONS: NONE. ALL THE INFORMATION THE WITNESSES PROVIDED IS TOO VAGUE AND CANNOT BE CORRELATED TO ANY CASE AT THIS TIME.

B. POTENTIAL LEADS: CONTINUE THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE IN CU NAM VILLAGE CONCENTRATING ON THE INFORMATION MR. TUAN OBTAINED CONCERNING AN INDIVIDUAL WHO EXHUMED THE REMAINS.

C. WITNESS RELIABILITY: POOR. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, THE WITNESSES APPEARED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT WOULD PLACE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS INCIDENT ON PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS. THEY DID NOT PROVIDE ANSWERS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER AND APPEARED TO BE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION CONCERNING THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE INCIDENT.

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MR. MAI TUONG PROVIDED HIS ANSWERS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER AND DID NOT APPEAR TO BE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION.

D. THE RIT BASED THE ASSESSMENTS IN THIS REPORT ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND DOES NOT INTEND FOR THESE ASSESSMENTS TO CONSTITUTE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

E. DURING THE 13TH JFA A JOINT TEAM VIEWED A BO TRACH DISTRICT STATISTICAL DOCUMENT (BO TRACH DISTRICT SHOOT DOWN RECORD). PAGE 3, ENTRY 18 STATES AT 0800, ON 17 AUG 68, THE CU NAM VILLAGE PEOPLE'S MILITIA SHOT DOWN AN F-4. IT CRASHED IN MY TRACH (MYX TRACHJ) AND SON TRACH (SOWN TRACHJ) VILLAGES. PAGE 7, ENTRY 19 LISTS CAPT SHANAHAN AS CAPTURED. (NOTE: THE NAME SHANAHAN CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, BUT THE LOSS DATE CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 1253).

F. IN JULY 1991 (14TH JFA), WHILE VISITING THE MR-4 MUSEUM IN VINH CITY, A JOINT TEAM REVIEWED A DOCUMENT WRITTEN BY THE ENEMY PROSELYTING OFFICE FOR MR4. THE FIRST PAGE WAS TITLED, "RECORD OF DEAD AMERICAN AIR PIRATE GRAVES IN QUANG BINH." ENTRY 7 LISTED NAME NAME, DOB, AND SERVICE NUMBER, AND INDICATED HIS F-4C AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN ON DATA AUG 1968. HIS BODY WAS BURIED IN DONG TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. IT NOTED THE BODY WAS INTACT. A SECOND PAGE WAS TITLED, "RECORD OF AMERICAN AIR PIRATES KILLED AND TORN APART IN MILITARY REGION IV." ENTRY 23 LISTED

Name NAME, DOB, SERVICE NUMBER, AND INDICATED HIS F-4 AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN ON DATA AUG 68 IN PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. (NOTE. THE DATA AUG 68 DATE CORRESPONDS TO THE DATE OF THE CASE DATA INCIDENT. WHILE THE NAME AND PERSONAL DATA IN ENTRY 23 RELATE TO NAME, THE DATE AND LOCATION INDICATES THE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES TO CASE DATA. IT APPEARS THE VIETNAMESE HAVE CONFUSED THESE TWO INCIDENTS.)

G. ON 17 DEC 1992, THE SRV PROVIDED A DOCUMENT TITLED, "REGISTER OF U.S. GRAVES IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE." ENTRY 10 LISTS NAME BY NAME, DOB, AND SERIAL NUMBER. IT SAYS HE WAS SHOT DOWN ON DATA AUG 68 AND DIED IN SEP 68. THE BODY WAS MISSING THE RIGHT ARM OR HAND. THE BURIAL LOCATION WAS PHUC DONG HAMLET PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH. AGAIN, IT APPEARS THE VIETNAMESE HAVE CONFUSED THE CASE DATA AND CASE 1253 LOSS INCIDENTS. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM WITNESSES ON THE 25TH JFA INDICATES THE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN PHUC DONG HAMLET, PHUC TRACH VILLAGE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1253.

H. THE MR4 SHOOT DOWN RECORD, ENTRY 1331, LISTS AN RF-4C SHOT DOWN AT CU NAM AT 0810 ON 15 AUG 68 WHILE ATTACKING NGHIA BUNG
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM DETAILED REPORT OF

RMKS/

INFORMATION MRS. VAO PROVIDED WITH ANY UNACCOUNTED-FOR U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS.

(4) WITNESS FOUR: THE INFORMATION MR. DUE PROVIDED IS CONSISTENT WITH THE INFORMATION THE OTHER THREE WITNESSES PROVIDED. HOWEVER, THIS INFORMATION INVOLVED A SITE THAT AMERICAN FORCES SUCCESSFULLY EXCAVATED AND DOES NOT CORRELATE TO AN UNACCOUNTED-FOR

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AMERICAN.

B. POTENTIAL LEADS: RECOMMEND THE VNOSMP FIND MR. LUONG AND MAKE HIM AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW. MRS. VAO IDENTIFIED MR. LUONG AS A MEMBER OF THE HAI AN VILLAGE POLICE FORCE WHO ALLEGEDLY TOOK THE AMERICAN'S WATCH FROM HER. MR. LUONG MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING ANY OTHER PERSONAL EFFECTS FROM THIS INDIVIDUAL.

C. WITNESS RELIABILITY: EXCELLENT. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, THE WITNESSES ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. AT THE START OF THE INTERVIEW WITH MRS. VAO, SHE INDICATED SHE HAD NO INFORMATION CONCERNING ANY UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. SHE WAS VISIBLY NERVOUS AND AT ONE POINT WAS CRYING. THIS IS PROBABLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT VILLAGE AND DISTRICT POLICE OFFICIALS PICKED HER UP AT HER HOME AND BROUGHT HER TO THE BINH CHAU VILLAGE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE HOUSE FOR INTERVIEW. MRS. VAO HAD NO PRIOR WARNING THAT A JOINT TEAM WAS GOING TO INTERVIEW HER AND THOUGHT THE POLICE WERE ARRESTING HER. BOTH THE VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS AND THE U.S. TEAM REASSURED HER THEY WERE ONLY INTERESTED IN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOSS OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. BOTH SIDES ALSO ASSURED HER THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY INTENTIONS OF ARRESTING HER. MRS. VAO THEN FELT COMFORTABLE AND PROVIDED HER INFORMATION IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER.

D. THE RIT BASED THE ASSESSMENTS IN THIS REPORT ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND DOES NOT INTEND FOR THESE ASSESSMENTS TO CONSTITUTE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

E. THE INFORMATION THE WITNESSES PROVIDED HAS A FEW DISCREPANCIES, BUT IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT. THE DISCREPANCIES ARE PROBABLY DUE TO THE PASSAGE OF TIME. THE AREA MR. DUE INDICATED AMERICAN FORCES EXCAVATED AND THE AREA MR. DAT AND MR. LANH POINTED OUT ARE APPROXIMATELY 100 METERS APART. DESPITE THESE DISCREPANCIES, WITNESSES ALL PROBABLY DESCRIBED THE SAME INCIDENT.

F. MR. DAT SAID THE GUERRILLA FORCES LEFT THE AREA WHILE THE AMERICANS SEARCHED FOR THE BODY. THIS COULD ACCOUNT FOR WHY HE AND MR. LANH DID NOT KNOW AMERICAN FORCES RECOVERED THE BODY.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY COMMENTS: NONE.

10. TEAM CHIEF COMMENTS:

A. THE VNOSMP, DONG NAI, BA RIA-VUNG TAU AND QUANG TRI PROVINCE OFFICIALS WERE VERY COOPERATIVE AND PROVIDED EXCELLENT SUPPORT TO THE RIT. ADVANCE WORK BY BOTH VNOSMP AND PROVINCE OFFICIALS WAS THOROUGH. THE RIT'S VNOSMP COUNTERPARTS PREPARED AND BRIEFED THE PROVINCE ON THE TEAM'S REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO THE TEAM'S ARRIVAL. THIS PREPARATION ALLOWED THE TEAM TO BEGIN AND COMPLETE THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE IN AN EXPEDITIOUS MANNER.

B. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: NONE.

11. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS: CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THIS INCIDENT MAY HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AT THE TIME OF LOSS, MORE INFORMATION IS NEEDED TO CONFIRM U.S. RECOVERY OF REMAINS.//

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INQUIRE=DOC28D
ITEM NO=00543478

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS740 MCN = 94327/44899 TOR = 943272118
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS6564 3272116-UUUU--RUEANSS.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O P 220843Z NOV 94
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE

ZEM

CONTROLS

UNCLAS

BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) CORRECTED MESSAGE
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS740 MCN = 94327/44899 TOR = 943272118
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS6564 3272116-UUUU--RUEANSS.
ZNR UUUUU

O 232116Z NOV 94
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
O P 220843Z NOV 94
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:RSA//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
ZEN/CJTFFA DET TWO HANOI
BT

UNCLAS //N03000//

SECTION 01 OF 02

AMPN/SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1262//
REF/A/MSG/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI/212350Z NOV 94//
REF/B/MSG/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH/250517Z SEP 93//
REF/C/MSG/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH/010722Z JUN 93//

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
RMKS/THIS REPORT IS BASED ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND NOT
INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.
1. REFERENCES.

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A. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF JOINT U.S./SRV ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM DURING THE 32ND JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) FROM 15 OCT TO 15 NOV 94.

B. REF B IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1262 CONDUCTED DURING THE 25TH JFA.

C. REF C IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1262 CONDUCTED DURING THE 23RD JFA.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION.

A. PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS REINVESTIGATION WAS TO:

(1) FOLLOW UP ON INFORMATION MR. HIEN PROVIDED DURING THE 23RD JFA ON A POSSIBLE F-4 CRASH SITE.

(2) CANVASS HAMLETS AND VILLAGES IN TAN HOI AND TAN THANH HAMLETS IN LIEN TRACH VILLAGE AS WELL AS TAM TRANG AND THUNG HAMLETS, IN LAM TRACH VILLAGE.

B. DATE/LOCATION. ON 8 NOV 94, IE1 TRAVELED TO PHUC TRACH (PHUCS TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH (BOOS TRACHJ) DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 1262.

C. CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE 24 AUG 68 LOSS OF AN F-4D AIRCRAFT ON A NIGHT ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION RESULTING IN TWO UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUALS.

D. SRT/PCIT CASE: N/A.

E. RESULTS OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS. JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATED THIS CASE ON TWO OTHER OCCASIONS.

(1) DURING THE 23RD JFA WHILE INVESTIGATING CASE 1177, A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED WITNESSES WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT POSSIBLY CORRELATES TO THIS CASE.

(2) DURING THE 25TH JFA, A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED WITNESSES AND SURVEYED CRASH AND BURIAL SITES.

F. RESULTS OF CURRENT INVESTIGATION. IE1 INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT AN AIRCRAFT CRASH IN 1968. THE INFORMATION THE TEAM OBTAINED DOES NOT CORRELATE TO THIS CASE.

(1) REMAINS SUMMARY. NONE RECOVERED OR RECEIVED.

(2) MATERIAL EVIDENCE SUMMARY. NONE RECOVERED OR RECEIVED.

(3) PERSONAL EFFECTS SUMMARY. NONE RECOVERED OR RECEIVED.

G. RECOMMENDATION. PENDING.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION.

A. ON 15 OCT 94, THE JOINT U.S./SRV INVESTIGATION TEAM ARRIVED IN HANOI CITY TO BEGIN THE 32ND JFA.

B. TEAM COMPOSITION.

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT.

CPT THURMOND, TIMOTHY	TEAM LEADER
SSG IVERSEN, ALFRED	ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
CTI2 FOSTER, RONALD	ANALYST/LINGUIST
CTISN HUYNH, TIM	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SSG EAGLE, MICHAEL	SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
SSG FELL, JOHN	SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
SSG MULLER, HARVEY	TEAM MEDIC

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SFC EHMANN, SCOTT EOD TECHNICIAN

(2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT.

MR. TRAN MINH TUAN (TRAANH MINH TUANS) MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS/TEAM LEADER
MR. VU THANG (VUX THAWNGS) MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE

MR. DO XUAN THANG (DDOOR XUAAN THAWNGS) MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE

MR. PHAM TRONG DUNG (PHAMJ TRONGJ DUNGX) MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

MR. NGUYEN DINH HIET (NGUYEENX DDINH HIEETJ) MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

(3) QUANG BINH PROVINCE TASK TEAM.

MR. LE DINH DUONG (LEE DDINH DWONG) TEAM LEADER
MR. NGO DINH KHUYNH (NGOO DDINH KHUYNH) QUANG BINH MIA OFFICE
MR. NGUYEN VAN TANH (NGUYEENX VAWN TANHF) QUANG BINH MIA OFFICE
MR. DANG VAN GIAN (DDANGJ VAWN GIANR) QUANG BINH MIA OFFICE

C. ON 8 NOV 94, THE JOINT TEAM TRAVELED TO PHUC TRACH
VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE TO
INVESTIGATE CASE 1262. PRIOR TO THE TEAM'S ARRIVAL, THE
VNOSMP CANVASSED HAMLETS AND VILLAGES IN TAN ROI AND TAN
THANH HAMLETS IN LIEN TRACH VILLAGE AS WELL AS TAM TRANG AND
THUNG HAMLETS IN LAM TRACH VILLAGE. THEY PROVIDED THREE
WITNESSES FOR THE JOINT TEAM TO INTERVIEW. THE WITNESSES
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) WITNESS 1

(A) NAME: MR. LE CAY (LEE CAAYF)

(B) AGE: 58 YOA

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE: LIFETIME RESIDENT OF PHUC
TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME.

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: VILLAGE

COMMANDER.

(G) WITNESS RELIABILITY: CREDIBLE AND RELIABLE.

(H) STATEMENT: DURING THE SIXTH LUNAR MONTH OF
1968 AT APPROXIMATELY 1000, HE SAW FOUR F-4 AIRCRAFT FLYING
OVER THE AREA. A MISSILE HIT ONE OF THE AIRCRAFT, CAUSING
IT TO EXPLODE IN THE AIR. PRIOR TO THE EXPLOSION, HE SAW
TWO PARACHUTES EJECT FROM THE AIRCRAFT. HE HEARD THAT PAVN
CAPTURED ONE PILOT IMMEDIATELY AND THE EJECTION KILLED THE
OTHER. THE CAPTURED PILOT HAD A BROKEN ARM AND HIS CAPTORS
TOOK HIM TO THE LOCAL CLINIC.

(1) MR. CAY WAS AT THE LOCAL CLINIC WHEN THEY
BROUGHT THE WOUNDED PILOT IN FOR TREATMENT. THE PILOT WAS A
CAUCASIAN MALE WITH BLONDE HAIR. THE PILOT DIED TWO MONTHS

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

LATER, IN AUGUST, FROM THE INFECTED WOUND.

(2) MR. CAY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BURYING THE
PILOT. HE DOES NOT KNOW THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE PILOT WHO
DIED FROM THE EJECTION.

(3) IN 1973, HE EXHUMED THE REMAINS OF THE

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PILOT HE BURIED. HE TURNED THE REMAINS OVER TO THE DISTRICT AUTHORITIES.

(4) THE VNOSMP TEAM LEADER SAID THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT REPATRIATED THE REMAINS MR. CAY EXHUMED.

(2) WITNESS 2

(A) NAME: MR. LE VAN MINH (LEE VAWN MINH)

(B) AGE: 44 YOA

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE: LIFETIME RESIDENT PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME.

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: VILLAGE CHAIRMAN.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: LOCAL

MILITIA MEMBER.

(G) WITNESS RELIABILITY: CREDIBLE AND RELIABLE.

(H) STATEMENT: DURING THE SIXTH LUNAR MONTH OF 1968 AT APPROXIMATELY 1600, MR. MINH SAW TWO F-4H AIRCRAFT. ONE AIRCRAFT WAS ON FIRE AND SMOKING. HE SAW TWO PARACHUTES EJECT FROM THE AIRCRAFT. HE LATER HEARD THAT SOLDIERS CAPTURED ONE PILOT AND THE OTHER DIED FROM THE EJECTION.

(1) HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CAPTURED PILOT, BUT SAID THE OTHER PILOT LANDED IN CHAI LAP (CHAIF LAAPJ) HAMLET. SOMEONE BURIED THE PILOT IN PHUC DONG (PHUCS DDOONGP) HAMLET, PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(2) HE HEARD THAT THE CAPTURED PILOT WAS A MAJOR AND THE DEAD PILOT WAS A LIEUTENANT COLONEL.

(3) IN 1972, HE MOVED FROM THE AREA AND JOINED THE ARMY. HE RETURNED IN 1989, AND HEARD THAT SOMEONE (NFI) EXHUMED THE GRAVE OF THE PILOT.

(4) MR. MINH KNEW OF ANOTHER INCIDENT AND PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: IN APRIL OF 1967 AT APPROXIMATELY 1200, HE SAW FOUR F-4H AIRCRAFT. ONE AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES AND HE SAW ONE RED PARACHUTE. THE PARACHUTE DRIFTED TOWARDS THE TOP OF A MOUNTAIN. THE LOCAL MILITIA AND SOLDIERS ATTEMPTED TO TRAVEL TO THE AREA TO SEARCH FOR THE DOWNED PILOT, BUT NUMEROUS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WERE BOMBING THE AREA AND PREVENTED THEM FROM REACHING THE DOWNED PILOT. MR. MINH SAID THAT AT APPROXIMATELY 0300, A HELICOPTER CAME AND RESCUED THE DOWNED PILOT.

(3) WITNESS 3

(A) NAME: MR. NGUYEN HIEN (NGUYEENX HIEENF)

(B) AGE: 37 YOA

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE: LIFETIME RESIDENT PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME.

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: N/A.

(G) WITNESS RELIABILITY: CREDIBLE AND RELIABLE.

(H) STATEMENT: IN APRIL OR MAY OF 1967 AT APPROXIMATELY 1400, ONE F-4H AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN CHAI LAP VILLAGE. APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR LATER, ANOTHER AIRCRAFT

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CAME AND RESCUED THE DOWNED PILOT. MR. HIEN DOES NOT KNOW OF ANY FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THIS OR ANY OTHER INCIDENT.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

A. MATERIAL EVIDENCE RETAINED BY JTF-PA: NONE.

B. MATERIAL EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHED AND LEFT IN PLACE:
NONE.

C. REMAINS. NONE RECOVERED OR RECEIVED.

5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS: NONE.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED. NONE.

8. ANALYST COMMENTS. WITNESSES 1 AND 2 SAID THE AIRCRAFT WAS AN F-4H AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT WAS AN F-4D. ALL THREE WITNESSES SAID THE EVENT OCCURRED DURING THE DAY. THE AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE WAS FLYING A NIGHT MISSION. THE WITNESSES STATEMENTS DO NOT CORRELATE TO THIS CASE.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS: NONE.

10. TEAM CHIEF COMMENTS:

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY.

(1) WITNESS 1 - CREDIBLE AND RELIABLE.

(2) WITNESS 2 - CREDIBLE AND RELIABLE.

(3) WITNESS 3 - CREDIBLE AND RELIABLE.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSION. CASE 1262 INVOLVED THE LOSS OF AN F-4D AIRCRAFT ON A NIGHT ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. ALL THREE WITNESSES WE INTERVIEWED PROVIDED INFORMATION ON AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED DURING THE DAY. THE INFORMATION THEY PROVIDED POSSIBLY CORRELATES TO CASES 0893 AND 1253 BASED ON LOSS LOCATION. WE DID NOT DISCOVER ANY NEW INFORMATION CORRELATING TO CASE 1262 AND HAVE EXHAUSTED ALL LEADS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE.

C. VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT COOPERATION AND SUPPORT.
EXCELLENT AT BOTH THE CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS.

D. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: NONE.

11. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS. PENDING.//

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INQUIRE=DOC23D
 ITEM NO=00449870
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = LGX940 MCN = 93268/08259 TOR = 932680524
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 ZNR UUUUU

HEADER
 R 250528Z SEP 93
 FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 250522Z SEP 93
 FM CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
 TO RUHQHQ/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//OCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUHQHQ/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M/
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHDC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:RSA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI
 RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

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DIA PASS TO DOD POW-MIA CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION OFFICE

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT: CASE DATA

REF: A. JTF/FA, DET 1, BKK TH, PART I: DTG240457Z SEP
 93; PART II: DTG240556Z SEP 93

B. JOINT INVESTIGATION REPORT: CU NAM VILLAGE (UNDATED)

1. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 25TH SERIES OF
 JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 19 AUG-
 20 SEP 93. PARAGRAPH 2. OF REF A CONCERNS THE
 INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA. THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS
 CASE IS REPORTED IN DETAIL HEREIN. THIS REPORT IS BASED
 ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE
 FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: ON 1 AND 4 SEP 93, IEI
 TRAVELLED TO CU NAM AND PHUC TRACH VILLAGES, BO TRACH

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DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE DATA. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE DATA AUG 68 CRASH OF AN RF-4C DURING A SOLO RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. ONE AMERICAN IN THIS CASE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED FROM A POW CAMP AND ONE AMERICAN IS UNACCOUNTED FOR. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED TWO WITNESSES IN CU NAM VILLAGE WHO TOLD OF THE CAPTURE, DEATH AND BURIAL OF A DOWNED CREWMAN. THE TEAM TRAVELLED TO THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE IN CU NAM VILLAGE AND THIS SITE CORRELATES TO THE CASE. THE TEAM ALSO INTERVIEWED SIX OTHER WITNESSES WHO PROVIDED NO INFORMATION RELATED TO THIS CASE. IMPENETRABLE JUNGLE AND SHEER MOUNTAIN CLIFFS CREATED DANGEROUS CONDITIONS THWARTED THE TEAMS ATTEMPTS TO SURVEY THE LAST KNOWN INCIDENT LOCATION. IE1 CONDUCTED AN AERIAL SURVEY OF THE INCIDENT LOCATION REFLECTED IN U.S. RECORDS, WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. RECOMMEND THIS CASE FOR EXCAVATION.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

- A. ON 1 SEP 93, IE1 TRAVELLED TO CU NAM (CWJ NAAAMR) VILLAGE, BO TRACH (BOOS TRACHJ) DISTRICT, QUANG BINH (QUANGR BINHF) PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE DATA. THE U.S. CONTINGENT CONSISTED OF:
- CPT ROBERT K. WEST (TEAM LEADER)
- MSGT ROBERT A. MCLEAN (ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER)
- MSGT MICHAEL B. NAJIM (JTF-FA LINGUIST/ANALYST)
- SFC PAUL F. HART (TEAM MEDIC)
- SSG DAMON D. MANNING (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- SSG PAUL A. ADAMS (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- SSG DREW A. DEASON (EOD TECHNICIAN)
- SSGT GREGORY A. STEIN (JTF-FA LINGUIST/ANALYST)
- SGT CHUCK Q. DOAN (JTF-FA ANALYST/LINGUIST)

VNOSMP MEMBERS INCLUDED:

- ZUONG VAN NGOC (DWONG VAWN NGOCJ) (TEAM LEADER)
- LUU VAN THO (LWU YAWN THOJ)
- BUI QUANG TAM (BUIF QUANG TAAM)
- TRINH QUOC KHANH (TRINH QUOC KHANH)
- NGUYEN QUANG MAO (NGUYEENX QUANG MAO)

THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE TASK TEAM INCLUDED:

- LE DUC ZWONG (LEE DDWCS DWONG) (TEAM LEADER)
- PHAM VAN LA (PHAMJ VAWN LA)
- LE CONG TANG (LEE COONG TAWNGJ)
- B. THE FIRST WITNESS PRESENTED FOR INTERVIEW WAS

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MR. NGUYEN LAN (NGUYENX LAN), A 65 YOA FARMER RESIDING IN KHUONG SON (KHWONG SOWN) HAMLET, CU NAM VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. LAN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

- 1. AT ABOUT 0900 HRS ON AN UNRECALLED DAY IN AUG 68, LAN WITNESSED AN F4 AIRCRAFT CRASH IN THE AREA. TWO CREW MEMBERS SUCCESSFULLY EJECTED FROM THE AIRCRAFT. ONE WAS HURT AND TRANSPORTED TO BO TRACH HOSPITAL. THIS

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CREW MEMBER WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSFERRED TO DISTRICT-LEVEL AUTHORITIES. LAN DID NOT KNOW WHO TRANSFERRED THE CREWMAN NOR DID HE KNOW WHO TREATED HIM. THE OTHER CREW MEMBER RESISTED CAPTURE, AND WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY LOCAL MILITIA.

- 2. THE BODY OF THE DEAD CREW MEMBER WAS BURIED BY MR. HOANG TIEN ZUNG (HOANGF TIEENS DUNGX) IN HA MON (HAF MOON) HAMLET. THE VILLAGE RECOVERED FROM THE DEAD CREW MEMBER ONE IDENTIFICATION CARD, ONE OR TWO DOG TAGS, ONE WATCH, ONE RING, ONE HAND-HELD RADIO, AND ONE COMPASS. ALL OF THOSE ITEMS WERE TRANSFERRED TO DISTRICT-LEVEL OFFICIALS. LAN DID NOT KNOW WHO RECOVERED THESE ITEMS. LAN WAS A COMPANY COMMANDER OF THE VILLAGE MILITIA AT THAT TIME. HE DID NOT KNOW IF DOCUMENTATION RELATED TO THIS INCIDENT STILL EXISTED.

- C. THE SECOND WITNESS PRESENTED FOR INTERVIEW WAS MR. HOANG TIEN ZUNG (HOANGF TIEENS DUNGX), A 57 YOA FARMER RESIDING IN TRUNG NAM (TRUNG NAAMJ) HAMLET, CU NAM VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. ZUNG WAS REFERENCED BY THE FIRST WITNESS AS THE INDIVIDUAL WHO BURIED THE DEAD CREWMAN. DURING THE 4TH JFA, ZUNG WAS INTERVIEWED BY THE JOINT TEAM (REF B). ZUNG RELATED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- 1. THE BODY OF THE DEAD CREW MEMBER WAS BURIED IN A BUNKER, APPROXIMATELY ONE METER DEEP. THE BODY WAS WRAPPED IN SIX METERS OF CLOTH AND PLACED IN A WOODEN COFFIN. THE BURIAL SITE IS PRESENTLY A CULTIVATED FIELD. THE WITNESS BELIEVED THAT THE REMAINS HAD NOT BEEN DISTURBED DUE TO THE DEPTH OF THE BURIAL.

- D. ZUNG LED THE TEAM TO THE BURIAL SITE IN CU NAM VILLAGE, WHICH WAS THE SAME SITE HE POINTED OUT DURING THE 4TH JFA (REF B). THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE IS LOCATED AT GRID COORDINATE XB48585095. THE SITE IS IN THE MIDDLE OF A CULTIVATED FIELD. ZUNG POINTED OUT A 15 X 30 X 20 X 50 METER AREA AS THE POSSIBLE BURIAL SITE. THE TEAM CONDUCTED A SEARCH OF THE AREA, DISCOVERING NO EVIDENCE OF REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, OR A POSSIBLE BURIAL LOCATION. DUE TO THE LARGE SIZE OF THE SITE, THE

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TEAM DID NOT CONDUCT AN EXCAVATION.

- E. ON 4 SEP 93, THE TEAM TRAVELLED TO PHUC TRACH (PHUCS TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT TO CONTINUE THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE. ACCORDING TO A QUANG BINH PROVINCE BURIAL DOCUMENT, THE BURIAL SITE RELATED TO THIS CASE WAS PHUC TRACH VILLAGE. WHILE, ACCORDING TO THE MILITARY REGION (MR) IV OPERATIONS JOURNAL, THE SHOOT-DOWN TOOK PLACE IN CU NAM VILLAGE.

- F. PRESENTED FOR INTERVIEW WAS MR. LE CAY (LEE CAAYJ), A 56 YOA FARMER RESIDING IN PHUC LOC (PHUCS LOOCJ) HAMLET, PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. CAY PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

- 1. APPROXIMATELY 1000 HRS ON AN UNRECALLED DAY IN JUL 68, CAY OBSERVED TWO F4 AIRCRAFT APRE IN THE SKY. ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE AREA, AND THE OTHER CRASHED FAR AWAY. HE ALSO OBSERVED TWO FULLY DEPLOYED PARACHUTES IN THE SKY. HE WAS THE VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER AT THE TIME, AND HIS UNIT WAS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE CAPTURE OF THE CREW MEMBERS. THE MILITIA OF THE BREWERY COMPANY IN THE AREA CAPTURED ONE OF THE CREW MEMBERS. THIS CREW MEMBER HAS INJURED IN ONE ARM, TREATED IN THE VILLAGE DISPENSARY, AND LATER DIED OF INFECTION. HIS BODY WAS BURIED IN THE VILLAGE.

- 2. CAY DESCRIBED THE AMERICAN AS A CAUCASOID, 1.80 METERS IN HEIGHT, HAVING BLOND HAIR AND BLUE EYES. HE HAD HIS LEFT HAND AMPUTATED AND WAS TREATED IN THE VILLAGE DISPENSARY FOR TWO MONTHS BEFORE HE DIED OF INFECTION. NURSE LE THI TIN (LEE THIJ TIN) NURTURED THE AMERICAN DURING HIS STAY AT THE DISPENSARY.

- 3. AROUND 1977, DISTRICT AUTHORITIES CAME AND EXHUMED THE REMAINS OF THE AMERICAN. THE WITNESS WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE EXHUMATION. THE REMAINS WERE STILL WRAPPED IN CLOTH AND INSIDE A WOODEN COFFIN; THE REMAINS WERE A FULL SET EXCEPT FOR A LEFT HAND. THE

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WITNESS RECALLED THAT MR. LE MINH HOANG (LEE MINH HOANGF) WAS A DISTRICT CADRE INVOLVED IN THE EXHUMATION.

- G. PRESENTED NEXT FOR INTERVIEW WAS MRS. LE THI TIN (LEE THIJ TIN), A 56 YOA RETIRED NURSE RESIDING IN PHUC DONG (PHUCS DDOONG) HAMLET, PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. TIN WAS REFERENCE BY CAY AS THE NURSE WHO TREATED THE INJURED AMERICAN DURING HIS STAY AT THE DISPENSARY. TIN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

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- 1. IN THE AFTERNOON OF AN UNRECALLED DAY IN 1968, A WOUNDED AMERICAN WAS ESCORTED TO THE VILLAGE DISPENSARY FOR TREATMENT. THE AMERICAN WAS NOT WEARING BOOTS AND HIS FLIGHT SUIT WAS SOAKED WITH BLOOD. THE WITNESS RECALLED THAT SHE SAW THE RANK OF TWO BARS ON THE FLIGHT SUIT.

- 2. THE AMERICAN HAD HIS HAND AMPUTATED AND STAYED IN THE DISPENSARY FOR TWO MONTHS BEFORE HE DIED OF INFECTION. THE AMERICAN DID NOT HAVE ANY SCARS OR TATOOS. HE WAS NOT BALD AND HAD "EXCELLENT" TEETH. THE WITNESS DID NOT RECALL THAT HE HAD ANY RESTORATION IN HIS TEETH.

- 3. TIN NURTURED THE AMERICAN DURING HIS STAY AT THE DISPENSARY. THROUGH HAND GESTURES, THE WITNESS GUESSED THAT THE AMERICAN WAS JUST MARRIED AND HAD NO CHILDREN. THE AMERICAN ALSO HAD ON HIM A SOLID GOLD BRACELET. THE WITNESS DID NOT RECALL THE NAME OF THE AMERICAN; SHE ALWAYS REFERRED TO HIM AS "PILOT" DURING HIS STAY. DR. DINH HUU SA WAS IN CHARGE OF THE DISPENSARY AND TREATED THE AMERICAN. DR. SA RETIRED IN THE VILLAGE. DURING THE AMERICAN'S STAY AT THE DISPENSARY, THERE WERE CADRES WHO CAME TO TALK TO HIM, BUT TIN DID NOT REMEMBER THE CADRES' NAMES.

- H. THE THIRD WITNESS PRESENTED FOR INTERVIEW WAS DR. DINH HUU SA (DDINH HWUJ SAF), A 67 YOA RETIREE RESIDING IN PHUC DONG HAMLET, PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. DR. SA WAS THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF PHUC TRACH VILLAGE DISPENSARY, AND REFERENCED BY TIN AS THE DOCTOR WHO TREATED THE AMERICAN. HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

- 1. IN 1968 THERE WAS AN AMERICAN WHO WAS LED TO THE DISPENSARY FOR TREATMENT, AND STAYED THERE FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS UNTIL HE DIED OF INFECTION. THE AMERICAN WAS ABOUT 40 YEARS OLD, A CAUCASIAN, AND ABOUT 1.65 METERS IN HEIGHT. HE WAS A LITTLE BALD AND HAD BLOND HAIR AND BLUE EYES. WHEN HE FIRST ARRIVED TO THE DISPENSARY, THE AMERICAN HAD A MUSTACHE AND A GOLD WEDDING BAND. HE DID NOT WEAR BOOTS. MR. THUONG (THWONGR) ESCORTED THE AMERICAN TO THE DISPENSARY.

- 2. THE WITNESS DID NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE AMERICAN, BUT HE HEARD FROM SOMEBODY THAT THE AMERICAN WAS A MAJOR. IN THE MEDICAL RECORD, THE WITNESS PUT "AMERICAN" IN THE PLACE OF THE AMERICAN'S NAME. ALL MEDICAL RECORDS AT THE DISPENSARY WERE BURNED IN A BOMB RAID DURING THE WAR. THE WITNESS COULD NOT RECALL THE NAMES OF THE CADRES WHO CAME TO THE DISPENSARY TO TALK

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TO THE AMERICAN.

- I. THE FOURTH WITNESS PRESENTED FOR INTERVIEW WAS MR. LE MINH HOANG (LEE MINH HOANGF), A 61 YOA RETIREE RESIDING IN PHUC DONG HAMLET, PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. HOANG WAS REFERENCED BY CAY AS A DISTRICT CADRE WHO PARTOOK IN THE EXHUMATION OF THE AMERICAN'S REMAINS. HOANG IS OLD AND VERY FORGETFUL. HE COULD ONLY RECALL THAT THE REMAINS EXHUMED WERE MISSING ONLY A HAND. WHEN EXHUMED, THE REMAINS WERE STILL IN A WOODEN COFFIN AND WRAPPED IN CLOTH. HE WAS UNABLE TO FURNISH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

- J. THE FIFTH WITNESS PRESENTED FOR INTERVIEW WAS MR. NGUYEN THUONG (NGUYEENX THOWNGR), A 53 YOA FARMER RESIDING IN PHUC DONG HAMLET, PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. THUONG WAS REFERENCED BY DR. SA AS THE INDIVIDUAL WHO ESCORTED THE AMERICAN TO THE DISPENSARY. THUONG PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

- 1. IN 1968, THUONG WAS WORKING FOR THE BREWERY COMPANY IN PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, AND PARTICIPATED IN THE COMPANY'S MILITIA. AT ABOUT 1500 HRS ON AN UNRECALLED DAY IN JUL 68, TWO F4 AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN. THERE WERE TWO PILOTS WHO PARACHUTED OUT SUCCESSFULLY. HIS UNIT CAPTURED ONE PILOT. THE OTHER PILOT LANDED IN A DIFFERENT AREA AND WAS CAPTURED BY ANOTHER UNIT. THE PILOT CAPTURED BY THUONG'S UNIT WAS HURT IN THE LEFT ARM, DURING A SHOOTOUT WITH HIS UNIT. MR. HOAN (HOANS) WAS THE ONE WHO SHOT THE PILOT. MR. HOAN PRESENTLY RESIDES IN VAN HOA (VAWN HOAS) VILLAGE, TUYEN HOA (TUYEEN HOAS) DISTRICT.

- 2. MR. HIA (HIA), THE COMPANY DIRECTOR, SEARCHED THE CAPTURED PILOT. THE WITNESS DID NOT RECALL THAT THE PILOT HAD ANY JEWELRY. THE WITNESS LEARNED FROM MR. HIA THAT THE PILOT WAS A FIRST LIEUTENANT. THE PILOT HAD TWO PISTOLS. ALL THE PERSONAL EFFECTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE PILOT WERE KEPT BY MR. HIA AND LATER TRANSFERRED TO DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. IT WAS THE COMMON PRACTICE TO TAKE OFF THE BOOTS FROM THE CAPTURED PILOTS. THE WITNESS AND ONE OTHER MAN ESCORTED THE PILOT TO THE VILLAGE DISPENSARY FOR TREATMENT. THE WITNESS FORGOT THE NAME OF THE OTHER MAN.

- K. MR. CAY THEN LED THE TEAM TO THE BURIAL SITE. THE SITE IS LOCATED IN PHUC TRACH VILLAGE AT GRID COORDINATES XB34895096. THE TEAM DUG A 40 X 40 CMS TEST PIT TO EXAMINE SOIL CONTENT, WHICH WAS HARD RED CLAY. NO REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS WERE RECOVERED. CAY

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REPORTED THAT REMAINS FROM THIS SITE HAD BEEN EXHUMED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. WITNESS WAS ABLE TO POINT OUT A 50 BY 50 METER AREA LOCATED WITHIN A CEMETERY IN PHUC TRACH VILLAGE AS THE PRIOR BURIAL LOCATION. A SEARCH OF THE AREA REVEALED NUMEROUS VIETNAMESE GRAVES, BUT NO EVIDENCE OF REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. THE TEAM CORRELATED THIS SITE TO CASE 1253.

- L. ON 1 SEP 93, IE1 CONDUCTED AN AERIAL SEARCH OF THE INCIDENT LOCATION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE HELD IN U.S. RECORDS. THE TEAM SEARCHED THE AREA SURROUNDING AND INCLUDING GRID COORDINATE XE450450 (VERIFIED BY THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM TRACKING FOUR SATELLITES). NO EVIDENCE OF REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, OR A POSSIBLE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE WAS DISCOVERED.

- M. ON 10 SEP 93, THE TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. PHAN VAN HIA (PHAN VAWN HIA), A 70 YOA RETIREE RESIDING IN PHUONG HA (PHWONG HAF) HAMLET, DAI TRACH (DAIJ TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. HIA WAS REFERENCED BY THUONG AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE BREWERY COMPANY IN PHUC TRACH VILLAGE AND THE GENTLEMAN WHO SEARCHED AND RETRIEVED PERSONAL EFFECTS FROM THE PILOT. HIA PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

- 1. APPROXIMATELY 1200 HRS ON AN UNRECALLED DAY IN THE DRY SEASON OF 1968, THERE WAS AN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE AREA. TWO PILOTS EJECTED AND THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE MOUNTAINS FAR AWAY. HIS COMPANY MILITIA FORCE CAPTURED BOTH PILOTS. ONE PILOT, A SECOND LIEUTENANT, SURRENDERED ON FIRST CONTACT WITH THE MILITIA. THE OTHER PILOT, A FIRST LIEUTENANT, TRIED TO EVADE, AND WAS SHOT IN THE HAND AFTER HE KILLED ONE OF THE MILITIA.

- 2. THE TWO PILOTS WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE PHUC TRACH VILLAGE AUTHORITY, BECAUSE HIS COMPANY WAS NOT CAPABLE OF HANDLING PRISONERS. HIA HEARD THAT THE SECOND LIEUTENANT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSFERRED TO DISTRICT AUTHORITIES, AND THE FIRST LIEUTENANT HAD HIS HAND AMPUTATED AT THE VILLAGE DISPENSARY AND SUBSEQUENTLY DIED OF INFECTION.

- 3. HIA DESCRIBED THE SECOND LIEUTENANT AS A CAUCASOID OF APPROXIMATELY 68 INCHES IN HEIGHT AND HAVING BLACK HAIR. THE FIRST LIEUTENANT WAS A CAUCASOID OF APPROXIMATELY 70-72 INCHES IN HEIGHT AND HAVING BROWN HAIR. MR. HIA KEPT THE PILOTS' IDENTIFICATION CARDS, REVOLVERS, AND SOME OTHER UNRECALLED ITEMS AS THE COMPANY INTENDED TO TRANSFER THEM LATER TO THE HIGHER

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 *****/

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AUTHORITIES. THE ITEMS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DESTROYED IN A BOMB RAID. THROUGH THE IDENTIFICATION CARDS, HIA LEARNED ABOUT THE RANK OF THE PILOTS.

- N. WITNESSES CLAIMED NO FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF CAPTURE INCIDENTS. WITNESSES ALSO CLAIMED NO FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF BURIALS OR KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICANS REMAINING IN VIETNAM AFTER THE WAR.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE

5. SURVEY RESULTS:

- A. PROJECT AREA: ALLEGED BURIAL SITE IS LOCATED IN CU NAM VILLAGE AT GRID COORDINATE XE48585095. MAP DATA: QUANG KHE MAP SHEET NUMBER 624411, EDITION 3-DMA, SERIES L7014, REVISED 1989

- B. OUTSTANDING FEATURES: NO OUTSTANDING FEATURES.

- C. TERRAIN: FLAT TERRAIN ABOUT 200 METERS FROM CU NAM VILLAGE WITH RICE PADDIES THROUGHOUT THE AREA.

- D. SOIL CONDITIONS: HARD, CLAY-LIKE DIRT.

- E. VEGETATION: SHRUBBERY LOCATED WITHIN THE DIMENSIONS OF THE SITE.

- F. METHOD OF SEARCH: SKIRMISH SEARCH OF A 50 X 50 METER AREA CONDUCTED.

- G. HAZARDS: NO SHADE

6. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS: RECOMMEND THIS CASE FOR EXCAVATION.

7. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: ADD POSSIBLE BURIAL SITE AT GRID COORDINATE XE48585095.

8. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE

9. ANALYST COMMENTS:

- A. WITNESS CREDIBILITY: ALL WITNESSES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MR. HOANG, FURNISHED INFORMATION IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. NO DECEPTION OR POSSIBLE COACHING WAS DETECTED. ALTHOUGH WITNESSES COULD NOT RECALL IMPORTANT DETAILS (I.E. THE PILOT'S NAME), THAT WAS LIKELY DUE TO THE 25-YEAR TIME PERIOD SINCE THIS INCIDENT. MR. HOANG WAS VERY FORGETFUL DUE TO OLD AGE AND POOR HEALTH. HIS STATEMENTS WERE INCOHERENT (I.E.

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THE PLANE CRASHED IN 1937).

- B. ACCORDING TO MR IV DOCUMENTS, THE CRASH SITE BELATED TO THIS CASE IS IN CU NAM VILLAGE. THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE BURIAL DOCUMENT INDICATES THE BURIAL SITE IS IN PHUC TRACH VILLAGE. WITNESS STATEMENTS SHOWED THAT THE SITE IN PHUC TRACH HAD BEEN EXCAVATED, WHILE THE SITE IN CU NAM HAD NOT BEEN DISTURBED. THE REMAINS OF THIS BURIAL SITE (PHUC TRACH) WERE EXHUMED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND PROBABLY TURNED OVER AS THE REMAINS RELATED TO THIS CASE. HOWEVER, THOSE REMAINS WERE IDENTIFIED BY CILHI AS THE REMAINS OF THE UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1253. THE INCIDENT RELATED TO CASE 1253 OCCURRED ONLY ABOUT NINE KILOMETERS FROM THE INCIDENT LOCATION FOR THIS CASE, IN THE PHUC TRACH VILLAGE AREA.

- C. THE REMAINS INITIALLY BELIEVED TO BE RELATED TO THIS CASE WERE REPATRIATED IN JAN 86 AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS THE REMAINS OF THE UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUAL OF CASE 1253. ALL WITNESSES IN PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, WHEN ASKED TO CHOOSE THE PICTURE OF THE PILOT TREATED IN THE VILLAGE DISPENSARY, DID NOT CHOOSE THE PICTURE OF THE PILOT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. CU NAM VILLAGE IS CLOSER TO THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION REFLECTED IN U.S. RECORDS FOR THIS CASE THAN PHUC TRACH VILLAGE. THESE FACTS (TO INCLUDE PARA 9.B.) PROBABLY INDICATE THAT THE SITE IN CU NAM VILLAGE IS MORE THAN LIKELY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 *****/

- D. THE GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PILOT RELATED BY WITNESSES CANNOT BE POSITIVELY CORRELATED TO EITHER OF THE UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH CASES 007A OR 1253, AS THE DESCRIPTION FITS BOTH CREW MEMBERS.

- E. ZUNG'S PREVIOUS STATEMENTS INDICATES THAT THE CREWMAN WHO WAS SHOT AND KILLED AND SUBSEQUENTLY BURIED IN CU NAM VILLAGE CAME FROM AN RF-4C WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN AT ABOUT 0900 HRS. THIS AIRCRAFT TYPE AND TIME CORRELATE WITH THIS CASE, AND NOT CASE 1253, WHICH INVOLVED AN F4D CRASH AT AROUND 1423 HRS. THIS FACT ALSO SUPPORTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE BURIAL SITE IN CU NAM IS RELATED TO THIS CASE. DURING THE 4TH JFA, ZUNG LED THE TEAM TO THE SAME SITE IN CU NAM VISITED BY THE TEAM DURING THIS JFA (REF B).

10. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS:

- A. LOGISTICS: SITE COULD BE EXCAVATED BY A STANDARD RECOVERY TEAM WITH STANDARD RECOVERY EQUIPMENT, WITH 30-40 INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL TO ASSIST. ANTICIPATE

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30 OR MORE DAYS NEEDED TO COMPLETE EXCAVATION.
RECOMMEND EXCAVATION BE CONDUCTED DURING THE DRY SEASON
(FEB-AUG). A LANDING ZONE IS APPROXIMATELY 50 METERS
FROM THE SITE. SITE IS ABOUT A 40-MINUTE DRIVE FROM
DONG HOI TOWN.

- B. RECOMMENDATIONS: BASED ON WITNESS STATEMENTS
THAT REMAINS WERE BURIED IN A WOODEN COFFIN ABOUT ONE
METER IN DEPTH, RECOMMEND THIS CASE FOR EXCAVATION. THE
WITNESS STATED THAT THE BURIAL SITE WAS IN A BUNKER.
RECOMMEND, IF POSSIBLE, AERIAL PHOTOS OF THE AREA DURING
THE WAR BE UTILIZED IN POSSIBLY PINPOINTING A SMALLER
BURIAL LOCATION.

11. TEAM CHIEF COMMENTS:

- A. CONCUR WITH ANALYST STATEMENTS. BASED UPON
WITNESS STATEMENTS; VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION OF THIS
INCIDENT; AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS INITIALLY
BELIEVED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE AS THE REMAINS
OF THE UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICAN OF CASE 1253, THE BURIAL
SITE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE IS THE SAME SITE VISITED
BY THE TEAM DURING THE 4TH JFA.

- B. RECOMMEND THIS CASE FOR EXCAVATION.

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INQUIRE=DOC23D
ITEM NO=00449789

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX880 MCN = 93268/01085 TOR = 932680428
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1519 2680432-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 250432Z SEP 93
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
R 250427Z SEP 93
FM CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
TO RUHQHQ/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//OCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
RUHQHQ/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M/
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:RSA//
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI BICKAM AFB HI
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK TH 35034

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT: CASE 1188

REF: A. JTF/FA, DET 1, BKK TH, PART I: DTG240457Z SEP
93; PART II: DTG240556Z SEP 93

1. REF IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 25TH SERIES OF
JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 19 AUG-
20 SEP 93. PARAGRAPH 2. OF REF CONCERNS THE
INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1188. THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS
CASE IS REPORTED IN DETAIL HEREIN. THIS REPORT IS BASED
ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE
FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: ON 22 AUG 93, IE1
TRAVELLED TO SON TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG
BINH PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 1188. THIS CASE
INVOLVES THE 22 MAY 68 CRASH OF AN F-4D AIRCRAFT WHILE

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ON A NIGHT ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. TWO AMERICANS ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR IN THIS CASE. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED FOUR WITNESSES, ONE OF WHOM PROVIDED INFORMATION PROBABLY RELATED TO THIS CASE. THE WITNESS TOLD OF A CRASH SITE HE DISCOVERED IN 1977-78. HE COULD NOT FURNISH INFORMATION RELATED TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS OR FATE OF THE AIRCREW. THE TEAM DISCOVERED LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT PROBABLY INDICATING THE CRASH OF AN F-4. NO REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS WERE DISCOVERED AT THE SITE. AN EXCAVATION OF THIS SITE IS NOT RECOMMENDED DUE TO THE SITE BEING LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE OF A STREAM ON A 60 DEGREE ROCKY SLOPE. THE LAST KNOWN INCIDENT LOCATION HELD IN U.S. RECORDS IS POSITIONED IN AN INHOSPITABLE MOUNTAINOUS AREA, CREATING SERIOUS SAFETY CONCERNS FOR TEAM MEMBERS. ON 1 SEP 93, IEI CONDUCTED AN AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INCIDENT LOCATION HELD IN U.S. RECORDS FOR THIS CASE WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. RECOMMEND THIS CASE BE PLACED IN THE PENDING CATEGORY.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

- A. ON 22 AUG 93, IEI TRAVELLED TO SON TRACH (SOWN TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH (BOOS TRACHJ) DISTRICT, QUANG BINH (QUANGR BINHF) PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 1188. THE U.S. CONTINGENT CONSISTED OF:

- CPT ROBERT K. WEST (TEAM LEADER)
- MSGT ROBERT A. MCLEAN (ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER)
- MSGT MICHAEL B. NAJIM (JTF-FA LINGUIST/ANALYST)
- SFC PAUL F. HART (TEAM MEDIC)
- SSG DAMON D. MANNING (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- SSG PAUL A. ADAMS (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- SSG DREW A. DEASON (EOD TECHNICIAN)
- SSGT GREGORY A. STEIN (JTF-FA LINGUIST/ANALYST)
- SGT CHUCK Q. DOAN (JTF-FA ANALYST/LINGUIST)

VNOSMP MEMBERS INCLUDED:

- ZUONG VAN NGOC (DWONG VAWN NGOCJ) (TEAM LEADER)
- LUU VAN THO (LWU VAWN THOJ)
- BUI QUANG TAM (BUIF QUANG TAAM)
- TRINH QUOC KHANH (TRINHF QUOOCS KHANHS)
- NGUYEN QUANG MAO (NGUYEENX QUANG MAO)

THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE TASK TEAM INCLUDED:

- LE DUC ZWONG (LEE DDWCS DWONG) (TEAM LEADER)
- PHAM VAN LA (PHAMJ VAWN LA)
- LE CONG TANG (LEE COONG TAWNGJ)

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- B. THE FIRST WITNESS PRESENTED FOR INTERVIEW WAS MR. PHAM THANH LUONG (PHAMJ THANH LWONG), A 38 YOA RESIDENT OF PHONG NHA HAMLET, SON TRACH VILLAGE. LUONG FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING A CRASH SITE IN THE AREA:

- 1. SOMETIME IN 1977-1978, LUONG DISCOVERED A CRASH SITE WHILE SEARCHING FOR METAL. THE SITE IS

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
LOCATED NEAR THE PEAK OF A MOUNTAIN IN A STREAM BED. A WATERFALL IS ALSO LOCATED AT THE SITE. THE WRECKAGE WAS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT A 200 SQUARE METER AREA.

- 2. LUONG OBSERVED A PARACHUTE AND MAPS AT THE CRASH SITE. HE DID NOT COLLECT THESE ITEMS. HE WAS INTERESTED ONLY IN METAL. HE DID NOT SEE REMAINS. THE METAL HE COLLECTED HAS SINCE BEEN SOLD. SINCE FIRST DISCOVERING THE SITE, HE HAS RETURNED TO THE SITE OCCASIONALLY TO GATHER MORE JUNK METAL. MANY LOCAL PEOPLE HAVE ALSO VISITED THE SITE, SEARCHING FOR METAL. LUONG HAS NEVER HEARD OF REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS BEING DISCOVERED AT THE SITE.

- 3. LUONG WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE DETAILS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS INCIDENT. HE COULD NOT PROVIDE NAMES OF POTENTIAL FIRSTHAND WITNESSES TO THIS INCIDENT. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT MILITARY UNITS WERE STATIONED IN THE AREA DURING THE WAR YEARS. HE DID NOT OBSERVED NUMBERS OR INSIGNIA ON THE WRECKAGE.

- C. LUONG ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION RELATED TO TWO OTHER CRASH SITES IN THE AREA. HIS STATEMENTS ARE NOT BELATED TO THIS CASE AND WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

- D. MR. NGUYEN VAN MUU (NGUYEENX VAWN MWUJ), A 69 YOA FARMER RESIDING IN THE LOCAL AREA AND FORMER VILLAGE PARTY CHIEF FROM 1964-1972; MR MAI XUAN HUYNH (MAI XUAAN HUYNHF), A 59 YOA FARMER AND FORMER VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER FROM 1964-1972; AND MR MAI HUU NHUONG (MAI HWU NHWONGJ), 43 YOA AND THE PRESENT VILLAGE CHAIRMAN PROVIDED STATEMENTS. ALL THREE FURNISHED INFORMATION RELATED TO A RESOLVED CASE. THE THREE INDIVIDUALS HAVE NO INFORMATION CONCERNING POSSIBLE DOCUMENTS OR ARCHIVE-RELATED RECORDS ASSOCIATED WITH INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE WAR YEARS.

- E. WITNESSES CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF CAPTURE INCIDENTS. WITNESSES ALSO CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF BURIAL SITES OR KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICANS REMAINING IN VIETNAM AFTER THE WAR.

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- F. LUONG LED THE TEAM TO THE CRASH SITE. THE SITE IS LOCATED AT GRID COORDINATE XE38533989 (VERIFIED BY THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM TRACKING FOUR SATELLITES). THE SITE IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 100 METERS FROM THE PEAK OF A MOUNTAIN. THE WRECKAGE WAS DISCOVERED IN AN INTERMITTENT STREAM BED, ABOUT 15 METERS UPSTREAM FROM A WATERFALL. THE STREAM REPORTEDLY FLOODS DURING THE RAINY SEASON. THE STREAM RUNS WEST TO EAST ON A SLOPE OF ABOUT 40 DEGREES. THE TEAM DISCOVERED PORTIONS OF PARACHUTE MATERIAL, RISER, AND CANOPY. PORTIONS OF A POSSIBLE G-SUIT AND MAP WERE ALSO FOUND.

- G. ON 1 SEP 93, THE TEAM CONDUCTED AN AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INCIDENT LOCATION FOR THIS CASE, AS REFLECTED IN U.S. RECORDS. THE TEAM ARRIVED AT GRID COORDINATE XE383416 (VERIFIED BY THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM TRACKING FOUR SATELLITES). NO EVIDENCE OF REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, OR A POSSIBLE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE WAS DISCOVERED.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: ITEM 'A' WAS PHOTOGRAPHED. ITEMS 'B' THROUGH 'F' WERE COLLECTED BY THE TEAM.

- A. TIRE IMPRINTED WITH THE FOLLOWING: "BF GOODRICH"; "49A 506G-5 206"; "FSN2620-088-452?"; "01"; "24241 MAR 68"; "62-J-4031"; "FABRIC REINFORCED CUT RESISTANT"; "24 PLY RATING NYLON"; "30 X 11.50 - 14.50".

- B. PORTION OF SEAT CUSHION

- C. PORTION OF POSSIBLE G-SUIT

- D. PORTION OF ESCAPE AND EVASION MAP

- E. PARACHUTE RISER WITH KNOCK FEEDER

- F. THREE PORTIONS OF PARACHUTE CANOPY

5. SURVEY RESULTS: THE SITE IS LOCATED ON A SLOPE OF

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

40-50 DEGREES APPROXIMATELY 200 METERS ABOVE SEA LEVEL. THE PLANE APPARENTLY CRASHED IN A WASH-DOWN GULCH. THERE WERE PIECES OF AIRCRAFT SCATTERED ON EACH SIDE OF THIS GULCH. APPROXIMATE WIDTH OF THE GULCH IS 15-20 METERS. THE PROBABLE COCKPIT IMPACT AREA IS LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS GULCH WHICH IS VERY ROCKY. ONLY SOIL AT THE SITE WAS TO THE SIDES OF THIS GULCH WHERE MINIMAL WRECKAGE WAS FOUND. THE MAJORITY OF WRECKAGE IS LOCATED IN THE GULCH.

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- A. PROJECT AREA: SITE IS LOCATED AT GRID COORDINATES XE38533989. MAP DATA: QUANG KHE MAP SHEET NUMBER 624411, EDITION 3-DMA, SERIES L7014.

- B. OUTSTANDING FEATURES: 60-80 DEGREE KARST SLOPE.

- C. TERRAIN: MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN WITH THICK VEGETATION SURROUNDING THE SITE AND NUMEROUS LARGE BOULDERS ON THE SITE.

- D. SOIL CONDITIONS: SOFT, POWDERY, GRAY SOIL

- E. VEGETATION: SURROUNDING THE SITE IS THICK VEGETATION WITH VERY SPARSE VEGETATION ON THE SITE ITSELF.

- F. METHOD OF SEARCH: SKIRMISH SEARCH OF A 100 X 100 METER AREA YIELDED NO REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS.

- G. HAZARDS: NONE NOTED

6. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS: RECOMMEND THIS CASE BE PLACED IN THE PENDING CATEGORY

7. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: CHANGE SITE COORDINATE TO READ XE38533989.

8. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE

9. ANALYST COMMENTS:

- A. WITNESS CREDIBILITY: THE WITNESSES ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. NO DECEPTION OR POSSIBLE COACHING WAS DETECTED.

- B. THE SITE VISITED BY THE TEAM IS LESS THAN TWO KILOMETERS FROM THE COORDINATE LISTED IN U.S. RECORDS AS THE INCIDENT LOCATION FOR THIS CASE. ONLY ONE OTHER INCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE AREA VISITED BY THE TEAM, ALMOST THREE KILOMETERS AWAY.

- C. BASED ON PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS BY A LIFE SUPPORT TECHNICIAN, THE PARACHUTE RISER WITH KNOCK FEEDER (PARA 4E ABOVE) FOUND AT THE SITE INDICATES AN F4-TYPE AIRCRAFT--THE SAME TYPE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THIS CASE.

- D. AFTER CANVASSING THE SURROUNDING VILLAGES AND HAMLETS, THE VNOSMP, PROVINCE TASK TEAM, AND VILLAGE LEADERSHIP WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE A FIRSTHAND WITNESS TO

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THIS INCIDENT.

10. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS: AN EXCAVATION OF THIS SITE BY A STANDARD RECOVERY ELEMENT IS NOT WARRANTED. THE CRASH SITE IS LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE OF A WASH-DOWN GULCH AND BOULDERS MEASURING ABOUT 10 METERS AND LARGER IN CIRCUMFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE REMOVED. SMALL AMOUNTS OF DIRT (APPROXIMATELY 5 - 10 CENTIMETERS) WAS REMOVED BETWEEN THE BOULDERS WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE LIFE-SUPPORT GEAR DISCOVERED BY THE TEAM WAS FOUND ALONG THE STREAM BED ON AND BETWEEN THE ROCKS AND BOULDERS. SITE WAS HEAVILY SCAVENGED. ANY REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN AT THE SITE HAVE PROBABLY BEEN WASHED AWAY OR SCAVENGED BY LOCAL RESIDENTS OVER THE YEARS. EXCAVATION OF THIS SITE IS NOT RECOMMENDED.

11. TEAM CHIEF COMMENTS:

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

- A. AFTER CANVASSING THE SURROUNDING VILLAGES AND HAMLETS, THE VNOSMP, PROVINCE TASK TEAM, AND VILLAGE LEADERSHIP WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE A FIRSTHAND WITNESS TO THIS INCIDENT. WITHOUT A FIRSTHAND WITNESS, THE TEAM IS UNABLE TO VERIFY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. THE SITE LOCATION AND PROBABLY THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE REVEAL A CORRELATION TO THIS CASE.

- B. AN EXCAVATION OF THIS SITE IS NOT RECOMMENDED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE TERRAIN, THE FACT THAT THE SITE HAS BEEN HEAVILY SCAVENGED, AND IS LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE OF A WASH-DOWN GULCH WHICH REMAINS FLOODED THROUGHOUT THE RAINY SEASON, GREATLY REDUCES THE PROBABILITY OF DISCOVERING REMAINS.

- C. THE SLOPE OF THE CRASH SITE AND THE ROCKY CONDITIONS, FURTHER NEGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL EXCAVATION.

- D. WITH NO FURTHER LEADS TO FOLLOW, RECOMMEND THIS CASE BE PLACED IN THE PENDING CATEGORY.

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INQUIRE-DOC23D
 ITEM NO=00449609
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = LGX708 MCN = 93268/05403 TOR = 932680259
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1166 2680303-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 250303Z SEP 93
 FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 250259Z SEP 93
 FM CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
 TO RUHQHQB/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//OCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M/
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHDC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:RSA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI
 RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK TH 35013

UNCLASSIFIED 0467 SEP 93

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT: CASE 1144

REF: A. JTF/FA, DET 1, BKK TH, PART I: DTG240457Z SEP
 93; PART II: DTG240556Z SEP 93

1. REF IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 25TH SERIES OF
 JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 19 AUG-
 20 SEP 93. PARAGRAPH 2. OF REF CONCERNS THE
 INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1144. THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS
 CASE IS REPORTED IN DETAIL HEREIN. THIS REPORT IS BASED
 ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE
 FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: ON 22 AUG 93, IE1
 TRAVELLED TO SON TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG
 BINH PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 1144. THIS CASE
 INVOLVES THE 25 APR 68 CRASH OF AN F-4D AIRCRAFT WHILE

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ON A NIGHT ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. TWO AMERICANS ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR IN THIS CASE. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED FOUR WITNESSES, ONE OF WHOM PROVIDED INFORMATION PROBABLY RELATED TO THIS CASE. THE WITNESS TOLD OF A CRASH SITE HE DISCOVERED IN 1977-78. HE COULD NOT FURNISH INFORMATION RELATED TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS OR FATE OF THE AIRCREW. THIS WITNESS LED THE TEAM TO THE SITE. THE TEAM DISCOVERED WRECKAGE THAT POSSIBLY CORRELATED TO AN F-4 TYPE AIRCRAFT STREWN ABOUT A LARGE AREA AT THE BASE OF KARST. NO REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS WERE DISCOVERED. DUE TO THE HAZARDOUS NATURE OF THE TERRAIN AND EVIDENCE FOUND, AN EXCAVATION OF THIS SITE IS NOT RECOMMENDED. THE DRASTIC CONDITIONS POSED BY THE ENVIRONMENT CAUSED SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONCERNS AND PROHIBITED THE TEAM FROM SURVEYING THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION. ON 1 SEP 93, IE1 CONDUCTED AN AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INCIDENT LOCATION HELD IN U.S. RECORDS FOR THIS CASE WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. RECOMMEND THIS CASE BE PLACED IN THE PENDING CATEGORY.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

- A. ON 22 AUG 93, IE1 TRAVELLED TO SON TRACH (SOWN TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH (BOOS TRACHJ) DISTRICT, QUANG BINH (QUANGR BINHF) PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 1144. THE U.S. CONTINGENT CONSISTED OF:

- CPT ROBERT K. WEST (TEAM LEADER)
- MSGT ROBERT A. MCLEAN (ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER)
- MSGT MICHAEL B. NAJIM (JTF-FA LINGUIST/ANALYST)
- SFC PAUL F. HART (TEAM MEDIC)
- SSG DAMON D. MANNING (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- SSG PAUL A. ADAMS (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- SSG DREW A. DEASON (BOD TECHNICIAN)
- SSGT GREGORY A. STEIN (JTF-FA LINGUIST/ANALYST)
- SGT CHUCK Q. DOAN (JTF-FA ANALYST/LINGUIST)

VNOSMP MEMBERS INCLUDED:

- ZUONG VAN NGOC (DWONG VAWN NGOCJ) (TEAM LEADER)
- LUU VAN THO (LWU VAWN THOJ)
- BUI QUANG TAM (BUIF QUANG TAAM)
- TRINH QUOC KHANH (TRINHF QUOOC KHANHS)
- NGUYEN QUANG MAO (NGUYEENX QUANG MAO)

THE QUANG BINH PROVINCE TASK TEAM INCLUDED:

- LE DUC ZWONG (LEE DDWCS DWONG) (TEAM LEADER)
- PHAM VAN LA (PHAMJ VAWN LA)
- LE CONG TANG (LEE COONG TAWNGJ)

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- B. THE FIRST WITNESS PRESENTED FOR INTERVIEW WAS MR. PHAM THANH LUONG (PHAMJ THANH LWONG), A 38-YOA RESIDENT OF PHONG NHA HAMLET, SON TRACH VILLAGE. LUONG FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING A CRASH SITE IN THE AREA:

- 1. SOMETIME IN 1977-1978, LUONG DISCOVERED A

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
CRASH SITE WHILE SEARCHING FOR METAL. THE SITE IS LOCATED AT THE BASE OF A KARST AND ABOUT 50 METERS FROM A STREAM. THE WRECKAGE WAS SCATTERED ABOUT A LARGE AREA.

- 2. LUONG DID NOT OBSERVE REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS AT THE SITE. HE WAS INTERESTED ONLY IN THE METAL. THE METAL HE COLLECTED HAS SINCE BEEN SOLD. SINCE FIRST DISCOVERING THE SITE, HE HAS RETURNED TO THE SITE OCCASIONALLY TO GATHER MORE JUNK METAL. MANY LOCAL PEOPLE HAVE ALSO VISITED THE SITE, SEARCHING FOR METAL. LUONG HAS NEVER HEARD OF REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS BEING DISCOVERED AT THE SITE.

- 3. LUONG WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE DETAILS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS INCIDENT. HE COULD NOT PROVIDE NAMES OF POTENTIAL FIRSTHAND WITNESSES TO THIS INCIDENT. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT MILITARY UNITS WERE STATIONED IN THE AREA DURING THE WAR YEARS. HE DID NOT NOTICE NUMBERS OR INSIGNIA ON THE WRECKAGE.

- C. LUONG ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION RELATED TO TWO OTHER CRASH SITES IN THE AREA. HIS STATEMENTS ARE NOT RELATED TO THIS CASE AND WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

- D. MR. NGUYEN VAN MUU (NGUYEENX VAWN MWUJ), A 69 YOA FARMER RESIDING IN THE LOCAL AREA AND FORMER VILLAGE PARTY CHIEF FROM 1964-1972; MR MAI XUAN HUYNH (MAI XUAAN HUYNHF), A 59 YOA FARMER AND FORMER VILLAGE MILITIA COMMANDER FROM 1964-1972; AND MR MAI HUU NHUONG (MAI HWU NHWONGJ), 43 YOA AND THE PRESENT VILLAGE CHAIRMAN PROVIDED STATEMENTS. ALL THREE FURNISHED INFORMATION BELATED TO A RESOLVED CASE. THE THREE INDIVIDUALS HAVE NO INFORMATION CONCERNING POSSIBLE DOCUMENTS OR ARCHIVE-RELATED RECORDS ASSOCIATED WITH INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE WAR YEARS.

- E. WITNESSES CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF CAPTURE INCIDENTS. WITNESSES ALSO CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF BURIAL SITES OR KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICANS REMAINING IN VIETNAM AFTER THE WAR.

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- F. LUONG LED THE TEAM TO THE CRASH SITE. THE SITE IS LOCATED AT GRID COORDINATE XE36274260 (VERIFIED BY THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM TRACKING FOUR SATELLITES). THE SITE IS LOCATED AT THE BASE OF A KARST ABOUT 30 METERS FROM A STREAM. WRECKAGE WAS SCATTERED ABOUT AN AREA APPROXIMATELY 100 X 100 METERS. THE TEAM DISCOVERED PORTIONS OF VARIOUS AIRCRAFT PARTS. NO REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS WERE FOUND.

- G. ON 1 SEP 93, THE TEAM CONDUCTED AN AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INCIDENT LOCATION FOR THIS CASE, AS REFLECTED IN U.S. RECORDS. THE TEAM ARRIVED AT GRID COORDINATE XE379425 (VERIFIED BY THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM TRACKING FOUR SATELLITES). NO EVIDENCE OF REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, OR A POSSIBLE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE WAS DISCOVERED.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE:

- A. RED PLASTIC HOSE WITH TWO CLAMPS AND A PIECE OF TAPE-LIKE MATERIAL WRAPPED AROUND THE HOSE. IMPRINTED ON THE CLAMPS AND MATERIAL IS THE FOLLOWING:

- 1. FIRST CLAMP: "OUTBD. EM."; "FLAPS DOWN".
 - 2. MIDDLE CLAMP: "AEROQUIP"; "656200-3-0190"; "DEC. 63"; "PT92582".
 - 3. MATERIAL: "32-69595-502 21"; "TORQUE IN"; "70-28" - B. PORTION OF STATIC GROUND IMPRINTED WITH THE FOLLOWING: "STATIC SYSTEM DRAIN"; "PRESS HERE".

- C. TWELVE-INCH LONG PIECE OF RUBBER IMPRINTED WITH THE FOLLOWING: "95..."; "SIDE NEXT TO BEARING L-9239 'A'".

- D. UNIDENTIFIED METAL FRAGMENT

- E. SMALL PART OF PROBABLE ENGINE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

- F. PORTION OF FUEL BLADDER IMPRINTED WITH THE FOLLOWING: "8.."; "TORQUE 5/"

- G. PORTION OF TURBINE BLADE

5. SURVEY RESULTS:

- A. PROJECT AREA: SITE IS LOCATED AT GRID COORDINATE XE36274260. MAP DATA: QUANG KHE; MAP SHEET NUMBER 6244II, EDITION 3-DMA, SERIES L7014.

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- B. OUTSTANDING FEATURES: DRY RIVER BED LOCATED AT BOTTOM OF SITE.

- C. TERRAIN: MINIMAL SOIL. SITE CONSISTS MAINLY OF LARGE, JAGGED BOULDERS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE SITE. ROCK CLIFFS AND DEEP CREVICES ARE THROUGHOUT THE SITE.

- D. SOIL CONDITIONS: MINIMAL SOFT, POWDERY SOIL.

- E. VEGETATION: NONE. SITE CONSISTS OF ONLY ROCK.

- F. METHOD OF SEARCH: DETAILED SKIRMISH SEARCH OF A 50 X 50 METER AREA YIELDED NO REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, OR LIFE-SUPPORT EQUIPMENT.

- G. HAZARDS: UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE DISCOVERED AT SITE. SHARP JAGGED ROCKS, A 100 FOOT SLOPE OF ABOUT 80 DEGREES, AND DEEP CREVICES CREATE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS.

6. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS: RECOMMEND THIS CASE BE PLACED IN THE PENDING CATEGORY

7. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: CHANGE SITE COORDINATES TO READ XE36274260.

8. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE

9. ANALYST COMMENTS:

- A. WITNESS CREDIBILITY: THE WITNESSES ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. NO DECEPTION OR POSSIBLE COACHING WAS DETECTED.

- B. THE SITE VISITED BY THE TEAM IS APPROXIMATELY 1.5 KILOMETERS FROM THE COORDINATES LISTED IN U.S. RECORDS AS THE INCIDENT LOCATION. INCIDENT LOCATIONS FOR TWO OTHER CASES ARE ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS FROM THE SITE VISITED BY THE TEAM, ACCORDING TO U.S. RECORDS. BOTH THESE CASES ARE RESOLVED. THE INCIDENT LOCATION FOR THE TARGET CASE IS NEAREST THE LOCATION VISITED BY THE TEAM.

- C. THE NUMBER ON THE PIECE OF TAPE-LIKE MATERIAL WRAPPED AROUND THE RED PLASTIC HOSE (PARA 4.A3 ABOVE) IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PART NUMBERING SYSTEM OF F4 AIRCRAFT--THE SAME TYPE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THIS CASE.

- D. AFTER CANVASSING THE SURROUNDING VILLAGES AND HAMLETS, THE VNOSMP, PROVINCE TASK TEAM, AND VILLAGE LEADERSHIP WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE A FIRSTHAND WITNESS TO

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THIS INCIDENT.

10. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS:
EXCAVATION BY A STANDARD RECOVERY ELEMENT IS NOT WARRANTED. THE SITE CONSISTS MAINLY OF LARGE BOULDERS, ROCK CLIFFS, AND CREVICES AT A DEPTH OF ABOUT 50-100 METERS. HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS EXIST THROUGHOUT THE AREA. AN EXCAVATION OF THIS SITE IS NOT RECOMMENDED.

11. TEAM CHIEF COMMENTS:

- A. AFTER CANVASSING THE SURROUNDING VILLAGES AND HAMLETS, THE VNOSMP, PROVINCE TASK TEAM, AND VILLAGE LEADERSHIP WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE A FIRSTHAND WITNESS TO THIS INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH, WITHOUT A FIRSTHAND WITNESS, THE TEAM IS UNABLE TO VERIFY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE, THE SITE LOCATION AND POSSIBLY THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE REVEAL A CORRELATION TO

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/
THIS CASE.

- B. AN EXCAVATION OF THIS SITE IS NOT RECOMMENDED. HAZARDS ARE ABUNDANT THROUGHOUT THE SITE. THE SITE CONSISTS OF EXTREMELY LARGE BOULDERS, ROCK CLIFFS, AND DEEP CREVICES. UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE AND SNAKES AT THE SITE POSE ADDITIONAL RISKS.

- C. RECOMMEND THIS CASE BE PLACED IN THE PENDING CATEGORY.

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INQUIRE=DOC22D
ITEM NO=00160243

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX409 MCN = 93152/04856 TOR = 931520746
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS4839 1520745-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 010745Z JUN 93
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
R 010722Z JUN 93
FM CJTFPA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
TO RUHQHQ/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
RUHQHQ/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHDC//
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//POW-MIA//
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT: CASE 1262

REF: JTF-FA DET ONE DTG271134Z MAY 93

1. REF IS THE SUMMARY REPORT FOR THE 23RD JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 22 APR TO 24 MAY 93. PARAGRAPH 2U OF REF CONCERNS THE INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1262. THE RESULTS OF THIS INVESTIGATION ARE REPORTED IN DETAIL HEREIN. THIS REPORT IS BASED ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: ON LB MAY 93, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IEL) TRAVELED TO PHUC TRACE VILLAGE, BO TRACE DISTRICT TO INTERVIEW TWO WITNESSES WITH INFORMATION BELIEVED TO BE RELATED TO CASE 1177. ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED INDICATED NO ASSOCIATION TO CASE 1177; HOWEVER, ONE WITNESS PROVIDED

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LIMITED INFORMATION ON TWO INCIDENTS INVOLVING AIRCRAFT CRASHES. THE FIRST HAS POSSIBLY AN F105 WHICH CRASHED NEAR CHAY LAP HAMLET SOMETIME AFTER 1968. THE SECOND INCIDENT WAS AN F4 AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED IN THANH SEN HAMLET. DUE TO THE VAGUE AND LIMITED TESTIMONY PROVIDED, NO FIRM CASE ASSOCIATION COULD BE ESTABLISHED BUT, BASED ON THE GENERAL LOCATION AND TIME OF LOSS, THE POSSIBILITY OF A CORRELATION TO CASE 1262 EXISTS. RECOMMEND FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO THESE TWO CRASH SITES.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

- A. ON 22 APR 93, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IEL) ARRIVED IN DONG HOI TOWN, QUANG BINH PROVINCE TO BEGIN INVESTIGATIONS OF ONE PRIMARY AND A NUMBER OF SECONDARY CASES IN FOUR DISTRICTS WITHIN THE PROVINCE. LATER THE SAME DAY, REPRESENTATIVES OF RECOVERY ELEMENT ONE (REL), IEL, AND THEIR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS WERE RECEIVED BY DINH HULL CUONG (DINE HWUX CWONGF), DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT, LTCOL MA SON BAO (MAX SOWN BAO), QUANG BINH PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND REPRESENTATIVE, AND NGUYEN TRI PHUONG (NGUYEENX TRIJ PHWONGF), MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE. MR. CUONG WELCOMED BOTH TEAMS TO THE PROVINCE AND PLEDGED TO AFFORD THE TEAMS WITH FULL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE THROUGHOUT THE JOINT ACTIVITY. HE ADDED THAT THE IMPACT OF RECENT HIGH LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN U.S. AND VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES HAS FILTERED DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL AND HOPED THAT THIS WOULD ADD TO THE SUCCESS OF THE TEAM'S MISSION. THE U.S. CONTINGENT CONSISTED OF:

- MSGT WILLIAM R. DEETER (TEAM LEADER)
- MSGT ROBERT A. MCLEAN (ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER)
- TSGT SCOTT J. BECKMAN (JTF-FA ANALYST/LINGUIST)
- CTI2 RONALD G. FOSTER (JTF-FA ANALYST/LINGUIST)
- SSG MICHAEL P. EAGLE (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- SSG DAVID A. REITER (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- SSG DREW A. DEASON (EOD SPECIALIST)
- TSGT LAWRENCE G. MCKEE (MEDICAL IDT)

VNOSMP MEMBERS INCLUDED:

- PHAM TRUONG GIANG (PHAMJ TRWOWNG GIANG/TEAM LEADER)
- LUU VAN THO (LWUX VAWN THOJ/MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE)
- THAN XUAN PHONG (TRAAN XUAAN PHONGF/MND)
- NGUYEN VAN HIEN (NGUYEENX VAWN HIEENS/MINISTRY OF

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INTERIOR)

- QUACH HUY HOANG (QUACH HUY HOANGF/MOI)

THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL TASK TEAM MEMBERS INCLUDED:

- LE DUG DUONG (LEE DDWCS ZWOWNG/TEAM LEADER)
- DO VAN PHAN (DOO VAWN PHAN/DEPUTY TEAM LEADER)
- LE MINH NGHIA (LEE MINH NGHIA)

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

B. ON 18 MAY 93, INVESTIGATION IEL TRAVELED TO THANH SEN (THANHS SEN) HAMLET, PHUC TRACH (PHUCS TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH (BOOS TRACHJ) DISTRICT TO INTERVIEW TWO WITNESSES WITH INFORMATION BELIEVED TO BE RELATED TO CASE 1177. THE INTERVIEWS TOOK PLACE IN THE PHUC TRACH PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE HOUSE. AFTER A BRIEF PROLOGUE BY MR. GIANG (VNOSMP) EXPLAINING THE JOINT TEAM'S MISSION, THE FIRST WITNESS, LE GAY (LEE CAAYJ), WAS INTRODUCED. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THIS WITNESS WAS DETERMINED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1253, A RESOLVED CASE. THE SECOND WITNESS, NGUYEN HIEN (NGUYEENX HIEEN), A 42 YOA RESIDENT OF THANH SEN HAMLET, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) ACCORDING TO HIEN, THERE WERE THREE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE LOCAL AREA DURING THE WAR. THE FIRST SHOOT DOWN WAS THE SAME INCIDENT, (DETERMINED TO BE CASE 1253), AS RELATED BY THE FIRST WITNESS.

(2) HIEN HAD ONLY MINIMAL KNOWLEDGE OF TWO OTHER INCIDENTS BOTH OCCURRING SOMETIME AFTER 1968. THE FIRST WAS AN F105 THAT CRASHED NEAR CHAY LAP HAMLET, PHUC TRACH VILLAGE. HE INDICATED THAT THE CRASH SITE WAS FIVE TO SIX KILOMETERS TO THE SOUTH OF THE INTERVIEW LOCATION. HIEN DID NOT GO TO THE CRASH LOCATION UNTIL SEVERAL YEARS LATER TO COLLECT SCRAP METAL. HE STATED THAT THIS SITE IS LOCATED IN A FIELD NEAR THE BASE OF A MOUNTAIN.

(3) THE LAST INCIDENT INVOLVED AN F4 AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED IN THANH SEN HAMLET SOMETIME AFTER 1968. HIEN STATED THAT HE HAS NEVER BEEN TO THIS CRASH SITE BUT OTHER VILLAGERS HAVE BEEN THERE TO COLLECT SCRAP METAL. HE BEARD THAT THE SITE IS UP IN THE MOUNTAINS, APPROXIMATELY A TWO HOUR HIKE FROM THE INTERVIEW LOCATION.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE

5. SURVEY RESULTS: N/A

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6. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS:

- A. RECOMMEND FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE TWO CRASH SITES MENTIONED IN WITNESS TESTIMONY TO DETERMINE IS EITHER IS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1262.

- B. REQUEST THE VNOSMP VISIT THE TWO CRASH SITES AND ATTEMPT TO LOCATE ADDITIONAL WITNESSES FOR THESE INCIDENTS.

7. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE

8. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED:
NONE

9. ANALYST COMMENTS: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SECOND WITNESS WITH REGARD TO THE SHOOT DOWN OF TWO ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA SURROUNDING PHUC TRACH VILLAGE WAS TOO LIMITED AND AMBIGUOUS TO MAKE A CASE DETERMINATION. HOWEVER, THE GENERAL LOCATION AND TIME FRAME IN WHICH THESE INCIDENTS OCCURRED INDICATE A POSSIBLE ASSOCIATION TO CASE 1262.

10. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS: N/A

11. TEAM CHIEF COMMENTS: THE WITNESS WAS EXTREMELY CANDID AND SINCERE IN HIS RESPONSES. ALTHOUGH THE TESTIMONY OF THIS WITNESS COULD NOT BE FIRMLY ASSOCIATED WITH ANY UNRESOLVED CASE, THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION CARRIED IN U.S. RECORDS WITH REGARD TO CASE 1262 REQUIRES FURTHER INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A CORRELATION EXISTS.

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 ITEM NO=00160232
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = LGX394 MCN = 93152/04807 TOR = 931520741
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS4821 1520740-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 010740Z JUN 93
 FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 010717Z JUN 93
 FM CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
 TO RUHQHQ/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHDC//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//POW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//
 RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT: CASE 1269

REF: JTF-FA DET ONE DTG271134Z MAY 93

1. REF IS THE SUMMARY REPORT FOR THE 23RD JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 22 APR TO 24 MAY 93. PARAGRAPH 2V OF REP CONCERNS THE INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA. THE RESULTS OF THIS INVESTIGATION ARE REPORTED IN DETAIL HEREIN. THIS REPORT IS BASED ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: ON 18 MAY 93, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IEL) TRAVELED TO PHUC TRACH VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT TO INTERVIEW TWO WITNESSES WITH INFORMATION BELIEVED TO BE RELATED TO CASE 1177. ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED INDICATED NO ASSOCIATION TO CASE 1177; HOWEVER, ONE WITNESS PROVIDED

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LIMITED INFORMATION ON TWO INCIDENTS INVOLVING AIRCRAFT CRASHES. THE FIRST WAS POSSIBLY AN F105 WHICH CRASHED NEAR CHAY LAP HAMLET SOMETIME AFTER 1968. THE SECOND INCIDENT WAS AN F4 AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED IN THANH SEN HAMLET. DUE TO THE VAGUE AND LIMITED TESTIMONY PROVIDED, NO FIRM CASE ASSOCIATION COULD BE ESTABLISHED BUT, BASED ON THE GENERAL LOCATION AND TIME OF LOSS, THE POSSIBILITY OF A CORRELATION TO CASE DATA EXISTS. RECOMMEND FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO THESE TWO CRASH SITES.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

- A. ON 22 APR 93, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IEL) ARRIVED IN DONG HOI TOWN, QUANG BINH PROVINCE TO BEGIN INVESTIGATIONS OF ONE PRIMARY AND A NUMBER OF SECONDARY CASES IN FOUR DISTRICTS WITHIN THE PROVINCE. LATER THE SAME DAY, REPRESENTATIVES OF RECOVERY ELEMENT ONE (REL), IEL, AND THEIR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS WERE RECEIVED BY DINH HULL CUONG (DINH HWUX CWONGF), DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT, LTCOL MA SON BAO (MAX SOWN BAO), QUANG BINH PROVINCE MILITARY COMMAND REPRESENTATIVE, AND NGUYEN TRI PHUONG (NGUYEENX TRIJ PHWONGF), MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE. MR. CUONG WELCOMED BOTH TEAMS TO THE PROVINCE AND PLEDGED TO AFFORD THE TEAMS WITH FULL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE THROUGHOUT THE JOINT ACTIVITY. HE ADDED THAT THE IMPACT OF RECENT HIGH LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN U.S. AND VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES HAS FILTERED DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL AND HOPED THAT THIS WOULD ADD TO THE SUCCESS OF THE TEAM'S MISSION. THE U.S. CONTINGENT CONSISTED OF:

- - MSGT WILLIAM R. DEETER (TEAM LEADER)
- - MSGT ROBERT A. MCLEAN (ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER)
- - TSGT SCOTT J. BECKMAN (JTF-FA ANALYST/LINGUIST)
- - CTI2 RONALD G. FOSTER (JTF-FA ANALYST/LINGUIST)
- - SSG MICHAEL P. EAGLE (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- - SSG DAVID A. REITER (SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST)
- - SSG DREW A. DEASON (EOD SPECIALIST)
- - TSGT LAWRENCE G. MCKER (MEDICAL IDT)

VNOSMP MEMBERS INCLUDED:

- PHAM TRUONG GIANG (PHAMJ TRWONG GIANG/TEAM LEADER)
- LUU VAN THO (LWUX VAWN THOJ/MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE)
- TRAN XUAN PHONG (TRAAN XUAAN PHONGF/MND)
- NGUYEN VAN HIEN (NGUYEENX VAWN HIEENS/MINISTRY OF

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INTERIOR)

- QUACH HUY HOANG (QUACH HUY HOANGF/MOI)

THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL TASK TEAM MEMBERS INCLUDED:

- LE DUG DUONG (LEE DDWCS ZWOWNG/TEAM LEADER)
- DO VAN PHAN (DOO VAWN PHAN/DEPUTY TEAM LEADER)
- LE MINH NGHIA (LEE MINH NGHIAK)

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

- B. ON 18 MAY 93, INVESTIGATION IEL TRAVELED TO THANH SEN (THANHS SEN) HAMLET, PHUC TRACH (PHUCS TRACHJ) VILLAGE, BO TRACH (BOOS TRACHJ) DISTRICT TO INTERVIEW TWO WITNESSES WITH INFORMATION BELIEVED TO BE RELATED TO CASE 1177. THE INTERVIEWS TOOK PLACE IN THE PHUC TRACE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE HOUSE. AFTER A BRIEF PROLOGUE BY MR. GIANG (VNOSMP) EXPLAINING THE JOINT TEAM'S MISSION, THE FIRST WITNESS, LE GAY (LEE CAAYJ), WAS INTRODUCED. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THIS WITNESS WAS DETERMINED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1253, A RESOLVED CASE. THE SECOND WITNESS, NGUYEN HIEN (NGUYEENX HIEEN), A 42 YOA RESIDENT OF THANH SEN HAMLET, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- (1) ACCORDING TO HIEN, THERE WERE THREE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE LOCAL AREA DURING THE WAR. THE FIRST SHOOT DOWN WAS THE SAME INCIDENT, (DETERMINED TO BE CASE 1253), AS RELATED BY THE FIRST WITNESS.

- (2) HIEN HAD ONLY MINIMAL KNOWLEDGE OF TWO OTHER INCIDENTS BOTH OCCURRING SOMETIME AFTER 1968. THE FIRST WAS AN F105 THAT CRASHED NEAR CHAY LAP HAMLET, PHUC TRACH VILLAGE. HE INDICATED THAT THE CRASH SITE WAS FIVE TO SIX KILOMETERS TO THE SOUTH OF THE INTERVIEW LOCATION. HIEN DID NOT GO TO THE CRASH LOCATION UNTIL SEVERAL YEARS LATER TO COLLECT SCRAP METAL. HE STATED THAT THIS SITE IS LOCATED IN A FIELD NEAR THE BASE OF A MOUNTAIN.

- (3) THE LAST INCIDENT INVOLVED AN F4 AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED IN THANH SEN HAMLET SOMETIME AFTER 1968. HIEN STATED THAT HE HAS NEVER BEEN TO THIS CRASH SITE BUT OTHER VILLAGERS HAVE BEEN THERE TO COLLECT SCRAP METAL. HE HEARD THAT THE SITE IS UP IN THE MOUNTAINS, APPROXIMATELY A TWO HOUR HIKE FROM THE INTERVIEW LOCATION.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE

5. SURVEY RESULTS: N/A

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6. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS:

- A. RECOMMEND FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE TWO CRASH SITES MENTIONED IN WITNESS TESTIMONY TO DETERMINE IS EITHER IS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA

- B. REQUEST THE VNOSMP VISIT THE TWO CRASH SITES AND ATTEMPT TO LOCATE ADDITIONAL WITNESSES FOR THESE INCIDENTS.

7. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE

8. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE

9. ANALYST COMMENTS: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SECOND WITNESS WITH REGARD TO THE SHOOT DOWN OF TWO ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA SURROUNDING PHUC TRACH VILLAGE WAS TOO LIMITED AND AMBIGUOUS TO MAKE A CASE DETERMINATION. HOWEVER, THE GENERAL LOCATION AND TIME FRAME IN WHICH THESE INCIDENTS OCCURRED INDICATE A POSSIBLE ASSOCIATION TO CASE DATA

10. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS: N/A

11. TEAM CHIEF COMMENTS: THE WITNESS WAS EXTREMELY CANDID AND SINCERE IN HIS RESPONSES. ALTHOUGH THE TESTIMONY OF THIS WITNESS COULD NOT BE FIRMLY ASSOCIATED WITH ANY UNRESOLVED CASE, THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION CARRIED IN U.S. RECORDS WITH REGARD TO CASE 1269 REQUIRES FURTHER INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A CORRELATION EXISTS.

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00343970

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS998 MCN = 96186/08280 TOR = 961860442
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS0555 1860244-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 040244Z JUL 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEFJII/J2

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 030722Z JUL 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO RUEACNP/BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS 633P

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J222//

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1924//

REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA 231012Z FEB 96//

AMPN/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT CONCERNING CASE 1924//

RMKS/1. ON 18 JANUARY 1996 A JOINT US/SRV TEAM INVESTIGATING A CASE IN HAI HUNG PROVINCE, VIETNAM INTERVIEWED A RESIDENT WITH FIRST HAND INFORMATION CONCERNING AN AIRCRAFT CRASH. JTF-FA ANALYSIS INDICATES THE ITEM PHOTOGRAPHED CAN NOT BE CORRELATED TO A SPECIFIC CASE.

2. THE TEAM PHOTOGRAPHED THE FOLLOWING ITEM:

- ONE STANDARD U.S. MILITARY MULTI-BLADE POCKET KNIFE, STAMPED WITH "IMPERIAL 1964 USA" AT THE BASE OF THE BLADE.

3. JTF-FA ANALYSIS INDICATES: THE ITEM IN PARA 2 IS A STANDARD ISSUE POCKET KNIFE. JTF-FA ANALYSIS INDICATES THE ITEM PHOTOGRAPHED CAN NOT BE CORRELATED TO A SPECIFIC CASE.

4. FOR BUPERS: THIS INFORMATION IS FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A COPY OF REF A WAS PROVIDED ON 29 FEB 96.

5. EVAL/CMB/RTR//

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00120863

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS383 MCN = 96155/25494 TOR = 961552049
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS4120 1552049-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 032049Z JUN 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

RHEFJII/J2

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 030902Z JUN 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO RHWRMPC/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHEMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-R//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//

SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "REPORT: NUMBER OF DEAD BANDIT PILOTS"//

REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/041802ZJAN94//

REF/B/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/050942ZJAN96//

REF/C/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/250912ZAPR96//

NARR/REF A IS JTF-FA ANALYSIS OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED "LIST OF PILOTS SHOT DOWN AND DIED IN VINH PHU." REF B IS A REEVALUATION OF REF A. REF C IS THE JTF-FA ANALYSIS OF A HANDWRITTEN DOCUMENT BEARING THE TITLE: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOTS WHO DIED IN VINH PHU." THE DOCUMENT ANALYZED BELOW IS SIMILAR TO THE DOCUMENT EVALUATED IN REF A. THE DATA ELEMENTS IN BOTH DOCUMENTS ARE SIMILAR AND CORRELATE TO THE SAME CASES. HOWEVER, ENOUGH DIFFERENCES WERE NOTED BETWEEN THE TWO DOCUMENTS TO JUSTIFY A SEPARATE EVALUATION. ADDITIONALLY, THREE NEW LINE ENTRIES ARE INCLUDED IN SUBJECT MESSAGE THAT DO NOT APPEAR IN REF A. FINALLY, REF C DOCUMENT APPEARS TO BE AN EARLIER, MORE COMPLETE VERSION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING AMERICAN REMAINS IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. REF C PROVIDES INFORMATION USEFUL IN THE EVALUATION OF SUBJECT DOCUMENT.//

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RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THREE SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ONE SET OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A REPORT TITLED: "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP." THIS REPORT INCLUDED TEN DOCUMENTS. THE SECOND SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A REPORT FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) MIA SPECIALIST TEAM TITLED: "REPORT OF RESULTS OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS TO COLLECT MIA INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS." THIS REPORT INCLUDED THREE DOCUMENTS. THE THIRD SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A VIETNAM OFFICE FOR SEEKING PERSONS (VNOSMP) ASSESSMENT OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM (SRT) CASES.

2. THE MOI REPORT, "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MOI'S SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP" DETAILS A 4 - 12 MAY 95, EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION IN VINH PHU, TUYEN QUANG, YEN BAI, HOA BINH, NINH BINH AND THANH HOA PROVINCES. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES BY THE SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS WAS TITLED, "REPORT: NUMBER OF DEAD BANDIT PILOTS."

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES LIMITED CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH THE FOLLOWING UNRESOLVED CASES: 0112-0-01, 0430-1-01, 0579-0-01, 0875-0-01, 0897-0-01 AND 1934; AND THE FOLLOWING RESOLVED CASES: 0396-0-01, 0533-1-01, 0544, 0659-0-01, 0914, 0781, 1939-0-01 AND 1939-0-02.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS A TYPEWRITTEN LIST OF 17 LINE ITEMS IN TABULAR FORM, WITH 9 DATA COLUMNS FOR EACH LINE. THE TRANSLATION BELOW LISTS HEADING INFORMATION FOR THE DOCUMENT FOLLOWED BY THE INDIVIDUAL LINE ENTRIES. THE DOCUMENT HEADING INFORMATION READS AS FOLLOWS: "MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, VINH PHU PROVINCE, POLITICAL OFFICE, NO.:--/05-6," "REPORT: NUMBER OF DEAD BANDIT PILOTS," "=10B=". A HANDWRITTEN ANNOTATION TO THE RIGHT OF THE TITLE READS: "TOTAL NUMBER DEAD 17 GUYS - (ILLEGIBLE) 31." (NOTE: IN THE REF C DOCUMENT THE NUMBER "(ILLEGIBLE) 49" APPEARS NEXT TO THE DOCUMENT TITLE. THE FIGURE IS WRITTEN IN A HAND SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE PRESENT DOCUMENT.) EACH OF THE NINE DATA COLUMNS FOR THE LINE ENTRIES IS SET APART BY A SEMICOLON (;). THE 9 DATA COLUMNS OF THE DOCUMENT READ AS FOLLOWS: "ENTRY NUMBER; SURNAME AND NAME; BIRTH DATE; RANK; MILITARY NUMBER; AIRCRAFT TYPE; DATE OF DEATH; PLACE OF BURIAL; COMMENTS." (NOTE: THE DATA COLUMNS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE ON THE REF C DOCUMENT, WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS: REF C CONTAINS FIELDS FOR THE UNIT CREDITED WITH SHOOTING DOWN THE AIRCRAFT, FOR WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A COFFIN, AND FOR WHETHER THE GRAVE WAS EXTANT OR HAD BEEN LOST. REF C HAD NO COLUMN FOR NOTES.) DATA FIELDS LEFT BLANK ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ARE INDICATED BY A HYPHEN (-). ANY INFORMATION ILLEGIBLE ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS REPLACED WITH A QUESTION MARK (?). EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ((ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES))).

5. THE DOCUMENT LINE ENTRIES READ AS FOLLOWS:
((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "1; GOORBERGMONT BLAKVL; 18-7-1939; CPT;

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FR 82697; F105; 02-12-1966; NGUYET DUC VILLAGE, YLAC; BURIED IN A COFFIN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0533, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON SIMILARITY IN NAME, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE, DAY AND YEAR OF BIRTH, AND PROVINCE OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0533. THE SERIAL NUMBER DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0533, NOR DOES IT CORRELATE WITH ANY U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.))
 - ((LINE ENTRY)) "2; NAME ' ; 01-7-1924; -; AO2073835; F105; DATA 8-66; HA PAGODA CEMETERY, VINH YEN TOWN; BURIED IN A COFFIN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA ., AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, MONTH AND YEAR OF BIRTH, SERIAL NUMBER, AND AIRCRAFT TYPE. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE DATA.))
 - ((LINE ENTRY)) "3; BIAWOND STEPHEN; 21-7-1940; 1LT; AC3147934; F105; 19-7-1966; TAM CANH VILLAGE, B/XUYEN; TRANSFERRED TO AN EARTHENWARE JAR" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0396-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND PROVINCE OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0396.))
 - ((LINE ENTRY)) "4; GION LOL, T HAOO; 31-10-1924; 2LT; FV941711; F105; 18-11-67; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, K/ANH; BURIED IN A COFFIN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0914-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND PROVINCE OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0914.))
 - ((LINE ENTRY)) "5; WINTONSCHARLESC RTHNESS; 10-3-1938; CPT; FR72444; RF10; 1-8-67; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, K/ANH; BURIED IN A COFFIN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0781, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON SIMILARITY IN NAME, DATE OF BIRTH AND PROVINCE OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0781. THE SERIAL NUMBER PROVIDED DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0781 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSS IN SOUTHEAST //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "REPORT: NUMBER RMKS/

ASIA. THE AIRCRAFT TYPE IS LISTED AS "RF10", THE AIRCRAFT TYPE FOR CASE 0781 WAS ACTUALLY AN RF101C.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "6; -; -; -; -; -; 8-11-67; DONG TINH VILLAGE, T/DUONG; -"

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "7; -; -; -; -; -; 8-11-67; -; -"

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "8; -; -; -; -; -; 8-11-67; XUAN LOI VILLAGE, B/XUYEN; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((FOUR AIRCRAFT LOSSES OCCURRED IN VIETNAM ON 8 NOV 67. ONLY ONE OF THESE OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. LINE ENTRIES 6, 7 AND 8 REFER TO TWO INCIDENTS INVOLVING THREE PERSONS OCCURRING IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON THAT DATE. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN LINE ENTRIES 6 AND 7 IS INSUFFICIENT TO CORRELATE WITH THE SINGLE AIRCRAFT LOSS THAT OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 8 NOV 67. HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION IN ENTRY 8 APPEARS

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TO BE A VARIANT OF THAT WHICH APPEARS IN ENTRY 2 OF REF C. THE PLACE OF BURIAL IN THE REF C ENTRY IS LISTED AS "SON LOI VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN", AS CONTRASTED WITH "XUAN LOI VILLAGE B/XUYEN." "B/XUYEN" PRESUMABLY REFERS TO BINH XUYEN DISTRICT. "XUAN" LOI VILLAGE LIES IN FORMER KIM ANH DISTRICT, "SON" LOI VILLAGE IN FORMER BINH XUYEN DISTRICT. BASED ON THE FOREGOING, ENTRY 8 OF THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT APPEARS TO BE IN ERROR, AND SHOULD HAVE READ "SON LOI VILLAGE, B/XUYEN." JTF-FA ANALYSTS CORRELATED ENTRY 2 OF REF C WITH CASE 0897, BASED ON DATE AND LOCATION. ENTRY 8 OF THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT, THEREFORE, SHOULD ALSO BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0897.)

((LINE ENTRY)) "9; -; -; -; -; -; 21-11-67; BAC SON VILLAGE, DA PHUC; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((THERE WERE NO U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES ON 21 NOV 67. ONE AIRCRAFT LOSS OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 20 NOV 67; HOWEVER, THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN THAT LOSS IS LISTED AS A RETURNEE. A 10KM GRID SEARCH OF THE AREA AROUND BAC SON VILLAGE REVEALS FIVE LOSS INCIDENTS, ONLY ONE OF WHICH, CASE DATA, TOOK PLACE WITHIN BAC SON ITSELF. CASE DATA TOOK PLACE ON 21 JAN 67. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE DATE MAY HAVE BEEN TRANSCRIBED IN ERROR. ENTRY 23 OF REF C CONTAINS SIMILAR INFORMATION TO THIS ENTRY, AND JTF-FA ANALYSTS CORRELATED IT WITH CASE DATA.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "10; -; -; -; -; -; 25-10-67; MINH PHU VILLAGE, K/ANH; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((TWO U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 25 OCT 67, AND ONE IN HA NOI MUNICIPALITY. THE TWO VINH PHU LOSSES, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN A PORTION OF THE PROVINCE WHICH IS NOW PART OF HANOI MUNICIPALITY, OCCURRED WITHIN 5 KM OF MINH PHU VILLAGE. ONLY ONE OF THESE, CASE 0875, INVOLVES AN UNACCOUNTED FOR CREWMAN. THIS ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0875-0-01 BASED ON EXACT DATE, LOCATION, AND FATE OF THE CREW.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "11; ASTVE DONOL; -; MAJ; 6019537; F105; 8-12-66; DI NAU VILLAGE, T/NONG; TRANSFERRED TO AN EARTHENWARE JAR" ((THIS ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0544 BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, AIRCRAFT TYPE, DATE OF INCIDENT AND LOCATION OF LOSS. ((NOTE: THE COORDINATES OF THE ORIGINAL LAST KNOWN LOCATION FOR THIS INCIDENT LIE IN THE VILLAGE IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO DI NAU VILLAGE. THE CURRENT INCIDENT LOCATION CARRIED IN BRIGHTLIGHT IS THE PRODUCT OF WARTIME SOURCE REPORTING. IT APPEARS THAT IN THIS INSTANCE THE ORIGINAL REPORTED LOCATION WAS THE MORE ACCURATE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "12; -; -; -; -; -; 29-4-67; YEN SON VILLAGE, T/SON; -" ((THIS ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0659, BASED ON DATE OF INCIDENT AND LOSS LOCATION.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "13; -; -; -; -; -; 24-7-65; VO MIEU VILLAGE, T/SON; EATEN BY WILD BOAR, REMAINS LOST" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0112, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON INCIDENT DATE AND LOSS LOCATION. THE COORDINATES OF THE LOSS LOCATION CARRIED IN BRIGHTLIGHT LIE WITHIN VO MIEU VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "14; -; -; -; -; -; 15-10-65; QUAT THUONG VILLAGE, VTRI; REMAINS DISPERSED UPON CRASH" ((NO U.S. LOSSES OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 15 OCT 65. ONE AIRCRAFT LOSSES OCCURRED ON 15 OCT 65 IN THE NEIGHBORING PROVINCE OF SON LA; HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LINE ENTRY IS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO CORRELATE TO THAT LOSS, OR TO ANY LOSSES IN THE VIET TRI AREA.

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JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO LOCATE A QUAT HUONG VILLAGE OR WARD WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF VIET TRI CITY.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "15; GRATHAMALEN; -; ?; -; F111A; 17-10-72; TIEN CHAN VILLAGE YLANG; BODY DISINTEGRATED." ((THIS LINE PROBABLY CORRELATES TO CASE 1939-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON SIMILARITY OF NAME, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1939.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "16; HOC/CORIT/CIEM ALON; -; CPT; -; -; -; -; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((THIS ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 1939-0-02, BASED ON SIMILARITY OF NAME ONLY.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "17; -; -; 1LT; -; FA; 06-10-72; VAN LUONG VILLAGE, T/DONG; BODY DISINTEGRATED" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON LOSS LOCATION AND DATE OF BURIAL. THE DATE OF BURIAL INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE OF CASE DATA. JCRC INVESTIGATORS VISITED VAN LUONG VILLAGE DURING THE 12TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY. INFORMATION THEY OBTAINED THERE ABOUT THE ONLY AIRCRAFT LOST IN THAT VILLAGE DURING THE WAR CORRELATED WITH CASE DATA. U.S. RECORDS ALSO INDICATE THAT NO AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN THAT OF CASE DATA CRASHED IN VAN LUONG VILLAGE.))

6. THE DOCUMENT CLOSES WITH THE FOLLOWING NOTES AND FIGURES ANNOTATED AT THE BOTTOM: "COMMENTS BY SEQUENCE NUMBER: 6 AND 7: THESE TWO GUYS WERE BURIED AS ONE BECAUSE ONE GUY STILL HAD HANDS AND HEAD AND ONE GUY STILL HAD LEGS. THEY WERE IN THE SAME AIRCRAFT SO COULD NOT BE TOLD APART. 15 + 16 THERE REMAINS A SMALL PORTION OF FLESH AND BONE FRAGMENTS BURIED IN AN EARTHENWARE JAR." ((THE INFORMATION RELATING TO ENTRIES 6 AND 7 IS INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC TO CORRELATE WITH ANY CASE IN JTF-FA FILES. THE INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH ENTRIES 15 AND 16 CORRELATES WITH CASE 1939 BASED ON THE ENTRY NUMBERS.))

((END TRANSLATION))

7. FOR HQ AFPC/DPWCM: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A COPY OF THE VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT AND TRANSLATION WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

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8. EVAL: BEM/AV/JC//

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PAGE:0001

INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00560820

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS711 MCN = 96118/07277 TOR = 961180452
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1266 1180453-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

R 270453Z APR 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEFJII/J2

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 250912Z APR 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO RUEAHOF/CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PED-P//

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

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CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//

SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT
PILOTS WHO DIED IN VINH PHU"//

RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THREE
SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ONE
SET OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A REPORT TITLED: "REPORT ON RESULTS OF
OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION
SEEKING GROUP." THIS REPORT INCLUDED TEN DOCUMENTS. THE SECOND SET
OF DOCUMENTS WAS A REPORT FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) MIA
SPECIALIST TEAM TITLED: "REPORT OF RESULTS OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS
TO COLLECT MIA INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS." THIS REPORT INCLUDED
THREE DOCUMENTS. THE THIRD SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A VIETNAM OFFICE
SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) ASSESSMENT OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS
TEAM (SRT) CASES.

2. THE MOI REPORT, "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY
OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP," DETAILS A
4 - 12 MAY 95 EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION IN
VINH PHU, TUYEN QUANG, YEN BAI, HOA BINH, NINH BINH AND THANH HOA
PROVINCES. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS
RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES BY THE SPECIAL

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INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS WAS TITLED: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOTS WHO DIED IN VINH PHU".

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES SOME CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH THE FOLLOWING UNRESOLVED CASES: 0112-1-01, 0430-1-01, 0579-0-01, 0897-0-01 AND 1955, AND THE FOLLOWING RESOLVED CASES: 0396-0-01, 0533-1-01, 0544-0-01, 0659-0-01, 0781-1-01, 0914-1-01, 1939-0-01, 1939-0-02, 1953-0-01, 1953-0-02, 1958-0-01, 1958-0-02, 1958-1-07 AND 1961. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE LINE ENTRIES IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH DATA CONTAINED IN JTF-FA RECORDS.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS A LIST OF 27 LINE ITEMS WITH 11 DATA COLUMNS. EACH OF THE 11 DATA COLUMNS FOR THE LINE IS SET APART BY A SEMI-COLON(;). ANY INFORMATION ILLEGIBLE ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS INDICATED BY A QUESTION MARK (?). THE DATA FIELDS LEFT BLANK ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ARE INDICATED BY A HYPHEN (-). THE 11 DATA COLUMNS READ AS FOLLOWS: "ENTRY NUMBER; UNIT NAME; SURNAME AND NAME OF BANDIT PILOT; DATE OF BIRTH; RANK; MILITARY NO.; TYPE OF AIRCRAFT FLOWN; DATE OF DEATH; PLACE BANDIT BURIED; HAVE COFFIN OR NOT; GRAVE EXTANT OR LOST." EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ((ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES)).

5. THE DOCUMENT LINE ENTRIES READ AS FOLLOWS:

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 1; BINH XUYEN; EIAMONDSTEPHN(EIAMONDSTEPHEN); 1-7-1940; 1LT; AC31147934; F105; 19-7-1966; TAM CANH VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN; HAVE COFFIN; TRANSFERRED TO EARTHENWARE POT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0396-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 2; BINH XUYEN; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 8-11-1967; SON LOI VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0897-0-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 3; KIM ANH; GION LOL THOO; 31-10-1924; 2LT; EV910711; F105; 18-11-1967; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE WAS EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0914-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE, LOCATION OF LOSS AND PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER. THE NAME LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CAN NOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0914 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSSES LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES. THE RANK LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0914.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 4; KIM ANH; WHTONSCHARIESCR TENESS; 10-3-1938; CAPT; FR72444; RF101; 1-8-1967; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE WAS EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0781-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 5; KIM ANH; NAME UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; 25-10-1967; MINH PHU VILLAGE, KIM ANH; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((FIVE LOSSES OCCURRED WITHIN 10 KM OF MINH PHU VILLAGE IN LATE 1967, FOUR RESOLVED CASES AND UNRESOLVED CASE

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DATA. NONE OF THESE CASES TOOK PLACE ON 25 OCT 67. IN FACT, NO LOSSES OCCURED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 25 OCT 67. TWO AIRCRAFT WERE LOST WITHIN THE PROVINCE ON 24 OCT 67, BOTH A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM MINH PHU VILLAGE. THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CONTAIN ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE A CORRELATION TO ANY OF THESE CASES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 6; YEN LAC; MOORBERGMONTERAKVE; 18-7-1939; CAPT; FR62699; F105; 2-12-1966; NGUYET DUC VILLAGE, YEN LAC; HAVE COFFIN; NO. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0533-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 7; VINH YEN; NAME ; 1-7-1924; CAPT; AC2073835; F105; 2-12-1966; HA PAGODA CEMETERY, VINH YEN TOWN; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE

DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE RANK LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE DATA))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 8; THANH SON; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 29-4-1967; YEN SON VILLAGE, THANH SON; NO; GRAVE (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0659, BASED ON DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 9; THANH SON; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 24-7-1965; VO MIEU VILLAGE, THANH SON; NO; GRAVE INTACT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0112-1-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON EXACT INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 10; VIET TRI; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 15-10-1965; QUAT HUONG VILLAGE, VIET TRI CITY; BODY DISINTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((JTF-FA DATA BASES LIST NO LOSSES IN VINH PHU PROVINCE IN OCT 65. A 20-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON VIET TRI CITY (WJ 2366; QUAT HUONG VILLAGE IS NOT LISTED IN ANY SOURCE AVAIL-
//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT RMKS/

TABLE TO JTF-FA) SHOWS ONLY FOUR INCIDENTS, NONE OF WHICH CAN BE CORRELATED WITH THIS ENTRY. BRIGHT LIGHT LISTS TWO CASES WITH AN INCIDENT DATE OF 15 OCT 65 BUT THE LOCATIONS OF LOSS LISTED FOR THESE CASES (SON LA PROVINCE) DO NOT CORRELATE WITH THIS ENTRY. THE ENTRY DOES NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE A CORRELATION TO ANY U.S. LOSS IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 11; TAM DUONG; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 8-11-1967; DONG TINH VILLAGE, TAM DUONG;

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 12; TAM DUONG; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 8-11-1967; DONG TINH VILLAGE, TAM DUONG; ((THESE TWO ENTRIES ARE JOINED BY A BRACKET AT COLUMNS 10 AND 11, INDICATING THAT THE DATA IN THOSE COLUMNS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS APPLYING TO BOTH ENTRIES. COLUMN 10 READS: "THESE TWO GUYS BURIED (ILLEGIBLE)." COLUMN 11 IS LARGELY ILLEGIBLE, BUT MAY READ: "GRAVE (ILLEGIBLE)"

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THERE IS STILL (ILLEGIBLE).") ((THE DATE OF THESE ENTRIES CORRELATES WITH CASE 0897, THE ONLY LOSS IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 8 NOV 67. HOWEVER, THE LOSS LOCATION REPORTED IN LINE ENTRY 2 (SON LOI VILLAGE, WJ 5371) CORRELATES MORE CLOSELY WITH CASE 0897 THAN DOES THAT PROVIDED IN ENTRIES 11 AND 12 (DONG TINH VILLAGE, WJ 6856). IN ADDITION, CASE 0897 INVOLVED ONLY ONE CREW MEMBER. THESE ENTRIES INVOLVE THE BURIAL OF TWO CREWMEN. THERE ARE 11 LOSS INCIDENTS, ALL INVOLVING THE DEATH OR CAPTURE OF U.S. PERSONNEL, LOCATED WITHIN 15 KM OF DONG TINH VILLAGE. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN LINE ENTRIES 11 AND 12 IS INSUFFICIENT TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH ANY OF THESE INCIDENTS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 13; YEN LANG; GWTAIHAMALEN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; F111A; 17-10-1972; TIEN CHAU VILLAGE, YEN LANG; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED (?) BURIED (?); (?) 2 GUYS (?).

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 14; YEN LANG; HOCORITTIEMALON; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; F111A; 17-10-1972; TIEN CHAU VILLAGE, YEN LANG; TOO LITTLE (?); (?). ((THESE TWO LINE ENTRIES PROBABLY CORRELATE WITH CASES 1939-0-02 AND 1939-0-01 RESPECTIVELY. BOTH INDIVIDUALS ARE RESOLVED. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAMES, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS. CASE 1939 IS THE ONLY CASE LISTED IN JTF-FA DATA BASES WITH AN INCIDENT DATE OF 17 OCT 72 AND A LOSS LOCATION IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. THE CASE 1939 RECORD LOSS LOCATION LIES WITHIN TIEN CHAU VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 15; YEN LANG; NAME UNKNOWN ((SIX ILLEGIBLE WORDS ARE WRITTEN TO THE LOWER RIGHT OF THIS COLUMN, IN PARENTHESES, WITH AN ARROW POINTING TO THE DATA)); UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 21-12-1972; THANH LANG VILLAGE, YEN LANG; THERE IS 1 (?); (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1961, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. CASE 1961 IS THE ONLY CASE LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES WITH AN INCIDENT DATE OF 21 DEC 72 AND A LOSS LOCATION IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. THE PROVINCE OF LOSS FOR CASE 1961 IS LISTED IN BRIGHT LIGHT AS HA NOI. DURING THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH EAST ASIA THIS LOCATION WAS IN SOC SON DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE. THANH LANG VILLAGE IS CENTERED ON WJ 6448, THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1961 IS WJ 7949, JUST 15 KM EAST OF THANH LANG.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 16; TAM NONG; ASTVEDONOL; 8-7-1923; MAJ; 6019537; F105; 8-12-1966; DI NAU VILLAGE, TAM NONG; BODY DISINTEGRATED; (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0544-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE RANK AND SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DO NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0544, NOR DOES THE SERIAL NUMBER CORRELATE WITH ANY U.S. LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 17; TAM NONG; UNCLEAR; CAPT; UNCLEAR; F111A; 17-10-1972; VAN LUONG VILLAGE, TAM NONG; BODY DISINTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((THE AIRCRAFT TYPE AND INCIDENT DATE ARE CONSISTENT WITH CASE 1939, WHICH INVOLVES THE ONLY F-111 AIRCRAFT LOST ANYWHERE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON 17 OCT 72. HOWEVER, LINE ENTRIES 13 AND 14 ABOVE CORRELATE MUCH MORE CONCLUSIVELY WITH CASE 1939 THAN DOES THIS ENTRY. IN ADDITION, JCRC INVESTIGATORS VISITED VAN LUONG VILLAGE DURING THE

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12TH JFA AND DETERMINED THAT THE ONLY AIRCRAFT TO HAVE CRASHED IN THAT VILLAGE DURING THE WAR WAS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE DATA. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN THIS ENTRY TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH CASE DATA OR ANY OTHER CASE LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 18; PHUC YEN; LYNNROBERTRAY; 6-16-1940; CAPT; FE3147063; B52; 21-12-1972; HOSPITAL 74 CEMETERY; THERE IS 1 ARM; (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1958-0-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND INCIDENT DATE.))

((LINE ENTRY)) 19; PHUC YEN; BEENSLVNNRICHARD BAGBEO9322; UNCLER; UNCLER; 2730126; B52; 12-21-1972; HOSPITAL 74 CEMETERY; THERE ARE 4 ARMS; AND (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1958-0-07, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND INCIDENT DATE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 20; KIM ANH; BEBUSCHARLESJAMES; 4-2-1951; UNCLER; 562801771; B52; 19-12-1972; GIA TRUNG HAMLET, QUANG MINH VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; LOST (?). ((THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1958-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, SERIAL NUMBER AND AIRCRAFT TYPE.))

((THE LOCATIONS OF LOSS LISTED IN LINE ENTRIES 18 AND 19 DO NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 1958, LYING 23 KM NNW OF THE LOCATION CARRIED IN JTF-FA FILES. HOWEVER, WARTIME REPORTING IN THE CASE 1958 FILE INDICATES A POSSIBLE LOSS LOCATION IN PHUC YEN TOWN, THE LOCATION PROVIDED IN THIS LINE ENTRY. THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN LINE ENTRY 19 DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 1958 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSSES LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES. THE INCIDENT LOCATION PROVIDED IN LINE ENTRY 20 ALSO DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH INFORMATION CARRIED IN JTF-FA FILES, LYING 17 KM NORTH OF THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION. THERE ARE OTHER DISCREPANCIES WORTHY OF NOTE. FIRST, ALL THREE ENTRIES INDICATE BURIAL OF ASSOCIATED REMAINS. HOWEVER, THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED IN ENTRY 19 WAS CAPTURED AND RETURNED TO U.S. CONTROL IN 1973. SECOND, THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED IN ENTRY 20 WAS RESOLVED THROUGH THE RETURN OF REMAINS, BUT HIS INCIDENT LOCATION DIFFERS FROM THAT PROVIDED FOR ENTRIES 18 AND 19. PRESUMABLY, THE TWO CREW MEMBERS RESOLVED THROUGH RETURN OF REMAINS WOULD HAVE BEEN RECOVERED FROM THE CRASHED AIRCRAFT, AS NOTED //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT RMKS/

IN THE WARTIME REPORTING CITED ABOVE, ALTHOUGH, GIVEN THE ALTITUDE FROM WHICH B-52 AIRCRAFT CRASHED, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT REMAINS FROM THE SAME AIRCREW MIGHT HAVE BEEN RECOVERED IN DIFFERENT AREAS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THESE DISCREPANCIES AND INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE COMPILER(S) OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY HAVE GARBLED OR MISUNDERSTOOD SOME DATA.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 21; KIM ANH; RISSIDONALDLOUIS; UNCLER; UNCLER; 359243061; B52; 18-12-1972; DONG TAO COOPERATIVE, DONG XUAN VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1953-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF

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LOSS. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION IS 15 KM WEST OF DONG XUAN VILLAGE, BUT WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO B-52 LOSSES, THIS IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT DISCREPANCY. DONG XUAN VILLAGE IS LOCATED IN WHAT IS NOW SOC SON DISTRICT, HA NOI CITY. IT SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH DONG XUAN VILLAGE, THANH HOA DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 22; KIM ANH; FERGUSONWALTERLCSC772; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; CARD4183186; B52; 18-12-1972; PHU LO VILLAGE, KIM ANH DISTRICT; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1953-0-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 1953 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSSES LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES. THE LOSS LOCATION LISTED IN THIS ENTRY LIES IMMEDIATELY TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DONG XUAN VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 23; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; DATA 11-1967; BAC SON VILLAGE, DA PHUC; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE, BASED ON LOCATION AND PARTIAL DATE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE DATA LIES WITHIN BAC SON VILLAGE, IN WHAT IS NOW SOC SON DISTRICT OF HA NOI CITY. THE DATE OF LOSS IS DATA JAN 67. GIVEN THE ACCURACY OF THE LOSS LOCATION, AND THE LACK OF CARE EVIDENT IN CERTAIN OTHER ENTRIES IN THIS DOCUMENT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE COMPILER(S) MAY HAVE MISTAKENLY TRANSCRIBED AN ADDITIONAL "1" IN THE MONTH PLACE WITHIN THE DATE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 24 DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; THANG THUC HAMLET, TIEN DUOC VILLAGE; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT.

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 25; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; THANG THUC HAMLET TIEN DUOC VILLAGE; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THESE LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATE WITH CASE 1955, WHICH INVOLVES FOUR UNRESOLVED INDIVIDUALS AND TWO RELEASEES. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF LOSS CITED IN THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1965, THE ONLY B52 LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES THAT OCCURRED ON 22 DEC 72. HOWEVER, THE LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1965 HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY EXCAVATION IN LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1955 LIES WITHIN TIEN DUOC VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 26; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; XUAN GIANG VILLAGE, DA PHUC; GRAVE EXTANT; HAVE COFFIN.

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 27; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; XUAN GIANG VILLAGE; DA PHUC; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THESE LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATE WITH CASE 1955, WHICH INVOLVES FOUR UNRESOLVED INDIVIDUALS AND TWO RELEASEES. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF LOSS CITED IN THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1965, THE ONLY B52 LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES THAT OCCURRED ON 22 DEC 72. HOWEVER, THE LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1965 HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY EXCAVATION IN LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1955 LIES WITHIN TIEN DUOC VILLAGE. XUAN GIANG VILLAGE LIES BETWEEN ONE AND TWO KM DUE EAST OF TIEN DUOC VILLAGE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT

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PORTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE FALLEN IN BOTH VILLAGES.))

6. FOR CDR PERSCOM/TAPC-PED-P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.
COPIES OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

ADMIN

7. EVAL: DWO/JMC//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00560744
 ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS694 MCN = 96118/07016 TOR = 961180435
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1250 1180435-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
 HEADER
 R 270435Z APR 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 250902Z APR 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEACNP/BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS-663P//
 RHWRMPC/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 BT
 CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED: "REPORT: NUMBER OF
 AMERICAN PILOTS CAPTURED IN VINH PHU FROM 1964 TO OCTOBER 1972"//
 RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THREE
 SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ONE
 SET OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A REPORT TITLED: "REPORT ON RESULTS OF
 OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION
 SEEKING GROUP." THIS REPORT INCLUDED TEN DOCUMENTS. THE SECOND SET
 OF DOCUMENTS WAS A REPORT FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) MIA
 SPECIALIST TEAM TITLED: "REPORT OF RESULTS OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS
 TO COLLECT MIA INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS." THIS REPORT INCLUDED
 THREE DOCUMENTS. THE THIRD SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A VIETNAM OFFICE
 SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) ASSESSMENT OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS
 TEAM (SRT) CASES.
 2. THE MOI REPORT, "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY
 OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP", DETAILS A
 4 - 12 MAY 95, EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION IN
 VINH PHU, TUYEN QUANG, YEN BAI, HOA BINH, NINH BINH AND THANH HOA
 PROVINCES. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS

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RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES BY THE SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP. ONE OF THESE DOCUMENTS IS TITLED:

"REPORT: NUMBER OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOTS CAPTURED IN VINH PHU FROM 1964 TO OCTOBER 1972."

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES LIMITED CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYST HAVE IDENTIFIED LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH THE FOLLOWING RESOLVED CASES: 0112-1-02, 0310-1-01, 0377-1-01, 0422-1-01, 0445-1-01, 0446-1-01, 0659-1-02, 0663-1-01, 0663-1-02, 0781-1-01, 0873-1-02, 0876-1-01, 0891-1-01, 0891-2-02, 0922-1-01, 1852-1-01, 1852-1-02, 1861-1-01, 1880-1-01, 1880-1-02, 1881-1-02, 1886-1-01, 1886-1-02 AND 1934-1-02. MOST OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE LINE ENTRIES IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH DATA CONTAINED IN JTF-FA RECORDS.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS A TYPEWRITTEN LIST OF 24 LINE ITEMS IN TABULAR FORM WITH 8 DATA COLUMNS FOR EACH LINE. THE DOCUMENT ALSO HAS A HEADER WHICH SHOWS SOURCE INFORMATION IN THE UPPER LEFT MARGIN AND THE DOCUMENT TITLE CENTERED AT THE TOP OF THE PAGE. THE HEADER INFORMATION IS TRANSLATED AS FOLLOWS:

((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

- "POLITICAL OFFICE
- VINH PHU PUBLIC SECURITY
- NO. 1072
- SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
- INDEPENDENCE - FREEDOM - HAPPINESS
- REPORT: NUMBER OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOTS CAPTURED IN VINH PHU FROM 1964 TO 10 - 1972"

((END TRANSLATION))

5. THE TRANSLATION BELOW LISTS EACH LINE ENTRY, WITH EACH OF THE EIGHT DATA COLUMNS FOR THE LINE SET APART BY A SEMICOLON (;). THE EIGHT DATA COLUMNS OF THE DOCUMENT READ AS FOLLOWS: "NUMBER; NAME; DATE OF BIRTH; SERIAL NO; RANK; AIRCRAFT TYPE; DATE OF CAPTURE; PLACE OF CAPTURE." DATA FIELDS LEFT BLANK ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ARE INDICATED BY A HYPHEN(-). ANY INFORMATION ILLEGIBLE ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS REPLACED WITH A QUESTION MARK(?). EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ((ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES)). THE DOCUMENT LINE ENTRIES READ AS FOLLOWS:

((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

- "1; DODOCHARLBC; 1-5-1942; 78006A; 1LT; F105; 4-9-1966; BA VIEN VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0445-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0445-1-01. THE NAME LISTED IN THIS ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0445 OR ANY OTHER U.S LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- "2; CHARLES BONO; 15-4-1938; 76601A; CPT; F105; 22-4-1966; BA VIEN VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0310-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0310-1-01.))

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- "3; OVRPHVNEALIONES; 23-1-1938; 69506A; F105; 29-6-1966; TAN MINH VILLAGE, DA PHUC" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0377-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0377-1-01.))

- "4; TOMDAHCRSLSC; -; FR77244; CPT; F105; 12-8-1967; NAM SON, DA PHUC" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0781-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, RANK AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE APPROXIMATE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0781-1-01.))

- "5; BLISSRONAUPGVEN; 12-8-1943; FR78531; 1LT; F105; 4-9-1966; MAI DINH, KIM ANH" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0446-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, YEAR OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0446-1-01.))

- "6; CHAKLSRGLLEENRPGR; 24-2-1929; 524951; MAJ; F4; 24-10-1967; TAM DAO DISTRICT TOWN" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0873-1-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0873. THE RANK LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0873.))

- "7; HONLNICH; 1932; 49644A; CPT; F105; 25-10-1967; TAN MINH VILLAGE DA PHUC" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0876-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, YEAR OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0876-1-01.))

- "8; RILHARDDIKEIN; -; A65931; CPT; F4; 24-7-1965; VO MIEU

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED: "REPORT: NUMBER OF RMKS/

VILLAGE, THANH SON" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0112-1-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0112-1-02. THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0112 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- "9; PIEDRISROSSEL; 9-4-1944; AD3157103; 1LT; F4; 8-6-1966; PHU NINH, PHU NINH" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0422-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, SERIAL NUMBER AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0422-1-01. THE RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND DATE OF BIRTH LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DO NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0422.))

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- "10; -; -; -; -; -; 29-4-1967; YEN SON, THANH SON" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0659, A RESOLVED CASE. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0659. CORRELATION WITH CASE 0653 IS BASED ON INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS ONLY. A SEARCH OF JTF-FA FILES REVEALED ONLY ONE LOSS, (CASE 0659) OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 29 APR 1967.))

- "11; THORVESOLLEO; 1937; -; MAJ; -; 30-4-1967; THANH SON" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0663-1-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, RANK AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0663-1-02. THE DATE OF BIRTH LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0663.))

- "12; NOROLEUGENLJOLONSON; 1936; -; CPT; F105; 30-4-1967; THANH SON" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0663-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0663-1-01.))

- "13; DIITONRIENARDA; 1930; 22497; MAJ; F105; 5-11-1967; TIEN PHU, PHU NINH" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0891-2-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0891-1-02. THE YEAR OF BIRTH LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CANNOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0891-2-02. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IS A RETURNEE, THE DATE OF BIRTH FOR CASE 0891-2-02 IS NOT LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- "14; IOBCIBERG; 1934; 61453A; CPT; F105; 5-11-1967; TIEN PHU, PHU NINH" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0891-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, YEAR OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0891-1-01.))

- "15; ENTLEKNWILHAMW; 29-11-1941; 313343D; CPT; F105; 6-11-1967; DOAN HUNG" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0922-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, SERIAL NUMBER, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE APPROXIMATE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 0922-1-01. THE DATE OF BIRTH LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CANNOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0922-1-01. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IS A RETURNEE, THE DATE OF BIRTH FOR CASE 0922 IS NOT LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- "16; REIGHWHLHAMW; 1947; 7939767; 1LT; F4; 11-5-1972; DAO TRU VILLAGE, LAP THACH" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1852-1-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1852. THE SERIAL NUMBER CANNOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 1852-1-02. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IS A RETURNEE, THE SERIAL NUMBER FOR CASE 1852-1-02 IS NOT LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

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- "17; HETTINGERJOSEPHVTLLAM; 1928; 52808; -; F4; 11-5-1972; DAO TRU VILLAGE, LAP THACH" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1852-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, YEAR OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1852-1-01. THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CANNOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 1852-1-01. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IS A RETURNEE, THE SERIAL NUMBER FOR CASE 1852-1-01 IS NOT LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- "18; VIRIAM; 1944; -; CPT; F4; 20-5-1972; THUONG CUU VILLAGE, THANH SON" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1861-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1861-1-01.))

- "19; GIEORGEROSE; 1943; 8458493; CPT; F4; 21-6-1972; DONG LUONG, CAM KHE" ((THIS LINE ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1880-1-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1880-1-02. THE SERIAL NUMBER AND DATE OF BIRTH LISTED IN THIS ENTRY CANNOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 1880. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IS A RETURNEE, THE SERIAL NUMBER AND DATE OF BIRTH FOR CASE 1880 ARE NOT LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- "20; BETROOILSREDCALLVSON; 1946; -; 1LT; F4; 21-6-1972; DONG LUONG, CAM KHE" ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1880-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME SIMILARITY, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1880-1-01. THE DATE OF BIRTH LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CANNOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 1880. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IS A RETURNEE, THE DATE OF BIRTH FOR CASE 1880 IS NOT LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- "21; GRANTDAVIDBRIAN; 1943; 7455080; CPT; F4; 26-6-1972; LANG

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED: "REPORT: NUMBER OF RMKS/

CONG, LAP THACH" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1881-1-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1881-1-02. THE DATE OF BIRTH AND SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CAN NOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 1881. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IS A RETURNEE, THE DATE OF BIRTH AND SERIAL NUMBER FOR CASE 1881 IS NOT LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- "22; JOHNPCERAK; 1944; -; CPT; F4; 27-6-1972; KIET SON, THANH SON" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1886-1-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE, DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN

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THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1886-1-02.))

- "23; DINGEEDAVIDB; 1943; -; CPT; F4; 27-6-1972; TAN SON, THANH SON" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1886-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1886-1-01. THE DATE OF BIRTH LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CANNOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 1886. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IS A RETURNEE, THE DATE OF BIRTH FOR CASE 1886-1-01 IS NOT LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- "24; LATEILAGEORGEPRANKIS; 1947; 8784986; 1LT; F4; 6-10-1972; KINH KE, LAM THAO" ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1934-1-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF CAPTURE INDICATED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT DATE FOR CASE 1934-1-02. THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CANNOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 1934-1-02. BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IS A RETURNEE, THE SERIAL NUMBER FOR CASE 1934-1-02 IS NOT LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

6. THE DOCUMENT CLOSSES WITH THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: "VINH PHU, 10/11/1972, COMMANDER OF VINH PHU PUBLIC SECURITY,/(END TRANSLATION))

7. FOR AFPC/DPWCM AND BUPERS/PERS 663P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT AND TRANSLATION WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

ADMIN

8. EVAL: DWO//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00256049

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS529 MCN = 96079/02988 TOR = 960790147
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS8055 0790147-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O P 230945Z FEB 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE

ZEM

CONTROLS

UNCLAS

BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0512//
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS529 MCN = 96079/02988 TOR = 960790147
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS8055 0790147-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

O 190147Z MAR 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHEFOCB/OC

RUEALGX/SAFE

O P 230945Z FEB 96 ZEL

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/ACS/ACS/EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RHEHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//

RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//

BT

UNCLAS //N03000/VOL-CCN//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
SECTION 01 OF 05

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CORRECTS DTG OF PART TWO IDENT
PART ONE OF TWO-PART TWO IDENT IS 230946Z FEB 96

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTF-FA/-/SEP//

SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA

REF: A. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 211703Z FEB 96

B. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 141700Z FEB 96

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- C. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 051440Z APR 95
- D. JTF-FA J2, MEMO, 04 AUG 1994
- E. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 132033Z DEC 93
- F. JCRC LIAISON, BANGKOK, TH, 300445Z JAN 88

RMKS/1. REFERENCES.

A. REF A IS THE 39TH JFA ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT CONCERNING CASE DATA.

B. REF B IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 11 JANUARY TO 9 FEBRUARY 1996.

C. REF C IS THE 34TH JFA DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING CASE DATA.

D. REF D IS THE JTF-FA J2 ANALYSIS OF HA BAC PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS COMBAT CHRONOLOGY.

E. REF E IS THE 26TH JFA FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT OF CASE DATA

F. REF F IS THE INVESTIGATION REPORT PROVIDED BY THE SRV DURING THE 22-25 JANUARY 88 TECHNICAL MEETING.

G. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS BASED ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION.

A. ON 18 AND 19 JANUARY 1996, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IE1) INVESTIGATED CASE DATA IN CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE.

B. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE 4 NOVEMBER 1966 LOSS OF AN F-105F AIRCRAFT WHILE FLYING A COMBAT SUPPORT MISSION, RESULTING IN TWO UNACCOUNTED-FOR INDIVIDUALS. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT REPATRIATED THE REMAINS OF ONE CREWMEMBER TO THE U.S. IN 1989. THE U.S. SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED THOSE REMAINS AS THOSE OF THE CASE DATA-0-01 INDIVIDUAL. THE SECOND CREWMEMBER FOR THIS CASE REMAINS UNACCOUNTED-FOR.

C. ON 18 JANUARY 1996, IE1 INTERVIEWED TWO WITNESSES AND RECEIVED FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF A 1965 CRASH IN BAI THAO HAMLET AND THE SUBSEQUENT CAPTURE OF THE PILOT. THESE ACCOUNTS PROBABLY CORRELATE TO RESOLVED CASE 0176. ONE WITNESS IDENTIFIED THE 1965 CRASH SITE, WHICH THE TEAM SEARCHED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. ONE WITNESS ALSO PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING A SEPARATE CRASH IN CAM LY VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE, WHICH PROBABLY CORRELATES TO AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THAT INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN A SEPARATE REPORT (REF A).

D. ON 19 JANUARY 1996, IE1 INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES AND RECEIVED FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF A 1966 CRASH IN HUNG DAO VILLAGE AND THE SUBSEQUENT BURIAL OF REMAINS FOUND AT THE SITE. ONE WITNESS IDENTIFIED THE CRASH SITE AND BURIAL LOCATION. THIS INFORMATION PROBABLY CORRELATES TO CASE DATA

E. IE1 DID NOT RECEIVE OR RECOVER ANY REMAINS WHILE INVESTIGATING CASE DATA

F. RECOMMENDATION: EXCAVATE.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

A. PURPOSE:

(1) INTERVIEW RESIDENTS OF THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS IN HA BAC PROVINCE FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING CASE DATA

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(A) DONG CONG (DOONGF COONGS) HAMLET, VU XA (VUX XAS) VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(B) CAM LY (CAAMR LYS) VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(C) DAN HOI (DAN HOOIJ) VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(D) TRI YEN (TRIS YEEN) VILLAGE, YEN DUNG DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(2) INTERVIEW RESIDENTS OF THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS IN HAI HUNG PROVINCE FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING CASE DATA

(A) BAI THAO (BAIX THAOR) HAMLET, BAC AN (BAWCS AN) VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.E., BELOW).

(B) HUNG DAO (HWNG DAOJ) VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.H., BELOW).

(C) LE LOI (LEE LOWIJ) VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(3) INTERVIEW MR. NGUYEN VAN DAU (NGUYEENX VAWN DAU) OF BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, AND HAVE HIM LEAD THE TEAM TO THE CRASH SITE NEAR BAI THAO HAMLET WHICH HE MENTIONED TO VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS INVESTIGATING CASE DATA IN 1988 (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.F., BELOW).

B. ON 11 JANUARY 1996, THE JOINT U.S./SRV INVESTIGATION TEAM ARRIVED IN HANOI TO INVESTIGATE TWO CASES IN HAI HUNG PROVINCE.

C. TEAM COMPOSITION.

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT.

CPT ERIC NEWMAN	TEAM LEADER
MSG STEPHEN E. THOMPSON	ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
CW4 ROBERT W. BARFIELD	ANALYST
SFC MITCHELL P. SCHNEITER	ANALYST/LINGUIST
MSGT HUNG M. NGUYEN	ANALYST/LINGUIST
CTI1 DANIEL L. MCLEOD JR.	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SSGT JAMES E. CREWS	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SGT MICHAEL A. DVORAK	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SSG MONTE E. COOPER	SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
SGT RICHARD J. JONES	SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
MSGT HAROLD J. CAMPBELL	TEAM MEDIC
SFC ALAN J. SCHNABEL	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECHNICIAN

(2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT.

TRAN MINH TUAN (TRAANF MINH TUAANS)	TEAM LEADER;
	MINISTRY OF
	FOREIGN AFFAIRS

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
 SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA
 RMKS/
 LE TRAN TUAN (LEE TRAANF TUAANS)

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DAO KHAC CAI (DAOF KHAWCS CAIR)

MINISTRY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE
MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR
MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR

LE VAN HOANG (LEE VAWN HOANGF)

NGUYEN VAN QUYNH (NGUYEENX VAWN QUYNHS)

TEAM LEADER
TEAM MEMBER
TEAM MEMBER
TEAM MEMBER
TEAM MEMBER

(3) HAI HUNG PROVINCE TASK TEAM.

PHAM VAN HOAN (PHAM VAWN HOANF)

NGUYEN VAN THUAN (NGUYEENX VAWN THUAAN)

PHAM NGOC HUNG (PHAM NGOCJ HUNGF)

NGUYEN VAN VY (NGUYEENX VAWN VYX)

LE VAN SON (LEE VAWN SOWN)

D. ON 12 JANUARY 1996, IEI MET WITH THEIR VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS TO DISCUSS THE TEAM'S INVESTIGATION PLANS. THE JOINT TEAM REVIEWED THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH CASE AND ESTABLISHED AN INVESTIGATION SCHEDULE. THE VIETNAMESE TEAM LEADER, MR. TUAN, INFORMED IEI THAT DURING THEIR UNILATERAL ADVANCE WORK THE VIETNAMESE TEAM CANVASSED BUT DID NOT FIND ANY WITNESSES WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING CASE #ATA IN DONG CONG HAMLET, CAM LY VILLAGE, DAN HOI VILLAGE, TRI YEN VILLAGE, OR LE LOI VILLAGE (SEE PARAS 3.A.(1) AND 3.A.(2)(C), ABOVE). THE U.S. TEAM LEADER CONCURRED WITH MR. TUAN'S SUGGESTION THAT THE JOINT TEAM NOT GO TO THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE VIETNAMESE TEAM HAD ALREADY MET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS AND INSTEAD CONCENTRATE THE INVESTIGATION IN THE AREAS THEY WERE ABLE TO LOCATE POTENTIAL WITNESSES TO THE CASE #ATA INCIDENT.

E. ON 18 JANUARY 1996, THE JOINT TEAM TRAVELED TO BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE. IEI MET WITH VILLAGE OFFICIALS AND DISCUSSED THE CASE #ATA INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH VILLAGE OFFICIALS, THE JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES AND OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) WITNESS ONE:

(A) NAME: NGUYEN VAN THINH (NGUYEENX VAWN THINHJ).

(B) AGE: 44 YOA.

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: BAI THAO HAMLET, BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT; 36 YEARS.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: STUDENT.

(G) STATEMENT:

((1)) BETWEEN 1400 AND 1500 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN JULY (LUNAR CALENDAR) 1965, MR. THINH SAW A PILOT PARACHUTE FROM A BURNING JET. THE AIRCRAFT, WHICH HE LATER HEARD WAS A F-4H, CAME FROM THE DIRECTION OF BAC GIANG (BAWCS GIANG) TOWN, HA BAC PROVINCE. AFTER THE PILOT EJECTED, THE JET CRASHED NEAR BAI THAO HAMLET. MR. THINH DID NOT KNOW HOW THE PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN BUT HEARD THAT ITS TARGET WAS THE BAC GIANG POWER PLANT.

((2)) THE AIRCRAFT IMPACTED APPROXIMATELY FOUR KILOMETERS FROM WHERE MR. THINH WAS HIDING IN A BUNKER. THERE WAS A LOUD EXPLOSION WHEN IT HIT AND THE WRECKAGE BURNED FOR A SHORT

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PERIOD OF TIME. WHILE HE PERSONALLY SAW ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT THAT SUBSEQUENTLY CRASHED, MR. THINH SAID THAT WHILE IN THE BUNKER HE HEARD OTHER PLANES FLYING AROUND THE AREA.

((3)) MR. THINH LATER HEARD THAT THE PILOT LANDED NEAR LE LOI VILLAGE AND WAS CAPTURED BY TROOPS FROM NEARBY HA BAC PROVINCE. HE WAS TOLD THE PILOT WAS AN AUSTRALIAN AND HAD NOT BEEN INJURED IN THE INCIDENT. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PILOT'S PERSONAL BELONGINGS OR EQUIPMENT, BUT HEARD THAT TROOPS TOOK THE PILOT TO HA BAC PROVINCE.

((4)) MR. THINH WENT TO THE CRASH SITE THE FOLLOWING DAY. A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE FROM ALL OVER THE AREA WERE ALREADY THERE. THE AIRCRAFT HAD MOSTLY DISINTEGRATED INTO SMALL UNIDENTIFIABLE PIECES UPON IMPACT; HOWEVER, A PORTION OF THE FRONT END REMAINED INTACT. HE DID NOT SEE ANY REMAINS AT THE SITE AND DID NOT HEAR ABOUT ANYONE FINDING ANY REMAINS. HE DID NOT SEE ANY OF THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS, EQUIPMENT, OR EJECTION SEAT AT THE SITE AND DID NOT HEAR ABOUT ANYONE FINDING THESE ITEMS. MR. THINH SAID HE TOOK SOME OF THE SMALL PIECES OF WRECKAGE, AS DID OTHERS AT THE SITE, BUT HE DOES NOT HAVE THEM ANYMORE. HE CANNOT REMEMBER IF ANY OF THE WRECKAGE HAD ANY NUMBERS OR SYMBOLS ON IT. MR. THINH SAID HE COULD GUIDE IEL TO THE CRASH SITE BUT THAT NO WRECKAGE REMAINS THERE.

((5)) WHEN ASKED HOW HE COULD BE SURE THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED IN JULY 1965 MR. THINH REPLIED THAT HE REMEMBERED THE TIME FRAME BECAUSE IT WAS SUMMER AND HE HAD JUST FINISHED ATTENDING SCHOOL. HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER CRASHES IN THE AREA, BUT HEARD THERE WAS A CRASH IN 1967 IN CAM LY VILLAGE, HA BAC PROVINCE. HE DID NOT KNOW ANY DETAILS ABOUT THE 1967 CRASH.

(2) WITNESS TWO:

- (A) NAME: TRAN VAN KHOAT (TRAANF VAWN KHOAWTS).
- (B) AGE: 64 YOA.
- (C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT; OVER 35 YEARS.
- (D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.
- (E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.
- (F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: FARMER.
- (G) STATEMENT:

((1)) BETWEEN 1200 AND 1300 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN JULY (LUNAR CALENDAR) 1965, MR. KHOAT SAW A FLIGHT OF THREE AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE DIRECTION OF HA BAC PROVINCE. ONE OF THE AIRCRAFT, WHICH HE LATER HEARD HAD BEEN HIT BY AN AAA UNIT IN HA BAC PROVINCE, WAS ON FIRE. A PILOT PARACHUTED OUT OF THE BURNING
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

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PLANE BEFORE IT CRASHED IN BAC AN VILLAGE. THE OTHER AIRCRAFT CIRCLED THE AREA FOR APPROXIMATELY 15 MINUTES, DROPPED TWO BOMBS, AND THEN FLEW AWAY.

((2)) THE PILOT LANDED ABOUT 800 METERS FROM MR. KHOAT'S HOUSE, WHICH AT THE TIME WAS LOCATED NEAR LE LOI VILLAGE. NEARBY MILITIA MEMBERS FROM CAM LY VILLAGE, HA BAC PROVINCE, CAPTURED THE PILOT. MR. KHOAT WENT AND SAW THE CAPTURED PILOT, A BIG, TALL MAN OVER TWO METERS IN HEIGHT. MR. KHOAT DESCRIBES THE PILOT AS BEING NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE, BUT HAVING TAN COLOR SKIN, WITH SHORT BLACK CURLY HAIR. TROOPS TOOK THE PILOT, WHO WAS NOT WOUNDED, TO CAM LY VILLAGE. MR. KHOAT DID NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE PILOT NOR WHAT HAPPENED TO HIM AFTER HE WAS TAKEN AWAY. ACCORDING TO MR. KHOAT, CHI LINH DISTRICT OFFICIALS AT THE SCENE TOOK THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS, EQUIPMENT, AND EJECTION SEAT.

((3)) LATER THAT AFTERNOON, AROUND 1500, MR. KHOAT WENT TO THE CRASH SITE. WRECKAGE LITTERED THE SITE BUT MR. KHOAT DID NOT SEE ANY REMAINS THERE. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT NO ONE DIED IN THE CRASH. THE PIECES OF THE AIRCRAFT WERE GREEN BUT HE DID NOT RECALL SEEING ANY MARKINGS OR SYMBOLS ON ANYTHING. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TYPE OF AIRCRAFT IT WAS BUT HE HEARD IT WAS A F-105. THERE IS NO LONGER ANY WRECKAGE AT THE SITE AS THE LOCALS SCAVENGED IT ALL. MR. KHOAT THOUGHT HE STILL HAD A PIECE OF THE WRECKAGE AT HOME.

((4)) MR. KHOAT THEN PROVIDED IE1 INFORMATION ON A DIFFERENT CRASH WHICH OCCURRED IN CAM LY VILLAGE, HA BAC PROVINCE. HE SHOWED THE TEAM A POCKET KNIFE HE FOUND AT THE SCENE OF THAT CRASH. THE INFORMATION HE PROVIDED CORRELATED TO AN UNRESOLVED 1972 LOSS INCIDENT AND IS REPORTED SEPARATELY (SEE REF B, ABOVE).

F. IE1 REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW A MR. NGUYEN VAN DAU (SEE PARA 3.A.(3), ABOVE). THE VNOSMP STATED THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION REPORT FROM WHICH THE U.S. DERIVED THE LEAD WAS INCORRECT (SEE REF F, ABOVE). THE PERSON REFERENCED IN THE REPORT IS ACTUALLY VU NGOC DAU (VUX NGOCJ ZAAUJ). THE JOINT TEAM THEN MET 53 YEAR-OLD MR. DAU AND FOUND THAT HE HAD NO PERTINENT INFORMATION TO PROVIDE. HE HAD BEEN AWAY IN THE MILITARY FROM 1960 TO 1975, AND DID NOT RETURN TO THE AREA UNTIL 1975. HE SERVED AS THE BAC AN VILLAGE CHAIRMAN FROM 1976 TO 1980 AND HIS INFORMATION WAS LIMITED TO HEARSAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN ONE AIRCRAFT CRASH IN THE VILLAGE WHILE HE WAS AWAY.

G. FOLLOWING THE INTERVIEWS, IE1 TRAVELED TO THE SITE OF THE JULY 1965 CRASH AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 44786 44946. THE SITE IS A FISH POND LOCATED NEXT TO MR. KHOAT'S (WITNESS TWO) HOUSE. HE MOVED AND BUILT A NEW HOME NEXT TO THE CRASH SITE IN 1970. MR. KHOAT DUG AND ENLARGED THE CRASH CRATER TO MAKE THE FISH POND. HE SAID THAT VILLAGERS SCAVENGED ALL THE WRECKAGE FROM THE CRATER PRIOR TO THAT. THE TEAM SEARCHED THE AREA AROUND THE CRASH SITE WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. MR. KHOAT SHOWED THE TEAM A LARGE PIECE OF STEEL HE CLAIMED TO HAVE FOUND AT THE CRATER. ADDITIONALLY, AN OLD WOMAN SHOWED THE TEAM A METAL PIPE WHICH ALSO ALLEGEDLY CAME FROM THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE.

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H. ON 19 JANUARY 1996, THE JOINT TEAM TRAVELED TO HUNG DAO VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE. IE1 MET WITH VILLAGE OFFICIALS AND DISCUSSED THE CASE DA-1A INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH VILLAGE OFFICIALS, THE JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES AND OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) WITNESS THREE:

(A) NAME: PHAM KHAC CHINH (PHAM KHACS CHINHS).
 (B) AGE: 39 YOA.
 (C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: VAN YEN (VAWNJ YEEN) HAMLET, HUNG DAO VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.
 (E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: HUNG DAO VILLAGE CHAIRMAN.
 (F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: STUDENT.
 (G) STATEMENT:

((1)) AT ABOUT 1400 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER 1966, MR. CHINH SAW A BURNING AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE NORTH-WEST. THE GREEN JET AIRCRAFT, WHICH WAS FLYING ALONE, CRASHED IN PHUONG SON (PHWONG SOWN) HAMLET, OVER TWO KILOMETERS FROM HIS HOME. HE DID NOT SEE OR HEAR THAT ANYONE HAD PARACHUTED FROM THE PLANE BEFORE IT CRASHED. HE DID NOT GO TO THE CRASH SITE RIGHT AWAY AS HE WAS AFRAID. ACCORDING TO MR. CHINH, THERE WERE CLUSTER BOMBS AT THE CRASH SITE WHICH KILLED THREE PEOPLE.

((2)) APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH LATER, MR. CHINH VISITED THE CRASH SITE FOR THE FIRST TIME. ONLY SMALL BITS OF WRECKAGE REMAINED. HE DID NOT SEE ANY PERSONAL EFFECTS OR REMAINS AT THE SITE. HE HEARD THAT ONLY ONE PERSON HAD BEEN IN THE PLANE AT THE TIME OF THE CRASH AND THAT ONLY BITS OF FLESH HAD BEEN FOUND. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE REMAINS OR WHO HAD VISITED THE SITE RIGHT AFTER THE INCIDENT OCCURRED.

((3)) IE1 ASKED MR. CHINH IF THE VILLAGE MAINTAINED ANY RECORDS WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT. HE SAID THERE WERE NO RECORDS WITH THAT KIND OF INFORMATION. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER TEAM QUESTIONS, MR. CHINH SAID HE HAD NEVER MET A JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM AND THAT NO AMERICANS HAD VISITED THE CRASH SITE BEFORE. HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER U.S. CRASHES.

(2) WITNESS FOUR:

(A) NAME: VU THI HAU (VUX THIJ HAAUJ).
 (B) AGE: 53 YOA.
 (C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: PHUONG SON HAMLET, HUNG DAO VILLAGE; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT.
 (D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.
 (E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

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- (F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: FARMER.
- (G) STATEMENT:

((1)) SOMETIME AFTER 1300 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN THE NINTH LUNAR MONTH OF 1966, MRS. HAU WITNESSED A BURNING AIRCRAFT CRASH ABOUT TWO HUNDRED METERS FROM HER HOUSE. IT HAD COME FROM THE DIRECTION OF BAC GIANG TOWN, HA BAC PROVINCE. SHE WENT BACK INTO HER HOUSE AS THERE WERE MANY PLANES IN THE AREA DROPPING BOMBS.

((2)) LATER IN THE AFTERNOON, AFTER THE OTHER PLANES LEFT, MRS. HAU AND MANY OTHER LOCAL RESIDENTS WENT TO THE CRASH SITE. THE AIRCRAFT HAD IMPACTED ON ROCKY SOIL CAUSING IT TO DISINTEGRATE AND SCATTER SMALL BITS OF WRECKAGE OVER A LARGE AREA; THERE WAS NO CRATER. SHE SAW MANY SMALL PIECES OF FLESH AT THE SITE AND ESTIMATED THAT THERE WAS PROBABLY ONE KILOGRAM OF REMAINS THERE, ENOUGH TO FILL A RUCKSACK. SHE DID NOT KNOW OR HEAR HOW MANY PEOPLE HAD BEEN IN THE AIRCRAFT. SHE DID NOT SEE ANY OF THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS OR EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT HEAR ABOUT ANYONE FINDING SUCH ITEMS.

((3)) MRS. HAU DID NOT SEE NOR HEAR WHAT HAPPENED TO THE REMAINS. SHE DID NOT SEE ANY FLESH AT THE SITE ON HER NEXT VISIT. SHE VISITED THE CRASH SITE OFTEN AS SHE LIVED NEARBY. MILITIA MEMBERS AND LOCAL RESIDENTS SCAVENGED THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. MRS. HAU COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND SAID THAT IT WAS THE ONLY CRASH SHE KNEW ABOUT.

(3) WITNESS FIVE:

- (A) NAME: VU DUY DO (VUX ZUY DOOX).
- (B) AGE: 40 YOA.
- (C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE:
PHUONG SON HAMLET, HUNG DAO VILLAGE; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT.
- (D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.
- (E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.
- (F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: STUDENT.
- (G) STATEMENT:

((1)) BETWEEN 1200 AND 1300 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER 1966, MR. DO HEARD THE SOUNDS OF AN APPROACHING AIRCRAFT. FROM THE BUNKER AT HIS HOUSE HE SAW A BURNING AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE DIRECTION OF HA BAC PROVINCE. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED ON THE SIDE OF A HILL, APPROXIMATELY 60 METERS ABOVE HIS HOUSE. WRECKAGE EXPLODED DOWN THE HILL, SETTING FIRE TO NUMEROUS HOUSES. OTHER AIRCRAFT FLEW AROUND THE AREA FOR ABOUT AN HOUR AFTER THE CRASH.

((2)) LATER IN THE AFTERNOON HE WENT TO THE CRASH SITE; MANY PEOPLE WERE ALREADY THERE. WRECKAGE WAS SCATTERED OVER A LARGE AREA AND THERE WERE BITS OF WHITE FLESH ALL OVER THE SITE. EVERYTHING BURNED UP IN THE CRASH; HE DID NOT SEE ANY OF THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS OR EQUIPMENT.

((3)) HE HEARD THAT A MR. LAP (LAAPJ), WHO DIED IN 1987, GATHERED UP THE REMAINS IN A BAG AND BURIED THEM AT THE BOTTOM OF THE HILL. MR. DO SAID THE REMAINS INCLUDED A SKULL, BUT

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HE DID NOT KNOW IF IT WAS AN INTACT SKULL OR ONLY A PORTION OF THE SKULL. HE DOES NOT KNOW OF ANYONE ELSE WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE BURIAL. MR. DO TOLD THE JOINT TEAM HE COULD SHOW THEM BOTH THE CRASH SITE AND BURIAL LOCATION. HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER CRASHES IN THE AREA.

I. FOLLOWING THE INTERVIEWS THE JOINT TEAM, ACCOMPANIED BY WITNESS FIVE, TRAVELED TO THE CRASH SITE. THE SITE, LOCATED AT THE TOP OF A HILL AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 37326 42473, IS IN A GRAVEYARD. THE GRAVE OF MR. LAP, THE MAN WHO BURIED THE REMAINS, IS SITUATED ON THE SPOT WHERE THE AIRCRAFT IMPACTED. THE TEAM SEARCHED THE AREA AND FOUND MINIMAL AIRCRAFT DEBRIS, CONSISTING OF SMALL BITS OF METAL, PLASTIC, AND WIRE (SEE PARA 5.A., BELOW). ONE RESIDENT ALLOWED THE TEAM TO EXAMINE A PIECE OF WRECKAGE ALLEGEDLY FOUND AT THE CRASH SITE (SEE PARA 4.B., BELOW).

J. AT THE BOTTOM OF THE HILL WITNESS FIVE POINTED OUT THE ALLEGED BURIAL LOCATION AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 37304 42345 (SEE PARA 5.B., BELOW). ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT AN EYEWITNESS TO THE BURIAL, THE WITNESS APPEARED CONFIDENT IN POINTING OUT AN APPROXIMATELY 10 X 10-METER AREA OF THE HAMLET GARDEN. HE SAID MR. LAP BURIED THE REMAINS IN A BAG APPROXIMATELY 40 CENTIMETERS DEEP. THE WITNESS STATED THAT AT THE TIME OF THE BURIAL THE LEVEL OF THE SOIL WAS ABOUT ONE METER LOWER. LATER, THE AREA WAS COVERED WITH MORE SOIL TO CREATE THE GARDEN.

K. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESS, AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT LOCAL RESIDENTS USED THE AREA AS THE INITIAL BURIAL LOCATION OF THEIR DEAD. AFTER THREE YEARS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH VIETNAMESE BURIAL TRADITIONS, THEY WOULD EXHUME THE BODIES AND PUT THE BONES IN A SMALL CASKET, THEN BURY THEM IN A DIFFERENT LOCATION. IE1 ASKED THE WITNESS IF IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR SOMEONE TO HAVE DUG UP THE REMAINS OF THE PILOT. THE WITNESS FELT IT WAS UNLIKELY. HE SAID THAT FAMILIES KNEW WHERE THEIR DEAD WERE BURIED AND DID NOT HAVE TO SEARCH AROUND FOR THEM.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

A. MATERIAL EVIDENCE RETAINED BY JTF-FA: NONE.

B. MATERIAL EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHED AND LEFT IN PLACE: ONE METAL CYLINDER, APPROXIMATELY FIVE INCHES IN DIAMETER, WITH MOSTLY ILLEGIBLE PRINTED LETTERS ON THE SIDE, INCLUDING A CIRCLE WITH THE LETTER "V" INSIDE.

C. REMAINS: NONE.

5. SURVEY RESULTS: ON 19 JANUARY 1996, IE1 SURVEYED A CRASH SITE AND AN ALLEGED BURIAL LOCATION POSSIBLY CORRELATING TO CASE DATA

A. SITE ONE (CRASH SITE):

(1) PROJECT LOCATION:

(A) VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 37326 42473.

(B) MAP DATA: MAP NAME: - PHA LAI, MAP NO. - 6252

II, MAP SERIES - L7014, PRINTED - 1967.

(2) OUTSTANDING FEATURES: THE CRASH SITE IS LOCATED IN A

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CEMETERY ON A RIDGE LINE.

(3) TERRAIN: STEEP.

(4) SOIL CONDITIONS: HARD, ROCKY SOIL.

(5) VEGETATION: GRASS WITH SMALL TREES IN CULTIVATION ON
 THE SIDE OF THE HILL.

(6) METHOD OF SEARCH: SURFACE SEARCH OF A 50 X 50-METER
 AREA.

(7) HAZARDS: NONE.

(8) RESULTS:

(A) REMAINS SEEN: NONE.

(B) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE.

(C) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE.

(D) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: MINIMAL AMOUNTS OF WIRE
 AND METAL FRAGMENTS.

(9) LOGISTICS: A STANDARD SIZE RECOVERY TEAM, WITH 20 TO
 30 WORKERS FROM LOCAL VILLAGE, CAN EXCAVATE THIS SITE IN 10 TO 15
 DAYS. NO SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED.

B. SITE TWO (BURIAL LOCATION):

(1) PROJECT LOCATION:

(A) VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 37304 42345.

(B) MAP DATA: MAP NAME: - PHA LAI, MAP NO. - 6252

II, MAP SERIES - L7014, PRINTED - 1967.

(2) OUTSTANDING FEATURES: THE SITE IS LOCATED IN A
 CABBAGE GARDEN BORDERED BY A RICE PADDY ON ONE SIDE AND A DIRT
 ROAD AND HOUSES ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE.

(3) TERRAIN: FLAT.

(4) SOIL CONDITIONS: EASY TO SCREEN.

(5) VEGETATION: CABBAGE IN CULTIVATION.

(6) METHOD OF SEARCH: SURFACE SEARCH OF THE ALLEGED
 BURIAL SITE.

(7) HAZARDS: NONE.

(8) RESULTS:

(A) REMAINS SEEN: NONE.

(B) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE.

(C) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE.

(D) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: NONE.

(9) LOGISTICS: A STANDARD SIZE RECOVERY TEAM, WITH 20 TO
 30 WORKERS FROM LOCAL VILLAGES, CAN EXCAVATE THIS SITE IN 7 TO 10
 DAYS. WET SCREENING IS AVAILABLE AT THIS SITE. AN AREA FOR A
 BASE CAMP IS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE SITE.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE.

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE.//

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ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS943 MCN = 96066/05934 TOR = 960660322

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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-B//

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SECTION 01 OF 05

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION: REPORTED CRASH SITE IN HUYN SON VILLAGE, HA BAC
PROVINCE, POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1924//

REF/A/DOC/WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM COL TEO, VNOSMP//

REF/B/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/071202ZAPR94//

REF/C/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/081800ZFEB95//

REF/D/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/271433ZSEP94//

REF/E/LTR/CDR JTF-FA/4AUG94//

REF/F/RMG/CDR PERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA/312000ZJAN91//

NARR/REF A IS THE VNOSMP DOCUMENT OUTLINING RIT ADVANCE WORK FOR THE
39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA). REF B IS THE REPORT OF THE JOINT
U.S./SRV PRIORITY CASE INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0706 CONDUCTED DURING
THE FOURTH PRIORITY CASE INVESTIGATION TEAM (PCIT) PHASE (24 FEB 93 -
31 MAR 94). REF C IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE
1924, FROM THE 33RD JFA (5-25 JAN 95). REF D IS THE DETAILED REPORT
OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1924, DURING THE 31ST JFA (18 AUG - 20 SEP
94). REF E IS THE COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE HA BAC PROVINCIAL MILI-
TARY HEADQUARTERS COMMAND. REF F REPORTS THE IDENTIFICATION OF RE-
MAINS REPATRIATED ON 13 SEP 90.//

RMKS/1. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION: ON 19 AND 20 JAN 96, THE RIT

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INVESTIGATED A REPORTED CRASH SITE IN HUYN SON AND BAC LUNG VILLAGES, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE. THE RIT INTERVIEWED FOUR WITNESSES WHO PROVIDED HEARSAY INFORMATION CONCERNING A CRASH AND SUBSEQUENT BURIAL OF REMAINS IN BAC LUNG VILLAGE DURING THE SUMMER OF 1972. NONE OF THE WITNESSES PROVIDED FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ABOUT THE BURIAL OF THE PILOT'S REMAINS. THE RIT SURVEYED A REPORTED CRASH SITE IN BAC LUNG VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 43754 48738 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE TEAM RECOVERED NO REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE DURING THIS INVESTIGATION. FIELD ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED IN THE INVESTIGATION INDICATES THE SITE THE RIT SURVEYED IS 400 METERS DOWNHILL FROM A SITE JOINT TEAMS SURVEYED ON ONE OTHER OCCASION. THE INFORMATION THE WITNESSES PROVIDED DURING THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION IS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THAT PROVIDED BY WITNESSES DURING THE PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OF CASE 1924 (REFS C AND D). THE RIT BELIEVES THE CURRENT WITNESSES MADE AN HONEST EFFORT TO FIND THE SITE, BUT DUE TO THE DENSE FOG, STEEP TERRAIN, AND PASSAGE OF TIME, THEY LED THE TEAM TO AN AREA JUST NORTH OF AND DOWNHILL FROM THE ACTUAL SITE.

2. BACKGROUND:

A. DURING A PCIT INVESTIGATION ON 9 AND 10 MAR 94, FOUR WITNESSES GAVE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF A NIGHT AIRCRAFT CRASH IN THE HUYN DINH MOUNTAINS SOUTH OF HUYN SON VILLAGE. THE WITNESSES OBSERVED SCATTERED REMAINS AT THE SITE. THE CRASH TOOK PLACE DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS AFTER 1969, POSSIBLY IN JUL OR AUG 72. THIS INFORMATION CORRELATES WITH CASE 1924 BY GENERAL TIME FRAME. CASE 1924 INVOLVES THE 17 SEP 72 LOSS OF AN A-6A AIRCRAFT WHILE ON A NIGHT ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER NORTHERN VIETNAM. THE PILOT OF ANOTHER AIRCRAFT REPORTED SEEING A TEN SECOND ORANGE EXPLOSION IN THE VICINITY OF (GC) 48Q XJ 387 158. ON 13 SEP 90, SRV REPATRIATED UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS IN BOX 13. ON 31 JAN 91, THE ARMED FORCES IDENTIFICATION REVIEW BOARD APPROVED THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE REMAINS AS ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. ONE SERVICEMEMBER REMAINS UNACCOUNTED-FOR.

B. INVESTIGATION RESULTS TO DATE: NONE. THIS WAS THE INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF THIS INFORMATION.

C. PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION:

(1) DETERMINE WHETHER AN AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE HUYN DINH MOUNTAINS IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES (GC) 48Q XJ 485 445. IF AN AIRCRAFT CRASHED THERE, SURVEY THE AREA AND ATTEMPT TO CORRELATE ANY WRECKAGE WITH A SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT AND CASE. (ACCOMPLISHED: SEE PARA 3G)

(2) RE-INTERVIEW MR. TRAN VAN DAU OF CHUA HAMLET, HUYN SON VILLAGE, AND MR. TRAN QUANG TE, MR. DO VAN CHUC AND MR. TRAN VAN PHA, ALL RESIDENTS OF LUONG KHOAI HAMLET, HUYN SON VILLAGE TO OBTAIN THE PRECISE LOCATION FOR THE REPORTED CRASH SITE. (PARTIALLY ACCOMPLISHED; MR. DAU IS DECEASED: SEE PARAS 3C THROUGH 3F AND REF A.)

(3) REQUEST THE PROVINCE MIA TASK TEAM INQUIRE ABOUT AN AIRCRAFT CRASH IN HUYN SON VILLAGE, NGHIA PHUONG, BAC LUNG AND CAM LY VILLAGES IN LUC NAM DISTRICT TO DETERMINE IF ANYONE ELSE KNOWS OF THIS INCIDENT AND POSSIBLY VISITED THE CRASH LOCATION.

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(ACCOMPLISHED: SEE PARA 3C)

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

A. PARTICIPANTS:

- (1) U.S. CONTINGENT:
 - (A) CW4 CLYDE GREEN, RIT TEAM LEADER
 - (B) SFC PATRICK A. FRANCO, JR., RIT ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
 - (C) SSG ALFRED S. IVERSEN, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST
 - (D) TSGT VY V. TRAN, RIT ANALYST/LINGUIST
 - (E) SSG WILLIAM E. COX, RIT SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
 - (F) MR. JAMES M. COYLE, JTF-FA FIELD RESEARCH DIRECTOR
- (2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT:
 - (A) COL PHAM TEO (PHAMJ TEOF), VNOSMP TEAM LEADER, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REP
 - (B) MR. TRINH THE HUNG (TRINHJ THEES HUNGF), VNOSMP TEAM MEMBER, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REP
- (3) HA BAC PROVINCE TASK TEAM:
 - (A) MR. NGUYEN VAN LOC (NGUYEENX VAWN LOOCJ), MIA TEAM LEADER
 - (B) MR. NGUYEN XUAN QUYEN (NGUYEENX XUAAN QUYENF), TEAM MEMBER
 - (C) MR. NGUYEN VAN THANH (NGUYEENX VAWN THANH F), TEAM MEMBER
- (4) LUC NAM DISTRICT TASK TEAM:
 - (A) MR. GIAP NGOC LAN (GIAWPS NGOCJ LAN), TEAM LEADER
 - (B) MR. DUONG VAN THUONG (ZWONG VAWN THWONGF), TEAM MBR
 - (C) MR. PHAM TRONG TUAN (PHAMJ TRONGJ TUAANS), TEAM MBR
- (5) HUYEN SON (HUYEENF SOWN) VILLAGE TASK TEAM:
 - (A) MR. PHAM VAN CACH (PHAMJ VAWN CACHS), TEAM LEADER
 - (B) MR. NGUYEN DUC BAN (NGUYEENX DWCS BANR), TEAM MBR
 - (C) MR. PHAM MINH (PHAMJ MINH), TEAM MEMBER

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED REPORT OF RMKS/

(D) MR. NGUYEN VAN TUONG (NGUYEENX VAWN TOWNGF), TEAM MEMBER

(E) MR. PHAN VAN MAU (PHAN VAWN MAUJ), TEAM MEMBER

B. ON 5 JAN 96, THE RIT HELD A PLANNING MEETING WITH THE VNOSMP CONTINGENT AT THE JOINT DOCUMENTS CENTER (JDC) IN THE ARMY MUSEUM, HANOI. AT THE MEETING, THE RIT PRESENTED THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS CASE TO THE VNOSMP.

C. ON 19 JAN 96, THE RIT TRAVELED TO BAC GIANG TOWN, HA BAC PROVINCE BY VEHICLE. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 19 JAN 96, THE TEAM MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE HA BAC PROVINCE TASK TEAM AT THE HA BAC GUEST HOUSE IN BAC GIANG. MR. NGUYEN VAN LOC (LOOCJ), VICE-CHAIRMAN OF HA BAC PROVINCE, REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO THE TEAM.

(1) THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM FOUND MR. TRAN QUANG TE, MR. DO VAN PHUC AND MR. TRAN VAN PHA. THE JOINT TEAM ARRANGED TO

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INTERVIEW ALL THREE ON THE MORNING OF 20 JAN 96.

(2) MR. TRAN VAN DAU (ZAAUJ) WAS DECEASED.

(3) THE PROVINCE TASK TEAM ARRANGED FOR THE RIT TO SURVEY THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE ON 20 OR 21 JAN 96 DEPENDING ON TIME CONSTRAINTS.

(4) THESE THREE WITNESSES WERE THE ONLY PEOPLE THE PROVINCE TEAM KNEW OF WITH INFORMATION ON THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE. MR. LOC SAID DURING ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR THIS CASE, HE HEARD THAT PEOPLE FROM CAM LY (CAWMS LYS), BAC LUNG (BAWCS LUNGX), AND HUYN SON (HUYEN SOWN) VILLAGES WENT TO THE SITE TO SCAVENGE, BUT NO ONE HAS REMAINS, ANY WRECKAGE, OR FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRASH.

D. WITNESS #1: ON 20 JAN 96, THE RIT RE-INTERVIEWED MR. TRAN QUANG TE AT THE HUYN SON VILLAGE COMMITTEE HOUSE (VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES (GC) 48Q XJ 47546 51723), HUYN SON VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE.

(1) NAME: MR. TRAN QUANG TE (TRAANF QUANG TEES)

(2) AGE: 77 YOA

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE: LUONG KHOAI (LWONG KHOAI) HAMLET, HUYN SON VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS ABOVE

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: VILLAGE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SPECIALIST

(7) BACKGROUND INFORMATION: A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. TE DURING THE FOURTH PCIT PHASE

(8) STATEMENT:

(A) MR. TE SAID THERE WERE A TOTAL OF THREE AIRCRAFT CRASH SITES IN THE AREA. TWO OF THE CRASH SITES WERE OF UNMANNED DRONE AIRCRAFT. MR. TE WITNESSED THE CRASH OF THE THIRD AIRCRAFT.

(B) AT APPROXIMATELY 0200, ON AN UN-RECALLED DATE IN THE FOURTH LUNAR MONTH OF 1972, MR. TE SAW A BURNING AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE DIRECTION OF BAC GIANG TOWN (WEST) CRASH INTO THE MOUNTAINS NEAR HIS HOME. DUE TO DARKNESS HE WAS UNABLE TO DISTINGUISH WHAT TYPE OF AIRCRAFT IT WAS.

(C) AT APPROXIMATELY 0400, HE TRAVELED TO THE CRASH SITE. WHEN HE ARRIVED, THERE WERE ALREADY MANY PEOPLE AT THE SITE SCAVENGING METAL. HE SAW NUMEROUS SMALL PIECES OF WRECKAGE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE AREA, BUT DID NOT RECALL SEEING ANY PARTS WITH IDENTIFYING MARKINGS. SINCE MANY PEOPLE WERE SCAVENGING THE SITE WHEN HE ARRIVED, HE DID NOT SEE ANY WRECKAGE WORTH COLLECTING. HE DID NOT REMEMBER SEEING ANY REMAINS AND DID NOT HEAR OF ANYONE ELSE FINDING REMAINS.

(D) COL TEO READ THE STATEMENT MR. TE PROVIDED TO A JOINT TEAM DURING PCIT PHASE FOUR. IN THIS REPORT MR. TE INDICATED HE SAW REMAINS AT THE CRASH SITE. AFTER HEARING HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENT MR. TE SAID HIS MEMORY WAS FADING, BUT HE STILL DID NOT REMEMBER SEEING ANY REMAINS. HOWEVER, HE DID HEAR MR. TRAN VAN DAU SAY THAT HE SAW SOME REMAINS.

E. WITNESS #2: ON 20 JAN 96, THE RIT RE-INTERVIEWED MR. DO VAN CHUC AT THE HUYN SON VILLAGE COMMITTEE HOUSE, HUYN SON VILLAGE, LUC

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NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE.

(1) NAME: MR. DO VAN CHUC (DOOX VAWN CHWCS)

(2) AGE: 45 YOA

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE:
LUONG KHOAI HAMLET, HUYEN SON VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC
PROVINCE; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS ABOVE

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: VILLAGE MILITIAMAN

(7) BACKGROUND INFORMATION: A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED

MR. CHUC DURING THE FOURTH PCIT PHASE

(8) STATEMENT:

(A) MR. CHUC REPEATED THE SAME INFORMATION THAT HE
TOLD THE PCIT INVESTIGATORS IN MAR 94. DURING THE NIGHT OF AN UN-
RECALLED DATE IN JUL OR AUG 72, HE SAW A JET AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM
THE DIRECTION OF BAC GIANG TOWN TOWARD THE VILLAGE. THE AIRCRAFT
WAS ON FIRE AND IT CRASHED INTO A NEARBY MOUNTAIN.(B) THE FOLLOWING MORNING, MR. CHUC WENT TO THE SITE.
WHEN HE ARRIVED HE SAW A LARGE GROUP OF PEOPLE SCAVENGING METAL. HE
SAW NUMEROUS PIECES OF WRECKAGE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE AREA. HE
RECALLED SEEING DATA PLATES ON SOME OF THE WRECKAGE, BUT DID NOT
REMEMBER ANY OF THE INFORMATION FROM THE DATA PLATES. HE ASSUMED
THE AIRCRAFT WAS AN F-4 BECAUSE MANY F-4'S CRASHED DURING THE WAR.(C) HE ALSO SAW PIECES OF FLESH LYING ON THE GROUND
NEAR THE CRASH CRATER, BUT HE DID NOT COLLECT ANY OR HEAR OF ANYONE
ELSE WHO COLLECTED ANY OF THE PIECES. HE HEARD THAT MR. TRAN VAN DAU
SAW PART OF A LEG AND FOOT, BUT DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING FURTHER ABOUT
WHAT HE DID WITH THE REMAINS.(D) HE DID NOT HEAR OF ANYONE WHO BURIED REMAINS FROM
THE SITE AND COULD PROVIDE NO FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS INCIDENT.P. WITNESS #3: ON 20 JAN 96, THE RIT RE-INTERVIEWED MR. TRAN
VAN PHA AT THE HUYEN SON VILLAGE COMMITTEE HOUSE, HUYEN SON VILLAGE,
LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE.

(1) NAME: MR. TRAN VAN PHA (TRAANF VAWN PHAS)

(2) AGE: 63 YOA

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE:

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) DETAILED REPORT OF
RMKS/LUONG KHOAI HAMLET, HUYEN SON VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC
PROVINCE; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS ABOVE

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: FARMER

(7) BACKGROUND INFORMATION: A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED

MR. PHA DURING THE FOURTH PCIT PHASE

(8) STATEMENT:

(A) DURING THE NIGHT OR EARLY MORNING HOURS ON AN
UN-RECALLED DATE IN THE FIFTH OR SIXTH LUNAR MONTH OF 1972, AN

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UNKNOWN TYPE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE MOUNTAINS APPROXIMATELY THREE KILOMETERS SOUTH OF HUYN SON VILLAGE.

(B) AT APPROXIMATELY 0800 OR 0900, MR. PHA WENT TO THE SITE TO SCAVENGE METAL. HOWEVER, WHEN HE ARRIVED HE SAW MANY PEOPLE ALREADY SCAVENGING THE CRASH SITE. SINCE MOST OF THE WRECKAGE WAS ALREADY GONE, HE DID NOT COLLECT ANY WRECKAGE AND HE RETURNED HOME.

(C) HE DID NOT SEE ANY REMAINS, BUT HE HEARD THAT MR. TRAN VAN DAU, WHO IS NOW DECEASED, SAW A BOOT WITH REMAINS IN IT. HE DID NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THIS INCIDENT.

G. THE JOINT TEAM THEN TRAVELED TO BAC LUNG (BAWCS LUNGS) VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE TO SURVEY THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE.

(1) THE THREE WITNESSES LED THE JOINT TEAM TO THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE. THE TEAM WALKED FROM XUAN PHU (XUAAN PHUS) HAMLET (XJ 43502 49566) UP A STEEP SLOPE TO A CREVICE IN THE MOUNTAINSIDE AT XJ 43754 48738 (NOTE: THE WITNESSES INDICATED THE CREVICE WAS ACTUALLY A CRASH CRATER). THE TEAM FOUND NO SIGNS OF AN AIRCRAFT CRASH AT THIS LOCATION.

(2) LOCAL VILLAGERS AROUND THE SITE SAID THEY HEARD UNKNOWN VILLAGERS BURIED THE PILOT'S REMAINS ABOUT 100 METERS FROM THE CRATER. NO ONE, TO INCLUDE THE VILLAGE AND DISTRICT OFFICIALS, COULD POINT TO THE BURIAL LOCATION. MANY OF THE VILLAGERS CLAIMED AN AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT THIS LOCATION IN AUG 72 AND KNEW SOMEONE BURIED REMAINS, BUT NO ONE KNEW ANY DETAILS. THEY ALSO SAID THERE WERE TWO PILOTS; ONE PILOT WAS BLACK AND ONE WAS CAUCASIAN.

H. WITNESS #4: WHILE AT THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE, THE RIT INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN HUU MINH, BAC LUNG VILLAGE COMMUNIST PARTY SECRETARY.

(1) NAME: MR. NGUYEN HUU MINH (NGUYEENX HWU MINH)

(2) AGE: 42 YOA

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME AT RESIDENCE: HUYN SON VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT.

(4) WARTIME RESIDENCE: SAME AS ABOVE

(5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: BAC LUNG VILLAGE COMMUNIST PARTY SECRETARY

(6) WARTIME OCCUPATION: VILLAGE MILITIAMAN

(7) STATEMENT:

(A) ON AN UN-RECALLED DAY AT APPROXIMATELY 0200, IN THE EIGHTH OR NINTH LUNAR MONTH OF 1972, AN F-4H CRASHED INTO THE SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN, NORTH OF THE VILLAGE. HE KNEW THE AIRCRAFT WAS AN F-4, BECAUSE SOME OF WRECKAGE HAD MARKINGS WITH "F-4H" WRITTEN ON THEM.

(B) HE HEARD TWO PILOTS WERE INVOLVED BECAUSE THE VILLAGERS FOUND THREE LEGS AND AN ARM. HE ALSO HEARD THE VILLAGERS BURIED THE REMAINS APPROXIMATELY 100 METERS NORTH-WEST OF THE CRATER. HE NEVER WENT TO OR SAW THE GRAVE SITE, AND ONLY HEARD THE INFORMATION FROM OTHER VILLAGERS.

(C) MR. MINH SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME A JOINT TEAM HAD VISITED THIS SITE. HE COULD PROVIDE NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON

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THIS INCIDENT.

I. AFTER CONCLUDING THE SITE SURVEY, THE RIT DEPARTED THE AREA.

(1) UPON RETURNING TO THE VEHICLES, THE DRIVER OF ONE VEHICLE RELAYED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HE OVERHEARD SOME OF THE VILLAGERS TALKING ABOUT. THE VILLAGERS SAID SOMEONE HAD ALSO FOUND A WATCH, AND TWO PARACHUTES (ONE WAS RED AND THE OTHER WAS WHITE). HOWEVER, NO ONE SEEMED TO KNOW WHO THE PERSON WAS OR IF HE STILL HAD THE ITEMS.

(2) WHEN THE JOINT TEAM RETURNED TO THE HA BAC HOTEL THEY MET WITH THE PROVINCE TEAM LEADER TO REPORT THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION. THE JOINT TEAM TOLD MR. LOC THEY RECEIVED MANY SECONDHAND ACCOUNTS CONCERNING AN AIRCRAFT CRASH AT THE SITE, BUT NO FIRSTHAND WITNESSES.

(3) THE U.S. TEAM LEADER ASKED MR. LOC IF HE WOULD UNILATERALLY INVESTIGATE FOR EYEWITNESSES AND ANYONE WHO MAY HAVE WRECKAGE. HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT ANY NEW INFORMATION ON THIS SITE TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TEAM.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE. NONE OF THE RESIDENTS OF HUEN SON AND BAC LUNG VILLAGES QUESTIONED CLAIMED TO HAVE ANY WRECKAGE TAKEN FROM THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE.

5. SITE SURVEY RESULTS: ON 20 JAN 96, THE RIT SURVEYED ONE SITE WHILE INVESTIGATING AN UNCORRELATED CASE.

A. PROJECT LOCATION:

(1) VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATE 48Q XJ 43754 48738

(2) MAP DATA: MAP NAME -PHA LAI, MAP NO. -6521 II, MAP SERIES -L7014, PRINTED -1966

B. OUTSTANDING FEATURES: NONE

C. TERRAIN: MOUNTAINS

D. SOIL CONDITIONS: HARD PACKED DIRT

E. VEGETATION: GRASS, AND SMALL SHRUBS

F. METHOD OF SEARCH: LINE SEARCH 100 METERS BY 100 METERS.

G. HAZARDS: THE SITE IS ON A STEEP INCLINE.

H. RESULTS:

(1) REMAINS SEEN: NONE

(2) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE

(3) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE

(4) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: NONE

I. LOGISTICS: A STANDARD-SIZED RECOVERY ELEMENT USING STANDARD EQUIPMENT AND AN ADDITIONAL 40 TO 50 LOCAL WORKERS CAN EXCAVATE THIS SITE. THE EXCAVATION WILL TAKE 10 TO 15 DAYS. THE TEAM WILL REQUIRE //

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EXTRA TARPS TO PROVIDE SHADED AREAS. THE TEAM CAN SET UP A BASE CAMP IN A FIELD, 200 TO 300 METERS FROM THE SITE.

6. AREA OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: THE RIT DID NOT INTERVIEW MR. TRAN VAN DAU. THREE WITNESSES AND THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF HA BAC PROVINCE INDICATED MR. DAU IS DECEASED.

7. ANALYST COMMENTS:

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A. CORRELATIONS:

- (1) WITNESS #1: THE INFORMATION MR. TE PROVIDED POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1924 BASED ON CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS, DATE AND TIME OF CRASH.
- (2) WITNESS #2: THE INFORMATION MR. CHUC PROVIDED POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1924 BASED ON CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS, DATE AND TIME OF CRASH.
- (3) WITNESS #3: THE INFORMATION MR. PHA PROVIDED POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1924 BASED ON CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS, DATE AND TIME OF CRASH.
- (4) WITNESS #4: THE INFORMATION MR. MINH PROVIDED POSSIBLY CORRELATES TO CASE 1924 BASED ON CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS, DATE, TIME OF CRASH AND NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT.

B. POTENTIAL LEADS: RECOMMEND A UNILATERAL TEAM RETURN TO BAC LUNG VILLAGE AND ATTEMPT TO FIND FIRSTHAND WITNESSES TO THE BURIAL OF THE ALLEGED REMAINS.

C. WITNESS RELIABILITY: GOOD. HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE REMAINS AND BURIAL OF THE REMAINS IS HEARSAY.

D. THE RIT BASED THE ASSESSMENTS IN THIS REPORT ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND DOES NOT INTEND FOR THESE ASSESSMENTS TO CONSTITUTE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

E. CONCLUSIONS:

- (1) BASED ON THE INFORMATION THE WITNESSES PROVIDED, THE HUYN SON CRASH SITE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1924 BY GENERAL TIME FRAME AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS. THE BURIAL SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1924 IS AT XJ 4393 4816. THIS LOCATION IS APPROXIMATELY 400 METERS FROM THE SITE THE RIT SURVEYED DURING THIS INVESTIGATION.

(A) DURING THE 31ST JFA, AN INVESTIGATIVE ELEMENT INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN VAN CHANG (NGUYEENX VAWN CHANGF), MR. BUI VAN THINH (BUIF VAWN THINHJ), AND MR. NGUYEN TIEN SI (NGUYEENX TIEENS SIX) IN CAM LY VILLAGE. MR. CHANG SAID IN SEP OR OCT 72, AT APPROXIMATELY 0300, AN AIRCRAFT APPROACHED HIS POSITION FROM THE WEST AT A VERY LOW ALTITUDE AND CRASHED INTO THE MOUNTAINS TWO KILOMETERS AWAY. HE AND MR. THINH SAID THE AIRCRAFT HAD DISINTEGRATED AND THERE WERE VERY FEW PIECES OF AIRCRAFT OR REMAINS. MR. THINH PARTICIPATED IN THE BURIAL OF SEVERAL PIECES OF REMAINS FROM THE PILOTS. IN JAN 86, MR. SI DUG UP THE REMAINS FROM THE CRASH SITE. THE DISTRICT AUTHORITIES ARRESTED MR. SI AND CONFISCATED THE REMAINS FROM THE SITE (REF C).

(B) ON 13 SEP 90, THE SRV REPATRIATED UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS IN BOX NO. 13. THE VNOSMP TOLD THE RIT THE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED IN HA BAC PROVINCE AND THEY BELIEVED THEY ARE FROM THE SITE THE TEAM VISITED. ON 31 JAN 91, THE ARMED FORCES REVIEW BOARD APPROVED THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE REMAINS AS CAPT VERNE G. DONNELLY, THE PILOT ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1924 (REF F). ONE INDIVIDUAL REMAINS UNACCOUNTED-FOR FROM CASE 1924.

(C) ON 20 AUG 94, DURING THE 31ST JFA, A JOINT TEAM TRAVELED TO THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE AND BURIAL SITE AT (GC) 48Q XJ 4393 4816 WITH MR. THINH AND MR. SI. THEY SEARCHED A 200 X 200-METER AREA AND DISCOVERED SMALL PIECES OF POSSIBLE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. MR.

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SI POINTED OUT A SHALLOW HOLE WHERE HE SAID HE EXHUMED THE REMAINS. THE JOINT TEAM EXCAVATED THE SITE, BUT DID NOT FIND ANY RESIDUAL REMAINS OR PERSONAL EFFECTS. THE TEAM FOUND INSUFFICIENT ITEMS TO CORRELATE THIS SITE TO CASE 1924.

(D) ON 11 JAN 95, DURING THE 33RD JFA, A JOINT TEAM TRAVELED TO GIAP SON HAMLET, CAM LY VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE CASE 1924. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. MAI VAN HOP (MAI VAWN HOWPJ), WHO HELPED MR. SI EXHUME THE REMAINS IN JAN 86. HIS FATHER, MR. MAI VAN GIAO (MAI VAWN GIAOS), SHOWED THE TEAM A WHEEL STRUT HE SAID HE SCAVENGED FROM THE SITE WHICH A JOINT TEAM DUG DURING THE 31ST JFA. MR. HOP VERIFIED THE REMAINS THE DISTRICT OFFICIAL CONFISCATED FROM MR. SI WERE THE SAME ONES HE HELPED EXHUME FROM THE SITE AT (GC) 48Q XJ 4393 4816. THE DISTRICT SECURITY POLICE ALSO PRODUCED A CHAIN OF CUSTODY RECEIPT FROM WHEN THEY CONFISCATED THE REMAINS FROM MR. NGUYEN VAN TUA (NGUYEENX VAWN TWAF). THE TEAM REPORTED THE WITNESSES' STATEMENTS GENERALLY CORRELATED TO CASE 1924 BASED ON TIME, MONTH AND YEAR. THEY DID NOT MAKE A DIRECT CORRELATION AT THAT TIME (REF D).

(2) AN ENTRY ON PAGE 170 OF A VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT TITLED "COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, HA BAC" LISTS AN A-6A SHOT DOWN AT 0056, 17 SEP 72, IN CAM LY VILLAGE. THE ENTRY NOTED THAT TWO PILOTS WERE DEAD. JTF-FA ANALYSTS CORRELATED THIS ENTRY WITH REFNO 1924 BASED ON DATE, AIRCRAFT TYPE, GENERAL AREA, AND STATUS OF AIRCREW (REF E).

(3) ALL THE WITNESSES FROM HUYN SON VILLAGE INDICATED THIS WAS THE ONLY AIRCRAFT TO CRASH IN THEIR VILLAGE OTHER THAN THE TWO DRONES. THE TEAM CONCLUDED THAT THE STATEMENTS OF THE CURRENT WITNESSES AND THOSE OF THE WITNESSES FROM THE 31ST AND 33RD JFA'S WERE TOO SIMILAR TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH TWO DIFFERENT INCIDENTS AND INCIDENT LOCATIONS. THE INFORMATION FROM THE HA BAC COMBAT CHRONOLOGY REINFORCES THIS CONCLUSION.

(4) WHILE INVESTIGATING THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE, THE RIT NOTED SEVERAL PECULIARITIES.

(A) THE DISTRICT TEAM SAID THEY DID ADVANCE WORK IN HUYN SON, NGHIA PHUONG, BAC LUNG AND CAM LY VILLAGES, BUT COULD ONLY FIND THE THREE EYEWITNESSES LISTED IN THE INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS. THEY SAID VILLAGERS IN BAC LUNG AND CAM LY MAY HAVE GONE TO THE SITE, BUT THE DISTRICT TEAM COULD NOT IDENTIFY EYEWITNESSES.

(B) DESPITE THIS CLAIM, WHEN THE TEAM WENT TO XUAN PHU HAMLET TO BEGIN THEIR CLIMB TO THE SITE, IT SEEMED AS IF EVERYONE THERE KNEW ABOUT THE AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED ON THE MOUNTAIN AT APPROXIMATELY 0200 IN THE SEVENTH OR EIGHTH LUNAR MONTH OF 1972. THEY ALSO HEARD THERE WERE TWO PILOTS, ONE BLACK AND ONE WHITE. THEY ALL
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STATED THE SITE WAS PICKED CLEAN OF WRECKAGE EARLY IN THE MORNING. HOWEVER, NONE OF THEM COULD IDENTIFY AN EYEWITNESS OR PROVIDE A PIECE

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OF WRECKAGE FROM THE SITE.

(C) THE RIT FOUND NO SIGN OF A CRASH SITE, EVEN THOUGH THE WITNESSES AND APPROXIMATELY 10 VILLAGERS POINTED OUT THE INDENTATION IN THE MOUNTAIN AS THE CRASH SITE. THERE WERE NO FRAGMENTS OF WIRE, RUBBER, PLEXI-GLASS OR METAL SUCH AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT TO FIND AT EVEN THE MOST SCAVENGED CRASH SITE. THE TEAM SEARCHED 50 METERS UPHILL FROM THE ALLEGED CRASH CRATER, UNTIL THE WITNESSES INDICATED IT WAS NO HIGHER.

(D) DURING THE INVESTIGATION AND SURVEY OF THE SITE, PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO STATE THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY SITE ON THE MOUNTAIN AND THE SITE HAD NEVER BEEN INVESTIGATED. THE ALLEGED BURIAL SITE FOR CASE 1924 IS APPROXIMATELY 400 METERS FURTHER UP THE STEEP HILL. TWO INVESTIGATING ELEMENT (IE) HAVE INVESTIGATED CASE 1924 IN CAM LY VILLAGE WITHIN THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF. ONE OF THOSE IE'S EXCAVATED AT THE ALLEGED SITE FURTHER UP THE HILL.

(5) THREE WITNESSES SAID PEOPLE FROM OTHER VILLAGES ARRIVED AT THE SITE FIRST AND TOOK ALL OF THE LARGE PIECES OF WRECKAGE. THIS COULD BE TRUE, SINCE THE CLOSEST POPULATED AREAS TO THE SITE ARE LOCATED IN CAM LY VILLAGE, FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY BAC LUNG. OF THE THREE SURROUNDING VILLAGES, HUYN SON IS FARTHEST FROM THE SITE.

(6) THE RIT HAD TO SEARCH A 50-KILOMETER RADIUS IN THE COMPUTER DATA BASE TO OBTAIN THE CORRELATION TO CASE 1924. DESPITE THE WORK OF THE 31ST AND 33RD JFA TEAMS, BRIGHT LIGHT STILL LISTED THE CASE 1924 AIRCRAFT LAST KNOWN LOCATION AT (GC) 48Q XJ 387 158 AT THE TIME OF THE INVESTIGATION. THE COMBINATION OF WITNESS STATEMENTS AND ARCHIVAL DATA SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A BRIGHT LIGHT UPDATE.

(7) THE ALLEGED CRASH SITE AT (GC) 48Q XJ 43754 48738 IS MOST LIKELY IN THE SAME AREA IN WHICH PREVIOUS WITNESSES SAID THEY EXHUMED REMAINS. GIVEN THE STEEP TERRAIN, THE FACT THAT THE MOUNTAIN WAS COVERED IN FOG AND THE GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT A CRATER WAS THERE, THE CURRENT WITNESSES POSSIBLY MISTOOK THIS AREA FOR THE ACTUAL AREA 400 METERS UPHILL FROM THAT LOCATION. THE LAST TIME THE WITNESSES SAW THE SITE WAS 20 YEARS AGO. MR. TE, MR. CHUC AND MR. PHA TOLD THE PCIT INVESTIGATORS ABOUT THIS ALLEGED CRASH SITE IN THE HUYN DINH MOUNTAINS IN MAR 94. THEY SAID IT OCCURRED AT NIGHT IN JUL OR AUG 72. ALL THE WITNESSES ONLY HEARD ABOUT THE BURIAL OF THE PILOT'S REMAINS. MR. DAU REPORTEDLY SAW REMAINS BUT IS NOW DECEASED.

(8) THE INFORMATION THE WITNESSES PROVIDED COMBINED WITH THE GENERAL SITE LOCATION PROBABLY CORRELATE TO CASE 1924 BY MONTH, YEAR, TIME, CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS, AND GENERAL LOCATION.

8. SEARCH AND RECOVERY COMMENTS: THE TEAM THOROUGHLY SEARCHED THE AREA AND FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. THIS SITE IS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR RECOVERY.

9. TEAM CHIEF'S COMMENTS:

A. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RIT'S VNOSMP COUNTERPARTS PREPARED AND BRIEFED THE PROVINCE ON THE TEAM'S REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO THE TEAM'S ARRIVAL.

B. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE PROVINCE TEAM COMPLETED ONLY THE BARE MINIMUM OF ADVANCE WORK PRIOR TO THE JOINT TEAM'S ARRIVAL.

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(1) WHEN THE TEAM ARRIVED, THE PROVINCE INFORMED THE TEAM THEY HAD LOCATED THE WITNESSES THE RIT REQUESTED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MR. DAU, WHO HAD DIED. IN ADDITION TO THE NAMED WITNESSES, THE TEAM HAD REQUESTED THE PROVINCIAL TASK TEAM DETERMINE IF ANYONE ELSE FROM HUYEN SON, NGHIA PHUONG, BAC LUNG AND CAM LY VILLAGES HAD INFORMATION OR WRECKAGE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INCIDENT. THE PROVINCE TEAM INFORMED THE RIT THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND OTHER WITNESSES.

(2) WHEN THE JOINT TEAM ARRIVED AT THE ALLEGED CRASH LOCATION, IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT MOST OF THE RESIDENTS OF XUAN PHU HAMLET, BAC LUNG VILLAGE WERE AWARE OF THE CRASH.

(3) DURING THE 31ST JFA, MR. NGUYEN ANH QUYEN WAS THE HA BAC PROVINCE TASK TEAM LEADER. DURING THE 33RD JFA, MR. NGUYEN VAN LOC WAS THE POW/MIA AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE. DURING THE 31ST JFA, THE JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATING CASE 1924 SURVEYED A LOCATION ON THE SAME MOUNTAIN, ONLY 400 METERS FROM THE LOCATION THE RIT SURVEYED DURING THIS INVESTIGATION. WHILE MR. LOC WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROVINCE'S WORK, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS PHYSICALLY PRESENT AT THE SITE DURING THE PREVIOUS SITE INVESTIGATIONS. HOWEVER, MR. QUYEN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A PARTICIPANT IN THE PREVIOUS SITE SURVEY. IT IS THE TFAM'S OPINION THAT THE HA BAC PROVINCE TEAM SHOULD HAVE MADE THE RIT AWARE THAT THE "HUYEN SON" SITE AND THE "CAM LY" (CASE 1924) SITE WERE PROBABLY THE SAME.

(4) IN FAIRNESS TO THE PROVINCE TEAM, A PREVIOUS TEAM HAD APPROACHED THE SITE FROM CAM LY VILLAGE (I.E., ON THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE HUYEN DINH MOUNTAINS). THIS TEAM MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN AWARE THAT WHEN THEY APPROACHED IT FROM BAC LUNG VILLAGE (I.E., ON THE NORTHWESTERN SIDE) THEY WERE APPROACHING THE SAME SITE. EVEN SO, SUCH AN ARGUMENT SAYS LITTLE FOR PROVINCIAL PREPARATION. IN THE TEAM'S OPINION, THE PROVINCE TEAM WAS TOO BUSY TO ACTIVELY ATTEMPT TO FUFIL THE RIT'S REQUIREMENTS IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

10. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIONS: N/A//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00073429

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS486 MCN = 96055/16009 TOR = 960551749
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1612 0551749-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O P 231012Z FEB 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE
ZEM

CONTROLS

UNCLAS

BODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT CONCERNING CASE 1924//
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS486 MCN = 96055/16009 TOR = 960551749
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1612 0551749-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

O 241749Z FEB 96
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFOCB/OC
RUEALGX/SAFE

O P 231012Z FEB 96 ZYB
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/PCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-R//
RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//
BT
UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTFF-FA/-/SEP//
SUBJ/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT CONCERNING CASE 1924//
REF: CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 211703Z FEB 96
RMKS/1. REFERENCE. REF IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 39TH JOINT
FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 11 JANUARY TO 9
FEBRUARY 1996.

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2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION. ON 18 JANUARY 1996, WHILE INVESTIGATING A SCHEDULED CASE IN BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IE1) INTERVIEWED A RESIDENT WITH FIRST-HAND INFORMATION CONCERNING AN AIRCRAFT CRASH. THE WITNESS CLAIMED HE HAD SEEN HUMAN REMAINS AT THE CRASH SITE. THE INFORMATION PROBABLY CORRELATES TO CASE 1924. IE1 DID NOT RECEIVE OR RECOVER ANY REMAINS WHILE INVESTIGATING THIS INCIDENT.

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION.

A. ON 11 JANUARY 1996, THE JOINT U.S./SRV INVESTIGATION TEAM ARRIVED IN HANOI TO INVESTIGATE FOUR CASES IN HA BAC AND HAI HUNG PROVINCES.

B. TEAM COMPOSITION.

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT.

CPT ERIC NEWMAN	TEAM LEADER
MSG STEPHEN E. THOMPSON	ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
CW4 ROBERT W. BARFIELD	ANALYST
SFC MITCHELL P. SCHNEITER	ANALYST/LINGUIST
MSGT HUNG M. NGUYEN	ANALYST/LINGUIST
CT11 DANIEL L. MCLEOD JR.	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SSGT JAMES E. CREWS	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SGT MICHAEL A. DVORAK	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SSG MONTE E. COOPER	SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
SGT RICHARD J. JONES	SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
MSGT HAROLD J. CAMPBELL	TEAM MEDIC
SFC ALAN J. SCHNABEL	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECHNICIAN

(2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT.

TRAN MINH TUAN (TRAANF MINH TUAANS)	TEAM LEADER; MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LE TRAN TUAN (LEE TRAANF TUAANS)	MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
DAO KHAC CAI (DAOF KHAWCS CAIR)	MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
LE VAN HOANG (LEE VAWN HOANGF)	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
NGUYEN VAN QUYNH (NGUYEENX VAWN QUYNHS)	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

(3) HAI HUNG PROVINCE TASK TEAM.

PHAM VAN HOAN (PHAM VAWN HOANF)	TEAM LEADER
NGUYEN VAN THUAN (NGUYEENX VAWN THUAAN)	TEAM MEMBER
PHAM NGOC HUNG (PHAM NGOCJ HUNGF)	TEAM MEMBER
NGUYEN VAN UY (NGUYEENX VAWN UYX)	TEAM MEMBER
LE VAN SON (LEE VAWN SOWN)	TEAM MEMBER

C. ON 18 JANUARY 1996, WHILE INVESTIGATING A SCHEDULED CASE, IE1 INTERVIEWED A RESIDENT OF BAC AN (BAWCS AN) VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE, WHO PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

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- (1) WITNESS NAME: TRAN VAN KHOAT (TRAANF VAWN KHOAWTS).
 (2) AGE: 64 YOA.
 (3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE; OVER 35 YEARS.
 (4) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.
 (5) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.
 (6) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: FARMER.
 (7) STATEMENT:

(A) AT APPROXIMATELY 0200 ON 16 AUGUST (LUNAR CALENDAR) 1966 OR 1967, AN AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO HUYEN DINH (HUYEENF DINH) MOUNTAIN, NEAR CAM LY (CAAMR LYS) VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE. MR. KHOAT DID NOT KNOW WHAT TYPE OF AIRCRAFT IT WAS OR THE CAUSE OF THE CRASH.

(B) MR. KHOAT WAITED UNTIL 1200 THAT AFTERNOON TO GO TO THE CRASH SITE. THE SITE WAS LOCATED NEAR THE TOP OF THE MOUNTAIN, APPROXIMATELY TWO KILOMETERS FROM HIS HOUSE IN BAC AN VILLAGE. THERE WERE MANY PEOPLE ALREADY AT THE SITE WHEN HE ARRIVED.

(C) THERE WAS A LARGE QUANTITY OF WRECKAGE AT THE CRASH SITE. MR. KHOAT SAW HUMAN REMAINS SCATTERED AMONG THE WRECKAGE, TO INCLUDE PIECES OF RIBS AND A LEG WITH WHITE SKIN. HE SAID THAT CAM LY VILLAGERS (NFI) GATHERED THE REMAINS AND BURIED THEM SOMEWHERE. HE DID NOT KNOW THE BURIAL LOCATION AND DID NOT KNOW ANYONE WHO WOULD HAVE THAT INFORMATION. MR. KHOAT DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY PEOPLE HAD DIED IN THE CRASH.

(D) VILLAGE OFFICIALS WERE ALSO AT THE CRASH SITE AND THEY PREVENTED PEOPLE FROM TAKING PIECES OF WRECKAGE AWAY. THEY DID ALLOW PEOPLE TO TAKE WIRE FROM THE SITE AS THERE WAS A LARGE QUANTITY OF WIRE SCATTERED AROUND THE AREA. EXCEPT FOR A POCKET KNIFE HE FOUND, MR. KHOAT DID NOT SEE ANY OF THE PILOT'S PERSONAL BELONGINGS OR EQUIPMENT AT THE CRASH SITE. HE DID NOT KNOW OR HEAR OF ANYONE ELSE FINDING ANY PERSONAL BELONGINGS OR EQUIPMENT.

(E) MR. KHOAT ALLOWED THE TEAM TO EXAMINE AND PHOTOGRAPH THE POCKET KNIFE HE FOUND AT THE SITE (SEE PARA 4.B., BELOW). HE FOUND IT STUCK IN AN APPROXIMATELY 7 X 7-INCH PIECE OF FLESH. IEL ASKED MR. KHOAT WHY THE VILLAGE OFFICIALS DID NOT TAKE THE POCKET KNIFE AWAY FROM HIM. MR. KHOAT SAID HE DID NOT LET THE VILLAGE OFFICIALS SEE IT.

(F) IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER TEAM QUESTIONS, MR. KHOAT SAID HE ONLY WENT TO THE CRASH SITE ONE TIME. HE DID NOT WANT TO RETURN TO THE SITE BECAUSE PEOPLE HAD DIED THERE. MR. KHOAT SAID THIS WAS HIS FIRST TIME TO BE INTERVIEWED BY A JOINT TEAM. HE COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY NAMES OF OTHER POTENTIAL WITNESSES TO THIS INCIDENT.

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
 SUBJ/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT CONCERNING CASE 1924//
 RMKS/

D. DURING THE INTERVIEW, MR. TUAN, THE VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TEAM LEADER, SAID THE VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEEKING

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MISSION PERSONS (VNOSMP) TOOK A JOINT TEAM TO THE CAM LY CRASH SITE ON THE 35TH OR 36TH JFA. HE SAID THE TEAM DID NOT EXCAVATE THE SITE, BUT LOCAL VILLAGERS TURNED OVER REMAINS TO THE TEAM. MR. TUAN TOLD IE1 THE CRASH OCCURRED IN 1972. IE1 THEN QUERIED MR. KHOAT FURTHER ABOUT THE YEAR OF THE CRASH. MR. KHOAT SAID HE WAS NOT SURE ABOUT THE YEAR THE INCIDENT OCCURRED.

E. FOLLOWING THE INTERVIEW, IE1 TRAVELED TO MR. KHOAT'S HOUSE TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE THE TEAM'S SCHEDULED CASE. WHILE AT HIS HOUSE, LOCATED AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 44786 44946, MR. KHOAT IDENTIFIED A DISTANT PEAK TO THE NORTHWEST AS THE SITE OF THE AIRCRAFT CRASH. MR. KHOAT MENTIONED THAT HE BUILT HIS HOUSE IN 1970 AND THE CRASH OCCURRED A FEW YEARS AFTER HE BUILT HIS HOUSE.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

A. MATERIAL EVIDENCE RETAINED BY JTF-FA: NONE.

B. MATERIAL EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHED AND LEFT IN PLACE: ONE STANDARD ISSUE U.S. MILITARY MULTI-BLADE POCKET KNIFE, STAMPED WITH "IMPERIAL 1964 USA" AT THE BASE OF THE LARGEST BLADE.

C. REMAINS: NONE.

5. SURVEY RESULTS. N/A.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES. BASED ON THE INFORMATION GATHERED THIS JFA, ALONG WITH THE INFORMATION GATHERED ON THE 20 AUGUST 1994 JOINT TEAM INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1924 IN CAM LY VILLAGE, THE CASE 1924 CRASH SITE LOCATION SHOULD BE CHANGED FROM GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 387 158 TO GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 4393 4816.

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED. N/A.

8. ANALYST COMMENTS.

A. WITNESS STATEMENTS. THE WITNESS PROVIDED A CREDIBLE ACCOUNT OF AN AIRCRAFT CRASH AND HIS SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO THE CRASH SITE. HE PRESENTED HIS INFORMATION IN AN HONEST AND STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. HE ATTEMPTED TO ANSWER THE TEAM'S QUESTIONS AS BEST HE COULD AND DID NOT SEEM TO EMBELLISH HIS ACCOUNT OF THE INCIDENT. IF HE DID NOT KNOW THE ANSWER TO A QUESTION, HE FREELY TOLD THE TEAM SO.

B. INCIDENT LOCATION SURVEY: NONE.

C. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSION: THE INFORMATION THE WITNESS PROVIDED PROBABLY CORRELATES TO CASE 1924 BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

(1) THE WITNESS STATED THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT APPROXIMATELY 0200. THE CASE 1924 AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT APPROXIMATELY 0200.

(2) WHILE THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION INITIALLY AS TO THE YEAR OF THE CRASH, THE WITNESS EVENTUALLY SAID THE DATE OF THE CRASH WAS 16 AUGUST (LUNAR CALENDAR), A FEW YEARS AFTER 1970 (SEE PARA'S 3.C.(A), 3.D., AND 3.E., ABOVE). CONSIDERING THE AMOUNT OF TIME THAT HAS PASSED, THE WITNESS' RECOLLECTION OF THE TIME FRAME OF THE INCIDENT COULD CORRELATE TO THE 17 SEPTEMBER 1972 LOSS DATE OF THE CASE 1924 AIRCRAFT.

(3) THE WITNESS STATED THAT AMONG THE REMAINS AT THE CRASH SITE WAS A LEG WITH WHITE SKIN. BOTH CREW MEMBERS OF THE CASE 1924 AIRCRAFT WERE CAUCASIAN.

(4) THE WITNESS-IDENTIFIED CRASH SITE (SEE PARA 3.E.,

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ABOVE) CORRELATES TO A SITE THAT A JOINT TEAM SURVEYED ON 20 AUGUST 1994 AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 4393 4816. THAT JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED WITNESSES WHO STATED IT WAS THE SITE OF A 1972 NIGHT-TIME AIRCRAFT CRASH. HOWEVER, THE ITEMS RECOVERED AT THE SUSPECTED A-6A CRASH SITE WERE INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A CORRELATION TO CASE 1924.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS. NONE.

10. TEAM LEADER COMMENTS.

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY: RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS: CONCUR WITH ANALYST COMMENTS.

C. HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION/SUPPORT: HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION WAS GOOD WHILE INVESTIGATING THIS CASE.

D. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: NONE.//

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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00073318

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS423 MCN = 96055/15662 TOR = 960551715
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1577 0551714-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O P 230945Z FEB 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE
ZEM

CONTROLSUNCLASBODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 0512//
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS423 MCN = 96055/15662 TOR = 960551715
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1577 0551714-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

O 241714Z FEB 96
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFOCB/OC
RUEALGX/SAFE
O P 230945Z FEB 96 ZYB
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30M//
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//
BT

UNCLAS //N03000//AMEMBASSY HANOI PASS TO CJTFFA DET TWO
SECTION 01 OF 05
PART ONE OF TWO-PART TWO IDENT IS 221746Z FEB 96

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTF-FA/-/SEP//

SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE DA7A

REF: A. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 211703Z FEB 96
B. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 141700Z FEB 96
C. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 051440Z APR 95

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- D. JTF-FA J2, MEMO, 04 AUG 1994
 - E. CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU, HI, 132033Z DEC 93
 - F. JCRC LIAISON, BANGKOK, TH, 300445Z JAN 88
- RMKS/1. REFERENCES.
- A. REF A IS THE 39TH JFA ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORT CONCERNING CASE 1924.
 - B. REF B IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 39TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) CONDUCTED IN VIETNAM FROM 11 JANUARY TO 9 FEBRUARY 1996.
 - C. REF C IS THE 34TH JFA DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING CASE DATA
 - D. REF D IS THE JTF-FA J2 ANALYSIS OF HA BAC PROVINCIAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS COMBAT CHRONOLOGY.
 - E. REF E IS THE 26TH JFA FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT OF CASE 0512.
 - F. REF F IS THE INVESTIGATION REPORT PROVIDED BY THE SRV DURING THE 22-25 JANUARY 88 TECHNICAL MEETING.
 - G. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS BASED ON FIELD ANALYSIS ALONE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.
2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION.
- A. ON 18 AND 19 JANUARY 1996, INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IE1) INVESTIGATED CASE DATA IN CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE.
 - B. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE 4 NOVEMBER 1966 LOSS OF AN F-105F AIRCRAFT WHILE FLYING A COMBAT SUPPORT MISSION, RESULTING IN TWO UNACCOUNTED-FOR INDIVIDUALS. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT REPATRIATED THE REMAINS OF ONE CREWMEMBER TO THE U.S. IN 1989. THE U.S. SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED THOSE REMAINS AS THOSE OF THE CASE DATA0-01 INDIVIDUAL. THE SECOND CREWMEMBER FOR THIS CASE REMAINS UNACCOUNTED-FOR.
 - C. ON 18 JANUARY 1996, IE1 INTERVIEWED TWO WITNESSES AND RECEIVED FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF A 1965 CRASH IN BAI THAO HAMLET AND THE SUBSEQUENT CAPTURE OF THE PILOT. THESE ACCOUNTS PROBABLY CORRELATE TO RESOLVED CASE 0176. ONE WITNESS IDENTIFIED THE 1965 CRASH SITE, WHICH THE TEAM SEARCHED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. ONE WITNESS ALSO PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING A SEPARATE CRASH IN CAM LY VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE, WHICH PROBABLY CORRELATES TO AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THAT INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN A SEPARATE REPORT (REF A).
 - D. ON 19 JANUARY 1996, IE1 INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES AND RECEIVED FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF A 1966 CRASH IN HUNG DAO VILLAGE AND THE SUBSEQUENT BURIAL OF REMAINS FOUND AT THE SITE. ONE WITNESS IDENTIFIED THE CRASH SITE AND BURIAL LOCATION. THIS INFORMATION PROBABLY CORRELATES TO CASE DATA
 - E. IE1 DID NOT RECEIVE OR RECOVER ANY REMAINS WHILE INVESTIGATING CASE DATA
 - F. RECOMMENDATION: EXCAVATE.
3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:
- A. PURPOSE:
 - (1) INTERVIEW RESIDENTS OF THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS IN HA BAC PROVINCE FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING CASE DATA
 - (A) DONG CONG (DOONGF COONGS) HAMLET, VU XA (VUX XAS)

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VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(B) CAM LY (CAAMR LYS) VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(C) DAN HOI (DAN HOOIJ) VILLAGE, LUC NAM DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(D) TRI YEN (TRIS YEEN) VILLAGE, YEN DUNG DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(2) INTERVIEW RESIDENTS OF THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS IN HAI HUNG PROVINCE FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING CASE DATA

(A) BAI THAO (BAIX THAOR) HAMLET, BAC AN (BAWCS AN) VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.E., BELOW).

(B) HUNG DAO (HWNG DAOJ) VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.H., BELOW).

(C) LE LOI (LEE LOWIJ) VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.D., BELOW).

(3) INTERVIEW MR. NGUYEN VAN DAU (NGUYEENK VAWN DAU) OF BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, AND HAVE HIM LEAD THE TEAM TO THE CRASH SITE NEAR BAI THAO HAMLET WHICH HE MENTIONED TO VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS INVESTIGATING CASE DATA IN 1988 (ACCOMPLISHED; SEE PARA 3.F., BELOW).

B. ON 11 JANUARY 1996, THE JOINT U.S./SRV INVESTIGATION TEAM ARRIVED IN HANOI TO INVESTIGATE TWO CASES IN HAI HUNG PROVINCE.

C. TEAM COMPOSITION.

(1) U.S. CONTINGENT.

CPT ERIC NEWMAN	TEAM LEADER
MSG STEPHEN E. THOMPSON	ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
CW4 ROBERT W. BARFIELD	ANALYST
SFC MITCHELL P. SCHNEITER	ANALYST/LINGUIST
MSGT HUNG M. NGUYEN	ANALYST/LINGUIST
CT11 DANIEL L. MCLEOD JR.	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SSGT JAMES E. CREWS	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SGT MICHAEL A. DVORAK	ANALYST/LINGUIST
SSG MONTE E. COOPER	SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
SGT RICHARD J. JONES	SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST
MSGT HAROLD J. CAMPBELL	TEAM MEDIC
SFC ALAN J. SCHNABEL	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECHNICIAN

(2) VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT.

TRAN MINH TUAN (TRAANF MINH TUAANS)	TEAM LEADER; MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LE TRAN TUAN (LEE TRAANF TUAANS)	MINISTRY OF
//	

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE DATA
RMKS/

DAO KHAC CAI (DAOF KHAWCS CAIR)

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MINISTRY OF

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LE VAN HOANG (LEE VAWN HOANGF)

NATIONAL DEFENSE
MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR
MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR

NGUYEN VAN QUYNH (NGUYEENX VAWN QUYNHS)

(3) HAI HUNG PROVINCE TASK TEAM.

PHAM VAN HOAN (PHAM VAWN HOANF)

TEAM LEADER

NGUYEN VAN THUAN (NGUYEENX VAWN THUAAN)

TEAM MEMBER

PHAM NGOC HUNG (PHAM NGOCJ HUNGF)

TEAM MEMBER

NGUYEN VAN VY (NGUYEENX VAWN VYX)

TEAM MEMBER

LE VAN SON (LEE VAWN SOWN)

TEAM MEMBER

D. ON 12 JANUARY 1996, IE1 MET WITH THEIR VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS TO DISCUSS THE TEAM'S INVESTIGATION PLANS. THE JOINT TEAM REVIEWED THE INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH CASE AND ESTABLISHED AN INVESTIGATION SCHEDULE. THE VIETNAMESE TEAM LEADER, MR. TUAN, INFORMED IE1 THAT DURING THEIR UNILATERAL ADVANCE WORK THE VIETNAMESE TEAM CANVASSED BUT DID NOT FIND ANY WITNESSES WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING CASE PATA IN DONG CONG HAMLET, CAM LY VILLAGE, DAN HOI VILLAGE, TRI YEN VILLAGE, OR LE LOI VILLAGE (SEE PARAS 3.A.(1) AND 3.A.(2)(C), ABOVE). THE U.S. TEAM LEADER CONCURRED WITH MR. TUAN'S SUGGESTION THAT THE JOINT TEAM NOT GO TO THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE VIETNAMESE TEAM HAD ALREADY MET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS AND INSTEAD CONCENTRATE THE INVESTIGATION IN THE AREAS THEY WERE ABLE TO LOCATE POTENTIAL WITNESSES TO THE CASE PATA INCIDENT.

E. ON 18 JANUARY 1996, THE JOINT TEAM TRAVELED TO BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE. IE1 MET WITH VILLAGE OFFICIALS AND DISCUSSED THE CASE PATA INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH VILLAGE OFFICIALS, THE JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES AND OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) WITNESS ONE:

(A) NAME: NGUYEN VAN THINH (NGUYEENX VAWN THINHJ).

(B) AGE: 44 YOA.

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: BAI THAO HAMLET, BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT; 36 YEARS.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: STUDENT.

(G) STATEMENT:

((1)) BETWEEN 1400 AND 1500 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN JULY (LUNAR CALENDAR) 1965, MR. THINH SAW A PILOT PARACHUTE FROM A BURNING JET. THE AIRCRAFT, WHICH HE LATER HEARD WAS A F-4H, CAME FROM THE DIRECTION OF BAC GIANG (BAWCS GIANG) TOWN, HA BAC PROVINCE. AFTER THE PILOT EJECTED, THE JET CRASHED NEAR BAI THAO HAMLET. MR. THINH DID NOT KNOW HOW THE PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN BUT HEARD THAT ITS TARGET WAS THE BAC GIANG POWER PLANT.

((2)) THE AIRCRAFT IMPACTED APPROXIMATELY FOUR KILOMETERS FROM WHERE MR. THINH WAS HIDING IN A BUNKER. THERE WAS A LOUD EXPLOSION WHEN IT HIT AND THE WRECKAGE BURNED FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. WHILE HE PERSONALLY SAW ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT THAT

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SUBSEQUENTLY CRASHED, MR. THINH SAID THAT WHILE IN THE BUNKER HE HEARD OTHER PLANES FLYING AROUND THE AREA.

((3)) MR. THINH LATER HEARD THAT THE PILOT LANDED NEAR LE LOI VILLAGE AND WAS CAPTURED BY TROOPS FROM NEARBY HA BAC PROVINCE. HE WAS TOLD THE PILOT WAS AN AUSTRALIAN AND HAD NOT BEEN INJURED IN THE INCIDENT. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PILOT'S PERSONAL BELONGINGS OR EQUIPMENT, BUT HEARD THAT TROOPS TOOK THE PILOT TO HA BAC PROVINCE.

((4)) MR. THINH WENT TO THE CRASH SITE THE FOLLOWING DAY. A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE FROM ALL OVER THE AREA WERE ALREADY THERE. THE AIRCRAFT HAD MOSTLY DISINTEGRATED INTO SMALL UNIDENTIFIABLE PIECES UPON IMPACT; HOWEVER, A PORTION OF THE FRONT END REMAINED INTACT. HE DID NOT SEE ANY REMAINS AT THE SITE AND DID NOT HEAR ABOUT ANYONE FINDING ANY REMAINS. HE DID NOT SEE ANY OF THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS, EQUIPMENT, OR EJECTION SEAT AT THE SITE AND DID NOT HEAR ABOUT ANYONE FINDING THESE ITEMS. MR. THINH SAID HE TOOK SOME OF THE SMALL PIECES OF WRECKAGE, AS DID OTHERS AT THE SITE, BUT HE DOES NOT HAVE THEM ANYMORE. HE CANNOT REMEMBER IF ANY OF THE WRECKAGE HAD ANY NUMBERS OR SYMBOLS ON IT. MR. THINH SAID HE COULD GUIDE IE1 TO THE CRASH SITE BUT THAT NO WRECKAGE REMAINS THERE.

((5)) WHEN ASKED HOW HE COULD BE SURE THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED IN JULY 1965 MR. THINH REPLIED THAT HE REMEMBERED THE TIME FRAME BECAUSE IT WAS SUMMER AND HE HAD JUST FINISHED ATTENDING SCHOOL. HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER CRASHES IN THE AREA, BUT HEARD THERE WAS A CRASH IN 1967 IN CAM LY VILLAGE, HA BAC PROVINCE. HE DID NOT KNOW ANY DETAILS ABOUT THE 1967 CRASH.

(2) WITNESS TWO:

- (A) NAME: TRAN VAN KHOAT (TRANF VAWN KHOAWTS).
- (B) AGE: 64 YOA.
- (C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: BAC AN VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT; OVER 35 YEARS.
- (D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.
- (E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.
- (F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: FARMER.
- (G) STATEMENT:

((1)) BETWEEN 1200 AND 1300 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN JULY (LUNAR CALENDAR) 1965, MR. KHOAT SAW A FLIGHT OF THREE AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE DIRECTION OF HA BAC PROVINCE. ONE OF THE AIRCRAFT, WHICH HE LATER HEARD HAD BEEN HIT BY AN AAA UNIT IN HA BAC PROVINCE, WAS ON FIRE. A PILOT PARACHUTED OUT OF THE BURNING PLANE BEFORE IT CRASHED IN BAC AN VILLAGE. THE OTHER AIRCRAFT CIRCLED THE AREA FOR APPROXIMATELY 15 MINUTES, DROPPED TWO BOMBS,
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

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AND THEN FLEW AWAY.

((2)) THE PILOT LANDED ABOUT 800 METERS FROM MR. KHOAT'S HOUSE, WHICH AT THE TIME WAS LOCATED NEAR LE LOI VILLAGE. NEARBY MILITIA MEMBERS FROM CAM LY VILLAGE, HA BAC PROVINCE, CAPTURED THE PILOT. MR. KHOAT WENT AND SAW THE CAPTURED PILOT, A BIG, TALL MAN OVER TWO METERS IN HEIGHT. MR. KHOAT DESCRIBES THE PILOT AS BEING NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE, BUT HAVING TAN COLOR SKIN, WITH SHORT BLACK CURLY HAIR. TROOPS TOOK THE PILOT, WHO WAS NOT WOUNDED, TO CAM LY VILLAGE. MR. KHOAT DID NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE PILOT NOR WHAT HAPPENED TO HIM AFTER HE WAS TAKEN AWAY. ACCORDING TO MR. KHOAT, CHI LINH DISTRICT OFFICIALS AT THE SCENE TOOK THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS, EQUIPMENT, AND EJECTION SEAT.

((3)) LATER THAT AFTERNOON, AROUND 1500, MR. KHOAT WENT TO THE CRASH SITE. WRECKAGE LITTERED THE SITE BUT MR. KHOAT DID NOT SEE ANY REMAINS THERE. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT NO ONE DIED IN THE CRASH. THE PIECES OF THE AIRCRAFT WERE GREEN BUT HE DID NOT RECALL SEEING ANY MARKINGS OR SYMBOLS ON ANYTHING. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TYPE OF AIRCRAFT IT WAS BUT HE HEARD IT WAS A F-105. THERE IS NO LONGER ANY WRECKAGE AT THE SITE AS THE LOCALS SCAVENGED IT ALL. MR. KHOAT THOUGHT HE STILL HAD A PIECE OF THE WRECKAGE AT HOME.

((4)) MR. KHOAT THEN PROVIDED IE1 INFORMATION ON A DIFFERENT CRASH WHICH OCCURRED IN CAM LY VILLAGE, HA BAC PROVINCE. HE SHOWED THE TEAM A POCKET KNIFE HE FOUND AT THE SCENE OF THAT CRASH. THE INFORMATION HE PROVIDED CORRELATED TO AN UNRESOLVED 1972 LOSS INCIDENT AND IS REPORTED SEPARATELY (SEE REF B, ABOVE).

F. IE1 REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW A MR. NGUYEN VAN DAU (SEE PARA 3.A.(3), ABOVE). THE VNOSMP STATED THE VIETNAMESE INVESTIGATION REPORT FROM WHICH THE U.S. DERIVED THE LEAD WAS INCORRECT (SEE REF F, ABOVE). THE PERSON REFERENCED IN THE REPORT IS ACTUALLY VU NGOC DAU (VUX NGOCJ ZAAUJ). THE JOINT TEAM THEN MET 53 YEAR-OLD MR. DAU AND FOUND THAT HE HAD NO PERTINENT INFORMATION TO PROVIDE. HE HAD BEEN AWAY IN THE MILITARY FROM 1960 TO 1975, AND DID NOT RETURN TO THE AREA UNTIL 1975. HE SERVED AS THE BAC AN VILLAGE CHAIRMAN FROM 1976 TO 1980 AND HIS INFORMATION WAS LIMITED TO HEARSAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN ONE AIRCRAFT CRASH IN THE VILLAGE WHILE HE WAS AWAY.

G. FOLLOWING THE INTERVIEWS, IE1 TRAVELED TO THE SITE OF THE JULY 1965 CRASH AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 44786 44946. THE SITE IS A FISH POND LOCATED NEXT TO MR. KHOAT'S (WITNESS TWO) HOUSE. HE MOVED AND BUILT A NEW HOME NEXT TO THE CRASH SITE IN 1970. MR. KHOAT DUG AND ENLARGED THE CRASH CRATER TO MAKE THE FISH POND. HE SAID THAT VILLAGERS SCAVENGED ALL THE WRECKAGE FROM THE CRATER PRIOR TO THAT. THE TEAM SEARCHED THE AREA AROUND THE CRASH SITE WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. MR. KHOAT SHOWED THE TEAM A LARGE PIECE OF STEEL HE CLAIMED TO HAVE FOUND AT THE CRATER. ADDITIONALLY, AN OLD WOMAN SHOWED THE TEAM A METAL PIPE WHICH ALSO ALLEGEDLY CAME FROM THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE.

H. ON 19 JANUARY 1996, THE JOINT TEAM TRAVELED TO HUNG DAO VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE. IE1 MET WITH

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VILLAGE OFFICIALS AND DISCUSSED THE CASE DATA INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH VILLAGE OFFICIALS, THE JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED THREE WITNESSES AND OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) WITNESS THREE:

(A) NAME: PHAM KHAC CHINH (PHAM KHACS CHINHS).
 (B) AGE: 39 YOA.
 (C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: VAN YEN (VAWNU YEEN) HAMLET, HUNG DAO VILLAGE, CHI LINH DISTRICT; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT.

- (D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.
 (E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: HUNG DAO VILLAGE CHAIRMAN.
 (F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: STUDENT.
 (G) STATEMENT:

((1)) AT ABOUT 1400 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER 1966, MR. CHINH SAW A BURNING AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE NORTH-WEST. THE GREEN JET AIRCRAFT, WHICH WAS FLYING ALONE, CRASHED IN PHUONG SON (PHWONG SOWN) HAMLET, OVER TWO KILOMETERS FROM HIS HOME. HE DID NOT SEE OR HEAR THAT ANYONE HAD PARACHUTED FROM THE PLANE BEFORE IT CRASHED. HE DID NOT GO TO THE CRASH SITE RIGHT AWAY AS HE WAS AFRAID. ACCORDING TO MR. CHINH, THERE WERE CLUSTER BOMBS AT THE CRASH SITE WHICH KILLED THREE PEOPLE.

((2)) APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH LATER, MR. CHINH VISITED THE CRASH SITE FOR THE FIRST TIME. ONLY SMALL BITS OF WRECKAGE REMAINED. HE DID NOT SEE ANY PERSONAL EFFECTS OR REMAINS AT THE SITE. HE HEARD THAT ONLY ONE PERSON HAD BEEN IN THE PLANE AT THE TIME OF THE CRASH AND THAT ONLY BITS OF FLESH HAD BEEN FOUND. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE REMAINS OR WHO HAD VISITED THE SITE RIGHT AFTER THE INCIDENT OCCURRED.

((3)) IEL ASKED MR. CHINH IF THE VILLAGE MAINTAINED ANY RECORDS WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT. HE SAID THERE WERE NO RECORDS WITH THAT KIND OF INFORMATION. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER TEAM QUESTIONS, MR. CHINH SAID HE HAD NEVER MET A JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM AND THAT NO AMERICANS HAD VISITED THE CRASH SITE BEFORE. HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER U.S. CRASHES.

(2) WITNESS FOUR:

(A) NAME: VU THI HAU (VUX THIJ HAAUJ).
 (B) AGE: 53 YOA.
 (C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: PHUONG SON HAMLET, HUNG DAO VILLAGE; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT.
 (D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.
 (E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.
 (F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: FARMER.
 (G) STATEMENT:

((1)) SOMETIME AFTER 1300 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE

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IN THE NINTH LUNAR MONTH OF 1966, MRS. HAU WITNESSED A BURNING AIRCRAFT CRASH ABOUT TWO HUNDRED METERS FROM HER HOUSE. IT HAD COME FROM THE DIRECTION OF BAC GIANG TOWN, HA BAC PROVINCE. SHE WENT BACK INTO HER HOUSE AS THERE WERE MANY PLANES IN THE AREA DROPPING BOMBS.

((2)) LATER IN THE AFTERNOON, AFTER THE OTHER PLANES LEFT, MRS. HAU AND MANY OTHER LOCAL RESIDENTS WENT TO THE CRASH SITE. THE AIRCRAFT HAD IMPACTED ON ROCKY SOIL CAUSING IT TO DISINTEGRATE AND SCATTER SMALL BITS OF WRECKAGE OVER A LARGE AREA; THERE WAS NO CRATER. SHE SAW MANY SMALL PIECES OF FLESH AT THE SITE AND ESTIMATED THAT THERE WAS PROBABLY ONE KILOGRAM OF REMAINS THERE, ENOUGH TO FILL A RUCKSACK. SHE DID NOT KNOW OR HEAR HOW MANY PEOPLE HAD BEEN IN THE AIRCRAFT. SHE DID NOT SEE ANY OF THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS OR EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT HEAR ABOUT ANYONE FINDING SUCH ITEMS.

((3)) MRS. HAU DID NOT SEE NOR HEAR WHAT HAPPENED TO THE REMAINS. SHE DID NOT SEE ANY FLESH AT THE SITE ON HER NEXT VISIT. SHE VISITED THE CRASH SITE OFTEN AS SHE LIVED NEARBY. MILITIA MEMBERS AND LOCAL RESIDENTS SCAVENGED THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE. MRS. HAU COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND SAID THAT IT WAS THE ONLY CRASH SHE KNEW ABOUT.

(3) WITNESS FIVE:

(A) NAME: VU DUY DO (VUX ZUY DOOK).

(B) AGE: 40 YOA.

(C) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE:
PHUONG SON HAMLET, HUNG DAO VILLAGE; LIFE-LONG RESIDENT.

(D) RESIDENCE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: SAME AS ABOVE.

(E) CURRENT OCCUPATION: FARMER.

(F) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: STUDENT.

(G) STATEMENT:

((1)) BETWEEN 1200 AND 1300 ON AN UNRECALLED DATE IN OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER 1966, MR. DO HEARD THE SOUNDS OF AN APPROACHING AIRCRAFT. FROM THE BUNKER AT HIS HOUSE HE SAW A BURNING AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE DIRECTION OF HA BAC PROVINCE. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED ON THE SIDE OF A HILL, APPROXIMATELY 60 METERS ABOVE HIS HOUSE. WRECKAGE EXPLODED DOWN THE HILL, SETTING FIRE TO NUMEROUS HOUSES. OTHER AIRCRAFT FLEW AROUND THE AREA FOR ABOUT AN HOUR AFTER THE CRASH.

((2)) LATER IN THE AFTERNOON HE WENT TO THE CRASH SITE; MANY PEOPLE WERE ALREADY THERE. WRECKAGE WAS SCATTERED OVER A LARGE AREA AND THERE WERE BITS OF WHITE FLESH ALL OVER THE SITE. EVERYTHING BURNED UP IN THE CRASH; HE DID NOT SEE ANY OF THE PILOT'S PERSONAL EFFECTS OR EQUIPMENT.

((3)) HE HEARD THAT A MR. LAP (LAAPJ), WHO DIED IN 1987, GATHERED UP THE REMAINS IN A BAG AND BURIED THEM AT THE BOTTOM OF THE HILL. MR. DO SAID THE REMAINS INCLUDED A SKULL, BUT HE DID NOT KNOW IF IT WAS AN INTACT SKULL OR ONLY A PORTION OF THE SKULL. HE DOES NOT KNOW OF ANYONE ELSE WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE BURIAL. MR. DO TOLD THE JOINT TEAM HE COULD SHOW THEM BOTH THE

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CRASH SITE AND BURIAL LOCATION. HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER CRASHES IN THE AREA.

I. FOLLOWING THE INTERVIEWS THE JOINT TEAM, ACCOMPANIED BY WITNESS FIVE, TRAVELED TO THE CRASH SITE. THE SITE, LOCATED AT THE TOP OF A HILL AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 37326 42473, IS IN A GRAVEYARD. THE GRAVE OF MR. LAP, THE MAN WHO BURIED THE REMAINS, IS SITUATED ON THE SPOT WHERE THE AIRCRAFT IMPACTED. THE TEAM SEARCHED THE AREA AND FOUND MINIMAL AIRCRAFT DEBRIS, CONSISTING OF SMALL BITS OF METAL, PLASTIC, AND WIRE (SEE PARA 5.A., BELOW). ONE RESIDENT ALLOWED THE TEAM TO EXAMINE A PIECE OF WRECKAGE ALLEGEDLY FOUND AT THE CRASH SITE (SEE PARA 4.B., BELOW).

J. AT THE BOTTOM OF THE HILL WITNESS FIVE POINTED OUT THE ALLEGED BURIAL LOCATION AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 37304 42345 (SEE PARA 5.B., BELOW). ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT AN EYEWITNESS TO THE BURIAL, THE WITNESS APPEARED CONFIDENT IN POINTING OUT AN APPROXIMATELY 10 X 10-METER AREA OF THE HAMLET GARDEN. HE SAID MR. LAP BURIED THE REMAINS IN A BAG APPROXIMATELY 40 CENTIMETERS DEEP. THE WITNESS STATED THAT AT THE TIME OF THE BURIAL THE LEVEL OF THE SOIL WAS ABOUT ONE METER LOWER. LATER, THE AREA WAS COVERED WITH MORE SOIL TO CREATE THE GARDEN.

K. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESS, AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT LOCAL RESIDENTS USED THE AREA AS THE INITIAL BURIAL LOCATION OF THEIR DEAD. AFTER THREE YEARS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH VIETNAMESE BURIAL TRADITIONS, THEY WOULD EXHUME THE BODIES AND PUT THE BONES IN A SMALL CASKET, THEN BURY THEM IN A DIFFERENT LOCATION. IE1 ASKED THE WITNESS IF IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR SOMEONE TO HAVE DUG UP THE REMAINS OF THE PILOT. THE WITNESS FELT IT WAS UNLIKELY. HE SAID THAT FAMILIES KNEW WHERE THEIR DEAD WERE BURIED AND DID NOT HAVE TO SEARCH AROUND FOR THEM.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

A. MATERIAL EVIDENCE RETAINED BY JTF-FA: NONE.

B. MATERIAL EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHED AND LEFT IN PLACE: ONE METAL CYLINDER, APPROXIMATELY FIVE INCHES IN DIAMETER, WITH MOSTLY ILLEGIBLE PRINTED LETTERS ON THE SIDE, INCLUDING A CIRCLE WITH THE LETTER "V" INSIDE.

C. REMAINS: NONE.

5. SURVEY RESULTS: ON 19 JANUARY 1996, IE1 SURVEYED A CRASH SITE AND AN ALLEGED BURIAL LOCATION POSSIBLY CORRELATING TO CASE DATA

A. SITE ONE (CRASH SITE):

(1) PROJECT LOCATION:

(A) VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 37326 42473.

(B) MAP DATA: MAP NAME: - PHA LAI, MAP NO. - 6252

II, MAP SERIES - L7014, PRINTED - 1967.

(2) OUTSTANDING FEATURES: THE CRASH SITE IS LOCATED IN A CEMETERY ON A RIDGE LINE.

(3) TERRAIN: STEEP.

(4) SOIL CONDITIONS: HARD, ROCKY SOIL.

(5) VEGETATION: GRASS WITH SMALL TREES IN CULTIVATION ON

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THE SIDE OF THE HILL.

(6) METHOD OF SEARCH: SURFACE SEARCH OF A 50 X 50-METER AREA.

(7) HAZARDS: NONE.

(8) RESULTS:

(A) REMAINS SEEN: NONE.

(B) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE.

(C) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE.

(D) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: MINIMAL AMOUNTS OF WIRE AND METAL FRAGMENTS.

(9) LOGISTICS: A STANDARD SIZE RECOVERY TEAM, WITH 20 TO 30 WORKERS FROM LOCAL VILLAGE, CAN EXCAVATE THIS SITE IN 10 TO 15 DAYS. NO SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED.

B. SITE TWO (BURIAL LOCATION):

(1) PROJECT LOCATION:

(A) VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES 48Q XJ 37304 42345.

(B) MAP DATA: MAP NAME: - PHA LAI, MAP NO. - 6252

II, MAP SERIES - L7014, PRINTED - 1967.

(2) OUTSTANDING FEATURES: THE SITE IS LOCATED IN A CABBAGE GARDEN BORDERED BY A RICE PADDY ON ONE SIDE AND A DIRT ROAD AND HOUSES ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE.

(3) TERRAIN: FLAT.

(4) SOIL CONDITIONS: EASY TO SCREEN.

(5) VEGETATION: CABBAGE IN CULTIVATION.

(6) METHOD OF SEARCH: SURFACE SEARCH OF THE ALLEGED

BURIAL SITE.

(7) HAZARDS: NONE.

(8) RESULTS:

(A) REMAINS SEEN: NONE.

(B) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE.

(C) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE.

(D) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: NONE.

(9) LOGISTICS: A STANDARD SIZE RECOVERY TEAM, WITH 20 TO 30 WORKERS FROM LOCAL VILLAGES, CAN EXCAVATE THIS SITE IN 7 TO 10 DAYS. WET SCREENING IS AVAILABLE AT THIS SITE. AN AREA FOR A BASE CAMP IS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE SITE.

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE.

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE.//

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 ITEM NO=00404789
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS989 MCN = 96194/38376 TOR = 961942354
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 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 122355Z JUL 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 110922Z JUL 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEACNP/BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS-663P//
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//MPH-10/INTC/INTM//
 RHWRAAA/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
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 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY
 MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "SITUATION OF
 AMERICAN BANDIT PILOT GRAVES IN THANH HOA TERRITORY"//
 REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/170802ZSEP92//
 REF/B/RMG/CJTFFA DET ONE/230214ZNOV93//
 REF/C/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/171812ZFEB94//
 REF/D/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/220633ZNOV94//
 REF/E/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/211812ZNOV95//
 REF/F/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/300902ZAPR96//
 NARR/REF A IS THE JTF-FA ANALYSIS OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED
 "STATISTICS OF AMERICAN INVADER AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY THE ARMY AND
 PEOPLE OF THANH HOA FROM 5 AUG 64 TO 31 OCT 65." REF B IS THE
 DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (DRI) OF CASE DATA FROM THE 26TH
 JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA). REF C IS THE JTF-FA ANALYSIS OF A
 VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED "COMBAT HISTORY OF THE THANH HOA ARMED
 FORCES." REF D IS THE DRI OF CASE FROM THE 32ND JFA. REF E
 IS THE DRI OF CASE 0578 FROM THE 38TH JFA. REF F IS THE JTF-FA
 ANALYSIS OF A VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT TITLED "LIST OF AMERICANS MISSING

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DURING THE WAR IN THANH HOA."/

RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 1995, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THREE SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ONE SET OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A REPORT TITLED: "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP." THIS REPORT INCLUDED TEN DOCUMENTS. THE SECOND SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A REPORT FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) MIA SPECIALIST TEAM TITLED: "REPORT OF RESULTS OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS TO COLLECT MIA INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS." THIS REPORT INCLUDED THREE DOCUMENTS. THE THIRD SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A VIETNAM OFFICE OF SEEKING PERSON (VNOSMP) ASSESSMENT OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS TEAM (SRT) CASES.

2. THE MOI REPORT, "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MOI'S SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP" DETAILS A 4-12 MAY 95 EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION IN VINH PHU, TUYEN QUANG, YEN BAI, HOA BINH, NINH BINH AND THANH HOA PROVINCES. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES BY THE SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS WAS TITLED, "SITUATION OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOT GRAVES IN THANH HOA TERRITORY."

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES LIMITED CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH UNRESOLVED CASES DATA .. DATA, 0350, AND DATA ; AND RESOLVED CASES: 0093, 0667, 0457, 0255, 1789, 0375-0-01, 0575-1-01, 0083-0-01 AND 1915-1-01.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS A LIST OF 19 LINE ITEMS IN TABULAR FORM, WITH THREE DATA COLUMNS ON EACH LINE. THE TRANSLATION BELOW LISTS HEADING INFORMATION FOR THE DOCUMENT FOLLOWED BY EACH LINE ENTRY. THE THREE DATA COLUMNS ARE SET APART BY SEMICOLONS (;). DIRECT TRANSLATIONS FROM THE DOCUMENT ARE ENCLOSED IN QUOTATIONS. EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES (()).

A. THE DOCUMENT HEADING INFORMATION READS AS FOLLOWS:

((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

- "SITUATION OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOT GRAVES
- IN THANH HOA TERRITORY
- (ACCORDING TO THANH HOA PROVINCE UNIT RESEARCH DOCUMENT DATED 19-4-1973)
- THE NUMBER OF DEAD BANDIT PILOTS FROM 1964-1968 AND 1971-1972 TOTALS 36 GUYS. ((WE)) ONLY KNOW THE FIRST AND LAST NAMES FOR 9 PILOTS, ((AND)) THE AGE AND IDENTIFICATION FOR 10 PILOTS. THE REMAINDER HAVE DIED ((AND THEIR)) BODIES DISINTEGRATED OR BURNED, ((SO)) THERE ARE NO PAPERS OR TRACE ((OF THEM)).
- ((REGARDING)) THE SITUATION ON GRAVES OF PILOTS BURIED IN THE LOCAL AREA ((THAT WE)) WANT TO FIND, THERE WERE NO COFFINS, ONLY DIRT SPREAD CURSORILY OVER ((THE BODIES)) AND NO MARKINGS, THEREFORE NOW THERE ARE ONLY 19 GUYS WHO STILL HAVE GRAVES. ((WE)) DID NOT FIND GRAVES FOR THE REMAINING 17 GUYS.
- ACCORDING TO LOCAL RECORDS THERE ARE GRAVES FOR AMERICAN BANDIT PILOTS AS FOLLOWS:"
- ((END TRANSLATION))

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B. THE DOCUMENT LINE ENTRIES READ AS FOLLOWS:

((BEGIN TRANSLATION))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "1"; QUANG VINH (QUANG XUONG); 4 GUYS; GRAVES OF 2 GUYS STILL EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0093, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 0093 WAS THE ONLY CASE IN QUANG VINH VILLAGE TO INVOLVE THE LOSS OF FOUR U. S. SERVICE MEMBERS. THE BURIAL SITE COORDINATES ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0093 ARE LOCATED IN QUANG VINH VILLAGE. IN ADDITION, ENTRY 8 OF REF B NAMES THE FOUR PERSONS BURIED IN QUANG VINH VILLAGE. THE FOUR NAMES CORRELATE WITH THE FOUR PERSONS LOST IN THE REFNO 0093 INCIDENT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "2"; QUANG YEN (QUANG XUONG); 1 GUY; GRAVE NO LONGER EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, AN UNRESOLVED CASE, BASED ON LOSS LOCATION. INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES, INCLUDING U.S. AND SRV DOCUMENTATION, AND THE RESULTS OF FIELD INVESTIGATION AND EXCAVATION, INDICATES THAT CASE DATA WAS THE ONLY CASE TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN QUANG YEN VILLAGE. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE BURIAL SITE NOTED IN THIS DOCUMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE RESULTS OF FIELD INVESTIGATION.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "3"; QUANG CHAU (QUANG XUONG); GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS ENTRY PROBABLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0667, BASED ON LOCATION AND PRESENCE OF A GRAVE. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON THIS VILLAGE (WG 9285) SHOWS 19 AIRCRAFT LOSSES. OF THESE 19, 12 WERE EITHER OPERATIONAL LOSSES OR RETURNEES. OF THE REMAINING SEVEN, ONLY TWO ARE CLOSE TO QUANG CHAU VILLAGE, ACCORDING TO SEALOSS. BOTH OF THESE, CASES 0092 AND 0667, WERE RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF JOINT FIELD INVESTIGATIONS, SO THE ACTUAL BURIAL LOCATIONS WERE NEVER CONFIRMED. REF C SHOWS THAT THE 0092 AIRCRAFT CRASHED OFF THE COAST OF QUANG NHAM VILLAGE. THIS LOCATION IS ABOUT 20 KM SOUTH OF QUANG CHAU VILLAGE. REF B PLACES THE CRASH SITE OF THE ENTRY CORRELATED WITH 0667 BETWEEN QUANG VINH AND QUANG HUNG VILLAGES, ABOUT 4 KM SOUTH OF QUANG CHAU VILLAGE. //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "SITUATION OF RMKS/

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION IN THE CASE 0667 FILE, THE INDIVIDUAL LOST IN THIS INCIDENT EJECTED SAFELY FROM HIS AIRCRAFT, AND DISAPPEARED INTO A TREE LINE AT THE EDGE OF QUANG CHAU VILLAGE. HE WAS NEVER HEARD FROM AGAIN. THE NOTATION IN A DOCUMENT THAT A GRAVE SITE STILL EXISTS IS ALMOST ALWAYS AN INDICATION THAT THE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH A RESOLVED CASE. LTJG GRAHAM WAS EITHER KILLED BY LOCAL FORCES DURING OR AFTER CAPTURE, OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES SUFFERED PRIOR TO OR UPON LANDING. HE WAS PROBABLY BURIED IN QUANG CHAU VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "4"; QUANG CHINH (QUANG XUONG); GRAVE LOST." ((THIS ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0457, BASED ON LOCATION OF LOSS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SEVERAL CASES IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA, U.S. RECORDS PLACE CASE 0457 CLOSEST TO QUANG CHINH VILLAGE. THIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS PRIOR

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TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF FIELD INVESTIGATIONS, SO THE DATA IN U.S. FILES OF THIS CASE HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED IN THE FIELD. NEVERTHELESS, DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF ANOTHER CASE IN THE AREA, A JOINT TEAM INTERVIEWED A WITNESS IN QUANG CHINH VILLAGE WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH CORRELATES WITH CASE 0457, TO INCLUDE BURIAL AND SUBSEQUENT RECOVERY OF REMAINS IN THE VILLAGE (REF E). THERE ARE NO OTHER CASES IN QUANG CHINH VILLAGE. NOTE: SUBJECT DOCUMENT INDICATES THAT THE GRAVE IN QUANG CHINH WAS LOST. NEVERTHELESS, THE SRV REPATRIATED THE REMAINS OF CASE 0457 IN 1983. THIS INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT THE SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY OF REMAINS TOOK PLACE AFTER SUBJECT DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED. THE WITNESS FROM QUANG CHINH VILLAGE DID NOT INDICATE WHEN HE GUIDED THE OFFICIAL RECOVERY PARTY TO THE BURIAL SITE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "5); QUANG HAI (QUANG XUONG); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS INFORMATION POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0255. ONE OF THE TWO CREWMEN IN THIS CASE IS A RETURNEE. THE OTHER WAS RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS IN DEC 88, BEFORE A JOINT INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE TOOK PLACE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ACTUAL LOSS LOCATION HAS NEVER BEEN DETERMINED. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION IS IN QUANG NHAM VILLAGE, 7 KM SOUTH OF QUANG HAI VILLAGE. HOWEVER, AN INTERVIEW REPORT IN THE CASE 0255 FILE PROVIDES INFORMATION WHICH CORRELATES VERY CLOSELY WITH THE TESTIMONY OF THE RETURNEE IN THIS INCIDENT. THE INTERVIEWEE STATED THAT THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE IN QUANG HAI VILLAGE. IN ADDITION, REF C CONTAINS AN ENTRY WHICH CORRELATES WITH CASE 0255 WHICH PLACES THE CRASH SITE OFF THE COAST OF QUANG HAI VILLAGE. THERE WERE NO OTHER INCIDENTS IN THIS AREA ON 18 FEB 66. INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING THE REPATRIATED REMAINS INDICATES THAT THEY WERE RECOVERED IN TINH GIA DISTRICT. NO OTHER DETAILS ARE PROVIDED. ALTHOUGH THIS INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CORRELATION PROPOSED ABOVE, IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT BY ITSELF TO OVERRULE IT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "6); QUANG DINH (QUANG XUONG); 2 GUYS; GRAVES EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 1789, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 1789 WAS THE ONLY CASE TO INVOLVE THE LOSS OF TWO U. S. SERVICE MEMBERS WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF QUANG DINH VILLAGE. IN ADDITION, A WARTIME NEWS REPORT CORRELATED WITH THIS CASE PLACES THE INCIDENT LOCATION IN QUANG DINH VILLAGE. THE REMAINS OF BOTH SERVICEMEN WERE REPATRIATED IN APR 88, BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF JOINT FIELD INVESTIGATION. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LOSS LOCATION OF THIS INCIDENT HAS NEVER BEEN CONFIRMED. INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING THE REPATRIATED REMAINS INDICATES THAT THEY WERE RECOVERED IN HOANG HOA DISTRICT, THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF WHICH LIES 4 KM NORTH OF QUANG DINH VILLAGE. ALTHOUGH THIS INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CORRELATION ESTABLISHED ABOVE, IT IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERRULE IT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "7); HAI LINH (TINH GIA); 1 GUY; GRAVE LOST." ((THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES TO PERMIT CORRELATION OF THIS ENTRY. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HAI LINH VILLAGE (WG 8455) SHOWS 13 AIRCRAFT LOSSES, NONE OF THEM IN HAI LINH VILLAGE ITSELF. OF THESE 13 INCIDENTS, 7 INVOLVE OPERATIONAL LOSSES OR RETURNEES. OF THE REMAINING SIX, TWO ARE OVERWATER LOSSES NEAR

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HON ME ISLAND, 15 KM SE OF HAI LINH VILLAGE. TWO OTHERS, BOTH RESOLVED CASES, CORRELATE MORE CLOSELY WITH OTHER ENTRIES IN THIS DOCUMENT. OF THE TWO REMAINING INCIDENTS, FIELD INVESTIGATION SHOWS THAT UNRESOLVED CASE 0578 PROBABLY TOOK PLACE IN HAI CHAU VILLAGE, 10 KM DUE NORTH OF HAI LINH VILLAGE (REF E). THE LAST INCIDENT IS RESOLVED CASE 0255, RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS IN 1983. INFORMATION IN THE CASE FILE AND IN SRV DOCUMENTS, INDICATES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL KILLED IN THIS INCIDENT DIED IN QUANG HAI VILLAGE, QUANG XUONG DISTRICT, 20 KM DUE NORTH OF HAI LINH VILLAGE. THE NOTATION THAT THE GRAVE HAS BEEN LOST IS A STRONG INDICATION THAT NO REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INCIDENT HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED. RECOMMEND INVESTIGATION OF THIS INFORMATION IN HAI LINH VILLAGE. NO JOINT TEAM HAS YET VISITED HAI LINH VILLAGE, AS NO INCIDENT IN JTF-FA FILES IS KNOWN TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE THERE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "8); HAI HOA (TINH GIA); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0375-0-01, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 0375-0-01 WAS THE ONLY CASE TO INVOLVE THE LOSS OF A U. S. SERVICE MEMBER WITHIN 12 KM OF HAI HOA VILLAGE. THIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS ON 15 DEC 88, BEFORE THE CASE UNDERWENT JOINT INVESTIGATION, CONSEQUENTLY, THE LOSS LOCATION WAS NEVER CONFIRMED. THE REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE WERE REPATRIATED AS UNIDENTIFIED, RECOVERED IN TINH GIA DISTRICT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "9); HAI THANH (TINH GIA); 1 GUY; GRAVE LOST." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA, WHICH INVOLVES ONE RESOLVED AND ONE UNRESOLVED INDIVIDUAL. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. FIELD INVESTIGATION IN HAI THANH VILLAGE OBTAINED INFORMATION CONSISTENT WITH CASE DATA, INCLUDING DISCOVERY OF ONE CAUCASIAN BODY ON THE BEACH OF THE VILLAGE, BURIAL OF THE BODY, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DESTRUCTION OF THE GRAVE SITE BY A STORM (REF D). IT IS NOT CLEAR TO WHICH OF THE TWO CREWMEN THIS INFORMATION PERTAINS. ONE INDIVIDUAL WAS RESOLVED BY UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS IN DEC 88, BEFORE THE CASE UNDER-
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTATION TITLED: "SITUATION OF RMKS/

WENT JOINT INVESTIGATION. INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING THE REMAINS INDICATED ONLY THAT THE REMAINS WERE RECOVERED IN TINH GIA DISTRICT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "10); HAI THUONG (TINH GIA); 1 GUY; GRAVE LOST." ((THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IS TOO LIMITED TO CORRELATE WITH A SPECIFIC U. S. LOSS. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HAI THUONG VILLAGE SHOWED REVEALED 10 INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE LOSS OF 15 U. S. SERVICE MEMBERS. SEVEN INCIDENTS AND TWELVE CREWMEN REMAIN UNRESOLVED. NONE OF THESE INCIDENT LOCATIONS LIES WITHIN HAI THUONG VILLAGE ITSELF.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "11); HOANG TRUONG (HOANG HOA); 1 GUY; GRAVE LOST." ((THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IS TOO LIMITED TO CORRELATE WITH A SPECIFIC U. S. LOSS. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HOANG TRUONG

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VILLAGE (WG 9997) SHOWS 26 AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS, NONE OF WHICH TOOK PLACE WITHIN THE VILLAGE. NINE INCIDENTS INVOLVED THE DEATH OF CREW MEMBERS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "12; THO BINH (TRIEU SON); 7 GUYS; GRAVES EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0350, WHICH INVOLVES THE LOSS OF EIGHT CREWMEN, FIVE OF WHOM REMAIN UNRESOLVED. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS, AND IS CONFIRMED BY FIELD INVESTIGATION AND SRV DOCUMENTS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "13; TAN NINH (TRIEU SON); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA AN UNRESOLVED CASE. THE CORRELATION IS BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS, AND PRESENCE OF A GRAVE. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON TAN NINH VILLAGE SHOWS THAT TWO INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE THERE, CASES 0095 AND 1A7A THIS FINDING HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY FIELD INVESTIGATION (REF B). INFORMATION OBTAINED IN THESE INVESTIGATIONS INDICATES THAT THE BODY OF THE CASE 1A7A PILOT WAS BURIED IN THE VILLAGE, WHILE THE SCATTERED, FRAGMENTED REMAINS IN CASE 0095 WERE NOT. THIS ENTRY, THEREFORE, CORRELATES WITH CASE DATA))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "14; HA TIEN (HA TRUNG); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXISTS." ((THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN JTF-FA FILES TO PERMIT CORRELATION OF THIS ENTRY. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HA TIEN VILLAGE SHOWS 13 AIRCRAFT LOSSES, NONE OF THEM IN HA TIEN VILLAGE. EIGHT OF THESE INCIDENTS INVOLVE RETURNEES OR OPERATIONAL LOSSES. OF THE REMAINING FIVE, THE LOSS LOCATION HAS BEEN DETERMINED BY FIELD INVESTIGATION FOR TWO AND THE LOCATION FROM WHICH THE SRV REPATRIATED REMAINS HAS BEEN DETERMINED FOR THREE. NONE OF THESE LOCATIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH HA TIEN VILLAGE OR HA TRUNG DISTRICT. WHILE THE NOTATION "GRAVE EXTANT" STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THESE REMAINS HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED, THE THREE REMAINS REPATRIATED FROM THIS AREA CAME FROM BIM SON TOWN AND NGA SON DISTRICT, NOT HA TRUNG DISTRICT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "15; THONG NHAT STATE FARM; 3 GUYS; GRAVES LOST" ((THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN THIS ENTRY TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH ANY INCIDENT IN JTF-FA FILES. A 15-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON THE THONG NHAT STATE FARM (WH 4721) SHOWS SIX LOSSES, NONE OF THEM WITHIN THE STATE FARM. NONE OF THESE INCIDENTS IS UNRESOLVED, AND NONE INVOLVED MORE THAN TWO PERSONS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "16; DONG LOC (HAU LOC); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0575-1-01, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. A GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON DONG LOC VILLAGE (WG 9008) SHOWS CASE 0575 WAS THE ONLY CASE INVOLVING THE LOSS OF A U. S. SERVICE MEMBER TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN DONG LOC VILLAGE. THE RESULTS OF THE GRID SEARCH ARE SUPPORTED BY WARTIME REPORTING IN THE CASE FILE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "17; THUONG NINH (NHU XUAN); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0083-0-01, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 0083 WAS THE ONLY CASE INVOLVING THE LOSS OF A U. S. SERVICE MEMBER TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THUONG NINH VILLAGE. THE LOSS LOCATION HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY FIELD INVESTIGATION, AS THE CASE WAS RESOLVED THROUGH UNILATERAL REPATRIATION OF REMAINS BEFORE THE CASE COULD BE INVESTIGATED. INFORMATION ACCOMPANYING THE REMAINS

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INDICATED THAT THEY WERE RECOVERED IN NHU XUAN DISTRICT.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "18; TAM CHUNG (QUAN HOA); 1 GUY; GRAVE EXTANT." ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 1915, BASED ON PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE OF LOSS. CASE 1915 WAS THE ONLY U. S. LOSS THAT OCCURRED WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF TAM CHUNG VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) "19 ME ISLAND; 6 GUYS; GRAVES LOST." ((THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN THIS ENTRY TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH ANY INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS IN JTF-FA FILES. A 20-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON HON ME (WG 9842) SHOWS A TOTAL OF 20 AIRCRAFT LOSSES. ONE OF THESE, AN OPERATIONAL LOSS, OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND. THE WATERS AROUND THE ISLAND SHOW FIVE LOSSES INVOLVING EIGHT UNACCOUNTED-FOR CREWMEN, SOME OF WHOM MAY HAVE BEEN INTERRED ON HON ME. FIELD INVESTIGATION OF THESE CASES HAS BEEN LIMITED AND INCONCLUSIVE, AS HON ME IS IN A MILITARY RESTRICTED AREA.))

- TOTAL: 36 PILOTS (9 HAVE NAMES, 10 DO NOT HAVE NAMES, 17 HAVE NAMES AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE"
((END TRANSLATION))

5. COMMENTS: THE DOCUMENT IS HANDWRITTEN IN A SINGLE HAND. IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN EXTRACTED FROM A LARGER DOCUMENT, AS THE SUB-TITLE SUGGESTS. INFORMATION IN THE DOCUMENT, WHEN COMPARED WITH OTHER CONTEMPORARY SRV DOCUMENTS AND THE RESULTS OF FIELD INVESTIGATIONS, SUGGESTS IT WAS WRITTEN SOMETIME IN THE PERIOD 1972-75.

6. FOR HQ AFPC/DPWCM, CMC WASH DC/MHP-10 AND BUPERS/PERS 663P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A COPY OF THE VIETNAMESE DOCUMENTS AND TRANSLATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

ADMIN

7. EVAL: BEM/JMC//
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INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00550211

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS633 MCN = 96215/04208 TOR = 962150340
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS0808 2150341-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O P 011800Z AUG 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO: SAFE
ZEM

CONTROLSUNCLASBODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1977//
//NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS633 MCN = 96215/04208 TOR = 962150340
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS0808 2150341-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

O 020341Z AUG 96

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

O P 011800Z AUG 96 ZYB

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:RSA//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33//

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC

RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//

BT

UNCLAS //N03000//

SECTION 01 OF 02

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

OPER/JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 96-4L//

MSGID/GENADMIN/JTF-FA/-/JUL//

SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1977//

REF/A/RMG/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE/010324ZAUG96//

REF/B/RMG/CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU HI/231939ZAPR96//

REF/C/RMG/CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU HI/171804ZFEB95//

REF/D/RMG/CDR JTF-FA, HONOLULU HI/291354ZDEC94//

REF/E/MAF/SERIES L7015, SHEET 6142 II, EDITION 4-TPC, NAME:

BAN NATHOM MAI//

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RMKS/1. REFERENCES:

A. REF A IS THE SUMMARY REPORT OF BILATERAL U.S./LAO ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (PDR) DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) 96-4L, FROM 13 JUN TO 13 JUL 1996.

B. REF B IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1977 CONDUCTED DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 96-3L.

C. REF C IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1977 CONDUCTED DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 95-3L.

D. REF D IS THE DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1977 CONDUCTED DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY 95-2L.

E. REF E IS A 1:50,000 SCALE MAP SHEET COVERING THE AREA OF OPERATIONS.

F. THE FOLLOWING REPORT INCLUDES FIELD ANALYSIS AND IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FINAL ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

2. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION:

A. ON 15 JUN 1996, THE INVESTIGATION ELEMENT (IE) INVESTIGATED CASE 1977 IN PHIN DISTRICT, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAO PDR.

B. CASE 1977 INVOLVED THE 04 JAN 1973 LOSS OF ONE U.S. SERVICEMEMBER WHO EJECTED FROM AN F-4D AIRCRAFT. WHILE CONDUCTING AN OPERATIONAL MISSION OVER LAOS, THE AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE, AND BECAME UNCONTROLLABLE. BOTH CREWMEMBERS EJECTED, AND ESTABLISHED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH EACH OTHER DURING THEIR DESCENT. ONCE ON THE GROUND, ONE OF THE CREWMEMBERS FOUND THE OTHER CREWMEMBER UNCONSCIOUS WITH A LARGE TREE LIMB ON TOP OF HIM. THE PILOT DIED AFTER ABOUT FIFTEEN MINUTES. DUE TO DENSE JUNGLE AND HOSTILE ENEMY ACTIVITY, THE INDIVIDUAL'S BODY COULD NOT BE EXTRACTED. THE SURVIVING CREWMEMBER WAS RESCUED.

C. ON 15 JUN 1996, THE IE TRAVELED TO BAN XETHAMOUAK. THE TEAM REINTERVIEWED MR. KHAMPON KHOUNSI (ALSO KNOWN AS "BOUNPON"). MR. KHAMPON WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE LOCATION WHERE HE LEFT THE BOX OF REMAINS ALONG ROUTE NINE. THE TEAM SEARCHED A 50 BY 50 METER AREA AT AND AROUND THE REPORTED REMAINS DROP LOCATION WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE AREA SEARCHED WAS FLAT AND SLIGHTLY OVERGROWN WITH BRUSH AND TALL GRASS. THE TEAM ALSO INTERVIEWED MR. BOUNGNO, VILLAGE CHIEF OF BAN SANAMIXAI, ONE OF THE NINE SUB-SECTIONS OF BAN XETHAMOUAK. MR. BOUNGNO STATED THAT THE NINE SUB-SECTIONS THAT COMPRISE BAN XETHAMOUAK WERE ESTABLISHED IN 1993. HE ALSO STATED THAT ALL THE INHABITANTS OF BAN XETHAMOUAK SETTLED IN THE AREA SUBSEQUENT TO THAT DATE. HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF REMAINS ALONG ROUTE NINE. THE TEAM DID NOT RECOVER ANY REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DURING THIS INVESTIGATION. THE TEAM SEARCHED THE AREA WHERE THE REMAINS WERE REPORTEDLY LEFT WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

D. RECOMMENDATION: N/A

3. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

A. PURPOSE:

- (1) HAVE MR. KHAMPON POINT OUT THE LOCATION WHERE HE

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LEFT THE BOX OF REMAINS ALONG ROUTE NINE.

(2) CONDUCT A GROUND SEARCH OF THE REMAINS DROP LOCATION POINTED OUT BY MR. KHAMPON.

(3) CONDUCT INTERVIEWS AT THE VILLAGES IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA TO DETERMINE IF RESIDENTS HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE REMAINS LEFT NEAR ROUTE NINE.

B. ON 13 JUN 1996, THE BILATERAL U.S./LAO INVESTIGATION TEAM ARRIVED AT BAN ALANG, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAO PDR, TO BEGIN JFA 96-4L.

C. TEAM COMPOSITION:

(1) U.S.:

CPT LOUIS PLEVELL	TEAM LEADER
SFC STEVEN DALLMANN	ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER
SSG JOHN STRAIT	ANALYST
SSGT SOMPATANA PHISAYAVONG	LINGUIST
SSG MONICA GUTIERREZ	SEARCH/RECOVERY SPECIALIST
SSG THOMAS CUNNINGHAM	TEAM MEDIC
SSG TODD MILLER	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) TECHNICIAN

(2) LAO:

CPT CHANTHOUY KINGLAVONG	MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
MR. SONEPHAPHAY VILAY	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(3) PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES:

MR. KIKEO SIVORASAK	SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE OFFICIAL
MR. BOUNLEUTH MANISOUAN	PHIN DISTRICT OFFICIAL

D. ON 15 JUN 1996, THE TEAM TRAVELED TO BAN THONGSAVANG (WD980325) WITH THE WITNESS, MR. KHAMPON. BAN THONGSAVANG IS ONE OF THE NINE SUB-SECTIONS THAT COMPRISE BAN XETHAMOUAK. MR. KHAMPON WALKED APPROXIMATELY 400 METERS NORTHEAST ALONG ROUTE NINE ATTEMPTING TO FIND THE LOCATION WHERE HE LEFT THE BOX OF REMAINS IN 1974. AT FIRST HE HAD DIFFICULTY RECALLING THE REMAINS DROP LOCATION, BUT THEN RECOGNIZED AND POINTED OUT AN AREA 15 METERS NORTH OF ROUTE NINE AT COORDINATE WD982321. MR. KHAMPON SAID HE WAS POSITIVE THIS SPOT IS WHERE HE LEFT THE REMAINS. HE RECALLED THE DITCH RUNNING ADJACENT TO ROUTE NINE AND THE REMNANTS OF A TERMITE MOUND NEXT TO THE DROP LOCATION. THE TEAM SEARCHED A 50 BY 50 METER AREA, BUT FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF THE BOX, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR REMAINS. THE TEAM INTERVIEWED MR. KHAMPON AND OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) NAME: MR. KHAMPON KHOUNSI (ALSO KNOWN AS MR. BOUNPON)

//

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
 SUBJ/DETAILED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1977//
 RMKS/

(2) AGE: 73

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: BAN PHONSA-AT, KHANTHABOULI DISTRICT, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAO

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PDR, SINCE 1975.

(4) CURRENT OCCUPATION: RETIRED

(5) OCCUPATION AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT: PHIN

DISTRICT OFFICIAL

(6) STATEMENT: MR. KHAMPON CONFIRMED THE STATEMENT HE GAVE TO THE TEAM DURING 96-3L (REF B). HE RECOGNIZED THE DROP LOCATION BY THE SMALL DITCH RUNNING ADJACENT TO ROUTE NINE. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD WALKED ABOUT AN HOUR FROM THE EXHUMED BURIAL SITE TO THE LOCATION ON ROUTE NINE (WD982321) WHERE HE LEFT THE BOX OF REMAINS. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO LEAVE THE REMAINS ALONG ROUTE NINE FOR SOMEONE ELSE TO PICK UP. HE DID NOT KNOW WHO WOULD PICK THEM UP, OR WHERE THEY WERE TAKEN. HE SAID THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF SECRECY DURING THE WAR, AND HIS SUPERIORS DID NOT GIVE HIM REASONS FOR THE THINGS HE WAS ORDERED TO DO. HE DESCRIBED THE BOX IN WHICH THE REMAINS WERE LEFT AS 18 INCHES LONG AND ROUGHLY THE SIZE OF AN AMMUNITION BOX. HE SAID THE LEG BONES WERE TIED TOGETHER AND PLACED ON TOP OF THE BOX BECAUSE THEY WERE TOO LONG TO FIT INSIDE.

E. UPON COMPLETING THE INTERVIEW WITH MR. KHAMPON, THE TEAM INTERVIEWED THE BAN SANAMIXAI VILLAGE CHIEF, AND OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) NAME: MR. BOUNGNO (NO LAST NAME)

(2) AGE: 34

(3) CURRENT RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF TIME THERE: BAN SANAMIXAI, PHIN DISTRICT, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAO PDR, SINCE 1993.

(4) CURRENT OCCUPATION: BAN SANAMIXAI VILLAGE CHIEF

(5) OCCUPATION AT TIME OF INCIDENT: N/A

(6) STATEMENT: MR. BOUNGNO STATED THERE WERE NO VILLAGES IN THE VICINITY OF THE REMAINS DROP LOCATION PRIOR TO 1993, AND THAT THE AREA WAS CALLED THE "WORKERS CONSTRUCTION AREA FOR ROUTE NINE." HE EXPLAINED THE MAIN VILLAGE IN THE AREA IS BAN XETHAMOUAK WHICH IS COMPRISED OF NINE SUB-SECTIONS. BAN THONGSAVANG AND BAN SANAMIXAI ARE THE TWO SUB-SECTIONS CLOSEST TO THE DROP LOCATION. HE SAID THAT NEITHER HE NOR ANYONE ELSE IN THE VILLAGE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT BECAUSE THEY DID NOT LIVE IN THE AREA PRIOR TO 1993.

4. MATERIAL EVIDENCE:

A. MATERIAL EVIDENCE RETAINED BY JTF-FP: NONE.

B. MATERIAL EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHED AND LEFT IN PLACE: NONE

C. REMAINS: NONE

5. SURVEY RESULTS: ON 15 JUN 1996, THE IE TEAM SEARCHED THE DROP OFF POINT BELIEVED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1977. THE GROUND SEARCH YIELDED NO REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, OR PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.

A. PROJECT AREA: DROP OFF POINT LOCATION IS GRID 48Q WD982321.

B. MAP DATA: NAME- BAN NATHOM MAI, SERIES- L7015,

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SHEET- 6142 II, EDITION 4-TPC PRINTED 1970.

C. OUTSTANDING FEATURES: THE SITE IS 15 METERS NORTH FROM HIGHWAY NINE.

D. TERRAIN: FLAT

E. SOIL CONDITIONS: HARD PACK RED CLAY

F. VEGETATION: LIGHTLY OVERGROWN WITH BRUSH AND TALL GRASS.

G. METHOD OF SEARCH: THE TEAM SEARCHED AN APPROXIMATE 50 BY 50 METER AREA.

H. HAZARDS: NONE

I. RESULTS:

(1) REMAINS: NONE

(2) IDENTIFICATION MEDIA SEEN: NONE

(3) PERSONAL EFFECTS SEEN: NONE

(4) AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SEEN: NONE

6. PERTINENT LOCATION OR DATA CHANGES: NONE

7. AREAS OR CASE FILE INFORMATION NOT INVESTIGATED: NONE

8. ANALYST COMMENTS:

A. WITNESS STATEMENTS: ALL INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED PROVIDED INFORMATION IN A CANDID, STRAIGHT FORWARD MANNER. MR. KHAMPON TRIED HARD TO REMEMBER THE DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT AND THE LOCATION WHERE HE LEFT THE REMAINS. THIS IS THE ONLY SET OF REMAINS MR. KHAMPON WAS INSTRUCTED TO EXHUME.

B. FIELD ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS: THE SEARCH AT THE REMAINS DROP COORDINATE YIELDED NO EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL EFFECTS OR REMAINS. THE TEAM THOROUGHLY SEARCHED THE SURROUNDING AREA. THE BOX OF REMAINS IS NO LONGER AT THE LOCATION WHERE MR. KHAMPON LEFT THEM.

9. SEARCH AND RECOVERY SPECIALIST COMMENTS: A DETAILED SEARCH OF THE DROP OFF SITE BELIEVED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1977 YIELDED NO PIECES OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE, PERSONAL EFFECTS, PILOT RELATED EQUIPMENT, OR REMAINS. THE SITE SURVEY YIELDED NO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD PROMPT FURTHER ACTION.

10. TEAM LEADER COMMENTS:

A. WITNESS RELIABILITY: ALL INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED DURING THE COURSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION APPEARED TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS FREELY AND HONESTLY TO THE BEST OF THEIR RECOLLECTION. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS INTERVIEWEES OFFERED THE TEAM INFORMATION WITHOUT BEING ASKED.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS: CONCUR WITH THE ANALYST'S COMMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 8.

C. HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION: EXCELLENT AT THE CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT LEVELS.

D. DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: NONE

11. RECOMMENDATION: N/A//
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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
 ITEM NO=00560820
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS711 MCN = 96118/07277 TOR = 961180452
 RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1266 1180453-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
 R 270453Z APR 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 250912Z APR 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
 TO RUEAHOF/CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PED-P//
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 BT
CONTROLS
 UNCLAS //N03460//
 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//
 SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT
 PILOTS WHO DIED IN VINH PHU"//
 RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 95, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER THREE
 SETS OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ONE
 SET OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A REPORT TITLED: "REPORT ON RESULTS OF
 OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION
 SEEKING GROUP." THIS REPORT INCLUDED TEN DOCUMENTS. THE SECOND SET
 OF DOCUMENTS WAS A REPORT FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) MIA
 SPECIALIST TEAM TITLED: "REPORT OF RESULTS OF UNILATERAL OPERATIONS
 TO COLLECT MIA INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS." THIS REPORT INCLUDED
 THREE DOCUMENTS. THE THIRD SET OF DOCUMENTS WAS A VIETNAM OFFICE
 SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) ASSESSMENT OF THE 84 SPECIAL REMAINS
 TEAM (SRT) CASES.
 2. THE MOI REPORT, "REPORT ON RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE MINISTRY
 OF INTERIOR'S (MOI) SPECIAL INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP," DETAILS A
 4 - 12 MAY 95 EFFORT BY THE MOI TO SEARCH FOR POW/MIA INFORMATION IN
 VINH PHU, TUYEN QUANG, YEN BAI, HOA BINH, NINH BINH AND THANH HOA
 PROVINCES. THE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND SKETCH MAPS
 RECOVERED AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE VARIOUS PROVINCES BY THE SPECIAL

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INFORMATION SEEKING GROUP. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS WAS TITLED: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT PILOTS WHO DIED IN VINH PHU".

3. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES SOME CASUALTY-RELATED INFORMATION. JTF-FA ANALYSTS HAVE IDENTIFIED LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATING WITH THE FOLLOWING UNRESOLVED CASES: 0112-1-01, 0430-1-01, 0579-0-01, 0897-0-01 AND 1955, AND THE FOLLOWING RESOLVED CASES: 0396-0-01, 0533-1-01, 0544-0-01, 0659-0-01, 0781-1-01, 0914-1-01, 1939-0-01, 1939-0-02, 1953-0-01, 1953-0-02, 1958-0-01, 1958-0-02, 1958-1-07 AND 1961. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE LINE ENTRIES IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH DATA CONTAINED IN JTF-FA RECORDS.

4. THE DOCUMENT IS A LIST OF 27 LINE ITEMS WITH 11 DATA COLUMNS. EACH OF THE 11 DATA COLUMNS FOR THE LINE IS SET APART BY A SEMI-COLON(;). ANY INFORMATION ILLEGIBLE ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS INDICATED BY A QUESTION MARK (?). THE DATA FIELDS LEFT BLANK ON THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ARE INDICATED BY A HYPHEN (-). THE 11 DATA COLUMNS READ AS FOLLOWS: "ENTRY NUMBER; UNIT NAME; SURNAME AND NAME OF BANDIT PILOT; DATE OF BIRTH; RANK; MILITARY NO.; TYPE OF AIRCRAFT FLOWN; DATE OF DEATH; PLACE BANDIT BURIED; HAVE COFFIN OR NOT; GRAVE EXTANT OR LOST." EACH LINE ENTRY IS FOLLOWED BY JTF-FA ANALYTICAL COMMENTS ((ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES)).

5. THE DOCUMENT LINE ENTRIES READ AS FOLLOWS:

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 1; BINH XUYEN; EIAMONDSTEPHN(EIAMONDSTEPHEN); 1-7-1940; 1LT; AC31147934; F105; 19-7-1966; TAM CANH VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN; HAVE COFFIN; TRANSFERRED TO EARTHENWARE POT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0396-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 2; BINH XUYEN; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 8-11-1967; SON LOI VILLAGE, BINH XUYEN; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0897-0-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 3; KIM ANH; GION LOL THOO; 31-10-1924; 2LT; EV910711; F105; 18-11-1967; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE WAS EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0914-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE, LOCATION OF LOSS AND PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER. THE NAME LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY CAN NOT BE CORRELATED WITH CASE 0914 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSSES LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES. THE RANK LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0914.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 4; KIM ANH; WIHTONSCHARIESCRTNESS; 10-3-1938; CAPT; FR72444; RF101; 1-8-1967; NGOC THANH VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE WAS EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0781-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 5; KIM ANH; NAME UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; UNKNOWN; 25-10-1967; MINH PHU VILLAGE, KIM ANH; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((FIVE LOSSES OCCURRED WITHIN 10 KM OF MINH PHU VILLAGE IN LATE 1967, FOUR RESOLVED CASES AND UNRESOLVED CASE

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TAFN NONE OF THESE CASES TOOK PLACE ON 25 OCT 67. IN FACT, NO LOSSES OCCURRED IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 25 OCT 67. TWO AIRCRAFT WERE LOST WITHIN THE PROVINCE ON 24 OCT 67, BOTH A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM MINH PHU VILLAGE. THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CONTAIN ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE A CORRELATION TO ANY OF THESE CASES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 6; YEN LAC; MOORBERGMONTERAKVE; 18-7-1939; CAPT; FR62699; F105; 2-12-1966; NGUYET DUC VILLAGE, YEN LAC; HAVE COFFIN; NO. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0533-1-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, RANK, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 7; VINH YEN; EANTONCVRTISARBDT; 1-7-1924; CAPT; DATA -8-1966; HA PAGODA CEMETERY, VINH YEN TOWN; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE

DATA AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, PARTIAL DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE RANK LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0430.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 8; THANH SON; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 29-4-1967; YEN SON VILLAGE, THANH SON; NO; GRAVE (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH RESOLVED CASE 0659, BASED ON DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 9; THANH SON; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 24-7-1965; VO MIEU VILLAGE, THANH SON; NO; GRAVE INTACT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0112-1-01, AN UNRESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON EXACT INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 10; VIET TRI; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 15-10-1965; QUAT HUONG VILLAGE, VIET TRI CITY; BODY DISINTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((JTF-PA DATA BASES LIST NO LOSSES IN VINH PHU PROVINCE IN OCT 65. A 20-KM GRID SEARCH CENTERED ON VIET TRI CITY (WJ 2366; QUAT HUONG VILLAGE IS NOT LISTED IN ANY SOURCE AVAIL //

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT RMKS/

TABLE TO JTF-PA) SHOWS ONLY FOUR INCIDENTS, NONE OF WHICH CAN BE CORRELATED WITH THIS ENTRY. BRIGHT LIGHT LISTS TWO CASES WITH AN INCIDENT DATE OF 15 OCT 65 BUT THE LOCATIONS OF LOSS LISTED FOR THESE CASES (SON LA PROVINCE) DO NOT CORRELATE WITH THIS ENTRY. THE ENTRY DOES NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE A CORRELATION TO ANY U.S. LOSS IN JTF-PA FILES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 11; TAM DUONG; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 8-11-1967; DONG TINH VILLAGE, TAM DUONG;

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 12; TAM DUONG; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; 8-11-1967; DONG TINH VILLAGE, TAM DUONG; ((THESE TWO ENTRIES ARE JOINED BY A BRACKET AT COLUMNS 10 AND 11, INDICATING THAT THE DATA IN THOSE COLUMNS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS APPLYING TO BOTH ENTRIES. COLUMN 10 READS: "THESE TWO GUYS BURIED (ILLEGIBLE)." COLUMN 11 IS LARGELY ILLEGIBLE, BUT MAY READ: "GRAVE (ILLEGIBLE)

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THERE IS STILL (ILLEGIBLE).") ((THE DATE OF THESE ENTRIES CORRELATES WITH CASE 0897, THE ONLY LOSS IN VINH PHU PROVINCE ON 8 NOV 67. HOWEVER, THE LOSS LOCATION REPORTED IN LINE ENTRY 2 (SON LOI VILLAGE, WJ 5371) CORRELATES MORE CLOSELY WITH CASE 0897 THAN DOES THAT PROVIDED IN ENTRIES 11 AND 12 (DONG TINH VILLAGE, WJ 6856). IN ADDITION, CASE 0897 INVOLVED ONLY ONE CREW MEMBER. THESE ENTRIES INVOLVE THE BURIAL OF TWO CREWMEN. THERE ARE 11 LOSS INCIDENTS, ALL INVOLVING THE DEATH OR CAPTURE OF U.S. PERSONNEL, LOCATED WITHIN 15 KM OF DONG TINH VILLAGE. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN LINE ENTRIES 11 AND 12 IS INSUFFICIENT TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH ANY OF THESE INCIDENTS.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 13; YEN LANG; GWTAIHAMALEN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; F111A; 17-10-1972; TIEN CHAU VILLAGE, YEN LANG; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED (?) BURIED (?); (?) 2 GUYS (?).

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 14; YEN LANG; HOCORITCTIEMALON; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; F111A; 17-10-1972; TIEN CHAU VILLAGE, YEN LANG; TOO LITTLE (?); (?). ((THESE TWO LINE ENTRIES PROBABLY CORRELATE WITH CASES 1939-0-02 AND 1939-0-01 RESPECTIVELY. BOTH INDIVIDUALS ARE RESOLVED. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAMES, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS. CASE 1939 IS THE ONLY CASE LISTED IN JTF-FA DATA BASES WITH AN INCIDENT DATE OF 17 OCT 72 AND A LOSS LOCATION IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. THE CASE 1939 RECORD LOSS LOCATION LIES WITHIN TIEN CHAU VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 15; YEN LANG; NAME UNKNOWN ((SIX ILLEGIBLE WORDS ARE WRITTEN TO THE LOWER RIGHT OF THIS COLUMN, IN PARENTHESES, WITH AN ARROW POINTING TO THE DATA)); UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 21-12-1972; THANH LANG VILLAGE, YEN LANG; THERE IS 1 (?); (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1961, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. CASE 1961 IS THE ONLY CASE LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES WITH AN INCIDENT DATE OF 21 DEC 72 AND A LOSS LOCATION IN VINH PHU PROVINCE. THE PROVINCE OF LOSS FOR CASE 1961 IS LISTED IN BRIGHT LIGHT AS HA NOI. DURING THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH EAST ASIA THIS LOCATION WAS IN SOC SON DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE. THANH LANG VILLAGE IS CENTERED ON WJ 6448, THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1961 IS WJ 7949, JUST 15 KM EAST OF THANH LANG.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 16; TAM NONG; ASTVEDONOL; 8-7-1923; MAJ; 6019537; F105; 8-12-1966; DI NAU VILLAGE, TAM NONG; BODY DISINTEGRATED; (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 0544-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE RANK AND SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DO NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 0544, NOR DOES THE SERIAL NUMBER CORRELATE WITH ANY U.S. LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 17; TAM NONG; UNCLEAR; CAPT; UNCLEAR; F111A; 17-10-1972; VAN LUONG VILLAGE, TAM NONG; BODY DISINTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((THE AIRCRAFT TYPE AND INCIDENT DATE ARE CONSISTENT WITH CASE 1939, WHICH INVOLVES THE ONLY F-111 AIRCRAFT LOST ANYWHERE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON 17 OCT 72. HOWEVER, LINE ENTRIES 13 AND 14 ABOVE CORRELATE MUCH MORE CONCLUSIVELY WITH CASE 1939 THAN DOES THIS ENTRY. IN ADDITION, JCRC INVESTIGATORS VISITED VAN LUONG VILLAGE DURING THE

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12TH JFA AND DETERMINED THAT THE ONLY AIRCRAFT TO HAVE CRASHED IN THAT VILLAGE DURING THE WAR WAS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1934. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN THIS ENTRY TO PERMIT CORRELATION WITH CASE 1934 OR ANY OTHER CASE LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 18; PHUC YEN; LYNNROBERTRAY; 6-16-1940; CAPT; FE3147063; B52; 21-12-1972; HOSPITAL 74 CEMETERY; THERE IS 1 ARM; (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1958-0-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND INCIDENT DATE.))

((LINE ENTRY)) 19; PHUC YEN; BEENSLVNNRICHARD BAPGEB09322; UNCLER; UNCLER; 2730126; B52; 12-21-1972; HOSPITAL 74 CEMETERY; THERE ARE 4 ARMS; AND (?). ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1958-0-07, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, AIRCRAFT TYPE AND INCIDENT DATE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 20; KIM ANH; BEBUSCHARLESJAMES; 4-2-1951; UNCLER; UNCLER; 562801771; B52; 19-12-1972; GIA TRUNG HAMLET, QUANG MINH VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; LOST (?). ((THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1958-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, SERIAL NUMBER AND AIRCRAFT TYPE.))

((THE LOCATIONS OF LOSS LISTED IN LINE ENTRIES 18 AND 19 DO NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 1958, LYING 23 KM NNW OF THE LOCATION CARRIED IN JTF-FA FILES. HOWEVER, WARTIME REPORTING IN THE CASE 1958 FILE INDICATES A POSSIBLE LOSS LOCATION IN PHUC YEN TOWN, THE LOCATION PROVIDED IN THIS LINE ENTRY. THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN LINE ENTRY 19 DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 1958 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSSES LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES. THE INCIDENT LOCATION PROVIDED IN LINE ENTRY 20 ALSO DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH INFORMATION CARRIED IN JTF-FA FILES, LYING 17 KM NORTH OF THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION. THERE ARE OTHER DISCREPANCIES WORTHY OF NOTE. FIRST, ALL THREE ENTRIES INDICATE BURIAL OF ASSOCIATED REMAINS. HOWEVER, THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED IN ENTRY 19 WAS CAPTURED AND RETURNED TO U.S. CONTROL IN 1973. SECOND, THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED IN ENTRY 20 WAS RESOLVED THROUGH THE RETURN OF REMAINS, BUT HIS INCIDENT LOCATION DIFFERS FROM THAT PROVIDED FOR ENTRIES 18 AND 19. PRESUMABLY, THE TWO CREW MEMBERS RESOLVED THROUGH RETURN OF REMAINS WOULD HAVE BEEN RECOVERED FROM THE CRASHED AIRCRAFT, AS NOTED

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: "LIST OF AMERICAN BANDIT RMKS/

IN THE WARTIME REPORTING CITED ABOVE, ALTHOUGH, GIVEN THE ALTITUDE FROM WHICH B-52 AIRCRAFT CRASHED, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT REMAINS FROM THE SAME AIRCREW MIGHT HAVE BEEN RECOVERED IN DIFFERENT AREAS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THESE DISCREPANCIES AND INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE COMPILER(S) OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY HAVE GARBLED OR MISUNDERSTOOD SOME DATA.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 21; KIM ANH; RISSIDONALDLOUIS; UNCLER; UNCLER; 359243061; B52; 18-12-1972; DONG TAO COOPERATIVE, DONG XUAN VILLAGE, KIM ANH; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1953-0-01, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON NAME, PARTIAL SERIAL NUMBER, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE AND LOCATION OF

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LOSS. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION IS 15 KM WEST OF DONG XUAN VILLAGE, BUT WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO B-52 LOSSES, THIS IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT DISCREPANCY. DONG XUAN VILLAGE IS LOCATED IN WHAT IS NOW SOC SON DISTRICT, HA NOI CITY. IT SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH DONG XUAN VILLAGE, THANH HOA DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 22; KIM ANH; FERGUSONWALTERLCSC772; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; CARD4183186; B52; 18-12-1972; PHU LO VILLAGE, KIM ANH DISTRICT; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THIS LINE ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1953-0-02, A RESOLVED CASE. CORRELATION IS BASED ON PARTIAL NAME, AIRCRAFT TYPE, INCIDENT DATE, AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED IN THIS LINE ENTRY DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH CASE 1953 OR ANY OTHER U.S. LOSSES LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES. THE LOSS LOCATION LISTED IN THIS ENTRY LIES IMMEDIATELY TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DONG XUAN VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 23; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 11-11-1967; BAC SON VILLAGE, DA PHUC; BODY DIS-INTEGRATED; NO GRAVE. ((THIS LINE ENTRY POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1955 AN UNRESOLVED CASE, BASED ON LOCATION AND PARTIAL DATE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1955 LIES WITHIN BAC SON VILLAGE, IN WHAT IS NOW SOC SON DISTRICT OF HA NOI CITY. THE DATE OF LOSS IS JAN 67. GIVEN THE ACCURACY OF THE LOSS LOCATION, AND THE LACK OF CARE EVIDENT IN CERTAIN OTHER ENTRIES IN THIS DOCUMENT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE COMPILER(S) MAY HAVE MISTAKENLY TRANSCRIBED AN ADDITIONAL "1" IN THE MONTH PLACE WITHIN THE DATE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 24 DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; THANG THUC HAMLET, TIEN DUOC VILLAGE; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT.

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 25; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; THANG THUC HAMLET TIEN DUOC VILLAGE; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THESE LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATE WITH CASE 1955, WHICH INVOLVES FOUR UNRESOLVED INDIVIDUALS AND TWO RELEASEES. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF LOSS CITED IN THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1965, THE ONLY B52 LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES THAT OCCURRED ON 22 DEC 72. HOWEVER, THE LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1965 HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY EXCAVATION IN LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1955 LIES WITHIN TIEN DUOC VILLAGE.))

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 26; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; XUAN GIANG VILLAGE, DA PHUC; GRAVE EXTANT; HAVE COFFIN.

- ((LINE ENTRY)) 27; DA PHUC; NAME UNKNOWN; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; UNCLEAR; B52; 22-12-1972; XUAN GIANG VILLAGE; DA PHUC; HAVE COFFIN; GRAVE EXTANT. ((THESE LINE ENTRIES POSSIBLY CORRELATE WITH CASE 1955, WHICH INVOLVES FOUR UNRESOLVED INDIVIDUALS AND TWO RELEASEES. CORRELATION IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE AND LOCATION OF LOSS. THE DATE OF LOSS CITED IN THIS ENTRY CORRELATES WITH CASE 1965, THE ONLY B52 LOSS LISTED IN JTF-FA FILES THAT OCCURRED ON 22 DEC 72. HOWEVER, THE LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1965 HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY EXCAVATION IN LUONG SON DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE. THE RECORD LOSS LOCATION OF CASE 1955 LIES WITHIN TIEN DUOC VILLAGE. XUAN GIANG VILLAGE LIES BETWEEN ONE AND TWO KM DUE EAST OF TIEN DUOC VILLAGE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT

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PORTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE FALLEN IN BOTH VILLAGES.))
6. FOR CDR PERSCOM/TAPC-PED-P: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.
COPIES OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

ADMIN

7. EVAL: DWO/JMC//

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INQUIRE=DOC34D
ITEM NO=00090998

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS375 MCN = 96058/05206 TOR = 960580514
PTTUZYUW RUEKJCS1708 0580513-UUUU--RUEALGX.

ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 270513Z FEB 96

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUCMACC/CDR 4TH PSYOP GP//AOCP-POG-SB//

RUEALGX/SAFE

P 270510Z FEB 96

FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1389

RUHPHA/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:ISA/DPMO-RA// PRIORITY

RUEHBK/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHDC

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J33//

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//JTFFA-DET2// 0137

RUEHBK/USDAO BANGKOK TH//POW-MIA//

RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

RUHVAAA/CDR USACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC/PED/H//

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

RUEHPF/CJTFFA DET FOUR PHNOM PENH

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 VIENTIANE 000378

STATE FOR EAP/VLC

E.O. 12356: N/A

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

TAGS: KPOW, MOPS, LA

SUBJ: LAO-U.S. CONSULTATIONS, 22-23 FEB 96
FROM CJTFFA DET THREE, VIENTIANE

REF A: USCINCPAC/MSG DTG 130030Z FEB 96

REF B: JOINT STAFF/DJS MSG DTG 162200Z FEB 96

1. SUMMARY: U.S. AND LAO REPRESENTATIVES MET IN
VIENTIANE, LAO P.D.R., 22-23 FEB 96 TO DISCUSS THE
PROGRESS OF OPERATION FULL ACCOUNTING AT THE
REGULARLY SCHEDULED SEMI-ANNUAL CONSULTATION. THE
COMMANDER JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING (CJTFF-
FA) REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF JOINT POW/MIA
ACTIVITIES OVER THE PREVIOUS FIVE MONTHS AND
DISCUSSED THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR FUTURE

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FIELD WORK. AMONG OTHER ISSUES, HE DISCUSSED WHEN ARCHIVAL RESEARCH CAN BEGIN, THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO ASSIGN A CIVILIAN ARCHIVIST TO DET THREE, THE REVIEW OF LAO FILMS CURRENTLY STORED IN HANOI, THE U.S. REQUEST FOR LAO UNILATERAL RESEARCH ON CASE 1977 AND ON THE LIST OF SIX INDIVIDUALS DASD WOULD PASSED TO AMB HIEM, THE CONTINUED USE OF VIETNAMESE WITNESSES, ADVANTAGES OF USING GROUND PENETRATING RADAR, THE USE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANCESTRY, THE EXCHANGE RATE USED TO COMPUTE BILLS FOR LAO SUPPORT TO JFA'S, AND THE U.S. HUMANITARIAN AID SURVEY TEAM'S ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED PROJECTS. AMBASSADOR TOMSETH REEMPHASIZED CJTF-FA CONCERNS ON ARCHIVAL RESEARCH, LAO ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONNEL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANCESTRY, AND THE LENGTH OF JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES. HE ALSO DISCUSSED U.S. GOVERNMENT HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS IN LAOS. END SUMMARY.

2. PARTICIPANTS.

- A. AMBASSADOR TOMSETH OPENED THE MEETING FOR THE U.S. SIDE. DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION BARR ATTENDED THE MEETING. BG VIALE, CJTF-FA, WAS THE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE JTF-FA TEAM, WHICH INCLUDED: LTC DIBRELL AND MR. GADOURY, JTF-FA DET THREE; LCDR MURPHY, CW2 SMITH, AND SSGT PHISAYAVONG, HQ JTF-FA; AND MR. HELGESEN, CILHI.

- B. AMB MALIGNA SAIGNAVONGS, DIR OF EUROPE AND AMERICAS DEPT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA), OPENED FOR THE LAO SIDE. OTHER LAO REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDED: MR. KHENTHONG NOUANTHASING, MFA AMERICAS DESK OFFICER; MAJ SIKHAI KEOVISAY, LAO TEAM CHIEF, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND); CPT CHANTHOUY KINGLAVONG, CPT KHAMKHONG INTHILATH, AND 1LT PHAYVANH CHANTHAPHOMMA, MND; MR NOI MINGSISOUVANH, MR BOUNTHAVY VILAVONG, MR SAVAD DAVONGSONE, AND MR. SONPHAPHAY VILAY, MFA; MR BOUNTA SOUTASAT, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI).

3. JTF-FA ISSUES/LAO RESPONSE. CJTF-FA PRESENTED THE TALKING POINTS, AS APPROVED (REF B). HE BEGAN BY THANKING THE LAO FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF DASD WOLD'S VISIT IN JAN 96 TO DISCUSS THE DOD CASE REVIEW. HE STATED THAT HIS VISIT LAST MONTH AND THE UPCOMING VISIT OF THE U.S. HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION ARE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES TO SHOW SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE EXTENT OF JOINT COOPERATION AND PROGRESS.

A. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH.

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(1) CJTF-FA STATED THE U.S. WAS VERY GRATIFIED WHEN THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN DET THREE AND THE LAO INTER-MINISTERIAL AD HOC COMMITTEE TOOK PLACE IN FEB 96, AND BY MR. KHENTHONG'S RECENT ACTIONS TO DETERMINE WHEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BEGIN RESEARCH AT THE MILITARY MUSEUM. HE NOTED THAT THE JOINT REVIEW OF THIS FACILITY WILL BE AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION ON ARCHIVAL RESEARCH, AND ASKED WHEN WORK COULD BEGIN.

(2) CJTF-FA STATED HE UNDERSTOOD THE LAO STAFFING RESOURCES NECESSARY FOR THE JOINT REVIEW OF PROPOSED ARCHIVAL REPOSITORIES. HE RECOMMENDED A MEETING BETWEEN THE U.S. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM (ART) AND THE AD

HOC COMMITTEE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS, FORMULATE A WORK PLAN, AND DEVELOP A SCHEDULE THAT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE WORK REQUIRED TO

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
CONDUCT JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES. CJTF-FA STATED THE U.S. LOOKED FORWARD TO THE LAO RESPONSE TO DAD WOLD'S PROPOSAL TO ASSIGN A FULL-TIME, LAO SPEAKING U.S. CIVILIAN ARCHIVIST TO THE DETACHMENT THREE STAFF TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH OFFICIALS ON THE AD HOC COMMITTEE.

(3) LAO RESPONSE: AMB MALIGNA STATED THAT THE LAO GOVERNMENT AGREED IN EARLY FEBRUARY TO ALLOW A JOINT REVIEW OF THE MILITARY MUSEUM AND IS CURRENTLY SEEKING A COUNTERPART TO WORK WITH THE U.S. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM, WHOM HE EXPECTED TO BE NAMED SOON. AMB MALIGNA FURTHER STATED THAT THE LAO GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS MR DETH SOUTLATHA AS THE FULL-TIME ARCHIVIST AND ANTICIPATES THAT HE WILL WORK POSITIVELY AND COOPERATIVELY WITH THE LAO SIDE.

(4) CJTF-FA STATED THE U.S. REMAINS VERY INTERESTED IN REVIEWING THE LAO FILMS STORED AT THE VIETNAM FILM INSTITUTE. HE NOTED THAT DURING VICE MINISTER SOUBANH'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN OCT 95, SOUBANH SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY ARRANGED FOR THE CONSOLIDATION IN VIENTIANE OF THE FILMS CURRENTLY STORED IN VIETNAM. CJTF-FA OFFERED TO ASSIST IN TRANSPORTING THE FILMS FROM HANOI TO VIENTIANE. CJTF-FA STATED WE WERE ANXIOUS TO REVIEW THE FILMS, AND REQUESTED NOTIFICATION OF HOW AND WHEN THEIR REVIEW CAN BEGIN.

(5) LAO RESPONSE: AMB MALIGNA THANKED THE U.S. SIDE FOR THE UPGRADES TO THE LAO NATIONAL ARCHIVES, TO INCLUDE THE SHELVING AND THE AIR

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CONDITIONING, AND FOR THE OFFER TO TRANSPORT THE LAO FILMS FROM HANOI TO VIENTIANE. BUT, HE SAID THE CURRENT AIR CONDITIONING IS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR STORAGE OF HIGH VALUE FILMS. HE REQUESTED THAT THE U.S. ASSIST IN UPGRADING THE FACILITY IN ORDER TO MEET THE SAME STORAGE REQUIREMENTS AS THE INSTITUTE IN HANOI, AND ASKED THAT THE US. SEEK A SPECIALIST WHO COULD DETERMINE WHAT IS REQUIRED TO BRING THE FACILITY UP TO STANDARD. AMB MALIGNA ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE LAO PERSONNEL IN THIS FACILITY BE PROVIDED PERIODIC MEDICAL CHECKS, INCLUDING CHEST X-RAYS. CJTF-FA RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. WILL CHECK THE FILM STORAGE STANDARDS OF THE VIETNAMESE FACILITY AND REVIEW OPTIONS FOR PRESERVING THE FILMS IN LAOS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE FILMS CANNOT BE STORED IN VIENTIANE AT THE PRESENT TIME, HE REQUESTED THAT THE LAO AUTHORIZE THE VIETNAMESE TO ALLOW THE U.S. ART IN HANOI TO VIEW THE FILMS. CJTF-FA DIRECTED LTC DIBRELL TO CHECK INTO MEDICAL EXAMS FOR WORKERS AT THE LAO NATIONAL ARCHIVES.

(6) CJTF-FA STATED THAT ON 1 FEB 96, DASD WOLD PASSED TO AMB HIEM IN WASHINGTON A LIST OF SIX INDIVIDUALS, WITH BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND SPECIFIC ACTIONS WHICH THE U.S. ASKED THE LAO GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE UNILATERALLY. DET THREE ALSO PASSED A COPY OF THIS LIST TO MR. KHENTHONG EARLIER THIS MONTH. HE NOTED THE LIST IS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION, AND WILL BE A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION DURING THE VISIT TO LAOS. HE ASKED FOR ANY INFORMATION THE LAO CAN PROVIDE REGARDING THESE CASES, INCLUDING THOSE ACTIONS WHICH RESULT IN NO NEW INFORMATION.

B. CASE 1977.

(1) CJTF-FA STATED THAT IN OCTOBER, DASD WOLD DISCUSSED WITH VICE MINISTER SOUBANH THE INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1977. MR. SOUBANH HAD REPLIED THAT HE ORDERED A UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER. CJTF-FA STATED THE U.S. LOOKS FORWARD TO LEARNING THE RESULTS OF THIS INVESTIGATION.

(2) LAO RESPONSE: AMB MALIGNA STATED THAT THE LAO TEAM IS CONTINUING TO UNILATERALLY INVESTIGATE CASE 1977. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE MAYOR OF THE TOWN WHO TOOK OVER SHORTLY AFTER THE INCIDENT OCCURRED DID NOT HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE BURIAL AND DISINTERMENT. HE DID, HOWEVER, PROVIDE THE NAMES OF POSSIBLE WITNESSES. MAJOR SIKHAI THEN DISCUSSED HIS PERSONAL INVESTIGATION

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OF THE CASE AND HIS ATTEMPT TO LOCATE SOME OF THE WITNESSES. HE DETERMINED THAT SOME OF THEM ARE DECEASED WHILE OTHERS HAVE MOVED TO DIFFERENT LOCATIONS. HE WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT TWO WHO REPORTEDLY HAVE INFORMATION ON THE CRASH INCIDENT. AMB MALIGNA ASKED FOR MORE TIME TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE THIS CASE.

C. LIVE SIGHTING INVESTIGATIONS. CJTF-FA PRAISED THE LAO OFFICIALS IN VIENTIANE AND LUANG NAMTHA FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF THE LIVE SIGHTING INVESTIGATION IN DEC 95. HE STATED THAT ALTHOUGH WE WERE UNABLE TO CONFIRM THE REPORT, IT REMAINS IMPORTANT TO THE OVERALL UNACCOUNTED FOR MISSION THAT BOTH SIDES WORK TOGETHER TO CONTINUE TO QUICKLY INVESTIGATE ALL CREDIBLE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS.

D. OVERALL LAO COOPERATION.

(1) CJTF-FA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO THE LAO GOVERNMENT FOR ITS OVERALL COOPERATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE. HE NOTED VICE MINISTER SOUBANH'S OCT 95 ASSURANCES OF THE LAO GOVERNMENT'S FULL COMMITMENT TO SEEKING INFORMATION ON MISSING AMERICANS, AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REQUESTS TO THE PROVINCES TO SEND ANY SUCH INFORMATION TO VIENTIANE. CJTF-FA STATED THE RECENT COMMENT BY LOUANG NAMTHA PROVINCE DEPUTY GOVERNOR ENG PENGMANH THAT HE RECEIVED WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THIS HUMANITARIAN MISSION IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF LAO COOPERATION. CJTF-FA STATED THAT INFORMATION SUCH AS THIS HELPS TO REINFORCE OUR REPORTS REGARDING THE LAOS CONTINUING HIGH LEVEL OF EFFORT AND COOPERATION.

E. JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES REVIEW. CJTF-FA REVIEWED JOINT FIELD WORK SINCE THE LAST CONSULTATIVE MEETING.

(1) HE NOTED JFA'S 96-1L AND 96-2L WERE MARKED BY GOOD LAO COOPERATION. JFA 96-2L WAS NOTEWORTHY IN THE WAY THE TEAM DEPLOYED TO THE BASE CAMP THE SAME DAY IT ARRIVED IN LAOS, AND BEGAN OPERATIONS THE NEXT DAY. THIS RAPID START WAS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE THOROUGH LAO COORDINATION DONE IN DECEMBER. CJTF-FA STATED THAT ONE ISSUE WHICH DID DETRACT FROM JFA 96-2L WAS LAO DISAPPROVAL OF THE USE OF GROUND PENETRATING RADAR (GPR) TO THOROUGHLY SEARCH THE AREA AROUND THE CASE 0339 SITE. CJTF-FA STATED HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE REQUEST TO USE GPR WAS DENIED, SINCE THE EQUIPMENT WAS USED IN LAOS IN 1993 DURING THE RECOVERY OF CASE 1983, AND ASKED IF THE LAO DESIRED ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION OF THE

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EQUIPMENT. EMPHASIZING THAT VALUABLE TIME IS LOST BY EXCAVATING IN UNPRODUCTIVE AREAS, HE ASKED THE LAO TO APPROVE THE USE OF GPR DURING FUTURE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES.

(2) LAO RESPONSE: AMB MALIGNA ASKED FOR MORE INFORMATION CONCERNING HOW AND WHY GPR IS USED. CJTF-FA RESPONDED BY EMPHASIZING THE VALUE OF GPR IN FINDING BURIAL SITES. HE PROVIDED AN EXPLANATION OF HOW ITS USE IN CASE 0339 WOULD HAVE GREATLY BENEFITED THE RECOVERY OPERATIONS. AMB MALIGNA THEN RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. SIDE CAN USE GPR BUT ONLY ON BURIAL SITES.

(3) SUMMARIZING RESULTS OF THE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES SINCE THE LAST CONSULTATION, CJTF-FA STATED JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATED 23 CASES AND EXCAVATED 7 SITES, AND THE MEDCAP DOCTORS TREATED A TOTAL OF 369 PATIENTS.

F. REMAINS. CJTF-FA PASSED A SUMMARY REPORT ON THE REMAINS RECOVERED DURING THE LAST TWO JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES AND DISCUSSED THE STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY THEM. HE BRIEFLY DETAILED REMAINS RECOVERY OPERATIONS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) DURING JFA 96-1L, REMAINS WERE RECOVERED ONLY FROM THE SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1561. REMAINS WERE ALSO RECOVERED FROM THIS SITE DURING JFA 95-6L, BUT THE EXCAVATION COULD NOT BE FINISHED AT THAT TIME.

(2) DURING JFA 96-2L, REMAINS WERE RECOVERED ONLY FROM THE SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0339.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

(3) FIVE CASES INVOLVING 21 INDIVIDUALS WERE IDENTIFIED SINCE OUR LAST MEETING. THEY ARE CASES 0955, 1530, 1576, 1926, AND 1983.

(4) SEVEN CASES ARE IN VARIOUS STAGES OF PROCESSING AND REVIEW WHICH MAY LEAD TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE 14 INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THOSE INCIDENTS.

(5) LAO RESPONSE: MAJOR SIKHAI REQUESTED CLARIFICATION ON WHY SOME OF THE REMAINS FOUND AT CRASH SITES WERE NOT IDENTIFIED AS AMERICANS. MR HELGESEN, CILHI, RESPONDED BY PROVIDING STATISTICS AND A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE STATUS OF REMAINS REPATRIATED FROM LAOS SINCE 1978. HE ALSO DISCUSSED THE DETERIORATION OF REMAINS DUE TO TIME AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF POSITIVELY CORRELATING SPARSE BONE FRAGMENTS TO MISSING AMERICANS. HE FURTHER STRESSED THIS DETERIORATION HAS PROMPTED CJTF-FAS CONCERNS ON WHY PRIORITY SHOULD NOW BE PLACED ON THOSE CASES WHICH OFFER THE BEST CHANCE

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OF FINDING REMAINS.

G. FUTURE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES.

(1) CJTF-FA STATED THAT LTC DIBRELL HAD ALREADY PROPOSED THE WORK PLAN FOR JFA 96-3L (7 MAR-5 APR 96) TO THE LAO. CJTF-FA THANKED THE LAO FOR CONSIDERING THE JTF-FA REQUEST TO RECOVER THE SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1436 IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE DURING THIS JFA. IF TIME PERMITS AFTER THIS RECOVERY, HE PROPOSED RETURNING TO VILABOULI DISTRICT TO COMPLETE THE CASE 0370 SITE RECOVERY, WHICH WAS LEFT ONLY PARTIALLY EXCAVATED IN FEB 94.

(2) CJTF-FA PROPOSED CONDUCTING JFA 96-4L FROM 30 MAY-5 JUL 96 AND JFA 96-5L FROM 15 AUG-20 SEP 96, AND ASKED THE LAO TO APPROVE THESE DATES. HE STATED THESE DATES INCLUDE 30 DAYS OF ACTUAL FIELD WORK AND 6 DAYS OF DEPLOYMENT TIME TO AND FROM LAOS. CJTF-FA NOTED THAT SINCE WE HAVE ONLY SCHEDULED FIVE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES THIS YEAR, THIRTY DAYS OF ACTUAL FIELD WORK PER JFA WILL HELP RECOUP SOME OF THE RESULTING LOST TIME. CJTF-FA STATED THAT TO MAKE MORE EFFICIENT USE OF OUR RESOURCES AND TIME, JFA WORK DAYS SHOULD INCLUDE EIGHT HOURS OF WORK TIME, PLUS LUNCH AND TRAVEL TIME TO AND FROM THE INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY AREAS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT BAD WEATHER OR LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES MAY OCCASIONALLY FORCE A SHORTER DAY, IN ORDER TO ENSURE EVERYONE IS SAFELY OUT OF THE FIELD BEFORE DARK.

(3) CJTF-FA ALSO ASKED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE FIELD TO CONDUCT UNSCHEDULED INVESTIGATIONS, SURVEYS, OR EXCAVATIONS OF OPPORTUNE CASES. HE NOTED THAT FOLLOWING UP LEADS WHILE THE TEAM IS IN THE AREA IS MORE EFFICIENT THAN RETURNING DURING A LATER JFA.

(4) CJTF-FA STATED THAT RECOVERY ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE EXCAVATING SITES USING A NORTH-TO-SOUTH APPROACH. INVESTIGATIONS WILL CONTINUE IN THE SOUTH, TO PERMIT THE INTEGRATION OF VIETNAMESE WITNESSES INTO THE WORK PLAN. ONCE INVESTIGATIONS ARE COMPLETE, HE PROPOSED TO RETURN TO THE NORTH TO COMPLETE REMAINING CASES. CJTF-FA STATED JTF-FA WILL REQUIRE A TEAM COMPOSITION OF ONE INVESTIGATION AND THREE RECOVERY ELEMENTS FOR EACH OF THE UPCOMING JFA'S. HE ASKED, HOWEVER, FOR THE FLEXIBILITY TO ALTER THIS MIX OF INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY ELEMENTS SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING JFA'S. IN ANY CASE, HE STATED, THE U.S. CONTINGENT WOULD NEVER EXCEED 4 ELEMENTS AND A TOTAL OF 40 MEMBERS.

(5) LAO RESPONSE: AMB MALIGNA RESPONDED THAT DUE TO THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CASE

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1436, HE HAS AGREED TO ALLOW THIS RECOVERY. HE NOTED THAT THIS IS AN EXCEPTION TO POLICY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A PRECEDENT FOR ADDITIONAL REQUESTS BY THE U.S. SIDE. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE AGREES TO THE PROPOSED WORK PLAN FOR 96-3L. HOWEVER, HE EMPHASIZED THAT JFAS BEYOND 30 DAYS CREATE A HARDSHIP FOR THE LAO TEAM. HE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO EXTEND JFAS BY A FEW DAYS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS BUT NOT THE SIX DAYS

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 *****/
REQUESTED BY THE U.S. SIDE. HE ALSO STATED, WHEN POSSIBLE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, WORK DAYS CAN BE EXTENDED TO EIGHT HOURS, BUT STRESSED THAT SAFETY, WEATHER, AND THE COMMUTE TO AND FROM THE WORK SITE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. MAJOR SIKHAI ALSO AGREED THAT AN EIGHT HOUR WORK DAY SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT, BUT IT WOULD NEED TO BE WORKED OUT IN THE FIELD AND REEVALUATED DAILY.

(6) U.S. RESPONSE: CJTF-FA THANKED THE LAO FOR APPROVING THE CASE 1436 RECOVERY AND STRESSED THAT CERTAIN CASES SHOULD NOW BE SCHEDULED FOR RECOVERY ON A PRIORITY BASIS. CJTF-FA BASED THIS ASSESSMENT ON HIS OBSERVATIONS OF RECOVERIES WHERE THE REMAINS HAD DETERIORATED SIGNIFICANTLY EVEN WHEN BODIES WERE BURIED

INTACT, SUCH AS CASE 0339. HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT ALL CASES ARE NOT EQUAL AND WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THOSE WHICH OFFER BETTER CHANCES OF FINDING REMAINS, SUCH AS BURIAL SITES AND CONFINED CRASH SITES. CJTF-FA PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE THE NORTH-TO-SOUTH APPROACH BUT FOCUS ON CASES WITH THE BEST CHANCE OF RECOVERY. THE TEAMS WILL RETURN ON A SECOND SWEEP FOR THOSE WITH LESS LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS. LTC DIBRELL THEN PRESENTED TWO MAPS WHICH DEPICTED THE REMAINING WORK CURRENTLY SCHEDULED IN LAOS. HE DEMONSTRATED HOW THE U.S. CAN CONTINUE TO USE THE NORTH-TO-SOUTH APPROACH WHILE PRIORITIZING THOSE CASES WITH THE HIGHEST PROBABILITY OF FINDING REMAINS.

H. VIETNAMESE WITNESSES.

(1) CJTF-FA REITERATED THE VALUE OF USING VIETNAMESE WITNESSES TO ASSIST INVESTIGATIONS IN LAOS, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY OF REMAINS AT THE CASE 0339 RECOVERY SITE DURING JFA 96-2L. THE VIETNAMESE WITNESSES RECOLLECTIONS WERE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR LOCATING REMAINS. HE THANKED THE LAO FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE IN FACILITATING USE OF THE WITNESSES, AND HOPED TO MAKE ADDITIONAL WITNESSES AVAILABLE FOR LAO INTERVIEW IN HANOI.

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(2) LAO RESPONSE: AMB MALIGNA STATED THAT THE LAO GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE TRILATERAL PROCESS BUT HE NOTED THAT VIETNAMESE WITNESSES HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME RECALLING EVENTS AFTER 25-30 YEARS. HE STATED THAT THE SUCCESS ON CASE 0339 WAS ACTUALLY DUE TO A LAO WITNESS RATHER THAN THE VIETNAMESE WITNESSES WHICH WERE BROUGHT IN. CJTF-FA THANKED THE LAO FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF THE WITNESS PROGRAM AND STRESSED THAT THE U.S. MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE ALL POSSIBLE LEADS.

I. U.S. PERSONNEL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANCESTRY.

(1) CJTF-FA STATED THAT JTF-FA IS RAPIDLY APPROACHING THE POINT OF NOT HAVING ENOUGH LINGUISTS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN LAOS, OBSERVING THAT INDIVIDUALS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANCESTRY COMPRISE A LARGE PORTION OF THE AVAILABLE LAO LINGUIST POOL. HE ASKED THE LAO GOVERNMENT, WHEN EVALUATING REQUESTS FOR VISAS TO LAOS, TO RECOGNIZE OUR DILEMMA AND BE OPEN TO ALL CANDIDATES WHO CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE JOINT TEAM. CJTF-FA STATED THAT JTF-FA WILL SCREEN CANDIDATES CAREFULLY, AND WILL ONLY NOMINATE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE FULLY QUALIFIED AND SENSITIVE TO THE LAO CULTURE.

(2) LAO RESPONSE: AMB MALIGNA EXPLAINED THAT THE LAO POLICY ON AMERICANS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANCESTRY IS STRICTLY ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. CJTF-FA THANKED THE LAO FOR THEIR POSITIVE RESPONSE AND STATED THAT A CASE-BY-CASE CONSIDERATION IS FAIR AND WILL BENEFIT THE WORK OF BOTH THE LAO AND U.S. SIDES.

J. KIP/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE.

(1) CJTF-FA STATED THE KIP/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE HAS REMAINED STABLE FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS AT APPROXIMATELY 920 KIP PER DOLLAR, WHILE BILLS FOR LAO SUPPORT TO JFA'S HAVE BEEN COMPUTED AT THE OLD RATE OF 750 KIP PER DOLLAR. HE PROPOSED USING THE MEDIAN EXCHANGE RATE FOR THE JFA PERIOD, AS DETERMINED BY THE LAO CENTRAL BANK, TO COMPUTE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 *****/
FUTURE BILLS.

(2) LAO RESPONSE: AMB MALIGNA STATED THAT THE EXCHANGE RATE OF 750 KIP PER DOLLAR WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE BANK ASSESSES A COMMISSION FEE. HE NOTED THAT SINCE THE RATE HAD RECENTLY CHANGED, HE WOULD AGREE TO THE CURRENT BANK RATE OF 920 KIP PER DOLLAR.

K. PAJERO INSPECTION PROGRAM. CJTF-FA THANKED THE LAO FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF THE PAJERO

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INSPECTION PROGRAM CONDUCTED EARLIER THIS MONTH BY U.S. ARMY MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS IN VIENTIANE. LTC DIBRELL WILL WORK WITH THE LAO TO SCHEDULE REQUIRED REPAIRS ONCE A MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IS FINALIZED. CJTF-FA STATED THAT ONE OF THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS ASSESSMENT IS THE CONTINUING NEED FOR PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE AND FREQUENT OPERATOR REPORTS OF PROBLEMS AND REQUIREMENTS.

L. HUMANITARIAN AID.

(1) CJTF-FA OBSERVED THAT DET THREE COMPLETED EXTENSIVE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL FILM ARCHIVE'S FACILITY, INCLUDING THE INSTALLATION OF NEW SHELVING AND AIR CONDITIONING TO ENHANCE THE ARCHIVE'S STORAGE CAPABILITY. HE NOTED JTF-FA IS LOOKING FORWARD TO CONTINUING WORK WITH THE FILM ARCHIVE STAFF.

(2) CJTF-FA STATED THE RECENT HUMANITARIAN AID SURVEY TEAM'S ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE IRRIGATION PUMP IN BAN NA, THE HOSPITAL IN PHONSAVAN, AND THE SCHOOL IN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE PROVIDED INFORMATION INSTRUMENTAL TO THESE IMPORTANT PROJECTS. HE STATED LTC DIBRELL WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE LAO TO ENSURE THE WORK PROGRESSES SMOOTHLY.

M. CONCLUSION.

(1) CJTF-FA CONCLUDED PRESENTATION OF THE TALKING POINTS BY THANKING AMB MALIGNA AND THE LAO TEAM FOR THEIR COOPERATION, AND PROPOSED HOLDING THE NEXT CONSULTATIONS IN VIENTIANE ON 26-27 SEP 96.

(2) AMB MALIGNA ACCEPTED THE PROPOSED DATES FOR THE NEXT CONSULTATIONS, BUT ASKED THE U.S. SIDE TO CONFIRM THESE DATES ONE MONTH PRIOR.

4. AMBASSADOR TOMSETHS ISSUES/LAO RESPONSE. AMB TOMSETH CONTINUED BY EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE HIGH LEVEL OF LAO COOPERATION.

A. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH AND ORAL HISTORIES. AMB TOMSETH EMPHASIZED THAT DOCUMENTS AND THE RECOLLECTIONS OF WITNESSES ARE OFTEN THE ONLY SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMATION WHICH WE HAVE NOT EXTENSIVELY EXPLORED IN LAOS. HE THANKED THE LAO FOR THE WORK OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE, AND HOPED THAT THE NECESSARY MANPOWER WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AND COORDINATE BETWEEN VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. HE ALSO REPEATED CJTF-FA REQUEST FOR A DECISION ON THE PROPOSED FULL-TIME ARCHIVIST.

B. LAO RESPONSE: SEE PARA 3. A(3).

C. U.S. PERSONNEL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANCESTRY.

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AMB TOMSETH STRESSED CJTF-FAS NEED TO BE ABLE TO USE AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL OF SOUTHEAST ANCESTRY AS LINGUISTS DURING JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THESE PERSONNEL ARE VITAL TO OUR JOINT FIELD WORK SINCE THEY POSSESS CRITICAL LANGUAGE SKILLS.

D. LAO RESPONSE: SEE PARA 3. I (2).

E. JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES. AMB TOMSETH ELABORATED ON CJTF-FAS REMARKS ON MAXIMIZING THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING JFAS. HE STATED THAT OUR PROPOSED ADJUSTMENT TO JFAS WHICH INCLUDES THIRTY WORKING DAYS IN THE FIELD WILL ULTIMATELY INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY AND REDUCE COSTS.

F. LAO RESPONSE: SEE PARA 3. G (5).

G. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. AMB TOMSETH DEVOTED THE REMAINDER OF HIS COMMENTS TO EFFORTS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS MAKING TO ADDRESS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS IN LAOS. HE BEGAN BY DISCUSSING THE U.S. GOVERNMENTS BUDGET AND THE PRESSURES FROM BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES TO CUT

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 007 *****/
EXPENDITURES. HE NOTED THAT SINCE THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) IS CLOSING DOWN OVER THIRTY BILATERAL MISSIONS DUE TO BUDGET PRESSURES, IT WILL BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FIND FUNDS FOR NEW PROGRAMS IN LAOS. HE STATED THAT THE U.S. WILL FIND INNOVATIVE WAYS TO ASSIST LAOS AS DEMONSTRATED BY ONGOING U.S. DOD AND USAID PROGRAMS. AMB TOMSETH THEN CONCLUDED BY DISCUSSING IN DETAIL HOW THE U.S. PROPOSES TO HELP THE LAO WITH THE PROBLEM OF UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE. HE THANKED THE LAO FOR ACCEPTING OUR LONG-STANDING OFFER TO HAVE EXPERTS SURVEY THE UXO PROBLEM AND STATED THAT THE RESULTING PROJECT TO TRAIN AND EQUIP LAO PERSONNEL FOR UXO DISPOSAL IS THE BEGINNING OF A LARGER MULTI-NATIONAL EFFORT TO COMBAT THIS PROBLEM. HE THEN PROVIDED DETAILS ON THE U.S. DOD PROGRAM TO UPGRADE THE LAO-MONGOLIAN HOSPITAL AND NOTED THAT THIS EFFORT WILL DIRECTLY HELP THE VICTIMS OF THE UXO PROBLEM.

H. LAO RESPONSE: AMB MALIGNA THANKED THE U.S. FOR THE HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS. HE INDICATED THAT HE IS AWAITING A FINAL DECISION FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE UXO PROJECT AND EXPECTS THAT WORK WILL BEGIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE STATED THAT THE LAO GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THE UPGRADE TO THE LAO-MONGOLIAN HOSPITAL. HE NOTED THAT THE MONGOLIAN AMBASSADOR SUPPORTS THE PROPOSED UPGRADES AND RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR THESE

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UPGRADES TO THE TWELVE YEAR OLD HO
SPITAL.

5. NEW LAO ISSUES. AMB MALIGNA THANKED AMB TOMSETH AND GEN VIALE FOR THEIR COMMENTS AND PROVIDED A RESPONSE TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND REQUESTS AS INDICATED ABOVE. IN ADDITION, AMB MALIGNA ADDRESSED THE FOLLOWING NEW ISSUES.

A. REIMBURSEMENT FOR LAO WORKERS. AMB MALIGNA STATED THAT FOR THE LAST TEN YEARS, THE U.S. SIDE HAS PAID 18 DOLLARS PER DAY FOR LAO WORKERS. HE COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD INCREASE THIS RATE TO ACCOUNT FOR COST OF LIVING INCREASES. HE BELIEVED THAT A RATE OF 35-40 DOLLARS PER DAY WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE.

B. DISPOSAL OF UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE. AMB MALIGNA PROPOSED THAT THE U.S. MAINTAIN A FIVE KILOGRAM QUANTITY OF EXPLOSIVES TO DESTROY UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE FOUND AT FIELD SITES. HE STATED THAT AS THE EXPLOSIVES ARE USED, THEY CAN BE SUPPLEMENTED BY ARRIVING U.S. TEAMS SO THAT THE QUANTITY ON HAND IS MAINTAINED AT APPROXIMATELY FIVE KILOS. HE STRESSED THAT THIS MEASURE WILL PROVIDE MORE CONTROL ON THE MOVEMENT OF EXPLOSIVES IN LAOS.

6. CONCLUSION. AMB TOMSETH CLOSED FOR THE U.S. SIDE BY THANKING THE LAO TEAM MEMBERS FOR THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION. HE ASSURED THEM THAT DESPITE THE U.S. GOVERNMENTS BUDGET DIFFICULTIES, WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO ASSISTING LAOS ADDRESS ITS MOST PRESSING HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.

7. COMMENTS. THIS MEETING WAS A FRIENDLY, CANDID DISCUSSION OF JTF-FA PROGRAMS AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. AMBASSADOR MALIGNA PROVIDED MANY STRAIGHT FORWARD RESPONSES TO U.S. REQUESTS; HE AGREED TO THE JOINT SURVEY OF THE MILITARY MUSEUM, ANNOUNCED THE LAO GOVERNMENTS ACCEPTANCE OF THE FULL-TIME CIVILIAN ARCHIVIST, PROVIDED DETAILS ON LAO UNILATERAL WORK ON CASE 1977, AGREED TO ALLOW THE RECOVERY OF CASE 1436 AS AN EXCEPTION TO POLICY, AGREED TO THE USE OF GPR ON POTENTIAL BURIAL SITES, AND APPROVED A NEW EXCHANGE RATE OF 920 KIP PER DOLLAR FOR JFAS. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT OFFER BLANKET APPROVAL FOR SOME U.S. REQUESTS, HE STATED THAT THESE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, SUCH AS EXTENDING JFAS BEYOND 30 DAYS, ESTABLISHING AN EIGHT HOUR JFA WORK DAY, AND EVALUATING REQUESTS FOR VISAS FOR AMERICANS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANCESTRY. THE LAO CONTINUED TO

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 008 *****/
APPROVE U.S. HUMANITARIAN PROPOSALS (SUCH AS THE
M.U.S.T. HOSPITAL), REQUESTED ADDITIONAL UPGRADES
FOR FOR LAO NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND SOUGHT INCREASED
COMPENSATION FOR THEIR WORKERS. TOMSETH
ADMIN
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INQUIRE=DOC33D
ITEM NO=00714170

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS240 MCN = 96044/03838 TOR = 960440236
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ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

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FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J30//

TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/BCLTV//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBT/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI

RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET FOUR//

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//

RUHHPQA/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI

RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

RUHVAHA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

BT

CONTROLS

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SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC J30//

SUBJ/22-23 FEB 96 POW-MIA CONSULTATIVE MEETING IN VIENTIANE//

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RMKS/1. PROPOSE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS FOR 22-23 FEB 96 POW-MIA CONSULTATION IN VIENTIANE. DCM WILL LEAD U.S. SIDE AND PRESENT OPENING REMARKS. WILL REVISE TALKING POINTS TO REFLECT DEVELOPMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THIS MESSAGE, AS WELL AS JOINT STAFF INPUTS. REQUEST JOINT STAFF CLEARLY INDICATE CHANGES TO FACILITATE REVISING SCRIPT. REQUEST INPUTS NLT 16 FEB 96.

2. PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOLLOW:

A. AMBASSADOR MALIGNA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LAO DELEGATION, I AM PLEASED TO AGAIN HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU. I THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLD'S AND MY VISIT LAST MONTH TO DISCUSS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CASE REVIEW. LAST MONTH'S VISIT, AND THE UPCOMING U.S. HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION VISIT IN MARCH, ARE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES TO SHOW SENIOR U.S.

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OFFICIALS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE EXTENT OF OUR WORK AND PROGRESS.

B. I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN TODAY'S MEETING BY DISCUSSING ARCHIVAL RESEARCH.

(1) WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT ARCHIVAL RESEARCH HAS POTENTIAL TO SUPPORT FIELD OPERATIONS. WE WERE THEREFORE VERY GRATIFIED WHEN THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN THE INTER-MINISTERIAL AD HOC COMMITTEE AND DETACHMENT THREE TOOK PLACE THIS MONTH. WE WERE FURTHER ENCOURAGED BY MR. KHENTHONG'S RECENT ACTIONS TO DETERMINE WHEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BEGIN RESEARCH AT THE MILITARY MUSEUM. WE BELIEVE THE JOINT REVIEW OF THE MILITARY MUSEUM WILL BE AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA OF ARCHIVE RESEARCH. WE ARE EAGER TO BEGIN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND WELCOME ANY RESPONSE YOU HAVE FOR US TODAY ON WHEN WE CAN START OUR JOINT RESEARCH.

(2) WE UNDERSTAND THE STAFFING RESOURCES NECESSARY FOR A JOINT REVIEW OF PROPOSED ARCHIVAL REPOSITORIES, AS NOTED BY MR. KHENTHONG. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE U.S. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM TO MEET WITH THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS, FORMULATE A WORK PLAN FOR REVIEWING DOCUMENTS, AND DEVELOP A SCHEDULE THAT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE WORK REQUIRED TO CONDUCT JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES. WE WOULD LIKE TO HOLD A MEETING WITH THE AD HOC COMMITTEE AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

(3) AN ADDITIONAL PROPOSAL FOR ARCHIVAL RESEARCH WAS RAISED BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLD DURING HIS VISIT IN JANUARY, AND WITH AMBASSADOR HIEM IN WASHINGTON EARLIER THIS MONTH. HE SUGGESTED ASSIGNING A FULL-TIME, LAO SPEAKING U.S. CIVILIAN ARCHIVIST WHO IS ACADEMICALLY TRAINED TO THE DETACHMENT THREE STAFF TO CONDUCT RESEARCH DIRECTLY WITH OFFICIALS ON THE AD HOC COMMITTEE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION REGARDING THIS PROPOSAL.

(4) WE ARE PLEASED WITH OUR CONTINUING PROGRESS IN THE REVIEW OF FILMS AT THE LAO NATIONAL FILM ARCHIVES. WE ALSO REMAIN VERY INTERESTED IN REVIEWING THE LAO FILMS STORED AT THE VIETNAM FILM INSTITUTE. DURING VICE MINISTER SOUBANH'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN OCT 95, HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ARRANGED FOR THE CONSOLIDATION IN VIENTIANE OF THE FILMS CURRENTLY STORED IN VIETNAM. WE BELIEVE THESE FILMS COULD POSSIBLY PROVIDE INFORMATION REGARDING UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE COMPLETED EXTENSIVE FACILITY IMPROVEMENTS AT THE LAO NATIONAL FILM ARCHIVES, AND BELIEVE THESE FILMS CAN NOW BE SAFELY STORED THERE. JTF-PA WILL BE PLEASED TO ASSIST YOU BY TRANSPORTING THE FILMS FROM HANOI TO VIENTIANE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING HOW AND WHEN THEIR TRANSPORT AND SUBSEQUENT REVIEW CAN BEGIN.

(5) ON 1 FEB 96, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLD PASSED TO AMBASSADOR HIEM IN WASHINGTON A LIST OF SIX INDIVIDUALS, WITH BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND SPECIFIC ACTIONS WHICH THE U.S. ASKS THE LAO GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE. DETACHMENT THREE ALSO PASSED A COPY OF THIS LIST TO MR. KHENTHONG EARLIER THIS MONTH. THE LIST IS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION, AND WILL BE A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION DURING ITS UPCOMING VISIT TO LAOS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE

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ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN PROVIDE REGARDING THESE ACTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE ACTIONS WHICH RESULT IN NO NEW INFORMATION.

C. IN OCT 95, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLD DISCUSSED THE INVESTIGATION OF CASE 1977 WITH VICE MINISTER SOUBANH. LAO WITNESSES HAD RELATED THEIR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE 1974 EXHUMATION OF AN AMERICAN PILOT'S REMAINS IN BAN KANG, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT DISAPPEARANCE WHEN ORDERS WERE RECEIVED TO ONLY TURN OVER LIVE PRISONERS. VICE MINISTER SOUBANH STATED THAT HE HAD ORDERED A UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE RESULTS OF THIS INVESTIGATION.

D. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT IN CONDUCTING THE LIVE SIGHTING INVESTIGATION IN DEC 95. THE COOPERATION OF OFFICIALS IN BOTH VIENTIANE AND LOUANG NAMTHA PROVINCE DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE THOROUGHNESS OF THE INVESTIGATION. ALTHOUGH WE WERE UNABLE TO CONFIRM THE REPORT, IT REMAINS IMPORTANT TO THE OVERALL UNACCOUNTED FOR MISSION THAT WE CONTINUE TO QUICKLY INVESTIGATE ALL CREDIBLE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS.

E. WE ALSO WISH TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO THE LAO GOVERNMENT FOR ITS OVERALL COOPERATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE. WE NOTE VICE MINISTER SOUBANH'S ASSURANCES IN WASHINGTON LAST OCTOBER OF THE LAO GOVERNMENT'S FULL COMMITMENT TO SEEKING INFORMATION ON MISSING AMERICANS. ALSO, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REQUESTS TO THE PROVINCES TO SEND ANY SUCH INFORMATION TO VIENTIANE ARE OF GREAT BENEFIT IN SPREADING THE NEWS OF OUR JOINT WORK. THE RECENT COMMENT BY LOUANG NAMTHA PROVINCE DEPUTY GOVERNOR ENG PENGMAI, TO THE LIVE SIGHTING INVESTIGATION TEAM, THAT HE RECEIVED WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THIS HUMANITARIAN MISSION IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS. IF YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO PROVIDE US COPIES OF THIS TYPE OF CORRESPONDENCE, WE CAN USE THEM TO CITE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF YOUR COOPERATION.

F. TO REVIEW JOINT FIELD WORK SINCE OUR LAST MEETING, JFA'S 96-1L AND 96-2L WERE BOTH SUCCESSFUL. TEAM LEADERS NOTED GOOD LAO COOPERATION DURING EACH OF THESE JFA'S.

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

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RMKS/

(1) JFA 96-2L WAS NOTEWORTHY IN THE WAY THE TEAM DEPLOYED TO THE BASE CAMP THE SAME DAY IT ARRIVED IN LAOS, AND BEGAN OPERATIONS THE NEXT DAY. THIS RAPID START TO THE JFA IS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE THOROUGH COORDINATION DONE IN DEC 95.

(2) ONE ISSUE THAT DID DETRACT FROM OUR WORK, HOWEVER, WAS NOT BEING ABLE TO USE THE GROUND PENETRATING RADAR TO THOROUGHLY SEARCH THE AREA AROUND THE CASE 0339 SITE, AS WE DID DURING THE RECOVERY OF CASE 1983 DURING JFA 93-3L. GROUND PENETRATING RADAR IS VERY USEFUL IN DETECTING BURIED MATERIAL, AND WOULD HAVE HELPED US DETERMINE THE LIMITS OF THE CASE 0339 SITE. WITHOUT IT, WE SPEND MUCH VALUABLE TIME DIGGING IN UNPRODUCTIVE AREAS, AS WAS THE SITUATION WITH THE 0339 RECOVERY. SINCE THE USE OF THIS SIMPLE DEVICE IS NOT NEW TO OUR OPERATIONS IN LAOS, DENIAL OF ITS APPROVAL

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DURING JFA 96-2L WAS BAFFLING. DO YOU WISH TO HAVE US ARRANGE A NEW DEMONSTRATION AND EXPLANATION OF THE GROUND PENETRATING RADAR PRIOR TO JFA 96-3L? ARE THERE OTHER STEPS WE CAN TAKE TO RENEW YOUR APPROVAL OF GROUND PENETRATING RADAR USE? IT IS CLEARLY IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH NATIONS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EVERY EXISTING TECHNOLOGY. WE THEREFORE ASK YOU TO APPROVE THE USE OF THIS EQUIPMENT DURING FUTURE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES, SO THAT WE MAY MAKE THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF OUR TIME AND RESOURCES.

(3) OVERALL, RESULTS OF THE TWO JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES SINCE OUR LAST CONSULTATION ARE FAVORABLE. JOINT TEAMS INVESTIGATED 10 (PLUS 2L TOTAL) CASES AND EXCAVATED 4 (PLUS 2L TOTAL) SITES, AND THE MEDCAP DOCTORS TREATED A TOTAL OF 224 (PLUS 2L TOTAL) PATIENTS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THIS HIGH LEVEL OF PROGRESS DURING FUTURE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES. (NOTE: WILL UPDATE ABOVE ONCE THE SUMMARY MSG FOR JFA 96-2L IS RELEASED.)

G. AS WE HAVE STATED AT OUR PAST MEETINGS, RECOVERY AND IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS IS ONE OF OUR HIGHEST PRIORITIES. WE WILL NOW DISCUSS THE REMAINS RECOVERED DURING THE TWO RECENT JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES, AND THE STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY THEM.

(1) DURING JFA 96-1L, REMAINS WERE RECOVERED ONLY FROM THE SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1561. WE ALSO RECOVERED REMAINS FROM THIS SITE DURING JFA 95-6L, BUT COULD NOT FINISH THE EXCAVATION AT THAT TIME.

(2) DURING JFA 96-2L, REMAINS WERE RECOVERED ONLY FROM THE SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0339.

(3) FIVE CASES INVOLVING 21 INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED SINCE OUR LAST MEETING. THEY ARE CASES 0955, 1530, 1576, 1926, AND 1983.

(4) WE ALSO HAVE 7 CASES IN VARIOUS STAGES OF PROCESSING AND REVIEW WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL LEAD TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE 14 INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THOSE INCIDENTS. THIS FOLDER CONTAINS REPORTS DETAILING REMAINS RECOVERED, CASES PENDING IDENTIFICATION, AND A LISTING OF RECENTLY IDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS.

H. REGARDING FUTURE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES, LTC DIBRELL HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH YOU OUR WORK PLAN FOR JFA 96-3L, SCHEDULED FOR 7 MAR THROUGH 5 APR 96. WE THANK YOU FOR CONSIDERING OUR REQUEST TO CONDUCT THE RECOVERY OF THE SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1436 IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE DURING THIS JFA. WE ARE REQUESTING THIS RECOVERY AS AN EXCEPTION TO OUR PROVINCE-BY-PROVINCE APPROACH. IF TIME PERMITS AFTER THIS RECOVERY, WE PROPOSE RETURNING TO VILABOULI DISTRICT TO COMPLETE THE CASE 0370 SITE RECOVERY, WHICH WAS LEFT ONLY PARTIALLY EXCAVATED AT THE END OF JFA 94-4L IN FEB 94. WE ESTIMATE IT WILL TAKE TWO TO THREE DAYS TO COMPLETE THIS RECOVERY.

(1) WE PROPOSE CONDUCTING JFA 96-4L FROM 30 MAY THROUGH 5 JUL 96, AND JFA 96-5L FROM 15 AUG THROUGH 20 SEP 96. TO FACILITATE PLANNING, WE ASK YOU TO APPROVE THESE DATES IN ADVANCE. THESE DATES INCLUDE 30 DAYS OF ACTUAL FIELD WORK AND 6 DAYS OF DEPLOYMENT TIME TO AND FROM LAOS.

(2) SINCE WE HAVE SCHEDULED FIVE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES THIS YEAR, INSTEAD OF SIX, THIRTY DAYS OF ACTUAL FIELD WORK PER JFA WILL

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HELP MAKE UP FOR SOME OF THE RESULTING LOST TIME. AS WE ALL KNOW, IT TAKES A GOOD DEAL OF TIME, EFFORT, AND RESOURCES TO BEGIN A JFA. WITH GOOD PLANNING, WE CAN MAXIMIZE THE TIME SPENT IN THE FIELD, AND MAKE THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF OUR RESOURCES AND TIME. WE BELIEVE THAT JFA WORK DAYS SHOULD INCLUDE EIGHT HOURS OF WORK TIME, PLUS LUNCH AND TRAVEL TIME TO AND FROM THE INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY AREAS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT BAD WEATHER OR LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES MAY OCCASIONALLY FORCE A SHORTER DAY, IN ORDER TO ENSURE EVERYONE IS SAFELY OUT OF THE FIELD BEFORE DARK. NEVERTHELESS, EIGHT HOURS OF WORK PER DAY WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO MAINTAINING THE PACE OF FIELD OPERATIONS.

(3) ANOTHER MEASURE TO HELP MAINTAIN THE PACE OF FIELD OPERATIONS IS HAVING THE FLEXIBILITY IN THE FIELD TO CONDUCT UNSCHEDULED INVESTIGATIONS, SURVEYS, OR EXCAVATIONS OF OPPORTUNE CASES. FOLLOWING UP LEADS WHILE THE TEAM IS IN THE AREA IS MORE EFFICIENT AND PLACES LESS OF A BURDEN ON THE LOCALITY THAN IF THE TEAM HAD TO RETURN TO THE SAME AREA DURING A LATER JFA.

(4) IN GENERAL, RECOVERY ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE EXCAVATING SITES USING THE PROVINCE-BY-PROVINCE APPROACH. INVESTIGATIONS WILL CONTINUE IN THE SOUTH, TO PERMIT THE INTEGRATION OF VIETNAMESE WITNESSES INTO THE WORK PLAN, SINCE MOST OF THESE CASES ARE BETWEEN KHAMMOUAN AND XEKONG PROVINCES. WHEN INVESTIGATIONS ARE COMPLETE IN THE SOUTH, WE PROPOSE TO RETURN TO THE NORTH TO COMPLETE CASES WHICH WERE NOT FINISHED EARLIER AND THOSE REQUIRING REINVESTIGATION BASED ON NEW LEADS, INCLUDING THOSE DEVELOPED DURING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CASE REVIEW. WE BELIEVE WE WILL REQUIRE A TEAM COMPOSITION OF ONE INVESTIGATION AND THREE RECOVERY ELEMENTS FOR EACH OF THE UPCOMING JFA'S. WE DO, HOWEVER, ASK FOR THE FLEXIBILITY TO ALTER THIS MIX OF INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY ELEMENTS SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING JFA'S. IN ANY CASE, THE TEAM WOULD NEVER EXCEED 4 ELEMENTS AND A TOTAL OF 40 U.S. MEMBERS.

I. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IN THE VALUE OF USING VIETNAMESE WITNESSES TO ASSIST WITH INVESTIGATIONS IN LAOS, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE SUCCESS WE HAD AT THE CASE 0339 RECOVERY SITE DURING JFA 96-2L. THE VIETNAMESE WITNESS'S RECOLLECTIONS WERE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR LOCATING REMAINS. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN
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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

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RMKS/

FACILITATING THE USE OF THESE WITNESSES, AND HOPE TO MAKE ADDITIONAL WITNESSES AVAILABLE FOR YOUR INTERVIEW IN HANOI.

J. TO CONTINUE FACILITATING COMMUNICATIONS DURING JFA'S, WE WILL AGAIN AUGMENT DETACHMENT THREE WITH TWO RADIO OPERATORS WHO WILL REMAIN IN VIENTIANE FOR THE DURATION OF THE JFA. THESE PERSONNEL PROVIDED IMPORTANT ASSISTANCE DURING RECENT JFA'S, ENABLING US TO CONSTANTLY MONITOR THE RADIOS WHILE THE TEAMS ARE IN THE FIELD. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS MATTER, SINCE CONSTANT COMMUNICATION HAS PROVEN VITAL IN ALLOWING US TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCIES.

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K. AN ISSUE WE MUST AGAIN RAISE IS THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANCESTRY. THE JOINT TASK FORCE IS RAPIDLY APPROACHING THE POINT OF NOT HAVING ENOUGH LINGUISTS TO SUPPORT OUR OPERATIONS IN LAOS. INDIVIDUALS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANCESTRY COMPRISE A LARGE PORTION OF OUR AVAILABLE LAO LINGUIST POOL. WE ASK THAT THE LAO GOVERNMENT, WHEN EVALUATING REQUESTS FOR VISAS TO LAOS, RECOGNIZE OUR DILEMMA AND BE OPEN TO ALL CANDIDATES WHO CAN CONTRIBUTE TO OUR JOINT TEAM. WE WILL SCREEN CANDIDATES CAREFULLY AND WILL ONLY NOMINATE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE FULLY QUALIFIED AND SENSITIVE TO THE LAO CULTURE.

L. ANOTHER ISSUE WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS INVOLVES THE EXCHANGE RATE USED TO COMPUTE BILLS FOR MND AND MFA SUPPORT TO JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES. THE EXCHANGE RATE HAS REMAINED STABLE FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS AT APPROXIMATELY 920 KIP PER DOLLAR, WHILE BILLS ARE COMPUTED AT THE OLD RATE OF 750 KIP PER DOLLAR. WE THEREFORE PROPOSE USING THE MEDIAN EXCHANGE RATE FOR THE JFA PERIOD, AS DETERMINED BY THE LAO CENTRAL BANK, IN COMPUTING FUTURE JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY BILLS.

M. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT OF THE PAJERO INSPECTION PROGRAM CONDUCTED EARLIER THIS MONTH BY U.S. ARMY MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS IN VIENTIANE. THESE INSPECTIONS ALLOWED US TO ASSESS THE CURRENT CONDITION OF THE VEHICLES, AND TO FORMULATE A MAINTENANCE PROGRAM TO ENSURE THEIR CONTINUED AVAILABILITY AND SAFETY. LTC DIBRELL WILL WORK WITH YOU TO SCHEDULE REQUIRED REPAIRS ONCE A PROGRAM IS FINALIZED.

N. AS YOU KNOW, JTF-FA COMPLETED EXTENSIVE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL FILM ARCHIVE'S FACILITY, INCLUDING THE INSTALLATION OF NEW SHELVING AND AIR CONDITIONING TO ENHANCE THE ARCHIVE'S STORAGE CAPABILITY. WE HOPE THESE EFFORTS WILL ASSIST THE LAO GOVERNMENT IN PRESERVING THE COUNTRY'S FILM HERITAGE, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR WORK WITH THE ARCHIVE'S STAFF.

O. WE WERE PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT HUMANITARIAN AID SURVEY. THE SURVEY TEAM'S ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE IRRIGATION PUMP IN BAN NA, THE HOSPITAL IN PHONSAVAN, AND THE SCHOOL IN ATTAPEU PROVINCE GAVE US INFORMATION INSTRUMENTAL TO THESE IMPORTANT PROJECTS. LTC DIBRELL WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH YOU TO ENSURE THE WORK PROGRESSES SMOOTHLY, AS SCHEDULED, AND IS OF BENEFIT TO THE LAO PEOPLE.

P. IN CONCLUSION, WE APPRECIATE THE CONTINUED COOPERATION WE HAVE RECEIVED AS WE ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR OUR SERVICE MEMBERS. TO CONTINUE OUR WORK, WE PROPOSE TO HOLD OUR NEXT CONSULTATION IN VIENTIANE ON 26 AND 27 SEP 96. TOGETHER WE HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS, AND WE KNOW THE PROGRAM PROPOSED TODAY WILL PROVIDE FOR EVEN GREATER SUCCESS IN THE FUTURE.//

ADMIN

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INQUIRE=DOC36D
ITEM NO=00152360

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS381 MCN = 96255/01870 TOR = 962550111
OTUZYUW RUEKJCS2648 2550112-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O 110112Z SEP 96
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
O P 091503Z SEP 96
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
TO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J32//
INFO AIG 960
RUBDPLA/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/RAP//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
RUBDPLA/AMEMBASSY HANOI VM/CJTFFA DET 2//
RHWRAAA/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//
RHWRAAA/HQ AFMWSA RANDOLPH AFB TX//MWD//
RUENMED/BUMED WASHINGTON DC//332//
RUEAHOF/CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-PED-P/TAPC-PED-F//

BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03000//

BODY

MSGID/SYS.RRM/CDR JTF-FA//
SUBJ/REPATRIATION OF REMAINS FROM SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM (SRV)//

RMKS/1. SUMMARY: A JOINT FORENSIC TEAM REVIEWED ALLEGED AMERICAN
REMAINS IN HANOI 23 - 24 AUG, 1996. FOLLOWING THE JOINT FORENSIC
REVIEW, THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER SELECTED REMAINS TO
U.S. CONTROL ON 27 AUG, 1996. THE REMAINS WERE PLACED ABOARD A
USAF C-141 AIRCRAFT WHICH DEPARTED HANOI 27 AUG, 1996 AND
ARRIVED HICKAM AFB 28 AUG, 1996.

2. SUMMARY OF REMAINS:

A. THE JOINT FORENSIC TEAM EXAMINED SIX GROUPS OF REMAINS. OF
THESE SIX GROUPS, JOINT FIELD TEAMS RECOVERED FIVE GROUPS OF
REMAINS AND VIETNAMESE CITIZENS TURNED OVER ONE.

B. THE JOINT FORENSIC TEAM SELECTED FIVE GROUPS OF REMAINS TO
RETURN TO THE U.S. FOR ANALYSIS. IN THE MULTIPLE PERSON CASES, WE
WILL NOT KNOW THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS THE REMAINS REPRESENT UNTIL
SPECIALISTS AT CILHI ANALYZE THEM. THE JOINT FORENSIC TEAM SELECTED
THE FOLLOWING REMAINS RECOVERED DURING THE 41ST JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY
POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FOLLOWING CASES:

- (1) CASE 0633
- (2) CASE 1372
- (3) CASE DA7A
- (4) CASE DA7A
- (5) CASE DA7A

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C. THE FINAL GROUP OF REMAINS, WHICH WERE TURNED OVER BY A VIETNAMESE CITIZEN, COULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH AN UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICAN EITHER BIOLOGICALLY OR CIRCUMSTANTIALLY, AND WERE NOT REPATRIATED.

3. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF REMAINS IS UNKNOWN FOR ALL CASES.

4. THE REMAINS WERE RETURNED IN 5 TRANSFER CASES.//

ADMIN

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INQUIRE=DOC35D
 ITEM NO=00658163
ENVELOPE
 CDSN = CFS673 MCN = 96230/00124 TOR = 962300004
 PTUZYUW RUEKJCS1044 2300004-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 161503Z AUG 96
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 TO: SAFE
 ZEM

CONTROLSUNCLASBODY

SUBJ: (MEC) SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 41ST JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM, 5 JULY
 //NOTICE// AUTOMATED MESSAGE ERROR CORRECTION

----- ORIGINAL MESSAGE TEXT -----

CDSN = CFS673 MCN = 96230/00124 TOR = 962300004
 PTUZYUW RUEKJCS1044 2300004-UUUU--RUEALGX.
 ZNR UUUUU

P 170004Z AUG 96
 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RHEFJII/J2
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 P 161503Z AUG 96 ZYB
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J327//
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//
 RUHPSGG/JTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO//
 RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//CJTFFA DET THREE//
 RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH//CJTFFA DET 4//
 BT
 UNCLAS //N03000//
 SECTION 01 OF 03

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
 MSGID/GENADMIN/CJTF-FA/-/AUG//
 SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 41ST JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM, 5 JULY
 THROUGH 6 AUGUST 1996//
 RMKS/1. SUMMARY: JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA) ELEMENTS
 CONDUCTED THE 41ST JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA) IN THE SOCIALIST
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) FROM 5 JULY THROUGH 6 AUGUST 1996. THE

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INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY TEAM (IRT) INCLUDED ONE HUNDRED AND SIX (106) U.S. PERSONNEL (TWO INVESTIGATION ELEMENTS, SIX RECOVERY ELEMENTS, ONE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM, AND ONE SPECIAL RECOVERY ELEMENT) WHO WORKED WITH THEIR SRV COUNTERPARTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE FATE OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. PRIOR TO THE START OF THIS JFA, JTF-FA AND SRV COUNTERPARTS CONDUCTED A COORDINATION MEETING IN NHA TRANG ON 31 MAY 1996. ON 5 JULY 1996, SIX (6) TEAMS DEPLOYED INTO DA NANG ON ONE (1) C-130 SORTIE AND ONE (1) C-141 SORTIE; ON 6 JULY 1996, FOUR (4) TEAMS DEPLOYED INTO DA NANG ON ONE (1) C-130 SORTIE AND ONE (1) C-141 SORTIE. THE TEAMS SUBSEQUENTLY DEPLOYED TO A TOTAL OF NINE (9) PROVINCES. ALL POSSIBLE HUMAN REMAINS THAT THE JOINT TEAMS RECOVERED OR RECEIVED DURING THIS JFA ARE CURRENTLY IN THE POSSESSION OF THE VIETNAMESE OFFICE SEEKING MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP) AND SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW SCHEDULED FOR 23 AND 24 AUGUST 1996 IN HANOI, SRV. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY:

A. CASES SCHEDULED: SEVENTY-SEVEN (77).

(1) INVESTIGATIONS: SIXTY-THREE (63).

(2) EXCAVATIONS: THIRTEEN (13).

B. CASES INVESTIGATED: FORTY-SEVEN (47). (0074, 0121, 0202, 0238, 0239, 0265, PCIT CASE 0372, 0443, PCIT CASE 0453, 0525, SRT CASE 0591, 0643, 0646, 0676, PCIT CASE 0678, 0770, 0780, 0784, 0824, 0844, 0973, 0976, 1115, 1132, 1136, 1140, 1144, 1168, 1222, 1238, 1267, 1269, 1294, 1407, 1552, 1648, 1649, 1672, 1706, 1721, 1793, 1810, PCIT CASE 1820, 1901, 1979, AND TWO (2) UNCORRELATED CASES.)

(1) RECOMMENDED CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE: EIGHTEEN (18). (0238, 0239, PCIT CASE 0372, 0443, SRT CASE 0591, 0780, 0844, 1140, 1168, 1144, 1238, 1407, 1552, 1649, 1706, PCIT CASE 1820, 1901, AND ONE (1) UNCORRELATED CASE.)

(2) RECOMMENDED TO EXCAVATE: SIX (6). (0646, 0770, 1115, 1132, 1269, AND 1810.)

(3) RECOMMENDED N/A: TWENTY-THREE (23). (0074, 0121, 0202, 0265, PCIT CASE 0453, 0525, 0643, 0676, PCIT CASE 0678, 0784, 0824, 0973, 0976, 1136, 1222, 1267, 1294, 1648, 1672, 1721, 1793, 1979, AND ONE (1) UNCORRELATED CASE.)

C. CASES EXCAVATED: NINE (9). (0633, SRT CASE 1042, 1105, DATA, DATA, 1372, DATA, 1603, AND DATA)

(1) EXCAVATED BY IE: NONE (0).

(2) EXCAVATED BY RIT: NONE (0).

(3) EXCAVATED BY RE: NINE (9). (0633, SRT CASE 1042, 1105, DATA, DATA, 1372, DATA, 1603, AND DATA)

(A) RE1: ONE (1) (CASE 0633).

(B) RE2: ONE (1) (CASE DATA).

(C) RE3: ONE (1) (CASE 1105).

(D) RE4: TWO (2) (CASES 1372 AND DATA).

(E) RE5: ONE (1) (CASE DATA).

(F) RE6: TWO (2) (CASES 1603 AND DATA).

(G) SRE: ONE (1) (SRT CASE 1042).

D. TOTAL REMAINS OBTAINED:

(1) OBTAINED BY IE: NONE (0).

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(2) OBTAINED BY RIT: NONE (0).

(3) OBTAINED BY RE: ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINE (189) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH/BONE FRAGMENTS. THIS INCLUDED THIRTY-FOUR (34) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH, APPARENTLY WITHOUT RESTORATIONS, AND TWENTY (20) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH, APPARENTLY WITH RESTORATIONS. THIS TOTAL DOES NOT REFLECT THE ENTIRE NUMBER OF REMAINS RE4 RECOVERED FROM THE CASE DATA SITE. PART OF THE REMAINS RE4 RECOVERED WERE IN A FLIGHT SUIT AND THE TEAM LEADER OPTED NOT TO OPEN THE FLIGHT SUIT TO AVOID DAMAGING THE REMAINS.

(4) UNILATERAL TURN-OVERS: ONE (1). THIS INCLUDED ONE (1) POSSIBLE HUMAN TOOTH, APPARENTLY WITHOUT RESTORATION, THAT A VIETNAMESE CITIZEN TURNED OVER TO IE2.

(5) BY CASE LISTING OF REMAINS OBTAINED:

(A) CASE 0633: THIRTY-FIVE (35) RECOVERED/NONE (0) RECEIVED.

(B) CASE 1372: FIFTEEN (15) RECOVERED/NONE (0) RECEIVED. THESE REMAINS INCLUDED SIX (6) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH, APPARENTLY WITHOUT RESTORATIONS, AND SEVEN (7) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH, APPARENTLY WITH RESTORATIONS.

(C) CASE DATA ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE (139) RECOVERED/NONE (0) RECEIVED. THESE REMAINS INCLUDED TWENTY-EIGHT (28) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH, APPARENTLY WITHOUT RESTORATIONS, AND THIRTEEN (13) POSSIBLE HUMAN TEETH, APPARENTLY WITH RESTORATIONS. RE4 RECOVERED AN AS-YET UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF REMAINS THAT WERE CONTAINED IN A FLIGHT SUIT. TO AVOID DAMAGING THE REMAINS, THE RE4 TEAM LEADER AND ANTHROPOLOGIST, WITH THE DET 2 COMMANDER'S CONCURRENCE, DID NOT OPEN THE FLIGHT SUIT TO EXAMINE THE REMAINS.

(D) UNCORRELATED: NONE (0) RECOVERED/ONE (1) RECEIVED. A VIETNAMESE CITIZEN TURNED ONE POSSIBLE HUMAN TOOTH, APPARENTLY WITHOUT RESTORATION, OVER TO IE2.

E. NUMBER OF WITNESSES INTERVIEWED:

(1) INTERVIEWED BY IE: SEVENTY-TWO (72).

(2) INTERVIEWED BY RIT: FORTY-SEVEN (47).

(3) INTERVIEWED BY RE: EIGHTEEN (18).

2. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT ONE (IE1): TWENTY-SIX (26) CASES SCHEDULED, EIGHTEEN (18) INVESTIGATED.

A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

B. CASES: TWENTY-SIX (26) (CASES 0074, 0121, 0202, 0265, 0443, 0525, 0643, 0770, 1144, 1222, 1238, 1267, 1269, 1294, 1552, 1793, 1979, AND ONE (1) UNCORRELATED CASES). (IE1 DID NOT INVESTIGATE CASES 0502, 0697, 1243, 1314, 1715, AND THREE (3) UNCORRELATED CASES.)

C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).

D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 41ST JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM, 5 JULY RMKS/

E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: FOUR (4).

3. INVESTIGATION ELEMENT TWO (IE2): TWENTY-SEVEN (27) CASES

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SCHEDULED, TWENTY (20) INVESTIGATED.

- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: TWENTY-SEVEN (27) (CASES 0238, 0239, 0676, 0780, 0784, 0824, 0844, 0973, 1132, 1136, 1140, 1168, 1407, 1648, 1649, 1672, 1706, 1721, 1901, AND ONE (1) UNCORRELATED CASES). (IE2 DID NOT INVESTIGATE CASES 0174, 1115, 1195, 1241, 1326, 1761, AND ONE UNCORRELATED CASE. THE RIT INVESTIGATED CASE 1115 INSTEAD OF IE2.)
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: FOUR (4).
4. RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT): TEN (10) CASES SCHEDULED, NINE (9) INVESTIGATED.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: FOUR (4) (0372, 0453, 0678, AND 1820).
 - B. CASES: SEVEN (7) (SRT CASE DATA, DATA, DATA, DATA, AND 1810. CASE DATA WAS ORIGINALLY ON IE2'S INVESTIGATION SCHEDULE; THE RIT INVESTIGATED THIS CASE INSTEAD OF IE2. THE RIT DID NOT INVESTIGATE SRT CASE 0135 AND SRT CASE DATA)
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: TWO (2).
5. RECOVERY ELEMENT ONE (RE1): ONE (1) CASE.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 0633).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
6. RECOVERY ELEMENT TWO (RE2): ONE (1) CASE.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE DATA).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
7. RECOVERY ELEMENT THREE (RE3): ONE (1) CASE.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE 1105).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: ONE (1).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
8. RECOVERY ELEMENT FOUR (RE4): TWO (2) CASES.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: TWO (2) (CASES 1372 AND DATA).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASE: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
9. RECOVERY ELEMENT FIVE (RE5): ONE (1) CASE.
- A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (CASE DATA).

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- C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
- D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
- E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
- F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: ONE (1) (CASE 0171).
- 10. RECOVERY ELEMENT SIX (RE6): TWO (2) CASES.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: TWO (2) (CASES 1115 AND 1603).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: TWO (2).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 11. SPECIAL RECOVERY ELEMENT: ONE (1) CASE.
 - A. PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - B. CASES: ONE (1) (SRT CASE 1042).
 - C. OTHER COUNTRY PRIORITY CASES: NONE (0).
 - D. OTHER COUNTRY CASES: NONE (0).
 - E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REPORTS: NONE (0).
 - F. INVESTIGATED FOR SURVEY: NONE (0).
- 12. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS.
 - A. THE 41ST JFA PROVED HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. OPERATING IN THE CENTRAL REGION, TEAMS TO INCLUDE THE RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION TEAM, COMPLETED EIGHT RECOVERIES AND 47 INVESTIGATIONS IN A SAFE AND EFFICIENT MANNER. ONE RECOVERY SITE, CASE 1209 IN NGHE AN PROVINCE, NEEDS AN ADDITIONAL JFA TO COMPLETE. THE TEAM CLOSED THE WORK SITE BUT NOT THE PROJECT AREA. RE4 EXTENDED IN COUNTRY UNTIL 6 AUGUST 1996, TO COMPLETE THE EXCAVATION OF THE SITE ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 1978. THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL TEAMS PROVED OUTSTANDING. AS IN THE PAST, THE SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES ASSIGNED TO THE 41ST JFA PROVED TO BE A CREDIT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES AND THE JOINT TASK FORCE. THEY LEFT THE VIETNAMESE WITH A POSITIVE IMPRESSION OF AMERICA AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY.
 - B. COMMUNICATIONS: DURING THIS JFA WE EMPLOYED INMARSAT, SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, TO BACK-UP HF COMMUNICATIONS TO FOUR RECOVERY TEAMS IN REMOTE AREAS. WITH FIVE OF SEVEN RECOVERY TEAMS IN REMOTE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS, INMARSAT PROVED A VALUABLE ASSET. WE REQUESTED THE VNOSMP COORDINATE FOR SUFFICIENT INMARSAT SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT EACH RECOVERY AND INVESTIGATION TEAM. MARINE COMMUNICATORS, TRAINED IN FIELD EXPEDIENT COMMUNICATIONS, REMAIN AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT TO SUCCESSFUL HF COMMUNICATIONS.
 - C. VIETNAMESE ADVANCE WORK. INVESTIGATION TEAMS IN THUA THEIN-HUE, QUANG NAM-DA NANG, AND QUANG TRI PROVINCES EXPERIENCED COORDINATION AND ADVANCE WORK PROBLEMS. WITNESSES WERE UNAVAILABLE AND SITES WERE NOT PREPARED AS EXPECTED PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE INVESTIGATION TEAMS. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, DISTRICT OFFICIALS WERE GIVEN ONLY A FEW DAYS NOTICE TO FIND A WITNESS PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

SUBJ/SUMMARY REPORT OF 41ST JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM, 5 JULY RMKS/

OF THE TEAMS. RECOVERY TEAMS REQUIRING BASE CAMPS AND LANDING ZONES

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COMPLETED PRIOR TO THEIR ARRIVAL FOUND THEM TOO FAR AWAY FROM THEIR WORK SITES OR NOT COMPLETED BY THE TIME REQUIRED. THESE ISSUES CAUSED DELAYS IN STARTING THE EXCAVATIONS. ONE VNOSMP COUNTERPART, FOR IE2, WAS A CONSISTENT OBSTACLE TO A SMOOTHLY COORDINATED AND PREPARED OPERATION. HE ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE HIGHER COMPENSATION AND ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE PLANS AT THE LAST MINUTE TO FORCE MORE COMPENSATION BE PAID. EXCEPT FOR COMMENTS LISTED ABOVE VIETNAMESE COOPERATION REMAINED EXCELLENT. ESPECIALLY WITH THE RIT, COOPERATION ALLOWED TEAMS TO MOVE TO ALTERNATE RECOVERY SITES IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER AND TO FOLLOW DEVELOPING LEADS ACROSS PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT BOUNDARIES.

D. WEATHER BECAME A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR TOWARD THE END OF THE JFA. ESPECIALLY IN THE MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS WHERE RECOVERY TEAMS WERE FORCED TO RELY ON HELICOPTER OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT, WEATHER EFFECTS WERE NOT AS EXPECTED FROM THE OPERATIONS ORDER AND OTHER HISTORICAL DATA. DURING THIS JFA, THREE TROPICAL STORMS AFFECTED OPERATIONS. IT APPEARS THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE HISTORICAL WEATHER DATA IS DEVELOPED FROM COASTAL AIR FACILITIES. IF OPERATIONS ARE PLANNED IN THE MORE REMOTE, MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS OF WESTERN VIETNAM, WE WILL NEED TO ADJUST OUR METEOROLOGICAL DATA (CURRENTLY BASED ON COASTAL CONDITIONS) TO REFLECT CONDITIONS IN THOSE AREAS WHERE ACTUAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS WILL OCCUR. WE MUST EVALUATE FUTURE PLANNED FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN THE CENTRAL MOUNTAINS, IF THEY ARE PLANNED AFTER THE MIDDLE OF JULY.

E. OPERATIONS CLOSE TO THE LAO/CAMBODIAN BORDER. THREE CASES WERE NOT INVESTIGATED ON THE 41ST JFA BECAUSE OF VIETNAMESE APPREHENSION IN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS CLOSE TO THE LAO BORDER. DIFFERENT THAN TRI-LATERAL OPERATIONS, THESE CASES WERE CLEARLY WITHIN THE VIETNAMESE BORDER ALTHOUGH WITHIN 5 KM OF THE BORDER. WE WILL PLAN AND EXECUTE FUTURE INVESTIGATIONS IN AREAS CLOSE TO THE LAO AND CAMBODIAN BORDERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE JFA AND MAKE THESE A POINT OF EMPHASIS AT PROVINCIAL COORDINATION MEETINGS.//
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----- END OF MESSAGE TEXT -----

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TAB 5

SRT CASES - QUICK REFERENCE

98 Individuals associated with 84 Cases

0021-1-01	VERSACE	0689-1-01	DELONG
0024-1-01	RORABACK	0692-0-01	RICH
0037-0-01	GRAINGER	0717-0-02	ROCKETT
0047-1-01	TADIOS	0736-1-01	SWANSON
0048-1-01	PARKS	0778-0-02	PACKARD
0049-1-01	BENNETT	0782-1-01	HYNDS
0050-1-01	COOK	0853-0-01	APPLEBY
0052-0-01	HERTZ	0859-0-02	HARDY
0053-1-01	DICKSON	0887-1-01	KNAPP
0086-1-01	WALKER	0904-1-02	COOK
0088-0-01	LYNN	0923-0-01	MARTIN
0099-1-01	SCHUMANN	0937-1-01	GRZYB
0105-0-01	LINDSEY	0951-1-01	BURNS
0106-1-01	EISENBRAUN	0996-0-02	WALLACE
0143-0-01	MOSSMAN	1001-0-01	KIMSEY
0175-0-01	WORCESTER	1017-1-01	BLOOD
0180-2-01	ADAMS	1018-1-01	OLSEN
0180-2-02	DUSING	1042-0-01	HAMMOND
0180-2-03	MOORE	1049-0-01	ELLIOT
0195-0-01	DOUGLAS	1075-0-01	MITCHELL
0195-0-02	PIRKER	1079-0-01	OLDS
0195-0-03	MILLER	1091-0-01	HUBBS
0195-0-04	VISCONTI	1093-1-01	RAY
0200-0-01	REITMANN	1156-0-01	AVERY
0201-0-01	ROBERTS	1181-1-01	GIST
0202-0-01	AUSTIN	1236-0-01	PARISH
0202-0-02	LOGAN	1248-2-01	HICKS
0215-2-02	NORDAHL	1250-0-01	MCELHANON
0220-0-01	CARTWRIGHT	1250-0-02	OVERLOCK
0220-0-02	GOLD	1260-1-01	FERGUSON
0251-0-01	HOPPS	1277-1-01	SHARK
0259-0-01	WOLOSZYK	1329-1-02	MORRISON
0279-0-01	DAVIS	1334-0-01	EVANS
0279-0-02	MCPHERSON	1334-0-02	BERRY
0301-0-01	MAPE	1375-2-01	KALIL
0307-0-01	ADAMS	1399-1-01	SMITH
0322-0-01	BRUCH	1484-0-01	FLANIGAN
0335-0-01	BAILEY	1610-3-05	YOUNG
0338-0-01	KING	1737-1-01	SALLEY
0391-0-01	WILKINS	1842-0-02	MCDONALD
0407-1-01	BOSSIO	1843-1-01	WILES
0407-1-03	HOSKINSON	1870-0-02	SEUELL
0407-1-05	DI TOMMASO	1898-0-01	HUARD
0408-0-01	CAMERON	1898-0-02	ODONNELL
0435-1-01	MILIKIN	1910-0-01	PITZEN
0507-0-01	JOHNSON	1910-0-02	PENDER
0529-1-01	NIEHOUSE	1934-1-01	ANDERSON
0591-0-04	WOOD	1973-0-02	FORRESTER
0621-0-01	FREDERICK	9951	WEATHERMAN

TAB 6

Individuals Originally on the Special Remains List Who Have Been Returned and Identified

Unilateral Repatriations

Refno 0037	Grainger	Returned May 1966*
Refno 0220	Cartwright	Returned May 1994
Refno 0220	Gold	Returned May 1994
Refno 1079	Olds	Returned 1988 Identified August 1996

Joint Team Recoveries

Refno 0853	Appleby	Returned January 1995 Identified October 1995
Refno 0951	Burns	Identified October 1994
Refno 1910	Pender	Returned October 1994 Identified March 1996
Refno 1910	Pitzen	Returned October 1994 Identified March 1996

* Unbeknown to the US Government, in 1966 the family of this civilian arranged with the Vietnamese for the recovery and repatriation of his remains. This was subsequently discovered when pursuit of the special remains cases was initiated.

TAB 7

Friday, September 06, 1996

VIETNAM PRIORITY DISCREPANCY CASES, REMAINS RETURNED

Page 1

REFNO	FULLNAME
0711	BLACKWOOD, GORDON BYRON
0439	BORTON, ROBERT CURTIS JR
0727	BUSCH, JON THOMAS
0909	CAPPELLI, CHARLES EDWARD
0928	CONDIT, DOUGLAS CRAIG
0913	DARDEAU, OSCAR MOISE JR
0761	DOVE, JACK PARIS SR
0855	FULLAM, WAYNE E
0031	GREER, ROBERT LEE
0531	GREGORY, ROBERT RAYMOND
1982	HALL, HARLEY HUBERT
0247	HANSON, ROBERT TAFT JR
0986	HORNE, STANLEY HENRY
0903	HUNEYCUTT, CHARLES J JR
1028	JOHNS, VERNON Z
0615	KARINS, JOSEPH J JR
0913	LEHNHOFF, EDWARD W
0659	POLLIN, GEORGE J
0179	POWERS, TRENT RICHARD
0611	PUTNAM, CHARLES LANCASTER
0318	REILLY, EDWARD DANIEL JR
0031	SCHRECKENGOST, FRED T
0761	SQUIRE, BOYD E
1943	TOLBERT, CLARENCE ORFIELD
0650	TUCKER, EDWIN BYRON
0107	WILLIAMSON, DON IRA
1835	YONAN, KENNETH JOSEPH

Count(FULLNAME) :

27.00

TAB 8

Friday, September 06, 1996 VIETNAM PRIORITY DISCREPANCY CASES, FATE CONFIRMED

Page 1

Refno	Name
0011	GERBER, DANIEL A
0011	MITCHELL, ARCHIE EMERSON
0011	VIETTI, ELEANOR A
0050	COOK, DONALD GILBERT
0051	DODGE, EDWARD RAY
0051	MCDONALD, KURT CASEY
0096	COMPA, JOSEPH JAMES JR
0096	CURLEE, ROBERT LEE JR
0096	HAGEN, CRAIG LOUIS
0096	HALL, WALTER LOUIS
0096	JOHNSON, BRUCE G
0096	OWENS, FRED MONROE
0096	SAEGAERT, DONALD RUSSELL
0105	LINDSEY, MARVIN NELSON
0108	BRAM, RICHARD CRAIG
0108	DINGWALL, JOHN FRANCIS
0109	GALLANT, HENRY JOSEPH
0109	TAYLOR, FRED (NMN)
0114	KOSKO, WALTER
0124	MELLOR, FREDRIC M
0158	MASSUCCI, MARTIN J
0158	SCHARF, CHARLES J
0168	MAYER, RODERICK LEWIS
0180	ADAMS, SAMUEL
0180	DUSING, CHARLES GALE
0180	MOORE, THOMAS
0213	MIMS, GEORGE I JR
0235	EGAN, JAMES THOMAS JR.
0242	BADOLATI, FRANK NEIL
0242	HODGSON, CECIL J
0242	TERRY, RONALD TERRANCE
0258	WILLS, FRANCIS DESALES
0267	COLLINS, WILLARD MARION
0267	FOSTER, ROBERT EUGENE
0304	TROMP, WILLIAM LESLIE
0322	BRUCH, DONALD WILLIAM JR
0326	MALONE, JIMMY M
0333	DEXTER, BENNIE LEE
0349	STEEN, MARTIN W
0358	HARRIS, GREGORY J
0381	GAGE, ROBERT HUGH
0439	BABULA, ROBERT LEO
0439	BODENSCHATZ, JOHN EUGEN JR
0439	CARTER, DENNIS RAY
0459	ROBERTSON, JOHN L
0641	O'GRADY, JOHN FRANCIS
0644	HAMILTON, JOHN S
0646	HASENBECK, PAUL ALFRED
0646	MANGINO, THOMAS ANGELO
0646	NIDDS, DANIEL R
0646	WINTERS, DAVID M
0677	NETHERLAND, ROGER M
0680	JEFFERSON, JAMES MILTON
0689	DELONG, JOE LYNN
0691	PATTERSON, JAMES KELLY
0715	FITZGERALD, JOSEPH E
0715	JAKOVAC, JOHN ANDREW
0715	MCGAR, BRIAN KENT
0727	APODACA, VICTOR JOE JR
0762	SCHIELE, JAMES F
0762	VANBENDEGOM, JAMES LEE
0785	BISZ, RALPH CAMPION
0804	SITTNER, RONALD NICHOLIS
0826	MOORE, HERBERT WILLIAM JR
0839	PLUMADORE, KENNETH LEO
0859	DERRICKSON, THOMAS G II
0859	HARDY, JOHN K JR
0873	CLARK, RICHARD CHAMP

Friday, September 06, 1996 VIETNAM PRIORITY DISCREPANCY CASES, FATE CONFIRMED

Page 2

Refno	Name
0903	MORGAN, JAMES S
0904	COOK, KELLY FRANCIS
0904	CREW, JAMES ALAN
0937	GRZYB, ROBERT H
0952	INNES, ROGER B
0952	LEE, LEONARD MURRAY
0976	REHE, RICHARD RAYMOND
0976	SYKES, DERRI
0977	FISCHER, RICHARD WILLIAM
1004	DUNN, MICHAEL E
1004	EIDSMOE, NORMAN EDWARD
1010	COCHEO, RICHARD NEWELL
1017	BLOOD, HENRY F
1018	OLSEN, BETTY ANN
1035	GODWIN, SOLOMON HUGHEY
1042	HAMMOND, DENNIS WAYNE
1086	HAMM, JAMES E
1093	RAY, JAMES MICHAEL
1131	HELD, JOHN WAYNE
1234	GREILING, DAVID SCOTT
1260	FERGUSON, WALTER JR
1318	SIMPSON, JAMES EDWARD
1318	CORNTHWAITE, THOMAS GUY
1321	ERSKINE, JACK D
1327	CUTHBERT, BRADLEY GENE
1329	FRANCISCO, SAN DEWAYNE
1329	MORRISON, JOSEPH C
1375	KALIL, THOMAS E
1402	MCDONNELL, JOHN TERRENCE
1414	BOWERS, RICHARD LEE
1428	DAHILL, DOUGLAS EDWARD
1428	NEWTON, CHARLES V
1428	PREVEDEL, CHARLES F
1523	GRAF, JOHN GEORGE
1639	PEDERSON, JOE PALMER
1639	PHILLIPS, ROBERT PAUL
1639	ROZO, JAMES MILAN
1660	PLASSMEYER, BERNARD HERBER
1737	SALLEY, JAMES JR
1737	TERRILL, PHILIP B
1747	PEARCE, DALE ALLEN
1756	STROHLEIN, MADISON ALEXAND
1810	WORTH, JAMES F
1820	WALKER, BRUCE C
1843	WILES, MARVIN BENJAMIN C
1882	MCCARTY, JAMES L
1901	BROWN, WAYNE GORDON II
1934	ANDERSON, ROBERT DALE
1981	MORRIS, GEORGE WILLIAM JR
1981	PETERSON, MARK ALLEN
2044	GREENLEAF, JOSEPH G

Count(Name) : 119.00

TAB 9

24 July 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Response to Questions From Congressman Doman

Reference: Letter from Congressman Doman, dated 5 July 1996.

The following represents the answers to a specific questions posed by Congressman Doman for Warren Gray:

1) Are you satisfied that the Vietnamese have provided all records and documents concerning Americans lost in Laos?

RESPONSE: Although an action has been proposed by DoD to get the U.S., Lao and Vietnamese sides together to discuss having the Vietnamese provide documents from its archives relative to American losses in Laos, that meeting has not been held. In the meantime, the Vietnamese have not provided records or documents concerning Americans lost in Laos.

2) When you testified before this subcommittee last November you indicated that Vietnam has demonstrated knowledge concerning over 250 unaccounted Americans from Laos, but has yet to turn over additional information unilaterally. Do you still hold this view?

RESPONSE: The Vietnamese Group 559 document identified a large number of incidents that occurred in Laos involving Americans; the listing was proof that the Vietnamese had specific knowledge about incidents involving over 250 Americans, a fact that had not been previously known to U.S. analysts. The Vietnamese have not provided source documents for the Group 559 listing, or other information about the American losses in Laos.

3) Based on that answer alone, do you believe that Vietnam has demonstrated "Full faith" cooperation?

RESPONSE: Vietnamese cooperation in this matter may improve in the future if the issue is kept on the table. Until that time, any characterization relative to the extent of their cooperation towards providing information on American losses in Laos in areas under their control cannot be considered full faith.

4) Do you believe that the book has been adequately closed on the Baron 52 case with respect to the NSA messages obtained on the day that the Baron 52 aircraft was shot down? What do you recommend needs to be done to get conclusive answers concerning those NSA messages? Do you believe the Vietnamese should be approached with respect to any records they might have on this incident?

RESPONSE: A thorough review of all reporting leading up to the February 1973 loss of Baron 52 has failed to associate the NSA message with that particular incident, and that possible association can effectively be closed. What cannot be overlooked or closed is the explanation for the NSA message itself; there simply has to be a plausible explanation, and there are leads that remain to be pursued towards that end. With regard to Baron 52, the U.S. Government will not close the book on the NSA message until it has been fully explained, and all of the families associated with Baron 52 briefed. It is highly doubtful that the Vietnamese have records on this incident since there was no related entry in the Group 559 record. On the other hand, considering the fact that a Vietnamese or Lao unit may have shot the aircraft down, it would have been normal procedure for the enemy unit to report the downed aircraft, and a record maintained. The Vietnamese should be asked to search available archives for information about the loss, and the Vietnamese should be asked to review and investigate the NSA message and to provide an explanation.

5) Do you believe this incident would have been reported through their chain of command at the time the airplane was lost?

RESPONSE: As noted above, if an enemy unit shot the aircraft down, a report would have been made through the chain of command. It should also be noted that three Vietnamese officials are reported to have visited the crash site three days after the incident. Those officials probably filed a report through channels, and that report may have included an explanation for the aircraft being downed.

6) I'm asking for your personal view. If asked, would you have recommended that the burial of the back seaters of the Baron 52 should have proceeded in March 1996 before more thorough analysis was done on the NSA message?

RESPONSE: I cannot fully answer this question. To go to group burial was a policy level decision and out of my purview of analysis. I can say that analysis on the NSA message should not have affected a policy level decision to go or not to go to group burial.

7) Regarding Lima Site 85: Do you believe the Vietnamese have come clean with respect to their involvement, with captured or deceased Americans during this incident?

RESPONSE: Vietnamese input to our review and analysis regarding Lima Site 85 has been limited to one individual, Trung Muc. There are obviously a large number of additional Vietnamese military personnel who have knowledge of the incident and there may be a number of Lao personnel who also have knowledge of the incident. There should also be official Vietnamese reports relative to the incident, however, these reports have not been provided, nor have the Vietnamese

undertaken an effort to identify and make available for interview any of its personnel.

8) Do you believe that the Pathet Lao have come clean with their full knowledge of what happened at Lima Site 85?

5

RESPONSE: The Lao response has been limited to statements made by one individual, former Pathet Lao General Singkapo in 1990; however, in 1991 Singkapo recanted on his previous statements about American POWs being captured at the site. The Lao have provided no other information, and not tried to identify and make available anyone who has knowledge of the incident.

9) Are you satisfied that General Trung Muc provided credible information regarding this incident?

RESPONSE: Much of Trung Muc's information about the preparatory stage leading up to and the actual attack on Phou Pha Thi appear to be credible. On the other hand, further interviews of Trung Muc and other Vietnamese and Lao that participated in the attack, as well as further investigations are necessary before determination can be made as to his credibility. It has to be noted that despite an extensive excavation on the mountain by the U.S. side, with Trung Muc present, not a single human bone fragment was found. This fact does not necessarily impact upon Muc's credibility, but does raise serious questions about what happened to the remains of the Americans killed on Phou Pha Thi.

10) Are there reports that the Soviets airlifted material off of Lima 85 after the battle?

RESPONSE: I am not aware of any such report.

11) Based upon your years of involvement in this issue, do you believe that the governments of Vietnam and Laos could provide additional information on the fate of David Hrdlicka, a known POW? That they could provide this information tomorrow if they made the political decision to do so?

RESPONSE: The Lao Government has admitted several times that American POWs were held in the caves at Viengsay; previous intelligence reporting has confirmed that David Hrdlicka was held there after his capture in 1965. It is important to note that Viengsay was also the headquarters area for the Pathet Lao, therefore knowledge of David Hrdlicka being held in Viengsay would have included every Pathet Lao member that visited or served at the Pathet Lao Headquarters after 1965. The Lao Government has never said directly that David Hrdlicka was held at Viengsay or that he died there; one reported eyewitness, a Pathet Lao Major, was interviewed several years ago at which time he stated that "David K" had been held in the caves in 1967 when he died and was buried nearby. One Lao official stated in 1985 that several items on display in the Lao military museum in

Vientiane were associated with the American POWs who were held at Viengsay during the war. The Federal Communications Commission card of David Hrdlicka was observed on display in the museum during the early 1980's. In 1987 the Lao Government agreed to provide pictures of David Hrdlicka, however, it never did so. Should it undertake the effort to do so, the Lao Government could easily provide additional information on the fate of David Hrdlicka. Note that Vietnamese military units were also stationed in and adjacent to Viengsay, and that Vietnamese personnel served as advisors to the Lao military, therefore, a large number of Vietnamese should also have information about the fate of David Hrdlicka.

D. WARREN GRAY
Chief, Current Ops Division

TAB 10

Questions for Melinda Cooke

1. "With respect to the Comprehensive Review, do you believe that the Vietnamese have made full faith cooperation with the cases where DPMO analysts concluded that the Vietnamese could unilaterally provide information to resolve cases?"

The Comprehensive Review identified a number of cases in which analysts concluded that it was possible Vietnam could provide additional information or assistance that might help maximize accounting. These judgments were based on an understanding of available information, which in many cases was incomplete. The inherent uncertainty of such conclusions was fully recognized at the time, and these judgments were undertaken only as a means to direct future case investigation. In short, we wanted to be able to focus our requests for unilateral assistance in an efficient manner, placing priority on those cases where it seemed most likely that the Vietnamese government might be able to provide additional data or other help.

When the Vietnamese were briefed on the results of the Comprehensive Review, they indicated that they would assist us in following up on requests for unilateral assistance. In January 1996, we tested this assurance and passed the first set of unilateral requests to the Vietnamese. We continued to pass additional requests in the following months and have since begun to receive answers. This process seems to be working and is still ongoing. Based on the results that are now beginning to come in, the Vietnamese appear to be cooperating in helping us find the answers we seek.

2. Directed to Mr. Sydow.

3. "Is there any doubt in your mind, based on your years of involvement with this issue, that these records should exist somewhere in the Vietnamese Communist Party archives?"

I have been involved in this issue since 1988 and have spent considerable time analyzing the organizations responsible for handling and reporting on U.S. POWs and casualties and on the records produced by these elements. Based on that experience, I would not expect to find valuable information that would help account for missing and killed Americans among the wartime Central Committee records. I would expect those records to include general policy discussion and to touch on issues relating to U.S. POWs only on occasion and not in any systematic or detailed way. It is possible that wartime Central Committee records are located in the archives of the Vietnamese Communist Party, but I am not aware of any information that would confirm that.

4. "Based on what we have received from Russia, do you believe that these Vietnamese records could enhance our knowledge about how many Americans were captured during the war?"

It would not be fair to base my conclusions about anything in Vietnam on what we have received from Russia. The body of data acquired in Russia so far has uniformly had little

value for accounting for individuals missing in Southeast Asia. That portion which has proven accurate has told us nothing new, and some information has been demonstrably inaccurate. My answer as to what I would believe about these records based on information from Vietnam is contained above.

5. "These records have not been provided. Is that correct?"

Yes, that is correct.

6. "In your personal judgment: Does that constitute full faith cooperation by Vietnam?"

Since I would not expect records from the Central Committee to contain valuable information that would help account for missing Americans, I do not believe they are a relevant measure of cooperation by Vietnam on this issue.

TAB 11

Memorandum for the record

September 6, 1996

Dornan July 5, 1996 Query
Individual questions

Personal Statement of Gary Sydow

Q: 1)

Answer:

In the follow-up to the results of Comprehensive Review, I believe that the Vietnamese are constructively cooperating with the requests for unilaterally provided remains or information. I explained my use of the word "constructive" in hearings before your Sub-committee, and I believe it to be a synonym for "full faith." In other words, I believe the Vietnamese have so far "made full faith cooperation" on some number of those cases; the process is ongoing.

Q:2)

Answer:

Central Committee wartime records on U.S. POWs have not been provided. As I pointed out in hearing testimony and in public briefings to the families of our missing men, I do not believe that seeking such records--primarily of a policy nature--is worthwhile, or, because of the nature of policy formulation in the Democratic/Socialist Republic of Vietnam, possible. The records which aid us in accounting for our men are found in different military/governmental organizations in Vietnam. The Vietnamese have in fact unilaterally provided us records on POWs from those organizations.

Q:3)

Answer:

As noted above, I have a sincere doubt that political records maintained in the Vietnamese Communist Party (and Politburo) archives or policy records of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Central Committee from wartime that have any relevance to the POW/MIA issue, if still extant, and that is not very likely, would help to account for our missing men. There may be some policy documents which support publically stated Vietnamese government policies on this issue.

Q: 4)

Answer:

The "these records" referent of these three questions is very unclear. Personally, I believe that the "1205 document" and the "735 document" are pieces of Vietnamese political disinformation intended to influence Russian policies. I cannot prove this assertion. As a POW-MIA senior analyst, I agree fully with the U.S. Government's intelligence community analysis of those documents as totally inaccurate on the question of Americans captured during the war. Nothing else that we have so far received from Russia indicates anything on the subject question.

Q: 5)

Answer:

Yes, that is correct. "These records" have not been provided.

Q: 6)

Answer: Again, question unclear. To paraphrase, does the non-provision of documents, which I happen to believe are not relevant to accounting nor to the total numbers of POWs lost, or the non-provision of political/policy documents, which I believe are not likely to contradict public historical positions, and which through the course of six years of difficult archival research in Vietnam I have come to believe may not still exist, or exist in the organizations cited, constitute "full faith cooperation." I guess it does not so constitute. In my personal judgment, the absence of something this doubtful cannot be construed as non-cooperation, either.

TAB 12

Dr. Castle's Responses to Questions Posed by Rep. Robert Dornan in his 5 July 1996 letter to DPMO

1) Please provide information on Pathet Lao General Singkapo. Was he a top level commander during the war? If anyone would have known about POWs in northern Laos, wouldn't he have been one of these people?

RESPONSE: From its very inception in 1955, General Singkapo Sikhotchounamaly was a senior leader on the Lao People's Revolutionary Party which secretly directed the Pathet Lao movement. He was active during the war as both a top military and political operative. As a senior figure, he would have had access to the most important and sensitive information possessed by the Lao communist leadership. Any information on American POW/MIAs, in my judgment, would have been known to General Singkapo.

2) Do we have intelligence that would indicate that he had POWs under his control during the war?

RESPONSE: I am aware of a wartime report which alleged that two pilots in flight suits were held under guard at General Singkapo's home. Intelligence analysts at the time evaluated the report as probable hearsay or a fabrication. I am not aware of any other reports on this subject.

3) Let's talk about Lima Site 85 and General Singkapo: What did Singkapo tell you about the possible capture of Americans at Lima Site 85 when you first spoke to him in 1990? Do you believe that he was "senile" when he told you this, as the Lao government now claims?

RESPONSE: I interviewed General Singkapo as part of my doctoral research in Laos. I was known to General Singkapo and the other Lao officials I interviewed as a Lao scholar who was also a US Air Force officer. I told the Lao I wanted an opportunity to explain in a detailed history of the war their side of the conflict. General Singkapo accepted and I interviewed him on two occasions. My questions were aimed at learning as much as I could about the Pathet Lao and their wartime activities. Only in the context of this did I, on 21 August 1990, pose a question to him about the March 1968 attack on Phu Pha Thi. During this interview a Lao-speaking State Department officer was also present. General Singkapo stated that he did know about the incident. He said that the Pathet Lao had captured 2-3 injured Americans and turned them over to the Vietnamese. He stated that the Pathet Lao, as policy, always turned over American prisoners to the North Vietnamese so that they could be sent to Hanoi.

As soon as the general began to discuss the Americans, I stopped the interview and re-stated what he had said so that the State Department officer and I would both hear it again. We then asked if General Singkapo would be willing to be interviewed by POW/MIA experts. He quickly and pleasantly answered that he would be willing to be interviewed on this subject. I then continued with my other questions on the war.

During both of my interviews with General Singkapo he was very animated, clearly described events, and was nearly always consistent with historical records. As I have said elsewhere, he struck me as a man who was very proud of his long and active political and military life and wanted his well deserved "place in history." I had no reason at the time to believe that he was not accurately recounting events -- even though these were activities which had occurred many decades earlier.

Over the years I have interviewed many hundreds of people, both in military and academic settings. I do not believe General Singkapo was "senile." He was an excellent subject for interview, both in recollection and demeanor. I say again, he wanted to tell his story.

4) Do you believe that General Trung Muc has conveyed everything he knows regarding what happened at Lima Site 85?

RESPONSE: I believe that Lieutenant Colonel Truong Muc should be re-interviewed. Since his initial interview DPMO has developed significant new information with regard to the events at Site 85. Lieutenant Colonel Muc must be re-interviewed by a skilled debriefer who has carefully studied the entire case and Muc's initial responses.

5) Do you believe there should be documents within the Ministry of National Defense in Hanoi regarding Lima Site 85? Have they been provided to the US?

RESPONSE: I have no information regarding documents within the Ministry of Defense in Hanoi. However, in 1994 while at the Vietnamese Air Force museum in Hanoi I saw a very detailed display of the January 1968 air attack on Site 85. The display had a complete mock-up of the mountain and site, photos of the aircrew and even a gun pod from the AN-2 Colt. While the narrative at the display was inaccurate, it said the site was heavily damaged, this is a very clear example of the detailed information the North Vietnamese possessed on the air attack. Two months later, when they actually captured the site, one would logically conclude that the Vietnamese army would have been proud of the achievement. However, we are told by the Vietnamese that

there was not even a written report of this singular event. In my view, this is absolute nonsense.

6) What do you believe still needs to be provided by the Vietnamese and Laotian governments regarding Lima Site 85?

RESPONSE: Lieutenant Colonel Truong Muc must be re-interviewed by a skilled linguist/debriefer with a detailed knowledge of the attack who has also studied Muc's initial interview. I believe this will develop leads to be followed up in Vietnam. I am absolutely convinced the Vietnamese know a great deal about the loss of Site 85. Since PAVN troops captured the site and remained in control of the mountain for many years after the battle, my sense is that the Lao would have only indirect knowledge through reporting by the Pathet Lao forces that supported the assault. While they may have some direct knowledge, this was basically a Vietnamese operation. Hanoi knows what happened. Although the JTF-FA report did not mention his presence, a video tape of the Muc interview at Pha Thi obtained by DPMO shows that Colonel Pham Teo, VNOSMP, accompanied Muc throughout the interview. The colonel's presence, and what seems some subtle coaching and discussion with Muc during the interview, underscores Vietnamese sensitivity to this event.

TAB 13'

Questions for Gen. James Wold:

5. Q: *What efforts have you made to interview the alleged author of the 735 document, General Hoang Anh who is reported to be living in retirement in Hue? Have you made any effort in the past three years to try to interview him? If not, why not? (Don't let Wold off the hook on this.)*

A: The only "Hoang Anh" we are aware of is the former member of the Party Secretariat whose specialty was agriculture. His published speeches consistently dealt with agriculture. Considering his background we have no reason to believe that he was ever associated with US POW/MIAs. Further, our analysis of the 735 document is that it offers no reliable information pertaining to missing Americans. Attached is a more detailed analysis of the referenced document.

10. Q: *Have you received the original documents that compiled the 559 document, the Military Region 4 document and the Group 875 documents -- all related to Vietnamese forces in Laos and Central Vietnam?*

A: We have not received the source documents from which the so-called "559 document" was apparently prepared. Our analysts do not know if these documents are extant at this time. Generally, we have repetitively queried the Vietnamese about their documents on Laos since the inception of the archival program. Although they have reported since the early 1990s that they had difficulty in finding any of these kinds of documents, citing their specific unsuccessful efforts to do so, they ultimately did, in fact, unilaterally provide the "559 document" in September 1993. In response to our continuous queries on the subject, in January 1995, and as recently as May 1996, they have replied to the effect that they have looked for the requested documents but have been unable to locate them. We have testified to this question several times in hearings before your sub-committee.

We have received copies of a number of records from units subordinate to Military Region 4, and from other Vietnamese governmental organizations located in this jurisdiction.

Our analysts have received comprehensive access and have completely analyzed the originals of the so-called "875 documents" the Vietnamese unilaterally provided in September 1993. The documents did not offer additional information that could assist in accounting.

TAB 14

Defense Prisoner Of War/Missing In Action Office

assessment

September 14, 1993

12

**PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE 735 DOCUMENT
RECEIVED FROM THE RUSSIANS ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1993****DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION**

- The document is allegedly a report to the 20th Party Plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, identified by the document as held in December 1970 and January 1971, by "Khoang An" (English translation of a Russian transliteration of a Vietnamese name), probably Hoang Anh (in Vietnamese), identified as Secretary of the Central Committee. The document was presumably forwarded to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and has a title page bearing the name of the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).
- The material received from the Russians consists of two pages of text from a document of undetermined length (the remaining text not provided), and a title page.
- The text states that the total number of "American aviator POW's in the DRV is 735," and that the Vietnamese had only published the names of 368. According to the document, the Vietnamese were planning to release the 368 when the U.S. agreed to the withdrawal of its troops from Vietnam and the rest when the Americans actually withdrew.
- The title page consists of a header reading "General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Main Intelligence Directorate," and the title "Report of Khoang An', Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPV [Workers Party of Vietnam] at the 20th Plenum of the CC WPV [Central Committee of the Workers Party of Vietnam] at the End of December 1970 - Beginning of 1971." The title page is dated "Moscow - 1971."
- The document was located in the same archive and font as the 1205 document.

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

- Like the 1205 document, this document is inconsistent and basically inaccurate. It allegedly originated at the 20th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, but the December 1970 - beginning of 1971 dates provided for the plenum are consistent

with the 19th and not the 20th Central Committee Plenum. The 20th occurred a year later in the early spring of 1972.

- The name rendered by the Russians, "Khoang An" may possibly be Hoang Anh, a member of the Party Secretariat from 1960 through the mid-70s. His name more closely resembles the Russian interpretation than any other Secretariat member of the period. Hoang's specialization on the Secretariat was agriculture. His published speeches consistently dealt with agriculture. A report on agriculture was given at the 19th Plenum. It is not known if Hoang Anh made the report.
- The numbers "1205" and "735" cannot in any way be considered to corroborate each other. In order to have captured 1205 Americans by September 15, 1972, as purported by the 1205 document, the Vietnamese would have had to have captured far more than 735 by the dates of either the 19th or 20th party central committee plenums.
- As with the number "1205," the number "735" is insupportably high. A combination of wartime and postwar all-source reporting indicates 735 POWs could not possibly have been in Vietnamese control in late 1970-early 1971 (the time of the 19th plenum) or in early 1972 (the time of the 20th plenum).
- It is not clear whether the 735 document refers specifically to the number of captured American pilots in North Vietnam as of December 1970 and the beginning of 1971 (the dates cited in the document), or as of early 1972, the time of the Central Committee's 20th Plenum (the plenum identified in the document). The known number of captured aviators for each of these dates comprises air crewmen known to have been in prison at that time. These include those who eventually returned, those who are known to have died in prison subsequent to the dates in question (all of whose remains have since been returned), and those whose circumstances of loss suggest the possibility of capture and detention, i.e. the priority discrepancy cases.
- Our records indicate that of the 591 POWs who returned during Operation Homecoming at the end of the war, 384 were aviators captured prior to January 1, 1971. The number of those who died in captivity, but who were still alive at this time, amounts to four and those priority discrepancy cases who were aviators and were lost prior to this date number 82. This means that according to U.S. records of aviators lost, as of January 1, 1971, the Vietnamese could not have been holding more than 470.
- By January 1, 1972, 12 more aviators had been captured, for a total of 396. The number who died in captivity, but who were still alive at this time amounts to three and those priority discrepancy cases who were aviators and were lost prior to this date number 99. The numbers in this case total 498, meaning that as late as January 1972, the Vietnamese could not have been holding more than 498 American aviators.

-
- There are simply not enough Americans who conceivably could have survived their loss incidents to reach captivity to account for the numbers claimed in this document or the 1205 document.
 - Inflated POW statistics, such as are offered in the 1205 and 735 documents, should not be viewed as unique, however. Reports containing inflated statistics were common at Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee plenums where information was often disseminated for effect to support agenda items. Moreover, Vietnamese communist wartime public releases as well as postwar military histories published in Hanoi contain similar examples of exaggerated figures.
 - A survey of 1972 and 1973 press releases of the Provisional Revolutionary Government's Liberation Press Agency, for example, yielded numerous accounts where battle statistics were obviously inflated. One such account relates that in 1972 in the Central Highlands revolutionary forces destroyed "60,000 enemy troops, including over 50 U.S. advisers," and "captured 4100 men including 3 lieutenant colonels, 1 colonel, 9 majors, 20 captains and hundreds of lieutenants."
 - A four volume history of the war published in Hanoi in 1975 entitled Achievements of the People in Resistance to the U.S. to Save The Country, includes in Volume 4, reference to communist forces having "removed from combat action" over "3,555,800 enemy (including 905,457 Americans and allies)." Reference is also made to the North having shotdown "4181 modern aircraft of all types...among which were 68 B-52s and 13 F-111s," from 5 August 1964 to 17 January 1973. U.S. records, list 17 B-52s and nine F-111s lost to enemy fire during the war.
 - The number "368" is consistent with the 368 names of POWs provided on a list entitled "U.S. Pilots Captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (From August 5, 1964 to November 15, 1970)." The list, also known as the "Kennedy List," was released by Hanoi on December 22, 1970. The Vietnamese routinely passed lists of POWs either to U.S. officials directly, or to foreign officials, U.S. peace activists, and the International Red Cross. Although none of the lists were comprehensive, they were consistent with our understanding of the numbers of POWs at the time.
 - We should not be surprised to find more of these kinds of documents in the archives of the former Soviet Union. The Russian members of the Joint Commission noted that they received reports from the Vietnamese on a number of topics containing inflated figures as a matter of course. We can anticipate that more such documents will be forthcoming, and that some will possess POW numbers that fail to stand up to scrutiny.

Prepared by DPMO Research and Analysis Division

TAB 15

MILITARY REGIONS / PROVINCES IN VIETNAM (WARTIME DIVISIONS)

NORTHWEST MILITARY REGION (region redesignated as MR 2 after the war)

Kerry 12/92- Pictures Collected over the Military Region 2 Operational Area

Rothman/Doughty 8/93 - Sketch of an Aircraft in Vicinity of Va Khi Hamlet, Muong Lan Village, Song Ma on 20 Sep 65

- Sketch of U.S. Aircraft Shot Down on 3 Nov 65
- Sketch of U.S. Aircraft Downed at Hua La Village
- Sketch of U.S. Aircraft Shot Down in 1965 at Pot Noi Hamlet, Chieng Coi Village, Son La Town
- Sketch of U.S. Aircraft Downed at Tu Nang Village
- Sketch of U.S. Aircraft crashed at Team 12, Moc Chau State Farm on 12 Mar 67
- Two U.S. Pilots were buried at the Vicinity of Team 65, Moc Chau State Farm
- Confirmation of Location Where One U.S. Pilot Died

SON LA: Kerry 5-6/93 - Map depicting statistics concerning U.S. aircraft shot down in Son La Province

Rothman/Doughty 8/93 - Nghia Lo and Son La (Record of U.S. pilots who were shot down and died in Son La and Nghia Province from 1965-72)

- "U.S. Pilots Who Died in Son La Province"
- "List of U.S. Pilots Came Down in Moc Chau (District, Son La Province) From 14 Jun 65 to 27 Jun 72"

Gober 5/95 - Activity results report for Son La Province Ministry of Interior Special Information Research Team, dated 27 May 1995

- Military Region 2, Son La Province Military HQ (No. 186) - Report on number of dead Americans discovered in Son La territory from 1965-1972
- Roster of American pilots lost or killed, dated 11 Jan 89
- Sketch map of incident in Moc Chau
- Sketch map of incident in Yen Chau (Tu Nang area)
- Sketch map of incident in Thuan Chau (Chieng Sinh area)
- "The Discovery of Dead American Pilots in Son La from 1965 to 1972" - document number 168 (two dates cited on document: 22 Jul 1988 & 11 Jan 1989)

NGHIA LO:

LAI CHAU:

VIET BAC MILITARY REGION (part of region redesignated as MR 2 after the war)

CAO BANG: Gober 5/95 - Letter from Vietnamese Veterans Association, Cao Bang Province, to Huynh Van Trinh. Dated 9 May 1995.

LANG SON: Kerry 11/92 - "Lang Son Province Roster of U.S. Aviators Whose Bodies Were Torn Apart"

Gober 5/95 - Report on the results of activities of the MOI Special Information-Collecting Group in Lang Son Province, cover letter dated 20 May 1995

- Chart - addresses number of cases of missing Americans : includes column for U.S. information; column on information and results of Vietnamese investigation; and column for witnesses and burial places

BAC THAI: Kerry 5-6/93 - Map depicting U.S. aircraft shot down in Bac Thai Province

Gober 5/95 - Report on the results of activities of the MOI Special Information-Collecting Group in Bac Thai Province, cover letter dated ? May 1995

- Activity Report from the Ministry of Interior Special Research Team in Bac Thai Province. Dated 23 May 1995.

- Directive from Bac Thai Public Security Service to District and City Security Police regarding the reinspection of American pilots' graves. Attached are grave statistics from 1972. Dated 27 May 1977.

- Report from Vo Nhai District Security Police to Bac Thai Security Police Service regarding the reinspection of American Pilots' graves and noting that grave in La Lien Village was recovered and transferred to province in 1974. Dated 2 June 1977.

- Confirmation Document from Dong Hy District regarding the turnover of the remains of five American Pilots to the political office of Bach Thai Province military headquarters in January 1975. Dated 13 June 1977.

- Report to the office of the Dong Hy District Police from Cay To Hamlet, Bo Dai forest, Phuc Xuan Village regarding excavation of a grave site in 1975. Dated 9 June 1977.

- Report of grave in Cho Chu Town, Dinh Hoa District: "Report to Examine and Verify American Pilot's Grave." Attached sketch shows grave location. Dated 4 November 1972.

- Report of grave in Son Dam Town, Phu Luong District: "Report to Examine and Verify American Pilot's Grave." Attached sketch shows grave location. Dated 11 November 1972.

- Report of grave in Quyet Thang Town: "Report to Examine and Verify American Pilot's Grave." Attached sketch shows grave location. Dated 24 November 1972.

- Report of grave in Cho Moi Town, Phu Luong District: "Report to Examine and Verify American Pilot's Grave." Attached sketch shows grave location. Dated 7 November 1972.

- Report of grave in My Phuong Town, Cho Ra District: "Report to Examine and Verify American Pilot's Grave." Attached sketch shows grave location. Dated 7 November 1972.

- Report of grave in Bai Quan-Y Hamlet, Khe Mo Town, Dong Hy District: "Report to Examine and Verify American Pilot's Grave." Attached sketch shows grave location. Dated 10 November 1972.

- Report of grave in Khe Mo Town, Dong Hy District: "Report to Examine and Verify American Pilot's Grave." Attached sketch shows grave location. Dated 22 November 1972.

- Report from Village Police Department of Binh Ly regarding the death of a pilot in the forest between Yen The and Ha Bac and the subsequent loss of the remains which had not been buried. Dated 7 November 1972.

- Report "Enemy Pilots' graves buried at villages in Dong Hy District." Attached sketch of grave in Dan Chu Village. Dated 13 November 1972.

VINH PHU: Rothman/Doughty 8/93 - "List of U.S. Pilots Shot Down in Vinh Phu"

Gober 5/95 - Vinh Phu Province Typewritten Report: "Report on Number of Pilots Who Died." Undated.

- Vinh Phu Province Typewritten Report: "Report on Number of Pilots Captured (From September 1966 to October 1972." Undated.

- Vinh Phu Province Handwritten Report: "Report on the Number of Pilots Shot Down and Captured in Vinh Phu from 1964 to October 1972." Dated 11 November 1972.

- Vinh Phu Province Handwritten Report: "Record of American Pilots Who Died in Vinh Phu." Undated.

- Sketch of Grave Site of "Eiamonds, Tephn" (Diamond, Stephen) in Tam Canh? Village, Binh Xuyen District. Undated.

YEN BAI: Gober 5/95 - Yen Bai Province Report: "Roster of U.S. Aircraft Pilots Who Died in Yen Bai Province. Undated (list appears to have been prepared in 1990's).

TUYEN QUANG: - Newspaper Article: "Mountainous Forests of Tuyen Quang Destroy Americans" Handwritten date, 5 August 1966.

HA GIANG:

LAO CAI:

PHU THO:

NORTHEAST MILITARY REGION

QUANG NINH: Kerry 12/92 - "Record of Aircraft Downed by the Self-Defense Forces by Year for Years 1965 - 1972"

- List of American Pilots Killed and Their Burial Points in Quang Ninh Province from 1964-66 and 1972.

Kerry 5-6/93 - Report of the shooting down of U.S. aircraft by the people and military of Ngoc Vung Village, 26 Dec 1972

Gober 5/95 - Results of activities of the Ministry of Interior's Special Information-Collecting Group in Quang Ninh Province, cover letter dated 18 May 95

- Roster of pilots killed in Quang Ninh (4 pages)

- Report - The clear situation of the American pilots that were shot down and died in Quang Ninh Province, report # 1094 (4 pages)

- Report - The situation and mission already carried out concerning the pilots gravesites, report # 112 (4 pages)

- Sketch: Grave of pilot on Vay Bo Island in Tieu Harbour (2 pages)

- Sketch of pilot grave in Bach Dan forest (3 pages)

- Sketch of grave in Trai Sau hamlet, An Sinh village (2 pages)

- Sketch of pilot's grave in Da Cong, Uong Bi (possible - copy difficult to read) (3 pages)

- Sketch of pilot's gravesite in Thuong Thong hamlet (2 pages)

- Sketch of pilot burial site in Cam Fa district and list of material evidence (2 pages)

- Sketch : pilot gravesite at Po Hang hamlet, Binh Xa village, Dinh Lap (2 pages)

- Diagram of 2 pilot burials at Khe Tau , Thau, Tung hamlet, Duong Hoa village (2 pages)

- List of pilots, crashsites and burial sites - document title is illegible (7 pages)

- Quang Ninh Military Command - Number 1065/TC (list of crashsites and burial sites) (6 pages)

HAIPHONG: Kerry 11/92 - HQ 350th Air Defense Division. List of Aircraft Shootdowns (During 1965-68 in Haiphong)

- Haiphong Military HQ "Record of American Aircraft Shot Down in Haiphong Province During the Three Years 1965-67."

Gober 5/95 - Report on the results of activities of the MOI Special Information-Collecting Group in Hai Phong city, cover letter dated 16 May 1995 (3 pages)

- List of dead U.S. pilots shot down in Hai Phong from 1965 to 1972, dated 16 May 1995 (6 pages)

- List of American pilots who were captured in Hai Phong (3 pages)

- Five pictures - pilot's identification cards, and pictures of dead pilots (3 pages)

MILITARY REGION 3, NORTH

HA BAC: Kerry 12/92 - Ha Bac Province Military Command Combat Chronology (of Air Attacks in the Province)

Gober 5/95 - Report on the results of activities of the MOI Special Information-Collecting Group in Ha Bac Province, cover letter dated 20 May 1995

- Report by Ministry of Public Security of Ha Bac Province on the number of enemy pilots killed over Ha Bac territory. Dated 17 November 1972.

- Statistical summary of pilots and aircraft downed in Ha Bac. Undated.

- Sketch of grave site of pilot downed in Dien Loc Hamlet. Undated.

- Sketch of grave site of pilot downed on 24 April 1966 in Hoang Thanh Village.

- Sketch of grave site of pilot downed in Quy Son Village.

- Sketch of grave site of pilot downed on 21 December 1972 in Mai Dinh Village.

HAI DUONG: Kerry 11/92 - List of Johnson & Nixon Aircraft Downed in Hai Hung
(HAI HUNG)

- Province Military HQ Consolidated List of U.S. Aviators Killed in Hai Hung

Gober 5/95 - Report on the results of activities of the MOI Special Information-Collecting Group in Hai Hung Province, cover letter dated 15 May 1995

- Letter to Police Dept re: American pilots shot down in Hai Hung, dated 28 Dec 1972

- List of American Pilots who died in Hai Hung Province (listed by district)

- Sketch of grave of American pilot - Eliot, Robert Malcolm - in Ngoc Lam hamlet, Tan Ky village, Tu Ky district
- "Gravesite diagram of American bandit - Elliot, Robert - in An Binh hamlet, Dan Tien village, Khoai Chau district"
- Sketch of grave of American pilot - McGrath, William LtCol - Kim Dong village
- Sketch of grave of American pilot - Ruswanx (sic?), Thomas Edward - in Nam Sach village
- Sketch of grave of American pilot - Harry Blackburn - in Cam Giang
- Sketch of grave of pilot - Bonling (sic?), Roy Howard - An Quy hamlet, Nguyen Giap village, Tu Ky district
- Gravesite diagram - Craig Charles, Captain, serial # 673504 - Hai Duong town
- Gravesite diagram of two American air pirates, died 1-6-1966, in Ngoc Lam village, My Hao district
- Gravesite sketch of American air pirate, died 4-8-1967, in Lao Trung hamlet, Lien Hoa village, Kim Thanh district
- Roster of American aircraft shot down over Hai Hung from 1965-1972

THAI BINH: Kerry 5-6/93 - Report of a battle by the Tra Linh detachment, Thai Binh Province, 23 Jul 1972

Kerry 5-6/93 - Report of a shooting down of an AD-6 aircraft on 17 Nov 1965, Thai Binh

Gober 5/95 - Reporting Letter from Nguyen Minh Cat to the Administrative Commission of Vu Thu Veterans Association, Thai Binh Province and Central Association in Hanoi.

HANOI: Vessey 4/93 - Statistical data on Air Force combat, 1965-1972 [All country]

- Logbook of American prisoners in North Vietnam
[AKA "368 list" or "Blue Book"]

- Ministry of National Defense list of U.S. pilots captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (forwarded to General Vessey after he left Hanoi) [so-called Kennedy List, January 1973 495 list]

** Documents provided by LTG Quang
- Biography of LTG Tran Van Quang in Cuu Chien Binh**

- General Political Directorate - Orders for the reassignment of high ranking cadre**

- Le Duan, "Letters from the South" **

Kerry 5-6/93 - Statistics concerning U.S. military/civilians and U.S. allies captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (NVN), 1964 - 1972

- Military and Civilian and Other Country Personnel Captured in South Vietnam Who Were Released to the Other Side in North Vietnam

- A number of illnesses of U.S. POWs (on display at the Joint MIA documents center, and miscellaneous photos of other documents provided Senator Kerry in the 5-6/93 visit

HUNG YEN:

MILITARY REGION 3, SOUTH

THANH HOA: Kerry 12/92 - identified as being part of MR 3 - "Record of American Aircraft Shot Down by the Army and People of Thanh Hoa from 5 Aug 1964 to 31 Oct 65"

Gober 5/95 - Situation on American Pilot Graves in Thanh Hoa Territory (According to Thanh Hoa Province Unit Research Document dated 19-4-1973)

Roster of Americans Missing During the War in Thanh Hoa. Dated 3 July 1990 or 1991 (says 19901).

HOA BINH: Kerry 11/92 - "List of American Pilots Taken by the People and Army of Hoa Binh During the Eight Years of Fighting the Air War, 3 May 65 - 30 Dec 72"

NINH BINH: Gober 5/95 -Ninh Binh Province Public Security Service: "Reports of U.S. Pilots Killed in the Ninh Binh Area." Dated 23 October 1972.

- Sketch: Location U.S. pilot captured. Khanh Ninh Village, Yen Khanh District. Undated.

- Sketch: Location of U.S. pilot captured. Khanh Loi/Khanh Tien Village, Yen Khanh District. Undated.

- Sketch: Location of U.S. pilot captured, 1200 hours 6 November 1965. Dong Giao farming Commune, Yen Mo District. Undated.

- Sketch: Location of U.S. pilot, died in crash, 1965. Van Phuong Village, Hoang Long District. Undated.

- 3 Sketches: Location of U.S. pilot, died in crash, 30 September 1965. Khanh Ninh Village, Tam Diep District. Undated.

- 2 Sketches of graves for a U.S. pilot (sketches were together when turned over, unclear if they pertain to same incident) : sketch of grave and wreckage

near Yen Bon village and sketch of grave in vicinity of Kinh Yeu Dong Water Canal and Co Giai mountain

- Sketch: location of U.S. pilot, died in crash, 0530 hours November 1967. Gia Hung Village, Gia Vien District. Dated 25 October 1972.

- Sketch: location of U.S. pilot, died in crash, 13 August 1965. Gia Lam Village. Gia Vien District. Dated 28 October 1972.

- Sketch: location of U.S. pilot, died in crash, 10 September 1972. Dong Giao State Farm, Hang Nuoc Village. Undated.

HA TAY: Kerry 12/92 - "Record of U.S. Aircraft Downed in Ha Tay Province from 1965-1967"

Kerry 5-6/93 - Report of a battle at Cau Gie on 6 Oct 1972

Gober 5/95 - Record from Ha Tay Province public security office of the number of aircraft shot down and the number of pilots who died in the province

- Record of downed aircraft and graves in Ha Tay Province, dated 25 Jan 73 (2 lists/3 pages)

NAM HA: Kerry 12/92 - "Record of U.S. Aircraft Downed or Hit During the Two Periods of
(HA NAM NINH) Bombardment in Ha Nam Ninh from 1965 to 1972"

Kerry 5-6/93 - Summary of a battle on 23 May 1972 by the 6th Battalion, Nam Dinh City

Kerry 5-6/93 - Summary of a battle on 11 Jun 1972 by the 6th Battalion, Nam Dinh City

MILITARY REGION 4

Vessey 2/92 - Summary Shootdown Record of American Aircraft Losses in Military Region 4 (prepared by MR4 Enemy Proselytizing Office)

NGHE AN: Kerry 12/92 - "Register of U.S. Graves in Nghe An Province"
(NGHE TINH)

QUANG BINH - "[Record of Aircraft Downed in] Quang Ninh District"
- "[Register of U.S. Pilot's Graves in] Quang Binh Province"

Gober 5/95 - Report of the Ministry of Public Security for Quang Binh Province, dated 16 May 1973.

- List of American Pilots Shot Down and Killed in Quang Binh. Handwritten.

HA TINH:

TRI THIEN HUE MILITARY REGION (B4)

Kerry 5-6/93 - Roster of U.S. POWs captured in Tri-Thien-Hue

THUA THIEN: Gober 5/95 - Letter from Veterans Association of Thua Thien Province. Dated 13 May 1995

MILITARY REGION 5 (B1)

QUANG NAM: Vessey 4/93 - Sketches of seven grave sites of Americans and foreigners from districts in Quang Nam-Da Nang Province

- List of Prisoners who died and list of foreign civilians captured in the central region of Vietnam [i.e. MR5 prison camp]

- Report of death of American prisoner Frederick J. Burns on 2 Jan 68

QUANG NGAI: Kerry 12/92 - History of the War in Quang Ngai Province, 1945-1975

QUANG DA:

PHU YEN:

KHANH HOA:

B3 FRONT

GIA LAI: CODEL 5/95 - Letter dated 25 Jul 1994 from Central Executive Committee, Veterans Association of Vietnam(VAV) to VAV Chapter in Gia Lai Province

KONTUM: - Letter dated 25 Jul 1994 from Central Executive Committee, Veterans Association of Vietnam(VAV) to VAV Chapter in Kon Tum Province

DAC LAC:

CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (MILITARY REGIONS 6,7,8,9,10, AND SAIGON-GIADINH SPECIAL ZONE) (B2 FRONT)

Vessey 4/93 - Listing of American prisoners that died in captivity, with statistical summary [source document for 1973 Provisional Revolutionary Government Died-In-Captivity List]

DONG NAI CODEL 5/95- Letter dated 25 Jul 1994 from Central Executive Committee, Veterans Association of Vietnam(VAV) to VAV Chapter in Dong Nai Province

TAY NINH - Letter dated 25 Jul 1994 from Central Executive Committee, Veterans Association of Vietnam(VAV) to VAV Chapter in Tay Ninh Province

TAB 16

Personal Responses to Congressman Dornan's Hearing Questions

Per: attached questionnaire

7/11/96

Quote: Questions for Defense POW/MIA Office analysts Sydow, Cooke and Gray:

Personal statement of C. Gary Sydow

Question:

1) Regarding the statistical summary ... "A Zero-based Comprehensive Review..."?

Question:

a) Did you, as a senior POW/MIA analyst...?

Answer:

a) As the principal manager of the analytic effort that went into the comprehensive review, I provided some of its concepts and themes and supervised the analysts who conducted the analysis and wrote up the results. Thus, while I did oversee the writing of analytic results which were later incorporated in "A Zero-based Comprehensive Review," I did very little of the writing. All of those results were subsumed into the Review.

I did, however, make several small edits to the final report the purpose of which was to ascertain that the language used or the inference drawn in the so-called "statistical summary" was consonant with the analysis on which it was based. One example was an edit to render parallel the depiction of the relative knowledgeability gained over the years in the reported categories of wartime and postwar collection by the U.S. Government, data turned over by Indochina countries unilaterally, and information uncovered through joint investigations in Indochina; as a result, the summary report after my edit now depicts the statistics explicitly: 20%, 23% and 38%, respectively. I also offered sentences or data compilations which I thought illustrated important analytic points to be made in the summary. Another example is the structure and forms of the data tables found in the text. I do not now recall all the sentences and edits offered, but generally they were both very small in number and fairly insignificant.

Apart from these and other small edits that I made at the time, the overriding implication of my answer here is that I deem the remainder of the text of the statistical summary to be consistent with the written analysis completed on July 21, 1995.

Question:

b) In particular, did you write....?

Answer:

b) I did not write the statement cited. I do not know with certainty who specifically did author it, but I have previously heard similar statements offered by various speakers/writers in policy fora, discussions and documents.

Question:

c) Do you believe that Vietnam can provide...?

Answer:

c) Yes. I believe Vietnam can provide access to additional such information, and I, as well as my colleagues here at DPMO, work aggressively to exploit opportunities in pursuit of it.

Question:

d) The summary also states, "We now judge...?"

Answer:

d) No, I did not write it. I do not know, nor have I been able to ascertain, if others of "us" (i.e. Gray, Cooke or other DPMO person) wrote it. Thus, I do not know who specifically did write it. I happen to agree with it, especially the word "automatically."

Question:

2) Each of you participated...?

Answer:

2) I did participate in, and in fact, coordinate, supervise and manage the analytic resources that produced the comprehensive review.

As for the earlier studies, I also participated in the initial formulation of concepts and contributed to the following compilation of the data in the 1987 Special National Intelligence Estimate(SNIE) on POW-MIA. I participated in, contributed to, provided the concept for, led, supervised and/or briefed various other Vietnam Branch, Special Office for POW-MIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, efforts from January 1985 onward. However, the three studies below appear to be the foci of the follow-on questions. I participated indirectly in each of these three studies in support and to a varying degree, but my contribution was relatively minor.

a) the DIA/PW-MIA 1990 Accountability Study. First, because of duties elsewhere, I participated very little in this study. I provided conceptual and intelligence support to the analysts conducting it,

principally on source interpretation. I was aware of the study approach and the results gained.

b) the 1990/91 Remains Storage Briefing for U.S. policymakers. I did not participate in the analysis for nor the formulation of the briefing, some part of which was based on the study above. However, after its publication, I was assigned on occasion to brief the conclusions and supporting cultural/political background jointly with Ms. Cooke, and was on less frequent occasion asked to brief the totality alone.

c) the Remains Storage Briefing of the Vietnamese. I was involved in the discussion, conception and coordination for this briefing, and oversaw its writing, but was not directly involved in its writing or presentation in May 1992.

"Those reports," presumably the study and briefings cited above, but principally the remains storage briefing, provided estimates, or expert guesses, of the numbers of sets of remains which the Vietnamese might have held at some unidentified earlier time and could subsequent to that time turn over. The study and the briefings never "found" an absolute number that could be immediately turned over at a specific and appointed time per se; the implied timing was imprecisely "in the 80s." Rather, in general, these findings reported data inferences (drawn in 1990 just after the beginning of the joint investigations) in the form of estimates. And in fact, stored remains were being turned over as these estimates were being discussed.

All of these studies were predicated on the assumption that if Vietnamese wartime and postwar retrieval and storage processes proceeded as they were expected to do (without any or little direct observation of those processes), one could make an "educated" estimate of the number of remains possibly available for turnover by Vietnam. These studies/briefs all examined, clarified and reported an essential insight at the time: the estimated numbers of sets of remains expected in the SNIE (from intelligence, "macro" indicators of Vietnam's national capability) seemed to match the expected numbers of remains presumed recoverable but not yet provided described by the data of the Accountability Study (number totals of "micro" case by case recoverability indicators). Both expectations assumed a high rate of recovery by the Vietnamese. The "macro", whole set and statistical nature of the resultant findings could not then, nor now, be applied to individual cases. In hindsight, these findings were very remote from what actually happened on the ground in specific wartime incidents and follow-ups, as more closely observed in Vietnam over the last eight years.

For its part, the recent Comprehensive Review worked from the bottom up from just those detail-based aspects of individual cases alluded to above. It then went on to categorize, compile and find the total numbers of specific and individual case data that held some particular characteristic in common, such as its investigative status. The resultant

generalizations were then summaries of individual judgments (made of course by analysts who had all of the above studies in mind when they made their judgments) on groups of individual cases. While this approach enables some amount of generalization, inferences drawn from this tend to be more restrictive because of the limiting nature of the specific data characteristics of the evidence.

We now are in the process of comparing whether the differing macro and micro approaches on the singular issue of remains storage will arrive at the same results. .

Other Indochinese governments, and the means of turnover, whether unilaterally, jointly or privately, were not comprehensively addressed.

Question:

3) Did the administration give you any criteria...?

Answer:

3) The guidance provided to me was that the review must: a) "cover all information held by the U.S. Government"; b) "deal with all (and only with) unaccounted for personnel in Vietnam from the war in Indochina"; c) "lead to accounting for those personnel"; (These three criteria were principally adopted from the parallel legislation) and, d) make certain that the analysts had complete freedom to do their work. Thus, I and the analysts of the Southeast Asia Division, Defense POW-MIA Office, who conducted the review were given complete freedom in the preparation of the analysis and the content of materials for examination.

Question:

4) How did the criteria used....?

Answer:

4) The principal and consistent singular purpose for all three sets of "studies", in 1987, 1990/91 and 1994/95, was the same: to facilitate and improve the pursuit of the fullest possible accounting for military and civilian personnel missing and killed in the war in Indochina. There were some distinguishing differences: the level of specificity of the data considered, the study objectives, and the analytic frameworks for the studies. In each of the studies the aspects of difference were all of lesser importance than that they supported and contributed to our overriding national purpose.

The first distinguishing criterion, as noted above, would be the level of specificity or "grossness" of the data used for the analytic work. In the 1987 SNIE the data were the collected intelligence reports, studies, . data and previous analyses, assessments and estimates of the data and the intelligence, produced up to the period of late 1986, or thereabouts

(certainly prior to our entrance into regular field operations in Vietnam). These "data" were very general, and in a sense, perceived in national and bilateral terms. The 1990/91 study and briefings were also macro in the same sense, but the data which contributed to the conclusions were specific, collated POW-MIA casualty related recoverability data, amassed, counted and analyzed. Although we had conducted several periodic investigations in Vietnam from September 1988 to that time, we relied very little on specific data recently learned from the field to season the macro conclusions drawn. In the natural course of events the 1994/95 study started from a more detailed level of specificity, taking comprehensive note of all the details we had learned we had learned on each of the 2202 cases (all cases unaccounted for at the start of the Comprehensive Review) that might be somehow construed to gain us further information or remains.

The objectives of the studies were another difference. The SNIE was intended to place the POW-MIA issue in a national policy and bilateral relationship (with Vietnam) context, for policy making discussion. The 1990/91 studies were aimed at making more effective our incipient accounting efforts in Indochina. The 1994/95 review was aimed at making the next step in accounting in each individual's case the most direct step toward accounting, given all the information we had to support that step.

The last distinction is the general framework or context through which we viewed the situation on the ground. In each period the authors had a different set of assumed constraints based upon their generally accepted view of the philosophy, objectives and capabilities of the other side during that period. For example, when the mortician is viewed through the "1987 eyeglass" that Vietnam only turns over remains for apparent policy goals, the thinking in the SNIE results; when the mortician's specific estimates (just, estimates), and the recoverability expectations are seen through the 1990 magnifying glass of U.S. accountability expectations, the DIA estimates result. And finally, when vast amounts of knowledgeability are seen through the microscope of repeated and intensive U.S. investigative and recovery efforts on individual cases, you have the 1994/95 Review. Each of these are certainly correct and appropriate for their time.

Question:

5) How is(sic) the differences in criteria....?

Answer:

5) Two examples show how the differing criteria are evident in the conclusions found, in these cases the criterion differing is the level of specificity. The macro types of study described above provided estimates (of, for example, sets of stored remains) with an explicit range of

uncertainty, e.g. 200-220, which range in itself demonstrates that not only is the estimated number not an absolute fixed number, but that the whole estimative process is to some extent uncertain. The shortcoming of this approach at the micro level is that one could not estimate if a particular individual's set of remains had been stored!

A contrasting example from the 1990 period, also macro in the sense that it dealt with Vietnamese national purposes and policy, but micro in the sense that it would (and did) identify 196 specific and named individuals in their wartime situation who were considered Last Known Alive during wartime in Vietnam.

Macro studies tend to result in sets of expectations, or technically, estimates. Micro studies gives us concrete and detailed lists of individuals according to the criterion set, but tend also to include other varying characteristics which must be dealt with in understanding the set.

Question:

a) Using the macro criteria, such as Vietnam's system....?

Answer:

a) One of the positive accomplishments of the comprehensive review is that the macro criteria that are cited in this question were part of the framework of the review with which each analyst prefaced his or her analytic approach to and made his or her judgment on a case. As the report pointed out their review did identify some 464 individuals where one of the host Indochina government can provide remains, records, witnesses or other assistance as the next best and a principal step. One cannot say however that those Comprehensive Review - Next Step, micro-type expectations can be unilaterally met by the Vietnamese, or that the provision of any record or witness will necessarily lead to a full accounting for that case.

Question:

6) Based on our review of some of the individual cases...?

Answer:

6) Deferred means that we have exhausted all reasonable means of further pursuit, and have not yet collected sufficient information to define a next step forward on the case. Allow me to note that "Deferred" reflects the conclusions of individual analysts, jointly coordinated and agreed to after discussion by several of his or her peers, that all reasonable steps in the joint investigative process have been exhausted. To my mind that also implies that we have examined an evidentiary track that shows all the reasonable steps forward on the case has been attempted once or several times, and that we have not found results. Thus (in response to the specific follow-on question) we have evidence from which the analyst

has concluded that reasonable Vietnamese attempts to provide witnesses or documents have been made but these have not been successful. These cases remain permanently open with a standing requirement for further information and further pursuit, whether in the intelligence arena or in the casualty investigation arena, whenever we can define a reasonable further step to take on the case.

Question:

7) Having been involved in the issue so long....?

Answer:

7) There have been, in my experience of nearly twelve years, three studies which "we" have done that some might consider "comprehensive," in three different senses of the word. This comprehensive review is the first that has been so titled, and is in fact the only comprehensive review that the Defense POW-MIA office has published.

a) In February 1990 the Special Office for POW-MIA/DIA reviewed all incidents of loss to identify those individuals whose wartime loss incident appeared to place them potentially in a captive situation. The purpose of the study was to determine which individuals "best illustrated the live prisoner issue." The ultimate result of this effort was to identify the list of the 196 priority discrepancy or Last Known Alive cases in Vietnam. We subsequently investigated these cases on a priority basis, and continue to do so on those still compelling. The results of the investigations, archival, and other information have enabled us to confirm the death of 146 of the those individuals, and we have accounted for 26 of those. This could be considered comprehensive in that we looked at potential for capture, life threatening wound, and proximity to the enemy across all cases; other aspects of the case were not considered.

b) In March-May of 1990 the Special Office for POW-MIA conducted the Accountability Study, a similarly all-cases assessment the main purpose of which was to assess the potential of U.S. Government to account for servicemembers by recovering their remains from the war in Indochina. Again it was comprehensive in that all cases were looked at, but aspects of cases such as actual host country recovery and record capability and processes were unconsidered at the time;

c) The 1994/95 Comprehensive Review in pursuit of additional knowledgeability and remains for all unaccounted for cases; this looked at all aspects of host country(s) and U.S. knowledgeability, to include all the lists which represent both historic and current U.S. expectations on each case.

Question:

8): When did each of you....?

Answer:

8) The compilation of the individual case analyses was finished on July 21, 1995.

Question:

9) We understand that the Comprehensive Review....?

Answer:

9) The report of the results was written, staffed, coordinated and prepared for congress in the ensuing four months.

Question:

10) ...Which of the documents thus far....?

Answer:

10) Clearly the so-called "MR-4 document" is the best to provide us insight in the Vietnamese accounting processes. Second would be not one document, but a group of disparate documents which include graves registration and other documents of record of U.S. losses provided by Vietnam in response to our U.S. government envoy requests in November-December of 1992. Third in importance would be the summary shootdown record of the Group 559. This was provided unilaterally by the Vietnamese in September of 1993. These and other documents have been significant in guiding U.S. accounting efforts.

Question:

11) Can you tell us the types of documents....?

Answer:

11) The documents received from the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Interior Special Research Teams in 1995 have been useful as new leads for joint operations. Most useful has primarily been wartime and immediate post-war records of graves recovery information and efforts. These documents were provided to the U.S. unilaterally.

Questions:

12-16) Question 12-16 has been directed to Mr. Gray and concerns Vietnamese records and knowledgability on Laos and the Dong Vai Prison.

Responses to "Questions for Defense POW/MIA analysts Sydow, Cooke, and Gray" by Melinda W. Cooke.

1. I wrote much of the text of this summary, but I have no recollection of writing the first statement. As far as I am aware, we have no access to information about the current intentions of the Vietnamese government beyond their stated positions that they are committed to treating this as a humanitarian issue and to cooperating to the extent they are able in helping us account for missing and killed Americans. I am personally optimistic, however, that Vietnam can provide additional information that would help maximize accounting, and that together our two governments are taking steps that will continue to uncover more such data.

The second statement, which I believe I wrote, conveys the regrettable reality that our expectations as to how much may ultimately be available must be tempered by several factors. We have learned that there was great variability in the amount of information collected by the Indochinese governments during the war and the degree to which such information survives to the present day. Moreover, the difficulty of finding what still survives, even for the Vietnamese, should not be underestimated. In many cases, the archival notations already acquired may be the only information collected at the time. Some of this information was based on oral reports or identification media that were passed up the chain of command and forwarded to higher echelons without amplifying data. In summary, we do not expect to find more information about all of our losses, and we realize that what we do hope to acquire may turn out to be of widely varying detail and utility.

2. The 1987 Special National Intelligence Estimate preceded my service in the government. I did, however, participate in later estimates that attempted to measure the degree to which the Southeast Asian governments could help maximize accounting. These earlier estimates were based on data available at the time they were created and, given the large body of evidence collected since that time, must now be considered outdated.

3. Without exception, analysts developed all criteria for the comprehensive review and prepared all case-by-case assessments with no outside guidance or interference from anyone.

4. The difference between the current study and those conducted earlier lies in the far more extensive body of information available today. This enabled analysts to undertake a case-by-case assessment of what actually took place in practice, as opposed to being forced to estimate what might have occurred based on limited sources and our general understanding of Indochinese systems.

5. Since 1992, the U.S. Government has acquired new information that affects our understanding of what happened to Americans missing or killed in Vietnam, as well as our expectations as to how many can ultimately be accounted for by the return of identifiable remains. As our comprehensive review has shown, during the course of our

in-country investigations we have learned much about what happened to specific individuals lost all over Vietnam. The Vietnamese have turned over significant wartime documents, and for the first time we have been able to interview several officials who were involved in the official Vietnamese program to recover the remains of U.S. personnel. Taken in aggregate, this new information has led us to reassess the assumptions that underlay our earlier estimates of the number of U.S. remains that the Vietnamese government might have recovered on their own. We are currently working on this new assessment and will advise you of the results as soon as they are available. I can't at this point tell you how those calculations will come out, but I can say for that we cannot sustain our belief in our earlier high estimates.

6. Cases deemed "deferred" are those for which investigative leads are currently exhausted, but there is still more that needs to be learned. In many instances, this has proved to be a temporary state, and pursuit of cases originally considered deferred has resumed as they have been relooked or new evidence has come to light.

7. I have been part of two prior reviews of cases in Indochina. Both were undertaken in 1990 but were more narrowly focused. Moreover, the amount of information available for review was far more limited.

8. I completed my analytic work in mid-July.

9. Reporting on the results of the comprehensive review underwent regular review and staffing.

10. I believe the most useful documents received from Vietnam are those prepared during wartime or in the immediate post war period. Principally these include shootdown rosters and reports on U.S. casualties and on the locations of U.S. graves.

11. In 1995 and 1996 we have received a variety of documents. Again, the most useful are those prepared during wartime or in the immediate postwar period.

24 July 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Response to Questions From Congressman Dornan

Reference: Letter from Congressman Dornan, dated 11 December 1995.

The following represents answers to specific questions posed by Congressman Dornan:

1). a). Did you, as a senior POW/MIA analyst write all or portions of the statistical summary entitled, "Zero-Based Comprehensive Review?" Please explain.

RESPONSE: I had no input to the statistical summary in question. Any and all input from the Current Operations Division was provided by the Deputy Chief of the division, USAF LTC Schiff, who also managed the analysts in Current Operations dedicated to working the review.

b). In particular, did you write the statement, "We have no evidence that information is being deliberately withheld." If you did not, who did? If you did, what was the basis for making such a statement?

RESPONSE: Since I had no input to the summary, and did not write the statement in question, I must defer to the analysts and action officers directly involved in writing the summary.

c). Do you believe that Vietnam can provide additional information (to include remains, documents or living survivors) to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans?

RESPONSE: Speaking only to the situation in Laos, and knowledgeable of the fact that a large majority of the American losses in Laos (over 80%) occurred in areas under Vietnamese control, the Vietnamese should be able to provide information that will contribute to the accounting process in Laos.

d). The summary also states, "We now judge that we can no longer automatically assume that previous archival correlations indicate additional information can be produced today." Did any of you write this statement. If so, what was the basis for this conclusion? If not, who did?

RESPONSE: In the absence of archival documents from the Lao Government in the past, the statement as written does not apply to Laos, or to holdings the Vietnamese might possess relative to Laos.

2). ...How do the findings of the Comprehensive Review differ from those of the 1987 SNIE and other postwar DIA estimates? Why?

RESPONSE: I left the POW issue in August 1987, and returned in August 1988, therefore, had no input to the SNIE.

3). Did the Administration give you any criteria to abide by in the preparation of the analysis and content of the case-by-case POW/MIA files prepared as part of the Comprehensive Review? If so, please explain.

RESPONSE: I was never given any criteria by anyone to abide by relative to the review.

4) How did the criteria used in the current study differ from those of prior studies such as the 1987 SNIE and DIA post-war reports?

RESPONSE: I cannot answer this question since I was not involved in establishing the criteria for either of the documents mentioned.

5). Question goes to criteria; does not apply to Gray.

a). Question also goes to criteria; does not apply to Gray.

6) Question relates to deferred cases and what Vietnam can do; does not relate to Laos, and therefore, does not apply to Gray.

7) Have there been other comprehensive reviews? Could you tell us how many times you have conducted such analyses?

RESPONSE: Since 1984 there have been five comprehensive reviews of the Lao and Cambodian cases, four of which I personally supervised. During the period July and August 1982, during review number four, my division analysts joined with the analysts in the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting to conduct a comprehensive review of the Lao and Cambodian cases to identify all discrepancy cases (POW at Homecoming, Last Known Alive, and Knowledgeability cases); the results of the review were published in a joint, formal message in August 1992.

8) When did each of you complete your portion of the individual case analysis?

RESPONSE: I was not involved in the individual case analysis; LTC Schiff's team finished the case analysis of the Lao and Cambodian cases well ahead of schedule.

9). Question concerns reason for delay in providing results to Congress; this question does not apply to Gray.

10) Question for Sydow and Cooke.

11). Question concerns documents received from Vietnam; does not apply to Gray.

12). What impact did the Group 559 summary and other documents have on your judgment regarding Vietnam's ability to return remains and provide relevant records on cases in Laos? Has Vietnam provided any or all of the source documents used to compile that summary? What type of related source documents do you believe that the Vietnamese should be able to provide?

RESPONSE: The Group 559 summary contained information on over 250 American losses in Laos, information that had not been previously known to DPMO analysts. The volume of the information contained in the document proved beyond any doubt that the Vietnamese were much more knowledgeable about American losses in Laos than previously known. Vietnam has never provided any of the Group 559 source documents relative to American losses in Laos. Vietnam should be able to provide field unit reports relative to the losses in Laos, especially those along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

13) We understand that 81 incidents in Laos involve 139 Americans who are considered last known alive cases. Despite U.S. Government knowledge that Vietnam controlled the areas in which roughly 90% were lost, these discrepancy cases are not usually mentioned in DoD public statements. How many of these 139 Americans were actually lost in Vietnamese controlled areas of Laos, and has Vietnam provided any records on these discrepancy cases?

RESPONSE: As mentioned above, over 80% of all American losses in Laos were in areas controlled by the Vietnamese. With regard to the discrepancy cases alone, the percentage rises to above 90% for discrepancy cases that occurred in Vietnamese controlled areas. Vietnam has not provided records on these discrepancy cases.

14). We hear in repeated testimony that Vietnamese witnesses have contributed to trilateral efforts to resolve cases, such as the Phou Pha Thi, or Lima Site 85, case in Laos. In general, how useful in obtaining accountability have the Vietnamese witnesses to incidents in Laos been? Would Vietnamese records accelerate accountability in such cases?

RESPONSE: In one excavation in Laos that involved a Vietnamese witness, remains were found during the operation; this one success makes the entire program worth the effort. In a number of cases the information from the Vietnamese witnesses has not helped; however, I think the best witnesses are yet to come; they are in the pipeline now for interview by the Lao Government, and should enter Laos by the end of calendar year 1996. It is doubtful that Vietnamese records would provide more valuable information than that from an eyewitness.

On the other hand, absent Vietnamese records, this statement may be proven wrong once records have been provided by the Vietnamese and used in the field.

15). There was a Vietnamese witness, a Mr. Trung Muc, who was allowed to go with Joint Task Force personnel to the Lima Site 85 location. Was Trung Muc a truthful witness or are there discrepancies in his testimony? Please explain.

RESPONSE: Only time and further U.S. Government investigations and interviews will prove whether Trung Muc was a truthful witness or not. Based upon the information provided by Muc, a lengthy excavation was conducted at the loss site; not one single human bone fragment was found. The discrepancy arises in this instance because Muc is reported to be one of the last persons to have observed the Americans, and he says he buried them in shallow depressions - remains should have been found. Until the U.S. Government has completed its investigation of this incident, it will be impossible to say he was or was not telling the truth about the incident and the fate of the Americans lost at the site.

16). Due to the volume of live sighting reports related to Dong Vai prison, it is important that the U.S. Government obtain the history and records of Dong Vai prison. Has the U.S. Government asked for these records? Has the Vietnamese agreed to provide them.

RESPONSE: The U.S. Government has not asked the Vietnamese for prison records relative to Dong Vai based upon previous reporting.

D. WARREN GRAY
Chief, Current Ops Division

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The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research. It also mentions the scope of the study and the limitations of the study.

The second part of the paper discusses the methodology used in the study. It mentions the data collection methods and the data analysis methods.

The third part of the paper discusses the results of the study. It mentions the findings of the study and the conclusions drawn from the study.

The fourth part of the paper discusses the implications of the study. It mentions the practical implications of the study and the theoretical implications of the study.

The fifth part of the paper discusses the future research. It mentions the areas for further research and the suggestions for future research.

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